Naval War College Review Volume 60 Article 10 Number 3 Summer
2007 Book Reviews The .SU . Naval War College
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War College: Book Reviews
BOOK REVIEWS
AN ACCESSIBLE WINDOW INTO CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT
Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, eds. The Science of Military Strategy. Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2005. 504pp. $40
This first English-language volume on published by China’s National Defense strategy by China’s People’s Liberation University in 2000, the better to under- Army (PLA) was translated by a team of stand actual PLA doctrine. The closest experts at the Academy of Military Sci- U.S. equivalent to these volumes collec- ences from the original Chinese-language tively might be Doctrine for Joint Opera- version (Zhanlüexue, 2001). Edited by tions (Joint Publication 3-0). two major generals with significant Part One surveys China’s historical ex- ability to shape PLA strategy as advisers perience and development of military to China’s powerful Central Military theory. The authors describe the cur- Commission (CMC) and Politburo rent age as an “era of sea,” in which Standing Committee, this volume un- maritime states, like their predecessors, doubtedly reflects elements of critical will employ Mahanian and other strate- policy trends in Beijing and hence mer- gies to “actively develop comprehensive its close examination by foreign re- sea power” and “expand strategic depth searchers and policy makers. Since this at sea.” Part Two offers Chinese per- book has deliberately been made acces- spectives on the laws and conduct of sible to an overseas audience, it is im- war. Chapter 9, on “Strategic Deter- portant to reflect on what message its rence,” deserves particular attention, as English-language publication may be it clearly provides a rationale for many intended to convey. elements of the PLA’s modernization The 2001 Chinese-language version is program that have been overlooked by used to educate senior PLA decision many foreign analysts. Part Three ex- makers, including those on the CMC, as amines future warfare and the implica- well as officers who may become China’s tions for China, including recent PLA future strategic planners. Now in its experience and combat guidelines. fourth printing, it can be read along Throughout the volume, the continuing with a variety of other texts, such as the relevance of the People’s War is empha- more operationally and tactically fo- sized as a foundation of Chinese mili- cused Science of Campaigns (Zhanyixue), tary strategy.
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134 NAVAL WARNaval COLLEGE War REVIEWCollege Review, Vol. 60 [2007], No. 3, Art. 10
It is this third section that will be of warfare. While this volume raises as greatest interest to Western scholars many questions as it answers, it is never- seeking insights into PLA thinking theless a welcome contribution to a vi- about China’s strategic situation. The tal field in which so little authoritative authors of this volume believe that information is available. China, both a land and a sea power, ANDREW S. ERICKSON faces multifaceted strategic opportuni- Naval War College ties and challenges. Despite its eighteen- thousand-kilometer coastline, China is currently constrained by the world’s longest island chain, centering on stra-
tegically, politically, and economically Howarth, Peter. China’s Rising Sea Power: The vital Taiwan. Taiwan is far from PLA Navy’s Submarine Challenge. New York: China’s only disputed territory, how- Frank Cass, 2006. 198pp. $125 ever: “1,000,000 square kilometers” of Peter Howarth, an Australian former maritime territory, “one ninth of diplomat and intelligence analyst, pres- China’s national land territory,” re- ents an excellent mix of strategic the- mains under contention. The authors ory, political dynamics, and tactical also identify energy supply security as detail in considering the Chinese sub- critical to China’s national develop- marine fleet. His treatment demon- ment. Their statement that the South strates a keen understanding of both China Sea possesses “rich oil reserves parts of the phrase “politico-military equivalent to that of [the] Middle East” strategy,” and it is the type of thinking conflicts with Western assessments, that Jeffrey Record of the Air War Col- however, leaving the reader wondering lege recently opined is too often miss- about the true strategic underpinnings ing in the American community. of Beijing’s claims. Indeed, the book is a pleasure to read, if The authors foresee possible threats to only because one gets to visit so many China’s “sovereignty, maritime rights, old friends in strategic theory, such as and great cause of reunification,” Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julian Corbett, threats that, should all other measures Bernard Brodie, Hervé Coutau-Begarie, fail, may necessitate a defensive (and Raoul Castex, Andre Beaufre, René therefore inherently just) war on Daveluy, Colin Gray, Carl Döenitz, and China’s “borderlines, seacoasts, and air Herbert Rosinski, as well as Mao Tse- spaces.” The resulting “high-tech local tung, Deng Xiaoping, and Sun Tzu. wars” may well require the PLA to con- Like so many others who write about front a technologically superior adver- China’s navy since the fall of the Berlin sary. Accordingly, the authors suggest Wall, Howarth is inclined to make sen- emphasizing preemption; employment sational claims on the subject, presum- of a broad spectrum of military tech- ably thereby justifying the work and nologies, including asymmetric “trump attracting attention. However, what dis- card” weapons; and integration of civil- tinguishes Howarth from so many oth- ian and military forces in missions (e.g., ers who have searched and found “guerrilla warfare on the sea”) that in- reasons to be alarmed at the conven- corporate political, economic, and legal tional naval power of China is that he
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War College: Book Reviews BOOK REVIEWS 135
tempers the sensational with frank as- of a preemptive surprise attack is part sessments of China’s limitations. of the Chinese strategic culture, he says, At the heart of this examination of Chi- but one does not have to cite the num- nese submarines, practically speaking, is ber of wars per year in which the Ming the potential showdown over Taiwan. dynasty engaged, for example, in order While Howarth notes that “China, like to support the conclusion that “the Germany, is handicapped by geogra- Pentagon has some justification in con- phy,” he points out that the defense of sidering that the risk of Beijing resort- Taiwan is equally handicapped by ing to force to try to resolve the Taiwan oceanography: its narrow and crowded issue is growing with the modernization seas are ideal for diesel submarines. His and transformation of the PRC’s mili- frankness, however, about such U.S. tary capabilities.” problems as naval drawdown, global re- Howarth is better off with his more ele- sponsibility, vulnerability of surface gant logic that submarines are designed ships to missile saturation, and the dif- for the task of concealment and sur- ficulties of operations in narrow seas prise and that surprise is a good tactic gives one new pause. when one’s forces are inferior. Eastern As an example of what is best about his and Western war planners have both work, Howarth considers not only the made use of the submarine and have tactical problems for China, Taiwan, appreciated it for the qualities for which and the United States (including the it is designed, regardless of whether exact requirements for successful sub- they were Chinese or their ancient an- marine warfare against a carrier-based cestors were contemporaries of Sun Tzu. navy) but also the proper political con- Nonetheless, it is exactly this effort to text of that potential conflict—that a blend classic strategic thinking with politically free and economically pros- current politics and tactical complexi- perous Taiwan is a dagger pointed at ties that is informative, intelligent, and the heart of the legitimacy of the Chi- provocative in this book. It is recom- nese Communist Party. Returning to mended for any library on naval affairs the intersection of tactics and strategic or Asian conflict, and good reading for judgment, Howarth includes in his final both U.S. and Chinese war planners. chapter an economical summary of the PETER J. WOOLLEY logic by which Chinese decision makers Fairleigh Dickinson University might be optimistic enough about their chances for success to initiate a conflict with Taiwan. One weakness in this confluence of pol- itics, strategy, and tactical matchups is Cole, Bernard D. Taiwan’s Security: History and that Howarth exaggerates the strategic Prospects. New York: Routledge, 2006. 254pp. influence of the great thinkers on policy. $125 His demonstration of how submarine Given the importance of the Taiwan is- warfare fits with Sun Tzu overreaches, sue for U.S. foreign and security policy suggesting as it does that submarine in East Asia, it is striking that relatively warfare fits perfectly with preformed little has been written on Taiwan’s de- Chinese strategic preferences. The logic fense reform and modernization
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136 NAVAL WARNaval COLLEGE War REVIEWCollege Review, Vol. 60 [2007], No. 3, Art. 10
programs, especially in contrast to the able to hold out until the U.S. military substantial amount of work scholars could intervene decisively. and policy analysts have produced in Cole also includes a brief discussion of recent years on Chinese military mod- the factors underlying Taiwan’s unwill- ernization and its implications for re- ingness to do more to counter China’s gional security. Bernard Cole’s Taiwan’s growing military capability. He argues, Security: History and Prospects, which first, that many officials in Taiwan be- provides a comprehensive and well lieve Chinese military threats lack cred- written assessment of recent develop- ibility and, second, that decision ments in Taiwan’s defense establish- makers in Taipei are convinced that the ment, represents an important step in United States would come to Taiwan’s filling this gap. assistance even if they turn out to have In this work, Cole—a respected China underestimated China’s willingness to scholar who served in the U.S. Navy for use force. According to Cole, the U.S. thirty years and is now professor of inter- decision to send two aircraft carrier national history at the National War battle groups to the region during the College—examines the changes cur- 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis not only rently under way in Taiwan’s armed convinced Beijing that attacking Taiwan forces and defense bureaucracy. The would likely result in American military main purpose of Cole’s thorough and intervention but also led Taipei to the well researched study is to assess same conclusion. Given the assump- changes in Taiwan’s defense posture tions that China lacks the willingness to and their implications for the island’s use force and that U.S. intervention is security. After presenting a brief history virtually assured in the unlikely event of of Taiwan’s military and an overview of a cross-strait conflict, many politicians the Chinese military threat, Cole ex- in Taiwan conclude that the island does plains that Taiwan in recent years has not really need to invest its own scarce been unwilling to increase the level of resources in defense. In all, Taiwan’s resources devoted to its own military Security makes an important contribu- capabilities. Although Taiwan is reorga- tion to scholarship and policy analysis nizing its defense bureaucracy and its by providing a readable and informative military is professional and well trained, assessment of a previously understud- the growing asymmetry in defense ied aspect of the U.S.-China-Taiwan spending between Taiwan and China is relationship. resulting in a rapid erosion of Taiwan’s MICHAEL S. CHASE long-standing qualitative edge over the Naval War College Chinese military. Indeed, Cole argues quite persuasively that the cross-strait military balance is tipping toward China as a result of Taiwan’s relatively
modest response to the growing security Asada, Sadao. From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The challenge represented by the accelera- Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States. tion of Chinese military modernization. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2006. Consequently, Taiwan cannot defend 385pp. $36.95 itself on its own and may not even be
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War College: Book Reviews BOOK REVIEWS 137
Sea power analysts surveying the “rise” of by cultivating a warrior ethos in the China commonly compare this emerging ranks. Perversely, IJN leaders disre- Asian titan to imperial Germany, whose garded key aspects of Mahanian theory, unification upset the European great- in particular the material foundations power concert ushered in after Waterloo, of sea power, as they contemplated and for good reason. Naval enthusiasts Mahanian naval warfare in the Pacific. like Kaiser Wilhelm II and Admiral From Mahan to Pearl Harbor makes an Alfred von Tirpitz, their imaginations ideal companion to David C. Evans and fired by the works of Alfred Thayer Mark R. Peattie’s Kaigun, which reviews Mahan, hurled Germany into naval the strategies, tactics, and technologies competition with Great Britain, the deployed by the IJN between the ser- dominant naval power of the day, with vice’s inception in Meiji Japan and the fateful results. References to Mahan are outbreak of World War II. Jon Tetsuro now routine among Chinese strategic Sumida’s Inventing Grand Strategy and thinkers. Will China’s Mahanians prod Teaching Command, a spirited defense of Beijing onto a similar path to sea Mahan against his detractors, would power, and will similar results ensue? make a useful supplement and counter- Along comes Sadao Asada, an emeritus point to Asada’s analysis. professor at Japan’s Doshisha Univer- Asada’s account is not impervious to sity. Asada’s masterful book From criticism. First, linking deeds with Mahan to Pearl Harbor reminds us that words and words with thoughts is no Asian maritime history also offers com- simple matter for historians. His many pelling lessons on how the rise of a new references to Japanese officers, say, sea power, in this case imperial Japan, “echoing” Mahan or acting out of can disturb a settled nautical equilib- “Mahanian navalism” invite critics to rium. In effect, the book is an intellec- quibble. The author establishes that tual history of the Imperial Japanese many Japanese mariners were reared on Navy (IJN). As the title suggests, the Mahan, but how do we know they were book traces the influence of Mahanian acting on Mahanian precepts on some theory on Japanese naval thinkers in the particular occasion if they did not say decades after The Influence of Sea Power so? Second, Mahan was prone less to upon History appeared in 1890. “stark racism” than to the clash-of- Asada attributes the IJN’s use and mis- civilizations rhetoric that dominated fin use of Mahan to a combination of fac- de siècle Americans’ views of Asia. tors—bureaucratic rivalry between the Still, these are minor faults in an in- army and the navy, groupthink within valuable work. Will China, like imperial the naval hierarchy, and an abdication Japan, succumb to Mahanian determin- of leadership by senior officials, to ism? How should America respond? name three. By the onset of World War These are questions worth pondering, II, the navy had convinced itself that and From Mahan to Pearl Harbor makes war with the United States was fated a good place to start. and that Japan could overcome Amer- ica’s overwhelming material superiority JAMES R. HOLMES Barrington, Rhode Island
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138 NAVAL WARNaval COLLEGE War REVIEWCollege Review, Vol. 60 [2007], No. 3, Art. 10
look at the mid-March 2004 mass rioting that swept through Kosovo, resulting in hundreds of civilian casualties and large- King, Iain, and Whit Mason. Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cor- scale destruction of property and, above nell Univ. Press, 2006. 228pp. $27.95 all, shattering any hope of reconciliation between Kosovo’s Albanian majority Iraq’s undiminished insurgency has cast and dwindling Serb minority. Five years an unmistakable pall over the U.S. mili- after launching Operation ALLIED FORCE tary’s nation-building mission, which to save the Albanians from the Serbs, until recently seemed a core compe- NATO troops had to defend the Serbs tency for the Department of Defense. from the Albanians, and not always with Both advocates and critics of America’s much ardor or success. efforts to bring peace, order, and good government to Baghdad agree that the King and Mason’s account is balanced aftermath of the Balkan wars of the and just, sparing no group, least of all 1990s offers examples of what was not the UN, the European Union, or NATO, done in the wake of Operation IRAQI from fair criticism as to how Kosovo FREEDOM’S epic Phase III success in has been governed since mid-1999. This spring 2003. The idea that extended is not a history text—it leaves out all U.S. military operations in Bosnia and but a limited, necessary understanding Kosovo have resulted in long-term po- of how Kosovo became so troubled by litical successes built on well executed the end of the 1990s—but rather a de- nation-building is accepted almost tailed telling of how ineffective Western without question. But is it so? political and military institutions have been at transforming Kosovo into any- Peace at Any Price poses that difficult thing resembling a law-abiding or self- question and provides a richly disturb- sustaining society. The authors spend ing series of answers that should be of considerable time detailing the depths interest to anyone concerned with the of interethnic hatreds, from the grand to ability of Western governments and or- the petty, that continue to cripple daily ganizations to bring stability to failed life in Kosovo, while refusing to spare states, even with overwhelming military Western nongovernmental organizations force at their disposal. The authors, from critiques of their naïveté and ineffec- both veterans of UN nation-building in tiveness in dealing with mutual Albanian- Kosovo, dissent from received wisdom Serb fear and loathing. in their survey of Kosovo after more than five years of NATO protection and Peace at Any Price ends with a helpful UN largesse. guide on how the international com- munity can do better the next time it is What King and Mason find in that trou- confronted with a Kosovo. King and bled, unstable, and impoverished Balkan Mason’s counsel is wise and well taken, statelet (which is legally part of Serbia ranging from how to improve war ter- but under international occupation, now mination to ensure a lasting peace, to inching painfully toward independence) how security and the rule of law must is a witches’ brew of nationalism, cor- be established before democracy can ruption, and criminality that bodes ill take root, and above all to how “bad for the future of Kosovo and surround- habits, “ including local “traditions” of ing states. The authors begin with a close
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War College: Book Reviews BOOK REVIEWS 139
banditry, criminality, and interethnic states’ political futures. These analyses violence must be altered, by force if follow Brian Loveman’s own overview necessary, if Western governments and of U.S. policies in the entire region. A organizations expect to make failed, chapter devoted to the European Union’s war-torn states into bona fide members efforts follows a state-by-state review, of the international community. and the book concludes with an exami- One only wishes that this little gem of a nation of a possible preemptive U.S. book had been published earlier. intervention in Colombia on the scale of operations currently being con- JOHN R. SCHINDLER ducted in Iraq. Naval War College However, this volume is not a resound- ing success. Loveman’s introductory chapter is a case in point. His basic ar- gument seems to be that U.S. policy,
Loveman, Brian, ed. Addicted to Failure: U.S. Secu- whether crafted by Republican or Dem- rity Policy in Latin America and the Andean Region. ocratic presidents, formed during or after New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006. 367pp. the Cold War, altruistic or operational $27.95 in nature, intentional or accidental, has It does not take exceptional analytical been consistently wrong. U.S. policy, talent to recognize that U.S. policies in Loveman argues, has for decades made the Andean region of South America matters worse for Andean states. There face severe challenges, especially those are two problems here. First, Loveman’s dealing with the war on drugs. Neither disdain for past and present U.S. actions does it take an exceptional historian to actually begins to obstruct and detract recognize that the United States has all from his central argument. Readers ex- too often paid insufficient attention to pecting to find a more academic and its regional neighbors and partners. objective analysis may question the ob- Finally, it takes no exceptional mastery jectivity of the author at the expense of of international relations to recognize the merit of his argument. The second that South America is becoming in- problem is even more serious. Loveman creasingly important to the safety, well- seeks to prove his contention with offi- being, and future prosperity of the cial U.S. reports and documents, but United States. For all these reasons, a the quotations are highly selective and clear explanation of U.S. policies in the all too often presented without context. region and evaluation of those policies’ Indeed, had an equally passionate voice track records and potential future con- argued the distaff side of Loveman’s ar- sequences are especially welcome. gument, this would have been a most interesting volume. To a degree, and despite a somewhat incendiary title, Addicted to Failure pro- Luckily, the next six chapters are differ- vides a portion of the needed under- ent. Authored by well known and re- standing. Its editor asked a rather spected scholars, they draw a compelling impressively credentialed group of ana- picture of U.S. policy in the Andean re- lysts to examine each of the countries in gion. Although all are worthy, Orlando the Andean region and the role that Perez’s evaluation of U.S.-Venezuelan U.S. policy has had in shaping those policy and Enrique Obando’s analysis
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140 NAVAL WARNaval COLLEGE War REVIEWCollege Review, Vol. 60 [2007], No. 3, Art. 10
of Peruvian-U.S. relations are the high primarily on state-to-state conflict, Carl points of the book. Obando does an es- von Clausewitz coined the notion that pecially fine job reviewing the successes war’s dominant tendencies make a and eventual failures of U.S. antidrug “paradoxical trinity,” of which one pole policies. comprises primordial violence, hatred, Addicted to Failure effectively raises sev- and enmity, a blind natural force. The eral significant issues for the reader to passions, Clausewitz wrote, “that are to mull over. Has the U.S. counterdrug be kindled in war must already be in- policy been a costly failure that has made herent in the people.” Concentrating on the rise of populist leaders such as Hugo guerrilla warfare, Mao Tse-tung fa- Chavez and Ernesto Morales easier? mously wrote that “in the relationship Does the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucion- that should exist between the people arias de Colombia (FARC) pose threats and the troops, the former may be lik- to the United States beyond those asso- ened to water and the latter to the fish ciated with drug trafficking? If the cur- that inhabit it.” rent policies are counterproductive, In the Peruvian case, repeated failure to what are the correct policies? Loveman understand and respect the rural popu- does not provide convincing answers to lation on the parts of the guerrillas (the the first two questions and does not ad- Sendero Luminoso, or “Shining Path”) dress the third. led by Abimael Guzmán and of the gov- At the end of the day, Addicted to Fail- ernment of Peru came close to dooming ure is a book that should not be disre- the efforts of both sides in the bloody garded. It encourages readers to plunge conflict. After the end of hostilities, a deeper into the complexities of South Truth and Reconciliation Commission America. For while Loveman and his concluded that more than sixty-nine authors may not offer any answers, it is thousand Peruvians had been killed in clear that the United States will face in- the fighting, with Maoist rebels of the creasingly complex challenges from this Shining Path responsible for the major- part of the world in the years ahead. ity of deaths. Both Clausewitz and Mao made clear that the end of warfare was RICHARD NORTON not destruction but policy. Lewis Taylor Naval War College shows how close the combatants came, through their own excesses, to defeating their own causes. Regrettably, Taylor, a lecturer in Latin
Taylor, Lewis. Shining Path: Guerrilla War in American sociology at the University of Peru’s Northern Highlands, 1980–1997. Liverpool, Liverpool, does not adequately high- U.K.: Liverpool Univ. Press, 2006. 232pp. $32.50 light the strategic implications of his subject. In fact, reading his book leaves In Shining Path Lewis Taylor provides unanswered the questions of why he compelling evidence that the attitude of wrote it and for whom. Taylor focuses the people can be decisive in war. That his study narrowly on the northern point will not surprise students of war- highlands of Peru, which were a partic- fare; they will recall that two great strat- ularly brutal locus of armed action. Al- egists stressed the central importance of though he acknowledges that generalized having the people on your side. Focusing
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violence occurred in 1992 in twenty- When a longtime Department of State one of Peru’s twenty-four departments, attorney and former member of the he ignores other important areas of the prestigious International Law Commis- conflict. He also writes as though the sion takes the time to recount his con- war in Peru proceeded without an inter- siderable firsthand observations of the national context, except for the intellec- performance of the United Nations, tual contribution of Mao Tse-tung. Naval War College Review readers do True, the Cold War had ended by the well to take notice. At a time when a time Peruvian agents captured Guzmán, new U.S. geographic command is being but many observers think the agents stood up in Africa and military forces could not have succeeded without the find their planning and operations cen- help of outside intelligence. In addition, ters increasingly visited by coalition, U.S. funding of antinarcotics programs interagency, international, and non- not only disrupted a source of support governmental organizational represen- to the Shining Path but also relieved tatives, it is indispensable to have a economic pressure on the government clear understanding of the evolving role of Peru when it was sorely stressed by of the UN Security Council and its the conflict. technical commissions and tribunal in- The Peruvian war provides insights for vestigators. Matheson provides us with the future of revolutionary movements an insightful description, one that in Latin America—in countries with nicely serves that purpose. elected governments and when no sup- The book is arranged in seven chapters port will be available from a Cuba or a and five appendixes. The first chapter Soviet Union, as it was during the Cold provides a straightforward description War. Fortunately, any reader interested of the UN Charter provisions that serve in those issues, as well as in a systematic as the framework for action by the Se- treatment of the strategic lessons of two curity Council. It is complemented by decades of conflict in Peru, can find an chapter 2, which describes the council’s excellent source in Cynthia McClintock’s jurisdiction and mandate as the institu- 1998 Revolutionary Movements in Latin tion charged with the “primary respon- America: El Salvador’s FMLN and Peru’s sibility for maintenance of international Shining Path, published by the United peace and security.” The next three States Institute of Peace Press. chapters provide general descriptions of the three principal modalities of Secu- PAUL D. TAYLOR Naval War College rity Council actions: sanctions, peace- keeping and governance, and use of force. The growing importance of UN technical commissions is then described, followed by an examination of the UN
Matheson, Michael J. Council Unbound: The role in prosecuting international Growth of UN Decision Making on Conflict and crimes. The book is well indexed and Postconflict Issues after the Cold War. Washington, includes summaries of some of the key D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006. council resolutions and a bibliography 422pp. $19.95 that will prove useful to those seeking more detailed coverage.
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Matheson documents most of the re- In 2000, Washington Post reporter Dana curring concerns in sanctions (prob- Priest wrote a series of articles on the lems with enforcement, collateral rising importance of the regional com- consequences, and possible legal limits batant commanders, comparing them on sanctions), peacekeeping operations to modern-day “proconsuls” whose (tensions produced by the principles of Roman forebears served as regional consent and impartiality applicable to governors and commanders in chief of Chapter VI peacekeeping operations), their military forces. Reveron’s Amer- and the use of force. Also provided is a ica’s Viceroys examines this comparison, most welcome description of the vari- providing a historical and contempo- ous UN technical commissions and of rary analysis of contemporary regional the criminal tribunals established by the combatant commanders and their ris- Security Council to address crimes ing influence in the foreign policy– committed in the former Yugoslavia making arena. (While the implications and in Rwanda. His descriptions are of this rising trend are left to the reader, concise, accurate, and well documented. nowhere does the book imply that our This book admirably serves its descrip- combatant commanders are present- tive role and supports the author’s the- day Caesars, about to cross the Rubicon sis regarding the council’s post–Cold and seize Rome.) The last chapter of War renaissance. In the end, however, Reveron’s book expertly examines their one comes away feeling that the UN has rising power and influence on tradi- been largely spared critical scrutiny in tional civil-military relations. In short, this book, that the writer, though emi- he finds, administrations use the mili- nently well qualified to take us through tary in non-warfighting ways, because a more focused and prescriptive treat- of its size, capabilities, and “can-do” ment of this vital international institu- culture. tion, stopped short. Now that Matheson It is somewhat ironic that it was the has piqued our interest, perhaps he will military services and the Pentagon that provide us with those additional in- fought hardest to prevent the ascen- sights in a sequel—one that draws out dancy of the regional combatant com- the lessons to be learned from the “re- manders. Four decades of legislative nascent” Security Council’s response to changes to the Department of Defense the acknowledged threats to interna- and military mistakes from World War tional peace and security posed by Iran’s II to DESERT ONE finally culminated in nuclear programs and the genocide in passage of the Goldwater-Nichols De- Darfur. fense Reorganization Act of 1986. This act finally gave unity of command to CRAIG H. ALLEN Naval War College the combatant commanders and re- duced the service chiefs to the second- ary role of training and equipping their forces. In hindsight, however, it was the Department of State, not the service
Reveron, Derek S., ed. America’s Viceroys: The chiefs, who suffered the greatest loss of Military and U.S. Foreign Policy. New York: influence with this change. Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 214pp. $75
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The regional combatant commanders international relations who are about to today are considered by many within the enter the field of national security policy U.S. government to be policy entrepre- making. While the cost of the hardcover neurs. Each commands a large staff, edition will certainly deter all but the oversees a huge budget, and travels fre- most avid readers of foreign policy, the quently within his region to promote paperback is now available for $26.95. U.S. interests. In fact, our national secu- DONALD K. HANSEN rity strategy now directs regional com- Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps batant commanders to engage with regional allies and promote theater secu- rity cooperation. A regional viewpoint and focus, instead of the country-specific
view represented by U.S. ambassadors, Gillespie, Paul G. Weapons of Choice: The Devel- makes combatant commanders ideally opment of Precision Guided Munitions. Tusca- suited to promote and implement secu- loosa: Univ. of Alabama Press, 2006. 232pp. $35 rity agreements with heads of state. At least since medieval expert Lynn Their enormous resources and regional White’s controversial argument that the access dwarf the capabilities of the State stirrup was responsible for the demise Department, whose process of policy of feudalism, historians have high- formulation still resides in Washington, lighted the seminal role of technology D.C. In contrast, regional commanders in social change. Paul Gillespie’s com- are out on the ramparts daily, just like pelling, compact history of precision the proconsuls or British viceroys in the guided munitions (PGMs) is unlikely to days of empire. raise such an acrimonious debate, but In this aspect, readers will find much of he has provided a valuable contribution value in the book. As Reveron points to the study of technology and society out, there is a paucity of scholarly re- and, more specifically, to the rapidly search on the subject of foreign policy growing body of literature concerning making by regional combatant com- the “revolution in military affairs.” manders and their subsequent en- The great advantage of Gillespie’s book croachment into traditional fields of is its focus on a single, obviously signif- international relations. Anthony Zinni, icant military technology and on that a retired Marine Corps general and for- technology’s effect on national security mer commander of U.S. Central Com- policy. The book traces the history of mand, describes the book in these PGMs from World War I; the grainy terms: “Derek Reveron has put together picture of a destroyed bridge on the an excellent work describing the con- dust cover turns out to be, somewhat troversial role of our nation’s combat- surprisingly, not the “Vietnam poster ant commanders. It is an insightful, child” for PGMs (the notorious Tranh accurate, and provocative presentation Hoa Bridge) but a bridge destroyed by of the issues and history done by an early guided bomb in Burma during first-rate contributors who clearly know World War II. Some readers may find a the subject.” The book is well suited for few of Gillespie’s claims a bit too “Air midcareer officers and students of Force laudatory,” but one should expect
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at least a bit of airpower advocacy from because “an anemic, casualty-averse a professor of history who teaches at the policy is unlikely to deter or defeat the Air Force Academy. Gillespie’s account determined, resourceful foe,” and per- is on the whole balanced and well docu- haps more importantly, because “win- mented, and his frank discussion of ning and maintaining the peace” has some of the less-than-favorable impacts proven much more difficult than de- of PGMs on national security policy stroying targets. While he could have makes it clear he is not a complete made his argument even stronger, Paul airpower zealot. Gillespie makes clear (with apologies to Nearly as valuable as the technology- Abraham Maslow) that the mere pres- policy linkage is the detailed and inti- ence of an elegant hammer could cause mate look at the technology innovation policy makers to overlook all but the process itself. Perhaps the best chapter nails. Iraq and Afghanistan may further is the author’s account of the mid-1960s reinforce Paul Gillespie’s assertion that development of the Paveway laser- “technology best serves those who guided bomb. Gillespie makes it clear thoughtfully implement it.”
that this was not the work of an “indi- DAVID BUCKWALTER vidual inventive genius” but rather the Naval War College product of a host of factors ranging from changes in national policy (i.e., “flexible response”), newly available supporting technologies (the laser and integrated circuit), an innovative engi- Burrows, William E. The Survival Imperative: neering team from a minor defense Using Space to Protect the Earth. New York: Forge contractor (Texas Instruments), and a Books, 2006. 306pp. $24.95 persistent and bureaucratically adept Nowadays we take for granted that Air Force colonel. space assets are necessary for military The biggest disappointment with this operations, but the nonmilitary use of work is that despite its October 2006 re- space has also passed into the realm of lease date, the most recent conflicts in the necessary. While the use of space as- Afghanistan and Iraq are treated almost sets, and thus access to space, is of vital as afterthoughts. There are PGM suc- importance to the nation, there is no cesses that could be amplified from watershed work that unites the politi- these conflicts (e.g., the evolution of cal, economic, industrial, and military “urban close air support” and even the aspects into a single vision. Space pol- demise of the terrorist al-Zarqawi), and icy, in other words, is still waiting for a fuller treatment would reinforce its Mahan. Gillespie’s central contribution. If he is not quite Mahan, veteran space Weapons of Choice makes a good case writer William E. Burrows lays a very that PGMs have indeed altered the good foundation for what could evolve American approach to war as “policy- into a national (or even international) makers have seized upon precision policy—planetary protection. The au- guided munitions as the key to more thor unites two major themes under this humane war.” Gillespie makes clear this concept: protecting the earth from aster- is not a wholly positive development, oid or comet strikes and monitoring the
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global environment to ward off an eco- critical insights on the political drivers logical disaster. for the space program. Burrows provides an excellent summary Is Burrows’s premise farfetched? The 5 of asteroid strikes, from the dinosaur December 2006 edition of the Washing- killer to the 1908 Tunguska impact. But ton Times quoted the December issue of is he overstating the threat? Imagine Popular Mechanics that on Friday, 13 Katrina on a global scale, or a nuclear April 2029, a twenty-five-million-ton power mistaking an asteroid for a nu- asteroid will pass the earth less than clear attack and retaliating. A large twenty-one thousand miles away. At enough strike could devastate the planet, least, scientists claimed there was a 99.7 and, without warning, we could do percent chance the asteroid will miss. nothing to prevent it. JOHN R. ARPIN Burrows, who also wrote Deep Black Major, U.S. Army Reserve (Retired) Centreville, Va. (1988), argues that overhead reconnais- sance systems represent the perfect tool for monitoring the global environment. He asserts that these types of assets can provide early warning of ecological dev- astation (such as deforestation and Klein, John J. Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles and Policy. Space Power and Politics Series. New overfishing), enabling more effective York: Routledge, 2006. 196pp. $110 protection of the environment. We are a nation inextricably linked to Burrows makes a number of recom- space. Every instrument of our national mendations. He argues for expanded power—diplomatic, information, mili- and continued support for ongoing ef- tary, economic—relies to some degree forts to monitor “near earth objects” on access to and unimpeded use of and supports a U.S. interagency effort space. Space Warfare: Strategy, Princi- for monitoring the global environment. ples and Policy uses this fact to illustrate In the long term, he believes, establish- its author’s point that despite an in- ing a human presence in space will be creasing reliance on space capabilities, necessary. Unlike other visionaries the United States has yet to develop a (such as Gerard K. O’Neill and G. comprehensive space-power theory. Harry Stine), Burrows declares that Klein has written extensively on space- permanent human presence in space power theory, and this book builds will follow an economic need, rather upon many of his previous works, ad- than the other way round. His wedge dressing the need for a national space into space is building a data warehouse strategy that adequately links space op- on the moon to preserve humanity’s erations with national interests. cultural and technological heritage. On the moon its contents would be accessi- Throughout Space Warfare Klein as- ble to anyone on earth who could rig a tutely draws numerous parallels with relatively simple communications site. space as a medium of national power similar to those of air, land, and the sea The author also provides a superb polit- as viewed and utilized by independent ical and social history of the space pro- states. As space capabilities increase in gram, up to the present, and provides importance in relation to national
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power and security around the world, although some of his basic premises Klein reasons, space will become an are quite repetitive. Additionally, a arena where states will protect their few of his recommendations may be space assets in the same manner that viewed as incredibly challenging, if not they protect their sovereign airspace, impossible, from technological and fis- land, and territorial seas. To this end, cal perspectives. he draws upon the historical context of This is a must-read for military and Sir Julian Corbett’s maritime strategy nonmilitary strategic thinkers with in- theory as a basis on which to build a terests or stakes in space operations. comprehensive space strategy. Previous While it is sure to raise some eyebrows, attempts at space strategies have hinged particularly in the air and space com- upon using air or naval strategies, or a munities, this book does what it is sup- combination of the two. Klein argues posed to do: raise the level of debate on that simply using air or naval strategies the formulation of a sound space strat- is too restrictive and does not ade- egy. This is a critically important subject, quately capture the uniqueness of space one that if not properly implemented operations. Air and naval strategies in and understood could have disastrous his view are too militarily focused, spe- consequences on our national interests. cifically on offensive weapons, or lack the proper linkage to the instruments of DANA E. STRUCKMAN Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force national power. For these reasons he Naval War College turns to Corbett’s maritime theory, which describes the relationship be- tween land and sea as vital and also serves well as a model for development of space strategy. Wright, Lawrence. The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda This unique approach may be criticized and the Road to 9/11. New York: Knopf, 2006. by some. However, these same critics 480pp. $27.95 would do well to understand Klein’s use Lawrence Wright has provided the mili- of Corbett not as the be-all and end-all tary professional an excellent primer approach to space strategy but rather as into the world of those who see the a framework upon which to build. In United States as a threat. The Arab fact, Klein himself admits that his ap- world remains little understood by proach to a space strategy largely agrees most Americans. It takes Wright nearly with current joint doctrine, the Space five hundred pages to lay out the com- Commission Report, and other publica- plex tale of modern Islamic fundamen- tions. However, his treatment highlights talism. It is no surprise that Osama Bin some areas deserving more debate, such Laden is a key player, and Wright gives as a better understanding of the defense him center stage. Bin Laden is the son of high-value positions in space and ac- of a wealthy Yemeni who through grit cess to what he calls “celestial lines of and hard work earned the favor of the communication,” a phrase adapted ruling family in Saudi Arabia for bold- from classic Corbett. ness in civil engineering projects that Klein’s Corbett-based space strategy is helped Saudi Arabia advance into the presented in a fairly easy-to-read way, twentieth century.
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The 1980s saw the first true conflict be- internal barriers swept aside. Much has tween Islamic fundamentalists and a been done in the years since that clear, major power, the ten-year war waged blue Tuesday morning in September to by the mujahideen in Afghanistan after reconcile that environment. The other the Soviet invasion. The Soviet Union take-away is that Bin Laden and his ilk withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, are more complex than their rhetoric having suffered an unexpected drub- would have us believe. His followers, bing. Emboldened by their victory however, see him as a devout Muslim, against one superpower, many muja- pure in thought and strident in deed, hideen, under the spiritual leadership of out to defend his faith from foreign in- Osama Bin Laden (who spent some time fluences bent on its destruction. So as in Afghanistan during the war), turned long as the United States remains en- to fighting the new threat to Islam posed gaged in that vital region, his likes will by the United States. The organization remain ever present and ever the threat. formed from disparate jihadist groups in DAVID L. TESKA Egypt, Iran, and Pakistan to meet this Commander, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve task was one whose name would become synonymous with the most violent form of anti-American Islamic fundamental- ism—al-Qa‘ida (the Base). Ironically, it
was the United States that, through the Key, Joshua, and Lawrence Hill. The Deserter’s CIA, had largely financed and equipped Tale: The Story of an Ordinary Soldier Who the mujahideen and other anti-Soviet Walked Away from the War in Iraq. New York: At- forces in Afghanistan. lantic Monthly, 2007. 237pp. $23 The Looming Tower is truly a book for Joshua Key is a young married man our time. The New York Times agrees; it with four children who joined the U.S. selected it as one of the ten best books Army to escape the grinding poverty of of 2006. Drawing upon expertise gained his life in Guthrie, Oklahoma. In 2003, from living and teaching in the Middle he was deployed to Iraq with the 43rd East, Wright has written a succinct and Combat Engineer Company. At the end engaging work on the history, religion, of seven months, Key had become so and temperament of a people who re- disillusioned with the Army and the Iraq main at best enigmatic to most Ameri- war that he deserted while on leave in cans. More importantly, Wright’s the United States. He ultimately made narrative characterizes the path to Sep- his way to Canada to ask for asylum. tember 11th as a lengthy and convoluted Lawrence Hill, a Canadian writer and one, a journey that started long ago. The journalist, put Key’s story into coherent attacks on that day were the next step in form. an irrevocable conflict between elements Although the book is well written, it is of radical Islam and the country they saw actually hard to read, because of the as a threat to their existence. U.S. Army’s allegations of Key’s disloy- The lessons of The Looming Tower are alty, dishonesty, disrespect, selfishness, many. The United States can succeed in dishonor, lack of integrity, and coward- its fight against the radicals of Islam ice, particularly during his first deploy- only if it is completely united, with all ment with the 3rd Armored Cavalry
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Regiment to Iraq. Also, like others who questions that many may ask them- have served for many years in the mili- selves when reading this book. Further, tary, I find it tough to read about the as a result of this work these trouble- wrong-headed thinking and excuses of some allegations now reside in the pub- a deserter. lic domain. The Army should determine Yet this is a book that we must read, if the truth. The outcome will determine for no other reason than not to allow if the allegations are to be refuted or if Private Key’s allegations to go unan- serious soul-searching and significant swered. Consider, for example, that this changes in Army culture, training, and book sells in Costco’s and is listed as leadership must be pursued. one of its best sellers. The Deserter’s Tale does a credible job Is Joshua Key a weak man who was explaining Joshua Key’s action, and it pressured by his wife to desert, exagger- provides some serious food for thought ating or lying outright about his experi- about how the United States has been ence in Iraq to justify his desertion and selecting, training, and leading its sol- gain sympathy from the Canadian au- diers. However, unfortunately, the book thorities? Or is Private Key a naive, fails to provide a good reason for Pri- trusting, moral man who could no lon- vate Key’s act of desertion.
ger stomach participation in a constant THOMAS MOORE series of immoral, unethical, and some- Monterey, California times illegal acts in Iraq? These are the
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