Naval War College Review Volume 60 Article 10 Number 3 Summer 2007 Book Reviews The .SU . Naval War College Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation War College, The .SU . Naval (2007) "Book Reviews," Naval War College Review: Vol. 60 : No. 3 , Article 10. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol60/iss3/10 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile Composite Default screen War College: Book Reviews BOOK REVIEWS AN ACCESSIBLE WINDOW INTO CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, eds. The Science of Military Strategy. Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2005. 504pp. $40 This first English-language volume on published by China’s National Defense strategy by China’s People’s Liberation University in 2000, the better to under- Army (PLA) was translated by a team of stand actual PLA doctrine. The closest experts at the Academy of Military Sci- U.S. equivalent to these volumes collec- ences from the original Chinese-language tively might be Doctrine for Joint Opera- version (Zhanlüexue, 2001). Edited by tions (Joint Publication 3-0). two major generals with significant Part One surveys China’s historical ex- ability to shape PLA strategy as advisers perience and development of military to China’s powerful Central Military theory. The authors describe the cur- Commission (CMC) and Politburo rent age as an “era of sea,” in which Standing Committee, this volume un- maritime states, like their predecessors, doubtedly reflects elements of critical will employ Mahanian and other strate- policy trends in Beijing and hence mer- gies to “actively develop comprehensive its close examination by foreign re- sea power” and “expand strategic depth searchers and policy makers. Since this at sea.” Part Two offers Chinese per- book has deliberately been made acces- spectives on the laws and conduct of sible to an overseas audience, it is im- war. Chapter 9, on “Strategic Deter- portant to reflect on what message its rence,” deserves particular attention, as English-language publication may be it clearly provides a rationale for many intended to convey. elements of the PLA’s modernization The 2001 Chinese-language version is program that have been overlooked by used to educate senior PLA decision many foreign analysts. Part Three ex- makers, including those on the CMC, as amines future warfare and the implica- well as officers who may become China’s tions for China, including recent PLA future strategic planners. Now in its experience and combat guidelines. fourth printing, it can be read along Throughout the volume, the continuing with a variety of other texts, such as the relevance of the People’s War is empha- more operationally and tactically fo- sized as a foundation of Chinese mili- cused Science of Campaigns (Zhanyixue), tary strategy. Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2007 1 T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Summer 2007\Ventura\NWC Review Summer 2007.vp Thursday, July 26, 2007 8:50:50 AM Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile Composite Default screen 134 NAVAL WARNaval COLLEGE War REVIEWCollege Review, Vol. 60 [2007], No. 3, Art. 10 It is this third section that will be of warfare. While this volume raises as greatest interest to Western scholars many questions as it answers, it is never- seeking insights into PLA thinking theless a welcome contribution to a vi- about China’s strategic situation. The tal field in which so little authoritative authors of this volume believe that information is available. China, both a land and a sea power, ANDREW S. ERICKSON faces multifaceted strategic opportuni- Naval War College ties and challenges. Despite its eighteen- thousand-kilometer coastline, China is currently constrained by the world’s longest island chain, centering on stra- tegically, politically, and economically Howarth, Peter. China’s Rising Sea Power: The vital Taiwan. Taiwan is far from PLA Navy’s Submarine Challenge. New York: China’s only disputed territory, how- Frank Cass, 2006. 198pp. $125 ever: “1,000,000 square kilometers” of Peter Howarth, an Australian former maritime territory, “one ninth of diplomat and intelligence analyst, pres- China’s national land territory,” re- ents an excellent mix of strategic the- mains under contention. The authors ory, political dynamics, and tactical also identify energy supply security as detail in considering the Chinese sub- critical to China’s national develop- marine fleet. His treatment demon- ment. Their statement that the South strates a keen understanding of both China Sea possesses “rich oil reserves parts of the phrase “politico-military equivalent to that of [the] Middle East” strategy,” and it is the type of thinking conflicts with Western assessments, that Jeffrey Record of the Air War Col- however, leaving the reader wondering lege recently opined is too often miss- about the true strategic underpinnings ing in the American community. of Beijing’s claims. Indeed, the book is a pleasure to read, if The authors foresee possible threats to only because one gets to visit so many China’s “sovereignty, maritime rights, old friends in strategic theory, such as and great cause of reunification,” Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julian Corbett, threats that, should all other measures Bernard Brodie, Hervé Coutau-Begarie, fail, may necessitate a defensive (and Raoul Castex, Andre Beaufre, René therefore inherently just) war on Daveluy, Colin Gray, Carl Döenitz, and China’s “borderlines, seacoasts, and air Herbert Rosinski, as well as Mao Tse- spaces.” The resulting “high-tech local tung, Deng Xiaoping, and Sun Tzu. wars” may well require the PLA to con- Like so many others who write about front a technologically superior adver- China’s navy since the fall of the Berlin sary. Accordingly, the authors suggest Wall, Howarth is inclined to make sen- emphasizing preemption; employment sational claims on the subject, presum- of a broad spectrum of military tech- ably thereby justifying the work and nologies, including asymmetric “trump attracting attention. However, what dis- card” weapons; and integration of civil- tinguishes Howarth from so many oth- ian and military forces in missions (e.g., ers who have searched and found “guerrilla warfare on the sea”) that in- reasons to be alarmed at the conven- corporate political, economic, and legal tional naval power of China is that he https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol60/iss3/10 2 T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Summer 2007\Ventura\NWC Review Summer 2007.vp Thursday, July 26, 2007 8:50:50 AM Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile Composite Default screen War College: Book Reviews BOOK REVIEWS 135 tempers the sensational with frank as- of a preemptive surprise attack is part sessments of China’s limitations. of the Chinese strategic culture, he says, At the heart of this examination of Chi- but one does not have to cite the num- nese submarines, practically speaking, is ber of wars per year in which the Ming the potential showdown over Taiwan. dynasty engaged, for example, in order While Howarth notes that “China, like to support the conclusion that “the Germany, is handicapped by geogra- Pentagon has some justification in con- phy,” he points out that the defense of sidering that the risk of Beijing resort- Taiwan is equally handicapped by ing to force to try to resolve the Taiwan oceanography: its narrow and crowded issue is growing with the modernization seas are ideal for diesel submarines. His and transformation of the PRC’s mili- frankness, however, about such U.S. tary capabilities.” problems as naval drawdown, global re- Howarth is better off with his more ele- sponsibility, vulnerability of surface gant logic that submarines are designed ships to missile saturation, and the dif- for the task of concealment and sur- ficulties of operations in narrow seas prise and that surprise is a good tactic gives one new pause. when one’s forces are inferior. Eastern As an example of what is best about his and Western war planners have both work, Howarth considers not only the made use of the submarine and have tactical problems for China, Taiwan, appreciated it for the qualities for which and the United States (including the it is designed, regardless of whether exact requirements for successful sub- they were Chinese or their ancient an- marine warfare against a carrier-based cestors were contemporaries of Sun Tzu. navy) but also the proper political con- Nonetheless, it is exactly this effort to text of that potential conflict—that a blend classic strategic thinking with politically free and economically pros- current politics and tactical complexi- perous Taiwan is a dagger pointed at ties that is informative, intelligent, and the heart of the legitimacy of the Chi- provocative in this book. It is recom- nese Communist Party. Returning to mended for any library on naval affairs the intersection of tactics and strategic or Asian conflict, and good reading for judgment, Howarth includes in his final both U.S. and Chinese war planners. chapter an economical summary of the PETER J. WOOLLEY logic by which Chinese decision makers Fairleigh Dickinson University might be optimistic enough about their chances for success to initiate a conflict with Taiwan. One weakness in this confluence of pol- itics, strategy, and tactical matchups is Cole, Bernard D. Taiwan’s Security: History and that Howarth exaggerates the strategic Prospects. New York: Routledge, 2006. 254pp. influence of the great thinkers on policy. $125 His demonstration of how submarine Given the importance of the Taiwan is- warfare fits with Sun Tzu overreaches, sue for U.S.