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If you have issues viewing or accessing this file, please contact us at NCJRS.gov. , • • : ,) .. .. r r • = , ::~t;P> t·' "': ',I ( L p, 1:p l-" ~ ,., liD 30 '3 - L (t U S ueparullcllt ot Ju!>tlGe 0 0 Institute Ju&tlce /3 3 1 !: N"\londl of k l' '", . ~~ J f, ~ , j' ," I !•. :1 t ~ " FBI L<'1\'· Ellf"rCl'!TII'lll Bull d ill r:,f rJ.tl d'I' L t" , l~J / ,; r " .'f \ -, ,,~~,' ~'" ~" .. t-' ! I; .... - ',., " ,~. I • • , • , , -------------- -~------ June 1991 M Volume 60 Law Enforcement Bulletin Number 6 [!=eatures Pharmaceutical Diversion and Abuse ISO S B :3 1 By Thomas C. Babicke ROP-ing in Fences I 30 .3 0 4 6 By James Trainum, Nancy Brown, and Raymond Smith, Jr. Drug Abuse and Testing in Law Enforcement 12 By Andrew J. Harvey l.s D :5 0 S- Plateauing in Law Enforcement I.'] 0 ';> 0", 16 By James M. Childers l,) 19 Gunshot Primer Residue 13030 J Page 19 By Roger W. Aaron Military Support to Civilian I J C> :3 (') (5) 24 Law Enforcement Agencies By R. Barry Cronin Detaining Suspected Drug Couriers: J::5 0 :5 0 '1 27 Recent Court Decisions By William U. McCormack Departments 5 Book Review 22 The Bulletin Reports Page 27 10 Police Practices United States Department of Justice Editor-Stephen D. Gladis, D.AEd. Federal Bureau of Investigation Managing Editor-Kathryn E. Sulewski Washington, DC 20535 Art Dlrector-John E. Ott Assistant Editors-Alice S. Cole William S. Sessions, Director Karen F. McCarron Production Manager-Andrew DiRosa Contributors' opinions and statements Staff Assistant-Garolyn F. Thompson should not be considered as an endorsement for any policy, program, or The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin service by the FBI. (ISSN-0014-5688) is published monthly by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 10th and The Attorney General has determined that Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, The Cover: Prescription medication misuse the publication of this periodical is necessary D.C. 20535. Second-Class postage paid at and abuse contributes tv the drug problems in the transaction of the public business Washington, D.C., and additional mailing in this country. See article p. 1. required by law of the Department of Justice. offices. Postmaster: Send address changes Use of funds for printing this periodical has to FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Federal been approved by the Director of the Office Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D.C. of Management and Budget. 20535 ISSN 0014-5688 USPS 383-310 13CJ30tq Detaining Suspected Drug Couriers Recent Court Decisions By WILLIAM U. McCORMACK ince 1968, the U.S. Supreme may quickly confirm or dispel an The purpose of this article is Court has recognized the officer's suspicion that the individ­ to alert law enforcement officers to Sconstitutional authority oflaw ual detained is a drug smuggler or the constitutional requirement for enforcement officers to temporar­ courier. reasonable suspicion and to assist ily detain an individual on less In the course of drug interdic­ them in deciding whether reason­ than probable cause. I Temporary tion efforts, some law enforcement able suspicion exists to detain a detentions have become an impor­ agencies have developed lists of suspected drug courier. It examines tant tool of law enforcement in factors and so-called drug courier recent court decisions addressing stopping the flow of illegal drugs profiles2 to assist officers in decid­ whether police had established into and around the United States. ing whether to detain a suspect. Some reasonable suspicion to detain sus­ A temporary detention based on of these factors and profiles have pected drug couriers and the extent reasonable suspicion gives offi­ been challenged on constitutional to which drug courier profiles can cers an opportunity to develop grounds when a law enforcement be used by police to establish rea­ probable cause through the use of officer employs them in detaining or sonable suspicion.This article then a trained drug-sniffing dog, fur­ stopping travelers in bus and train offers law enforcement officers ther questioning of a suspect, and stations, airport terminals, and on some specific recommendations other investigative efforts that the highways. regarding the types of facts and --------------------------------------------------------------------June1991 127 observed behavior that can con­ to detain a person must be based on suspect appeared nervous during his stitutionally be used to establish a totality of the circumstances and return flight to Honolulu. Again, he reasonable suspicion for a tempo­ that the concept of reasonable suspi­ had not checked any luggage and rary detention. cion is not readily or even usefully was dressed exactly as when he left reduced to a neat set of legal rules. Honolulu. After getting off the plane, USEFULNESS OF PROFILES The Court reviewed the use of a drug the couple was detained by DEA In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court courier profile in Sokolow, but did Agents, who asked the suspect for decided United States v. Sokolow,3 a not find that the use of a profile his ticket and identification. They case involving the use of a drug either added to or detracted from the were told that he did not have them courier profile to detain an individ­ significance of the factors relied upon and that his name was Sokolow. ual in an airport. In Sokolow, the to detain a suspected drug courier. Sokolow and his companion were Court held that reasonable suspicion Rather, the Court found that based then escorted to the DEA office at on a totality of the circumstances, all the airport, and shortly thereafter, of the factors taken together amounted a drug-sniffing dog alerted on to reasonable suspicion to detain the Sokolow's brown shoulder bag, defendant. which was then searched pursuant to a search warrant. After a second ... each decision to Factual Background of Sokolow search warrant was later obtained, " In Sokolow, a young man (the detain an individual 1,063 grams of cocaine were found suspect) approached a ticket agent at in a different bag. must be judged on the Honolulu International Airport The U.S. Court of Appeals for the individual facts and requested two round-trip tickets the Ninth Circuit reversed Sokolow's available... at the tilne to Miami for a flight leaving later subsequent conviction on the grounds of the stop, viewed in that day. He was dressed in a black that there was insufficient reason­ light of the officer's jumpsuit and was wearing gold able suspicion to detain him at the training and jewelry. The suspect, appearing airport and that this illegal detention nervous, told the ticket agent that the tainted the subsequent search of the experience. tickets were for Andrew Kray and bag. The U.S. Supreme Court re­ Janet Norian and paid for them with versed the Ninth Circuit and held $20 bills taken from a large roll of that under a totality of the circum­ twenties. He and his female com­ stances, there were sufficient facts " panion did not check their four pieces known by the DEA Agents to justify of luggage when they later boarded Sokolow's detention. their flight. After the ticket agent informed Reasonable Suspicion Based on police about the cash purchase of the Totality of Circumstances tickets, an officer checked the phone In analyzing the facts needed number given by the suspect and to detain a suspected drug courier, determined that it was not listed in the Supreme COUlt stated in Sokolow the name Andrew Kray. The officer that an officer must be able to articu­ then determined that the suspect late something more than an un­ and his companion had reservations particularized suspicion or hunch. to return from Miami to Honolulu The Court added that the level of just 3 days from the date of their suspicion is considerably less than Special Agent McCormack is a legal departure. instructor at the FBI Academy in proof of wrongdoing by a prepon­ Quantico, Virginia. Drug Enforcement Administra­ derance of the evidence and obvi­ tion (DEA) Agents observed that the ously less than that needed for 28/ FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin ---------------------------- probable cause.4 In finding that rea­ suspicion must require the in establishing reasonable suspicion sonable suspicion existed based on a Agent to articulate the factors to detain. totality of the circumstances, the Court leading to that conclusion, stated that the primary facts the DBA but the fact that these factors PROFILES AS Agents relied upon to justify their may be set forth in a 'profile' INVESTIGATIVE AIDS stop were: does not somehow detract Sokolow makes it clear that 1) Sokolow paid $2,100 for from their evidentiary law enforcement officers should not two airplane tickets from a significance as seen by a rely exclusively on drug courier roll of $20 bills; trained agent. "7 profiles ot a magical number of matching factors to establish reason- 2) He traveled under a name able suspicion to detain a suspected that did not match the name , drug courier. Nonetheless, profiles under which his telephone can be particularly useful for a law number was listed; ... the legal basis for a enforcement officer who is recently 3) His original destination temporary' detention hired or transferred from a different was Miami, a source city for . I h assignment. illicit drugs; IS simp y t e Officers who have extensive 4) He stayed in Miami {or presence or absence experience conducting drug inter- only 48 hours, even though a of reasonable diction efforts in a particular airport round-trip flight from suspicion based on a or other public facility or area are Honolulu to Miami takes 20 totality of the likely to gain valuable knowledge about drug trafficking in that loca- hours; c"cums.
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