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112646NCJRS.Pdf If you have issues viewing or accessing this file contact us at NCJRS.gov. ~ Oil> .. ~ ~~ .. ~ - ' .... ·e·,' '" December 1987, Volume 56, Number 12 .•• r-. 1 Introducing the New Director Transformational Police Leadership by Donald C. Witham The "Bobby Joe" Long Serial Murder Case: A Study in Cooperation (Conclusion) , J Z, G'i3 By Gary Terry and Michael P. Malone O@]@[Ji)~OlfO@@~O@[Ji) rL..,14 On-Line Exchange of Fingerprint Identification Data By Dennis G. Kurre [b®~@n [QlD©@~~ [17 Look But Don't Touch: The Plain View Doctrine JI2."4~ ~ By Kimberly A. Kingston 24 Book Review 25 1987 Index 31 Wanted by the FBI 112645- U.S. Department of Justice 112646 National Institute of JUstice This document .has been .reproduced exactly as received from the pe~~on ~r organization originating it. Points of view or opinions stated In IS ocument. ~re tho~e of the authors and do not necessaril repr~sent the official posilion or policies of the National Institute Yf J ustlce. 0 Permission to reproduce this copyrighted material has been granted by FBI -.l!3W Enforcement BuTleITn~ to the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS). Further reproduction outside of the NCJRS system requires permis­ ~ sion of the copYright owner. Law Enforcement Bulletin United States Department of Justice Published by the Office of Public Affairs The Cover: Federal Bureau of Investigation Milt Ahlerich, Acting Assistant Director The fourth Director of the Federal Bureau of Washington, DC 20535 Investigation-Judge William S. Sessions William S. Sessions, Director Editor-Thomas J. Deakin Assistant Editor-Kathryn E. Sulewski Art Director-John E. Ott The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin The Attorney General has determined that the Production Manager/ publication of this periodical is necessary in the (ISSN-0014-5688) is published monthly by the transaction of the public business required by Reprints-Mark A. Zettler Federal Bureau of Investigation, 10th and Penn­ law of the Department of Justice. Use of funds sylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, DC 20535. for printing this periodical has been approved Second-class postage paid at Washington, DC. by the Director of the OHice of Management Postmaster: Send address changes to Federal and Budget through June 6, 1988. Bureau of Investigation, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Washington, DC 20535. ISSN 0014-5688 USPS 383-310 M ~ i' Look But Don't Touch: il The Plain View Doctrine II ! ! "To be in plain view, an item must be plainly visible to a law i \ enforcement officer standing in a position where he has a lawful I 1 right to be." ! By KIMBERLY A. KINGSTON Special Agent FBI Academy Legal Counsel Division Federal Bureau of Investigation Quantico, VA Law enforcement officers of other than conducted a cu rsory search for the indicted on ci":Nges of armed robbery. Federal jurisdiction who are interested shooter, other victims, and weapons. P~jN to t-ial, the State court in any legal issue discussed in this arti­ Although no people were found, several grantelJ HiGk~' motion to suppress the cle should consult their legal adviser. weapons and a stocking-cap mask stereo t\quipi nent seized from his apart­ Some police procedures ruled permis­ were discovered during the search. ment. On review, the Arizona Court of sible under Federal constitutional law Before leaving the scene, one of Appeals,4 although recognizing the va­ are of questionable legality under State the officers noticed two sets of expen­ lidity of the initial warrantless entry into law or are not permitted at all. sive stereo components in Hicks' apart­ the apartment due to the exigent cir­ ment. Noting that the stereo equipment cumstances created by the shooting,S appeared out of place in the otherwise affirmed the lower court's order to sup­ ARIZONA V. HICKSI ill-appointed apartment, the officer be­ press on the grounds that the obtaining On April 18, 1984, police officers in gan to suspect that the components of the serial numbers was an additional Phoenix, AZ, were called to a local may have been stolen. To satisfy his search that was unrelated to and, there­ apartment complex to investigate an curiosity, the officer more closely exam­ fore, not justified by the exigency. 6 In so apparent shooting. Early reports indi­ ined the stereos, moving the individual holding, the court of appeals implicitly cated that a bullet, which was fired components in the process, to read and rejected the State's steadfast conten­ through the floor of an apartment oc­ record their serial numbers. A subse­ tion that the officer's actions regarding cupied by James Hicks, struck and in­ quent telephone call to police head­ the stereo components were totally jus­ jured a man living in the apartment be­ quarters revealed that a number of the tified under the "plain view" doctrine. low. Once on the scene, the officers components had been taken in a recent After the Arizona Supreme Court de­ quickly entered Hicks' apartmenf2 and armed robbery. The stolen components nied further review in the matter, the were ultimately seized,3 and Hicks was _____________________________________ December 1987 I 17 , ¥ III A U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari? parked in his driveway. The automobile to more closely examine the State's was thoroughly searched and vac­ contention in light of previous decisions uumed 2 days later. Evidence obtained ! involving the "plain view" doctrine. during the search was later admitted I against Coolidge, who was found guilty ORIGIN OF THE and sentenced to life in prison. Both the I PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE judgment and sentence were pffirmed I I The U.S. Supreme Court officially by the Supreme Court of New recognized the concept of "plain view" Hampshire.12 The U.S. Supreme Court ~ in the 1968 case of Harris v. United j then granted certiorari to "consider the \ States. s In Harris, a police officer, while " constitutional questions raised by the i Special Agent Kingston in the process of securing an im­ admission of [certain] evidence against i pounded automobile, discovered evi­ Coolidge at his trial."13 !, dence of a robbery. The evidence, a ve­ The first question considered by ! hicle registration card that was found the Court in Coolidge was the validity of I lying face down on the door jamb, was i the warrant that authorized the search later introduced against Harris, the of Coolidge's car. The warrant in ques­ owner of the impounded automobile, tion was signed by the State attorney and he was convicted on robbery general acting ?,,!:, a justice of the I charges. The conviction was first re­ 14 ~ peace. The attorney general, versed, then affirmed by the court of ap­ however, was also actively in charge of l 9 [} peals. Finally, when the U.S. Supreme the murder investigation and later as­ Court had an opportunity to address the sumed the role of chief orosecutor at issue of whether the registration card trial. Because the Court found that the Ill. had been obtained by means of an un­ 'I attorney general was so closely aligned lawful search,10 the Court, in a very with law enforcement in this case that short per curiam decision, simply an­ he could not be considered a neutral I nounced that "objects falling in the plain and detached magistrate as required by 1 view of an officer who has a right to be the Constitution,15 the warrant was de­ in the position to have that view are !I clared invalid. With the warrant nullified, subject to seizure and may be intro­ the search of Coolidge's automobile duced in evidence."11 Because the stood "on no firmer ground than if there 1 Court found that the officer had a right i had been no warrant at all."16 If, there­ ! to be in a position to view the vehicle fore, the search was to be justified, it registration card, the card was deemed had to be justified on one of the excep­ to have been lawfully seized and admit­ tions to the warrant requirement. 1? ted into evidence. Consequently, the In an effort to preserve the evi­ t conviction was affirmed, and the plain dence seized from the automobile, the I view doctrine was formally adopted. State advanced a number of theories A few years later, in the case of i which would bring the search of the au­ t Coolidge v. New Hampshire, the Su­ tomobile within one of the exceptions to preme Court had another opportunity to the warrant requirement. 18 One of the clarify the concept of plain view. In ! theories proposed by the State sug­ Coolidge, police officers investigating ! gested that the vehicle could have been \ the murder of a 14-year-old girl ob­ seized under the plain view doctrine tained warrants to arrest Coolidge and and searched later as part of a search his car. Acting on those war­ custodial inventory. Ignoring the inven­ rants, officers arrested Coolidge in his tory portion of the State's argument, a home and seized the automobile eM t 54 n 'M' &£ u • •• if probable cause to believe that an item is evidence of a crime cannot be established without making some further intrusion, no matter how slight, then the search and seizure of that item cannot be justified under the plain view doctrine." plurality19 of the Court in Coolidge was merely a plurality opinion which es­ minutes later, defendant and two others focused on the plain view exception to tablished no binding precedent, the exited the room and were arrested. One the warrant requirement and concluded lower courts have generally adhered to agent then entered the hotel room to in­ that it was inapplicable to that case.
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