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The Plain View Doctrine in the 1971 Supreme Court Case of the Coolidge V

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The Plain View Doctrine in the 1971 Supreme Court Case of the Coolidge V If you have issues viewing or accessing this file contact us at NCJRS.gov. - .- .: .. ;.*~:...~~ ~:..~ ....... ~"'\.\':t.."''', Part I of this article discussed the development of the plain view doctrine in the 1971 Supreme Court case of The Coolidge v. New Hampshire 30 and considered the first of the three ele­ ments of a valid plain view seizure, the requirement that the officer have a pri­ Plain View or valid reason to be present within the premises or vehicle where the evi­ dence is observed. The conclusion of the article will continue the analysis of Doctrine the plain view doctrine, focusing on the two remaining requirements for a valid (Conclusion) plain view seizure: (1) The discovery of the item must be "inadvertent"; and (2) the item to be seized must be "immedi­ By JOSEPH R. DAVIS ately apparent" as contraband or evi­ dence of a crime. Special Agent Legal Counsel Division Inadvertence Federal Bureau of Investigation The second requirement for a Washington, D.C. valid plain view seizure is that the dis­ covery of the item be inadvertent. 31 Law enforcement officers of other This was the element of the plain view than Federal jurisdiction who are doctrine found to be lacking in the interested in any legal issue discussed facts of the Coolidge case, because in this article should consult their legal the officers knew the location of the adviser. Some police procedures ruled automobile for several days prior to the permissible under Federal seizure, had ample opportunity to ob­ constitutiona/laware of questionable tain a search warrant, and intended to legality under State law or are not seize the automobile when they en­ permitted at all tered on the suspect's propfl!ty.32 Jus­ tice Stewart explained the reason for the requirement that the discovery be inadvertent: "The rationale of the [plain view] exception to the warrant requirement . is that a plain-view seizure will not turn an initially valid (and therefore lim­ ited) search into a 'general' one, while the inconvenience of procuring a war­ rant to cover an inadvertent discovery is great. But where the discovery is antLcipated, where the police know in advance the location of the evidence and intend to seize it, the situation is altogether different. The requirement October 1979 I 27 ". overwhelming majority of decisions . have accepted 'inadvertence' as a constitutionally required element of the plain view doctrine." of a warrant to seize imposes no incon­ In this case, postal inspectors had The court noted that the postal venience whatever, or at least none determined that certain delivery room inspectors "knew" that other packages which is constitutionally cognizable in a employees of a large department store had been mailed to the employee's legal system that regards warrantless were engaged in a scheme whereby home during the past year, "believed" searches as 'per se unreasonable' in merchandise from the store was being that items other than the items speci­ the absence of 'exigent circum­ mailed, without payment, to wives of fied in the warrant would ,be found, and stances'." 33 the delivery room employees. Postal intended to seize such items. It also The "inadvertent discovery" re­ officials had specifically identified one noted the presence of the store secu­ quirement has been the most contro­ box, containing name-brand cosmet­ rity officer was indicative of the fact versial aspect of the plain view ics, which was mailed on a particular that the authorities "anticipated" dis­ doctrine since it was first articulated by date to the wife of one of the employ­ covery of further store merchandise Justice Stewart in Coolidge. In fact, ees. Additionally, they had been in­ not named in the warrant. 38 The court this is the element of the plain view formed by another store employee that felt the "inadvertence" element of doctrine that prompted Justice Blaok other packages had been mailed over plain view do(}1rine was not present, and Justice White to dissent from that a period of a year to the home of the and therefore, ordered suppression of portion of Justice Stewart's opinion same employee to whom the cosmet­ the items seized. 39 which dealt with the plain view doc­ ics were known to have been mailed, The above case illustrates a trine. 34 Aithough legal scholars, and although the specific mailing dates and "broad" interpretation of the inadver­ occasionally courts, continue to debate contents of these other packages were tence requirement, seemingly requiring whether this portion of the Supreme not known. the suppression of evidence seized Court's opinion in Coolidge is binding An assistant U.S. attorney, who where oificers "suspected" or "ex­ as precedent,35 it appears that the was consulted in the course of the pected" that items not named in the overwhelming majority of decisions investigation, advised the postal offi­ search warrant would be located, but which have considered it have accept­ cials that probable cause existed only did not have probable cause to believe ed "inadvertence" as a constitutionally for the seizure of the package of name­ the items would be found. required element of the plain view doc­ brand cosmetics. Accordingly, a The majority of the cases have t~ine. 36 Therefore, for purposes of this search warrant was sought and ob­ interpreted the inadvertence require­ article, it will be assumed that this ele­ tained describing only the one package ment more narrowly and have required ment must be satisfied. and its contents. the suppression of evidence seized in Given the requirement that a dis­ When the search warrant was ex­ plain view only where, prior to the sei­ covery must be "inadvertent," a further ecuted at the employee's residence, a zure, officers had probable cause to question remains: Just how "inadver­ store security officer accompanied the believe the items would be present, tent" must the discovery be? postal authorities for the purpose of and therefore, could have obtained a A few courts have interpreted in­ identifying any additional merchandise search warrant specifically describing a,dvertent to mean "unexpected" or belonging to the store found in the the items. 4o "unanticipated," and therefore, have home. The box described in the war­ A recent Federal court of appeals refused to sanction plain view seizures rant was never found, but a number of case, United States v. Hare,41 illus­ where the officer had some expecta­ other boxes, identified as containing trates the majority view. In this case, tion that such items would be found. A merchandise from the store, were dis­ special agents of the Bureau of Alco­ recent Federal district court decision, covered and seized. hol, Tobacco and Firearms (AT F) had In Re Motion for Return of Property, 37 gathered evidence that Hare was in­ illustrates this approach. volved in the illegal interstate transpor­ tation of substantial quantities of firearms. In the course of their investi­ gation, the ATF agents had contacted agents of the Drug Enforcement Ad­ ministration (DEA) and had determined 28 I FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin ". .'probable cause' is the appropriate standard of certainty to justify a warrantless plain view seizure." the DEA agents were also investigating "If 'inadvertent' is interpreted as plain view in situations where the offi· Hare for suspected narcotics viola­ 'unexpected,' an absurd scenario cers had insufficient facts prior to the tions. After extensive investigation, an would take place every time the police seizure to apply for and obtain .a ATF agent obtained a search warrant execute a search warrant on tl1e prem­ search warrant. for Hare's residence, which authorized ises of a person suspected of engaging "any special agent of the Bureau of in a variety of criminal activities, but Immediately Apparent Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms" to when they have probable cause (and a The third and final requirement for search Hare's home fer an unknown warrant) to search for the fruits of only a valid plain view seizure is that the quantity of firearms, ammunition, a on.e crime. In such a case, whenever incriminating nature of the item to be sawed-off shotgun, and a machinegun, evidence of one of these other crimes seized be "immediately apparent" to all possessed in violation of Federal turns up, even though it would have the officer. As Justice Stewart ex­ criminal statutes. been impossible to obtain a warrant plained in Coolidge: The search warrant was executed previously, someone must be sent to "Of course, the extension of the by ATF agents, while three DEA obtain a new warrant to authorize the original justification is legitimate only agents guarded the doors to the resi­ seizure. At the same time, the where it is immediately apparent to the \ ' dence. The ATF case agent testified intrusion has already occurred in a fully police that they have evidence before that the DEA agents were there to legal, limited manner, so Fourth them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not provide additional manpower and to Amendment interests are not served be used to extend a general explorato­ identify narcotics in the event that any by delay. The courts do try to avoid ry search from one object to another were found in the course of the search. imposing significant limitations and until something incriminating at last In the living room, on a table in burdens on the ability of the police to emerges." 46 plain view, the agents found narcotics do their job when those burdens would Thus, it is clear that not all objects and narcotics paraphernalia which serve no purpose. We conclude that within the plain view of an officer who were immediately recognizable as unless the police had the abih'ty and is lawfully present are subject to sei­ such.
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