The Chinese Communists, 1930-1945 Author(S): Henry G
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Western Washington University Western CEDAR History Faculty and Staff ubP lications History 7-1970 Nature of Leadership: The hineseC Communists, 1930 - 1945 Henry G. Schwarz Western Washington University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://cedar.wwu.edu/history_facpubs Part of the Asian History Commons Recommended Citation Schwarz, Henry G., "Nature of Leadership: The hineC se Communists, 1930 - 1945" (1970). History Faculty and Staff Publications. 40. https://cedar.wwu.edu/history_facpubs/40 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the History at Western CEDAR. It has been accepted for inclusion in History Faculty and Staff Publications by an authorized administrator of Western CEDAR. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Trustees of Princeton University The Nature of Leadership: The Chinese Communists, 1930-1945 Author(s): Henry G. Schwarz Source: World Politics, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Jul., 1970), pp. 541-581 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009650 . Accessed: 30/10/2014 13:02 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Cambridge University Press and Trustees of Princeton University are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to World Politics. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Thu, 30 Oct 2014 13:02:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE NATURE OF LEADERSHIP* The ChineseCommunists, 1930-1945 By HENRY G. SCHWARZ* INTRODUCTION THE twentiethanniversary ofthe assumption of state power by the ChineseCommunists is a convenientoccasion to take stockof the many dramaticevents that have taken place since that firstday in Octoberof 1949, when Mao Tse-tungproclaimed the new People's Republicof China. The anniversary,however, is more than a fortui- tousproduct of the Westerncalendar. It lies close to one of thosecon- vulsiveperiods that have jolted China fromtime to time and have causedmajor changes in the Chinesestate and society.The creationof thePeople's Republic twenty years ago was one suchperiod. The Great Leap Forwardof the late fiftieswas another,and the recentGreat ProletarianCultural Revolution may have been a third.Each of these eventshas substantiallyreshaped the stateor societyor both. From a historicalpoint of view, the next major eventthat may well come shortlyafter the twentiethanniversary is the death of Mao Tse-tung and otherco-founders of theCommunist state. This anniversary,there- fore,offers an opportunityto reassessthe recordof the ChineseCom- munistssince 1949 witha view towardunderstanding the settingand theproblems that the post-Mao leadership will soon inherit. Such a taskcannot be complete,however, without a reassessmentof thenature of leadership.Indeed, without studying the nature of leader- ship,we cannotunderstand much else of a totalitariansystem where in theoryand practicethe Partyleadership is boththe originatorand ex- ecutorof changesin all major aspectsof the world'smost populous country. Perhapsthe mostimportant among the leadership'smany facets is therelations among the handful of men who untilat leastthe cultural revolutionhave governedCommunist China. Specifically,before we can understandChina we must understandthe relativeinfluence of eachof these men in thegoverning process. As to theidentity of China's leadership,an almostlimitless choice is open to the researcher,from the entiremembership of the CommunistParty to one man. This studydesignates the Political Bureau as the leadershipalthough a * This paper was firstpresented at the Seventh International Conference on World Politics, Noordwijk, The Netherlands, August 31-September6, i969. This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Thu, 30 Oct 2014 13:02:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 542 WORLD POLITICS studyof thenature of leadershipeven of a highlystructured political systemsuch as CommunistChina may at timeshave to include leaders who are not membersof thePolitical Bureau. Such methodological flexibilityis even more necessary in anystudy of theCommunist lead- ershipbefore i949, whenit was lessstructured and morein flux. Strangeas itcertainly is, after twenty years of state power and almost fiftyyears of existenceof theChinese Communist Party, not a single monographhas been writtenon thisvitally important subject. The onlybook whosetitle promises to studythe natureof leadershipis JohnW. Lewis' Leadershipin CommunistChina.1 But the title is misleadingbecause, instead of analyzingthe actual nature of leader- ship,it ablyand comprehensivelypresents certain ideals of leadership as expoundedin theParty's guidelines. This is notto saythat China specialistshave ignored the nature of leadership. Quite on thecontrary, virtuallyevery study of theParty and manystudies on othersubjects manifesttheir authors' conceptions of the leadership.In mostcases, however,these conceptions are not treatedin theirown right.They arebut images applied to the treatment ofsome other subject. As Isaacs and othershave shown,images are acquiredsubconsciously and are seldomreliable. They are formedout of a varietyof haphazardlyac- quiredexperiences, such as personalrecollections of lifein China,bits and piecesof informationacquired from scholarly and otherworks, seeminglyrelevant observations in other countries that are either Com- munistor Asianor economicallyunderdeveloped or anycombination thereof,and many others. No twoChina specialists have an identicalimage, but while there are manyminor differences, most China specialists share one general image. I callthis image quasi-collective. It shows policy issues as beingthreshed outin a frankand no-holds-barredmanner among the seven men in theStanding Committee, if notquite so freelyin thelarger Political Bureau.Such leadership is collective,but the prevailing image adds one importantdifference, in its depictionof Mao Tse-tung'sinfluence as considerablygreater than that of his co-leaders.Mao is envisagedas beingmore than first among equals in thathis decision-making powers havepresumably been relatively unencumbered bythe actions and opin- ionsof otherleaders. By virtueof explicitlysuperior prerogatives and ofhis own persuasive powers, Mao is seenas beingable to influence the outcomeof policydeliberations. Moreover, he and onlyhe can imple- mentpolicies in ways somewhat divergent from the letter and the spirit 1 Ithaca i963. This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Thu, 30 Oct 2014 13:02:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE NATURE OF LEADERSHIP: CHINA 543 ofthese policies. In sum,the image projects a crossbreedbetween a col- lectiveand a fullyhierarchical leadership. Onebasic shortcoming ofthis image is thatit handles the concept of powerin an undifferentiatingmanner. An excellentmajor work of re- centyears opens with the flat assertion that "Mao Tse-tung'srise to poweris a well-knownfact."2 By failing to dissect"power" and to sub- jectits myriad interacting facets to analysis,many scholars have been led tobelieve, erroneously in my opinion, that "power" will inevitably andin all politicalsystems gravitate to one person. An analysisof lead- ership,based on "power,"helps to bringabout an imagethat comes at timesperilously close to an all-or-nothingview. I suspectthat the con- ceptof "power,"taken as a whole,is tooimposing to encouragedis- section. ProfessorRue providesclear illustrations of this effect in relationto twocardinal aspects of leadership. On theproblem of relations within theleadership, the focus of this study, Rue says that "the Seventh Con- gress[of April of 1945] was Mao'sCongress of Victors. He had over- comeall hisenemies in theChinese party."3 Categorical concepts breed morecategorical concepts; "power" begets "enemies" and "victors." Ofthe almost infinite variety of internal relationships, that of "enemy" is onlyone but, admittedly, the most sharply delineated of all relation- ships."Victors," which in thecontext of thesentence refers not to na- tionalvictors over the Japanese, whose defeat was certainin Aprilof I945, butto intra-Party victors, is equallycategorical. It leaves no room foranything but its antithesis, the "vanquished." The conceptof undifferentiated"power" embedded in the quasi- collectiveimage also affectsthe analysis of leadershipcontrol over the Partyhierarchy. Rue statesthat "after the SeventhCongress, Mao's powerrested on twoclosely related factors. One was control of the party apparatus;the other was the belief of other leaders of the Chinese party thathis political line was correct and that his thought was the best rep- resentativeof Marxist-Leninistideology in China."4I shallelaborate lateron themerits of this statement. For thetime being, it willsuffice topoint out that Mao is portrayed,as in thedescription of intra-leader- shiprelations, as beingmuch more than first among equals. He, and onlyhe, had "control of the party apparatus." Anotherfundamental shortcoming of thequasi-collective image is itsreliance on documentaryevidence that is eitherskimpy or altogether 2John E. Rue, Mao Tse-tung In Opposition,