SPECIAL FEATURE: THE LEGACY OF SAM FRANCIS The Method of Samuel T. Francis: From Burnham to Ethnopolitics Brent Nelson 37 Three Pillars Michael O’Meara 49 Personal Recollections of Sam Francis Jared Taylor 55 Remembering Sam Francis Louis T. March 61 Prophets of Rootedness: Sam Francis and Friedrich Nietzsche Mark Wegierski 69 Apostrophe to a Gardener Sam Francis 75

BOOK REVIEWS Esau’s Tears Reviewed by Kevin MacDonald 77 The Conservative Bookshelf: Essential Works That Impact Today’s Conservative Thinkers Reviewed by Robert S. Grifﬁn 85 Thinkers of our Time: James Burnham Reviewed by Louis Andrews 93 Beautiful Losers: Essays on the Failure of American Conservatism Reviewed by Peter B. Gemma 95

About the Editors 101 Editorial Advisory Board 102

The Occidental Quarterly (ISSN 1539-3925), a journal of Western thought and opinion, is published by The Charles Martel Society four times annually in the Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter. Unsolicited manuscripts from contributing authors should be submitted to the editorial department: P.O. Box 695, Mt. Airy, MD 21771. Style sheets are available upon request. Subscriptions in the U.S. are $40 annually, $78 for two years, and $114 for three years; subscription rates for Canada are $45 (ﬁrst year), $88 (two years), and $129 (three years); European subscription rates: $60 (ﬁrst year), $118 (two years), and $174 (three years). All subscriptions, including additional inquiries or subscription problems, should be mailed to the subscription department: P.O. Box 3462, Augusta, GA 30914. Back issues are $10 each. � � � � � � ��

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THE INTELLECTUAL LEGACY OF SAM FRANCIS

istorian, author, editor, and columnist, Sam Francis—unlike his contemporaries in the conservative movement—occupied a unique H standpoint on the political and cultural struggle to preserve what must be preserved of our Western heritage. A genuine skeptic in the tradition of H. L. Mencken, Sam had a firm understanding of human nature that doubtless owed its roots to his Presbyterian upbringing. He grasped, as has no other contemporary national commentator, the dynamics of race and culture as forces that shape and distinguish each nation and civilization. And, while Sam took an avid interest in the study of human evolution and in the application of genetics and its sociobiological out- growths in understanding human behavior, he was a militant defender of Christianity’s role and traditions as the faith of the West. From his deep study of history and politics, Sam developed two conceptual frameworks to describe the political forces that dominate contemporary Western nations. Influenced by the American political philosopher James Burnham and Burnham’s preceptors—Machiavelli, Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, and Robert Michels—he analyzed the operations of the small elites that rule all human societies, including “democracies.” Sam’s purpose was not to advance the case for oligarchy but rather to arm, intellectually and volitionally, the white American citizen, whose honor and liberties were always his chief concern, against those despoilers of his country who rule through artifice and fraud behind a false screen of “freedom.” Several of the essays in this issue of TOQ examine this facet of Sam’s work. Sam derived his second schema for political analysis from the late political scientist Donald Warren, who identified the chief potential opposition to the vise-like grip in which the U.S. political, business, and “nonprofit” octopus now holds the fate of the American nation as the Middle American Radicals (MARs). Gradually forsaking the shibboleths of establishment conservatism, Sam brought all of his formidable gifts to the defense of the MARs, still the nation’s majority and the heirs of the founders and builders of Americas, for all that America’s real rulers sneer at them as “rednecks,” “ethnics,” and the denizens of “fly-over country.” 4 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly

Sam hammered out numberless hard-hitting editorials and columns to en- lighten the MARs as to their real interests, and coined many a pungent phrase to drive home his point. Thus, following the Rodney King riots of 1992, he encapsulated the real significance of the widespread antiwhite violence, which claimed scores of incident lives, with a tag lifted from lawyers’ briefs on behalf of the criminal “motorist” whose behavior occasioned the riots: “Blunt Force Trauma.” Sam’s style and substance on behalf of Middle America earned him his share of nicknames from his admirers and deriders alike. Pat Buchanan famously called him “the Clausewitz of the right,” while to Marxist Leonard Zeskind, who smears patriots for ostracism and blacklisting, Sam was the “General from MARS.” Eventually Sam paid for his brilliance and his fortitude with what, to the summer soldiers and sunshine patriots of today’s conservatism, was career ruin. Yet, although he was fired from his position as an award-winning editor at the Washington Times, and though his many enemies on the left and right continued to brand him a “racist” in their dogged efforts to deny him a living from championing our cause, Sam continued to hone and to use his weapons, ever to better effect, in defense of his and our kind. We take pride that a considerable portion of the full flowering of Sam’s intellect took place in the pages of this journal, where he worked devotedly as editor and writer for four years. For those fortunate to have known him as a comrade and companion, Sam was a friend of unshakeable loyalty. Indomi- table in combat, wise in counsel, Sam Francis was both a lion and a fox for his nation, his culture, and his race. Just before his death, Sam put the finishing editorial touches on a volume entitled Race and the American Future. This collection of powerful essays, by some of the foremost writers on the issues that affect our race, will be available later this year and is expected to be judged a definitive assessment of America’s contemporary quagmire. CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 1954–1964

RAYMOND WOLTERS

PART II: THE CONTINUING CONTROVERSY

he segregationists’ counterattack on the Brown ruling and its historical and social science underpinnings was not limited to courtroom battles. Ever since Brown they Thad also challenged the prevailing public opinion about school desegregation. After Stell v. Savannah they redoubled these efforts. Henry E. Garrett and Wesley Critz George often wrote for general audiences, and two especially gifted writers, James J. Kilpatrick and Carleton Putnam, also came to the defense of segregation. From the moment of the Brown decision, Kilpatrick regarded desegregation as “jurisprudence gone mad.” He thought the Supreme Court had ignored eight decades of legal precedents and willfully disregarded the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since the justices had interpreted the Constitution “to suit their own gauzy concepts of sociology,” Kilpatrick recommended that the South use every possible legal means to circumvent desegregation. “Let us pledge ourselves to litigate this thing for fifty years,” he wrote. “If one remedial law is ruled invalid, then let us try another; and if the second is ruled invalid, then let us enact a third…If it be said now that the South is flouting the law, let it be said to the high court, You taught us how.”1 In an extraordinary series of editorials published in the Richmond News Leader in 1955, Kilpatrick resurrected the Jeffersonian idea of interposition as a way to stop abuses of federal power. When a Federalist Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, in apparent disregard of states’ rights and of the First Amendment’s prohibition of laws that abridged freedom of speech, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson prepared protests known as the Virginia and Kentucky Resolves. If the federal government acted unconstitutionally, Madison and Jefferson asserted, a state had the right to interpose its authority between the federal government and its own citizens. Yet Madison and Jefferson did not have to specify the precise meaning of interposition, for the Alien and Sedition Acts expired on March 3, 1801, the day before Jefferson succeeded John Adams as president of the United States. It was John C. Calhoun, writing in the 1820s and 1830s, who prescribed how states might resist unconstitutional federal encroachments without with- drawing from the Union. They could “interpose,” or suspend, the operation of 6 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly a federal law considered unconstitutional, pending resolution of the dispute according to the manner prescribed in Article V of the Constitution. In joining the Union, each state had conceded that the Constitution might be amended by three-fourths of the states. Thus interposition by one state could prevail only if it was sustained by at least one-fourth of the sister states. Individual states possessed the right to set aside laws they considered unconstitutional, Calhoun asserted, but this right was to be checked by the power of three-fourths of the states acting in concert. Kilpatrick thought the right to interpose could be inferred from the nature of the Constitution and its system of checks and balances. In his view the Brown Court, while purporting to interpret the Constitution, had actually amended the charter and in the process had arrogated powers that were reserved to not fewer than three-fourths of the states. According to the logic of Madison, Jef- ferson, and Calhoun, however, usurpations such as Brown could be checked and suspended pending appeal to the people of the states that had joined to form the federal Union.2 In February 1956, Virginia’s state legislature adopted an interposition resolution which asserted that, in the absence of an amendment to the Constitution, states retained the authority to operate racially segregated schools, provided such schools were substantially equal. By mid-1957, eight states had formally approved measures of interposition, and three others had protested officially against the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown.3 Meanwhile, 19 southern senators and 81 members of the House of Rep- resentatives challenged the legitimacy of Brown with a formal Declaration of Constitutional Principles (popularly known as “the Southern Manifesto”). It described “the unwarranted decision of the Supreme Court” as the substitu- tion of “naked power for established law.” It praised states that had “declared the intention to resist forced integration by any lawful means.” And it asked people outside the South “to consider the constitutional principles involved against the time when they too, on issues vital to them, may be the victims of judicial encroachment.”4 Endorsed by many southern luminaries (including Harry Byrd of Virginia, James F. Byrnes of South Carolina, J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, and Richard B. Russell of Georgia), the Southern Manifesto was “a calculated declaration of political war against [Brown].”5 It shouted defiance while declaring for law and order. It became a battle cry for massive resistance.6 Since Kilpatrick was a journalist steeped in American history, his arguments emphasized states’ rights and constitutionalism. He mentioned differences in brain size and IQ, but with touches of uncertainty that befit a writer who did not pretend to be a scientist. He acknowledged that “the question of the Negro’s innate inferiority has not been proved and hence is still open.” Person- ally, Kilpatrick “incline[d]” toward the view that Negroes, on average, were innately inferior in intellectual ability, but he refused to assert that he knew Summer 2005 / Wolters 7 this to be true. He insisted instead that, in terms of the problem immediately at hand, the question of whether the Negro’s shortcomings were innate was “irrelevant.” If the condition was intrinsic, Kilpatrick saw “nothing but disas- ter…in risking an accelerated intermingling of blood lines.” If it was acquired, blacks still lagged so far behind that most whites were determined not to let their children be “guinea pigs for any man’s social experiment.” Kilpatrick pointed in particular to practical problems that he thought would beset the schools if integration were implemented at a time when one race, on average, trailed far behind the other in academic achievement.7 This did not satisfy the segregationists’ most popular writer, Carleton Putnam. Putnam thought that Kilpatrick and some other southerners were mistaken to think “that the Constitution could save [the South]—that states’ rights was its best defense.” Instead of emphasizing constitutional principles, segregationists should stress the importance of differences in brain size and IQ; and they should warn that interracial mating would increase if students were sent to desegregated schools where they would be taught that racial differences were of no great significance. Putnam said that “instinctive human kindness” had prevented many southern leaders from emphasizing the importance of IQ and the size and structure of the brain, but the NAACP and its allies had left segregationists with “no choice.” However much they might regret the necessity of discussing the shortcomings of the Negro, there was “a point at which kindness…ceases to be a virtue.”8 Putnam was an unlikely recruit to the segregationist cause. He was born in New York, educated at Princeton and Columbia, and descended from the Revolutionary War general Israel Putnam. After making a fortune as a founder and executive of Delta Airlines, he had written a well-regarded biography of Theodore Roosevelt. When the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Brown, Putnam was absorbed with other matters and did not pay much attention to school desegregation. But he kept abreast of the news and over the course of the next few years found the arguments for segregation more cogent than those for integration. After the school desegregation crisis in Little Rock (1957–58) Putnam wrote to President Eisenhower saying that “the law must be obeyed,” but Brown was wrong, “that it ought to be reversed, and that meanwhile every legal means should be found, not to disobey it, but to avoid it.”9 President Eisenhower did not respond to Putnam’s letter, but Putnam had made the case for segregation with such style and force that, after the letter was published in southern newspapers, a group called the “Putnam Letters Com- mittee” received $37,000 in contributions to reprint the letter as a paid adver- tisement in newspapers outside the South.10 When eight northern newspapers refused the ads, Putnam became convinced that the national press had closed its mind and had established a “paper curtain” to prevent the American people from hearing the truth about race and race relations. To combat this, Putnam published two books, Race and Reason: A Yankee View (1961), which sold more 8 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly than a hundred thousand copies, and Race and Reality (1967). A Northerner by birth and inheritance, Putnam won acclaim in the South. In Mississippi, Governor Ross Barnett designated October 26, 1961, “Race and Reason Day,” and in Louisiana and Virginia the state boards of education made Race and Reason required reading for high school students.11 Putnam argued that there were substantial biological differences between the races and that differences in anatomy, especially brain structure, were “the crux” of America’s racial problems.12 He feared that school integration would lead to “an ever increasing rate of interbreeding” and that this eventually would degrade American civilization. This was hardly a new idea, and one critic dismissed Putnam’s work as simply another “pernicious” addition to “the rubbish pile of racist tracts.” But it was an especially “dangerous contribution” because, as other critics observed, Putnam was “an effective writer with a fluid style and beguiling presentation”; he was making “tiresome” arguments with such “verve and literacy” that he was “enchanting a number of southern newspaper editors and even a few scientists.”13 Putnam put a Yankee gloss on an argument that southerners had been making for years. As James T. Patterson has noted in his history, Brown v. Board of Education (2001), segregationists not only “raised the specter of sexually aggressive black males” but also “worried that their own children might come to enjoy the company, even sexual relationships, with blacks.”14 This was true of elite whites as well members of the rank and file. In 1956 South Carolina’s Governor James F. Byrnes, himself a former justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, insisted one cannot discuss [Brown] without admitting that, in the South, there is a fundamental objection to integration. White Southerners fear that the purpose of many of those advocating integration is to break down social barriers in the period of adolescence and ultimately bring about intermarriage of the races. Because they are opposed to this, they are opposed to abolishing segregation. Segregation was not based on “petty prejudice,” Byrnes insisted, but on “an instinctive desire for the preservation of our race.” He contended that “pride of race has been responsible for the grouping of people along ethnic lines throughout the world.” He endorsed Benjamin Disraeli’s assertion that no one should “treat with indifference the principle of race. It is the key to history.” Although Byrnes did not dwell on racial statistics pertaining to crime, illegitimacy, and venereal disease, he said parents should try to rear their children in an atmosphere reasonably free from moral dangers. When they were forced to give their children to school authorities for several hours each day, parents had the duty as well as the right to “control the schools their children attend.” “The lives of our children must not be fashioned by some bureaucrat in Washington,” Byrnes declared.15 Herbert Ravenal Sass, a well-known author from Charleston, South Caro- lina, also worried that “integration of white and Negro children in the South’s Summer 2005 / Wolters 9 primary schools would open the gates to miscegenation and widespread racial amalgamation.” In an article in the Atlantic, Sass maintained that integration rested on the premise that blacks and whites were essentially alike except for skin color. Integrated schools consequently would turn out “successive generations in whom, because they are imbued with this philosophy, the instinct of race preference would have been suppressed.” Some people thought this would be a good thing, the happy solution to the race problem in America. But Sass maintained that one need look no farther than Latin America to see that the fusion of racial bloodlines led to second-class societies.16 Not all segregationists feared miscegenation. Sociologist A. James Gregor, for one, said that because people possessed an instinctive “consciousness of kind” there was little chance of widespread interracial mating. According to Gregor, “social creatures throughout the animal kingdom” manifested a “disposition to identify with only select members of [their] species.” Hence, in the past “anything more than a casual or temporary contact between widely diverse races” had led, at the least, to “prejudice and discrimination and a subsequent rationalization for felt preferences.” On some occasions, mixing had led either to subordination or extermination.17 Nevertheless, Carleton Putnam warned that one could not break down educational barriers “without eventually breaking them down heterosexually.” As an example, he mentioned the comment of an eighteen-year-old white girl who attended an integrated high school in the North: I remember reading somewhere that a famous sociologist said that about the last person that the average white kid would be interested in is a Negro. I have news for him. Integration is a gradual process. At first it is difficult to see anything but that they are Negroes. Later you think of them as just people and then as friends. As one girl I know put it, from there it is just a hop, skip and a jump before you think of them as more than friends. Almost every white girl I knew had a secret crush on one of the colored boys. The crushes varied from warm friendship to wild infatuation…One of the girls felt guilty about it but she kept on dating the colored boy…She once told me that if people were going to object they shouldn’t expose us to the temptation. As she put it, we’re not all saints.18 In his private correspondence Putnam acknowledged that the available evidence had not conclusively proved or disproved the theory of innate Negro inferiority. He knew that anthropology was “not an exact science.” He agreed with the judgment of the NAACP’s John A. Morsell “no [scholar] has ever been able (or is ever likely to be able) to control enough of the conditioning factors to make genuinely scientific comparison possible.” Putnam considered Morsell’s comment “the best critique…of any I received…in style and tone, as well as in content.” Nevertheless, Putnam insisted that “in the management of human affairs all law and practical judgments are based on a balance of probabilities.”19 10 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly

While James J. Kilpatrick and Carleton Putnam were the leading popular- izers of the case for segregation, like-minded scientists and social scientists joined together in 1959 to establish the International Association for the Advancement of Ethnology and Eugenics (IAAEE). It was an imposing title for an organization whose purpose was to oversee and coordinate the efforts of scientific racists. Chartered in 1959, the IAAEE’s first president was Robert Kuttner, the Creighton University biologist who had given testimony in Stell v. Savannah. The membership included most of those who had testified in Stell and many others: British geneticist R. Ruggles Gates, Italian sociologist Corrado Gini, and several American professors, among them George Lundberg of the University of Washington, Frank McGurk of Villanova, Audrey M. Shuey of Randolph-Macon Womens College, and Charles Callan Tansill of Georgetown. With funds provided by Wickliffe Draper of the Pioneer Fund, the IAAEE set up a scholarly journal, Mankind Quarterly, and distributed pamphlets and other literature to a mailing list of sixteen thousand people.20 The revival of scientific racism surprised many observers, who thought that the Second World War and the destruction of fascism had brought an end to such thinking. Because the Nazis had perverted racial science, many scholars avoided the field of racial studies. In his book of 1942, Man’s Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race, Ashley Montagu had noted In our time the problem of race has assumed an alarmingly exaggerated importance. Alarming, because racial dogmas have been made the basis for an inhumanely brutal political philosophy which has already resulted in the death or social disfranchisement of millions of innocent individuals.”21 In 1961 the members of the American Anthropological Association approved a resolution which asserted that “for the good of mankind in general the myth [of racial inferiority] ought to be recognized for what it is—a pretext for bigotry and discrimination.22 The organization of the IAAEE and publication of Mankind Quarterly, however, signaled that at least some authorities no longer felt “that because the study of race once gave ammunition to racial fascists, who misused it,” researchers should avoid the study of racial differences.23 Instead, several racial scientists had decided, as one critic noted, “to re-open Pandora’s box.” According to this critic, “the fact that scientist[s] of [the] calibre of [R. Ruggles] Gates [were] participating in the undertaking render[ed] the initiative nothing less than tragical.”24

THE BOASIAN COUNTERATTACK

The pro-segregation testimony in Stell, the IAAEE, and Mankind Quarterly eventually provoked a counterreaction among mainstream social scientists. Many conventional scholars initially seemed to sputter, as if they did not wish to pay the compliment of a rational response to arguments they considered unworthy. They feared that discussion might dignify the proposition that Summer 2005 / Wolters 11 blacks were inherently inferior in intellectual aptitude. They hardly knew what to say when told that black students, even gifted black students, would be better off in all-black schools. Charles L. Black of the Yale Law School confessed that it was hard for him to keep “a straight face” when he heard such statements.25 Others responded with abusive reproach. Writing in Man, the journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of London, G. Ainsworth Harrison dismissed the first three issues of Mankind Quarterly as “no more than incompetent attempts to rationalize irrational opinions.”26 In Science, the journal of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Santiago Genoves criticized Mankind Quarterly for “using science, or rather pseudosci- ence, to try to establish postulates of racial superiority or inferiority based on biological differences.”27 And in Current Anthropology, Juan Comas described Mankind Quarterly as “a supposedly scientific journal whose contents are the cause of profound concern to those interested in racial questions…”28 Critics of the IAAEE and of Mankind Quarterly began by noting that the great majority of anthropologists rejected scientific racism. In simplified form, racists said that races could be identified by physical appearance and measurements; that some races possessed more intelligence than others; and that races which were deficient in intelligence lacked the ability to develop or even to maintain a high civilization. In response, critics said there was a “nearly overwhelming rejection of scientific claims of white superiority by a consensus of scientific opinion.”29 Yet appeals to authority did not settle the matter, for scientific racists insisted that truth was not established by majority vote. They knew that anti-racist views had become predominant in the academic world, and they recognized that “the favorable opinion of [a scholar’s] fellow intellectuals is vital since he depends on them for a livelihood and companionship.”30 Yet, despite an inhospitable climate of opinion at most universities and foundations, racist scholars felt the need to publish, even if it meant that they would suffer professionally. They said it would never do if scholars, for reasons of expediency, lied to the world about what they considered the truth. “Not since the days of Galileo has science seen anything like [this],” the editor of Mankind Quarterly declared.31 Scientific racists thought their views had been rejected because of recent political developments. Mankind Quarterly acknowledged that Nazi Germany had committed “terrible crimes and gross abuses,” “allegedly in the name of ‘race.’” In the opinion of the journal, however, “the tragedy of Nazism and the reaction to its bestialities,” unfortunately, had also instigated a counter reaction that “had come to bedevil our field of studies.”32 Contributors to the quarterly affirmed that, in reaction against the Nazis’ perverse use of doctrines of racial superiority and inferiority, many well-intentioned scholars went to the other extreme and denied the existence of any significant racial differences. One contributor said that “as a result of the German excesses most intellectuals…took a stand at the other extreme on the question of…the existence of 12 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly racial differences.”33 Another complained that fellow scholars would not have “a frank and realistic discussion of the minority problem” because they feared that “a more realistic view would merely be seized upon by the prejudiced as vindication of their hostility.”34 Meanwhile, an important transition had occurred within the field of anthropology. At one time physical anthropologists had been dominant at Harvard, Pennsylvania, and other leading universities. In the nineteenth century physical anthropologists had been preoccupied with classifying and measuring distinctive populations. In the early years of the twentieth century they continued to measure variations in the shape of heads and the color of hair, eyes, and skin. They were especially concerned with fossils and with documenting the sequence whereby Homo sapiens had evolved from early primate ancestors and had adapted to different environments. Yet physical anthropology came under a cloud in the 1930s. One leader of the discipline, Earnest Hooton of Harvard, felt it necessary to state explicitly that his findings “should not be interpreted as a substantiation of any of the ridiculous and pernicious doctrines of racial inequality which have become a menace to the peace of the world and which have brought tragedy upon millions of blameless and worthy individuals.”35 Nevertheless, Hooton also insisted that anthropologists had a responsibility to report the truth on racial differences. So did Carleton Coon of the University of Pennsylvania, who “rel- ished the diverse personalities and physical traits of all he met.” Coon “cared genuinely and deeply about some of the tribal peoples he lived with. But he was always classifying, noting features, slotting people into pigeonholes, whether he was meeting Kurdish herders in Iraq or Celtic academics in Boston. And he had names for these pigeonholes—scientific ones, not racial epithets—and an ineradicable habit of referring casually to people as he thought of them, as members of a particular group or subgroup.”36 After Hitler, the tendency to classify people became unfashionable and even offensive to some. The vogue then shifted to cultural anthropology, a field that had been germinating for decades in the seminars of Columbia University professor Franz Boas. At one time Boas had reported that “the average size of the Negro brain is slightly smaller than the average size of the brain of the white race,” and he therefore thought it likely “that differences in mental characteristics of the two races exist.” Even before Hitler’s rise to power, however, Boas had come to emphasize that a people’s cultural heritage—their ideas and values—shaped the way they lived. Boas acknowledged that Caucasians had developed a high civilization “which is sweeping the whole world”; that Asians had developed impressive but less technical civilizations; and that Negroes lagged behind. But he insisted that “the reason for this fact” did “not necessarily lie in a greater ability of the races of Europe and Asia.” He thought “the variations in cultural development” could be explained “by a consideration Summer 2005 / Wolters 13 of the general course of historical events” and without recourse to any innate differences.37 Boas also trained a number of influential anthropologists (among them Ruth Benedict, Melville Herskovits, Alfred Kroeber, Margaret Mead, Ashley Montagu), and the “Boasians” (as they were sometimes called) proceeded to detach “civilization” from “race.” They not only stressed the importance of culture and history in shaping human behavior; they also repudiated the significance of race as a way to account for human differences. Previously, many educated people had considered racial inheritance responsible for at least some differences in civilizational standards. The Boasians, on the other hand, attributed the differences to history and environment. They emphasized “patterns of culture” as an explanation of social behavior. They minimized the significance of physical differences. And by emphasizing that the range of differences within the black racial grouping greatly overlapped that among whites, they called into question the very concept of race. Some Boasians regarded “the Negro race” not as a biological reality but a sociological concept.38 After World War II, the predominance of cultural anthropology was manifest in several official resolutions. In a 1951 statement that Ashley Montagu edited for UNESCO, fourteen well-regarded geneticists and anthropologists asserted: “[T]he differences in physical structure which distinguish one major group from another give no support to popular notions of any general ‘superiority’ or ‘inferiority’…The scientific material available to us at present does not justify the conclusion that inherited genetic differences are a major factor in producing the differences between the cultures and cultural achievements of different peoples or groups…Available scientific knowledge provides no basis for believing that the groups of mankind differ in their innate capacity for intellectual and emotional development.”39 Ten years later the governing board of the American Anthropological Association expressed its “concern” over what it described as the “false and misrepresentative” use of “anthropological science” by persons who were “not recognized by the American Anthropological Association as professional anthropologists.” By a vote of 192–0, the Association asserted that “scientific evidence indicates that the range of mental capacities in all ethnic groups is much the same,” and it specifically “repudiate[d] statements…that Negroes are biologically and in innate mental ability inferior to whites …”40 In 1963 the American Association of Physical Anthropologists “deplore[d] the misuse of science to advocate racism” and specifically condemned “such writings as [Carleton Putnam’s book] Race and Reason.”41 These statements were further evidence of the shift in opinion that had accelerated in the years since 1942, when, at the height of Nazism, Ashley Mon- tagu had called attention to the harm that could be done in the name of “race.” As fellow anthropologist C. Loring Brace noted, Montagu’s book, Man’s Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race, “rode a wave of public reaction fueled by a 14 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly growing awareness of the pervasive evil manifest in the Nazi uses of ‘race.’” Indeed, “the social message concerning the misapplication of the concept of ‘race’…was so compelling that the book went through three editions before biologists began to make the first tentative steps toward catching up with” Montagu.42 Eventually, there was a counterreaction among some physical anthropologists. In 1954, for example, Carleton Coon complained about “certain writers, who are mostly social anthropologists.” According to Coon, these writers considered it “immoral to study race” and produced “book after book expos- ing [race] as a ‘myth.’ Their argument is that because the study of race once gave ammunition to racial fascists, who misused it, we should pretend that races do not exist.”43 Some biologists, geneticists, and zoologists also refused to abandon the concept of race. One such was geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky, who was a personal friend and sometimes co-author with Ashley Montagu. Nevertheless, Dobzhansky continued to maintain that “Race differences are facts of nature which can, given sufficient study, be ascertained objectively.” Dobzhansky believed that, over the long course of history, many of the differences probably had been adaptations to different climates and environments. Darker skins, for example, were resistant to sunburn and skin cancer, lighter skins less susceptible to frostbite, and other differences may well have influenced the ability to thrive in high altitudes and susceptibility or resistance to certain diseases.44 The need for effective medical treatments would later stimulate further study of human genetic variability. While noting the persistence of races, Dobzhansky also recognized that, because of migrations and racial crossings, physically intermediate populations had existed for thousands of years. The gene flow had been so pervasive that there were no “pure” races. It was possible, perhaps likely, that there had been enough hybridization to create intellectual equality among the subgroups of mankind. Dobzhansky also insisted that there was no warrant for believing that differences in physical characteristics were related to a group’s ability to develop or maintain a civilization. “Nobody can discover the cultural capacities of…races until they have been given something like an equal opportunity to demonstrate these capacities.”45 Some egalitarians went further, in part, perhaps, out of fear that the concept of race inevitably would serve as a pretext for bigotry and discrimination. In 1980 the Academic American Encyclopedia reported that “many scientists today reject the concept of race.” In 1993 the “many” was changed to “probably most.”46 In 1995, researchers at a meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science announced that “the concept of race …has no basis in fundamental human biology.”47 And in 2004 biologist Paul R. Gross noted an extraordinary paradox. Many American intellectuals, when asked to identify their society’s most serious problem, answered, “Race.” But many (most?) of Summer 2005 / Wolters 15 these intellectuals also insisted that the concept of “race” was meaningless: “that there are no biologically significant human group differences, hence no human races.”48 To explain their rejection of race, some scholars pointed to genetics. Melville Herskovits wrote in 1961 that physical anthropologists no longer “went about the world measuring heads in order to classify people…” They had shifted their focus to studying genetics and in the process had discovered that many genes were distributed without regard to skin color. In fact, Herskovits said that among the groupings of mankind there was so much overlapping of so many genes as to call into question the idea that there were distinct races.49 Again and again, egalitarians emphasized the significance of the overlapping. They insisted that any differences between racial averages were small when compared to the differences among individual members of each race. Even those who conceded that “on the average, the brain of the [N]egro is slightly smaller than the brain of the European” also emphasized the great “variability which is found within each race.”50 Julian Huxley summed up this point of view when he asserted: [T]he genetic variability of the human species is so well distributed that the average genetic difference between different classes or social groups and different nations or ethnic groups is negligible or small in its effects compared with the improvements which can be effected through better living conditions and education.51 Others said that popular conceptions of race were constructed socially rather than scientifically. To illustrate this point, Pierre L. van den Berghe noted that a light-skinned person of partial African ancestry would be considered a Negro in the United States but not in Brazil.52 Eventually, for many scholars it became almost an article of faith, one that was repeated regularly, with feeling if not conviction, that race was a social construct. All human groups were basically the same, they insisted, and any differences were culturally determined products of differences in upbringing, lifestyle, and social environment. This point of view seemed implicit in the titles of two influential books: Race: A Study in Superstition, by Jacques Barzun, and Man’s Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race, by Ashley Montagu. It was also the thesis of a much-admired 2003 documentary for the Public Broadcasting System, The Power of an Illusion. Was race a reality or merely a social construct? It may be presumptuous for an historian to offer an opinion when anthropologists and geneticists have different claims. Yet most authorities acknowledged that different populations differed in the frequency of some genes, and that these differences were the result of evolution in geographically distinct regions. They conceded that differences existed. But they differed when it came to whether the differences should be called “racial.” Many anthropologists decided to minimize the importance of difference for fear that acknowledging the reality of “race” 16 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly might again conduce to disastrous consequences. Frank B. Livingstone, for example, admitted that “genetic variability among human population[s]” was “a central problem of physical anthropology.” But Livingstone described the differences in terms of “cline” and “morphism” rather than “race.”53 The trend toward de-emphasizing the importance of race was reinforced by a recognition that racial studies had been politicized in the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education. Egalitarians knew that the question of school segregation was lurking in the background (if not at the fore), and they sus- pected that those who challenged the basic intellectual equality of the Negro did not do so for scientific reasons. However much racists might clothe their arguments in the garb of science, one professor at the University of Missouri noted, they could not “obscure the fact that the[ir] position… would have no particular interest…were it not for the current controversy over the integration of education.”54 Nevertheless, some observers thought egalitarians were going too far when they said that races were merely “social constructs” and not biological realities. The physical anthropologist Carleton Coon scoffed that the “soft pedaling” and “prudery” of some cultural anthropologists with respect to race was “equaled only by their horror of Victorian prudery about sex.”55 The geneticist Theodo- sius Dobzhansky warned that denying the existence of biological phenomena might do worse than breed confusion. “To say that mankind has no races” was so counterintuitive that it would play “into the hands of race bigots” by discrediting science.56 The work of Carleton Putnam served as an illustration of Dobzhansky’s point. From the outset Putnam recognized that “social construction” was a concept that racists could also use. When anthropologists said that “race” had no biological significance but was employed to justify the subordination of unpopular minorities, Putnam answered that the “deconstruction” of race had been devised to protect and promote the interests of Jews. According to Putnam, much of modern anthropology was “clever and insidious propaganda posing in the name of science.” He emphasized that Franz Boas, “the founder of the modern vogue,” was a Jew, as were Boas’s influential students Melville Herskovits, Ralph Klineberg, and Ashley Montagu (whose given name, Put- nam noted, was Israel Ehrenberg). Even before Hitler, Putnam wrote, these men were “smarting under what they considered unjustified discrimination.” Therefore, “they set purposefully to the task of showing they were just as good as the native stocks (as, indeed, in many ways they were), and they tried to do this by proving that all races were equal in their adaptability to our white civilization.” They secured professorships at leading universities, cliquishly cultivated like-minded colleagues, and marginalized and ostracized those who did not share their views. Soon they dominated the field of anthropology. Ac- cording to Putnam, Jewish anthropologists were on “a self-serving mission” and their “objectivity” should be “judged accordingly.”57 Other critics later Summer 2005 / Wolters 17 asserted that Boas’s influential gentile protégées Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead similarly reified the importance of “culture” as a way to undermine established mores and justify their own deviant sexual practices.58 Some later scholars have endorsed Putnam’s argument, but with qualifications. Historian Carl N. Degler conceded that “Boas’s influence upon Ameri- can social scientists in matters of race can hardly be exaggerated,” since Boas “developed in America the concept of culture, which, like a powerful solvent, would in time expunge race from the literature of social science.” Degler further concluded that “Boas did not arrive at that position from a disinterested, scientific inquiry.” “Instead, [Boas’s] idea derived from an ideological commitment that began early in his life,” when he observed and suffered from anti-Semitism in his native Germany. “Throughout his adult life,” Degler noted, “Boas’s face bore the scars from a duel entered into during his university days to punish an anti-Semitic slur.”59 Hasia R. Diner has also noted that Boas “felt profoundly conscious of his religious background and his minority status in German society.”60 Degler and Diner concluded that Boas stressed the importance of culture (and de-emphasized race) in part because he thought racial explanations were being used to deny opportunities and acceptance to members of minority groups.61 Other scholars have suggested yet another motive: that Boas and especially his disciple Alfred Kroeber had a “professional interest in providing a secure intellectual base for [the] newly emerging field of anthropology.” By denying the influence of biology and by emphasizing the significance of culture, they promoted the discipline of anthropology in its competition with established biological sciences.62 Nevertheless, Putnam probably “exaggerate[d] the role of Boas in Ameri- can anthropology,” as Sherwood Washburn of Berkeley insisted in a personal letter.63 There was not enough evidence to prove that anthropologists had conspired to mislead the public about the scientific evidence regarding racial differences. Egalitarians recognized, however, that they would need more than “social construction” to discredit scientific racism. It was necessary to challenge the physical evidence that Negroes, as a race, had smaller brains than Asians and Caucasians. One possibility was to assert that there was little or no correlation between intelligence and the size of human brains. Autopsies have revealed, for example, that some noted intellectuals possessed brains of less than average size, while the brains of many criminals were larger than average64—which led paleoanthropologist Pat Shipman to conclude that “neither brain nor skull size has any relationship to the intelligence of the individual.”65 Yet what was true for individuals might not apply to groups. Egalitarians therefore felt the need to question whether Negroes, as a race, really did have smaller than average brains, with some of the deficit occurring in the prefrontal areas that were considered especially important for abstract thinking. 18 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly

Two of the most persuasive critiques of racist science came from unlikely sources: Robert E. Kuttner of the Creighton University Medical School, and Dwight J. Ingle, the chairman of the Department of Physiology at the University of Chicago. This was unexpected, for Kuttner and Ingle had been associated with scientific racism. Both wrote for Mankind Quarterly. Kuttner had given testimony for segregation in Stell v. Savannah and had served as president of the IAAEE. Ingle had publicly opposed “the random mixing of races in schools” and later expressed alarm about “the very high birth rate among indolent incompetent Negroes.”66 Yet neither was blind to the canons of scientific proof. During the preparation for the Stell litigation, Kuttner had warned segregationist lawyers about the paucity of evidence for Wesley Critz George’s assertions about the size and structure of Negro brains. To establish morpho- logic differences, George relied especially on previous research done by Bennet Bean, C. J. Connolly, and F. W. Vint, but Bean and Vint had published their work in 1906 and 1934, before “modern methods of electrophysiology and experimental neurophysiology became standard,” and Connolly’s statements were so full of qualifications that he could easily be quoted to the opposite effect. Kuttner especially doubted that Vint, who had measured skulls in Kenya, had the equipment needed to make “such delicate measurements.”67 Ingle similarly concluded that George’s assertions were “without scientific value.” To prove the existence of “significant average differences” between the brains of Asians, Caucasians, and Negroes, it would be necessary to gather representative samples after ensuring that the environment, “including prena- tal and postnatal nutrition,” had been equivalent. Researchers would have to take into consideration the age, stature, and bulk of the individuals concerned. And “the brains would have to be removed from skulls at the same time after death, fixed, processed and measured by identical methods.” To guard against bias, the brains would also have to be studied by several experts as “unknowns”—that is, without being told that the sample was of one race or another.68 None of the extant studies had done this. Ingle hastened to add, “The fact that the presently existing evidence for inferiority of the Negro brain is without value does not mean that the brains of Whites and Negroes are identical.” Indeed, the evidence, “unsatisfactory as it is,” led Ingle to consider it “probable that genetic endowment plays an important role in determining racial differences.” Ingle was opposed to intermarriage “until it can be proven that [it] involves no risk to the future of mankind.” But he nevertheless thought that Carleton Putnam and Wesley Critz George had based their conclusions on “worthless evidence.”69 Ingle’s approach riled Putnam. “You are a timid little academician,” Put- nam wrote in one letter to Ingle. “You know full well that the overwhelming weight of evidence is enough to sink the American and British navies, yet you talk about waiting for more. You don’t want more evidence, Ingle. You just want to hide behind a tree….”70 Putnam also was testy with William F. Summer 2005 / Wolters 19

Buckley of the National Review, who sometimes featured essays by the antiegalitarian writers Ernest van den Haag and Nathaniel Weyl but generally steered mainstream conservatism away from an alliance with scientific racists (as Buckley also avoided the John Birch Society and the “objectivism” of Ayn Rand). Putnam considered it folly not to tell readers that Negroes probably were inferior to Caucasians in intelligence. He thought it irresponsible not to warn that desegregation would lead to more mixed mating and, eventually, a decline in standards of civilization. “To say that Carleton’s letters [to Buckley] were overaggressive would be putting the matter mildly,” Weyl confided in one letter.71 In public Putnam continued to affirm “the overwhelming balance of probability that racial differences exist in the morphology of the human brain.” He continued to say that this accounted for “differences in the capacity to adapt to Western civilization.” He insisted, “because the evidence is not perfect is no reason for basing a social revolution on the assumption that the opposite of the evidence is true.” He challenged egalitarian scientists to “conduct tests of their own.” He sputtered, “With the hundreds of millions of dollars available to them through leftist American foundations, these scientists could easily finance a project controlled to the most exacting taste. However, they have not conducted such tests and will not conduct any. For obvious reasons, they do not dare.”72 Putnam’s rhetoric betrayed a recognition that doubt had been cast on the anthropological arguments for segregation. The evidence with respect to the size and structure of the brain was not conclusive. Nor, it turned out, was the evidence from intelligence tests. The evidence from several decades of psychological testing admittedly showed that whites, on average, did better than blacks, and the deficiency among blacks appeared to be especially great on tests that were intended to measure abstract intelligence. These tests included symbols (numbers, diagrams, formulas) and required the test taker to draw inferences and to assemble and reassemble information. The racist psychologist Henry E. Garrett characterized these aptitudes as “the sort of ability that creates a modern technical society.”73 According to Garrett, “the lag of the Negro in abstract ability” was responsible for his having “not produced any of the so-called great civilizations of the past,” the reason why “the black African over most of his history has been a miserable creature, beset by disease, tormented by animal and human enemies.”74 Journalist James J. Kilpatrick seemed to concur. “For thousands of years,” Kilpatrick wrote, black Africans had lived “in effective possession of one of the richest continents on earth.” Yet, although they had “lived by the sea,” they had “never conceived the sail.” They had “dwelled in the midst of fantastic mineral deposits, and contrived no more than the crudest smelting of iron and copper. The Negro developed no written language, not even the poorest hieroglyphics; no poetry; no numerals; not even a calendar that has survived.” Kilpatrick conceded 20 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly

“that certain African arts and crafts reached a tolerably interesting stage of development.” “But south of the Sahara there was no literate civilization, no intellects at work to comprehend and solve the abstract problems.”75 This sort of talk warmed the heart of Carleton Putnam. Like Garrett and Kilpatrick, Putnam thought history had rendered a definitive verdict. “Any man with two eyes in his head can observe a Negro settlement in the Congo, can study the pure-blooded African in his native habitat as he exists when left on his own resources, can compare this settlement with London or Paris, and can draw his own conclusions regarding relative levels of character and intelligence—or that combination of character and intelligence which is civilization.”76 Nevertheless, the historical evidence was problematic. One could at- tribute the underdevelopment of sub-Saharan Africa, as Franz Boas did, to the difficulty of traversing the vast desert that separated black Africa from the civilization that gradually extended from Egypt and Babylon over the Mediterranean area, and from there later into Northern Europe.77 Or one could point, as Thomas Sowell would, to the stunting of human interaction in black Africa that stemmed from a scarcity of navigable inland waterways and other geographic factors.78 In addition, ascribing backwardness to racial inferiority could also be used against Caucasians, since many whites had been “uncouth barbarians at a time when the Egyptians and the Babylonians had a flourishing civilization.”79 Thus the evidence from history was suggestive, at best. And the evidence from psychology was not conclusive, either. There was no doubt that, on average, blacks scored below whites on intelligence tests. But the reasons for the difference were hotly disputed. Intelligence tests were useful for identifying youngsters with special problems and for classifying students or employees who were ready for different levels of study or work. But many Americans doubted that the tests explained why the test scores were such as they were. They also thought psychologists overstepped when they said their tests measured innate mental capacity, as distinguished from knowledge and acquired skills. Puzzles and questions might reveal something about memory, ingenuity, and other mental faculties, but many people scoffed when the testers said they could measure a general “intelligence” that was fixed by heredity. The journalist and social philosopher Walter Lippmann characterized such claims as a sort of predestination, one that would condemn those who were socially disadvantaged to inferior positions in society. He warned against intelligence testers who yearned to “occupy a position of power which no intellectual has held since the collapse of theocracy.”80 Lippmann hated “the impudence of a claim that in fifty minutes you can judge and classify a human being’s predestined fitness in life…I hate the abuse of scientific method which it involves. I hate the sense of superiority which it creates, and the sense of inferiority which it imposes.”81 Summer 2005 / Wolters 21

Some psychologists also presented evidence to challenge the notion of innate differences in intelligence. Otto Klineberg reported that northern Negroes consistently outperformed southern blacks on intelligence tests. Some racists attributed this to selective migration, saying that “the most intelligent and energetic of southern African Americans [had] migrated north.” But Klineberg warned against accepting an hereditarian interpretation when the results could be explained equally well on the basis of environment. Klineberg accordingly concluded that northern blacks did better because of superior educational opportunities in the North.82 Meanwhile, an African-American scholar devised a caustic method for debunking the alleged link between intelligence and race. Writing in The Crisis and in Opportunity, the official magazines of the NAACP and the Urban League, Horace Mann Bond reported that whites in the South, who haled from states with “the purest racial stock of the so-called Nordic branch,” made lower scores than whites in the North and West, where there had been a larger infusion of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. If the difference in these scores could not be attributed to environment and educational opportunities, then it seemed to follow “that the white population of [the South] is inherently and racially inferior to the whites of another section of the country.”83 Even those who specialized in administering intelligence tests noted that the correlation coefficient (that is, the correlation between test scores and performance in school) was about 0.5. This was enough to satisfy statisticians that the tests were relevant—that, in fact, they were better at predicting performance than interviews, experience, or letters of recommendation. But a correlation of 0.5 meant that sometimes there was no correlation between performance on the test and later. Whatever the statistics and correlations, many Americans distrusted inflated claims about the value of intelligence tests, especially when the tests had a disproportionate impact on a minority group that had been subjected to systematic discrimination. In addition, by the 1950s, if not earlier, there was general agreement that nature and nurture both played important roles in shaping “intelligence.” Practically everyone conceded that IQ scores were influenced by environment as well as heredity, with most estimates attributing between 40 and 60 percent of “intelligence” to the influence of environment.84 Even Carleton Putnam conceded the “possibility” that “the finding of intelligence tests” might be “the result of environment.”85 This point was underscored by the responses to a 1961 article that Henry Garrett published in the scholarly journal, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine. Garrett had repeated his standard refrain: that “on the various tests of abstract intelligence, the American Negro regularly and persistently scores below the mean of comparable American Whites”; that “the lag of the Negro in abstract ability plus his long history of non-intellectual achievement forces us to infer that his inferiority…vis-à-vis the White is in part innate and of genetic origin.”86 22 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly

In response, several readers noted that there was general agreement that IQ was influenced by both heredity and environment. Thus the question at issue was whether and how much allowance should be made for the history of Negroes—their experience with slavery, segregation, and discrimination. And how much allowance should be made for the continuing isolation and relative economic deprivation, and for the persistent assertions that blacks were, by nature, intellectually inferior? For many, these factors of history, background, and opportunity easily explained the 15 point difference in the mean IQ scores of American blacks and whites. Anthropologist Melville Herskovits insisted that cultural factors were “critical.”87 Psychiatrist Morton H. Frank noted that, because of the complexity of history, culture, and society, “socioeconomic factors cannot…be equated.”88 Psychologist Nathaniel Eisen similarly wrote that “the influence of socioeconomic conditions on the intelligence of Negroes” was “well known.”89 Ashley Montagu also maintained that differences in test scores “could be explained on socio-cultural grounds.” In fact, Montagu asserted, “the major factors in producing the differences in mental ability…are demonstrably of a cultural nature.”90 The arguments of egalitarian social scientists, in psychology as in anthropology, were not conclusive. But they were sufficient to call into question the assertions of scientific racists. The hypothesis that IQ differences could be accounted for by nurture was tenable. Egalitarian social scientists had rebutted the contentions of scientific racists.

A FRAGILE CONSENSUS

The difficulty of doing research on racial differences partook of a double- edged sword, one that wounded scientific egalitarians as well as scientific racists. Because the major races were so heterogeneous, because the interaction of nature and nurture was so complex, because of problems with sampling and measurement, and because it was hard to develop tests of intelligence that were truly culture-free, it had not been possible to prove that Caucasians and Negroes differed with respect to innate intelligence. For the same reasons, however, it was also impossible to prove that the different races were equally endowed with intelligence. Consequently, in the 1960s scholars in the field arrived at a consensus. Racists and egalitarians agreed that cultural and hereditary factors combined to influence intelligence, and further agreed that there was no definitive proof with respect to the relative importance of the two factors or their manner of interaction. Thus Dwight J. Ingle, while refusing to embrace the idea of racial equality, acknowledged that it had “not been possible to control or equate the culture factor in comparing the intelligence of Whites and Negroes.”91 Ingle continued to believe that genetic endowment “probabl[y] played an important role in determining racial differences in drives, aptitudes, and achievements,” Summer 2005 / Wolters 23 but he conceded that the evidence was not conclusive. According to Ingle, “the concept that White and Negro races are approximately equally endowed with intelligence remains a plausible hypothesis for which there is faulty evidence. The concept that the average Negro is significantly less intelligent than the average White is also a plausible hypothesis for which there is faulty but, in my opinion, somewhat stronger evidence.”92 Meanwhile, Ashley Montagu also acknowledged that there was no proof as to the equal distribution of innate intelligence. This was quite a concession for Montagu, who had written in 1944 “with some degree of assurance that in all probability the range of inherited capacities in two different ethnic groups is just about identical.”93 In 1961, however, Montagu asserted that he had been misunderstood; that he had never maintained that the races were equal in mental abilities; that he had contended only “that studies claiming to have proven that genetic differences were the responsible causes [for differences in test scores and standards of civilization] have not upon critical examination been found to prove anything of the sort.”94 Technically there was no inconsistency in Montagu’s statements, since the “range” of intelligence differs from the “distribution.” The former term refers to individuals—where each race possesses a great range, from the retarded to the genius. The latter refers to averages. A great deal of controversy might have been avoided if Montagu had clarified the difference when Man’s Most Dangerous Myth was published in 1942; or in 1950–1951 when he edited the UNESCO statement on race. In 1961, however, Montagu asserted that “during more than thirty-five years of reading on the subject I have not more than once or twice encountered a writer who claimed that ‘the races were equal in mental abilities.’” Montagu said that he himself did not subscribe “to the view that all races are equal in mental ability”; that he simply believed that, “whatever the differences in mental ability may be between the races, the only practical and decent way to behave toward the members of every group is to give them every opportunity to realize whatever is in them to fulfill themselves.”95 While many social scientists were becoming skeptical, even agnostic, about the relative importance of nurture and nature, other people were coming to think (or at least say) that the races were equally endowed with intelligence. Thus the Harvard historian Oscar Handlin declared, “There is no evidence of any inborn differences of temperament, personality, character, or intelligence among races.”96 And the Berkeley historian Kenneth M. Stampp asserted, in memorable language, “Negroes are, after all, only white men with black skins, nothing more, nothing less.”97 In the 1950s and 1960s many well-educated people, perhaps most of them, embraced what historian Walter Jackson has called a “liberal orthodoxy.”98 They assumed that the races did not differ in intelligence, aptitudes, or character. This view became increasingly popular as the civil rights movement gained momentum in the 1960s. 24 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly

In accounting for the success of the civil rights movement many historians have embraced the “backlash thesis” of University of Virginia law professor Michael J. Klarman. According to this thesis, the combination of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown and rank-and-file civil rights demonstrations gave rise to “a southern political climate in which racial extremism flourished.”99 Believing that Brown was unjustified, white southerners refused to desegregate their public schools and also organized “massive resistance” to racial boycotts, sit-ins, and freedom rides—a resistance that often lapsed into violent assaults on civil rights activists. Then, when the brutal repression was televised to the rest of the nation, there was a backlash as whites outside the South demanded that the federal government protect the activists, desegregate the schools, and enact new laws to guarantee the right to vote and to end discrimination in public accommodations. According to Professor Klarman, Martin Luther King and other civil rights leaders were well aware of this chain of causation. King may have begun with the hope that he could convince southern whites that racial discrimination was wrong. Eventually, however, he modified his approach. In 1963 King chose Birmingham, Alabama, as the site for massive demonstrations because he calculated that the police chief, Eugene “Bull” Connor, would deal roughly with demonstrators. When Connor complied with attack dogs and fire hoses, the nation was repulsed and Congress responded with the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The next year King focused a voting rights campaign on Selma, Alabama, because he expected that the local sheriff there, Jim Clark, would behave as Bull Connor had in Birmingham. When this happened, the American public was again outraged and Congress responded with the Voting Rights Act of 1965. “It was the brutality of southern whites resisting desegregation that ultimately rallied national opinion behind the enforcement of Brown and the enactment of civil rights legislation.”100 Klarman conceded that Brown had no warrant either in constitutional history or in the precedents of the Supreme Court. He acknowledged that the justices simply thought that segregation was wrong, “and they were determined to forbid it, regardless of whether conventional legal sources sanctioned that result.” Klarman, however, considered it “pointless” to bewail judicial activism because, he wrote, “the Court’s constitutional interpretations have always been influenced by the social and political contexts of the times in which they were rendered.”101 Klarman did not mention the anthropological and educational arguments of the southern resistance, and he admitted that the legal points of the Southern Manifesto were well taken. He conceded, in addition, that the leading critics of desegregation did not endorse violence. Mississippi’s Senator James Eastland, for example, cautioned, “Acts of violence and lawlessness have no place. The fight we wage must be a just and legal fight.” Georgia’s congressman James Davis similarly insisted: “There is no place for violence or lawless acts,” just Summer 2005 / Wolters 25 after he had called Brown “a monumental fraud” and a “brazen usurpation of power.”102 Klarman severely censured the critics of desegregation, saying that racist intellectuals and southern politicians “either knew that [their] rhetoric was likely to incite violence, or they were criminally negligent for not knowing it.” In making this argument, Klarman reiterated views that civil rights activists and their supporters often expressed in the 1960s. Roy Wilkins of the NAACP had insisted that southern vigilantes “were made bold by groups of so-called respectable people which have urged publicly that the courts be defied.” After a bombing in Atlanta, Georgia, the city’s mayor declared, “Whether they like it or not, every rabble-rousing politician is the godfather of the cross-burners and dynamiters who are giving the South a bad name.” And in Tennessee one lawyer blamed school desegregation violence on the senators and representa- tives who signed the Southern Manifesto: “What the hell do you expect these people to do when they have 90 some odd congressmen from the South sign- ing a piece of paper that says you’re a southern hero if you defy the Supreme Court.”103 The civil rights movement also gained popularity because prior to the late 1960s the demands of the movement were for policies that most white people, at least most whites outside the South, considered reasonable. Blacks were demanding an end to the humiliation of segregated public facilities; they were demanding the right to vote; and they were demanding the desegregation but not the massive integration of the public schools. At the time desegregation was not understood to mean that black and white students must mix in proportion- ally balanced schools. In Brown II (the implementation order of May 31, 1955) the Supreme Court ordered school districts to “make a prompt and reasonable start” and then to proceed “with all deliberate speed” toward admitting students to public schools “on a racially nondiscriminatory basis.” The Court also mentioned two nondiscriminatory methods for achieving desegregation—either freedom of choice for individual students or assignment according to “the limits set by normal geographic school districting.”104 It was understood that neither method would lead to a great deal of racial mixing—because most students, blacks as well as whites, would not freely choose to attend a school in which their race was in the minority, and because the races often were disproportionately concentrated in different residential neighborhoods. Until the late 1960s most whites outside the South thought the demands of the civil rights movement were unambiguously legitimate. And, because of the violence associated with massive resistance, most of these whites also considered the opponents of desegregation not only mistaken but also intellectually ignorant and morally benighted. These impressions were reinforced when civil rights leaders insisted that their demonstrators should be nonviolent and dignified. For tactical reasons, the civil rights leaders sought to portray a contrast “between well-dressed, polite, studious blacks peacefully protesting” 26 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly and, wherever possible, a violent mob of whites, “a ragtail rabble, slackjawed, black jacketed, grinning fit to kill.” The freedom riders “count[ed] upon the racists of the South to create a crisis,” and black leaders in Birmingham “calculated for the stupidity of a Bull Connor.”105 Several background trends also contributed to the success of the civil rights movement. Hitler’s extremism had discredited racism during World War II, and during the Cold War desegregation at home was of benefit to American foreign policy. Meanwhile, because of the Great Migration of blacks away from the rural South and toward urban areas, more blacks were voting—and politicians were seeking their support. At the same time, the growth of the national economy had led to a larger black middle class, whose purchasing power mattered more than ever before. With economic integration throughout the nation, and especially with the increasing influence of chain stores, corporate leaders pressed the white South to accept the national norms. The “nationalizing” of television and radio also had a similar effect. In addition, the New South developed patterns of settlement that resembled the situation in the North more than that of the Old South. In Dixie relatively few whites continued to live as a minority in predominantly black areas. Instead, they followed the example of their northern cousins and moved to predominantly white suburbs. Thus the arguments for segregation, arguments that had been developed to protect whites in predominantly black agrarian societies, increasingly seemed beside the point.106 By the 1960s the legal, anthropological, and educational arguments of the white South seemed obsolete, out-of-date, of another era. These trends provided the context in which many rank-and-file whites began to say that all races were equally endowed with intelligence. Politicians did not wish to alienate a growing segment of the electorate. Business leaders did not want to lose black customers. With the growing spatial segmentation of the American population, there was less reason to give offense. Most of all, whites outside the South did not wish to be associated with massive resistance to what they considered the sane and sensible demands of the civil rights movement. Racists nevertheless developed a different explanation for the popularity of what they called the “equalitarian dogma”—the belief “that all races are potentially equal in ability and differ only in their opportunity to achieve.”107 They charged that scholars who sympathized with the civil rights movement had engaged in a duplicitous form of double dealing. In the professional journals, the civil rights scholars were careful and precise in their statements. They admitted that, because of the difficulty of controlling the relevant variables, “it is just as unscientific to support an equalitarian dogma as it is to maintain that the actual cultural superiority or inferiority of a certain human group is due to morphological …differences.”108 Racist writers alleged, however, that when the civil rights scholars were not writing for professional journals, when they were hiring, firing, and promoting fellow scholars within their academic departments and professional associations, they established egalitarianism “as a major premise Summer 2005 / Wolters 27 not to be questioned.”109 They said that “budding young scientists of independent mind jeopardize[d] their careers by challenging the dogma and may be silenced by strong disapproval.” They said that through control of universities and foundations, egalitarians made it almost impossible for dissenters to hold jobs. Where outside the South, one psychiatrist asked, “could a psychologist, sociologist or anthropologist find employment if he openly and unreservedly espoused the theory of…racial inequality?”110 Racist writers also alleged that “many college students have been indoctri- nated and parrot the equalitarian arguments without competent familiarity with the evidence.”111 They said in addition that heterodox books of good quality, after being repeatedly rejected by established academic presses, had to be published with the imprimatur of little-known publishers. They lamented that Carleton Coon, an eminent scholar who was the president of the American Association of Physical Anthropologists in 1962, was first denounced and later ostracized because he would not toe the liberal line on racial matters. This, they said, sent an unmistakable message to other scholars. Racists were not alone in lamenting the treatment accorded to Professor Coon. Writing in 1994, the liberal science writer Pat Shipman also expressed regret that “the tenor of the times” was such that Coon, a “scientific purist,” was “disgraced and, to some extent, driven out of his profession” for two reasons. First, Coon refused to comment one way or the other when racist writers made use of Coon’s studies of fossils and skulls. He said it was “the duty of a scientist to do his work conscientiously and…to reject publicly only the writings of those persons who…have misquoted him.” Egalitarian critics insisted, however, that Coon should criticize the racists, that he “cannot disclaim all responsibility” in this regard.112 In addition, egalitarians found fault because Coon persisted in “defending the unpopular position that the relative intelligence of the human races was a matter about which there were insufficient data.”113 Coon’s “crime” was not heresy. His position was the same as that expressed by Ashley Montagu and other egalitarians, when they were writing for Science or Perspectives in Medicine and Biology. But Coon wrote for the general public and continued to assert that “whether or not the average mental capacity of one race exceeds that of another is…beside the point because even if such differences exist—and we do not know yet whether they do or do not—each race includes bright, average, and dull people.”114 Coon’s statement was defensible. There are so many possible explanations for racial differences that it behooves cautious scholars to be skeptical, even agnostic, about the relations between nature and nurture, civilization and race. But by the 1960s the backlash against the white South had reached full force. By then a liberal orthodoxy held that, whatever scientists might think about the inadequacy of the evidence, they were not to get in the way of the struggle for social and civil rights. In 1962 the members of the American As- sociation of Physical Anthropologists insisted on voting on a resolution that 28 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly all races were of equal intelligence, even though Coon insisted that the proof of this proposition (or of its antithesis) was still lacking. Coon then resigned as president of the Association, took early retirement from the University of Pennsylvania, and “died in 1981, unredeemed in the eyes of the anthropological community.”115 There is a saying that truth crushed to earth will rise again. The same is often true of nagging questions. Concerns about the relative influence of nature and nurture were stifled for a while, but they would persist as the course of school desegregation and integration proceeded through the 1960s and beyond.

Raymond Wolters is Thomas Muney Keith professor of history at the University of Delaware. He received the American Bar Association’s Silver Gavel Award for his earlier study of desegregation, The Burden of Brown. The article above is adapted from his forthcoming book.

ENDNOTES

1. James Jackson Kilpatrick, The Southern Case for School Segregation (Crowell-Col- lier Press, 1962), 105; Richmond News Leader, June 1, 1955; Raymond Wolters, The Burden of Brown: Thirty Years of School Desegregation (Knoxville: University of Ten- nessee Press, 1984), 88–90. 2. Richmond News Leader, November 21, 22, and 23, 1955; James J. Kilpatrick, The Sovereign States: Notes of a Citizen of Virginia (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1957). 3. Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950s (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), 131. 4. Congressional Record, 84th Congress, 2nd Session (March 12, 1956), 3948, 4004; Numan Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 116. 5. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (New York: 1962), 256. 6. Harry S. Ashmore, An Epitaph for Dixie (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1957), 32. 7. Kilpatrick, The Southern Case, 43, 71, 70, 72, 72–93. 8. Carleton Putnam, Race and Reason: A Yankee View (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961), 20, 35, 109. Putnam was sensitive to the charge that his work was “ungentlemanly” in that it gave offense to Negroes, a weak minority group that had suffered much from unfair discrimination. In response, Putnam shifted blame to egalitarians, especially Jewish egalitarians, who allegedly had selﬁsh ulterior motives. “I indict the men who have fooled and goaded the Negro—the men who have made it necessary for the rest of us to point out truths which the Negro might otherwise have been spared the telling.” 9. Putnam, Race and Reason, 6. 10. I. A. Newby, Challenge to the Court: Social Scientists and the Defense of Segrega- tion, 1954–1966 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), 152. The eight newspapers were the Washington Post, Los Angeles Examiner, Los Angeles Times, Summer 2005 / Wolters 29

Pittsburgh Press, Indianapolis Star-News, Newark News, Newark Star-Ledger, and Buf- falo News. 11. Putnam, Race and Reason, 13; Newby, Challenge to the Court, 165–167; John J. Jack- son, Jr., The Scientific Defense of Segregation, 202–204 (MS); Corey T. Lessig, “Roast Beef and Racial Integrity: Mississippi’s ‘Race and Reason Day,’ October 26, 1962,” Journal of Mississippi History 56 (1994): 1–15. 12. Putnam, Race and Reality, 81. 13. Barton Bernstein, review of Race and Reason, Journal of Negro History 48 (January 1963): 58–60; I. A. Newby, Challenge to the Court, 158; Louis Schneider, “Race, Reason and Rubbish Again,” Phylon 23 (1962): 149. 14. Patterson, Brown v. Board of Education, 88. 15. James F. Byrnes, “Guns and Bayonets Cannot Promote Education,” U. S. News and World Report, October 5, 1956, 104; Byrnes, “The Supreme Court Must Be Curbed,” U. S. News and World Report, May 18, 1956, 50, 58; Byrnes, speech at dedication of Municipal Auditorium, Spartanburg, December 1, 1951; Howard H. Quint, Profile in Black and White: A Frank Portrait of South Carolina (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1958), 25. 16. Herbert Ravenall Sass, “Mixed Schools and Mixed Blood,” Atlantic Monthly 198 (November 1956): 45–49. 17. A. James Gregor, “On the Nature of Prejudice,” 217–224. Gregor, who was then employed at the University of Hawaii, did not give testimony in Stell v. Savannah. Some of his published articles were entered into the records of the case, however, and Gregor exchanged letters with the lawyers and other segregationists who were involved in the case. 18. Putnam, Race and Reason, 65. 19. Putnam-Morsell correspondence, quoted in Jackson, The Scientific Defense of Seg- regation (MS, Chapter 5, pp. 163–64); Putnam, Race and Reason, 30–31. 20. See Jackson, The Scientific Defense of Segregation, chapter 5; Newby, Challenge to the Court, chapter 6; and William H. Tucker, The Funding of Scientific Racism: Wickliffe Draper and the Pioneer Fund (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002) 65–130. 21. Ashley Montagu, Man’s Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race (New York: Oxford University Press, Fifth Edition Revised and Enlarged, 1974), ix. 22. Science 135 (March 16, 1962): 988. 23. Henry E. Garrett, reply to Juan Comas, Current Anthropology 2 (October 1961): 320. 24. A. Thomas, reply to Juan Comas, Current Anthropology 2 (October 1961): 330. 25. Charles L. Black, “The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions,” 425. 26. G. Ainsworth Harrison, “The Mankind Quarterly,” Man 61 (September 1961): 163–164. 27. Santiago Genoves, “Racism and ‘The Mankind Quarterly,’” Science, December 8, 1961, 1928–1932. 28. Juan Comas, “’Scientific’ Racism Again,” Current Anthropology 2 (October 1961): 306. 29. Jackson, The Scientific Defense of Segregation (ms), 119. 30. William A. Massey, “The New Fanatics,” Mankind Quarterly 4 (October–December, 1963): 76. 30 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly

31. Robert Gayre, paraphrased by Carleton Putnam, “These Are the Guilty,” Mankind Quarterly 4 (July–September, 1963): 22. 32. “The Mankind Quarterly Under Attack,” Mankind Quarterly 2 (October–December, 1961): 79. 33. William Massey, “The New Fanatics,” Mankind Quarterly 4 (October–December 1963): 75. 34. George A. Lundberg, “Some Neglected Aspects of the ‘Minorities’ Problem,” Mankind Quarterly 3 (April–June 1963): 211–212. 35. Earnest A. Hooton, Apes, Men and Morons (New York: Putnam, 1937), 210. 36. Pat Shipman, The Evolution of Racism (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 175. 37. Franz Boas, “The Real Race Problem,” Crisis 1 (November 1910): 2, 23; Boas, The Mind of Primitive Man (New York: McMillan, 1911), 5, 11, 22, 29. 38. Dinesh D’Souza, The End of Racism (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 153 and passim; Carl Degler, In Search of Human Nature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 81 and passim; Hasia R. Diner, In the Almost Promised Land (Westport: Green- wood Press, 1977), 147 and passim. 39. “Statement on the Nature of Race and Race Differences,” Current Anthropology 2 (October 1961): 304–306. 40. Science 136 (March 16, 1962): 988; Jackson, The Scientific Defense of Segregation (ms), 263. 41. American Association of Physical Anthropologists 21 (1963): 402. Thirty years later, the 1993 business meeting of the American Association of Physical Anthropologists entertained a motion that declared: “As scientists who study human evolution and variation, we believe that we have an obligation to share with other scientists and the general public our current understanding of the structure of human variation… Nineteenth and early twentieth century categories of race have often been used to support racist doctrines. The race concept currently is understood to have little scientific merit…” Yet this motion did not pass, perhaps because, as Pat Shipman has written, “the number of opinions in a room full of anthropologists is roughly equivalent to the number of anthropologists.” Shipman, The Evolution of Race, 220–221. 42. C. Loring Brace, “Foreword to the Sixth Edition,” Man’s Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race, by Ashley Montagu (Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press, 1997), 14, 16. 43. Carleton S. Coon, The Story of Man (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954), 187–188. 44. Theodosius Dobzhansky, Mankind Evolving: The Evolution of the Human Species (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), 267 and passim. 45. Ibid., 286. 46. Academic American Encyclopedia (Princeton: Arete Publishing Company, Inc., 1980), 33; Academic American Encyclopedia (Danbury: Grolier Incorporated, 1993), vol. 16, 33. 47. Los Angeles Times, February 20, 1995, A1. 48. Paul R. Gross, “Race: No Such Thing,” The New Criterion 22 (April 2004), 86–90. Gross was reviewing Race: The Reality of Human Differences (Boulder: Westview, 2004), by Vincent Sarich and Frank Miele, which maintains that “race” is a sound biological classification and not just a social construct. 49. Melville J. Herskovits, “Rear-Guard Action,” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 5 (Autumn 1961): 124–126. Herskovits also stated, however, that his opposition to Summer 2005 / Wolters 31

“the concept ‘race’” was not entirely scientific—that he also felt the need to oppose a dubious idea that not only was being used “to preserve inequalities” but also caused such “tensions in world relations” as to constitute a “threat to world peace.” Ibid., 126, 129. 50. Franz Boas, “The Problem of the American Negro,” Yale Review 10 (1920): 386. 51. Julian S. Huxley, Heredity East and West (New York: Schuman, 1949), 185. 52. Pierre L. van den Berghe, “Racism,” Academic American Encyclopedia (1993): vol. 16, 37–38. 53. “On the Non-Existence of Human Races,” Current Anthropology 3 (June 1962): 279–81. The matter of definition could become heated because it touched on the question of whether Jews constituted a distinct race. Some geneticists and physical anthropologists classified Jews as a race because of inbreeding and possession of specific heritable traits. See A. James Gregor’s comments and citations in Mankind Quarterly 2 (1961): 3, and 3 (1962): 42–43. But Earnest Hooton of Harvard would not classify the Jews as a separate race even though he acknowledged the existence of inbreeding and “the dominance of certain anatomical features.” Ibid., 42. Juan Comas regarded any treatment of Jews as a biological race as dangerous myth-mongering, but A. James Gregor thought otherwise: “Since there is no universally accepted taxonomy, all that can legitimately be required of a scientist is that he use the term ‘race’ with a carefully stipulated denotation.” Ibid., 44. See also Carleton Coon, “Have the Jews a Racial Identity?” in Isaque Graebner, ed., Jews in a Gentile World: The Problem of Anti-Semitism (New York: McMillan, 1942), 20–37. 54. Solomon Garb to Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 5 (Autumn 1961): 135–136. 55. Carleton Coon, The Story of Man (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), 188. 56. Theodosius Dobzhansky, “Comment on Frank B. Livingston, ‘On the Non-Exis- tence of Human Races,’” Current Anthopology 3 (June 1962): 280. 57. Putnam, Race and Reason, 18, 47. 58. Derek Freeman was one of the first and probably the most influential of Mead’s critics. See his book, Margaret Mead and Samoa: The Making and Unmaking of an An- thropological Myth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983). Also see E. Michael Jones, Degenerate Moderns: Modernity As Rationalized Sexual Misbehavior (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993). 59. Degler, In Search of Human Nature, 61, 71, 73. George W. Stocking has written that Boas was “the most important single force shaping American anthropology in the first half of the twentieth century.” Delimiting Anthropology (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2001), 26. For an especially pointed interpretation of Boas, see Kevin MacDonald, The Culture of Critique (Westport: Praeger, 1998), passim. Also see Marshall Hyatt, Franz Boas: Social Activist (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), chapter 5 and passim; and a forthcoming article by Glen Anthony Harris, “Franz Boas and Black-Jewish Relations at the Begin- ning of the Twentieth Century.” According to Harris, Boas thought that Negroes and Caucasians differed in their physical makeup. He thought the brain of the average Negro was smaller than that of the average Caucasian; that the differences in anatomy made it plausible to assume that there were corresponding mental differences. Boas even wrote that because of “fundamental differences between whites and blacks,” “the first question to be answered by scientific investigation is…. How far [blacks] may be considered the inferior [and] whites…superior.” According to Harris, Boas was a 32 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly racial liberal only in the sense that Boas thought that despite differences in racial averages there was also considerable overlap among individual members of the different races—and that consequently most blacks “when given the facility and opportunity will be perfectly able to fill the duties of citizenship,” and that some outstanding individual blacks “will be able to outrun their white competitors.” Harris based some of his comments on a book that Vernon J. Williams published in 1989 (From a Caste a Minority: Changing Attitudes of American Sociologists toward Afro-Americans) and on an article that Williams published in volume 92 of The American Philosophical Association Newsletters on Philosophy and the Black Experience. 60. Diner, In the Almost Promised Land, 143. 61. Long before Putnam, Degler, and Diner, Boas conceded the point. In 1924 he wrote: “It is easily recognized that the majority of defenders of the superiority of this Northwest European type are swayed, not by scientific arguments but by prejudice, but it is equally true that the defenders of race equality who have risen to combat their views are no less influenced by a desire to defend the position of those races that have been designated inferior.” American Mercury 3 (1926): 124. In 1925 Boas acknowledged that much of the literature that was “intended to maintain the irrelevancy of racial affiliation[s]” had been penned in “an effort to combat the anti-Semitic drift of our times.” Nation 120 (January 28, 1925): 89. 62. Degler, In Search of Human Nature, 82–83. 63. Jackson, The Scientific Defense of Segregation (ms, chapter 7, 264). 64. Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (New York: W. E. Norton and Company, 1981), 92–95. 65. Pat Shipman, The Evolution of Race, 213. Franz Boas was more circumspect in his conclusions. As mentioned above (see note 59), Boas had reported that the races differed slightly in the structure of the brain, and that therefore it was likely that there were also differences in mental characteristics. However, Boas also reported “that the relation between mental ability and brain-weight is rather remote, and that we are not by any means justified in concluding that the larger brain is always the more efficient tool for mental achievement. There is presumably a slight increase of average ability corresponding to a considerable increase in average brain-weight; but this increase is so slight that in a comparison of the mental ability of the Negro race and the white race, the difference in size of the brain seems quite insignificant.” “The Real Race Problem,” 22, 23. For yet another opinion, see the statement of Donald A. Swan in Mankind Quarterly 2 (1962): 237. “[S]tudies of large numbers of brains have established a positive relationship—statistical in nature—between brain weight and mental capabilities, and as Professor Carleton Coon notes ‘among living populations, absolute brain size is generally, although not necessarily individually, related to achievement.’ Furthermore, the brains of intellectually distinguished men are generally larger and more complex and those of mental defectives are generally smaller….” Surprisingly, Henry E. Garrett, one of the most emphatic of the psychologists who insisted that Negroes were inferior to Caucasians in intelligence, and that some of that inferiority was due to heredity, once wrote that “discussion of brain size and intelligence is tedious and irrelevant. I doubt that anyone thinks that mere brain size has any marked relationship to intelligence. One of the largest brains on record is that of an idiot.” Current Anthropology 2 (October 1961): 319. Summer 2005 / Wolters 33

66. Dwight J. Ingle, letter to the editor, Science 133 (1961): 960; Ingle, “Racial Differ- ences and the Future,” Science 146 (1964): 378; Tucker, The Science and Politics of Racial Research, 155, 182. 67. Jackson, The Scientific Defense of Segregation (MS, chapter 6, 224). 68. Dwight J. Ingle, “Comments on the Teachings of Carleton Putnam,” Mankind Quar- terly 4 (1963): 30; Dwight J. Ingle, “Racial Differences in the Future,” 375–379. 69. Dwight J. Ingle, “Comments on the Teachings of Carleton Putnam,” 40, 41–42. 70. Carleton Putnam to Dwight Ingle, December 26, 1962, quoted in Jackson, The Sci- entific Defense of Segregation (ms chapter 7, page 288) 71. Ibid., 302. 72. Carleton Putnam, “A Reply to Dwight Ingle,” Mankind Quarterly 4 (July–Septem- ber, 1963): 44. 73. Henry E. Garrett, “Racial Mixing Could Be Catastrophic,” U. S. News and World Report, November 18, 1963, 92–93. 74. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 5 (Winter 1961): 262, 264. 75. Kilpatrick, The Southern Case, 50, 54. 76. Putnam, Race and Reason, 7. 77. Franz Boas, “The Real Race Problem,” Crisis 1 (November 1910): 23. 78. Thomas Sowell, Migrations and Cultures: A World View (New York: Basic Books, 1996); Sowell, Conquests and Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1998). 79. Franz Boas, “The Problem of the American Negro,” Yale Review 10 (1920): 390. 80. Walter Lippmann, “A Future for the Tests,” New Republic (November 29, 1922): 10. 81. Lippmann, quoted in Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Bell Curve: Intel- ligence and Class Structure in American Life (New York: Free Press, 1994), 6. 82. Otto Klineberg, Negro Intelligence and Selective Migration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935), 59–60 and passim; John P. Jackson, Jr., Social Scientists for Social Justice (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 22. Klineberg also noted that on World War I army tests the average score of black soldiers in four northern states was higher than the average score of whites from four southern states. Some critics took exception to comparing the best of one group with the worst of another, but the comparison reinforced the argument that educational, social and economic factors (that is, “culture”) were key to understanding racial differences on intelligence tests. 83. Horace Mann Bond, “Intelligence Tests and Propaganda,” Crisis 28 (1924): 63; Bond, “What Army ‘Intelligence’ Tests Measured,” Opportunity 2 (1924): 198, 200; Bond, “Cat on a Hot Tin Roof,” Journal of Negro Education 27 (1958): 519, 529, 523. 84. Studies of identical twins who have been reared apart have led some researchers to estimate the influence of heredity as high as 70%. 85. Jackson, The Scientific Defense of Segregation (ms), 221. 86. Henry E. Garrett to Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 5 (Winter 1962): 262. 87. Melville J. Herskovits, “Rear-Guard Action,” 127. 88. Morton H. Frank to Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 5 (Autumn 1961): 139. 89. Nathaniel H. Eisen to Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 5 (Autumn 1961): 141. 90. Ashley Montagu to Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 5 (Autumn 1961): 132, 133. 34 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly

91. Dwight J. Ingle, “Comments on the Teachings of Carleton Putnam,” 29. 92. Ibid., 40, 41, 29, 28; Science 133 (1961): 960. However, Carleton Putnam remained unreconstructed and unrepentant: “No amount of talk about environment,” he wrote,” can change the fundamental facts.” “[A]nybody who can believe that the Negro’s limitations are solely environmental in the face of African history and of Haitian history…and of forty years of intelligence tests, and of the microscopic studies of Vint, and of the morphology of Bean…and of the other evidence in [Wesley Critz George’s book, The Biology of the Race Problem] …any person, I say, who can believe the Negro is the product of his history and environment (instead of vice versa) in the face of all those facts may not belong in a mental institution, but I dread the thought of his teaching any child of mine.” Putnam to The New Republic 148 (February 23, 1963): 29–30; Putnam, “These Are the Guilty,” Mankind Quarterly 4 (July–September 1963): 25. 93. Science 100 (October 20, 1944): 383–384. 94. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 5 (Autumn 1961): 132, 133. 95. Ibid., 132, 134. Montagu’s statements were consistent with views expressed by his mentor, Franz Boas, who had written in 1924: “I grant willingly that proof of mental equality has not been adduced…But I insist that nobody has ever given satisfactory proof of an inherent inequality of races, and that the final solution of this problem still has to be found.” American Mercury 3 (1924): 169. 96. Oscar Handlin, quoted by Carleton Putnam, “These Are the Guilty,” 13. 97. Kenneth M. Stampp, The Peculiar Institution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), vii. 98. Walter Jackson, Gunnar Myrdal and America’s Conscience: Social Engineering and Racial Liberalism, 1938–1987 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990). Also see John P. Jackson, Jr., “The Scientific Attack on Brown v. Board of Education, 1954–1964,” American Psychologist 59 (September 2004): 531. 99. Michael J. Klarman, “How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis,” Journal of American History 81 (June 1994): 103. 100. Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 385. 101. Ibid., 447, 449, 298, 303, 296. 102. Quoted by Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights, 428. 103. Ibid. 104. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), 298 n. 2, 300, 301. 105. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights, 429. 106. For a good summary of the social and economic trends, see Michael J. Klarman, “Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement,” Virginia Law Review 80 (February 1994): 7–150. In Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Knopf, 1949), V. O. Key stressed that southern race relations had been greatly influenced by the concerns of whites who lived in predominantly black areas. 107. Henry E. Garrett, “One Psychologist’s View of ‘Equality of the Races,’” U. S. News and World Report, August 14, 1961, 72. 108. Santiago Genoves, “Letter to the Editor,” Science 135 (March 16, 1962): 988. 109. Garrett, “One Psychologist’s View of ‘Equality of the Races,’” 73. 110. Putnam, Race and Reason, 49. 111. Garrett, “One Psychologist’s View of ‘Equality of the Races,’” 73. Summer 2005 / Wolters 35

112. Shipman, The Evolution of Racism, 209, 207. For more on this point, see Jackson, The Scientiﬁc Defense of Segregation, chapter 7. 113. Pat Shipman, The Evolution of Racism, 209, 206. 114. Carleton Coon, The Story of Man, 182. 115. Pat Shipman, The Evolution of Racism, 217, 198–200. “A large part of

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�� THE METHOD OF SAMUEL T. FRANCIS: FROM BURNHAM TO ETHNOPOLITICS

BRENT NELSON

he identification of Samuel T. Francis as a paleoconservative may lead many to conclude that he belonged to the traditionalist school, repre- Tsented in the United States by Russell Kirk, which has its basis in certain transcendent principles implicit in the writings of Edmund Burke. This would be a great misunderstanding, because the paleoconservatism of Francis and others is “a modern innovation scarcely two decades old…. This becomes clear when one considers the slightly lengthier history of another movement, neoconservatism…paleoconservatism is a reaction to neoconservatism” (Wolt- ermann, 9). Francis was unique among the paleoconservatives in his employment of an analytical method, unlike those political commentators of the right who merely react to developments by appealing to a set of transcendent principles, considered to be grounded either in natural law or in divine revelation. His method was largely derived from James Burnham, about whom Francis published Power and History: The Political Thought of James Burnham (1984). Not only was this the first thorough examination of Burnham’s thought, but it was the first written by a student of the political right which proceeded from Burnham’s provocative, but now largely forgotten, early work, the books he published before his association with William F. Buckley’s National Review. During this period, Burnham was in transition from the Trotskyist Marxism he had abandoned toward the Cold War anti-Communism with which he is usually identified by conservatives. Francis’s study of Burnham begins with an examination of his The Manage- rial Revolution (1941), which argued that “capitalism was indeed undergoing a lethal crisis in the 1930s and that it would be succeeded by a new form of society with a different ruling class and different political and social institutions” (Power, 8), which Burnham called “managerialism.” In Francis’s words, “[T]he transition from capitalism to managerial society would be as profound and as world-historically important as the earlier transition from feudalism to capitalism” (Power, 8). The managerial revolution is variously manifested in New Deal America, National Socialist Germany, and the Soviet Union. In the U.S., the transition to it is marked by conflict between “the old entrepreneurial elite,” which seeks to maintain a “limited state,” and the 38 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly rising managerial class, which seeks an end to the “distinction between the state and the economy” (Power, 12). Burnham’s Managerial Revolution is written with a lapidary clarity of style and cogency of argument which characterizes virtually all of his work. (Burn- ham at the time was a professor of philosophy at New York University.) Those reading the work long after World War II may be led to give too much attention to Burnham’s incorrect prediction of the outcome of that war (the emergence of three superpowers: the U.S., Germany, and Japan) and to overlook the remarkable achievement which it is. The development of a distinctive style is not the least aspect of Burnham’s achievement. Francis’s work, too, possesses a distinctive style, though in his case the trenchancy of Burnham is leavened with a recurrent sense of wit that is often suggestive of H. L. Mencken. Francis gives more attention to Burnham’s second book, The Machiavellians, Defenders of Freedom (1943), than to The Managerial Revolution. It is Francis’s belief that “The Machiavellians is Burnham’s most important book” (Power, 49). Francis reaffirmed this belief more than twenty years after he wrote these words and emphasized that it is the 1943 edition which should be read (Personal interview). The principles explicitly set forth in The Machiavellians form the body of the method of Samuel Francis, the method which set him apart from the crowd of right-wing publicists and journalists. Interpreters of Burnham on the left (e.g., Milovan Djilas) have, understandably, ended their consideration of his work with The Managerial Revolution and have ignored The Machiavellians. Francis notes that the transition from The Managerial Revolution to The Machiavellians marked the end of Marxist influence upon Burnham’s analysis (Power, 41). In The Machiavellians, Burnham quite obviously strives to maintain Weber’s wertfrei approach, shuns both Marxian and religious precepts, and seeks to apply “the scientific method” (Burnham’s words) to the study of politics. Burnham begins The Machiavellians with a study of Dante’s De Monar- chia in which he demonstrates the difference between the “formal” and the “real” meaning of a political text. This is illustrative of one of the greatest of the Machiavellian principles: “The laws of political life cannot be discovered by an analysis which takes men’s words and beliefs, spoken or written, at their face value. Words, programs, declarations, constitutions, laws, theories, philosophies, must be related to the whole complex of social facts in order to understand their real political and historical meaning” (Machiavellians, 224). The “formal meaning” of De Monarchia is presented using the terms of “the fictional world of religion, metaphysics, miracles, and pseudo-history,” while the “real meaning” must be presented “in terms of the actual world of space, time, and events” (Machiavellians, 9–10). Burnham surveys the history of Flor- ence, drawing upon Machiavelli’s account of it, and Dante’s life to arrive at “the real meaning of De Monarchia”: Eternal salvation, the highest development of man’s potentialities, everlasting peace, unity, and harmony, the delicate balance of abstract relations between Summer 2005 / Nelson 39

Church and State, all these ghosts and myths evaporate, along with the whole elaborate structure of theology, metaphysics, allegory, miracle, and fable. The entire formal meaning, which has told us nothing and proved nothing, as- sumes its genuine role of merely expressing and disguising the real meaning. This real meaning is simply an impassioned propagandistic defense of the point of view of the turncoat Bianchi exiles from Florence, specifically; and more generally of the broader Ghibelline point of view to which these Bian- chi capitulated. De Monarchia is, we might say, a Ghibelline Party Platform” (Machiavellians, 19–20) Machiavelli, in contrast to Dante, an obfuscator, is the founder of “the scientific study of politics.” In Burnham’s words, “If an inquiry is to remain scientific, but nevertheless pursue other goals than those that are peculiar to science,” such goals must meet certain standards, the first of which is that “they must be non-transcendental…formulated in terms of the actual world of space and time and history. Second, they must have at least a minimum probability of realization” (Machiavellians, 29–30). Dante’s empire is to assure the salvation of all men, to assure one world government in peace. It is grounded in the transcendent, the non-existent, and has a formal goal that is impossible of attainment. Machiavelli, to the contrary, has the “chief immediate practical goal” of “the national unification of Italy” (Machiavellians, 31). To the objection that Machiavelli would “divorce politics from ethics,” Burnham replies that “Machiavelli divorced politics from ethics only in the same sense that every science must divorce itself from ethics” (Machiavellians, 38). Moreover, given that Machiavelli’s real goal is not other than his formal goal, his “ethics are much better than those of Dante” (Machiavellians, 39). Burnham finds most admirable in Machiavelli the fact that in his writing, as in “all scientific discourse,” “the distinction between formal and real meaning…is inapplicable. Formal meaning and real meaning are one” (Machiavel- lians, 48). This fact may explain why “the harsh opinion of Machiavelli has been more widespread in England and the United States than in the nations of Continental Europe. This is no doubt natural because the distinguishing quality of Anglo-Saxon politics has always been hypocrisy, and hypocrisy must always be at pains to shy away from the truth” (Machiavellians, 76). Burnham bids that, following the Machiavellians, “we examine not what follows from some abstract metaphysical principle but how men behave…Where they are themselves the subject-matter, men still keep the door resolutely shut…Per- haps the full disclosure of what we really are and how we act is too violent a medicine” (Machiavellians, 76–7). Isaiah Berlin, who in his essay on “The Originality of Machiavelli” presents a survey of the many conflicting interpretations of Machiavelli, does not mention Burnham, but he does note that Leo Strauss is the most recent author of an “anti-Machiavel,” Thoughts on Machiavelli (1958) (Against the Current, 36). The most notorious of anti-Machiavels is, of course, that written by Frederick the Great at the suggestion of Voltaire. Strauss’s polar opposition to Burnham’s 40 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly position on Machiavelli is interesting given the fact that Strauss is widely cred- ited with being the ideological founder of neoconservatism. See, for example, Anne Norton (Machiavellians, 161–80). Francis obviously admires Burnham’s frankness and realizes that it cost him some support he might otherwise have had. He notes the criticism of Burnham by other conservatives who argue that his thought “is reductionist; it eliminates too much of the transcendent, the ethical, and the divine from human life to provide a reliable tool for understanding politics” (Power, 126). Burnham’s approach was too scientific, too empirical, for most traditionalists. According to Francis, “Unlike several other modern conservative thinkers, who defend tradition as a manifestation of natural law, ethical principles, divine revelation, or some other transcendental reality, Burnham rests his case for tradition on the empirical nature and the particularity and uniqueness of tradition, ‘social experience acting through time’” (Power, 117). Burnham’s recognition of Machiavelli as the archetype of political realism in itself would lead some of his critics to link him with fascism. Mussolini described The Prince as a “vade mecum for statesmen” (Berlin, 35). More convincing evidence of some parallelism between Burnham and fascism is the argument presented by Ernst Nolte in his Three Faces of Fascism that “resistance to transcendence” is the hallmark of fascism (Nolte, 429–34). Nolte’s work reaches its climax in his definition of German fascism: “National Socialism was the death throes of the sovereign, martial, inwardly antagonistic group. It was the practical and violent resistance to transcendence” (Nolte, 421). This should be simply noted in passing because the meaning of the term “transcendence” is less clear in Nolte than it is in Burnham. Perhaps some meaningful difference is apparent in the fact that transcendence is met with resistance in fascism, according to Nolte, but in Burnham (and the Machiavellians he considers) with a mere denial that it is knowable. Though he does not use the term, Burnham in places suggests that man is possessed by a Nietzschean Wille zur Macht that assures an unending dynamism or instability in human government. In his words, “The recurring pattern of change expresses the more or less permanent core of human nature as it func- tions politically. The instability of all governments and political forms follows in part from the limitless human appetite for power” (Machiavellians, 63). According to Machiavellian theory, in Francis’s words, “the human appetite for power and man’s physical inability to live alone are the causes of human society—not the natural sociability of man. Society is not harmonious or consensual but is in constant conflict, instability, and flux because of the insatiable nature of the desire for power. A legislator or a body of citizens (Ma- chiavelli) or a ruling class (Burnham and the Machiavellians) imposes order and consensus on society through force and fraud (deception, ideology, myth, or political formula) and uses power for his or its own interests as perceived through the formulas and ideologies that the rulers accept” (Power, 121–2). Summer 2005 / Nelson 41

The Machiavellians whom Burnham examines are, in addition to Machia- velli himself, the following theoreticians of elitism: Gaetano Mosca, Georges Sorel, Robert Michels, and Vilfredo Pareto (Machiavellians, 81–220). Burnham and the Machiavellians interpreted politics as, in Francis’s words: the savage and incessant struggle for power at all levels of society, regardless of how this struggle might be disguised by language, symbolism, and institutional forms. Driven by insatiable appetites and irrational beliefs, men seek to dominate each other or to escape domination by others. This struggle inevitably results in a minority coming to power, monopolizing as much as possible political, economic, military, technical, and honorific resources and excluding and oppressing the majority. In this way there is formed an ‘elite’ (Pareto), ‘ruling class’ (Mosca), or ‘oligarchy’ (Michels) that rules the majority and exploits it for its own benefit through force and fraud” (Power, 30). “[T]he record of this unending rise and fall of ruling minorities is human history” (33). Francis admits that “the Machiavellians saw little ground for hope of democratic emancipation. They interpreted modern democracy as a special kind of disguised oligarchy based on commercial and industrial power and not fundamentally different from earlier kinds of elitism” (Power, 33). He warns that, because of this unflinching frankness, “The Machiavellians is probably Burnham’s most misunderstood book” (Power, 45). Some have overlooked “Burnham’s exposition of the theory of juridical defense, his criticism of managerial political tendencies, or his own defense of liberty” (Power, 45). Francis explains: Burnham and his mentors were not arguing for elitism in the sense of “aristocracy.” They were not arguing that elites should rule the majority because their members are better, wiser, stronger, more intelligent, or more virtuous than most men. They were arguing for the sociological inevitability of minority domination, for the impossibility of majority rule and democracy in any literal or meaningful sense…the fact of oligarchy is irrelevant to its truth. (Power, 35) The Machiavellian thinkers also recognize that the elites constantly change their composition. Mosca, for example, recognized an aristocratic tendency or a democratic tendency in elites, depending upon the elite’s openness to recruitment (Power, 35). Pareto gives particular attention to “the circulation of elites,” by which an “in-elite” generates and is displaced by an “out-elite” (Machiavellians, 205–220). “[J]uridical defense” (in the popular cant phrase, “the rule of law, not men”) is cited by Mosca as a means of limiting power (Power, 39). “The best regime to both Mosca and Pareto is not that in which the virtue of the citizen is most developed but that in which the security and liberty of the citizen and the commonwealth are best protected” (Power, 40). Burnham’s “primary concern, like Machiavelli, was to establish a verifiable methodology for the analysis of social and political affairs, but he was also concerned to discover a realistic means 42 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly of evaluating and judging political institutions and behavior. He found both in the Machiavellians, and it was the limitation of power that remained for Burnham the primary political ideal” (Power, 40–41). Unlike Marx, the Machiavellians believe that a “crisis of power” for the ruling elite, which leads to a ruling elite’s replacement by a new elite, is not necessarily economic. In Francis’s words, the managerial elite arose because “new social forces, especially technological developments, over which the capitalist or entrepreneurial elite had no control, rendered its institutions and ideologies obsolescent and less useful for preserving its power. The older elite also underwent a psychological, intellectual, and moral degeneration” (Power, 42). According to Francis, “The Machiavellians had emphasized the historical role of organized minorities in seizing power and imposing their rule through organization. They had also derogated the importance of ideas and verbal expressions as causative factors in history” (Power, 62). Pareto stressed “residues,” “the internal and subrational psychic forces of man, and external forces such as biological or physical factors that had consequences. Ideas and their expressions in art, literature, philosophy, or religion are of secondary importance in the historical process, and their principal significance is their function as myths or ideologies that reflect and support the power of an elite or counter-elite” (Power, 63). Though verbal expressions do not dictate who holds power, what Burn- ham calls “ideology” and what Mosca calls “the political formula” is central to the retention of power. Burnham thus explains Mosca’s concept of the political formula: [I]t may be seen from historical experience that the integrity of the political formula is essential for the survival of a given social structure. Changes in the formula, if they are not to destroy the society, must be gradual, not abrupt. The formula is indispensable for holding the social structure together. A widespread skepticism about the formula will in time corrode and disintegrate the social order. It is perhaps for this reason, half-consciously understood, that all strong and long-lived societies have cherished their ‘traditions,’ even when, as is usually the case, these traditions have little relation to fact, and even after they can hardly be believed literally by educated men (Machiavellians, 100). In other words, the members of the elite must endure the Faustian frustra- tion of never daring to tell the best of what they know. This must also limit their possible actions. According to Burnham A dilemma confronts any section of the elite that tries to act scientifically. The political life of the masses and the cohesion of society demand the acceptance of myths. A scientific attitude toward society does not permit belief in the truth of the myths. But the leaders must profess, indeed foster, belief in the myths, or the fabric of society will crack and they will be overthrown. In short, the leaders, if they themselves are scientific, must lie (Machiavellians, 269). Summer 2005 / Nelson 43

In Francis’s words: Burnham emphasized in virtually all of his writings the importance of will, courage, daring, intelligence, the ability to lead and make sacrifices, a dynamic sense of the opportune—in short, what Machiavelli called virtù—for the success or failure of an individual, an elite, or a country. The failure of will that Burnham perceived in the decadent entrepreneurial elite and that he later excoriated in the liberal elite in the 1950s and 1960s was a crucial factor in the social and political decline of their societies (Power, 63). Similarly, Burnham “saw political organization—not economic conditions or intellectual conditions—as the crucial factor that explained the rise of Com- munism” (Power, 62). As late as 1954, when Burnham published his analysis of the Cold War, The Struggle for the World, he believed that in the U.S. the capitalists still held more power than the managers; that there was still “power to restrain power,” the only guarantee of a modicum of freedom (Power, 54). By the end of the decade, when he had joined National Review, Burnham had concluded that the balance had tipped in favor of the managerial elite and that that elite had adopted an ideology, liberalism, which must weaken it in its confrontation with the Soviet Union, a state which had no out-elite to restrain its ruling elite. In The Machia- vellians, Burnham suggests at several points (particularly pages 232, 253–254) that the American managerial elite was fully as capable of Realpolitik as was the entrepreneurial elite. By 1964, when he published Suicide of the West: The Meaning and Destiny of Liberalism, he had abandoned this assessment. According to Francis, Burnham sees as the “fundamental liberal principle” a belief “that human nature is plastic, mutable and in flux and that there are no inherent, natural, or immutable qualities of man that prevent the rational development of a progressive social order” (Power , 88). In the terms of Machiavelli’s metaphor of the lions and the foxes, the entrepreneurial elite enrolls in its ranks more lions, the managerial elite more foxes (Power, 92–93). Foxes would seem to be people who give more credence to the fundamental liberal principle. Pareto refers to foxes and lions as “residues,” Class I residues being “the instinct for combinations,” Class II residues, the use of force. An American elite of “foxes,” dominated by Class I residues, must fail to meet the challenge of foreign enemies who are led by “lions” (Power, 93). “Liberal ideology is…not a cause but is itself a symptom of the decline of the West” (Power, 95). “Ruling groups in the West are…effete….” (Power, 95). Liberalism simply rationalizes “their exhaustion, decadence, and unresponsiveness to civilizational challenges” (Power, 96). Burnham points to “the dilemma” of managerial rule. Francis describes it thus: “If managerial society requires for the control of its internal power structure the psychic forces that are efficient at managerial and verbal skills but have an aversion to force, then there is a contradiction between the internal requirements of managerial power and its external requirements, which demand skill 44 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly

in the use of force. Hence it is that the principal threat to the survival of a managerial society, in which Class I forces predominate, must come from outside it or from below, from Class II residues consigned to the lower strata of society. Pareto had made this contradiction explicit, and Burnham had quoted his lengthy statement of it in Suicide of the West” (Power,105). As Francis summarized: “Clearly, the West could not survive against external or internal coercive threats as long as the liberal managerial elite held power” (Power, 106). “By the mid 1960s,” according to Francis, “Burnham had given up on the new class as well as on the old, and he was looking outside both categories of the elite—the new managerial sectors as well as the old entrepreneurial branch—to the ‘middle Americans’ for a new leadership” (Power, 110). Francis quotes from Burnham, writing in National Review in 1969: In our country, it is the paradoxical and unnatural fact that, more and more, the people—the broad middle mass of people who do the work—are holding the country together, giving it, if unconsciously for the most part, what direction it has, and sustaining the governing elite that, having lost its nerve, must before long lose its mission. This creates a historical mon- strosity, since the broad masses cannot govern, and in truth do not want to. If, therefore, the natural governors quit, the masses will have to fashion new ones” (Power, 111). What Burnham suggested in 1969 about “the broad middle mass of people” seemed to find independent confirmation in 1976 when Donald I. Warren, a sociologist, published a study entitled The Radical Center: Middle Americans and the Politics of Alienation. Warren’s identification of a group within the population, which he called “Middle American Radicals (MARs),” who were equally alienated from the old political right and the New Left, and who felt themselves to be menaced by those below them and ignored and exploited by those above them, was the subject of Francis’s influential essay “Message from MARs,” published in 1982 in The New Right Papers. These middle American radicals (“MARs”) were the emerging leaders of the broad middle mass of Americans. Francis defines them in terms that Burnham might have employed: MARs form a class—not simply a middle class and not simply an economic category—that is in revolt against the dominant patterns and structures of American society. They are, in the broadest sense, a political class, and they aspire, through the New Right, to become the dominant political class in the United States by displacing the current elite, dismantling its apparatus of power, and discrediting its political ideology (“Message from MARs,” 68). This “Message from MARs” was reprinted in the most complete collection of Francis’s writings, Beautiful Losers (1993), and was the basis for Francis’s analysis during the next twenty years. Francis’s articles and columns regarding the middle American radicals, published in issues of the Summer 2005 / Nelson 45 monthly magazine Chronicles during the years 1989 through 1996, were reprinted as the volume Revolution from the Middle (1997). The fall of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the years after 1989 might seem to have offered a fortuitous deliverance to the managerial elite, incapable as it was (accepting Burnham’s analysis) of adequately defending the U.S. and the West against such an external threat. An internal threat remained, however, from alienated minorities within the U.S. and from an influx of reinforcements of those minorities through mass immigration into the U.S. from Third World countries. The managerial elite accepted and encouraged this mass influx. Worse yet, a section of the political right, the neoconservatives, attempted to accommodate the managerial elite on this and other issues. In “Neoconservatism and the Managerial Revolution,” an essay published in 1986 and reprinted in Beautiful Losers, Francis warns that the neoconservatives, offering a new ideology to the managerial elite, threaten “to co-opt and mute the radical antimanagerial impetus of the Old and New Right.” If this “neoconservative co-optation” succeeds, “the result will not be the renaissance of America and the West but the continuation and eventual fulfillment of the goals of their most committed enemies” (Beautiful Losers, 116–7). Co-optation by neoconservatives and others only partially explained why the middle American radicals failed to emerge as an out-elite. Francis also realized that the state of the middle American mass itself inhibited the rise of such an out-elite. Writing in 1990 in Chronicles on “The Middle American Proletariat,” Francis admits that the new middle class “conspicuously lacks the material independence of the old middle class and the authority, security, and liberty that independence yields” (Revolution from the Middle, 54). Francis quotes Andrew Hacker, who writes that the members of the new middle class “are employees, and their livelihoods are always contingent on the approval and good will of the individuals and organizations who employ them…. Whatever status and prosperity today’s middle-class American may have is due to the decision of someone to hire him and utilize his services” (Revolution from the Middle, 55). According to Hacker, this new middle class is close to “the traditional concep- tion of a proletariat” (Revolution from the Middle, 55). Francis concludes that the American middle class has suffered “a profound dispossession…. Lacking the autonomy of the bourgeois middle class, it is unable to formulate a new identity that would offer resistance to the emerging transnational elite and its allies in the underclass” (Revolution from the Middle, 55). Not himself a disciple of Burnham, Donald Warren did not consider whether or not the middle American radicals would one day rise to become an out-elite which could challenge the entrepreneurial and managerial elites. He did note in The Radical Center that “The fact that MARs will not readily join in collective action in order to redress their grievances suggests that in the future MARs may only rarely manifest anger in some form of collective 46 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly action or participation in a political movement” (The Radical Center, 192). War- ren believed that middle American radicals “will need to construct forms of political expression which tend to be different from some of the models used by students, blacks, the organized poor as well as the typical bureaucratic professional” (The Radical Center, 192). Writing in 1990, Francis found the American middle class “unable to formulate a new identity that would offer resistance to the emerging transnational elite and its allies in the underclass” (Revolution from the Middle, 55). Warren, writing in 1993 in Telos, suggests that the middle American masses were about to find an identity as victims, as a displaced majority. In another article in Telos in 1995, Warren gives this identity a flesh and blood reality by proclaiming it to be simply “white Americans.” He cites, but does not endorse, Wilmot Robertson’s The Dispossessed Majority (1972). At least since the beginning of the 1990s, Francis had been implicitly finding an identity between middle Americans and white Americans. By the middle of the decade, he had reached the point where he began to write and speak directly about such an identity. For that reason, Edward Ashbee in his insightful survey of paleoconservatism concludes that “Among leading paleoconservatives, only Samuel Francis confronts the boundaries between American ethnicity directly” (“Politics of Paleoconservatism,” 76). Francis’s speech, “Why Race Matters,” delivered before the American Renaissance conference in 1994, maintained no distance between political for- malism and political realism in stating an identity between middle Americans and white Americans. The reaction to this speech confirmed what Burnham observed about hypocrisy. The most brutal reaction to Francis came from traditionalist conservatives of the transcendental variety. They as well as neoconservatives (e.g., Dinesh D’Souza) quoted from the speech, always with expressions of either real or feigned horror, the following words: Instead of invoking a suicidal liberalism and regurgitating the very universal- ism that has subverted our identity and our sense of solidarity, what we as whites must do is reassert our identity and our solidarity, and we must do so in explicitly racial terms through the articulation of a racial consciousness as whites…The civilization that we as whites created in Europe and America could not have developed apart from the genetic endowments of the creating people, nor is there any reason to believe that the civilization can be success- fully transmitted to a different people. If the people or race who created and sustained the civilization of the West should die, then the civilization also will die (Francis, “Why Race Matters,” 5). Setting aside the often designedly indecorous utterances of the marginalized, Francis’s speech was the most revealing event on the American political right in decades. One need only compare the distance between the formal and the real in, for example, the platform of the States Rights Democrats of 1948 or the “Southern Manifesto” of the South’s senators ten years later. One can apply to this speech the words of Burnham, in a quite different context, that in Summer 2005 / Nelson 47 it “the distinction between formal and real meaning…is inapplicable. Formal meaning and real meaning are one” (Machiavellians, 48). Those who sought to ban Francis from public discourse at first attacked him through his employment, removing him from his editorial position with the Washington Times newspaper. Possibly motivated by fear even more than rivalry, they saw in “racialists” such as Francis people who were more leonine than vulpine, moved more by the residues of Class II than those of Class I, people who would publicly question the political formula or (possibly even more dangerous) calmly and rationally speak and write about issues that went beyond its implicit boundaries. The political impact of the resumption of mass immigration in the decades following 1965 was not foreseen by Burnham, Warren, Robertson, or anyone else. The nonchalance with which the American ruling elites, both the in-elite and the out-elite, regarded the eventual obliteration of America’s ethnic and cultural identity was without precedent. Francis addressed this challenge in a number of his syndicated newspaper columns, those from the years 1998 through 2001 being collected as America Extinguished (2002). In his last monograph, Ethnopolitics: Immigration, Race, and the American Political Future (2003), Francis presents frankly the real basis of the Republican party’s electoral power, the force of white racial identity which has sustained it over the decades of its advance from an unprecedented weakness in 1964 to its capture of both the White House and the Congress in 2004. The polemic of America Extinguished is here buttressed with extensive statistical data. At this stage, it was apparent to Francis that the “neoconservative co-optation” had gone beyond the stage of nascence which he had noted in 1990 to become the commanding position of the Republican party. In Ethnopolitics Francis calls upon the national leadership of the Republican party to reconsider what must be its eventually self-destructive strategy. The untimely death of Samuel T. Francis ended his work on a book which, reportedly, had it been completed, was to have examined the relation of conservatism to race. No one can replicate the work of Francis, in this regard or otherwise, but it is an open possibility for anyone to study his method of political analysis, both as implicitly present in his own works and as explicitly stated in the works of Burnham, particularly The Machiavellians, and to apply that method to the interpretation of future events.

Brent Nelson is the author of America Balkanized: Immigration’s Challenge to Government.

REFERENCES

Ashbee, Edward. “Politics of Paleoconservatism.” Society 37(3) (2000): 75–84. 48 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly

Berlin, Isaiah. Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas. New York: Viking Press, 1980. Burnham, James. The Machiavellians, Defenders of Freedom. New York: John Day, 1943. ___. The Managerial Revolution. 1941. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1972. Francis, Samuel T. America Extinguished: Mass Immigration and the Disintegration of American Culture. Monterey, VA: Americans for Immigration Control, 2002. ___. Beautiful Losers: Essays on the Failure of American Conservatism. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1993. ___. Ethnopolitics: Immigration, Race, and the American Political Future. Raleigh, NC: Representative Government Press, 2003. ___. “Message from MARs: The Social Politics of the New Right.” The New Right Papers. Ed. Robert W. Whitaker. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982. 64–83. ___. Personal interview. November 6, 2004. ___. Power and History: The Political Thought of James Burnham. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984. ___. Revolution from the Middle. Raleigh, NC: Middle American Press, 1997. ___. Thinkers of Our Time: James Burnham. 2nd ed. London: Claridge Press, 1999. ___. “Why Race Matters.” American Renaissance (September 1994): 1–6. Robertson, Wilmot. The Dispossessed Majority. Cape Canaveral, FL: Howard Allen, 1972. Nolte, Ernst. Three Faces of Fascism: Action Française, Italian Fascism, National Socialism. Trans. Leila Vennewitz. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966. Norton, Anne. Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004. Warren, Donald I. The Radical Center: Middle Americans and the Politics of Alienation. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976. ___. “The Politics of the Displaced Majority.” Telos 95 (1993): 147–160. ___. “White Americans As a Minority.” Telos 104 (1995): 127–134. Woltermann, Chris. “What is Paleoconservatism?” Telos 97 (1993): 9–20. THREE PILLARS

MICHAEL O’MEARA

never met Sam, but since encountering his monthly column in Chronicles in 1989 or 1990, I knew his was a voice worth attending. In developing a white Inationalist consciousness, I’ve had the benefit of to few such voices—and of these, fewer still that have been American. Be it Nash’s “conservative intellectual movement,” the Reagan movement of the 1980s, or the various sects comprising the often mislabeled “hard right,” not one seemed uncontaminated by the liberal tenets of the antiwhite leviathan. Sam, though, was different. For despite his former ties to the Establishment and to the not always forthright palecons, he spoke not just to the reigning disorder, but to its malignant roots in the nation’s ruling class—and thus to the issue of regime change. Sam’s two decades of antiliberal commentary memorably conveyed certain ideas key to our people’s survival. Of these, three strike me as especially founda- tional. The first, requisite to any political project, designates the enemy against which white America must struggle if it is to reclaim control of its destiny. Pace antiliberalism’s obsessive wing, this enemy is not the omnipotent Jew or the occult power of a well-heeled conspiracy, but the corporate, technocratic elites which took state power from the bourgeoisie during the 1930s. Because the hegemony of these elites depends on the suppression of the country’s European civilization and ethnos, Sam thought “Middle America,” the nation’s white core, to be the likely axis of any resistance movement. But in addition to designating the enemy and the forces to be mobilized against it, Sam risked his “bread and butter” to warn of the right’s bankruptcy, of its antipathy to any “revolution from the middle,” and of the necessity of the “new nationalism.” These three ideas—the conceptual pillars defining who we are, who our enemy is, and what politics ought to dictate our relationship to the enemy—represent not merely an invaluable part of Sam’s legacy, but, I believe, the possible programmatic basis of a white American rebirth.

THE NEW CLASS

Sam’s “analytical gestalt,” as evident in his one book-length work and his two important collections of essays, owed its greatest debt to James Burnham. A former Trotskyist conversant with the major debates of Europe’s turbulent thirties and a later student of Machiavelli’s so-called “science of power,” Burnham bequeathed to Sam a way of thinking quite unlike the classical liberal (or liberal conservative) stance of the American Right. Burnham, accordingly, disclaimed the Old Right’s “formalistic and 50 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly normative approach” to politics and focused his scientific method on the social-historical processes responsible for “the emerging patterns and forces in American and world politics.” But while his modernist methodology favored scientific procedures and disparaged arguments built on ethical absolutes and transcendental certainties, it nevertheless differed from other modernist schools in rejecting the subversive impetus that liberal politics gives to scientific and naturalist doctrines. For this reason, Sam claimed Burnham’s “counter-modernism” led not to the Gulag, the end point of the left’s modernism, but to the Framers’ republicanism. Burnham’s influence was especially prominent in shaping Sam’s view of the managerial revolution. Seeing historical change in terms of Pareto’s circulating elites, Burnham thought the crisis of the thirties had brought the bourgeois era to an end. Lacking mass support, as well as the specialized skills to run large, complex organizations, the old entrepreneurial class had had no alternative in this period but to cede to a “new class” schooled in the techniques of late capitalism. Yet unlike Marxists, who saw managerialism as simply another stage in capitalism’s development, Burnham thought the transition from bourgeois to New Class rule, from America’s Second Republic to its Managerial Imperium, tantamount to a revolutionary transformation, for the managers’ “new modes and orders” rejected traditional social relations, family values, the transmission of property, and much of the internalized world of meaning characteristic of bourgeois society. Given the New Class’s roots in the decision-making centers of Washington’s leviathan state and in similar apparatuses in the universities, the foundations, the mass media, and the major corporations, its members viewed the communal, social, and racial particularisms of American life as hindrances to the realization of their technobureaucratic order. Their main occupation was thus neither the advancement of the nation’s biocultural project nor the mobilization and organization of its labor, but rather the supervision of a rationalized system in which the nation’s particularisms were treated as functional impediments and economics as but one (though clearly the most important) of the various interrelated realms falling to their managerial expertise. As such, they took no account of the “deliberate sense of community” (Willmoore Kendall) native to the American political tradition and, like tyrants of old, endeavored to repress the historically established consensus derived from this deliberate sense. To this end, they took to manipulating public opinion, denigrating the traditional heritage, programming behavior, legislating the forced congregation of the races, and attempting whatever promoted their managerial Gleichgestaltung. The “cult of economic growth, material acquisition, and universal equality” legitimating such practices rested on a no less deracinated concept of existence, for the material and civil implications of this cult sought to extirpate the “little platoons,” organic particularisms, and all those things expressive of white America’s historic will. Not coincidentally, the “colossal aggregate” that Summer 2005 / O'Meara 51 now makes up the United States is “held together not by any natural sense of historic community, but through the artificial bonds imposed by bureaucratic routines and disciplines, corporate market strategies, and the mass collective channels in which Americans move, play…and communicate.” Even more ardently than Burnham, Sam came to regard the regime’s liberal tenets as “an ideology of Western suicide,” stifling not just the spirit of America’s European origins, but the biological existence of those whose ancestors founded the nation and those who continue to embody its living essence. Indeed, Sam was rather categorical in arguing that the managers’ leviathan state posed a life- and-death threat to the nation, for it denied European-descended Americans the right to preserve themselves as a people. From Burnham, Sam also acquired a way of addressing the Jewish question. Though some have criticized him for his discretion in dealing (or not dealing) with this issue, it ought nevertheless to be stressed that despite the reticence his profession dictated, he significantly enhanced our understanding of their formidable institutional leverage. For managerial rule, as he explained on numerous occasions, fuses political, cultural, and economic powers into a single totalitarian concentration. This means that once an alien force succeeds in infiltrating a regime’s decision-making centers, it acquires influence over nearly everything else. Moreover, the bloodless character of the managers’ regime, its privileging of materialist and rationalist imperatives, its indifference to history, culture, and ethnos—these also foster a situation in which the system welcomes aliens into its inner circles and facilitates the implementation of their antiwhite policies, provided, of course, that they champion its interests and conceal their specific racial agenda. Contrary, then, to those who think the “disenfranchisement” of the Jews will automatically solve our problems, Sam’s social-historical understanding of the leviathan’s antiwhite impetus forces us to take a more realistic view of it, to accept that its just not outsiders, but certain developments inherent to modernity that are responsible for our present plight, and thus to acknowledge that modern America, in disavowing its biocultural foundations, has become what Philippe Grasset calls un problème de civilisation.

REVOLUTION FROM THE MIDDLE

An analytically cogent understanding of the enemy would not be worth much if it did not also identify a force to oppose it. As Marx’s labor movement freed socialism of its founders’ utopian illusions, Sam lighted upon the managers’ “grave digger.” Thus, while Burnham saw no alternative to the managerial regime and concentrated on defending those localities of power and independence that had escaped its clutches, Sam was able to define a social force to challenge it. For long after the bourgeoisie made its peace with the New Class, white workers and small businessmen continued to pay the bill for its social engineering and therapeutic reforms. Indeed, the oppositional potential 52 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly of Middle American alienation was evident as early as the early fifties, when McCarthy mobilized wide swaths of middle- and working-class Americans against the regime’s “suicidal” exercise of state power. Then, after the managers signed on to the cause of racial equality and Third World immigration, this populist disaffection assumed an explosive potential. Sam’s envisioned “revolution from the middle” was not, however, without its problems. Besides the fact that Burnham misread the character of the twentieth century’s most important events (specifically the rise of fascism, the Second World War, and the Cold War), relied on a naive “science of power,” and occasionally favored New Class interests, Sam’s notion of Middle America (influenced by Donald Warren) was not entirely compatible with Burnham’s theory of elites. For in relying on the managerial state for a variety of essential services (Social Security, Medicare, home loans, collective bargaining, etc.), Middle America had become so ensconced in its system that it no longer posed a distinct socioeconomic alternative to it; at best, it retained a capacity for cultural resistance, but even here it had lost much of the cohesion, rootedness, and independence of its prewar counterpart. Nevertheless, in the rumblings set off by McCarthy and then by the Wallace movement, the Reagan Democrats, the electoral campaigns of Ross Perot, David Duke, but especially of Pat Buchanan, Sam detected the early stirrings of a Middle American revolt, as whites rallied to maverick politicians championing “the American Way of Life and the historic culture behind it.” Despite his terminology, then, it was mainly as a white nation struggling to reclaim its identity and its independence, rather than as a class or an elite, that Sam came to see Middle America. In fact, by the early nineties, his rhetoric had become noticeably more nationalistic, as he privileged an ethnoracial concept of the Heartland and an “America First” foreign policy.

BEYOND LEFT AND RIGHT

In siding with Burnham’s neo-Machiavellianism, Sam also diverged from the mainstream right, which had historically divided into libertarian and traditionalist currents. In his view, libertarians stressing the economic individualism of American identity were too closely allied with liberal modernity to constitute a distinct pole of antiliberal opposition, whereas traditionalists rejected modernity outright, concentrating on philosophical “esoterica” irrelevant to the great conflicts of our secular age. Both tendencies, he argued, ignored questions touching on social structures and historical change and instead put their faith in abstract moral ideals—which left them politically powerless. Burnham, by contrast, fully accepted modernist premises, even as he turned them against their liberal application. His conservative defense of traditional freedoms was based, as a result, not on metaphysical concerns, but on ones favoring scientific, empiricist, and historicist criteria that challenged “the conventional modernist categories defined by the left.” Summer 2005 / O'Meara 53

Yet however much the antimetaphysical, socially conscious, and historically informed realism characterizing Sam’s thought owed to Burnham, he was nevertheless a more radical thinker than his mentor, oriented as he was to the social forces resisting the managers’ regime and to the ideas undermining its legitimacy. Thus, in the eighties, while still favoring facets of Reagan’s policies, he was already taking his distance from the Old and New Rights—arguing that the politically organized forces of American “conservatism” had either fled the field of battle or else deserted to the enemy, as they formed ranks with the neocons, made their peace with the Wilsonian-Rooseveltian tradition of mil- lenarian globalism, and “crawled into bed with the managerial establishment.” Worse, Reagan-era conservatives began what eventually became a wholesale conversion to the ideology of racial equality, effectively severing themselves from the people who created the civilizational heritage they ostensibly sought to conserve. Besides betraying white America in embracing Big Government and its “rainbow” program of civil rights, affirmative action, feminism, Third World immigration, open borders, and faith-based imperialism, these so-called right- ists helped empty the right of its political substance. This, though, was more than a matter of opportunism, for it reflected a larger sea change: Not only had the organized right for much of the latter half of the twentieth century begun accommodating liberal modernist principles, but the voting behavior of Middle Americans increasingly defied conventional political designations, as they supported politicians and policies combining elements of both the traditional left and the traditional right (economic liberalism and social conservatism). The conflicts that once distinguished right from left have, in fact, begun to cede to new ones, as Middle Americans committed to their national, racial, and civilizational identities array themselves against a cosmopolitan New Class hostile to these identities. In stressing, then, that the left-right convergence generates new polarities and that every concession to a “conservatism” supportive of the “oppressive, socially destructive, and anti-American liberal power structure” undermines the fighting capacity and principles of white America, Sam inad- vertently recuperated one of the defining principles of the interwar heritage of revolutionary nationalism—again taking his distance from virtually all the “conservative” tribunes of his time. In this spirit, he argued that it was neither in retreat from the leviathan’s aggressions nor in nostalgic appeal to the Old Republic, but only in “transcending the artificial and obsolete framework of right and left” that Middle America would prevail. Indeed, no major American rightist, least of all Burnham, would go as far in this. Sam’s development as a revolutionary anti-liberal, however, was stopped short of completion, for his fate, alas, was that of a transitional thinker, straddling two eras. Given that his counter-modernist analytic precluded any consideration that modernity might be cause for doubt, he did not see that left and right, designations born of the modern world, had become obsolete 54 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly as modernity ceased to be a viable historical force. Likewise, he refused all truck with postmodernism, ignoring that both the archaic and futuristic dimensions of twenty-first century nationalism are more faithfully upheld in its relativist and anti-foundationalist perspective than in modernity’s scientific one. Without pursuing these ideas further, suffice it to note that Sam’s counter-modernism was itself a form of modernism, subject to many of the same limitations, however much it avoided liberalism’s more subversive practices and provided invaluable guides for our own movement.

METAMORPHIC TRANSFORMATION

It is testament to Sam’s integrity—and to the special qualities of his mind— that, as a product of an elite university, a former Senate aide and foundation fellow, a respected journalist and insider, he was able to look beyond the reigning ideas to work out an analysis that grasped the nature of our plight, the social forces to overcome it, and the ideas and organizations appropriate to our struggle. At the beginning of Power and History, there is a long quotation by Burnham that graphically captures something of the elemental force of this achievement. The quotation describes the slow, tortuous process by which a “strange species” of crab sheds its old shell in order to grow a new one, “without which it cannot live.” The old shell clings to the crab’s ﬂesh at a thousand points, but it has to be discarded, no matter how painful the metamorphosis. Then, once the shell is gone and before the new one develops, there is a dangerous period in which the crab is “exposed to all its enemies on the seaﬂoor.” Sam, as I saw him, was not unlike Burnham’s crab. Heir to a certain tradition to which he felt organically attached, he, in contrast to the overwhelming majority of self-described conservatives, realized the lifeless shell of the American right had to be discarded if the nation were to survive. In risking the dangers of this painful transformation, he would generate a body of ideas that promises our people the prospect of a future.

Michael O’Meara, Ph.D., studied social theory at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales and modern European history at the University of California. He is the author of New Culture, New Right: Anti-Liberalism in Postmodern Europe (2004). PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS OF SAM FRANCIS

JARED TAYLOR

amuel Todd Francis was the premier philosopher of white racial consciousness of our time. No one did more to alert whites to the crisis they Sface, and no one called them more eloquently to action. His intellectual sweep was of course much broader than this—he was an expert on Machiavelli, a James Burnham scholar, a learned critic of H. P. Lovecraft—but it is for his pioneering work in modern race-realist thought that he will be remembered. His work will endure, esteemed by both scholars and activists. What we have lost forever is the man himself, and tens of thousands of readers who knew him only through his writing will never know that man. Any reader quickly discovers the power of Sam’s mind, the depth of his erudition, his sly humor, but behind his supple prose there was a complexity that was sometimes at odds with his public figure. Perhaps that is why some of us who had the good fortune to call Sam a friend have tried, as best we can, to put his extraordinary personality into words. Those who admired him from a distance may want to know more about the man who influenced their thinking. I knew Sam for only the last 15 or 16 of his 57 years, so there are chapters of his life that are closed to me. I did not know the precocious student and beloved little brother who was quickly marked as the family genius. I did not know the university and graduate student who, after flirtations with liberalism, was already moving toward conservatism. Nor did I know the Heritage Foundation scholar or Senate aide, with a reputation for careful research and brilliant analysis that established him as an authority on terrorism. Sam kept friends from all those periods of his life, and their perspective is longer than mine. Still, I am glad to have known the later Sam Francis, the one who brought immense historical learning to bear on the formulation of a distinctive understanding of the world, which is his special gift to our times. In this sense, I believe I knew the real Sam Francis. It was in 1988 or 1989 that, like so many others, I first met Sam through his writing. I was determined to make his acquaintance, and we first corresponded in connection with a race-oriented publication I had decided to start, and which eventually became American Renaissance. He wrote for the magazine, and served as one of the founding members of the non-profit organization established to run it, so ours was a professional collaboration that grew into friendship. It was a surprise for me to discover that the author of such bold, slashing essays was a shy man. Sam hid his shyness behind a gruff, even forbidding 56 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly manner, and it took me some time to learn his secret. It was only during the last eight years of Sam’s life that I lived near enough to see him frequently face to face, so before that period we met at conferences and spoke on the telephone. In the first years of our friendship, telephone calls had a ritual beginning. “Hello,” he would answer, with a dour tone that discouraged conversation. “Oh, Jared,” he would add, in the same dour tone, as if I were a bill collector or carpet salesman, and then keep me on the line for 45 minutes. He was glad to talk, and happy to hear from me, but it was years before his “Oh, Jared” had any spark of welcome or pleasure. For those who penetrated his reserve, Sam was famous for good conversation. At ease and among friends, he could delight companions for hours as he ranged from Plutarch to horror movies to foreign affairs to stories about the people he had known. He enjoyed a glass of good cheer—sometimes quite a few glasses—but I never saw him in the slightest way impaired. There was no one with whom one could spend a more enjoyable and instructive evening. It was a pity Sam did not make his delightful, affable side more available. At conferences and meetings, he did not try to meet new people, but sought the comfort of old comrades. And yet, of course, his circle of acquaintances was very wide, because so many people admired him and managed to cut their way through his reserve. I think his desire for comfortable surroundings was of a piece with his shyness, and also due to his distaste for sharp disagreement. For someone whose very existence was a provocation to much of America, Sam did not enjoy forceful debate, but preferred instead to explore the perspectives of people with whom he agreed, to share insights, to compare notes. He generally declined invitations to take part in television or radio debates, because he had no patience for the self-righteousness and ignorant moralizing to which he would be subjected. His contribution was to write and speak; thoughtful people would recognize the truth. Sam’s distaste for conflict led to a certain reticence. His religious views, for example, he kept to himself. His close circle ran from militant scoffers to devout churchmen, and he saw no reason to sow discord or provoke unneces- sary argument. This is not to say that Sam trimmed his arguments; only that he kept silent when to speak would cause pointless discord. Nor did he hesi- tate to contradict what he took to be foolishness. If anything, he reserved his frankest disagreement for those he trusted best, and I know from experience what it was like to face the full force of his aroused intellect! My favorite conversations with Sam were those that were at first the least expected. It was no surprise that a man with a Ph.D. in history would know the British Empire inside out, could discourse on the classics, and always bolster an argument with an illuminating example from American history. But where had he picked up such a deep knowledge of Joseph Conrad, how did he know Summer 2005 / Taylor 57 so much about Alexander Pope, and when had he gone to the trouble to learn by heart some of Hilaire Belloc’s Cautionary Tales for Bad Children? Sam had a real love of literature, and sometimes spoke yearningly of the life he might have led as a writer of fiction. I once showed him a short story I had published and was thrilled when he said he envied me for having written it. Somewhere in his papers there are sure to be experimental sketches that would throw yet another light on his fascinating personality. Like so many people of distinction in their own fields, Sam had an om- nivorous, wide-ranging curiosity, and this was why he could speak so in- terestingly not just about novelists and poets but movie-makers, politicians, military commanders, and even economists and scientists. I soon learned not to be surprised at what he was likely to know, and always looked forward to hearing what he would say about the latest novel I had read or curious bit of history or psychology I had stumbled upon. Given his powerful mind and wide reputation, it was no surprise Sam was always a popular conference or dinner speaker, and perhaps never so much so as at the biennial American Renaissance conferences at which he spoke without fail from 1994 to 2004. And yet here, too, Sam had a surprising touch of vulnerability. Although he had transfixed audiences scores of times, Sam still worried over how he would be received, and usually asked me to put him on the program early so he could put his work behind him and enjoy the rest of the conference. When Sam spoke, his shyness sometimes concealed his real stature. He wrote out and read his speeches for fear of losing his train of thought if he spoke only from notes, and though what he wrote was brilliant, his head- down delivery could blunt his message. A new Sam would emerge when he finished his remarks and took questions from the floor. Here, suddenly, was the unscripted Sam, charming an audience of hundreds as if it were a dinner party of eight. His unrehearsed wit and insight were a perfect complement to his prepared thoughts, and as the years passed, I eventually persuaded him he did not need a full text. By the time he died, Sam often spoke from notes, and increasingly his speeches came from the heart, as well as from the page. Sam was not without faults, and the gruffness with which he hid his shyness sometimes left wounds. Everyone who knew Sam appreciated his wit, but sometimes his sallies touched on the faults or vanities of others. He was a life- long bachelor, and this may sometimes have dulled him to others’ sensitivities. He must have had dinner at my house twenty times before he had anything more to say to my wife than “Is Jared there?” when she answered the phone. How, she used to wonder, could a man who had been so companionable the night before treat her like the answering service? But Sam meant no disrespect; it was just his manner. My wife noticed that he came to dinner empty-handed, but after a word from me he always brought wine or flowers. 58 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly

Sam was not exactly a ladies’ man, but he appreciated female attention. Once he walked into my house with several companions. My daughter, then seven or eight, who had seen him many times, ran to him and threw her arms around him. He turned to the other men, with a happy smile on his face, and said “I get a hug.” I never knew Sam to be extravagant. He was unimpressed by the material ways in which people display wealth or status, and he lived simply. For many years, he drove a faded maroon Chevy Caprice that belched smoke for what must have been the last twenty thousand of its two hundred thousand miles. It was a solid, Sam-like car of the sort police departments use for cruisers, but it always tickled me to think of so hard-headed a man driving something called a “caprice.” Like many bachelors, Sam would have had no idea how to entertain people at his own house, to which I was invited only once despite our close acquaintance. It was a modest, suburban tract house in Prince George’s County, Maryland, and I believe it was the only house he ever owned. He showed me upstairs and down, proudly pointing out the family pieces that were so large a part of the furniture and decor. In the basement was his office, with shelves and shelves of books—nearly three thousand, I believe he told me. Although he had an office in Alexandria, Virginia, Sam often worked at home and was clearly very comfortable there. Sam’s house was in a part of Maryland that was rapidly becoming “diverse.” He worried that property values were dropping, and sometimes wondered whether he should move to Virginia. There was not much violence in Sam’s immediate neighborhood, but he was prepared if it ever came. He believed in an armed citizenry, and his weapons did not just gather dust. I have been to the range with Sam, and am quite sure he would have shot an intruder through the heart. Sam preserved his privacy as carefully as any man I know, and also did not drag his career into his private life. At the time of his funeral on February 26, 2005, his sister and cousins were staggered by the number of out-of-town strangers who came streaming to Chattanooga to pay final respects. To them, he was still their dear, local boy. They had only vague notions of the figure he cut in the larger world. Just as Sam kept his private life separate from that of the writer and activist, he kept his career out of his private life. Indeed, Sam’s love of privacy was so strong that he might not have approved of this recollection I have written of a man rather than of a body of work. If he is looking down upon us now, I hope he will forgive me, and understand that many are eager to know something of the man whose writing moved them. At the same time, I confess that I write also for myself. Sam’s loss has been a harder blow than I would have expected. Sudden death is always a shock, but especially when a man is only in his fifties. Sam was just a few years my elder, and though I have built up a grim accustomedness to the deaths of people of Summer 2005 / Taylor 59 my parents’ generation, Sam is the first close friend of my own generation to be struck down. I grieve for Sam, therefore, not only for the great things he had yet to do for our movement, but for what he meant to me as a friend. He had just un- dertaken to write what promised to be his greatest contribution yet to racial scholarship and activism, and we are all the poorer that this book will never be written. At the same time, as I realized a few days after he died, aside from my immediate family and associates, there is no one whom I saw or spoke to more frequently. He leaves a gaping void both in our movement and in our hearts, and to remember and write about Sam is the closest I can come to having my dear friend with me once again.

Jared Taylor is the editor of American Renaissance (www. amren.com). THE Sample list of T H E S O C I A LC O N T R A C T S O C I A LC O N T R A C T contributors & w r i t e r s: THE SOCIAL CONTRACT is a quarterly journal that publishes articles, essays and book Wayne Lutton, Ph.D. reviews advocating the open discussion of Dan Stein

such related issues as population size William Buchanan and rate of growth, immigration limitations, Joseph Fallon protection of the environment and precious resources, as well as preservation and Nelson Brent, Ph.D. promotion of a shared American language Sam Francis, Ph.D. and culture. L a w rence Auster

Denis McCormack TH E SO C I A L CO N T R A C T journal examines trends, events, and ideas that could unravel Robert Birre l l

America’s delicate social fabric. That’s why Mark We g i e r s k i immigrant numbers and immigration policies John Zmirak, Ph.D. rank high in the activities and concerns of THE David Payne, Ph.D. SOCIAL CONTRACT: we favor immigration, but at much lower, more traditional levels; we are in Mark Godec, M.D.

favor of fewer admissions in order to reduce Roy Beck the rate of America's population growth, Peter Brimelow protect jobs, preserve the environment, and foster assimilation. Gerda Bikales Miles Wolpin, Ph.D.

Michael W. Masters

The SocialContract.co. m .www. Steven Camaro t a

445 East Mitchell Street • Petosky, MI 49770 $25 annually (four issues) Subscribe at: WWW.TheSocialContract.com or toll-free: 1-800-4843 REMEMBERING SAM FRANCIS

LOUIS T. MARCH

The following text is from an address by the author that was presented at a memorial program on March 15, 2005, in Arlington, Virginia.

ood evening. Thank you for the opportunity to speak about our friend Dr. Samuel T. Francis. G Sam’s tangible achievements were many—the degrees earned, awards won, speeches given, books, essays, and columns written, and the largely untold story of the many people he helped. However, tonight I will speak not so much about Sam the accomplished thinker, writer, and political leader, but rather about Sam my true, gifted, and most rarified friend. About this time twenty-eight years ago, a colleague had complimentary tickets to one of those conservative appreciation dinners in Washington. As a young Senate staffer, I jumped at the chance to go. Jimmy Carter had been sworn in as president, and we movement conservatives—that’s what we were called back then—were digging in, as it were, to promote our principles in the face of a White House and Congress dominated by the left. I remember those good old days—we were the hard-core conservatives, the early-day paleocons. Our situation back then brings to mind Shakespeare’s words, “We few, we happy few, we band of brothers…” Leaving the dinner, my colleague spotted an old buddy from the North Carolina Conservative Society and hailed him over. He was Sam Francis. Af- terwards my colleague remarked that Sam was a mere shadow of his former self—“He must have lost about a hundred pounds!” Sam was actually slender. This was 1977. About a week later, Sam called and invited me to lunch. We hit it off and then some. We’d read a few of the same books and had similar interests. Fellow Southerners, we both had forebears who suffered the late unpleasantness a scant hundred years before—so there were no illusions about big government beneficence! We had both been in Washington a matter of weeks. As time passed, we found ourselves meeting for lunch two or more times a week, sometimes in the Senate cafeteria, sometimes at a Capitol Hill watering hole called The Man in the Green Hat. Patrons were packed like sardines in 62 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly that place—there was no privacy—so Sam and I began taking walks around the block after lunch, swapping stories and expounding on our politically incorrect ideas. It was on those walks, in the 1970s, that we tumbled to the realization that the Washington “leadership” of the conservative movement was woefully out of sync with its grassroots supporters in the heartland. We wondered why. Sometimes we would talk ourselves around the block two or three times until one of us would say, “Don’t we have jobs somewhere?” Then he would walk one way, back to the Heritage Foundation, and I in the other direction, to that bloated bastion of imperial democracy, the United States Senate. Sam was at his best during the regular beer bashes I used to throw at my bachelor pad. As they wound down, after midnight, the ten or fifteen linger- ing diehards would gather round and Sam would hold forth, dropping droll Francis witticisms left and right. Yet, however unsparing his banter in those days, it was not unkind—he had such a way with words. Usually the conversation continued into the very wee hours, and we’d go out to breakfast at Bob and Edith’s or that old truck stop-type restaurant on Route 1 near Crystal City—which, sadly, is now an Afghan restaurant. One day at our usual after-work haunt, I was a bit down in the mouth. I’d been invited out to California, and needed an extra $500 that I didn’t have just then, to make the trip. I had never been to California. Sam, out of the blue, spoke up: “I’ll lend you the money. I have the $500, you need it, end of story.” I was amazed. And if you knew what a fastidiously frugal fellow he was, you’d be too! But that is how I got to California the first time—courtesy of Sam. Though he was my de facto banker, he would accept no perks beyond repayment. In fact, he allowed me to spring for lunch only once—to celebrate his newly conferred Ph.D. Then we discovered Jerry Woodruff, now editor of Middle American News, to which you all should subscribe. Sam, Jerry, and I were like three peas in a pod—we’d pile in the car and head out to a party, movie, used bookstore, or some bargain-basement eatery. Ladies would be present on occasion, neces- sitating two or even three cars between us. Of course, back then we weren’t paying the price of empire at the gas pumps. From time to time we would visit a firing range. A good Southerner, Sam was at ease with arms. He was a very good shot. I asked how he became so. He replied, “When you aim, think of the enemies of our civilization.” Soon enough, 1980 rolled around, and Sam’s old friend Dr. John East, also of the North Carolina Conservative Society, was elected to the Senate by the skin of his teeth. Sam and his friend the Senator-elect talked, and he came aboard the Senator’s staff. Sam hosted many a consultation in his office at the Senate Inter- nal Security Subcommittee. “Dr. Sam,” as we used to call him, dis- pensed everything from personal anecdotes to advice on terrorism, Summer 2005 / March 63 conservatism, and how to find a job in the Reagan administration. The early Reagan days were full of hope. Conservative Republicans led the Senate, and Southern “boll-weevils” gave the good guys a working majority in the House. We actually thought we could turn things around. But it was not to be. Some of our former conservative stalwarts morphed into political hacks. Cutting government was fine until they became part of government. Position trumped principle. At the same time, a new breed of Republican mysteriously appeared on the Reagan ranch. Big government conservatives, today known as neoconservatives—the Trotskyite right (some of their leaders were former Trotsky- ites)—materialized in our midst. They had money behind them, and an agenda totally foreign to defenders of the Old Republic. Our early feelings of cautious euphoria gave way to grim determination. We really learned who was boss after Sam introduced me to his friend Dr. Mel Bradford, a Southern gentleman if there ever was one. Mel’s name was twice put forth for presidential appointments, both times swamped by a tsunami of neoconservative smear. To the best of my knowledge, that was Sam’s first head-on encounter with the Trotskyite right, a lesson he never forgot. But we still had our fun. One day in the Senate, when Sam was at the top of his game, fortune foisted upon him a delegation of angry liberal women. They were “activists.” They were hostile. They were in enemy territory and they knew it. Sam graciously heard them out, but that was not enough. The ostensible leader of the group, a large African-American woman, rose and loudly demanded that Senator East endorse their petition for sanctions against South Africa. Sam, thoughtfully, looked up, wadded up their petition, threw it in the wastebasket, and calmly told them to “Get the hell out of my office.” That was his first fifteen minutes of fame. The switchboard lit up with press calls and demands to “Fire Dr. Francis!” However, nothing came of it save a deluge of congratulatory phone calls from his fans—those were the days before email. Afterwards, Sam told me that one rather “harsh-looking” woman in the bunch “just glared at me—glared—like some kind of wild beast!” Of course I don’t know what else he expected of them after he trashed their petition that way. There were sad times as well. Early one Sunday morning in 1985, Sam called to tell me that Senator East, who suffered mightily, had committed suicide. Two days before, Sam had finished helping the Senator with his forthcoming book. The death of Senator East began a new chapter in Sam’s life. He was pursuing an opportunity at the National War College when the Washington Times called. The Times was a relatively new outfit then, an upstart newspaper actively seeking conservative talent. How times have changed at the Times! 64 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly

It didn’t take long for Sam to settle in and begin serving up the paper’s fin- est fare. My best memory from the Times days was when he called me—happy as a clam—to say he had won the American Society of Newspaper Editors Distinguished Writing Award for Editorial Writing. He went on to win it two years in a row! The pen of Sam did not gladly suffer fools. He wrote about the Beltway conservative leadership marshalling their following in a phone booth, such was their clout. He lampooned the GOP as The Stupid Party. He coined the term “anarcho-tyranny.”1 He challenged “open borders” immigration. The Trotskyite right was doing a slow burn. When warned that his writing might get him into trouble, Sam recalled that we were descended from the likes of those who camped with Washington at Valley Forge, manned the barricades at the Alamo, and stood with Stonewall Jackson. “What is writing a newspaper column compared to that?” he thundered. “What are they going to do, shoot me, burn my home?” (Of course this was spoken years before Waco, Ruby Ridge, and the so-called “Patriot Act.”) You see, Sam’s forebears did not help conquer a continent to have descendants that would snivel and cower in the face of such threats. He just wasn’t born that way. Sam made many friends while at the Times. Gordon Liddy read his columns on the radio, and Pat Buchanan courageously gave voice to some of Sam’s ideas while rocking the Republican establishment to the core. I remember Sam’s calls the day he was “demoted” at the Times (can you imagine Sam, demoted, at anything?) and later when he was fired. He was fired not for anything spoken or written, but for attending a conference. While it was a rather public conference, the Washington Times had to read about it months after the fact in the Washington Post. So they fired Sam—for being Sam. But the last laugh was on the apostles of political correctness. Sam landed on his feet and then some. While a few papers killed his column, the world- wide Web more than took up the slack. His following mushroomed. He was permanently on a roll! Sam spoke up for Middle America. He had the temerity to believe, in this age of political correctness, that Americans should not only be free to speak, but to speak freely. He even had the impertinence to state the obvious: Most of these beleaguered Middle Americans were white folks. Why should we have to circle the wagons in our own country? He even spoke up for the ideas of those much-maligned “dead white males,” the Found- ing Fathers. So many of the laughs I had with Sam were “situational”—you just had to be there. One time he invited me along to a speaking engagement up north. It turned out to be an A#1 right-wing geek-fest. Yes, there are such things. A prominent sign on one of the vending tables read “Wake Up America.” One huge fellow, about Sam’s size, was asleep on the front row. Summer 2005 / March 65

He had a face that looked like Santa Claus with a screw loose. He snored loud enough to be heard from the back of the room. “Look at THAT,” Sam snorted. “I don’t want that so-and-so snoring while I speak.” Well, Sam began his speech, and the big fellow began to stir. By the time Sam had finished, our twisted Santa was wide-eyed awake. He lit into Sam about black helicopters and such, telegraphing to all he was a nutcase nonpareil. Sam the gentleman struggled mightily to keep a straight face as the crowd cackled with laughter. It was quite a scene. As we were leaving, Sam told me, “When these people actually get around to their ‘wake-up America’ campaign, they would do well to let that guy snooze.” On the way back we toured Baltimore, taking in his alma mater, Johns Hopkins, and some of H. L. Mencken’s old haunts. Passing through a neighborhood that had fallen victim to “diversity” since his college days, Sam, no fan of social engineering, sarcastically remarked: “Let’s declare this place an enterprise zone—that’s what is needed to stop crime— enterprise zones! Get Jack Kemp on the line!”2 Kemp has championed preferential tax treatment for “enterprise zones” as a panacea for urban blight. Sam was a bit irate after one speech. A few folks had gathered round and offered him a great deal of free advice—on health and fitness. “What business is it of theirs if I smoke and gain weight?” he roared. “Look,” I said, “these are your people—your followers, your fans. They care about you. They want you around for the duration.” He paused—and then quietly replied, “I hadn’t really thought of it that way.” Unlike the political world’s hollow self-promoters, Sam didn’t think in egocentric terms. “Well, you should think of it that way from now on,” I preached. “Whatever you think about this bunch, you’re their leader.” He smiled, and said half under his breath: “That’s like being an admiral in the Swiss Navy.” Sam was a native of Chattanooga, raised in the city and on beautiful Lookout Mountain. His roots go back to America’s founders. He was descended from hardy English, Scots-Irish, and Huguenot stock. A few well-intentioned folk have expressed a post-mortem interest in Sam’s spiritual well being. I am sure he would be grateful. Some have scoured his writing, searching for traces of affinity for a particular church or theology. It may be helpful to those people to know, however incomprehensible it may seem, that the class of people Sam was born into are taught from the time they are tots that a gentleman does not wear his religious faith on his sleeve. Talk is cheap. A gentleman lives his creed. Sam was a son of the South, an occasional speaker at gather- ings of the Sons of Confederate Veterans. He had an old portrait of Mary Todd Lincoln. His middle name was Todd, after his father. There is a Todd line in his background. Some of you may know 66 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly that Mary Todd’s brothers were high-ranking Confederate officers. He attended prep school at Baylor (then a military academy) in Chattanooga. He won writing awards even then. Sam selected Johns Hopkins for undergraduate school because he wanted to be a physician. He entered college as a premed student. He worked one summer in a hospital blood lab, fomenting anxiety at home with talk of the blood samples he handled. He was intensely interested in psychiatry. That is probably why he became a writer. It may explain his interest in science fiction. It is possible that is why he came to Washington, D.C. in the first place—to observe firsthand the world’s largest working loony bin. (Talk of psychiatry reminds me of the old story, told outside the beltway, of when a Washington thug held a gun to a man’s head and demanded “Give me all your money or I’ll blow your brains out.” The man said “Let me think about it. What a choice! You don’t need any brains to live in Washington, but it sure takes money.”) He also had a critical eye for cinema. I once recommended Francis Ford Coppola’s The Godfather, which had been released about two decades earlier. Foul language aside, it was a fascinating social commentary. He seemed interested. Some months later Sam’s brilliant piece The Godfather As Political Metaphor appeared in Chronicles. Another of Sam’s friends recently told us that he was such a fan of the Blair Witch Project that he drove to Burkittsville, Maryland, to see where it was filmed. His boyish curiosity never faded. Sam’s friendship has been a constant in my life for twenty-eight years. His loss is an open wound. At times he was gruff and irascible, dispatching a conversation with his trademark “Humph!,” which meant it was time to change the subject. Most times he was warm and generous. Nobody’s fair-weather friend, he stood by his compatriots, trouble or not. He helped many. As a matter of fact, our last conversation before he was stricken was about what could be done to help a friend bludgeoned out of a job by craven neoconservatives. Sometimes we would talk daily—other times weeks would pass between chats. The advent of email leavened our discourse. Aside from the hilarious online chat, it gave me the opportunity to occasionally bait him with material he hadn’t already seen. No more will be the emails, late evening phone calls, the jokes, the remi- niscing, or those dinners, too many to count, where we would invariably be booted out as the busboys closed the place around us. That part of my life, sadly, is gone. Yet Sam’s legacy lives. His quantifiable achievements, the degrees, writings, and awards, are obvious. But the extent of his influence in the realm of ideas, on so many, may never be known. He was that rare one among us, an original thinker. He understood, as few do, the dynamics of power. The very title of his first book, Power and History: The Political Thought of James Burnham, Summer 2005 / March 67 was revealing. Sam was not only a student of history. He truly understood the forces that shape history. The philosopher Arthur Schopenauer wrote, “All truth passes through three stages. First, it is ridiculed. Second, it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as self-evident.” Sam left us during that tortured second stage of truth, the violent opposition. He understood this as he labored happily to rouse the Middle American majority from its slumber. He was doing so, winning hearts and minds one by one, sowing seeds of courage along the way. We discount his influence at our folly. History taught him that the course of events could turn on a dime, that the specter of chaos is ever present, as is hope. So he persevered. We shall never forget him.

Louis T. March is the author of Harvest of Lies: The Black Farmer Lawsuit Against the U.S. Department of Agriculture (2004) and Immigration and the End of Self-Government (1999).

ENDNOTES

1. Deﬁned as “a condition in which government, unable or unwilling to punish the guilty, punishes the innocent instead.” 2. Former Congressman Jack Kemp, the 1996 Republican vice presidential nominee, had previously complained about Sam’s Washington Times editorials. We’ve got to do more than just pray for immigration reform. First read …

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MARK WEGIERSKI

n his eulogy for Sam Francis in the Middle American News, Jerry Woodruff tells of Sam’s profound interest in Friedrich Nietzsche. In his office, Sam kept a framed Iprint of his favorite words from Nietzsche given to him by Woodruff. The quotation comes from Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft (“The Gay Science,” today more usually translated as “The Joyful Wisdom” section 283 of book four). Woodruff cites part of the passage, which, he writes, “might provide a fitting epitaph”: I welcome all signs that a more virile, warlike age is about to begin, which will restore honor to courage above all. For this age shall prepare the way for one yet higher, and it shall gather the strength that this higher age will require one day—the age that will carry heroism into the search for knowledge and that will wage wars for the sake of ideas and their consequences. To this end we now need many prepa- ratory courageous human beings…—human beings who know how to be silent, lonely, resolute, and content and constant in invisible activities;…human beings distinguished as much by cheerfulness, patience, unpretentiousness, and contempt for all great vanities as by magnanimity in victory and forbearance regarding the small vanities of the vanquished;…human beings…accustomed to command with assurance but instantly ready to obey when that is called for—equally proud, equally serving their own cause in both cases, more endangered human beings, more fruitful human beings, happier beings! For believe me: the secret for harvesting from existence the greatest fruitfulness and the greatest enjoyment is—to live dangerously! Through his total commitment to intellectual and ideological struggle on behalf of the best of Western civilization, Sam Francis found his own way of “living dangerously” or, in the contemporary argot, “living on the edge.” He was masterful in what Nietzsche had called “philosophizing with a hammer.” Yet his books—on the American political philosopher James Burnham and of essays on America’s plight —offer an insightful and witty perspective comparable to H.L. Mencken. Perhaps one can take comfort for this from the fact that many of Nietzsche’s books were self-published in their initial appearance, in very low print runs, and at first sold only slowly. Despite the various personal difficulties with which Nietzsche’s life was fraught, his work enabled, eventually, an intellectual revolution which can be compared in some respects to those of Copernicus or Darwin, the effects of which effects—for good and for ill—have resounded down each succeeding decade. What is especially interesting about Nietzsche was that he laid bare some of the major implications of what living in late modernity might actually mean for human beings, 70 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly at a time, the late nineteenth century, when it seemed that white, Western, Christian civilization had reached its highest apogee of power. Whether Nietzsche was merely a symptom of late modernity, or an active cause of much turmoil—i.e., among the originators of the idea of a “world without limits”—as well as to what extent he was the most thoroughly modern (postmodern?) thinker, or the most profoundly antimodern (postmodern?) critic of late modernity remain matters for lively debate. Unlike most of the writings of Nietzsche, Sam Francis’s writings were often phrased in the terminology of social science; they also paid more respect to the “old verities” and national and religious traditions. Dr. Francis still embraced the term “paleo-conservatism”—whereas Nietzsche was frequently critical of conservatives and enunciated a sharp, pungent critique of Christianity. As Sam Francis frequently implied in his many columns, we live in a social and cultural landscape in which what was once approvingly called Western civilization has largely been lobotomized, and its heart virtually cut out—indeed, today it can often appear that virtually everything “high” and “noble” has been crushed and torn down—for all that the modern “transformation of values” has many of its roots in Nietzsche’s thought, and whether he would approve or disapprove of the late modern “nomads.” Looking at the political implications and strategy of the recent culture wars in a Francis-like fashion, the 1960s sexual and cultural revolutions and their aftermath may be seen as a watershed development in which, in exchange for the near-total social submission of the majority to minority interests, left-liberalism offered (in theory at least) the superficially seductive, psychologically appealing prospect of an almost total sexual freedom (“sexual liberation”), plus consumerist satisfactions for everyone. As unmasked by Sam Francis, the true rulers of society and its authorized exercis- ers of unbridled force, lust, and cruelty in the current landscape of North America are, under the aegis of the managerial power elite, the largely ressentiment-driven “minority interests,” the wealthy left-liberal elites, and the countercultural left, rather than Nietzsche’s self-confident, aristocratic Nietzschean “overmen.” Indeed, it could be argued, as Paul Edward Gottfried (a close friend of Francis) has suggested, that the pre-1960s left, including many of the most radical socialists and communists, would have found the central concerns of the post-1960s left and its camp followers puzzling, incoherent, or simply repugnant. Indeed, most of the old-fashioned left (such as Canada’s Co-operative Commonwealth Federation party in Canada) considered notions of traditional nation, family, and religion as simply a part of pre-political existence which it had no desire to challenge. The corollary is that, having finally won their hard-fought victory over big-business and the up- per classes, the majority’s middle, lower-middle, and working classes (the leadership elements of which Sam Francis—following Donald Warren—called “Middle American Radicals”) have fallen into the thrall of a rising new alliance between the “new-style” managerial-therapeutic state and the arriviste “visible minorities” and other “outcast” groups. Summer 2005 / Wegierski 71

In marked contrast to certain of Nietzsche’s more extreme assertions, Sam Francis believed in a core human nature that was accessible to scientific study and demonstration through the so-called “hard new social sciences”: sociobi- ology, evolutionary psychology, animal ethology (the comparative study of human and animal behavior), and genetics. In his sharp commentary on the Lawrence Summers scandal, Francis contrasted the “tabula rasa,” environment-über-alles approach of would-be social engineers with what, he acidly noted, should have been the cheering, hopeful news that some part of human nature may actually be beyond the power of these social engineers. According to Sam, it was just that unwelcome reminder to the social engineers that drove the frenetic rage against the Harvard president’s comments. Nietzsche was far more questioning than Francis of the existence of a core human nature: the import of his notorious words “God is dead” is that humanity can no longer hold any standards to be objectively true. Describing the conceptual chaos unleashed by late modernity, Nietzsche seeks a way out of it by some kind of re-imagining or re-imaging. A profound exploration of the term “a world without boundaries,” or limits, may lead to a deeper understanding of what the main project of left-liberalism is really about. It is the annihilation of what Nietzsche had called “the bounded horizons”— including traditional notions of nation, family, and religion. Although—especially in Nietzsche’s view—a world without limits may create opportunities for the arising of creative “new modes and new orders,” in which the only hope is for “tradition” to be created by conscious political endeavor—it is also full of the dangers of falling into a dystopia along the lines of the posthistorical technocracy so eerily evoked (in 1932) in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World. In the more politically practical thought of Sam Francis, it is the “Middle Ameri- can Radicals” who will be the vanguard of a national, cultural, and spiritual restoration in America. In the aftermath of World War II, some have considered Nazism to have been virtually a direct outflow of Nietzsche’s thought—and hence endeavored to consign the thinker to infamy. It could be argued that the ever intensifying memorialization of the rise, onward march, and downfall of Nazism—now claimed by many in the opinion-forming elites to have emerged from the central traditions of white, Western, Christian civilization—has had the un- fortunate collateral effect of making the defense of rootedness and excellence ever more difficult in the post-1960s period. Ironically, there is today less and less understanding of the real history of that earlier era, as exemplified in the curious downplaying of the vast extent of Nazi Germany’s evil against Slavic countries and peoples, and in the exculpation of the role played by Commu- nism and Stalin in the rise of Nazi Germany. Nietzsche himself would have likely dismissed the entire Nazi phenomenon as a tendency that fed from uncontrolled and engorged “slave resentments”—and thus quite prone to indulge in cruel and vicious acts against its opponents. Nazism was plainly 72 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly

“ignoble” and “without honor”; however ferocious Sam’s writing may have appeared to some, there was clearly a core of civility, decency, and a high degree of reflection behind it. Communitarian and traditionalist conservative philosophy today is often approached in a fashion seen, for example, in Stephen Holmes’s The Anatomy of Antiliberalism (Harvard University Press, 1993). Holmes’s approach is little more than a reductio ad Hitlerum. It cannot be denied, however, that the interwar trends of fascism and Nazism have subsequently been exploited to potentially devastating effect for the future of the West. The post-1960s period has seen an attempt to create circumstances conducive to casting all varieties of rooted European nationalism, traditional Christianity, and Western community spirit into the dustbin of history along with the manifest excrescence of Nazism. It could be argued that contemporary communitari- anism, as well as traditionalist conservative philosophy, actually represent a quiet, desperate plea to recover some minimal aspects of social existence, virtually all of which have been lost in the pell-mell rush to the hyperliberal, hypercapitalist, hypermodern, “Brave” New World. Thus Holmes’s critique is clearly an infelicitous one, seen against the backdrop of the current-day context of late North American modernity. In their obsessing over Nazi evil, many people have forgotten the lesson that evil may often reappear, under totally different auspices, in a different period of history. As J.R.R. Tolkien put it, “for evil always takes on another shape, and grows again.” It is the most proximate, current-day evil that Sam Francis most strongly stood against. What critics such as Paul Gottfried have called the “managerial-therapeutic regime” today maintains its hegemony through massive instrumentalities such as the mass media, the mass-education system, and a vast state, as well as corporate, apparatus. To consider, for example, my country, Canada through a Burnham/ Francis analysis lens, it can be seen that today there are probably close to a million, often highly remunerative, positions concerned directly with the maintenance of the ideological hegemony of the managerial-therapeutic state. To take only one example (from the 1990s) of so many available, the annual budget of the National Action Committee on the Status of Women, the main feminist lobby group, was provided almost entirely out of taxpayers’ money. It was roughly comparable to the annual budget of the broadly right-wing Reform Party of Canada, which the Reform Party had to honestly compete for in the public arena. In the late 1990s, during the HRDC (Human Resources Development Canada) scandal, it was alleged that over a billion dollars (Canadian) of public money had gone into the private coffers of prominent Liberal Party members. It is only now that another scandal, wherein over $100 million (Canadian) of public money went to a handful of prominent Liberals, finally threatens to bring down the federal Liberal government. The resources available to left-liberals thus outweigh those of the right wing by Summer 2005 / Wegierski 73 astronomical factors—making a mockery of parliamentary and democratic principles, and of the notion of a free exchange of ideas. If the big business and corporate world is correctly understood to be, in the overwhelming majority of cases, highly inimical and subversive to social conservatism, then traditionalism’s position in many Western societies might seem all but hopeless. It could also be pointed out that the “needs” (claims) of minorities vis-à-vis the majority are seemingly unlimited. If Donovan Bailey, “the world’s fastest man” (whose visage, for example, has been featured on every box of Kellogg’s Corn Flakes in Canada as part of an endorsement for which he has received several million dollars), can express a sense of victimization, then how much more apparently legitimate are the claims of minorities who are living in some measure of genuine poverty? It could be acerbically argued that today’s Canada has been reconstructed to serve the virtually unrestricted, unlimited elevation, preferment, and unqualified exaltation of “recognized minorities” in virtually every sphere of societal endeavor. Indeed, the more aggressive minority and Third World leaderships seem to be saying to European countries, what’s yours is to become mine, and what’s mine stays mine. Is it possible to evade the conclusion that demographics is destiny? Today it could appear that for Western peoples the day when the evidently unrelenting pressures of immigration and multiculturalism will somehow be contained, and their own elites be forced to cease the ongoing self-effacement of the West, is only a dream. Seen through the glass of the elite- and minority-controlled mass media, it can seem that the overwhelming majority of our young people—our future—are ut- terly deracinated—intellectually, morally, culturally, and ethnically. It can appear that whatever intellectual acuity they possess is largely deployed in sniffing out and suppressing “political incorrectness” in all its variegated forms (in others and in themselves). Yet those who wish to implicate Nietzsche in the late-modern project seem to ignore his obvious preference for the truly aristocratic in all forms of life and thought, his utter contempt for the Last Man—that homunculus of plastic corporate and communist materialism that he foresaw in his visionary Also Sprach Zarathustra—in their strained focus on Nietzsche’s epistemology, rather than his ethics. Indeed, Nietzsche’s radical perspective could be interpreted as an attempt to redeem and re-nourish a transformed idea of the classical μεγαλόψυχος (megalopsychos: “great-souled man”), transmogrified in response to, and in order to confront, the extraordinarily harsh terrain of late modernity, in order to nurture and let flourish great-souled men. Nietzsche would also probably argue that the problem of the evolution of technology, past a certain point, is not that it makes human beings into “masterful conquerors,” but rather into comfort-addicted, “fitness”-crazed, “health”-obsessed Last Men, dancing in velvet chains. 74 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly

One might then pose the critical question: On behalf of which project is Ni- etzschean irrationalism to be deployed today: cultivating nature’s aristocracy—or foddering minority resentments? It can also be seen that conservative critics of Nietzsche who, inspired by the abstract universal aspects of Greek philosophy, are the upholders of classical “liberal arts,” simply ignore many of the aristocratic aspects of “liberal education”—aspects they generally tremble to own up to. Thus in his often insightful defense of liberal education, Values Education and Technology: The Ideology of Dispossession (University of Toronto Press, 1995), classicist Peter C. Emberley endeavors to lay much of the blame for the errors of late modern educational theorizing precisely on Nietzsche’s thought. The fairly common left-wing interpretation of Nietzsche as a “do-your-own-thing” postmodernist and critic of traditional Christian morality is similarly one-sided. It could be argued out that “liberal education,” in its etymological root (i.e., as that befitting truly free men), had a sociopolitical dimension, which was simply something which gave “polish” to true gentlemen, schooling them in how to properly relate to their social peers, superiors, and inferiors. It implied the teaching and inculcation of character, the nourishing of patriotism, and the upholding of meaningful rank-orderings. The “reactionary” aspects of “liberal education” are obviously ferociously denounced by left-liberal educationists, but they have also been deliberately washed out or downplayed by many of the purported defenders of liberal education today. Some of the ultimate origins of Sam Francis’s refined political thought lie in James Burnham, and in those thinkers—such as Vilfredo Pareto—whom Burn- ham identified and explicated in his famous book The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom. Further back in political history, they would trace to Thomas Hobbes, and, of course, Niccolo Machiavelli himself—who are to be read as sharp, practical-minded, monarchist or republican patriots. The views propounded by such figures as James Burnham and Sam Francis can be stark but bracing. From the straightforward position of Hobbesian hard realism, European and European-descended societies need not seek the per- mission of philosophes, savants, clerks, or multiculturalists in fighting for their existence. (Every society may strive to undertake efforts for its self-preservation—and define their own criteria for membership.) Sam Francis has, without too many specifics, suggested the calling forth of hard new elites that will break asunder the current managerial-therapeutic regime. Either they will succeed (to a greater or lesser extent) or be swept away into the garbage can of history. Presumably, all subsequent academic theorizing will be readjusted to reflect the result of this world-historical conflict, with no mercy likely to be shown for the losers. So it always was, and so it always will be.

Mark Wegierski is a Canadian writer and historical researcher. SAM FRANCIS AS POET

As a senior at Baylor School, a coeducational day and boarding college prep school founded in 1893 in Chattanooga, Tennessee, Sam Francis demonstrated his literary talent at seventeen years of age by winning ﬁrst place in a poetry contest. Reprinted below is the full text of the award-winning poem:

APOSTROPHE TO A GARDENER

Your garden has grown. In its youth Its colors were rose and tulip, like unto The early bursting of the sun in early spring, The early twilight of late October, When frosty sunlight silverplates the hills And makes the clouds like shining stock-cars racing. Rainbows that spat into a blindman’s eye Were in your garden, but it has grown old. So now its dry stalks haunt the dust, Specters of the tulip and the rose, and toads And grasshoppers chortle in their brown dead mold. Burnt sticks, where ﬂowers grew, now cringe Beneath the winter sun. Sand and grit, where the black loam breathed, Now dance in shapeless jig To a raving wind.

* * * * *

Your egos were too much for it. They could Not stand to see much green and spangled youth, And so they scorched it down beneath The frozen glare of torches, red, all red, against The summer night of stars, bubbling open, Red with hate and twisting ignorance, Yet they lit ﬁres that kept you warm That summer night (cold in summer, cold in night), 76 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly

Yet they set a passion in your self That tore your heart and mind apart, and yet, They kept you warm that night (cold in summer).

* * * * *

Cold in night, cold with all the loneliness Of a thousand crimson Eyes.

—Sam Francis Age 17 Baylor School Grade 12 First Place, Poetry A REVISIONIST VIEW OF ANTI-SEMITISM

Esau’s Tears: Modern Anti-Semitism and the Rise of the Jews Albert Lindemann New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997 $70.00 cloth

592 pp.

Reviewed by Kevin MacDonald

istorians have become increasingly aware that their reconstructions of the past are often influenced by the intellectual blinders and political Hagendas of the present. This is paradigmatically true in the minefield that is Jewish history. So seldom do conscientious historians dare to tread there that unblinkered investigations of the Jewish past tend to have a more enduring value. Thus it is with Albert Lindemann’s important 1997 book Esau’s Tears—important because it deals courageously and honestly with very sensitive topics in the history of nineteenth- and twentieth-century anti-Semitism up to the rise of National Socialism. Lindemann’s thesis is that modern European anti-Semitism is linked to the “rise of the Jews,” that is, to the very substantial increase in the cultural, political, and economic power of Jews beginning in the nineteenth century. That thesis is controversial because it identifies real conflicts of interest between groups as central to anti-Semitism. Although Lindemann is well aware that anti-Semites often exaggerate Jewish behavior, and occasionally even invent it, his book challenges the still common view that anti-Semitic attitudes are nothing more than the fundamentally irrational residues of Christian religious ideology or the psychological projections of inadequate personalities. Lindemann develops a comparative approach, discussing anti-Semitism in Austria, England, France, Germany, Romania, Russia, and the United States in an attempt to find commonalities and differences. Although the book contains authoritative analyses of anti-Semitism in all these countries, I will highlight Lindemann’s analysis of anti-Semitism in Russia without, I am afraid, doing justice to the nuances of his presentation. Lindemann notes that Jews were highly resistant to attempts by the tsarist government to russify 78 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly them, remaining a nation apart in dress, language, diet, and civil law. The tsarist authorities attempted to keep Jews apart from the Russian peasants because they believed Jews exploited the peasants economically and corrupted them with alcohol. Jews were often in the position of managing peasants for Russian aristocrats and in lending money and providing alcohol to them as innkeepers. Stereotypes of Jews as prominent in the liquor trade, usury, prostitution, and criminal activity were hardly figments of anti-Semitic imaginations. Moreover, tsarist oppression of Jews was far less severe than usually de- picted. Jews could own land, engage in commerce, and attend universities. Nor were Jews the only group subject to restrictions and under suspicion by the authorities. The requirement to serve in the military reflected a suspen- sion of a peculiar Jewish privilege, not an anti-Semitic persecution. Most Jews were restricted to the Pale of Settlement, but this area was larger than France or Spain, and forty times the area of modern Israel. Lindemann comments on the “cramped and intolerant life of the shtetl,” as illustrated by an incident in which Jewish men dragged a woman through the street, kicking her and spitting on her for violating sexual taboos. Liberalization of restrictions on Jews in the 1860s and 1870s resulted in economic success for many Jews but left the vast majority impoverished—at least partly because of their very rapid rate of population increase, Jewish traditions that opposed strenuous physical labor, and Jewish religious laws that influenced them to avoid certain economic activities and enter others such as the clothing industry and the food preparation industry, in disproportionate numbers. Nevertheless, Jews were much more upwardly mobile than other groups in Russia, and their success placed them in competition with other groups that exerted pressures to control the numbers of Jews in business and the professions. Rather than being planned by the government, as asserted by historians such as Simon Dubnow, anti-Jewish pogroms were spontaneous uprisings in opposition to Jewish economic domination facilitated by the liberalization of the 1860s. Indeed, the government abhorred outbreaks of mass violence as a sign of popular discontent and in some areas was quite effective at preventing it. The government’s response to the pogroms of 1881 was to place limits on Jewish economic activities in order to protect the peasants, to make it more difficult to move out of the Pale of Settlement, and to impose quotas of around 10 percent on Jewish admission to universities. The result was that Jewish emigration to the West intensified, but the tensions remained. Lindemann provides an extended discussion of the Kishinev pogrom of 1904, noting the complex economic and political context of the pogrom, the role of an anti-Jew- ish agitator, and the exaggerations and falsehoods contained in accounts of it by Jewish participants and organizations both in Russia and the West. Jews within Russia increasingly turned to revolutionary socialism as a panacea for their blunted aspirations. Jews were overrepresented among Summer 2005 / MacDonald 79 socialist revolutionaries in Russia, as elsewhere in Europe and the United States, and Jewish capitalists were involved in financing their efforts. Jew- ish power and influence in Western countries was much commented on and was widely regarded by the Russian government as directed at undermining Russia and the tsar. For example, Jacob Schiff financed Japan’s war against Russia because of his antipathy to the tsar. During World War I a large portion of the world’s Jews could muster little sympathy for defending Russia and viewed Germany as being more tolerant to Jews. A very important source of twentieth-century anti-Semitism, exemplified by Hitler, has been the belief that Jews were instrumental to the success of the Bolshevik revolution. Contrary to many historians, Lindemann assigns Jews a very prominent role in the revolution. He notes that “citing the absolute numbers of Jews, or their percentage of the whole, fails to recognize certain key if intangible factors: the assertiveness and often dazzling verbal skills of Jewish Bolsheviks, their energy, and their strength of conviction” (p. 429). This comment fits well with the general tendency for Jews to be highly successful in a wide range of areas requiring high intelligence, conscientious- ness, and personal ambition.1 Jews who became radicals retained their high IQ, their ambitiousness, their persistence, their work ethic, and their ability to organize and participate in cohesive, highly committed groups. Contrary to claims by some that Jewish Bolsheviks had abandoned their Jewish identities, Lindemann shows that ethnic background was important to all participants in the conflict between Stalin and Trotsky and his supporters. Moreover, Lindemann points out that several of the leading non-Jews in the Bolshevik movement, including Lenin, might be termed “jewified non-Jews”—“a term, freed of its ugly connotations, [that] might be used to underline an often overlooked point: Even in Russia there were some non-Jews, whether Bolsheviks or not, who respected Jews, praised them abundantly, imitated them, cared about their welfare, and established intimate friend- ships or romantic liaisons with them” (p. 433). For example, Lenin “openly and repeatedly praised the role of the Jews in the revolutionary movement; he was one of the most adamant and consistent in the party in his denuncia- tions of pogroms and anti-Semitism more generally. After the revolution, he backed away from his earlier resistance to Jewish nationalism, accepting that under Soviet rule Jewish nationality might be legitimate. On his death bed, Lenin spoke fondly of the Jewish Menshevik Julius Martov, for whom he had always retained a special personal affection in spite of their fierce ideological differences.” Citing Paul Johnson’s History of the Jews (New York: HarperCollins, 1988), Lindemann notes Trotsky’s “paramount” role in planning and leading the Bolshevik uprising and his role as a “brilliant military leader” in establish- ing the Red Army as a military force (p. 448). Moreover, many of Trotsky’s personality traits are stereotypically Jewish: 80 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly

If one accepts that anti-Semitism was most potently driven by anxiety and fear, as distinguished from contempt, then the extent to which Trotsky became a source of preoccupation with anti-Semites is significant. Here, too, Johnson’s words are suggestive: He writes of Trotsky’s “demonic power”—the same term, revealingly, used repeatedly by others in referring to Zinoviev’s oratory or Uritsky’s ruthlessness. Trotsky’s boundless self-confidence, his notorious arrogance, and sense of superiority were other traits often associated with Jews. Fantasies there were about Trotsky and other Bolsheviks, but there were also realities around which the fantasies grew. (p. 448) Lindemann notes that Jews were also highly overrepresented as leaders among the other communist governments in Eastern Europe as well as in communist revolutionary movements in Germany and Austria from 1918 to 1923. Jewish agents in the service of the Soviet Union also featured prominently in Western communist parties: “Even within the various and often violently contending factions of the nascent communist parties of the West, ‘foreign Jews, taking orders from Moscow’ became a hot issue. It remained mostly taboo in socialist ranks to refer openly to Moscow’s agents as Jewish, but the implication was often that such foreign Jews were destroying western socialism” (pp. 435–436). Nor does Lindemann shrink from discussing the biological moment of Judaism, that is, the concern with preventing intermarriage, the concern with purity of blood, the low status of converts, and the lack of interest in proselytism. Judaism is “only uncertainly a community of belief,” a comment indicating Lindemann’s belief that Judaism is much more an ethnic group than a religion—a position that I think is unavoidable.2 Lindemann labels these practices “protoracism” and suggests that they “contributed in vague, often contradictory ways to modern racism, especially to its concern with racial exclusiveness and purity” (p. 74). Indeed, besides their traditional practices, which bespeak a primitive racialism among Jews, Jews were also in the forefront of racialist thinking in the nineteenth century. Benjamin Disraeli “may have been, both as writer and even more as a personal symbol, the most influential propagator of the concept of race in the nineteenth century, particularly publicizing the Jews’ alleged taste for power, their sense of superiority, their mysteriousness, their clandestine international connections, and their arrogant pride in being a pure race” (p. 77). Racialist thinking was typical of the nineteenth century generally. Among Jews racialist thinking can be found throughout the Jewish intellectual spectrum; it was common among Zionists and typified several prominent Jewish intellectuals, such as Heinrich Graetz and Moses Hess. Thus, while there was some fantasy involved in anti-Semitic beliefs about Jews, the nineteenth-century anti-Semitic idea that Jews regarded themselves as a superior race was also based on real Jewish behavior and attitudes. It is not possible to write in this area without being aware of the intense passions of many who have written before. The book therefore, perhaps inevitably, deals centrally with Jewish historiography and Jewish self-conceptions. Summer 2005 / MacDonald 81

Lindemann (p. 535; italics in text) writes that “Jews actually do not want to understand their past—or at least those aspects of their past that have to do with the hatred directed at them, since understanding may threaten other elements of their complex and often contradictory identities.” He notes that especially in popular history, a strong tendency exists to favor an emotionally laden description and narrative, especially of colorful, dramatic, or violent episodes, over explanation that employs calm analysis or a searching attention to historical context. Pogroms, famous anti-Semitic affairs, and the description of the ideas of anti-Semitic authors and agitators are described with moral fervor, rhetorical flair, and considerable attention to the details of murder, arson, and rape. Background, context, and motives are often slighted or dealt with in a remarkably thin and tendentious fashion. (p. 12) Lindemann considers (pp. ix–x) the impassioned, moralistic rhetoric and simplistic analyses to be found in Robert Wistrich’s Anti-Semitism: The Longest Hatred and in the writings of Holocaust historians Lucy Dawidowicz and Dan- iel J. Goldhagen. (Wistrich in turn labeled Lindemann’s book “deeply pernicious.”)3 “In order to write ‘genuine’ German history, [Dawidowicz] seems to think, hatred and resentment rather than sympathy or love constitute the appropriate state of mind,” Lindemann writes. “She makes precious little effort to understand the motivations of nineteenth-century nationalistic Germans. They are simply contemptible ‘other people’” (p. 509). He describes Howard Morley Sachar’s chapter on Romanian anti-Semitism as “a tirade, without the slightest effort at balance” (p. 509). Finally, one detects in Lindemann a certain incomprehension regarding the powerful need among Jews to remain a people apart in the contemporary world. After showing that modern anti-Semitism is fundamentally rooted in real conflict between ethnic groups and that it has resulted in enormous bloodshed and intrasocietal animosity, he asks, “What is the meaning of Jew- ish survival in modern times to a modern, secular consciousness? . . . How can Jewish survival be considered any more important than, say, the survival of the Wends, Byelo-Russians, Chechens, or Croats? In the context of a multicultural society such as the United States why should a Jewish ethnicity or cultural style resist blending and ‘disappearing’ any more than the cultural styles of the Germans, Swedes, or Irish? Intermarriage and assimilation have occurred and are occurring in most other communities, but do prominent Armenian- American or Japanese-American leaders publicly address the issues with such terms as ‘bloodless Holocaust’ and ‘candy-coated poison’?” (p. 543). He notes that Jewish leaders regard the Jewish case as fundamentally different from other groups and that the Jewish position comes close to ethnic chauvinism. These questions are particularly relevant because, as Lindemann notes, Jewish power and influence are quite high in the contemporary world, particularly in the United States, and there is no question that official American Judaism is becoming more traditionally separatist in its focus and more concerned to prevent intermarriage.4 It is by no means clear that multicultural societies 82 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly characterized by ethnic chauvinism and conflicts of interest among their con- stituent groups can long survive without the intense intrasocietal hatreds and animosities that have been the consistent consequence of the rise of a powerful Judaism in Western societies.5 Lindemann’s findings fit well with an evolutionary approach to group conflict.6 His book is concerned with nineteenth- and early twentieth-century anti-Semitism, but these kinds of findings may be generalized throughout Jewish history. Jewish characteristics, including especially resource competition with non-Jews, have always been central to understanding historically important examples of anti-Semitism. Moreover, there is a long history of Jewish religious apologetics and historiography that has functioned in the same way as much contemporary Jewish historiography, that is, to interpret history and Jewish religious law in a manner that presents Judaism as a morally superior beacon to the rest of humanity.7 And Lindemann is quite correct in emphasizing the ethnic, “protoracist” elements of Judaism, although here, as in many other parts of the book, he is clearly bending over backwards to avoid offending Jewish sensibilities. Jews have indeed remained a people apart throughout their history, and they have been deeply concerned about marry- ing each other. There is a pronounced tendency toward idealizing endogamy and condemning exogamy apparent in Jewish religious writings, and the data indicate that Jews have remained genetically distinct from the groups they have lived among despite having lived among them for centuries.8 Albert Lindemann’s thoroughly researched, informed, and forthright interpretation of a key period in the past of the Jews and the European peoples among whom they lived is a vital contribution to that larger history as well as to the history of anti-Semitism.

Kevin MacDonald is Professor of Psychology, California State Uni- versity - Long Beach, and the author of a trilogy on Judaism as an evolutionary strategy: A People That Shall Dwell Alone (1994), Separation and Its Discontents (1998), and The Culture of Cri- tique (1998), all published by Praeger 1994–1998. A revised edition of The Culture of Critique (2002), with an expanded introduction, is available in a quality soft cover edition from www.1stBooks.com or www.amazon.com.

ENDNOTES

1. Kevin MacDonald, A People That Shall Dwell Alone: Judaism As a Group Evolutionary Strategy (Westport, CT: Praeger), pp. 165–226. 2. Ibid., passim. 3. Robert Wistrich, “Blaming the Victim,” Commentary (February 1998), p. 60. Summer 2005 / MacDonald 83

4. Kevin MacDonald, Separation and Its Discontents: Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), pp. 263–278. 5. Ibid., pp. 89–175. Kevin MacDonald, The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), pp. 303–332. 6. MacDonald, Separation and Its Discontents. 7. Ibid. 8. MacDonald, A People That Shall Dwell Alone, pp. 23–110. Understanding the United States: Illusions that Guide Contemporary America

A collection of articles published in The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies by Dwight D. Murphey

JSPES Monograph No. 30, ISBN 1-930690-59-1, 181 pages, paperback, $24.00 – plus Postage $3.50 (USA), $5.50 (foreign), Visa and MasterCard Welcome purchase this book and request information on other books from… Council for Social and Economic Studies P.O. Box 34070, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20043 [email protected], TEL:(202) 371-2700 FAX:(202) 371-1523 Also visit www.JSPES.org and see www.MANKINDQUARTERLY.org. POLITICAL PALEONTOLOGY?

The Conservative Bookshelf: Essential Works That Impact Today’s Conservative Thinkers Chilton Williamson, Jr. New York: Citadel Press, 2004 $22.95 cloth

314 pages

Reviewed by Robert S. Grifﬁn

ow many of these conservative classics have you read? Suicide of the West by James Burnham HTreason by Ann Coulter One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich by Alexsandr Solzhenitsyn Brave New World by Aldous Huxley Witness by Whittaker Chambers The Camp of the Saints by Jean Raspail City of God by St. Augustine The Conservative Mind by Russell Kirk The Bear by William Faulkner Ideas Have Consequences by Richard Weaver The question—and the list—come from the back cover of Chilton William- son, Jr.’s book, The Conservative Bookshelf: Essential Works That Impact Today’s Conservative Thinkers. Williamson’s commentaries on these ten books and forty others, prefaced by a brief introduction, comprise the volume. These fifty books are Williamson’s fifty, not the fifty, essential conservative books; there is no established definition of conservative and no agreed-upon conservative canon, and The Conservative Bookshelf is a book of advocacy. Williamson is the senior editor of Chronicles magazine, which reflects a paleoconservative perspective (defined in a bit). He has constructed his list of essential books and written about them from this frame of reference, and he openly argues the merits of paleoconservatism. Also, I received the impression from reading his commentaries and from the authors he chose to include that he is a strong Christian and more particularly a Roman Catholic. 86 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly

There’s a progression to The Conservative Bookshelf: It goes somewhere. If you take where it ends up, with a drama of sorts, a conflict, a struggle between protagonists and antagonists, heroes and villains, good guys and bad guys, you can pretty much account for what’s in the book and what isn’t. The fifty books and Williamson’s commentaries justify the protagonists’ cause. Who are the protagonists in this drama, the book’s heroes, if you will? We meet three prominent ones on page 304, to be exact: Thomas Fleming, Samuel Francis, and Clyde Wilson. These three leading contemporary paleoconservative intellectuals attended the University of North Carolina together in the 1970s. Williamson quotes the novelist Walker Percy as referring to them as the “Chapel Hill Conspiracy.” Fleming is currently the editor of Chronicles, the magazine for which Williamson writes. Francis, the late political editor of Chronicles, was also a syndicated columnist and the book review editor of The Occidental Quarterly. Wilson is a historian and editor of the John C. Calhoun Papers at the University of South Carolina. Williamson includes books by the three men in his essential fifty: Fleming’s The Morality of Everyday Life: A Classical Alternative to the Liberal Tradition, Francis’ Revolution from the Middle, and Wilson’s From Union to Empire: Essays in the Jeffersonian Tradition. While these three men are highly influential thinkers, the best-known paleoconservative is the journalist and former presidential contender, Patrick Buchanan. Buchanan is represented in The Conservative Bookshelf by his The Death of the West: How Dying Populations and Immigrant Invasions Imperil Our Country and Civilization. What do the paleos, as they are called, believe? They emphasize the positive aspects of America’s Western heritage and want it to prevail and worry that it is threatened. They point out the negative impact of mass non-European immigration and of an increasingly multiracial and multiethnic population on American culture and society. They are concerned about the harmful effects of free trade and economic globalism on working Americans and their families. They value regionalism, decentralization, and local control. They are opposed to what they see as an intrusive, controlling federal government and an over- reaching welfare state apparatus in this country. They view with alarm the current American foreign policy, which appears to them to be bent on imposing our will on other countries on and empire building. In general, they are critical of the secularized, homogenized, de-Europeanized, pacified, deluded, manipulated, lowest-common-denominator-leveled, popular-culture-dopified country they see America becoming. Another theme among the paleos is concern for the well-being and fate of the white race, although that remains largely tacit. Francis was the only prominent paleo I know of to talk about white people directly. I read his weekly newspaper columns in Conservative Chronicle, and he straight out wrote about the interests of white people—no euphemisms, no circumlocutions. Most paleos deal with race indirectly. An example is one of Williamson’s Summer 2005 / Griffi n 87

fifty, Peter Brimelow’s book, Alien Nation. And I remember when reading Buchanan’s book, The Death of the West, having the distinct feeling that he was talking about the death of the white race as much as he was talking about the death of the Western cultural heritage. The paleos, then, are the good guys in Williamson’s drama, and what this book comes down to is a paleoconservative reading list. And who are the villains? They aren’t, as you might expect, the liberals and far left-wingers. The bad guys are those who adhere to another brand of conservatism: neoconser- vativism. The story in Williamson’s book is about is who is going to come out on top, the paleoconservatives or the neoconservatives. What do the neoconservatives, or neocons, believe? What do they want? Basically, it’s the opposite of what the paleos believe and want. The neos point out the negative aspects of the Western and American heritage: oppression, exploitation, racism, patriarchy and other authoritarian tendencies, and narrow, ethnocentric conceptions of art and decorum. Rather than viewing America as the product of an Anglo-Christian people and tradition, neocons see this country as the repository of certain laudable ideals: freedom, equality, democracy. Neocons applaud large-scale non-European immigration and a multiracial, multiethnic, egalitarian America. Neocons believe in free trade and economic globalism. They accept strong federal government initiatives directed at ensuring economic and social justice. They see an opportunity and obligation for America to spread democracy and freedom around the globe. It must be pointed out that Jews are overrepresented among the neoconservatives. Among the prominent Jewish neocons are Norman Podhoretz, Irving Kristol and his son William, David Frum, David Brooks, Jonah Goldberg, Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, and Paul Wolfowitz. (Some prominent gentile neocons: Daniel Patrick Moynihan, William Bennett, James Q. Wilson, and Mi- chael Novak.) While they aren’t always up front about it, paleos are concerned about the impact Jewish intellectuals and activists are having on America. For example, paleos believe that Jewish neocons and Jewish organizations such as the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) have been strongly influential in this country’s attempt to “democratize” and thus pacify Israel’s enemies in the Middle East, beginning with Iraq. One of Williamson’s fifty books deals directly with the influence of Jewish intellectuals, John Murray Cuddihy’s The Ordeal of Civility: Freud, Marx, Lévi-Straus, and the Jewish Struggle with Modernity. Three contemporary paleos—Francis, Buchanan, and Joseph Sobran (Sobran is represented in the fifty by his book, Single Issues: Essays on the Crucial Social Questions)—have expressed opposition to Jewish activities publicly, and all three have paid a price for doing so: scorn and ridicule, marginalization, and/or losing jobs and opportunities. None of Williamson’s fifty essential conservative books is by a Jewish author, nor, since Williamson sees the neocons as the villains in the piece, so to speak, do any of the neocons’ writings appear in The Conservative Bookshelf. (For readers who want to look 88 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly into neoconservatism, Podhoretz’s book Breaking Ranks: A Political Memoir, would be a good place to start.) At the present time, Williamson tells us, the neocons are winning out over the paleos, and he refers to “the triumph (however temporary) of neoconservatism.” There is no doubt about how he wants the story to turn out. He wants paleoconservatives to win against “this shallow, arrogant, aggressive, and materialistic thing called neoconservatism.” Williamson orders his fifty books by rank. He starts by placing them in one of six categories and then ranks the categories. Starting at the top rank, the categories are Religion, Politics, Society, Economics, The Prophetic Artist, and The Present Day. He also ranks the books within each category, with the result that, in order, the top category of Religion includes the Bible, The Aboli- tion of Man by C. S. Lewis, St. Augustine’s City of God, and the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. In the Politics category, The Republic by Cicero; Reflections on the Revolution in France by Edmund Burke; Considerations on France by Joseph de Maistre; The Federalist by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay; Rationalism in Politics, and Other Essays by Michael Oakeshott; the Kirk book; The Liberal Mind by Kenneth Minogue; Weaver’s Ideas Have Consequences; the Southern Agrarian manifesto, I’ll Take My Stand: The South and the Agrarian Tradition; Garet Garrett’s Burden of Empire: The Legacy of the Roosevelt-Truman Era; James Burnham’s Suicide of the West: An Essay on the Meaning and Destiny of Liberalism; Whittaker Chambers’s Witness; and Robert Conquest’s Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine. Books of similar scope and character are included in the Society category—for example, de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, Burnham’s The Managerial Revolution, Ortega y Gasset’s Revolt of the Masses, etc.—and in the Economics section, not only Frederick Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom but also Pope Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum. The Prophetic Artist includes T.S. Eliot and Solzhenitsyn and works by Faulkner, Evelyn Waugh, G.K. Chesterton, and others, including Jean Raspail’s The Camp of the Saints. The Present Day Section consists of the books by Brimelow, Buchanan, Fleming, Francis, and Wilson (and a book about the paleoconservatives by Joseph Scotchie), and two books by women writers, The Power of the Positive Woman by Phyllis Schlafly and Treason by Ann Coulter. The Conservative Bookshelf is the survey course on conservatism that you never got in college. And the instructor is superb. Williamson has fine cre- dentials: He is a former literary and senior editor of National Review magazine, has written extensively for magazines and newspapers (you can find some of his writings at the VDARE website, www.vdare.com), and is the author of four non-fiction books. He is informed and thoughtful and writes very well. I felt privileged to be in his company, and I couldn’t put the book down. I read the fifty commentaries out of order, picking the one that looked most interesting and reading that one and putting a check mark by it in the table of contents, and then going to the next one that seemed most interesting. The Summer 2005 / Griffi n 89 six or seven pages he devotes to each book made for nice “bite-sized morsels.” For me, reading this book was like going through a box of assorted chocolates. Williamson’s discussions invite you to read the books you haven’t read. This week, after reading what Williamson had to say about it, I picked up the Whit- taker Chambers book Witness at the library, and it was worth my time. I was especially taken by Chambers’s eloquent foreword that he framed as a letter to his children. A good teacher makes you think. I’ll go into three things Williamson prompted me to think about and one thing he prompted me to fantasize. Read- ing this book caused me to think more about the place of religion, and more particularly Christianity, in conservatism. Williamson obviously considers religion generally and Christianity in particular to be front and center. He af- firms Russell Kirk’s declaration, “All culture arises out of religion.” He holds that the Bible is “the indisputable ground that (with the obvious exception of the classical tradition) all Western thought comes from” and “the bedrock of Western civilization.” The Old and New Testaments, he offers, were “mysteriously anticipated by the greatest minds (Socrates, Plato) of the classical Pagan tradition that preceded it.” Other and similar assertions include the statements that Christianity and the West are “unimaginable apart from one another” and that the Western rationalist tradition is “unshakably Christian.” Conservatism involves man’s willingness to “accept from God an unchange- able plan for man.” Piety and openness to the absolute “remain the dominant, indestructible, inseparable component, and also the animating principle of the generic conservative mind.” Paleoconservatives are “keeping the old conservative flame,” which includes the Christian faith. I was particularly interested in how Williamson supports those claims because I brought to this reading a different way of looking at culture and religion and at Christianity. Cultures, it has seemed to me, arise out of biologically grounded human needs and wants related to survival and safety, reproduction, order and predictability, connection to others, and personal and collective expression. Religion and spirituality are consequences, manifesta- tions, of those needs and wants, resultant cultural elements rather than primary cultural precipitants. In other words, culture doesn’t arise out of religion but rather the reverse: Religion arises out of culture. As for Christianity in particular, it has seemed to me that its doctrine and practices run counter to some of the central tenets I ascribe to conservatism. There is its universalist message: that there is really no difference among people, that we are all—black, white, yellow, and brown, European, African, Latin American, and Asian—part of Jesus’ flock. And there is its egalitarianism: The meek shall inherit the earth, the last shall be first, and so on. And it has seemed to me that Christianity has been antagonistic to reason and science, as evidenced by the ordeal of Galileo and the rest. And just the whole idea of deifying and worshiping a martyred Middle Eastern Jew has not seemed to me 90 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly to be the truest religious expression of European people, Western people. The pantheistic, nature-centered religions of Northern Europe before the Roman imposition of Christianity have appeared to me to resonate more closely to the issue of who the European people are than Christianity. To me the Poetic Edda has seemed to be more our book than the Bible. The claims for religion and Christianity came through clearly in William- son’s religion section, but not, at least for me, the support for those claims. I was told, and I wanted to be shown. I found it surprising that his discussion of the Bible—the highest-ranking book among the fifty—was significantly shorter than any of the other forty-nine: one full page and two half pages. I thought he would give the number one book more space than that. For comparison, Faulkner’s The Bear took up five full pages and two half pages. The second work Williamson discussed in the religion section, C.S. Lewis’s Aboli- tion of Man, centered on Lewis’s treatment of the concept of the Tao. To me, that discussion supported a concern for ultimate reality, for the metaphysical, but I couldn’t plug it into a general argument for the transcendent or a particular argument for Christianity. As for the other two sources in the religion section—Augustine’s City of God and Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations—I did my best, reading each twice, but Williamson’s discussions stayed airy, words connected to other words. I couldn’t ground what he offered in any reality to which I could relate. Maybe I was the problem; a book is only as good as the reader. Whatever the case, the religious outlook I brought to this book wasn’t challenged by its contents. The second issue that The Conservative Bookshelf caused me to think more about is where the individual fits into conservatism. Williamson’s presenta- tions focused on the collective: religion, culture, ideas, public issues, what it is all about, what “we” are, what “we” do, what “we” should do. Where does that leave me? I ask myself—this mortal, finite, human being sitting here in front of this computer on a Friday afternoon? And where does it leave you, the person reading this right now. It has been important to me to have encountered the writings of people— Frank Chodorov, Murray Rothbard, and Frank Meyer come to mind—who, at least at one point, in the 1950s and ‘60s, were associated with conservatism but who focused on the individual rather than the collective. These three weren’t writing about abstractions—Western man, conservative ideology, God’s rules, whatever. They were writing about me, the one trying to put a good life together here in Burlington, Vermont. They didn’t write about my obligation to align with some preordained plan. They wrote about how free I am, and how capable, to manifest the person I really am beneath all the conditioning I’ve had in my life. I consider it healthy for me to have engaged both the collective-focused visions of writers such as William Buckley and the individual-focused visions of these writers I’ve just mentioned. Meyer wrote about fusing the collective- and individual-centered visions. I prefer to allow them to remain separate and Summer 2005 / Griffi n 91 to clash and compete and come together and fall apart within my mind as I confront the choices and take the actions that comprise my life. Williamson includes the economist Friedrich Hayek and his arguments for a free enterprise economy, which does emphasize personal freedom, and the Nock book has a more iconoclastic approach than the others, but Wil- liamson doesn’t include books of the Rothbard-Chodorov-Meyer sort. That’s his call, and indeed these writers don’t fit into the paleoconservative frame of this book. These days they’d be classified as libertarians; “them,” not “us,” to conservatives of whatever stripe. But if all I take in is about the big picture and my duty to carry on this or that or abide by something or another or de- fer to something else, I feel hemmed in and get edgy. I admire Russell Kirk immensely and have profited greatly from his writings. But at the same time I picture him as a pudgy guy in a dark suit with a vest sitting at the head of the dinner table, and that’s just not me. I care about the destiny of the West, but the truth of it is I spend most of my time thinking about friendship, love, sex, pleasure, honest expression, my mental and physical health, and finding a rewarding way to get through my day-to-day activities. And the truth of it is I’m going to attend to people whose work or life example informs these personal concerns. So tonight I’m not going to read From Union to Empire. I’m going to pick up where I left off in a biography of the French film director François Truffaut and watch a video of his film Jules and Jim. That brings up a third thing I’m thinking about: Who are some contemporary conservative artists? Two of the ten writers in Williamson’s prophetic artist category, Solzhenitsyn and Raspail, are alive, but they are past their productive years. I am hard pressed to name conservative artists of the first rank now in their prime. The novelist Tom Wolfe (and he is getting up there in years)? Who else? What television shows reflect a conservative perspective? Not Desperate Housewives. What films? The Passion of the Christ? What else? Name a conservative playwright past or present. Shaw in his early years? Who else? When people think of American playwrights, Tennessee Williams, Arthur Miller, Edward Albee, Sam Shepard, and David Mamet come to mind, none of them conservative. I’m not saying there aren’t any conservative artists; I’m saying that I don’t know of any, and I attend to the arts more than most, I believe. Reading through Williamson’s ten books in The Prophetic Artist category, I thought he might have been reaching some to fill out his list. (Edward Abbey? Hemingway? Flannery O’Connor? Really?) These days, I have been reading novels by writers that I see as essentially nihilistic (example: Chuck Palahniuk, Fight Club) and I don’t want to give that up because, frankly, I don’t think that conservatives are the only ones who speak the truth or create good art. But I’m still left with the question: Who are the conservative artists? As for what I fantasized while I was reading The Conservative Bookshelf, I imagined that in 2012 an attractive governor from Williamson’s current home state of Wyoming was the Republican candidate for president, and that he ran 92 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly on a paleoconservative platform (although he didn’t use that label—“paleo” anything doesn’t stir the passions): America’s European heritage and character; traditional moral values; Christianity as a core aspect of American life; immigration control; non-interventionism in foreign affairs; an American-interests-first trade policy; a check on the growth of the federal government and its incursion into the affairs of states and communities; merit rather than group preference; and academic excellence and local control in education. And he won!

Robert S. Grifﬁn’s latest book is One Sheaf, One Vine: Racially Conscious White Americans Talk about Race. JAMES BURNHAM

Thinkers of our Time: James Burnham Samuel Francis London: Claridge Press, 1999 Paperback $14.95 (available from Amazon.com)

164 pp.

Reviewed by Louis Andrews

ames Burnham was possibly the leading theoretician of the twentieth century American anti-communist right, yet he is almost entirely unknown to the Jrank and file today. Even amongst the leadership he was often profoundly misunderstood. For example, one prominent antiwar libertarian considers him a globalist and a neoconservative. Thankfully the late American political journalist and author, Dr. Samuel Francis, left us with this updated version of his book Power and History, originally published in 1984. This new edition is in the “Thinkers of Our Time” series by the Claridge Press. Burnham was of English Catholic immigrant background and graduated at the top of his class at Princeton, then attended Balliol before starting his academic teaching career. By the early 1930s he was already a dedicated Marx- ist and a friend of Sidney Hook and others on the Trotskyite left. Yet he was never doctrinaire and soon his differences came to the fore. By 1940 he was a member of the Fourth International, helped found the Workers Party, and then broke entirely with Marxism, Trotskyite or otherwise, with the realization that the end-stage of capitalism was not socialism, but “managerialism.” The result was his first important work, The Managerial Revolution, which showed the relationship among Stalinism, fascism, Nazism, and New Dealism, and of all of these to totalitarianism. It became a minor classic and may have had more influence on the intellectual left than the right. The Machiavellians may be Burnham’s most important and most misunderstood book. Subtitled Defend- ers of Freedom, it analyzed the political theories of four non-Marxist thinkers 94 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly who greatly influenced Burnham: Sorel, Mosca, Pareto, and Michels. Despite his decade-long flirtation with Marxism, Burnham recognized that ideologies were not scientific, but merely existed to provide a “rationalization for the existence and power of the dominant minority.” Belief in an ideology is entirely nonrational and thus impervious to reasoned argument. Liberty and freedom best exist in societies where opposing forces, formal or informal, provide restraints on tyranny. Burnham notes “Juridical defense can be secure only where there are at work various and opposing tendencies and forces, and where these mutually check and restrain each other.” Private property, religion, and freedoms of press and speech are among these checks. Ultimately, though, only power can restrain power; thus the need for a strong opposition. Francis notes “virtually all of Burnham’s writing since The Machiavellians must be understood in reference to it.” In the years immediately following, Burnham concentrated on outlining a strategy for the defeat of communism in a series of books, some of which were originally prepared for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. Today these are of but historical interest as a road largely not taken. In the early 1950s Burnham par- ticipated in the founding of National Review and was a senior editor until the end of his career. He was also one of the few notable intellectuals who refused to denounce Senator McCarthy, instead resigning from the board of Partisan Review in protest. Burnham’s Congress and the American Tradition, which appeared in 1959, considers American government and American tradition through the Machiavellian lens and comes to conclusions that often support those of conservatives, but do so for untraditional reasons. For example, he valued tradition because of its social utility, not because of any “nostalgic sentiment or…ethical, metaphysical, or theological principles.” Romulus and Remus can be quite as good as the Magna Carta, if believed. Burnham’s last book is also his best known, if only because of its snappy title—Suicide of the West. As the title suggests, he argues that the West is dying and the death is self-imposed. Liberalism is not the cause, but is the ideology that “motivates and justifies the contraction, and reconciles us to it.” Thus, liberalism “permits Western civilization to be reconciled to dissolu- tion.” James Burnham influenced a number of important thinkers besides Sam Francis, including Brian Crozier. This book provides an excellent look into the mind of one of the century’s most interesting intellects and also opens a window for a better understanding of its author, Dr. Samuel Francis, who will himself remain one of the most important American political thinkers.

Louis Andrews is managing editor of The Occidental Quarterly and webmaster of Stalking the Wild Taboo (www.lrainc.com/swtaboo/). This review was originally published in Right Now! 27 (April-June 2000) and has been re-edited. WINNING AND LOSING: MARCHING ORDERS FROM SAM FRANCIS

Beautiful Losers: Essays on the Failure of American Conservatism Samuel Francis Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1993 $37.50

237 pp.

Reviewed by Peter B. Gemma

lthough my colleague Louis Andrews may disagree (see “Thinkers of our Time: James Burnham,” page 93), I believe Beautiful Losers: Essays on Athe Failure of American Conservatism is the best book Sam Francis wrote. It’s a wonderfully eclectic mix of practical politics, philosophical musings, and authentic analysis of public policy. Best of all, the book remains timely. Why does Beautiful Losers, a dozen years after publication, give purpose— particularly to political action? Consider the author’s succinct observation on tactics and impetus: “I place more emphasis on the concrete forces of elites, organization, and psychic and social forces such as class and regional and ethnic identity than on formal intellectual abstractions and their logical extrapolations as the determining forces of history.” Another example of why Sam Francis is still a unique and incisive political protagonist can be found in his explanation of the conservative movement’s realignment and reduction: The quarrel between the Old Right and the neoconservatives arose not so much from intellectual and philosophical conflicts as from social, ethnic, political, and professional differences between them, and the philosophical differences were, in fact, expressions of these social divisions. Curiously, just a year after Beautiful Losers was published, the Republi- cans were making impressive electoral gains. Nineteen ninety-four ushered in the seemingly historic era of Newt Gingrich and the GOP’s “Contract with America.” Sam had predicted the previous year that “[v]irtually every cause to 96 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly which conservatives have attached themselves for the past three generations has been lost, and the tide of political and cultural battle is not likely to turn anytime soon.” Since conservatives affixed their political fortunes solely to the Republi- cans, the casual observer might have considered Sam’s thesis flawed—especially on election night, 1994. But a good student of vrai politique understood that a Republican majority in Congress was no more a help to traditional conservative issues than was the “moderate” Democrat Bill Clinton, who was reelected in 1996, or, currently, the “compassionate conservative” regime of George Bush. According to Beautiful Losers, “the ideology or formula of liberalism grows out of the structural interests of the elite that espouses it.” George Wallace—a Sam Francis favorite—said there “ain’t a dime’s worth of difference” between the political parties and, from the Beautiful Losers political lesson book, that’s especially true when it comes to the governing elite’s wielding of managerial power. Beautiful Losers—essays he wrote during the 80s and early 90s—covers a broad range of people (Joe McCarthy to Martin Luther King) and policies (interventionist foreign stratagems to patronizing domestic programs.) It is a political thriller: a whodunnit…and why they’re getting away with it.

A REVIEW OF SAM FRANCIS

The Washington Post noted in its obituary that Sam Francis was “an outspo- ken voice of American conservatism,” and that “he wasn’t just conservative, but proudly ‘paleoconservative’—certainly not neoconservative.” Sam Francis was not difficult to define politically—he was usually deemed a paleoconservative, a nationalist, and, in the best sense of the word, a reactionary. He was also quite orthodox in his dogma, defending things moral and decent in expedient and exciting style. He advocated “a thunderous defense of moral and social traditionalism…a domestic ethic that centers on the family, the neighborhood and local community, the church and the nation as the basic framework of values.” He condemned “immediate gratification, indulgence, and consumption.” The philosophical core of Sam Francis, a political street fighter, is not hard to find in this book. He observes that “Traditionalist and bourgeois ideologies, centering on the individual as moral agent, citizen, and economic actor, could not provide justifications for the managerial economy and the managerial state.” Thus, the cultural war we now fight began when The bourgeois ideal…was replaced by a managerial political ideal that involved a bureaucratic, social engineering state actively intervening in and altering by design the economic, social, and even intellectual and moral relationships of its subjects…. The new ideology of the managerial regime thus involved a cosmopolitan, universalist, and egalitarian myth that challenged the localized and traditionalist loyalties and moral values of bourgeois society. Beautiful Losers is a diary of Sam’s evolutionary journey as a political revolutionary. In the introduction (must reading to properly appreciate the Summer 2005 / Gemma 97 dynamics of what follows), he details why he put together this collection on policies, people, and politics: No matter how beautiful [conservatism’s] ideas and theories, no matter how compelling a chart of the currents of history’s river it drew, American conservatism was not enough to channel those currents into other courses. It is a chronicle and an explanation of these beautiful losers in our history that these essays may serve.

A REVIEW OF REVIEWS

In looking back on the impact of Sam Francis, it is delightful to see how much attention his commentary received. Mainstream media reactions include this from the Detroit News (November 17, 1993): “Francis is a skilled prose stylist; his essays are often a pleasure to read for that reason alone,” but the paper also noted that “Francis is an expert complainer.” No argument there, I suppose. Publishers Weekly (September 6, 1993) described Beautiful Losers as “provocative.” Well, um, obviously. From the conservative press there were a variety of reactions to the charges and challenges contained in the book. The New American (May 2, 1994) observed: “There is a strong tendency among American conservatives to so ideologize their outlook that they often find that they have cut the ground from beneath themselves…Samuel Francis’ magnificent book is a powerful signal to conservative Americans that a fundamental change in our strategy and tactics is now a matter of life and death.” Southern Partisan (3rd quarter, 1995), remarked: “Acting on the iconoclastic aphorism that ‘sacred cows make the best ham- burger,’ Francis feeds starving Old Right multitudes on such trenchant essays as ‘The Cult of Dr. King,’ ‘Message from MARs’ [Middle American Radicals], and ‘Equality as a Political Weapon.’” First Things (April 1994), on the other hand, offered its readers a terse no- tice that Sam’s thoughts were in print. It began: “The author has considerable writing talents; more the pity that they are spent in such a dismal cause. The cause is paleoconservatism.” Harrumph. Professor Paul Gottfried, writing in The Social Contract (Spring 1994), observed: “[The author’s] anthology of essays assails almost every received assumption of respectable N.Y.-D.C. conservatism, especially of its neoconservative kingmakers.” He qualifies this statement by noting: “Francis pushes too far a belief, which he shares with his mentor James Burnham as well as with Karl Marx and the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, that the dominant class pursues its material and political interests no matter what kinds of fanciful rationales it uses to mask them.” The Washington Times (October 24, 1993)—where Sam served as a columnist for years—published a review that stated: “When Mr. Francis gets his dander up, he can be both cruel and unusual…Beautiful Losers is an angry book.” Cranky, but still accurate enough. 98 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly

A long, thoughtful, but not uncritical interpretation of Beautiful Losers, penned by the noted historian Eugene D. Genovese, appeared in Crisis magazine (September 1994). “Francis makes fresh contributions to the development of the critique of equality and radical democracy,” Geno- vese wrote. “The burden of Beautiful Losers belies the gloom and apparent hopelessness of its title: It calls for a coalition to assert the interests of a healthy Middle America and repeal the welfare state. By no means is Francis ready to throw in the sponge…” Genovese is critical of Sam Francis’s analysis on several key points: “That we need a new coalition to combat the reigning moral degeneracy and irresponsible individualism that are paraded as ‘alternate life-styles’ is clear enough. That we can get anywhere by projecting imaginary new political classes to undergird such a coalition is doubtful.” He freely admits, however, “The Left as well as the Right would profit greatly from a vigorous debate over his principal theses.” Beautiful Losers received some intense interest from libertarians. Reason magazine (April 1994) carried a review that opined: “Francis hates the modern state with an inspiring and radical passion. Would that his passions were rooted in a love for liberty instead of a hatred for the values of the people in charge.” The author explains and complains: As an intellectual rather than activist movement, Francis’s revanchism is best known as ‘paleoconservatism,’ a term he thinks clumsy and rejects. Pat Buchanan is its political figurehead and most famous exponent…. Though these days Buchanan’s columns and Francis’s are almost in- distinguishable in stance, Francis’s tone tends to be sharper, less jolly, more vicious. In this sense he is truer to his principles than Buchanan. How can one be a cheerful warrior when the cause one must fight to the death for is lost? No wonder a chapter of this book is devoted respect- fully to that glum crusader in defense of a decadent and defeated West, Whittaker Chambers. David Gordon, writing in the Ludwig von Mises Institute’s Mises Re- view (Fall 1995), was on target in his summary of Beautiful Losers: Francis adopts [James] Burnham’s famous thesis of a ‘managerial revolution.’ Developments in science and technology, along with the atten- dant growth of large corporations, have in the twentieth century made old-fashioned capitalism, based on small business, obsolete. Nowadays, managers and a technical-scientific elite control the economy. Liberal- ism expresses the interests of this managerial elite. Those who wish to counter liberalism, cannot proceed effectively by appealing to the same groups whose interests liberalism serves. Gordon admits: I have underestimated Francis’s subtlety. Although he writes with apparent sympathy for Burnham’s modernism, and seems critical of traditionalists, I cannot find any explicit profession by him of the modernist Summer 2005 / Gemma 99

creed. It would not be surprising if it turns out that this ironist has baited a trap for prospective critics. Murray Rothbard, who stretched the libertarian label often, created a thought-provoking fourteen-page review for the Rothbard-Rockwell Report (July, 1994.) It was a message to all ideologues: In the introduction to this brilliant collection of essays, Dr. Samuel Fran- cis crystallizes one of his unique contributions to modern conservative thought. Since World War II, he points out, conservative intellectuals and theorists (and this would be true in spades for libertarians) have concentrated on what ideas should be adopted in society. In the famous phrase of Old Rightist Richard Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences. Of course, Sam Francis concedes, but what they have all neglected are the crucial questions what and who decides which ideas get adopted, to generate those consequences? As Francis puts it, with his typical blend of powerful reasoning and mordant wit: “Ideas do have consequences, but some ideas have more consequences than others, and consequences ensue from which ideas is settled simply because the ideas serve human reason through their logical implications but also because some ideas serve human interests and emotions through their attachment to drives for political, economic, and social power, while others do not.”

A REVIEW RECAP

The late, great Murray Rothbard wrote this about the late, great author of Beautiful Losers: What does Sam Francis want? Shining through the hard-headed analysis, the answer is clear: he is fervently opposed to the rule of the existing Left Liberal-neoconservative–Official Conservative managerial elite, and aims to replace that elite by a mass movement of working class Americans who would, as far as possible, return to leadership by the bourgeois elite. The inspiration and expectation that comes from reading and reread- ing Beautiful Losers is best found in Sam Francis’ description of “Middle American Radicals” (aka “MARs.”) He warns the establishment: The choice between the present elite and its challengers is not merely between one power and another. It is a choice between degeneration and rebirth, between death and survival, for survival is not a right or a gift freely granted by the powers that be. Survival, in the jungle or in political society, is a hard-won prize that depends ultimately on power itself. In this world, wrote Goethe, one must be the hammer or the anvil. The essence of the message from MARs is that the messengers want to work the forge. Sam’s Middle American Revolutionaries—that’s us, no matter how well off your stockbroker promises you are or soon will be—must confront the “hedonistic, pragmatist, relativist and secularized cosmopolitanism” of “managerial globalism” and its “elite.” 100 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly

Our marching orders, left behind by Generalissimo Samuel T. Francis in Beautiful Losers, are forthright: “Disperse and dismantle the managerial verbalist class.” You got any questions, soldier?

Peter B. Gemma has written for such publications as USA Today and Middle American News. The radical Southern Poverty Law Center asserts that he is a “veteran far-right agitator” who “has championed many conservative causes over the years.” Summer 2005 / About the Editors 101

ABOUT THE EDITORS

• Editor Kevin Lamb is the editor of Race, Genetics and Society: Glayde Whitney on the Scien- tiﬁc and Social Policy Implications of Racial Differences (2002). His articles have appeared in National Review, Chronicles, The Asian Wall Street Journal, Society, Mankind Quarterly, Conservative Review, and The Journal of Social, Political & Economic Studies. He is a frequent contributor to The Social Contract and Right Now! Mr. Lamb is a former managing editor of Human Events (2002-2005) and former library assistant for Newsweek’s Washington bureau (1989–2002).

• Associate Editor and Book Review Editor Wayne Lutton, Ph.D. (history), has been writing on national security, military history, and immigration-related issues for over thirty years. Currently editor of The Social Contract, he has been a college professor of history and government at both the undergraduate and graduate levels, served as research director for a foundation, and worked as a policy analyst in Washington, D.C. He has testiﬁed before Congress and the Colorado legislature on public policy aspects of managing HIV/AIDS. Dr. Lutton has authored, co-authored, or contributed to 19 books, including The Immigration Time Bomb, The Immigration Invasion, Immigration and the American Identity, and The Real American Dilemma. Articles by Dr. Lutton are included in eight college-level textbooks. Over the years he has written hundreds of articles and reviews which have appeared in Chronicles, Human Events, National Review, Strategic Review, The Occidental Quarterly, and other journals of scholarship and opinion. He is a frequent guest on radio talk shows and has appeared on C-SPAN a number of times.

• Managing Editor and Web Edition Editor Louis Andrews is a graduate of the College of Charleston (SC) and did graduate work in the Department of History at the University of South Carolina. He is a businessman, web developer, and writer and has been published in Right Now!, the Augusta Chronicle, The Occidental Quarterly, and the online journal pinc, for which he served as book review editor. He is also the developer and webmaster of the Stalking the Wild Taboo website and the author of North Carolina’s Demographic Transforma- tion: The Impact of Race and Immigration (2004). Though a native of South Carolina, Mr. Andrews has lived in Augusta, Georgia, since 1982.

• Associate Editor Theodore J. O’Keefe studied history and classics at Harvard College. During his career in publishing he has edited several racial-nationalist and historical revisionist periodicals and helped bring numerous books on European and American history and culture into print. Mr. O’Keefe has also published many articles on the political and cultural aspects of our civilization’s contemporary crisis. 102 Vol. 5, No. 2 The Occidental Quarterly

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Virginia Abernethy, Ph.D., emeritus professor of psychiatry, Vanderbilt University Medical School, is the author of Population Politics: The Choices That Shape Our Future (Insight Books, 1993; Transaction 1999), Population Pressure and Cultural Adjustment (Human Sciences Press, 1979), and (editor) Frontiers in Medical Ethics: Applications in a Medical Setting (Ballinger, 1980). A former editor of Population and Environment, she is the author of numerous articles in professional journals and a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. She is a graduate of Wellesley College (B.A., 1955) and Harvard University (M.A. 1969, Ph.D., 1970). Frank Ellis, Ph.D., is a lecturer in Russian at the University of Leeds, England, and the author of Vasily Grossman: The Genesis and Evolution of a Russian Heretic (Berg, 1994), From Glasnost to the Internet: Russia’s New Infosphere (St. Martin’s Press, 1999), and The Macpherson Report: ‘Anti-racist’ Hysteria and Sovietization of the United Kingdom (Right Now Press Ltd., 2001). He has published articles on topics that range from Soviet war literature to political correctness. Prior to taking up an academic career he was a professional soldier and served in the Parachute Regiment of the Special Air Service. Wayne Lutton, Ph.D. (history), editor of The Social Contract, is a policy analyst and historian. He has published widely on population and immigration concerns. Dr. Lutton has been research director for an educational institute and a college professor and is the author of or contributor to many books and monographs, including The Immigration Time Bomb (revised 1988) and The Immigration Invasion. His articles and reviews have appeared in Chronicles, National Review, The Social Contract, and other journals of scholarship and opinion. Richard Lynn, Ph.D., professor emeritus of psychology, University of Ulster, Coleraine, Londonderry, Northern Ireland, is the author most recently of Eugenics: A Reassessment (Praeger, 2001), The Science of Human Diversity: A History of the Pioneer Fund (University Press of America, 2001), and Dysgenics: Genetic Deterioration in Modern Popu- lations (Praeger, 1996). Other published writings include “National IQ and Economic Development: A Study of Eighty-One Developing Nations” (with Tatu Vanhanen), Mankind Quarterly (Summer 2001); “Geographical Variation in Intelligence,” in The Scientiﬁc Study of Human Nature: Tribute to Hans J. Eysenck at Eighty, (editor) Helmuth Nyborg (Pergamon, 1997); “The Decline of Genotypic Intelligence” and “In Support of the Nutrition Theory,” in The Rising Curve: Long-Term Gains in IQ and Related Measures, (editor) Ulric Neisser (APA, 1998). Dr. Lynn is a contributor to various monographs and psychological journals; his previous books include Educational Achievement in Japan: Lessons for the West (M.E. Sharpe, 1988); (editor) Dimensions of Personality: Papers in Hon- our of H.J. Eysenck (Pergamon, 1981); and Personality and National Character (Pergamon, 1971). He currently serves as an editorial advisor to Mankind Quarterly. Kevin MacDonald, Ph.D., professor of psychology, California State University- Long Beach, is the editor of Population and Environment and former editor of the Human Behavior and Evolution Society Newsletter. He is the author most recently of The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements (Praeger, 1998), Separation and Its Discontents: Toward an Evo- lutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism (Praeger, 1998), and A People That Shall Dwell Alone: Summer 2005 / Editorial Advisory Board 103

Judaism As a Group Evolutionary Strategy (Praeger, 1994). As a frequent contributor to monographs and author of numerous articles in evolutionary psychology, religion, and ethnic relations, his previous books include Sociobiological Perspectives on Human Development (Springer-Verlag, 1988), Social and Personality Development: An Evolutionary Synthesis (Plenum, 1988), and (editor) Parent-Child Play: Descriptions and Implications (State University of New York Press, 1993). Brent A. Nelson, Ph.D., a freelance writer, is the author of America Balkanized— Immigration’s Challenge to Government (American Immigration Control Foundation, 1994), as well as numerous articles and book reviews. James C. Russell, Ph.D., is the author of The Germanization of Early Medieval Chris- tianity: A Sociohistorical Approach to Religious Transformation (Oxford University Press, 1994) and has taught classes at Saint Peter’s College, New Jersey. Derek Turner, editor of the London-based conservative quarterly Right Now!, is a British journalist and frequent contributor to Chronicles and The Social Contract. Miles D. Wolpin, Ph.D., J.D., is professor emeritus of political science, State University of New York, Potsdam, (N.Y.), and the author of a dozen books, including Alternative Security and Military Dissent (Austin & Winﬁeld, 1994) and America Insecure: Arms Transfers, Global Interventionism, and the Erosion of National Security (McFarland & Co., 1991), as well as scores of articles on militarism, national security, Third World politics, and immigration. He is a frequent contributor to The Social Contract. Do You Want Your Children to be Racial Minorities? f we let current trends con- presses an unabashed prefer- tinue, by the year 2050 ence for the culture and way of Iwhites will be a minority life of the Euro-American ma- race in the United States. Will jority. We have been publishing that be good for your country or for 12 years, and our contribu- your children? tors include Samuel Francis, Current race and immigration Michael Levin, Jared Taylor, policies assume that race is Richard Lynn, and Fr. James something trivial that can be Thornton. made not to matter. This is false. Subscriptions are $24.00 for Race helps determine where 12 monthly issues. most of us live, where we send our children to school, whom we marry, and what church we join. Race will also determine the character of our country. If we acquire a Third World population we will become a Third World country. American Renaissance is a monthly newsletter that ex-

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