Brian O'sullivan AWAY ALL BOATS Pt
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AWAY ALL BOATS: A study of the evolution and development of amphibious warfare in the Pacific War A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in History in the University of Canterbury by Brian O’Sullivan University of Canterbury 2008 Abstract Amphibious operations are a topic central to the history of World War Two in the Pacific Theatre. The majority of research on this topic has been centred on the impact of American experiences and successes attributed to the development and evolution of amphibious warfare. The contributions of the United Kingdom and Japan to the development of amphibious warfare have been either overlooked or marginalized. This thesis will investigate the amphibious activities of all three powers both during and before the Pacific War, and seek to explain the importance of each nation’s contribution to amphibious warfare. In addition, the thesis will demonstrate how in its highest forms amphibious operations became a fully fledged system of global force projection. The thesis will explain how each of these powers interpreted the legacy of the failure of the 1915 Gallipoli campaign both in the context of their own wartime experiences, and in their respective strategic worldviews. This interpretation is central to how each power prepared for amphibious operations in the next war. The importance of the geography of the Pacific Ocean to the evolution and development of amphibious warfare will be discussed, as will the advances in technology that allowed the creation of logistical systems to support these operations. 2 Acknowledgements Throughout this project I have been fortunate to receive the support and generous assistance of many people. In particular I would like to thank the following people: my supervisors, Dr Kenneth Henshall, and Professor Peter Hempenstall, for their assistance, advice, and guidance in the production of this thesis; Dr Richard Holdaway for generously lending me material on the Royal Navy; Akira Takizawa for responding so quickly to my queries on Japanese Landing Craft; Dr Neville Bennett for his gift of books; my partner Katherine Bushman for providing both moral support and technology; Rick and Elaine Bushman for their generous gifts of books and primary source material; my sister Anna for her assistance in preparing the illustrations in this work; my family for their overall support; Mel Wright for her assistance with all my projects; Aaron McMillan for his willingness to listen; my fellow Masters students and the History Department for providing a friendly work environment; and numerous other persons who helped in some way that I have failed to mention. I am also grateful to the US Navy, the US Army, the Australian War Memorial, and the Imperial War museum for the use of photographs in the text. Naturally the responsibility for any errors in this work is mine, and mine alone. 3 Contents Abstract 2 Acknowledgements 3 Contents 4 Glossary 5 Chapter 1 Introduction 6 Chapter 2 From Quebec to ‘Albion’ 28 Chapter 3 Interwar Developments and Operations 56 Chapter 4 Development of Equipment 93 Chapter 5 Amphibious Operations during the Pacific War 123 Bibliography 160 4 Glossary AWM Australian War Memorial BuShips US Navy Bureau of Ships Chi Ha Japanese Type 97 Medium Tank COHQ Combined Operations Head Quarters (UK) Daihatsu Japanese Type ‘A’ Landing Craft Dukw (pronounced ‘Duck’) US amphibian truck FLEX Fleet Landing Exercise (US Navy) FMF Fleet Marine Force FMFRP Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication FTP Fleet Training Publication (US Navy) HAF Historical Amphibious File (US Marines) ISTDC Inter Service Training Development Centre (UK) IWM Imperial War Museum (UK) Ka-Chi Japanese Type 3 amphibious Tank Ku-Mi Japanese Type 2 Amphibious Tank LCA Landing Craft Assault LCM Landing Craft Mechanised LCP(L) Landing Craft Personnel Large LCP(R) Landing Craft Personnel Ramped LCT Landing Craft Tank LCV Landing Craft Vehicle LF Landing Force LSD Landing Ship Dock LSI Landing Ship Infantry LSI(L) Landing Craft Infantry, Large LSM Landing Ship Medium LST Landing Ship Tank LVT Landing Vehicle Tracked MLC Motor Landing Craft (UK) ONI Office of Naval Intelligence (US Navy) POA Pacific Ocean Area RAAF Royal Australian Air Force RAF Royal Air Force (UK) RAN Royal Australian Navy Rikusentai Naval Landing Party (Japan) RN Royal Navy (UK) SNLP Special Naval Landing Party (Japan) Suki Japanese amphibian truck SWPA South Western Pacific Area USMC United States Marine Corps Yusokan Class of Japanese Landing Ship, with a superficial resemblance to Allied LCT 5 Chapter One Introduction This study will attempt to answer how by the end of the war in the Pacific amphibious warfare developed from a military impossibility, to a fully fledged system of force projection. Mastery of the art of amphibious warfare was one of the major factors that allowed the United States and its allies to defeat the Japanese Empire during World War Two. By 1945 the United States had developed the ability to project and sustain military force into virtually any coastal area in the world. Before the war such capability would have been considered impossible in the wake of the failed Dardanelles campaign, due to advances in defensive firepower and the rise of modern airpower.1 Amphibious warfare underwent a transformation during World War Two. In 1939 Liddell Hart, a noted British military theorist, would describe amphibious operations as being "almost impossible, because of the vulnerable target which a convoy of transports offers to the defenders’ air force. Even more vulnerable is the process of disembarkation in open boats".2 Yet, after major successful amphibious operations had been conducted during the war, Liddell Hart would write in 1960 that "[a]mphibious flexibility is the greatest strategic asset that a sea power possesses".3 The purpose of this study is to examine not just the development of amphibious warfare, but to also demonstrate how, during the Pacific War, it evolved into a 'higher form' of operation. This change 1S. E. Morrison, The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United S tates In The Second World War, Boston, 1963, p.15. 2 cited in J. H. Alexander, “Across the Reef: Amphibious warfare in the Pacific” in The Pacific War: From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima , Oxford, 2006, p.198. 3 cited in N. Polmar, and P. B. Mersky, Amphibious Warfare: An Illustrated History, London, 1988, p.6. 6 resulted in the creation of amphibious taskforces capable of providing their own air and naval gunfire support, and operating vast distances from their home base of operations. These taskforces were used in the Pacific by the United States to perform what writer Joseph H. Alexander called 'Storm Landings'. Alexander defines these as being “risky, long-range, large-scale, self-sustaining assaults executed against strong opposition and within the protective umbrella of fast carrier forces.”4 While Alexander is writing about operations in the Pacific, such as Operation Galvanic,5 his words could just as easily be applied to another taskforce operating a vast distance from its home port, that which the British Royal Navy used in Operation Corporate during the Falklands War (April 2nd to June 14th 1982). Operating a vast distance form the United Kingdom, or other friendly ports, the taskforce had to supply its own airpower protection, in addition to supplying air and naval gunfire support to operations conducted ashore. It is this type of taskforce which clearly demonstrates the modern evolved form of amphibious warfare today, and which can trace its genesis back to the Pacific War. Amphibious warfare Amphibious warfare can be defined as the projection of military force from the sea, onto a hostile or potentially hostile shore.6 While the term 'projection' can have many uses, it is the physical projection of military power that is important in this definition. The United States Navy, one of the great practitioners of the art of amphibious warfare, defines it as being “a military operation 4J. H. Alexander, Storm Landings: Epic Amphibious Battles in the Central Pacific, Annapolis, 1997, p. xiii. 5 The 2nd US Marine Division journeyed approximately 2000 miles from its base in Wellington, New Zealand, to its target Betio Island in the Tarawa Atoll chain, present day Kiribati. See Fig. 3. 6 I. Speller, and C. Tuck, Strategy and Tactics: Amphibious Warfare, Staplehurst, 2001, p.7. 7 launched from the sea by an amphibious force, embarked in ships or craft with the primary purpose of introducing a landing force (LF) ashore to accomplish the assigned mission”. 7 British practice is to use the terminology of ‘combined operations’ to describe amphibious operations, as they require the combined efforts of more than one arm of the service. In fact amphibious warfare has a history stretching back into antiquity. Records from the Egyptian Empire, dating to around 1200 B.C,8 show that coastal provinces were experiencing attacks from raiders based in the Mediterranean islands and southern Europe. Homer’s Iliad 9 describes a war between the kingdoms of Greece and the city of Troy, which is in effect the story of an amphibious campaign. It starts with the initial Greek landings and assault on Troy, and later the feigned withdrawal used by the Greeks to lull the Trojans into taking a certain wooden horse into their city. Thucydides in his History of the Peloponnesian War 10 describes many amphibious operations conducted throughout the war, most notably the various campaigns conducted in Sicily. This long, ongoing, tradition of amphibious warfare is not surprising given that 70.8% of the planet’s surface is water. 11 Thus the ability to project military force across water onto a hostile shore is particularly useful. It is also an ability often developed out of geographical necessity. As Napoleon remarked “the policy of a 7 US Navy, Joint Publication 3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, Washington, 2001, p.18.