U.S. Public Response to Terrorism

U.S. Public Response

to Terrorism

Panel Study 2001–2002

George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service Texas A&M University College Station, Texas August 2003

This research was conducted with support from National Science Foundation Award Number 0234119.

George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service Texas A&M University College Station, Texas

U.S. Public Response

to Terrorism

Panel Study 2001–2002

Kerry G. Herron, Ph.D. Research Scientist

Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Ph.D. Professor of Public Policy Joe and Teresa Long Chair in Business and Government

August 2003

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to express appreciation to the following organizations and individuals whose support made this project possible.

The University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM Roger L. Hagengruber, Ph.D., Director, UNM Institute for Public Policy Amelia A. Rouse, Ph.D., Deputy Director, UNM Institute for Public Policy Amy S. Goodin, Deputy Director of Research, UNM Institute for Public Policy Eric Whitmore, Program Coordinator, UNM Institute for Public Policy

Texas A&M University, College Station, TX Richard Chilcoat, Dean, George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service F. P. Rick Johnson, George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service Carol L. Silva, Ph.D., George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service Rene Pitts, George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service Karla S. Stone, The Bush School’s Center for Policy & Governance

The National Science Foundation

This research was conducted with support from the National Science Foundation. Award Number 0234119

Abstract

This report analyzes findings from a telephone survey of 935 members of the U.S. general public conducted between September 12 and November 4, 2001 and a subset or “panel” consisting of 474 of the original respondents who also participated in a follow-up study conducted between September 12 and November 11, 2002. Where possible, responses in 2001 and 2002 are compared to identical questions previously asked in 1995 or 1997.

Key areas of investigation include the following: (1) assessments of the U.S. and international security environments; (2) nature and extent of the current and foreseeable threat of terrorism; (3) policy implications of terrorism and government efforts to prevent terrorism; (4) assessments of the ongoing war on terrorism and prospects for preventing future acts of terrorism; and (5) change in public opinion in the year following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). More generally, we use the issue of terrorism to investigate and test key tenets of the ongoing debate about capacities and limitations of mass publics to contribute to complex policy domains in times of national stress.

Compared to pre-9/11 measurements, respondent concerns about current and future threats posed by terrorism increased substantially immediately after 9/11, but support for intrusive measures to combat terrorism was modest, and public reactions did not evidence the kinds of emotional volatility associated with traditional concepts of mass opinion in times of national crises. Clear trends toward moderation of support for intrusive anti-terrorism measures and declining support for the use of coercive force to punish terrorist states were evident among panel members one year after 9/11. The weight of our data contradict traditional assumptions about the instability of public opinion and narrow capacities of mass publics to contribute to foreign and security policy processes.

iii

Contents

Front Matter

Abstract iii Contents iv

Chapter One: Introduction and Overview 1

Section 1.1: Background and Purpose of the Study 1 Section 1.2: Research Objectives 5 Section 1.3: Analytical Approach 6 Section 1.4: Organization of the Report 7

Chapter Two: Aggregate Trends 9

Section 2.1: Security Environment 10 Section 2.2: The Evolving Threat of Terrorism 16 Section 2.3: Countering Terrorism 28 Section 2.4: Responding to Terrorism 40 Summary of Key Points from Chapter Two 45

Chapter Three: Individual Level Analyses 49

Section 3.1: Demographic Attributes of the Panel 54 Section 3.2: Individual Views on the Threat of Terrorism 55 Section 3.3: Intrusive Policies for Preventing Terrorism 59 Section 3.4: Using Force to Respond to Terrorism 66 Section 3.5: Cross Sectional Comparisons of Subgroups 69

Chapter Four: Emerging Perspectives 73

Section 4.1: Assessing Ongoing Efforts to Combat Terrorism 73 Section 4.2: Implications of 9/11 for Respondents’ Behaviors 79 Section 4.3: Summarizing Outlooks 83

Appendix 1: Research Methodology 85

Section 1: Analytical Approach 85 Section 2: Attributes of Panel Studies 86 Section 3: The Role of Statistical Weighting 87 Section 4: Sampling 88 Section 5: Data Collection 91 Section 6: Cooperation Rates 92

Appendix 2: Questions, Distributions, and Means 93

References 111

Intentionally Blank

Chapter One Introduction and Overview

This report presents findings from a survey of 935 randomly selected members of the U.S. general public in 2001 and a subset or “panel” consisting of 474 of the original respondents who also participated in a follow-up survey in 2002. The purpose of the study is to better understand how public views of terrorism and its implications are evolving in the wake of the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 (hereafter referred to as “9/11”). The survey in 2001 was conducted between September 12 and No- vember 4; the follow-up survey was conducted one year later between Sep- tember 12 and November 11, 2002.

Section 1.1: Background and Purpose of the Study

Beyond the intrinsic importance of gaining insight into how Americans’ understanding of terrorism is evolving in the post-9/11 period, these panel data contribute to better understanding the capacities and roles of the public in collective decision making under stress. Modern concepts of public opinion in the U.S. and its proper role in policy processes evolved to an elitist perspective by the middle of the 20th century characterized by the following: (1) a presumption of minimal capacities of mass publics to understand and contribute to complex policy domains—especially foreign and security policies; (2) empirical evidence suggesting that belief systems of ordinary citizens are insufficiently structured to inform and constrain policy choices in areas where individuals lack specialized knowledge or experience; and (3) criticism of means for systematically measuring and understanding public views. These concepts gained wide acceptance among political sophisti- cates, theorists, and academics, and, together, helped shape the “traditional” view of limited public capacities that continues to inform contemporary assumptions about what elites should expect from the general public. Argu- ments for the traditionalist perspective have been advanced, among others, by Lippmann (1922, 1925), Bailey (1948), Morgenthau (1948), Markel (1949), Almond (1950), Kennan (1951), Converse (1964, 1970), Zaller (1992), and Weissberg (2001). The traditionalist perspective rests on three key propositions concerning public capacities:

• Ordinary citizens lack the cognitive capacities to understand politically so- phisticated and technically complicated issues and are insufficiently knowl- edgeable about complex policy domains to develop reasoned preferences.

• Underlying dispositions among the general public are insufficient to provide systematic structure and coherence of views about complex policy issues.

• Public opinion at the individual level is unstable, subject to rapid swings, and susceptible to overreaction.

By the latter part of the 20th century, traditionalist concepts came under critical scrutiny for several reasons. Methods for systematically measuring public perspectives became more widely accepted, and mounting evidence from opinion survey research contradicted traditionalist concepts. Com- bined with widespread distrust of foreign and security policy decisions made during the Vietnam era and a normative desire to illustrate that democratic governance need not limit public participation in public policy making, revisionists began to seriously question the tenets of traditional views of public capacities. Among the revisionist challenges were published findings by Caspary (1970), Achen (1975), Wittkopf (1981, 1986, 1990, 1994), Oldendick and Bardes (1982), Wittkopf and Maggiotto (1983), Pef- fley and Hurwitz (1985), Sniderman and Tetlock (1986), Hurwitz and Pef- fley (1987, 1990), Shapiro and Page (1988, 1994), Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991), Page and Shapiro (1992), Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis (1995), Holsti (1996), Page and Barabas (2000), and Herron and Jenkins- Smith (2002). Countervailing propositions suggested by this body of revisionist research include the following:

• Reasonably well-defined belief systems and complex heuristics support and constrain mass public opinions in both domestic and foreign policy domains in much the same ways in which they provide structure and coherence to views of elite publics.

• While over-time variation in individual opinions and issue salience is evident, such variation should not be equated with broadly unstable and volatile public opinion. Longitudinal analyses of aggregate public views show long-term stability in collective opinions that are related to underlying beliefs or that are events-driven.

• Complete information is not required for reasoned policy choice. Ordinary citizens are cognitive misers who choose to disregard most of the information they could acquire while retaining information they consider most im-

portant to their individual and collective welfare. Selective information processing is an attribute of rationality and cognitive sophistication, not a result of limited capacities to comprehend.1

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the ongoing war on terrorism provide just the kind of security events, foreign policy challenges, and policy choices that are at the heart of the debate about public capacities. The shocking nature of the attacks in New York and Washington, portrayed by the news media repeatedly and in graphic form, captured the nation’s attention as few events have. As is evident in Figure 1.1, the sheer quantitative deluge of news items about terrorism following the September 11 terrorist attacks stands in striking contrast to prior levels—even following earlier terror events such as the Oklahoma City bombing. The raw materials for public reactions are amply present for evaluating the content, coherence and stability of the public’s perceptions and reactions.

Figure 1.1: Monthly Reporting of Terrorist Incidents: 1991–20022

7000 2nd WTC Bombing 9/11/01 6000

5000

4000 # 3000 Olympic Bombing Oklahoma City Bombing of U.S. Bombing Embassies in 2000 1st WTC Kenya and Tanzania Bombing 1000

0 1/91 1/92 1/93 1/94 1/95 1/96 1/97 1/98 1/99 1/00 1/01 1/02 9/02 Month/Year

1 This is not a recent conclusion. As Anthony Downs noted in 1957, rational decision making leads ordinary citizens not to gather large amounts of political information. On this subject, see also Hurwitz and Peffley (1987), Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996), Page and Shapiro (1992), and Lupia and McCubbins (1998). 2 Reports consist of instances in which the words “terrorist” or “terrorism” appear in the headline or lead paragraph in articles published between January 1, 1991 and September 30, 2002 in the following eight periodicals: Chicago Sun-Times, Houston Chronicle, Miami Herald, New York Times, Philadelphia Enquirer, San Francisco Chronicle, USA Today, and the Wall Street Journal.

Does the American public, collectively, have the cognitive sophistication to process large volumes of rapidly evolving, incomplete, contradictory, and controversial information about the nature and implications of terrorism? Do members of the general public have sufficiently robust belief structures and associated predispositions to provide a political and policy “rudder” during a period of national crisis? Are ordinary citizens too emotionally reactive to provide stability and composure in the aftermath of the most destructive attacks on the U.S. homeland in history? When public fears about security are high, how are values about individual rights affected? If compromises of individual prerogatives become publicly acceptable for purposes of security in times of crisis, are pre-crisis levels of cautions and protections sought when the threat subsides? If so, which groups of persons are most likely to want to roll back losses in freedoms?

The timing of our 2001 national security survey immediately following the terrorist events of 9/11 affords a unique opportunity to systematically evaluate the views of the same sample of the U.S. public one year after the events. Findings provide a reference point for subsequent measurements, and help document public perspectives prior to potential future terrorist events. By comparing general views long before 9/11 with those immediately following 9/11 and those among the same respondents after the first year of the war on terrorism, we provide benchmarks reflecting how members of the public are adapting to the aftermath of 9/11 and its implications for national and international security. Our data also help indicate how citizens are understanding U.S. organizational and functional initiatives to prevent and combat terrorism, and they provide insight into how policies are judged by subgroups of citizens having different demographic attributes.

From a broader and more long-term perspective, as technological and in- formational advances create an increasingly interconnected and shared future, the role of publics in assessing risks and threats, making trade-offs in freedom of action and security, and in guiding policy evolution will become increasingly important. Data that help evaluate public judgment and decision processes, public risk perceptions, risk communication and manage- ment, and structural and organizational performance of government efforts to counter terrorism will be of lasting utility in evaluating the international war on terrorism and will contribute important evidence to debates about democratization and public capacities

Section 1.2: Research Objectives

Our research objectives included gaining insight about public views of the following four critical and related dimensions of terrorism and how associated opinions evolve over time.

• Security Environment: What are public assessments of the current and foreseeable security environments? How has national and international security changed in the post-cold war era? What is the role of nuclear deterrence in preventing terrorism with weapons of mass destruction?

• Nature of the Threat of Terrorism: How does the public rate the overall threat of all kinds of terrorism in the U.S. today and for the next ten years? How do participants rate current threats of foreign and domestic terrorism to critical U.S. infrastructures? Specifically, what is the threat to telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil supplies and services, water supply systems, transportation systems, banking and finance, emergency services, and continuity of government?

• Policy Implications of Terrorism: To what degree does the public think government can prevent acts of terrorism? What are the implications for civil liberties of government efforts to stop terrorism? How certain should government be before using military force against a country suspected of supporting terrorism? How do preferences for response options change if the country provides: (1) training and personnel for terrorists; (2) funding for terrorists; and/or (3) sanctuary for terrorists?

• Emerging Assessments: Is the U.S. engaged in a war on terrorism? If so, how well is it being prosecuted and what are the prospects? Can it be “won”? If so, what constitutes “winning”? How effective in terms of modi- fying Americans’ everyday lives have the terrorists been thus far? In what ways have participants’ lives been changed by the threat of terrorism and ongoing efforts to combat terrorism? What is the outlook for preventing major terrorist attacks in the U.S. over the next five years?

More generally, our objective is to employ the substantive issue of terrorism to investigate the key tenants of the ongoing debate between traditionalists and revisionists about the capacities and limitations of mass publics to participate in complex policy domains such as foreign and security policy processes, especially in times of higher national stress.

Section 1.3: Analytical Approach

Where available, this study employs subsets of questions previously admin- istered to national samples of the U.S. general public in 1995 (Herron and Jenkins-Smith 1996), 1997 (Herron and Jenkins-Smith 1998), and 1999 (Herron, Jenkins-Smith, and Hughes 2000). New questions were added in 2001 (Jenkins-Smith and Herron 2002) and repeated in 2002, and additional new questions were included in 2002. This provides a range of comparative options including public views several years before the terrorist attacks of 9/11, public reactions immediately following 9/11, and views among a subset of the same respondents one year later.

For some questions, we show trends in public assessments of national samples before and after 9/11 that help calibrate the effects of the terrorist attacks on the U.S. public. For other questions, we compare responses from the same individuals immediately following 9/11 and one year later that help show initial reactions and the evolution of views among the same respondents about terrorism during the first year after the events. We also added a number of new questions in 2002 designed to measure contemporaneous public assessments of the ongoing war on terrorism. Questions were designed to support the following statistical analyses: (1) descriptive parameters such as frequencies and central tendencies; (2) comparative measurements and trends over time; (3) relationships among key variables; and (4) demographic implications. This multi-layered survey approach provides rich analytical opportunities not available from individual snapshots using different survey instruments and the narrow range of response options typical of some media polls. A detailed discussion of the methods used in sampling and data collection and the various rates of cooperation for each survey are provided in Appendix One.

To account for the differences between our original survey of 935 respondents in 2001 and the subset of 474 participants who could be contacted one year later and who agreed to a second lengthy survey, we examined demographic characteristics among those who participated in both surveys (our panel members) and those who participated in 2001 but did not participate for whatever reason in 2002. On average, panel members were approximately six years older (p < .0001), were more highly educated (p < .0001),

and reported somewhat higher annual household incomes (p = .0004).3 These demographic differences are typical of respondents who are less mobile than other portions of the parent population. The proportions of men and women who were panel members did not differ significantly from those who did not participate in 2002, and the two subsamples did not differ significantly in terms of self-rated political ideology.

For comparing central tendencies between the 935 participants in 2001 and our 474 panel members in 2002, we employ a “weight” calculated for each response value for each question that normalizes the panel members to the larger original group based on responses in 2001. The weighting method is discussed in detail in Appendix One.

In Appendix Two, we show distributions of responses and central tendencies for each of the following groups: (1) the full sample of 935 respondents in 2001; (2) the subgroup of 474 participants in 2001 who became panel members in 2002; (3) the unweighted responses of our 474 panel members in 2002; and (4) the weighted responses for our 2002 panel. Throughout the report, we employ weighted distributions and means when making most group level unpaired comparisons, and we employ unweighted statistics for individual level paired comparisons. Distinctions among weighted and unweighted comparisons are clearly indicated.

Section 1.4: Organization of the Report

In Chapter Two we examine aggregate trends in public assessments of the broader security environment, the scope and nature of the threat of terrorism, and associated implications of government efforts to prevent future acts of terrorism.

3 Throughout this study, we report the results of analyses of variance (ANOVAs) in terms of p-value, which is a measure of the probability that statistical outcomes (such as differences in central tendencies) would have occurred by chance. We attribute statistical significance to those differences that would have occurred by chance fewer than five times in 100 (equivalent to a 95 percent confidence level). However, statistical significance does not always equate to operational or policy relevance. For example, the relevance of statistically significant differences in means must be judged in the context of the variables being measured and the groups being compared.

Chapter Three analyzes the implications of respondent attributes and exam- ines differences in unweighted individual level measures among the panel members immediately following 9/11 and one year later to help identify and explain evolving views.

In Chapter Four, we report emerging assessments about the progress of the war on terrorism to date, and we examine public views of prospects for the future.

Appendix One reports on the methods used for sampling and data collection and discusses cooperation rates. We also explain weighting methods used to normalize the subset of respondents who participated both in 2001 and 2002 with the entire group that participated in 2001.

In Appendix Two, we provide a comprehensive listing of questions, frequencies of responses, and weighted and unweighted means. Where applicable, differences in means are tested for statistical significance.

Chapter Two Aggregate Trends

The unhappy truth is that the prevailing public opinion has been destruc- tively wrong at the critical junctures. The people have imposed a veto upon the judgments of informed and responsible officials. They have compelled the governments, which usually knew what would have been wiser, or was necessary, or was more expedient, to be too late with too little, or too long with too much, too pacifist in peace and too bellicose in war, too neutralist or appeasing in negotiation or too intransigent. … It has shown itself to be a dangerous master of decisions when the states are life and death. (Lippmann, 1955, p. 20)

It is simply not the case that the collective policy preferences of the U.S. public are nonexistent, unknowable, capricious, inconsistent, or igno- rant. Instead, they are real, meaningful, well measured by polls, differentiated, coherent, and stable. They react understandably and predictably to events and new information. The classic justifications for ignoring public opinion do not hold up. (Page and Shapiro, 1992, p. 397)

These very different concepts of mass opinion representing traditional (elite) vs. revisionist views of public capacities frame our analysis of public assessments of security in the context of the post-cold war environment, the events of 9/11, and the ongoing struggle against terrorism. Traditionalist expectations about the implications of large-scale exogenous events on public opinion, such as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the terrorist attacks of 9/11, are that resulting fears will be widespread and that public moods will be emotionally volatile, swinging widely towards extremes. Publics are expected to be vulnerable to over-reactive policies that curtail freedoms. Revisionist expectations of public opinion under such circumstances are that resulting perturbations in mass opinions will be modest and in predictable directions, and that they will dampen within the near-term (depending on subsequent events and actions). Adjustments (if any) to core beliefs about relationships between government and citizens will be transitory, with a return toward previous expectations in the months after the exogenous event. In our surveys, we expected to find initial shifts in public concerns and tolerances for government actions to increase security following the events of 9/11, but, in the absence of subsequent large-scale terrorist attacks, we also expected to find declining tol-

erances for added limitations on public prerogatives and decreasing support for restrictive or invasive security measures one year after those events.

In this chapter, we explore public views both about the events of 9/11 and about government reactions to those events by comparing trends in grouped responses to questions about (1) the strategic environment and security context, (2) the evolving threat of terrorism, (3) policy options for preventing terrorism, and (4) preferences for responding to terrorism. When analyzing responses to questions asked in surveys prior to 2001, we compare distributions and means from earlier national samples to responses from our full sample of 935 respondents in 2001 and to the weighted responses from our 474 panel members in 2002.1 When analyzing responses to questions not asked prior to 2001, we compare the views of our 935 respondents in 2001 with the weighted views of our panel members in 2002. In a third method, we show unweighted comparisons between the responses in 2001 and 2002 among our 474 panel members.

Section 2.1: Security Environment

We began with questions designed to assess public views of the broader strategic security environment, to include trends since the end of the cold war. The following four questions help establish the overall security context within which public assessments of terrorism are situated. Each was asked of randomly selected national samples of the U.S. general public in 1997, 1999, and 2001, and our panel members in 2002.

• Considering the international environment as a whole, and using a scale from one to seven where one means the world is much less secure, and seven means the world is much more secure, how do you think international security has changed since the end of the cold war? (t4)

• Focusing more specifically on the U.S., and using the same scale from one to seven where one means much less secure, and seven means much more secure, how has U.S. security changed since the end of the cold war? (t5)

• Turning now to nuclear considerations, on a scale from one to seven where one means the chances have decreased greatly, and seven means the chances have increased greatly, how has the breakup of the Soviet Union

1 Use of weighted data from our panel in 2002 is indicated by “wtd”.

affected the chances that the U.S. will be involved in a war with any country in which nuclear weapons are used? (t6)

• Using the same scale from one to seven, how do you think the breakup of the Soviet Union has affected the possibility that nuclear weapons will be used by any country against any other country? (t7)

We compare trends in grouped response patterns in Figures 2.1–2.4.

Figure 2.1: How International Security Has Changed Since the Cold War

60 53 Means (t4) 50 45 44 43 40 1997: 4.30 40 37 33 1999: 4.14 29 % 30 2001: 4.05 21 19 20 20 2002: 3.80 16 (wtd) 10 97–02: p < .0001 01–02: p = .0095 0 Less Secure Same More Secure 1–3 4 4–7

Figure 2.2: How U.S. Security Has Changed Since the Cold War

60 (t5) Means 52 50 50 46 42 1997: 4.36 39 40 38 1999: 4.30 30 32 % 30 2001: 3.92 19 19 20 18 2002: 4.08 16 (wtd) 10 97–02: p = .0024 01–02: p = .1152 0 Less Secure Same More Secure 1–3 4 4–7

Figure 2.3: Change in Prospects for U.S. Nuclear Conflict Since Soviet Breakup

60 53 Means (t6) 51 48 50 42 43 1997: 4.04 40 37 1999: 4.35 32 30 % 30 2001: 4.26

20 17 2002: 4.47 16 16 15 (wtd)

10 97–02: p < .0001 01–02: p = .0488 0 Decreased Same Increased 1–3 4 4–7

Figure 2.4: Change in Prospects for Nuclear Conflict Among Others Since Soviet Breakup

70 (t7) Means 58 60 55 57 51 1997: 4.41 50 1999: 4.66 40 % 31 2001: 4.60 30 25 26 23 2002: 4.64 19 21 20 17 18 (wtd)

10 97–02: p = .0111 01–02: p = .6238 0 Decreased Same Increased 1–3 4 4–7

Figure 2.1 shows a distinct trend in assessments of how international security has changed since the end of the cold war. The proportion of respondents who consider the international system to be less secure increased from 29 percent in 1997 to 44 percent in 2002. Mean assessments declined across each measurement period, and the overall change from 1997 to 2002 was highly statistically significant. Figure 2.2 shows a similar, though less consistent, pattern about assessments of how U.S. security has changed in the post-cold war era. The decline from 1997 to 2002 is statistically significant, but the slight increase in 2002 compared to 2001 is not significant. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 indicate growing public assessment that the potential for conflict involving nuclear weapons has increased since the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Narrowing the scope of our analysis only to panel members, we show in Table 2.1 paired comparisons of unweighted mean responses to each of the same four questions among our 474 panelists in 2001 and 2002.

Table 2.1: Panel Assessments of the Security Environment: 2001 vs. 2002

Questions 2001 2002 p (Paired Comparisons of Unweighted Means) Panel Panel Value How has international security changed since the cold war? 3.97 3.79 .0745 (t4) [1 = much less secure—7 = much more secure] How has U.S. security changed since the cold war? (t5) 3.78 4.04 .0042 [1 = much less secure—7 = much more secure] How has the breakup of the Soviet Union affected chances the U.S. will be involved in nuclear war? (t6) 4.08 4.43 .0001 [1 = decreased greatly—7 = increased greatly] How has the breakup of the Soviet affected the possibility of nuclear war between any two countries? (t7) 4.50 4.62 .1665 [1 = decreased greatly—7 = increased greatly]

Over the course of the first twelve months following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, our panelists reflected, on average, a sense of deteriorating international security, but reported a statistically significant increase in overall assessments of U.S. security. Though we cannot say with confidence why respondents considered U.S. security to have increased, two factors may be relevant. Participants may have recovered somewhat from the shock immediately following 9/11 that influenced their judgments in 2001, and they may have regarded subsequent U.S. efforts to combat terrorism in Afghanistan and elsewhere as enhancing U.S. security. Regardless of the rationale, panel responses do not reflect a radical decline in public assessments of U.S. security that traditional expectations of public volatility might anticipate. Regarding the possibility of nuclear conflict, our panelists thought the chances of U.S. involvement increased significantly, and they registered a slight increase in the possibility of nuclear conflict between other states.

Against this backdrop of public assessments of the strategic security environment, we posed the following three questions about the efficacy of nuclear deterrence.

Lead-in: The next questions ask about your perceptions of nuclear deterrence, which means preventing someone from using nuclear weapons against us, because they expect that we would retaliate by using nuclear weapons against them.

• Using a scale from zero to ten where zero means not at all important, and ten means extremely important, how important are U.S. nuclear weapons for preventing other countries from using nuclear weapons against us today? (t24)

• Now we want you to think about preventing the use of chemical and biological weapons against the U.S. today. Using a scale where zero means not at all important, and ten means extremely important, how important are U.S. nuclear weapons for preventing other countries from using chemical or biological weapons against us today? (t26) [Note: first asked in 1999]

• On a scale from zero to ten where zero is not at all important, and ten is extremely important, how important is it for the U.S. to retain nuclear weapons today? (t36)

In Figures 2.5–2.7, we compare distributions of responses.

Figure 2.5: Importance of U.S. Nuclear Weapons for Preventing Other Coun- tries From Using Nuclear Weapons Against Us Today

35 (t24) Means 30

1997: 7.41 25 1999: 7.66 20 % 2001: 7.62 15 2002: 7.43 10 (wtd)

5 97–02: p = .8923 01–02: p = .1752 0 012345678910 Not At All Extremely Important Important

Figure 2.6: Importance of U.S. Nuclear Weapons for Preventing Other Coun- tries From Using Chemical or Biological Weapons Against Us Today

25 (t26) Means 20 1999: 6.57 15 2001: 5.96 % 10 2002: 6.17 (wtd)

5 99–02: p = .0142 01–02: p = .2938 0 012345678910 Not At All Extremely Important Important

Figure 2.7: Importance of Retaining U.S. Nuclear Weapons Today

40 (t36) Means 35

30 1997: 7.19

25 1999: 7.50 % 20 2001: 7.72 15 2002: 7.42 (wtd) 10

5 97–02: p = .1156 01–02: p = .0348 0 012 45678910 Not At All Extremely Important Important

Patterns of responses to these three questions are consistent with stable public judgments of the importance of deterrence provided by U.S. nuclear weapons. More than a decade after the end of the cold war, our samples show high valuation of U.S. nuclear deterrence for preventing other countries from using weapons of mass destruction against the U.S. However, we should note that the efficacy of nuclear deterrence for preventing the use of chemical or biological weapons against the U.S. was substantially lower, on average, than that for preventing the use of others’ nuclear weapons. On average, all groups

consistently have supported retaining U.S. nuclear weapons.2 We also should note that the wording of these questions was designed to measure public assessments of the efficacy of deterring the use of weapons of mass destruction by other countries. They did not ask about deterring the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist or other non-state groups.

To close this section, we show in Table 2.2 paired comparisons of mean perspectives about the importance of U.S. nuclear weapons among our panel members in 2001 and 2001.

Table 2.2: Panel Assessments of the Importance of U.S. Nuclear Weapons

Questions 2001 2002 p (Paired Comparisons of Unweighted Means) Panel Panel Value Importance of U.S. nuclear weapons for preventing other countries from using nuclear weapons against us (t24) 7.61 7.39 .1148 [0 = not at all important—10 = extremely important] Importance of U.S. nuclear weapons for preventing other countries from using chemical or biological weapons against 5.76 6.08 .0188 us (t26) [0 = not at all important—10 = extremely important] Importance of retaining U.S. nuclear weapons (t36) 7.66 7.35 .0362 [0 = not at all important—10 = extremely important]

Among panel members, mean ratings of the importance of U.S. nuclear weapons for preventing the use of other countries’ nuclear weapons decreased slightly, while mean assessments of the importance of U.S. nuclear deterrence of chemical or biological weapons increased significantly. Over- all, mean judgments of the importance of retaining U.S. nuclear weapons declined significantly during the year between surveys.

Section 2.2: The Evolving Threat of Terrorism

In this section we examine respondents’ views about the evolving nature of threats posed by terrorism. We begin with broad assessments of overall

2 However, other questions asked in the same national surveys, but not included in this report, indicate public preferences for significantly reducing the numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons to levels approximating 2,500—3,000 strategic warheads. See Jenkins-Smith and Herron 2002.

threats from terrorism, including nuclear terrorism, and then move to assessments of threats to specific U.S. critical infrastructures. Following the previous pattern, and where possible, we include responses to the same questions when asked in earlier surveys. The following four questions were designed to elicit evolving views of the macro threat posed by terrorism.

• Considering both foreign and domestic sources of terrorism, and considering both the likelihood of terrorism and its potential consequences, how do you rate today’s threat of all kinds of terrorism in the U.S. on a scale from zero to ten where zero means no threat, and ten means extreme threat? (t71)

• Turning to the future, and using the same scale from zero to ten, how do you rate the threat of all kinds of terrorism in the U.S. during the next ten years? (t72)

• Now I would like to know about your perceptions of today’s threat of nuclear terrorism. On a scale from zero to ten where zero means there is no threat of nuclear weapons being used by terrorists, and ten means there is extreme threat, how do you rate today’s threat of nuclear terrorism occurring anywhere in the world? (t17)

• On the same scale from zero to ten, where zero means no threat, and ten means extreme threat, how do you rate the threat of nuclear weapons being used by terrorists anywhere in the world during the next ten years? (t18)

We compare responses in Figures 2.8–2.11.

Figure 2.8: Threat to U.S. From All Kinds of Terrorism Today 60 (t71) Means 50

40 1997: 6.34 2001: 8.59 % 30 2002: 8.02 20 (wtd)

10 97–02: p < .0001 01–02: p < .0001 0 012345678910 No Threat Extreme Threat

Figure 2.9: Threat to U.S. From all Kinds of Terrorism During Next Ten Years

45 (t72) 40 Means 35

30 1997: 6.87

25 2001: 8.13 % 20 2002: 8.06 15 (wtd) 10 97–02: p < .0001 5 01–02: p = .6144 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

No Threat Extreme Threat

Figure 2.10: Threat of Nuclear Terrorism Occurring Anywhere Today

25 Means (t17) 20 1997: 7.03

15 1999: 7.14 % 2001: 7.05 10 2002: 7.28 (wtd) 5 97–02: p = .0765 01–02: p = .1243 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 No Threat Extreme Threat

Figure 2.11: Threat of Nuclear Terrorism Occurring Anywhere During Next Ten Years

25 (t18) Means

20 1997: 6.83

1999: 7.09 15 % 2001: 7.08 10 2002: 7.33 (wtd) 5 97–02: p = .0003 01–02: p = .0938 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 No Threat Extreme Threat

Responses to our first two questions about the overall threat of terrorism today and for the next decade (Figures 2.8 and 2.9) have as their base of reference views recorded in 1997, and they show a predictable increase immediately following 9/11. But note that one year after 9/11, the mean assessment of the current threat of terrorism declined significantly, though it remained substantially higher than our 1997 benchmark. The mean assessment of the threat posed by all forms of terrorism over the next ten years, however, declined only slightly during the first year following 9/11, and measurements in 2001 and 2002 remained significantly above mean views of the future threat of terrorism reported four years earlier. These patterns of responses suggest that while participants felt somewhat less threatened by terrorism in 2002 than in 2001, they still reflected concern about the continuing and future threats posed by terrorism.

Relative to our measures of broader terrorist threats, our two questions about nuclear terrorism indicate that the events of 9/11 had somewhat less effect on respondents’ judgments. For these measures we have pre-9/11 benchmarks in 1997 and 1999, and while they are high in absolute terms (near or above seven on a zero to ten scale), comparisons with assessments since 9/11 show no significant change in public estimates of the current threat of nuclear terrorism. They do indicate, however, a statistically significant increase between assessments in 1997 and those in 2002 of future threats posed by nuclear terrorism. Clearly, respondents across all measurement periods considered the potential use of nuclear weapons by terrorists to pose a substantial threat, and it seems apparent that respondents were able to differentiate between nuclear and other types of terrorist threats.

In Table 2.3, we show paired comparisons of unweighted mean responses to the same four questions among the same individuals interviewed in 2001 and 2001.

Table 2.3: Panel Assessments of Macro Terrorist Threats

Questions 2001 2002 p (Paired Comparisons of Unweighted Means) Panel Panel Value Current threat to U.S. from all kinds of terrorism (t71) 8.47 7.95 < .0001 [0 = no threat—10 = extreme threat] Threat to U.S. from all kinds of terrorism in next decade (t72) 8.11 8.05 .4096 [0 = no threat—10 = extreme threat] Threat of nuclear terrorism occurring anywhere today (t17) 6.81 7.19 .0024 [0 = no threat—10 = extreme threat] Threat of nuclear terrorism occurring anywhere in next decade 6.92 7.26 .0067 (t18) [0 = no threat—10 = extreme threat]

Differences among our panel members show the same earlier patterns where assessments of the current threat from all kinds of terrorism declined significantly and judgments about the future threat remained relatively stable during the first year following 9/11. Also, panel members considered the current and future threat of nuclear terrorism to be significantly higher in 2002 than in 2001. Thus our panel members were somewhat less concerned about the overall threat than they were immediately after 9/11, but their concerns about the potential use of nuclear devices by terrorists grew during the first year of the war on terrorism. On the whole, these patterns reflect the kinds of measured assessments revisionist expectations of public capacities would predict.

Critical Infrastructures

In 1997 we initiated a series of questions about public perceptions of the vulnerabilities of U.S. critical infrastructures to terrorist attacks. We repeated those questions in 2001 and with our panel in 2002. The series be- gins with two inquiries about threats to critical infrastructures as a group from both foreign and domestic terrorists, as shown below and charted in Figures 2.12 and 2.13.

Lead-in: The next series of questions deals with critical infrastructures in the U.S. such as telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil supplies and services, banking and finance, transportation systems, water supply systems, emergency services, and continuity of government. First I want to know your perceptions about potential threats to these kinds of infrastructures as a group. On a scale from zero to ten where zero means no threat, and ten means extreme threat, please rate each of the following as potential threats to critical U.S. infrastructures.

• Significant damage to critical U.S. infrastructures resulting from terrorism sponsored by foreign groups or individuals (t85)

• Significant damage to critical U.S. infrastructures resulting from terrorism sponsored by U.S. groups or individuals (t86)

Figure 2.12: Threat to Critical U.S. Infrastructures From Foreign Terrorists

30 (t85) Means 25

20 1997: 6.07

2001: 7.44 % 15 2002: 7.11 (wtd) 10

5 97–02: p < .0001 01–02: p = .0043 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 No Threat Extreme Threat

Figure 2.13: Threat to Critical U.S. Infrastructures From Domestic Terrorists

30 (t86) Means 25

20 1997: 4.96

2001: 5.71 % 15 2002: 5.54 10 (wtd)

5 97–02: p < .0001 01–02: p = .2678 0 0 1 2345678910

No Threat Extreme Threat

Several points about these comparisons seem noteworthy. First, in relative terms, and both before and after 9/11, respondents clearly perceived the threat of terrorism from foreign groups or individuals to be greater than the threat from U.S. terrorists. Second, participants rated foreign and domestic terrorist threats to U.S. critical infrastructures near or above midscale in all measurement periods. Third, public threat perceptions about critical infrastructures as a group increased significantly after 9/11 both for foreign and domestic sources of terrorism. Finally, assessments of the threat of foreign terrorism to critical U.S. infrastructures declined significantly in the year following 9/11, while views of the threat of domestic terrorism declined somewhat in the post-9/11 period, but the drop was more modest and did not reach statistical significance. Overall, after a heightened sense of the vulnerabilities

of U.S. critical infrastructures immediately following the 9/11 attacks, respondents’ assessments retracted moderately over the following 12 months during which there were no further terrorist attacks on U.S. soil.

In Table 2.4, we display paired comparisons of unweighted mean responses to these two questions among the same 474 panel members in 2001 and 2002.

Table 2.4: Panel Assessments of Overall Terrorist Threat to Critical U.S. In- frastructures as a Group

Questions 2001 2002 p (Paired Comparisons of Unweighted Means) Panel Panel Value Threat to critical U.S. infrastructures from foreign terrorists 7.28 7.05 .0318 (t85) [0 = no threat—10 = extreme threat] Threat to critical U.S. infrastructures from domestic terrorists 5.52 5.47 .6143 (t86) [0 = no threat—10 = extreme threat]

On average, panelists’ assessments of the threat to critical U.S. infrastructures from foreign terrorists declined in the year following 9/11, but the perceived mean threat from domestic terrorists remained stable.

To provide greater insight into public views of terrorist threats to specific categories of infrastructures, we asked the following questions about eight critical infrastructure groups.3

Lead-in: Turning now to individual types of U.S. infrastructures, some people have suggested that terrorists might pose physical threats to property and people and electronic threats to computer networks and other technologies. On a scale where zero means no threat, and ten means extreme threat, please rate the threat that you think terrorists pose to each of the following categories of essential services in the U.S. Please consider both the likelihood of such terrorist acts occurring and their potential consequences.

• Telecommunications such as telephones, television, radio, and the Internet (t87)

• Electrical power systems, including generating, transmitting, and distributing electrical power (t88)

3 The eight questions were randomly ordered for each respondent to avoid systematic response bias.

• Gas and oil supplies and services, including producing, refining, transporting, and distributing petroleum products and natural gas (t89)

• Banking and finance, including checking services, credit cards, and stock markets (t90)

• Transportation systems, including capabilities for all forms of travel and freight shipments (t91)

• Water supply systems, including watersheds, aquifers, water treatment, and water distribution for all purposes (t92)

• Emergency services, such as medical, police, fire, and rescue (t93)

• Continuity of government, meaning preserving institutions and functions of government at all levels (t94)

We organize responses from our 1997, 2001, and 2002 surveys by mean risk quartile among the eight categories of infrastructure in 2002, beginning in Fig- ures 2.14 and 2.15 with the two infrastructures judged to be most threatened by terrorism: water supply systems and gas and oil supplies and services.

Figure 2.14: Terrorist Threat to Water Supply Systems

25 (t92) Means 20

1997: 5.83 15 2001: 6.86 % 10 2002: 7.10 (wtd)

5 97–02: p < .0001 01–02: p = .1176

0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

No Threat Extreme Threat

Figure 2.15: Terrorist Threat to Gas and Oil Supplies and Services

25 (t89) Means 20 1997: 6.14 15 1997 2001: 7.01 % 2001 2002: 6.82 10 2002 (wtd) (wtd)

5 97–02: p < .0001 01–02: p = .1715 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 No Threat Extreme Threat

In this top quartile, we see similar patterns with all mean vulnerability ratings for water supply systems and gas and oil supplies and services above midscale in each of our time periods from 1997 to 2002. A statistically significant increase is apparent in 2001 immediately after the attacks on 9/11, and subsequent data indicate that perceived risks increased further (water supplies) or held steady (oil and gas supplies) among our panel one year later. On average, water supply systems ranked fourth in 1997 (telecommunications, gas and oil, and electrical infrastructures were considered more vulnerable), and in 2001 water supply systems ranked third (gas and oil supplies and transportation systems were judged more vulnerable), but in 2002 water supplies were regarded by our panel members as the most vulnerable of our eight critical infrastructure categories.

Our second quartile of infrastructure threats includes electrical power systems and transportation systems shown in Figures 2.16 and 2.17.

Figure 2.16: Terrorist Threat to Electrical Power Systems 25 (t88) Means 20

1997: 5.83 15 1997 2001: 6.57 % 2001 2002: 6.75 10 2002 (wtd) (wtd)

5 97–02: p < .0001 01–02: p = .2782 0 0 1 2345678910 No Threat Extreme Threat

Figure 2.17: Terrorist Threat to Transportation Systems

25 (t91) Means 20 1997: 5.73 15 1997 2001: 6.96 % 2001 2002: 6.60 10 2002 (wtd) (wtd)

5 97–02: p < .0001 01–02: p = .0134 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 No Threat Extreme Threat

Again, all mean vulnerability ratings for the second quartile were above midscale in each measurement period. Mean public views of the terrorist threat to electrical systems were significantly higher after 9/11 than in 1997, and ratings changed little between 2001 and 2002. Regarding transportation systems, mean vulnerability ratings also significantly increased in 2001 compared to 1997, and, somewhat surprisingly, one year later our panel members rated the terrorist threat to transportation systems significantly lower than in 2001. This reduction possibly could be related to highly visible efforts to improve the security of airline travel and other means of transportation in the year following the airliner attacks of 9/11.

Our third quartile of vulnerability includes telecommunications and banking and finance. We chart their response patterns in Figures 2.18 and 2.19.

Figure 2.18: Terrorist Threat to Telecommunications

25 (t87) Means 20 1997: 6.12 15 1997 2001: 6.42 % 2001 2002: 6.32 10 2002 (wtd) (wtd)

5 97–02: p = .1353 01–02: p = .4690 0 012345678910 No Threat Extreme Threat

Figure 2.19: Terrorist Threat to Banking and Finance

25 (t90) Means 20 1997: 5.61 15 1997 2001: 6.40 % 2001 2002: 6.29 10 2002 (wtd) (wtd)

5 97–02: p < .0001 01–02: p = .3956 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 No Threat Extreme Threat

While distribution patterns for telecommunications and banking and finance are generally similar, significant changes in means between our pre-9/11 measures in 1997 and post-9/11 responses in 2002 occurred only for banking and finance.

The two critical infrastructures perceived by respondents to be least threatened by terrorism were continuity of government and emergency services. We compare their ratings in Figures 2.20 and 2.21.

Figure 2.20: Terrorist Threat to the Continuity of Government

25 (t94) Means

1997: 5.06 15 1997 2001: 5.74 % 2001 2002: 5.47 10 2002 (wtd) (wtd)

5 97–02: p = .0112 01–02: p = .1128 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 No Threat Extreme Threat

Figure 2.21: Terrorist Threat to Emergency Services

25 (t93) Means 20 1997: 4.80 15 1997 2001: 5.60 % 2001 2002: 5.44 10 2002 (wtd) (wtd) 5 97–02: p = .0002 01–02: p = .2189 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 No Threat Extreme Threat

After significant mean increases in 2001 over our 1997 findings, views moderated in 2002. Nevertheless, these two infrastructures, judged to be least vulnerable, were rated above midscale both in 2001 and 2002, indicating that each of the eight critical U.S. infrastructures were believed by most respondents to be threatened by potential terrorist attacks.

We conclude our discussion of infrastructure vulnerabilities with a summary in Table 2.5 of paired comparisons of unweighted mean assessments by our 474 panel members in 2001 and 2002.

Table 2.5: Panel Assessments of Terrorist Threats to Eight Critical Infrastructures

Questions 2001 2002 p (Paired Comparisons of Unweighted Means) Panel Panel Value Water supply systems (t92) 6.70 7.02 .0032 [0 = no threat—10 = extreme threat] Gas and oil supplies and services (t89) 6.84 6.75 .4667 [0 = no threat—10 = extreme threat] Electrical power systems (t88) 6.39 6.63 .0690 [0 = no threat—10 = extreme threat] Transportation systems (t91) 6.73 6.49 .0374 [0 = no threat—10 = extreme threat] Telecommunications (t87) 6.18 6.13 .5671 [0 = no threat—10 = extreme threat] Banking and finance (t90) 6.12 6.15 .7571 [0 = no threat—10 = extreme threat] Continuity of government (t94) 5.25 5.24 .8422 [0 = no threat—10 = extreme threat] Emergency services (t93) 5.19 5.25 .2479 [0 = no threat—10 = extreme threat]

With the exception of water supply systems and transportation systems, our panel members changed their views about critical infrastructure vulnerabilities in 2002 little over those reported in 2001. Water supply systems reflect a significantly heightened sense of vulnerability to terrorist attacks, and respondents in 2002 placed this type of infrastructure at the top of their list both in absolute terms and relative to earlier assessments. Panel views of the vulnerabilities of transportations systems declined during the year following 9/11.

Given the backdrop provided by our analyses of participants’ assessments of the security environment in general (Section 1) and the threats posed in more specific terms by terrorism (Section 2), we now turn to some of the associated implications for policy preferences.

Section 2.3: Countering Terrorism

In this section we investigate respondents’ views about prospects for preventing future terrorist attacks, support for a variety of potential policies for reducing the threat of terrorism, and views about a range of policy options that

might be considered in the wake of potential future acts of terrorism. Among these measures are judgments about the implications of government antiterrorism policies for public prerogatives that help contrast traditionalist and revisionist expectations about the stability and predictability of mass opinions.

Prospects for Preventing Terrorism

To gain insight into broad perspectives about the feasibility of preventing future acts of terrorism and whether prevention can be accomplished without unacceptable intrusions into public rights and privacy, we asked participants to respond to the following three statements. Using slightly different wording, these measures were previously applied to a national sample of the U.S. general public in 1995 (Herron and Jenkins-Smith 1996), which provides a pre-9/11 baseline for comparison with more recent responses in 2001 and 2002.4

Lead-in: The terrorist bombing in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995 and the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC on September 11, 2001 have raised questions about what can be done to stop terrorism. Using a scale from one to seven where one means you strongly disagree, and seven means you strongly agree, please respond to the following statements:

• There is nothing the government can do to stop determined terrorists. (t73)

• The government could stop terrorists, but only with unacceptable intrusions on people’s rights and privacy. (t74)

• The government must try to stop terrorists, even if it intrudes on some people’s rights and privacy. (t75)

We compare responses in Figures 2.22–2.24.

4 The wording on 1995 did not, of course, make reference to the September 2001 terrorist attacks. In all other respects, the question wording was identical.

Figure 2.22: Nothing Government Can Do to Stop Determined Terrorists

45 (t73) 40 Means 35 30 1995: 3.65 1997 25 2001: 3.20 % 2001 20 2002: 3.47 2002 (wtd) 15 (wtd) 10 95–02: p = .1986 5 01–02: p = .0475 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

Figure 2.23: Can Stop Terrorists Only With Unacceptable Intrusions

30 (t74) Means 25

20 1995: 4.48 1997 2001: 4.06 % 15 2001 2002: 4.27 2002 (wtd) 10 (wtd)

5 95–02: p = .0980 01–02: p = .1046 0 1 234567 Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

Figure 2.24: Government Must Try to Stop Terrorism Even If Intrusive

50 (t75) 45 Means 40

35 1995: 5.12 30 1997 2001: 5.51 % 25 2001 2002: 5.06 20 2002 (wtd) (wtd) 15 10 95–02: p = .5755 5 01–02: p < .0001 0 1 234567 Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

On average, most respondents disagreed with the assertion that there is nothing government can do to stop determined terrorists. Means were below midscale for each of the three measurement periods, and a response value of one (strongly disagree) was the modal answer in each of the surveys (Figure 2.22). Opinion was more divided about the statement that government can stop terrorists only with unacceptable intrusions on individual rights and privacy, with means clustered just above the midpoint of the scale (Figure 2.23). Distributions of this nature with means near the middle of the scale can indicate indecision as well as widely distributed views. Of note is the lack of significant variation prior to, immediately following, and one year after the exogenous events of 9/11. There was much less disagreement about our third assertion that government must try to stop terrorism, even if it intrudes on some people’s rights and privacy. The modal response in all three surveys was seven (strongly agree), and the means were all above five on a seven point scale (Figure 2.24). In these response patterns, we see an initial increase in agreement immediately following 9/11, followed by a moderation in views one year later that revisionists would expect.

Before moving on to more specific questions about policy options for preventing terrorism, we show in Table 2.6 paired comparisons of unweighted means among our panel members in 2001 and 2002.

Table 2.6: Panel Assessments of Government’s Role in Preventing Terrorism

Questions 2001 2002 p (Paired Comparisons of Unweighted Means) Panel Panel Value There is nothing government can do to stop determined terror- 3.13 3.45 .0095 ists. (t73) [1 = strongly disagree—7 = strongly agree] The government could stop terrorists, but only with unacceptable intrusions on people’s rights and privacy. (t74) 4.00 4.27 .0227 [1 = strongly disagree—7 = strongly agree] The government must try to stop terrorists, even if it intrudes on some people’s rights and privacy. (t75) 5.45 5.01 < .0001 [1 = strongly disagree—7 = strongly agree]

Within our panel, members reflected significantly more pessimism in 2002 than in 2001 about the prospects for government to stop terrorism, but the means in both periods were below midscale. Panelists’ pessimism also is reflected in a higher mean value for the second assertion about government ef-

forts to stop terrorism causing unacceptable intrusions into personal domains. Finally, though means in both periods were above midscale for our last assertion, panelists were significantly less sure in 2002 about the argument that government must try to stop terrorists, even at the cost of individual rights and privacy. Mean responses among panelists to each of the two latter questions seem to reflect increasing caution during the year following 9/11 about government measures to prevent terrorism that also restrict public freedoms.

Taken together, the above responses to general assertions show the context within which our next set of questions about more specific policy options was situated. The context is one in which most respondents before and after 9/11 felt that government can and should make efforts to prevent terrorism, but panelists evidenced caution about the implications of those efforts for individual prerogatives.

Policies for Preventing Terrorism

The following series of nine questions elicit public reactions to specific policy options for combating and preventing terrorism. The options were designed to reflect measures of public willingness to tolerate government intrusiveness in the pursuit of security from terrorism. For the first six options, we show pre- 9/11 reference points established in our national survey conducted in 1995 (Herron and Jenkins-Smith 1996); the other three questions were first asked in 2001 and do not have a base of prior reference.5

Lead-in: Using a scale where one means strongly oppose, and seven means strongly support, how would you feel about giving the federal government the following powers to prevent terrorism?

• The power to infiltrate and spy on organizations in this country that the government suspects of planning terrorist acts, even if the groups have not been convicted of any crime (t77)

• The power to search for and seize weapons from groups that are suspected of planning terrorist acts, even if the groups have not been convicted of any crime (t78)

5 These nine questions were asked in random order for each respondent to prevent unin- tended order effects.

• The power to ban people from speaking on radio or television if they advocate anti-government violence (t80)

• The power to ban information about bomb-making from computer networks (t81)

• The power to require national identification cards for all U.S. citizens (t79)

• The power to quickly expel from the U.S. any citizen of another country who is suspected of planning a terrorist act, even if the person has not been convicted of any crime (t76)

• The power to restrict travel within the U.S. (t82)

• The power to restrict travel to and from the U.S. (t83)

• How would you feel about the U.S. government restricting immigration into the U.S. to prevent terrorism? (t84)

We begin by graphing responses to our first two questions relating to privacy and search and seizure in Figures 2.25 and 2.26.

Figure 2.25: Infiltrating and Spying on Suspected Organizations in the U.S.

50 (t77) 45 Means 40 35 1995: 4.77 30 1997 2001: 5.56 % 25 2001 2002: 5.28 20 2002 (wtd) (wtd) 15 10 95–02: p < .0001 5 01–02: p = .0101 0 1 234567 Strongly Oppose Strongly Support

Figure 2.26: Searching for and Seizing Weapons From Suspected Groups in U.S. 50 (t78) 45 Means 40

35 1995: 4.88 30 1997 2001: 5.51 % 25 2001 2002: 5.19 20 2002 (wtd) (wtd) 15 10 95–02: p = .0147 5 01–02: p = .0003 0 1 234567 Strongly Oppose Strongly Support

Response patterns are similar for both questions. They are characterized by means well above midscale in each response period and modal responses for each survey at seven, the highest scale value. Clearly, both before and after 9/11, most respondents were supportive of using government resources to spy on and infiltrate suspected terrorist organizations and to search for and seize weapons from groups suspected of potential terrorist acts, even if no convictions have been obtained. There was an expected spike in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, which was moderated among our panel members 12 months later. But mean support for both options remained significantly higher in 2002 than when originally measured in 1995.

In Figures 2.27 and 2.28 we compare responses to two of our questions dealing with restricting speech on radio or television if used to advocate anti-government violence and restricting certain types of information from computer networks for the purposes of preventing civil violence. (Note that the scales for the vertical axes of the two charts differ.)

Figure 2.27: Suppressing Advocacy of Violence on Radio or Television

35 (t80) Means 30 25 1995: 3.85 1997 20 2001: 3.87 % 2001 15 2002: 3.63 2002 (wtd) (wtd) 10 95–02: p = .1320 5 01–02: p = .0879

1 234567

Strongly Oppose Strongly Support

Figure 2.28: Banning Bomb-Making Information From Computer Networks

70 (t81) 60 Means

50 1995: 5.44 1997 40 2001: 5.69 % 2001 30 2002: 5.35 2002 (wtd) (wtd) 20

95–02: p = .1454 10 01–02: p = .0061

1 234567 Strongly Oppose Strongly Support

Reactions to our question about prohibiting advocacy of anti-government violence on radio or television were polarized, with the largest numbers of responses at each end of the scale. Means for all three periods were below midscale. Response patterns did not spike immediately following 9/11, as has been the pattern in some questions, and the lowest absolute mean was recorded in 2002. Reactions were quite different regarding government banning bomb-making information from computer networks. Means in each of our three measurement periods were well above midscale, and the modal response in each survey was seven. Though both issues are about free speech, our respondents clearly differentiated between anti-government criticism (even if violence is advocated) and open accessibility to information about bomb mak-

ing. They were polarized about the former, with most opposing such restrictions, while a large majorities agreed in their support for the latter.

The very different response patterns to these two questions are informative in two respects. They show that when compared to potential intrusions into privacy, such as those relating to surveillance and search and seizure of weapons (as shown in Figures 2.25 and 2.26), freedom of public speech— even when used to advocate violence against the government—is much more guarded. Also, participants differentiated between freedom of expression on radio and television and freedom of expression on computer networks such as the Internet. This suggests that anti-terrorist policies impinging on free speech and information flow may receive highly differentiated levels of public support, depending on the issues and circumstances.

Our next question deals with a topic that has been the subject of occasional public debate since 9/11. We asked participants how they felt about the government requiring national identification cards for all U.S. citizens. We summarize responses in Figure 2.29.

Figure 2.29: Requiring National Identification Cards

50 (t79) 45 Means 40

35 1995: 4.23 30 1997 2001: 5.06 % 25 2001 2002: 4.81 20 2002 (wtd) (wtd) 15 10 95–02: p < .0001 5 01–02: p = .0662 0 1 234567 Strongly Oppose Strongly Support

Results show that participants in 1995 were divided over the issue of national identification cards, with clusters of responses at either end of the scale and 42 percent of participants opposing the concept. In both post-9/11 surveys, opposition dropped to less than 30 percent, and means rose appre- ciably above midscale. Support declined a bit among our panelists in 2002

relative to 2001, but the bimodal pattern of responses in 1995 at the two extremes of “strongly oppose” and “strongly support” was not evident after 9/11. Our measurements suggest that a major shift in public support for a system of national identification cards may have occurred.

Our next two questions in this series deal with immigration policies. The first inquires about support for expelling foreign visitors suspected of planning terrorism, even if they have not been convicted of any crime. It was asked in each of our three measurement periods. The second question deals with government restrictions on immigration into the U.S. in an effort to prevent potential acts of terrorism. It was asked only in 2001 and 2002. We chart results in Figures 2.30 and 2.31.

Figure 2.30: Expelling Foreign Visitors Suspected of Planning Terrorism

50 (t76) 45 Means 40

35 1995: 5.26 30 1997 2001: 5.37 % 25 2001 2002: 5.28 20 2002 (wtd) (wtd) 15

10 95–02: p = .8429 5 01–02: p = .4422

1 234567

Strongly Oppose Strongly Support

Figure 2.31: Restricting Immigration Into the U.S. to Prevent Terrorism

50 (t84) 45

40 Means 35 30 1997 2001: 5.33 % 25 2001 2002: 5.26 20 2002 (wtd) (wtd) 15 10 01–02: p = .5810 5 0 1 234567 Strongly Oppose Strongly Support

Response patterns to each question are strongly supportive, and all means are well above midscale. In Figure 2.30, mean responses do not statistically differ between pre- and post-9/11 measurements. Large majorities of our participants consistently supported policies that would expel or prevent the entry of foreign visitors suspected of involvement in terrorist activities.

We close this series with two questions asked in 2001 and 2002 about restricting domestic travel within the U.S. and foreign travel to and from the U.S. in an effort to prevent terrorism. Figures 2.32 and 2.33 compare responses.

Figure 2.32: Restricting Domestic Travel Within the U.S.

50 (t82) 45

40 Means 35 30 1997 2001: 3.56 % 25 2001 2002: 2.84 20 2002 (wtd) (wtd) 15 10 01–02: p < .0001 5 0 1 234567 Strongly Oppose Strongly Support

Figure 2.33: Restricting International Travel To and From the U.S.

50 (t83) 45

40 Means 35 30 1997 2001: 4.77 % 25 2001 2002: 4.18 20 2002 (wtd) (wtd) 15 10 01–02: p < .0001 5 0 1 234567 Strongly Oppose Strongly Support

Even in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, respondents resisted the suggestion that domestic travel in the U.S. might be restricted to help prevent future terrorist attacks. Twelve months later, opposition to that policy option grew significantly, with two out of three of our panelists in 2002 opposing it. But participants’ views about restricting international travel to and from the U.S. were quite different, with stronger initial support for that option in 2001, and though support was significantly lower in 2002, the mean remained above midscale for both periods. A pattern of moderating views during the first year after 9/11 are evident in the responses to both questions, illustrating that when a policy option that restricts individual freedoms is largely unpopular (restricting domestic travel within the U.S.) or when it has majoritarian support (restricting international travel to and from the U.S.) increases in support following exogenous events are likely to moderate over time after the events.

To close our discussion of policy options for preventing terrorism, we show in Table 2.7 paired comparisons of unweighted means among our panel members in 2001 and 2002 for each of the nine policy options discussed in this section.

Table 2.7: Panel Assessments of Policy Options for Preventing Terrorism

Questions (1 = strongly support—7 = strongly oppose) 2001 2002 p (Paired Comparisons of Unweighted Means) Panel Panel Value Infiltrating and spying on organizations in this country suspected of planning terrorist acts, even if the groups have not 5.44 5.22 .0270 been convicted of any crime (t77) Seizing weapons from groups suspected of planning terrorist 5.40 5.12 .0102 acts, even if they have not been convicted of any crime (t78) Banning people from speaking on radio or television if they 3.78 3.58 .1182 advocate anti-government violence (t80) Banning information about bomb-making from computer net- 5.55 5.28 .0099 works (t81) Requiring national identification cards for all U.S. citizens (t79) 4.84 4.70 .2321 Expelling from the U.S. any citizen of another country suspected of planning a terrorist act, even if the person has not 5.32 5.25 .3542 been convicted of any crime (t76) Restricting immigration into the U.S. to prevent terrorism (t84) 5.21 5.20 .7368 Restricting domestic travel within the U.S. (t82) 3.41 2.78 < .0001 Restricting international travel to and from the U.S. (t83) 4.66 4.13 < .0001

Support among our panel members in 2002 for these policy options all were lower, on average, than those reported in 2001. Five options elicited statistically significantly different mean responses. Panelists were significantly less supportive in 2002 of infiltrating and spying on groups in the U.S. not convicted of any crime, searching for and seizing weapons from such groups, and banning information about bomb-making from computer networks. Also, they were significantly less supportive of restricting domestic travel within or international travel to and from the U.S. to prevent terrorism. These changes appear to reflect predictable moderation of higher initial support for intrusive domestic policies to prevent terrorism immediately following 9/11.

Section 2.4: Responding to Terrorism

Our final series of questions in this chapter deals with options for responding to terrorist attacks that originate outside the U.S. We examined response options in two dimensions: (1) type and degree of complicity, and (2) nature and range of potential responses. To combine the two dimensions, we asked participants to consider the same specified range of responses for three different levels of complicity. Then we asked them to express the degree of certainty required of a country’s complicity in terrorist attacks before the U.S. should use military force against that country.

Tailoring Responses to Complicity

We asked the following questions, all of which were answered on the same scale, to better understand how participants differentiated among three kinds of state level complicity in the events of 9/11, and how participants preferred the U.S. to respond to each level of complicity.

Lead-in: Responding to the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC in September 2001 poses difficult choices involving a range of options. The next several questions ask how you think the U.S. government should respond given certain conditions.

• If our government determines to a high degree of certainty that another country actively participated in the acts of terrorism by providing personnel or training for the terrorists, would you support the following re-

sponses by the U.S.? Please answer “yes” or “no” to each of the following options. (t95_1–5)

1. Applying strong diplomatic and political pressures against that country

2. Applying strong economic and trade sanctions against that country

3. Conducting air strikes against that country using conventionally armed weapons, such as bombs and cruise missiles

4. Using U.S. military forces to invade that country

5. Attacking that country using U.S. nuclear weapons

• If our government determines to a high degree of certainty that another country actively supported the acts of terrorism by providing funding to the terrorists, would you support the following responses by the U.S.? (t96_1–5)

(same five response options)

• If our government determines to a high degree of certainty that another country provided sanctuary to the terrorists, would you support the following responses by the U.S.? (t97_1–5)

(same five response options)

In Tables 2.8–2.10, we compare unweighted responses to each question among our panelists in 2001 and 2002.

Table 2.8: Responding to Personnel or Training support for Terrorists (t95)

% 2001 % 2002 Chi Sq U.S. Response Options No Yes No Yes p-Value 1. Apply strong diplomatic and political pressures 2.7 97.3 2.7 97.3 .9616 2. Apply strong economic and trade sanctions 4.7 95.35.8 94.2 .4266 3. Conduct air strikes using conventional weapons 20.3 79.7 30.0 70.0 .0008 4. Use U.S. military forces to invade 19.3 80.7 31.4 68.6 < .0001 5. Attack using U.S. nuclear weapons 78.5 21.5 83.3 16.7 .0654

Table 2.9: Responding to Funding Support for Terrorists (t96)

% 2001 % 2002 Chi Sq U.S. Response Options No Yes No Yes p-Value 1. Apply strong diplomatic and political pressures 3.2 96.8 2.0 98.0 .2731 2. Apply strong economic and trade sanctions 3.4 96.64.3 95.7 .4916 3. Conduct air strikes using conventional weapons 28.9 71.1 49.2 50.8 < .0001 4. Use U.S. military forces to invade 36.5 63.5 53.7 46.3 < .0001 5. Attack using U.S. nuclear weapons 83.3 16.7 88.1 11.9 .0389

Table 2.10: Responding to Sanctuary Support for Terrorists (t97)

% 2001 % 2002 Chi Sq U.S. Response Options No Yes No Yes p-Value 1. Apply strong diplomatic and political pressures 3.2 96.8 2.9 97.1 .8256 2. Apply strong economic and trade sanctions 5.1 94.97.2 92.8 .1833 3. Conduct air strikes using conventional weapons 24.6 75.4 38.7 61.3 < .0001 4. Use U.S. military forces to invade 26.5 73.5 42.3 57.7 < .0001 5. Attack using U.S. nuclear weapons 81.4 18.6 88.8 11.2 .0021

Several trends seem apparent. In both measurement periods, panelists were strongly supportive of employing diplomatic measures and economic sanctions to respond to each of the three types of complicity in terrorism. Relative to diplomatic and economic options, support decreased in 2002 for each of the three remaining options involving the use of military force. In 2001, over 70 percent of respondents supported using air strikes with conventional mu- nitions to respond to terrorism, but by 2002, the margin of support declined significantly, even though a majority of participants continued to support the use of conventional airstrikes. Differences in support between 2001 and 2002 were more pronounced for using U.S. military forces to invade the country supporting terrorism. Majority support of 81 percent (personnel and training), 64 percent (funding), and 74 percent (sanctuary) declined significantly to 67 percent, 46 percent, and 58 percent, respectively. The option of using U.S. nuclear weapons to respond to terrorism drew little support in either time frame, with roughly 80 percent or more of respondents opposed.

Across both measurement periods, differences in support for coercive force were somewhat higher when the offending country provided personnel and training or sanctuary than when the culpability was limited to funding terrorism.

These patterns illustrate that public reactions following 9/11 initially supported using coercive force, but even during the initial trauma immediately following the attacks, most respondents would not countenance the use of nuclear weapons. They also show how public support for all forms of coercive force moderated significantly over the course of the first year. These kinds of public reactions about how to respond to the most deadly attack from outside forces in U.S. history are much more aligned with the expectations of revisionists than with traditionalist concepts of how mass publics process and evaluate complex policy options in times of national crisis. Re- sponses show controlled reactions, temporal moderations, and little evidence of highly emotional and reactionary views.

Certainty of Culpability and Responding to Terrorism

The previous questions about response options were based on an assump- tion of having determined culpability to a high degree of certainty. Also of interest are public views about how sure our government should be of a country’s support for terrorism before using U.S. military force to respond. To help gage this issue we asked the following question.

We are interested in how certain you think the government should be in the future that a country supported terrorist acts against the U.S. before we take military action. Using a scale from zero to ten where zero means not at all certain, and ten means completely certain, how certain should the government be before it retaliates using military force? (t98)

In figure 2.34 we compare responses from our full sample of 935 in 2001 with weighted responses from our 474 panel members in 2002. The sizable consensus in 2001 that the government should determine culpability to a high degree of certainty before employing U.S. military force against a supporting country was even higher in 2002, with the mean approaching nine. The modal response was ten (completely certain) in both measurement periods.

Figure 2.34: Degree of Certainty Required for Military Response (t98)

50 (t98) 45

40 Means 35 30 1997 2001: 8.74 % 25 2001 2002: 8.94 20 2002 (wtd) (wtd) 15

10 01–02: p = .0260 5 0 0 1 2345678910 Not At All Certain Completely Certain

A paired comparison of unweighted mean responses from our panel members showed a slight increase from 8.77 in 2001 to 8.94 in 2002, but the change was not significant (p = .0928). These patterns clearly indicate that our participants set the bar of certainty quite high for the justification of U.S. military retaliation, and they do not reflect the kinds of public panic and emotional overreaction some traditionalists would expect. Even in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, respondents reflected a reasoned and cautious desire to be certain about culpability before exercising coercive or punitive force.

The weight of findings reported in this chapter clearly support revisionist concepts of public capacities. Little evidence supporting traditionalist expectations was found.

Summary of Key Points from Chapter Two (Use of weighted data from our panel in 2002 is indicated by “wtd”.)

• The Security Environment (pp. 10–16)

– Assessments in each measurement period of changes in international security and in U.S. security since the cold war clearly trend toward worsening security in the post-cold war era. – Most respondents in each measurement period considered the chances of nu-

clear conflict to have increased since the breakup of the Soviet Union.

– A large majority of respondents in each measurement period considered U.S. nuclear weapons important for deterrence and favored retaining them. – Unweighted views of panelists in 2002, compared to their responses immediately following 9/11 show an upturn in assessments of overall U.S. security, but increased concern that the U.S. may become involved in nuclear conflict. Panelists’ valuation of nuclear deterrence and their support for retaining U.S. nuclear weapons remained high.

• The Evolving Threat of Terrorism (pp. 16–28)

– Mean assessments of the current threat from all kinds of terrorism were significantly higher in 2002 (wtd) than pre-911 ratings, but were significantly lower than those recorded in 2001 immediately following 9/11. – Compared to responses in 1997, projections of the overall threat from terror-

ism in the next ten years were significantly higher in 2001 and 2002 (wtd).

– Mean views in 2001 and 2002 (wtd) of the current and future threat of nuclear terrorism occurring anywhere in the world were above seven on a scale from zero to ten.

– Unweighted comparisons of panelists’ views show a significant decrease in the current threat to the U.S. from all kinds of terrorism in 2002 relative to the period immediately following 9/11, but significant increases in the chances that nuclear terrorism may occur somewhere in the world.

– In 2002 (wtd), threats of terrorism to eight named critical U.S. infrastructures were ordered from highest to lowest as follows: (1) water supply systems; (2) gas and oil supplies and services; (3) electrical power systems; (4) transportation systems; (5) telecommunications; (6) banking and finance; (7) conti-

nuity of government; and (8) emergency services.

Key Points (continued)

– In 2002 the mean threat of terrorism to each of the eight critical infrastructures was rated at or above 5.4 (wtd.) on a scale from zero (no threat) to ten (extreme threat). – Differences in panelists’ unweighted mean assessments in 2001 and 2002 of threats to critical infrastructures were statistically insignificant except for increased threats to water supply systems and decreased threats to transportation systems in 2002.

• Countering Terrorism (pp. 28–40)

– On average, respondents in 1995, 2001, and 2002 (wtd) disagreed with the assertion that government can do nothing to stop determined terrorists. Reac- tions to the statement that terrorists can be stopped only with unacceptable intrusions into peoples’ rights and privacy were widely distributed in all

three periods, but most respondents in each of the surveys agreed that government must try to stop terrorism even if intrusive measures are required.

– Respondents reported strong support for government actions to infiltrate and spy on organizations suspected of planning terrorist acts and for seizing

weapons from such groups, even if they have not been convicted of any crime. Support for both measures was significantly higher in both post-9/11 surveys than in 1995, but was significantly lower in 2002 (wtd) than in 2001. – Forty-five percent of participants in 2001 and 39 percent of those in 2002

(wtd) favored suppressing the advocacy of violence on radio or TV, while 77 percent in 2001 and 72 percent in 2002 (wtd) supported banning bomb- making information from computer networks to help prevent terrorism. – Mean support for requiring national identification cards for all U.S. citizens

increased significantly from 52 percent in 1995 to 67 percent in 2001 before declining to 62 percent in 2002 (wtd).

– Strong support was reported in 2001 and 2002 (wtd) for expelling foreign visitors suspected of planning terrorism and for restricting immigration into

the U.S. to prevent terrorism.

– 52 percent of respondents in 2001 and 66 percent of respondents in 2002 (wtd) opposed restricting travel within the U.S. to prevent terrorism, but 62 percent of participants in 2001 and 49 percent of respondents in 2002 (wtd)

supported restricting travel to or from the U.S. to prevent terrorism.

Key Points (continued)

– Unweighted panel support for policy options for preventing terrorism in 2002 declined, on average, relative to the level of support evident in 2001. Significant changes were observed for five options: support dropped in 2002 for (1) infiltrating and spying on groups in the U.S. not convicted of any crime, (2) seizing weapons from such groups, (3) banning information about bomb-making from computer networks, and (4) restricting travel within the U.S. or (5) to and from the U.S.

• Responding to Terrorism (pp. 40–44)

– Respondents did not make large distinctions in accountability among different types of support for terrorism, but they considered providing personnel and training or sanctuary to terrorists to be somewhat more serious than providing funding support.

– Among our panel members in 2001 and 2002, support for U.S. actions against countries that sponsor terrorism varied from almost unanimous support for diplomatic and political sanctions, to high levels of support for air strikes and invasion, to little support for using U.S. nuclear weapons.

– However, unweighted support among panelists for the use of conventional military force declined significantly in 2002 compared to 2001.

– Panelists in both 2001 and 2002 wanted the U.S. to have very high levels of certainty of culpability before using force against a country that supported

terrorism.

• Theoretical Implications (pp. 9–44) – Compared to pre-9/11 measurements, respondent concerns about current and future threats posed by terrorism increased substantially immediately after 9/11, but support for intrusive measures to combat terrorism was modest, and public reactions did not evidence the kinds of emotional volatility associated with traditional concepts of public opinion in times of national crises. – Clear trends toward moderation of support for intrusive anti-terrorism measures and declining support for the use of coercive force to punish terrorist states were evident among panel members one year after 9/11. These patterns are in keeping with revisionist expectations of public capacities.

Intentionally Blank

Chapter Three Individual Level Analyses

In the preceding chapters, we briefly sketched some of the parameters of the long-standing debate over public capacities. One important dimension of that argument relates to the nature and implications of volatility in public opinion. This issue is rooted deeply in the contrasting values commonly at- tached to rationality and emotionalism in democratic processes. Traditional concepts of the ideal polity elevate rationality to a central goal while charac- terizing emotional volatility as a danger from which democratic government must be protected.

The Federalist Papers are replete with cautions and structural remedies for the “passions” of the public (Hamilton, No. 15, p. 110; Madison, No. 50, pp. 3171, 3192; Madison No. 52, pp. 324–325; Madison No. 63, p. 3843; Hamil- ton No. 71, p. 432). From the Founding Fathers to today, traditional concepts of public capacities have warned against the unreliable and unstable nature of mass opinion. For example, Lippmann (1925) disparaged mass opinion as ill informed and inert until aroused by evil interruptions to normal habitual processes of life. Opinion then becomes vulnerable to overreaction and manipulation, only to wane again when the crisis subsides. Com- menting on the limitations of public opinion in the post-World War II era, Almond (1950, p. 239) stated: “Perhaps the gravest general problem con- fronting policymakers is that of the instability of mass moods, and cyclical fluctuations which stand in the way of policy stability.” In 1956 Almond reiterated his concerns: “For persons responsible for the making of security policy these mood impacts of the mass public have a highly irrational effect. Often public opinion is apathetic when it should be concerned, and panicky when it should be calm.” (p. 59). Converse (1964, 1975) found public opin-

1 “But it is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to control and regulate the government. The passions ought to be controlled and regulated by the government.” 2 “When men exercise their reason coolly and freely on a variety of distinct questions, they inevitably fall into different opinions on some of them. When they are governed by a common passion, their opinions, if they are so to be called, will be the same.” 3 “… there are particular moments in public affairs when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful representations of interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn.”

ion to be so unstructured and unconstrained as to be devoid of consistency over time. One implication that reasonably can be drawn from Converse’s research (though not explicitly stated) is that the lack of longitudinal stability of public opinion makes it susceptible to perturbations associated with exogenous and temporary events (Holsti 1996). Zaller (1992) suggests that members of the general public have so many different temporary construc- tions of views and preferences that instability of opinion (as indicated by varying responses to opinion survey questions over time) reflects the fact that different considerations are salient at different times, and that only the more well-informed and capable members of the public (elites) consistently constrain policy choices in accordance with organized and integrated sets of beliefs. Implicit in Zaller’s construct are the detrimental effects of emotions in the absence of well-defined constraints (coherent belief structures and values) among members of the general public. Mayer (1993) cautions that the public’s immediate reaction to a crisis event may be very different than its considered, long-term judgment, and that changes in public attitudes pro- duced by some crises wear off very quickly when the crises end. The implication is a caution against public over-reaction in times of national stress.

As might be expected, revisionists take exception to traditional models of the volatile public. In 1970, Caspary challenged both Almond’s premise (low and unstable public attention to foreign affairs) and Almond’s conclusions (unstable support for foreign policy commitments). Analyzing a broader set of foreign policy questions, Caspary concluded that “… American Public Opinion is characterized by a strong and stable ‘permissive mood’ toward international involvements” (p. 546). Mueller (1973) found that declining public support for and increasing resistance to U.S. participation in the con- flicts in Korea and Vietnam were systematically related to increasing battle deaths, reflecting a logical connection to a critical measure of associated costs. Achen (1975) concluded that when rigorous methodologies are applied, evidence shows that the U.S. general public’s foreign policy views are roughly as stable as those on domestic policy. Using a panel study, Peffley and Hurwitz (1992) found that dramatic changes in foreign policy events (the rapidly changing U.S.–Soviet relationship after the arms summits of 1987 and 1988) had predictable and reasonable effects on American public opinion, but they also uncovered evidence of impressive stability in respondents’ images of the Soviet Union and public preferences for specific foreign policies. But perhaps the largest and most comprehensive macro analysis of empirical data on the stability of mass attitudes about foreign policy was con-

ducted by Page and Shapiro (1992) and Shapiro and Page (1994). Using responses to thousands of survey questions posed in hundreds of opinion surveys collected between the 1930s and 1991, they found ample evidence of a “rational” public with highly stable views on domestic and foreign policy issues. Stimson (1991, 2001) and Erikson, Mackuen, and Stimson (2002) applied an economic model and a macro approach involving multiple survey questions over many years and found that the public has relatively stable preferences for more or less government, and that the preferences move predictably over time relative to inflation and unemployment. They also found that while change among the better educated may be somewhat more rapid and of greater magnitude, members of the general public with lower socioeconomic attributes show controlled movement in the same directions under the same stimuli as elites.

Parallel to the policy oriented discussions about the stability or volatility of mass opinions, a related debate is underway about the broader health of democratic processes, the degree to which they are in trouble, and what might be done to strengthen them. In this debate, “Reason is commonly portrayed as a fragile force for progress, justice, and greater democracy, which requires pro- tection against the intrusive and destructive impulse of emotion.” (Marcus 2002, p. 7). Language and political communication, deliberative processes, rational choice theory, decision making, media influence, and the role of elites are key elements of this discussion. The central theme is that if a more perfect and equitable space for public political discourse can be secured, a less than rational public can be helped (by elites) to derive rational policies (Habermas 1979, 1984). Fishkin (1991) suggests citizen juries, citizen conferences, and other specialized public fora to inform citizens of the scope of the issues and help educate them to the rudimentary facts in play. Others (Gutmann 1987; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996) advocate a better citizenry by improving reasoning abilities. Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) contend that one essential component for improving democratic governance is to increase the political knowledge of the electorate. Still others (Warren 1996) prefer to emphasize the role of informed elites.

Much research effort has gone into investigating how the public makes political decisions (Thompson 1970; Jackson and Marcus 1975; Krouse and Marcus 1984; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Marcus and Hanson, eds. 1993; Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 1995). Another central focus has been to investigate what constitutes “rational” decision making and which

institutional arrangements best support it (Riker 1982; Foster 1984; Rabi- nowitz and MacDonald 1989; Aldrich 1993). While the debate is too wide- ranging and multi-dimensional to survey comprehensively here, one key element is most relevant to our line of investigation in this chapter. The relationship between reason and emotion is key both to the debate about the future of democratic discourse and to the issue of volatility in mass opinion.

Marcus (2002) holds that the traditional construct in which reason and emotion are juxtaposed as polar opposites whose individual existence depends on the absence of the other (zero sum) is wrong conceptually. He argues that publics are able to be rational, in part, because they also have emotions. Rather than preventing rationality, emotions enable rationality, thus the effort to exclude passion from politics will undermine public capabilities to reason.4 While differentiating between positive emotions (such as compas- sion, tolerance, and generosity) and negative emotions (such as hate, intoler- ance, and greed), Marcus also notes that emotion, as opposed to reason, is the well-spring of public enthusiasm and the motivation for political action. In the complete absence of emotion, pure reason would almost always result in the status quo; change depends not only on rational calculations, but emotional commitment to bring about the changes they imply.

One aspect of emotion most germane to our discussion is anxiety. According to Marcus (2002), public anxiety, such as that deriving from the traumatic events of 9/11, promotes immediate learning while diminishing reliance on the previously learned. Old habits (and old policies) did not provide the de- sired security, else 9/11 could not have happened; new information is needed to reevaluate the threat and understand the changed security environment. Un- der such conditions, Marcus argues that anxious voters may exhibit less habitual associations and may rely less on partisanship and other familiar heuristics while seeking new and more satisfying explanations of the changed circumstances. The acquisition and weighing of information also can be affected by anxiety. Marcus and MacKuen (1993) note that anxious voters learn far more about candidate positions than complaisant ones. The level of accurate political information has been cited as a shortcoming of mass publics (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), and the effects of anxiety arising from events like 9/11 are likely to stimulate public learning and information gathering.

4 Frank (1988) would add that “passion” has an important strategic role within reason, reducing the likelihood that rational self-interest will lead to destructive patterns of behavior akin to the familiar “prisoner’s dilemma” game.

Though anxiety does not, in itself, produce any specific decision, it pro- foundly affects the way people go about deciding. Schwarz and Bless (1991) and Bless (2000) report that different affective states require different information processing strategies. They found that individuals in positive affective states rely more on general knowledge structures and familiar heuristics, while persons in negative affective states (anxious, fearful) rely less on general knowledge structures and are more likely to focus on data applicable to the situation. Thus in the absence of anxiety, complacent reliance on habit pertains, but under conditions of anxiety, publics are more willing to consider new alternatives. According to Marcus (2002), rather than fueling instability and volatility, anxiety (an emotional influence) promotes and stimulates rational processes. At the same time, the range of policy changes available for consideration can vary widely and have large implications for open societies. Anxious publics may be willing to consider new and different policy options that would not have been entertained under more familiar conditions of status quo and complacency.

The terrorist attacks against the U.S. on September 11, 2001 provide the opportunity to further investigate this line of argument empirically. No more singularly distinctive event since the demise of the Soviet Union has re- ceived more media attention (see Chapter One, Figure 1.1), created more public anxiety, and posed such a wide range of options for policy change. Ideally, we would have measurements of public opinion immediately before and immediately after 9/11, but, obviously, if such events were predictable, they would be avoidable. We do have some measures taken in 1995 and 1997 that help establish baselines well before 9/11, but only in a general sense. We can, however, analyze the reactions of panel members measured immediately following 9/11 and one year later. In this chapter, we focus primarily on individual level analyses that help describe changes in public views of the terrorist threat, the nature of public support for anti-terrorist measures that also impinge on public prerogatives, and public views about the use of military force in the war on terrorism. Focusing on our panel members, we explore the issue of opinion volatility and dynamics affecting the dampening of opinion changes following 9/11. We begin by describing the demographic characteristics of our panel members.

Section 3.1: Demographic Attributes of the Panel

In table 3.1, we summarize the distributions and means (where appropriate) of our panel members by age, gender, education, annual household income, ethnic minority/majority status, self-rated political ideology, and political partisanship. These data show that—as we should expect—over the course of the panel waves the survey respondents aged by one year, became slightly wealthier, and attained slightly more education. Shifts in core beliefs, such as political ideology, were statistically unchanged on average. Such core beliefs provide a test of the stability of important underlying beliefs, in that they are assumed to be relatively stable and to provide the hierarchical structure that guides more specific beliefs. In the case of our panel, fully 51.5 percent of the respondents reported no change in their ideological self-placement between 2001 and 2002, and 88.1 percent moved one point or less on the seven-point scale (chi-square 618.44, p < 0.0001). Thus our panel showed remarkable stability in this basic belief during the tumultuous year following the September 2001 terrorist strikes. Given that underlying stability in basic beliefs, how did perspectives and preferences concerning terrorism evolve over that period?

Table 3.1: Demographic Attributes of Panel Members

% 2001 % 2002 Mean 2001 Mean 2002 Age 47.57 48.57 18–30 11.8 10.8 31–50 47.9 46.0 > 50 40.3 43.2 Gender Women 51.5 51.5 Men 48.5 48.5 Education < College 21.8 21.6 College 53.5 52.8 > Bachelor’s Degree 24.7 25.6 Household Income 5 $50–60,000 $50–60,000 $0–50,000 43.1 41.7 $51–100,000 41.2 39.4 > $100,000 15.7 18.9

(continued next page)

5 Income ranges shown for 2001 reflect estimated household income earned in 2000; income shown for 2002 represents estimated household income earned in 2001.

Table 3.1 (Continued): Demographic Attributes of Panel Members

% 2001 % 2002 Mean 2001 Mean 2002 Ethnic Subgroups Black, Hispanic, Am. Indian 10.7 10.7 All Others 89.3 89.3 Ideology (1–7) 6 4.39 4.34 Liberal (1–2) 7 17.2 17.9 Center (3–5) 8 51.3 51.5 Conservative (6–7) 9 31.5 30.6 Partisanship Democrat 10 41.0 38.4 Republican 11 43.0 43.3 All Others 16.0 18.3

Section 3.2: Individual Views on the Threat of Terrorism

To help gauge how individual level views on current and future threats posed by terrorism changed during the first year following 9/11, we combined responses to the two following questions to form a terrorist threat index.

• Considering both the likelihood of terrorism and its potential consequences, how would you rate today’s threat of all kinds of terrorism in the U.S. on a scale from zero to ten where zero means no threat, and ten means extreme threat. (t71)

• Turning to the future, and using the same scale from zero to ten, how would you rate the threat of all kinds of terrorism in the U.S. during the next ten years? (t72)

These same questions also were asked in 1997, and can provide a baseline for comparison from well before the events of 9/11. The 1997 survey followed the Oklahoma City bombing incident by two years, and the Olympic Games bombing in Atlanta by one year (see Chapter One, Figure 1.1). In Figure 3.1, we comparatively chart the terrorist threat index for 1997, with the same index among our 474 panel members in 2001 (immediately following 9/11), and 2002.

6 Scale values are as follows: 1 = strongly liberal; 2 = liberal; 3 = slightly liberal; 4 = middle of the road; 5 = slightly conservative; 6 = conservative; 7 = strongly conservative. 7 Those who rated themselves strongly liberal or liberal. 8 Those who rated themselves slightly liberal, middle of the road, or slightly conservative. 9 Those who rated themselves conservative or strongly conservative. 10 Those who identified somewhat or completely with the Democrat party. 11 Those who identified somewhat or completely with the Republican party.

Figure 3.1: Comparing Assessments of the Terrorist Threat Index12

40 t71 + t72 35 Means 30 1997: 6.60 25 2001: 8.27 % 20 2002: 8.00 15 97-01: p < .0001 10 97-02: p < .0001 5 01-02: p = .0228 (unpaired) 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 No Threat Extreme Threat

Compared with the combined assessments in 1997 of the current threat of all kinds of terrorism and the projected threat for the next decade (6.60), our panel members registered a predictably steep and significant increase in mean threat assessments immediately after 9/11 (8.27). That increase was followed by a smaller, but still statistically significant, decrease (8.00) one year later. Note that the modal response for both post-9/11 measurements was a value of ten, the highest response option available.

In Table 3.2 we compare mean values on the terrorism index for different demographic and ideological groupings in 1997, 2001, and 2002.

12 The terrorist threat index was created by averaging equally weighted responses to questions t71 and t72 described above.

Table 3.2: Mean Terrorism Index by Demographic and Ideological Groupings

Grouping Means: Means: Means: Change Paired n Variables 1997 2001 2002 ‘01–‘02 p-Value (‘01&‘02) All (’97) 6.600 8.270 8.003 –.267 .0026 445 Panel (‘01, ‘02) Age 18–30 (1) 6.458 8.434 7.887 –.547 .0110 53 31–50 (2) 6.763 8.225 8.043 –.182 .1375 211 > 50 (3) 6.460 8.273 7.992 –.281 .0623 181 1,2: p =.0669 1,2: p =.4292 1,2: p =.5673 Unpaired 1,3: p =.9917 1,3: p =.6047 1,3: p =.7187 Comparisons 2,3: p =.0510 2,3: p =.8046 2,3: p =.7860 Gender Women (0) 6.933 8.346 8.200 –.146 .2745 228 Men (1) 6.238 8.189 7.797 –.392 .0006 217 Unpaired Comp 0,1: p <.0001 0,1: p =.3774 0,1: p =.0201 Education < College (1) 7.067 8.478 8.113 –.365 .0543 93 College (2) 6.536 8.210 8.000 –.210 .0755 241 > Bachelor (3) 5.986 8.209 7.900 –.309 .1027 110 1,2: p =.0003 1,2: p =.2545 1,2: p =.6129 Unpaired 1,3: p <.0001 1,3: p =.2949 1,3: p =.4137 Comparisons 2,3: p =.0019 2,3: p =.9983 2,3: p =.6341 Income 0–50K (1) 6.691 8.149 7.819 –.330 .0280 171 51–100K (2) 6.492 8.296 7.981 –.315 .0254 159 > 100K (3) 6.113 8.434 8.549 .115 .6079 61 1,2: p =.1777 1,2: p =.4678 1,2: p =.4269 Unpaired 1,3: p =.0238 1,3: p =.2911 1,3: p =.0097 Comparisons 2,3: p =.1449 2,3: p =.6033 2,3: p =.0254 Minority Blk, Hisp, AI (1) 6.909 8.667 8.429 –.238 .2243 42 All Others (0) 6.542 8.230 7.955 –.275 .0045 396 Unpaired Comp 1,0: p =.0502 1,0: p =.1530 1,0 p =.1103 Ideology 1–2 Liberal (1) 6.426 7.892 7.595 –.297 .2955 74 3–5 Center (2) 6.674 8.398 8.004 –.394 .0014 225 6–7 Conserv (3) 6.522 8.295 8.254 –.041 .7538 134 1,2: p =.2061 1,2: p =.0430 1,2: p =.0953 Unpaired 1,3: p =.6690 1,3: p =.1569 1,3: p =.0131 Comparisons 2,3: p =.2973 2,3: p =.6086 2,3: p =.2112 Partisanship Dems 2–3 (1) 6.711 8.475 7.825 –.650 < .0001 157 Repubs 2–3 (2) 6.329 8.270 8.161 –.109 .3991 165 All Others (3) 6.766 8.098 7.992 –.106 .6640 61 1,2: p =.0159 1,2: p =.3140 1,2: p =.0985 Unpaired 1,3: p =.7517 1,3: p =.1377 1,3: p =.5663 Comparisons 2,3: p =.0098 2,3: p =.5565 2,3: p =.5269

The first point to be made from Table 3.2 is to note that composite assessments of the current and future threat of terrorism increased substantially across all demographic and ideological categories between our initial measurements in 1997 and our 2001 survey immediately following 9/11. For each subgroup, the increase in mean assessments from 1997 to 2001 had a p-value < .0001. In 2002, means generally declined from their highs recorded in 2001, but each measurement for each subgroup in 2002 remained significantly higher than the corresponding values in 1997.

Looking vertically within each category at the unpaired comparisons of mean values in 1997, notice that variations among some of the subgroups across all categories except ideology were large enough to be statistically significant. Next note in our 2001 survey immediately following 9/11, that, with one exception, differences in means among panelists in 2001 did not differ significantly within each demographic or ideological category. The single exception was a significantly lower mean threat measurement among liberals compared to ideological centrists (p = .0430). In all other cases, reduced distinctions in mean threat assessments compared to 1997 may be related to implications of 9/11. Notice also that by the time of our survey one year later in 2002, significant differences between some subgroups again were evident. This finding supports Marcus’ (2002) assertion, noted above, that publics experiencing high levels of anxiety may rely less on habitual associations and less on partisanship and other familiar heuristics while seeking understanding of the changed circumstances. One of the immediate effects of 9/11 may have been a temporary muting of most differences in assessments of the current and future threat of terrorism across all our demographic and ideological categories.

Looking horizontally at the paired comparisons among our panel members in 2001 and 2002, note that (again with one exception) assessments of the current and future terrorist threat decreased among each of our subgroups between 2001 and 2002. The single exception was a statistically insignificant increase in threat recorded by respondents in 2002 having annual household incomes greater than $100,000. The decreases in mean threat assessments were statistically significant for ages 18–30 (p = .0110), men (p = .0006), respondents without college educations (p = .0543), those with annual household incomes below $50,000 (p = .0280), those with annual household incomes between $50,000 and $100,000 (p = .0254), whites and

Asians (ethnic majority) (p = .0045), ideological centrists (p = .0014), and those identifying most closely with the Democrat party (p < .0001).

These data suggest that the events of 9/11 initially increased significantly the awareness of the threat of terrorism across all our demographic and ideological subgroups while also muting distinctions previously and subsequently observable among some of those subgroups. Though assessments of the terrorist threat subsided somewhat among some subgroups during the first year after 9/11, none returned near the levels reported in 1997. The rate at which some subgroups reassessed the terrorist threat in the 12 months between the 2001 and 2001 surveys varied significantly, and those changes imply that, to the degree support for policies designed to prevent and counter terrorism are related to public perceptions of the prevailing threat, we also may find initially high levels of policy support become more differentiated by demographic and ideological attributes as time passes after terrorist attacks. It is to those questions we turn next.

Section 3.3: Intrusive Policies for Preventing Terrorism

To gain insight into the dynamics of public views about policies for preventing terrorism that also may impinge on individual prerogatives, we created an index combining questions about antiterrorism policies that would curtail free speech, and by combining responses to policy options for requiring national identification cards and restricting domestic air travel within the U.S. we created a second index about freedom of movement. The component questions for each index are shown below.

Lead-in for Both Indices: Using a scale where one means strongly oppose, and seven means strongly support, how would you feel about giving the federal government the following powers to prevent terrorism?

• Freedom of Speech Index

– The power to ban people from speaking on radio or television if they advocate anti-government violence (t80)

– The power to ban information about bomb-making from computer networks (t81)

• Freedom of Movement Index

– The power to require national identification cards for all U.S. citizens (t79)

– The power to restrict travel within the U.S. (t82)

Both questions comprising the freedom of speech index first were asked in 1995, and those responses provide a pre-9/11 baseline for general comparisons. In Figure 3.2, we compare responses comprising the freedom of speech index from 1995 with responses to the same questions reported in 2001 (immediately following 9/11) and 12 months later in 2002.

Figure 3.2: Comparing Responses to the Freedom of Speech Index13

30 t80 + t81 25 Means

20 1995: 4.70 2001: 4.66 % 15 2002: 4.44

10 95-01: p = .7405 95-02: p = .0195 5 01-02: p = .0790 (unpaired) 0 1 234567 Strongly Oppose Strongly Support

Compared to earlier measurements in 1995, mean support for curtailing speech on the radio and the Internet in an effort to prevent terrorism decreased slightly following 9/11. By the time of our survey in 2002, support for these kinds of intrusive restrictions further declined such that mean support in 2002 was statistically significantly below our earlier measurements in 1995. Contrary to the cautions of some traditionalists, these data do not show volatility around an exogenous event, and the change is not in the direction traditionalist theory predicts (toward compromising individual prerogatives for the sake of increased security).

For a more detailed examination of views by demographic and ideological categories, in Table 3.3 we compare mean subgroup values for the freedom of speech indices measured in 1995, 2001, and 2002.

13 The freedom of speech index was created by averaging equally weighted responses to questions t80 and t81 described above.

Table 3.3: Mean Speech Index Values by Demographic and Ideological Groupings

Grouping Means: Means: Means: Change Paired n Variables 1995 2001 2002 ‘01–‘02 p-Value (‘01&‘02) All (’95) 4.700 4.664 4.441 –.223 .0085 447 Panel (‘01, ‘02) Age 18–30 (1) 4.626 4.736 4.311 –.425 .0837 53 31–50 (2) 4.565 4.460 4.244 –.216 .0446 213 > 50 (3) 5.018 4.884 4.710 –.174 .2422 181 1,2: p =.6952 1,2: p =.3517 1,2: p =.8227 Unpaired 1,3: p =.0305 1,3: p =.6107 1,3: p =.1792 Comparisons 2,3: p =.0043 2,3: p =.0287 2,3: p =.0185 Gender Women (0) 4.995 4.976 4.758 –.218 .0614 229 Men (1) 4.374 4.337 4.108 –.229 .0646 218 Unpaired Comp 0,1: p <.0001 0,1: p =.0004 0,1: p =.0004 Education < College (1) 5.110 5.317 5.349 .032 .8667 93 College (2) 4.440 4.686 4.345 –.341 .0033 242 > Bachelor (3) 4.404 4.050 3.878 –.172 .2995 111 1,2: p <.0001 1,2: p =.0054 1,2: p <.0001 Unpaired 1,3: p =.0003 1,3: p <.0001 1,3: p <.0001 Comparisons 2,3: p =.8503 2,3: p =.0033 2,3: p =.0355 Income 0–50K (1) 4.870 4.865 4.804 –.061 .6544 171 51–100K (2) 4.396 4.441 4.150 –.291 .0361 160 > 100K (3) 4.462 4.460 3.911 –.549 .0139 62 1,2: p =.0020 1,2: p =.0445 1,2: p =.0020 Unpaired 1,3: p =.1795 1,3: p =.1554 1,3: p =.0018 Comparisons 2,3: p =.8330 2,3: p =.9484 2,3: p =.4113 Minority Blk, Hisp, AI (1) 4.847 4.714 4.250 –.464 .1114 42 All Others (0) 4.676 4.666 4.485 –.181 .0423 397 Unpaired Comp 1,0: p =.3695 1,0: p =.8766 1,0 p =.4548 Ideology 1–2 Liberal (1) 4.681 4.351 4.135 –.216 .3846 74 3–5 Center (2) 4.692 4.553 4.358 –.195 .0731 225 6–7 Conserv (3) 4.757 4.937 4.715 –.222 .1557 135 1,2: p =.9579 1,2: p =.4373 1,2: p =.4027 Unpaired 1,3: p =.7386 1,3: p =.0328 1,3: p =.0323 Comparisons 2,3: p =.6653 2,3: p =.0621 2,3: p =.0912 Partisanship Dems 2–3 (1) 4.904 4.414 4.134 –.280 .0734 157 Repubs 2–3 (2) 4.712 4.897 4.758 –.139 .2846 165 All Others (3) 4.571 4.589 4.290 –.299 .1231 62 1,2: p =.2960 1,2: p =.0194 1,2: p =.0036 Unpaired 1,3: p =.0445 1,3: p =.5526 1,3: p =.5995 Comparisons 2,3: p =.3796 2,3: p =.2593 2,3: p =.0982

Several patterns emerge from examining unpaired comparisons among subgroups within each measurement period. In absolute terms, mean support for restrictions to speech for the purposes of preventing terrorism was greatest among those in the highest age group and lowest among those between the ages of 31 and 50 for each of the three surveys. Women were significantly more supportive of restrictions to speech than were men in each survey. Sup- port for restricting speech varied inversely with education in each survey. Those in the lowest income categories expressed the highest support for the proposed policies in each measurement period. On average, those who identified themselves as liberal or strongly liberal were least supportive of the proposed restrictions, while those who categorized themselves as conservative or strongly conservative were most supportive in each of the three time periods. In both post-911 surveys, those who identified somewhat or completely with the Democrat party were least supportive, on average, while those who identified somewhat or completely with the Republican party were most supportive of the measures for restricting speech to prevent terrorism.

Turning to paired measures of how views among our panel members changed in the first year following 9/11, we note that with the exception of respondents with less than college level educations, respondents in 2002 in all other demographic and ideological categories reported lower mean support for restricting speech to prevent terrorism than was reported one year earlier. Not all changes reached the level of statistical significance, but the trend toward lower acceptance of the suggested measures was clear. Decreasing mean support was statistically significant for ages 31–50 (p = .0446), participants with college educations (p = .0033), those with annual household incomes exceeding $50,000 ($50–100K, p = .0361; > $100K, p = .0139), and respondents reporting non-minority ethnicities (p = .0423).

Finally, we note the overall stability of views before, immediately following, and a year after 9/11. Unlike the sharply revised assessments of the threat of terrorism described above, most responses on this index averaged between values of four and five on a scale from one to seven, suggesting that support for restricting speech to help prevent future terrorism was open to consideration, but was neither heavily favored nor opposed in any of the three periods, especially among those respondents from higher socioeconomic groups. In those cases where support for restricting speech initially increased immediately following the attacks, it often subsided to below pre- 9/11 levels by 2002.

Our next index in this category relates to policy options impinging on movement and travel. The movement index is composed of responses to questions about requiring national identification cards (question t79) and restricting domestic airline travel to help prevent future acts of terrorism (question t82). The latter question was not asked prior to 2001, so comparisons of this index are limited to the panel members who responded in 2001 and 2002. We compare their index scores in Figure 3.3.

Figure 3.3: Comparing Responses to the Freedom of Movement Index14

30 t79 + t82 25 Means 20 2001: 4.12 % 15 2002: 3.77 10 Paired p < .0001 5

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Oppose Strongly Support

Immediately following the attacks of 9/11, our panel members rated options for issuing national identification cards and restricting domestic airline travel to prevent further attacks just above midscale at 4.12, on average, with about 38 percent supportive, 22 percent undecided, and 40 percent opposed. Twelve months later, the same panel members rated such options significantly lower at a mean of 3.77, with only about 28 percent supportive, 25 percent undecided, and 47 percent opposed.

To look for patterns in the declining support, we compare mean scores to our freedom of movement index in 2001 and 2002 among various demographic and ideological subgroups in Table 3.4.

14 The freedom of movement index was created by averaging equally weighted responses to questions t79 and t82 described above.

Table 3.4: Mean Movement Index by Demographic and Ideological Groupings Grouping Means: Means: Paired n Variables 2001 2002 Change p-Value (’01 & ‘02) Full Panel 4.117 3.771 –.346 < .0001 447 Age 18–30 (1) 4.349 4.104 –.245 .2486 53 31–50 (2) 3.951 3.627 –.324 .0038 213 > 50 (3) 4.243 3.843 –.400 .0052 181 1,2: p = .1527 1,2: p = .0754 Unpaired 1,3: p = .7210 1,3: p = .3514 Comparisons 2,3: p = .1289 2,3: p = .2322 Gender Women (0) 4,258 3.945 –.313 .0072 229 Men (1) 3.968 3.587 –.381 .0012 218 Unpaired Comp 0,1: p = .1027 0,1: p = .0329 Education < College (1) 4.608 4.473 –.135 .4766 93 College (2) 4.010 3.614 –.396 .0008 242 > Bachelor (3) 3.964 3.550 –.414 .0024 111 1,2: p = .0097 1,2: p < .0001 Unpaired 1,3: p = .0124 1,3: p = .0003 Comparisons 2,3: p = .8253 2,3: p = .7485 Income 0–50K (1) 4.135 3.901 –.234 .0824 171 51–100K (2) 4.106 3.578 –.528 < .0001 160 > 100K (3) 4.105 3.895 –.210 .3346 62 1,2: p = .8928 1,2: p = .1020 Unpaired Com- 1,3: p = .9153 1,3: p = .9837 parisons 2,3: p = .9959 2,3: p = .2037 Minority Blk, Hisp, AI (1) 4.333 3.714 –.619 .0209 42 All Others (0) 4.103 3.797 –.306 .0005 397 Unpaired Comp 1,0: p = .4505 1,0 p = .7727 Ideology 1–2 Liberal (1) 3.696 3.608 –.088 .6737 74 3–5 Center (2) 4.284 3.813 –.471 < .0001 225 6–7 Conserv (3) 4.019 3.715 –.304 .0418 135 1,2: p = .0186 1,2: p = .3816 Unpaired 1,3: p = .2374 1,3: p = .6905 Comparisons 2,3: p = .1944 2,3: p = .6074 Partisanship Dems 2–3 (1) 4.182 3.666 –.516 .0002 157 Repubs 2–3 (2) 4.200 3.879 –.321 .0136 165 All Others (3) 3.750 3.661 –.089 .7204 62 1,2: p = .9293 1,2: p = .2820 Unpaired 1,3: p = .1412 1,3: p = .9869 Comparisons 2,3: p = .1068 2,3: p = .4080

In comparison to the options previously described for restricting free speech, combined mean support for requiring national identification cards and restricting domestic air travel to help prevent terrorism was somewhat lower, with most subgroup means near midscale. Unpaired comparisons across demographic and ideological groupings within each measurement period indicate that opinion was most clearly differentiated by education. Both in 2001 and 2002, mean support for the proposals affecting movement and travel decreased with increasing education. Significantly lower levels of support for the measures were reported in 2001 among those who classified themselves as liberal or strongly liberal, but those differences were not as pronounced in 2002.

In terms of change over time (paired comparisons), mean support for requiring national identification cards and restricting domestic airline travel declined (in absolute terms) within each subgroup between 2001 and 2002. Statistically significant decreases in mean support were recorded for those above the age of 30, for both women and men, for those having a college education, for those earning between $51,000 and $100,000 annually, for both ethnic minority and majority groups, for those who classified their political ideology as centrist or conservative, and for those identifying with either the Democrat or Republican parties. The absolute value of mean scores for each of these groups was below midscale in 2002. By the time of our second survey, only panelists 30 years of age and younger and those without college educations rated their support for such measures above midscale. While we cannot state with certainty why support for these issues declined significantly, one reason might be related to highly publicized efforts to improve airport and air travel security during the course of the intervening year. Such measures may have caused some panelists to consider further restrictions on domestic air travel to be unnecessary.

Section 3.4: Using Force to Respond to Terrorism

As described in Chapter Two, Section 2.4, we asked a series of questions in each of our post-9/11 surveys about preferences for responding to the terrorist attacks against New York and Washington, DC. The questions inquired about response options in two dimensions: type and degree of complicity, and nature and range of potential responses. We asked respondents to consider the same specified range of five response options for the following three levels of complicity: providing personnel or training to the terrorists (t85); providing funding (t96); and providing sanctuary (t97). The range of response options for each level of complicity, and to which each panel member answered “yes” or “no”, included the following:

1. applying strong diplomatic and political pressures;

2. applying strong economic and trade sanctions;

3. conducting air strikes using conventionally armed weapons, such as bombs and cruise missiles;

4. using U.S. military forces to invade; and

5. using U.S. nuclear weapons.

By scoring a value of one for each affirmative response to option number three (conventional air strikes) and option number four (military invasion) for each of the three levels of complicity (personnel/training, funding, and sanctuary), we created an index representing support for the use of conventional military force to respond to 9/11. The index ranges from a value of zero, indicating the absence of any “yes” responses to options number three or number four for each of the three levels of complicity, to a value of six, indicating a response of “yes” to options three and four for each of the three levels of complicity. We graph index values for 2001 and 2002 in Figure 3.4.

Figure 3.4: Comparing Preferences for Conventional Military Responses

50 t95/2 + t95/3 + t96/2 + t96/3 + t97/2 + t97/3 45

35 Means

30 2001: 4.37 % 25 2002: 3.49 20 15 Paired p < .0001 10 5 0 0123456 Conventional Military Response Index

Immediately following the attacks of 9/11, support among our panel members for using conventional U.S. military force averaged well above midscale at 4.37. When we conducted our second survey in the fall of 2002, U.S. military operations in Afghanistan were underway, but operations had not begun in Iraq. By that time, mean support for conventional military operations against suspected terrorist supporters had declined significantly to 3.49.

This response pattern suggests that, as some traditionalists might argue, public support for the use of force in response to 9/11 was substantially higher in the immediate aftermath of the attacks when public outrage was highest. A year later, when public emotions perhaps had cooled somewhat, support for the use of force declined significantly. Note, however, that the modal score on the conventional military response index was a value of six in both surveys, and mean support for the use of military force remained above midscale in both surveys, so the change was not from a position of support to one of opposition, but rather a moderation of the level of support present immediately after 9/11.

To gain further insight into whose views changed most, we show in Table 3.5 mean support for conventional military responses among our now familiar demographic and ideological subgroupings.

Table 3.5: Mean Support for Conventional Military Force by Subgroups Grouping Means: Means: Paired n Variables 2001 2002 Change p-Value (’01 & ‘02) Full Panel 4.374 3.494 –.883 < .0001 436 Age 18–30 (1) 4.431 3.824 –.607 .0265 51 31–50 (2) 4.502 3.679 –.823 < .0001 209 > 50 (3) 4.205 3.170 –1.035 < .0001 176 1,2: p = .8158 1,2: p = .6590 Unpaired 1,3: p = .5080 1,3: p = .0673 Comparisons 2,3: p = .1411 2,3: p = .0229 Gender Women (0) 3.987 3.036 –.951 < .0001 223 Men (1) 4.779 3.967 –.812 < .0001 213 Unpaired Comp 0,1: p < .0001 0,1: p < .0001 Education < College (1) 4.586 4.195 –.391 .0491 87 College (2) 4.588 3.538 –1.050 < .0001 238 > Bachelor (3) 3.755 2.827 –.928 < .0001 110 1,2: p = .9930 1,2: p = .0129 Unpaired 1,3: p = .0087 1,3: p < .0001 Comparisons 2,3: p = .0003 2,3: p = .0045 Income 0–50K (1) 4.337 3.626 –.711 < .0001 163 51–100K (2) 4.272 3.468 –.804 < .0001 158 > 100K (3) 4.984 3.355 –1.629 < .0001 62 1,2: p = .7785 1,2: p = .5283 Unpaired Com- 1,3: p = .0236 1,3: p = .4014 parisons 2,3: p = .0161 2,3: p = .7260 Minority Blk, Hisp, AI (1) 4.850 3.700 –1.150 .0007 40 All Others (0) 4.348 3.482 –.866 < .0001 388 Unpaired Comp 1,0: p = .1310 1,0 p = .5456 Ideology 1–2 Liberal (1) 3.216 2.311 –.905 < .0001 74 3–5 Center (2) 4.395 3.491 –.904 < .0001 220 6–7 Conserv (3) 4.992 4.205 –.787 < .0001 132 1,2: p < .0001 1,2: p < .0001 Unpaired 1,3: p < .0001 1,3: p < .0001 Comparisons 2,3: p = .0026 2,3: p = .0013 Partisanship Dems 2–3 (1) 3.778 2.974 –.804 < .0001 153 Repubs 2–3 (2) 4.944 4.093 –.851 < .0001 161 All Others (3) 4.355 3.306 –1.049 .0007 62 1,2: p < .0001 1,2: p < .0001 Unpaired 1,3: p = .0891 1,3: p = .3409 Comparisons 2,3: p = .0167 2,3: p = .0087

Unpaired comparisons across subgroups within the same survey show that, both in 2001 and 2002, women were significantly less supportive of responding to the 9/11 attacks with U.S. military force than were men. Support for military retaliation also declined in both surveys with increasing levels of education, with increasingly liberal political ideologies, and among those who most closely identified with the Democrat party. Conversely, support for using airstrikes and military invasion was significantly higher among men, participants with lower levels of education, those with more conservative ideological orientations, and Republican partisans. Support did not systematically vary by age, income level, or minority and majority ethnicities.

As to change during the period between the two measurements in willingness to sanction the use of conventional military force, support for military options declined significantly between 2001 and 2002 within each of our demographic and ideological subgroups. This illustrates that the overall changes in preferences for military options reported in 2002 and graphed in Figure 3.4 were consistent in direction and distributed widely across respondent characteristics. In terms of absolute mean values, support for the use of military force declined the most among panelists over the age of 50, those having college educations, respondents earning incomes above $100,000 per year, participants who were of black, Hispanic, or American Indian heritage, and those who were center to left politically.

Section 3.5: Cross Sectional Comparisons of Subgroups

We summarize with a look at each of our demographic and ideological subgroups and their level of differentiation among our four composite measures of : (1) terrorist threat assessments; (2) willingness to curtail speech to prevent terrorism; (3) willingness to require national identification cards and restrict domestic air travel to prevent terrorism; and (4) support for the use of conventional military force for responding to the events of 9/11.

Age: Age was not a strong discriminator of support among our panelists for any of the four indices, and age did not systematically differentiate changes in views over time. These data suggest that assessments of the threat of terrorism, how to go about preventing it, and under what circumstances to use conventional military force in response to acts of terrorism may not vary systematically by age. Of course that could change if future circumstances or

actions place differential risk or cost on some age groups, but at the stage of the war on terrorism at which our measurements were taken, age did not importantly differentiate views about terrorism along the dimensions we tested.

Gender: Women rated the threat of terrorism significantly higher than did men before, immediately following, and one year after the events of 9/11. In our two surveys after 9/11, women were more willing to consider restricting speech to help prevent future acts of terrorism, but were less willing to employ military force in response to the events of 9/11. Changes in views among women and changes among men between the 2001 and 2002 surveys were consistent in direction and similar in magnitude.

Education: In our pre-9/11 surveys, higher levels of formal education were systematically related to lower assessments of the threat posed by terrorism, but that differentiation was muted in both surveys following 9/11. Support for restricting speech and travel to prevent terrorism declined with higher levels of education across all measurement periods, with the most systematic differences appearing between those with and without college educations. Support for the use of military force to respond to 9/11 also declined with higher levels of formal education. When the focus is shifted to changes in beliefs and preferences over the 2001–2002 time period, the largest changes were evident for those with the highest levels of education (a college degree or more). By 2002, those with higher levels of education showed a much greater tendency to retreat from their 2001 willingness to curtail individual prerogatives. And this same group significantly moderated its support for armed interventions in response to other nations’ support for terrorist groups. One average, those with less education shifted in the same directions, but the magnitude of the shift was approximately half that of the more educated respondents.

Income: Unpaired comparisons of mean assessments of the threat posed by terrorism before and immediately following 9/11 were not clearly delineated by income; differences were somewhat more pronounced in 2002, when those in the highest income category (reporting incomes above $100,000) rated the threat significantly higher than those with lower incomes. Support for restrictions on speech tended to decline with increasing income, but support for restrictions on travel were less well differentiated by income. Sup- port for the use of military force was not systematically related to income in either post-9/11 measurement periods. Paired comparisons of change over time in mean threat assessments were not patterned by income. However,

between 2001 and 2002, support for restricting speech declined most among the highest income category and declined least among the lowest income category. In addition, support for the use of military force declined most among the higher income groups. Thus, over the 2001–32002 time period, respondents with higher incomes were more likely to change their policy positions (to moderate them) than those with lower incomes.

Ethnic Minority/Majority: None of our four indices were importantly differentiated in terms of within group comparisons or changes over time by whether respondents were members of ethnic minorities (Black, Hispanic, American Indian) or ethnic majorities (white, Asian, all others).

Self-Rated Ideology: Assessments of the threat of terrorism measured before 9/11 were not differentiated by ideology, but those measured after 9/11 tended to reflect lower threat ratings by liberals and higher assessments by conservatives. Prior to 9/11, support for restrictions on speech to help prevent future terrorism was not importantly differentiated by ideology, but in both post-9/11 surveys, conservatives were significantly more willing to restrict both speech and travel than were liberals. The most distinct difference, however, was in willingness to use U.S. military force, where support increased significantly with movement from liberal to conservative positions on the ideology scale. As to change over time, none of our four indices reflected highly differentiated rates or directions of change between 2001 and 2002 based on ideology.

Political Partisanship: In 1997, those who identified somewhat or completely with the Democrat party rated the current and future threat of terrorism significantly higher than those who identified somewhat or completely with the Republican party. After 9/11, distinctions in threat assessments based on partisan identity were not significant. Conversely, in 1995, mean support for restrictions on speech to help prevent terrorism did not differ significantly between Democrats and Republicans, but after 9/11, mean support for restricting speech was significantly higher among Republicans than among Democrats. Similarly, support in 2001 and 2002 for restrictions on movement and travel were significantly higher among Republicans, and partisan distinctions were even more sharply drawn on the issue of using U.S. military force to respond to terrorism, where Republicans were significantly more supportive. As to changes in views between 2001 and 2002, Democ-

rats reduced their assessment of the threat of terrorism significantly more than did Republicans.

Overall, these results are not consistent with the contention that highly charged events will result in volatile and unstructured responses among mass publics. The initial public response to the terrorist strikes, in the immediate aftermath of the event, demonstrated a broad and consistent shift in public perceptions toward a greater perceived threat from terrorism, and greater willingness to support policies to reduce that threat. But even in the highly charged context of the most serious attack on the American homeland in modern times, the overall public response was quite measured. On average, the public showed very little propensity to undermine speech protections. And willingness to engage in military retaliation moderated significantly over the following year.

Perhaps most interesting is that the greatest propensity to change beliefs between 2001 and 2002 was evident among the best educated and wealthiest of our respondents—hardly the expected source of volatility. The post-9/11 change also showed an increasing delineation of policy preferences by ideological and partisan positions. Put differently, those whose beliefs changed the most were also those with the greatest access to and facility with information (the richest, best educated), and the nature of the changes was en- tirely consistent with a structured and consistent pattern of public beliefs. Overall, we find these patterns to be quite reassuring, and consistent with the general findings of the revisionist theorists of public opinion.

Chapter Four Emerging Perspectives

In this chapter, we describe responses to new questions that were first asked of respondents to our 2002 survey. Though no comparisons over time are yet possible, these questions provide insights about how participants as- sessed the first year of the war on terrorism after 9/11.

Section 4.1: Assessing Ongoing Efforts to Combat Terrorism

We asked the following four question designed to measure whether respondents considered actions against terrorism since 9/11 to constitute a “war” against terrorists, and if so, what would constitute winning such a war, and how long participants thought it would take to prevail.

• Immediately following the terrorist attacks in September 2001, President Bush declared that the U.S. was beginning a war on terrorism. Since that time, the U.S. has engaged in a range of actions overseas and at home to combat terrorism. Using a scale from one to seven where one means you strongly disagree, and seven means you strongly agree, please consider the actions of the U.S. over the past year and tell me how strongly you either disagree or agree with the statement: “The U.S. is engaged in a war on terrorism today.” (tt101)

• Views differ about what it would take to win a war on terrorism. Using a scale where zero means no reduction in the terrorist threat since September 2001, 50 means reducing the terrorist threat by half, and 100 means completely eliminating the terrorist threat, what reduction in threat would mean winning the war on terrorism to you? (tt103)

Lead-in: For the next two questions, suppose that winning the war on terrorism is defined by a reduction in the threat of terrorism by half of that which existed immediately after the September 2001 terrorist attacks.

• First, on a scale from zero to ten where zero means not at all confident, and ten means completely confident, how confident are you that the U.S. will eventually win the war on terrorism? (tt105)

• Next, assuming that the U.S. can win the war on terrorism, how many years do you think it will take to win? (tt106)

We chart responses in Figures 4.1–4.4.

Figure 4.1: Ongoing U.S. Actions Constitute a “War” on Terrorism 70 (tt101) 60

50 Mean 40 % 2002: 6.14 30

1234567

Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

Clearly, most participants considered U.S. actions since 9/11 to constitute a war on terrorism, and 61 percent strongly agreed with that assertion. Next we asked them to characterize in terms of reduction in the post-9/11 terrorist threat what would constitute “winning” the war on terrorism.

Figure 4.2: What Constitutes “Winning” the War on Terrorism?

40 (tt103) 35

30 Mean 25 % 20 2002: 74.73

10 5 0 0–10 21–30 41–50 61–70 81–90 11–20 31–40 51–60 71–80 91–100 Reduction of Terrorist Threat (%)

The modal response indicates that about 38 percent would not consider the war on terrorism to be won until the level of terrorist threat that existed imme-

diately following 9/11 is reduced by 90 or more percent, but the mean level of threat reduction that constituted winning was about 75 percent. In figure 4.3 we show participants’ level of confidence in eventually meeting that goal.

Figure 4.3: Confidence in Eventually Winning the War on Terrorism 20 (tt105)

Mean

% 10 2002: 6.06

0 0 1 2345678910

Not At All Completely Confident Confident

About 60 percent of respondents reported confidence that the war on terrorism eventually will be won, 22 percent were not confident of eventually winning, and the remaining 18 percent were undecided. Next we asked participants to assume the war could be won and to estimate how long it would take.1

Figure 4.4: How Long Will It Take to Win the War on Terrorism?

40 (tt107) 35

25 Mean % 20 2002: 16.92 15

10 5 0 0–5 11–15 21–25 31–35 41–45 > 50 6–10 16–20 25–30 36–40 46–50 Years Required to Win War on Terrorism

1 Open ended questions can receive outlier responses that skew central tendencies. In this case, we trimmed one estimate of 1,000 years to more accurately represent most perspectives.

The modal response was six to ten years, but some respondents were much more pessimistic, estimating as long as a century. Overall, the mean estimate was about 17 years. Perhaps the most important point from these responses is that most participants expected the war on terrorism to be a lengthy process, with less than 25 percent of respondents expecting the war to be won within five years. This suggests that the U.S. general public expects a long-term struggle against terrorism.

These patterns show that, in September–November 2002, a large majority of participants considered the U.S. to be engaged in a war on terrorism, and that a reduction in the post-9/11 threat of terrorism of about 75 percent would constitute victory. Our sample was generally confident that the war eventually can be won, but most expected it to take a decade or more to conclude.

We also asked participants about the following two specific policy initiatives for combating terrorism. We chart responses in Figures 4.5–4.6.

• Since the terrorist attacks on the U.S. in September 2001, the government has taken several actions intended to improve airport security. On a scale from zero to ten where zero means not at all effective, and ten means completely effective, how do you rate efforts to improve U.S. airport security thus far? (tt99)

• The president has asked Congress to create a new cabinet-level department for homeland security where government efforts to prevent terrorism can be consolidated. On a scale from one to seven where one means you strongly oppose creating this new government agency, and seven means you strongly support its creation, how do you feel about creating a U.S. Department of Homeland Security? (tt100)

Figure 4.5: Recent Efforts to Improve Airport Security

25 (tt99) 20

Mean 15 % 2002: 5.28 10

0 1 23456789 10 Not At All Completely Effective Effective

Opinion about the effectiveness of efforts to strengthen airport security was cautiously positive, with about 48 percent rating the efforts above midscale and about 32 percent rating them below midscale. The remaining 20 percent were undecided.

Figure 4.6: Create Department of Homeland Security?

45 (tt100) 40

30 Mean 25 % 20 2002: 5.36 15 10 5

1 234567

Strongly Oppose Strongly Support

In the fall of 2002, our sample’s views about creating a new cabinet-level department of homeland security were unambiguously supportive, with the modal response being the highest scale rating, and the mean being well above midscale. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security became operational on January 24, 2003.

The following questions asked respondents to rate the overall effectiveness of the ongoing war on terrorism, and to assess the likelihood of preventing all large-scale terrorist attacks against the U.S. in the next five years.

• On a scale from zero to ten where zero means not at all effective, and ten means completely effective, how effective do you believe U.S. efforts in the war on terrorism have been thus far? (tt104)

• Using a scale from zero to ten where zero means not at all likely, and ten means extremely likely, how likely do you think it is that we will be able to prevent all large-scale terrorist attacks against the U.S. in the next five years? (tt108)

We summarize responses in Figures 4.7 and 4.8.

Figure 4.7: Effectiveness of War on Terrorism Thus Far

25 (tt104) 20

Mean 15 % 2002: 5.78 10

0 1 23456789 10

Not At All Completely Effective Effective

Fully 60 percent of our sample rated the overall effectiveness of the first year of the war on terrorism above midscale. Only 22 percent considered those efforts ineffective, while 22 percent were undecided.

Turning to prospective outlooks, we show judgments of the likelihood of preventing all large-scale attacks in the next five years in the following graph.

Figure 4.8: Preventing All Large-Scale Terrorist Attacks in Next Five Years

25 (tt108) 20

Mean 15 % 2002: 4.58 10

0 0 1 23456789 10 Not At All Extremely Likely Likely

Though participants were positive about the progress being made in the war on terrorism, they were divided about the likelihood that all large-scale terrorist attacks in the next five years could be prevented. About 38 percent

were optimistic about preventing all such attacks, while about 42 percent were more pessimistic. The remaining 20 percent were undecided.

Section 4.2: Implications of 9/11 for Respondents’ Behaviors

To better understand at a personal level the implications for Americans of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, we posed two related series of questions. The first asked participants to make judgments about the degree to which the attacks were successful in creating societal unease and anxiety among Americans, and the second group of questions asked participants how the threat of terrorism affected their individual willingness to participate in a specified range of activities. Our first set of three questions were as follows.

Lead-in: On a scale where zero means the terrorists who attacked the U.S. on September 11, 2001 were not at all successful, and ten means they were completely successful, how successful do you believe the terrorists were at bringing about each of the following?

• Causing Americans to be more suspicious of other people (tt109)

• Causing Americans to give up important rights and freedoms (tt110)

• Causing Americans to become more fearful in their everyday lives (tt111)

We compare responses in Figures 4.9–4.11.

Figure 4.9: Terrorists’ Success of 9/11 in Causing Americans to be More Suspicious

35 (tt109) 30

25 Mean 20 % 2002: 7.68 15

0 0 1 23456789 10 Not At All Completely Successful Successful

Figure 4.10: Terrorists’ Success of 9/11 in Causing Americans to Give Up Rights and Freedoms 20 (tt110)

15 Mean

% 10 2002: 4.96

0 0 1 23456789 10 Not At All Completely Successful Successful

Figure 4.11: Terrorists’ Success of 9/11 in Causing Americans to be More Fearful

20 (tt111)

15 Mean % 10 2002: 6.28

0 0 1 23456789 10 Not At All Completely Successful Successful

Responses to these three questions show that while acknowledging that the attacks of 9/11 were partially successful in achieving some goals of terrorism, such as causing Americans to be more suspicious (Figure 4.9: 81 percent) and fearful (Figure 4.11: 60 percent), opinion was more evenly divided about whether the attacks resulted in Americans giving up important rights and freedoms. About 42 percent of our sample considered the terrorists to have been successful in causing the loss of essential freedoms, while 44 percent disagreed, and 14 percent were unsure. A year after 9/11, these patterns of responses illustrate the ability of our sample to address hard questions about the implications of 9/11 for American society, and they show that U.S. policies taken to prevent

future attacks were perceived by a significant proportion (though not a majority) of respondents to threaten important American freedoms.

Our next series of questions asked participants to rate the implications of 9/11 for their willingness to engage in common travel and assembly behaviors. We compare responses in Figures 4.12–4.14 (note that vertical scales vary).

Lead-in: On a scale from one to seven where one means greatly decreased, four means no change, and seven means greatly increased, how has the threat of terrorism affected your willingness to engage in the following activities?

• Flying on commercial airliners within the U.S. (tt113)

• Traveling outside the U.S. (tt114)

• Attending public events or visiting public places where there are large crowds of people, such as sporting events, shopping centers, parades, and political rallies. (tt115)

Figure 4.12: Effects of 9/11 on Willingness to Take Commercial Flights Within the U.S.

70 (tt113) 60 50 Mean 40 % 2002: 3.93 30

20 10

0 1234567 Greatly Decreased No Change Greatly Increased

Figure 4.13: Effects of 9/11 on Willingness to Travel Outside the U.S.

50 (tt114) 40

Mean 30

% 2002: 4.14 20

0 1234567 Greatly Decreased No Change Greatly Increased

Figure 4.14: Effects of 9/11 on Willingness to Assemble

70 (tt115) 60 50 Mean 40 % 2002: 3.83 30

20 10

0 1234567 Greatly Decreased No Change Greatly Increased

Responses to these three questions all show distinctive distributions having modal values of four and means very near the scale midpoint, indicating that our respondents considered their willingness to travel domestically or overseas and their willingness to assemble among large crowds of people had, on average, not been significantly changed by the terrorist events of 9/11.

Section 4.3: Summarizing Outlooks

New questions asked of our panel members one year after 9/11 reflect clear assessments that the U.S. is, indeed, engaged in a war on terrorism that to be won will require reductions on the order of 75 percent of the terrorist threat existing immediately after 9/11. When our questions defined winning as a reduction of 50 percent or more of the threat following 9/11, about 60 percent of participants thought the war eventually will be won, but the process will be long in duration, with estimates averaging about 17 years. Re- spondents gave positive marks to recent efforts to strengthen airport security and were very strongly in favor of consolidating U.S. efforts to prevent terrorism under a new cabinet level federal department.

Overall assessments of the first year of progress in the war on terrorism were positive, with 60 percent judging U.S. efforts effective, but participants were almost evenly divided about the prospects for preventing all large-scale terrorist attacks in the U.S. over the next five years.

Respondents judged the 9/11 terrorists generally to have been successful in causing Americans to become more suspicious of others and to be more fearful, but opinion was divided about whether U.S. efforts to combat terrorism threatened important rights and freedoms of the American people. Large majorities of our sample indicated that the threat of terrorism had not influenced their willingness to travel domestically or to participate in large assemblies. A plurality of respondents (48 percent) also indicated that terrorist threats have not affected their willingness to travel outside the U.S.

These response patterns show little evidence of the kinds of public overre- actions and emotional volatility assumed by traditionalist concepts of public capacities and mass opinion. They show measured, reasoned responses to the traumatic events of 9/11 and cautious optimism about prevailing in a long-term struggle against terrorism

Intentionally Blank

Appendix 1 Research Methodology

This appendix describes analytical concepts, sampling procedures, data collection methods, response rates, weighting procedures, and associated methods and techniques used in this study.

Section 1: Analytical Approach

This study includes findings from a survey of 935 probabilistically selected members of the U.S. general public interviewed by telephone between Sep- tember 12 and November 4, 2001 and a panel consisting of 474 of the original respondents who also participated in a follow-up telephone survey between September 12 and November 11, 2002. Where possible, responses from both surveys are compared with responses to identical questions employed in telephone surveys of probabilistic samples of the U.S. general public conducted during the following dates: (1) September 30 – November 14, 1995 (n = 2,490);1 and (2) September 15 – November 2, 1997 (n = 1,639).2

The primary focus of the study is to compare public views about issues associated with terrorism measured prior to the terrorist attacks in the U.S. conducted on September 11, 2001 (9/11) with views immediately following those attacks and with views one year after 9/11. Our analyses include responses from the following groups and subgroups: (1) the full sample of 2,490 respondents in 1995; (2) the full sample of 1,639 respondents in 1997; (3) the full sample of 935 respondents in 2001; (4) the subgroup of 474 participants in 2001 who subsequently participated as panel members in 2002; (5) the unweighted responses of our 474 panel members in 2002; and (6) the responses of our 2002 panel weighted (normalized) to the full 935 sample of 2001. We employ weighted distributions and central tendencies when making most group level unpaired comparisons, and we employ un-

1 See Herron and Jenkins-Smith, 1996, for description of research methods, questions, responses, and analysis of the 1995 survey. 2 See Herron and Jenkins-Smith, 1998, for description of research methods, questions, responses, and analysis of the 1997 survey.

weighted statistics for individual level paired comparisons among panel members who participated in both our 2001 and 2002 surveys.

Section 2: Attributes of Panel Studies

Most surveys are based on one discreet probabilistic sample of a population. When questions are repeated over time using a series of different population samples, much can be learned about the direction and magnitude of evolving public opinions, but less can be said about change at the individual level because the same persons do not participate in more than one survey. Panel studies provide perhaps the best method for gauging attitude evolution at the individual level of analysis, because the same individuals are repeatedly interviewed over time. Data from panel studies can support group comparisons and individual level analyses of changes in attitudes. Differences in views from the same individual over time can be used as dependent or independent variables to help test hypotheses about why changes occur and among which subgroups they occur.

Panel studies are most successful when they are initially designed and funded for repeated administration to the same people over long periods of time. One of their characteristics is that each subsequent administration of the survey neces- sarily is to a smaller sample because of the normal attrition of participants as they tire of the process, relocate, die, or otherwise become unavailable. Minimiz- ing attrition (also known as mortality) of the sample requires continuing maintenance, which typically consists of repeatedly contacting participants and updat- ing information about their address, phone number, availability, and eligibility.

Long-term panel studies are relatively rare because they are expensive, time consuming, and labor intensive. Even when well-supported, panel studies have their drawbacks. For example, in some cases, the wrong person can be interviewed by mistake. Subsequent panels can become less representative of the parent population because those persons who repeatedly can be contacted may differ systematically from the general population that is more mobile. (Members of subsequent panels tend to be older, better educated, more afflu- ent, and more interested and well-informed about the topics under investigation.) Another problem is that earlier interviews can influence the views of respondents reflected in subsequent surveys. Their limitations notwithstand- ing, panel studies can provide powerful insights into the evolution of individual perspectives and preferences.

Section 3: The Role of Statistical Weighting

Our baseline survey conducted immediately following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 was not funded to provide continuing sample maintenance. As a matter of routine procedure, we asked each participant in 2001 for their permission to contact them again in the future, but funds were not available to update changes in addresses and phone numbers, monitor respondents’ abilities to participate in future surveys, and to otherwise “track” participants and maintain the currency of information about panel members. When subsequent funding from the Na- tional Science Foundation became available for a follow-up panel study, many respondents had relocated during the intervening year. Since our original random sample frame did not contain names and addresses, we were unable to update many phone numbers that had changed in the interim between the 2001 and 2002 surveys. The result was a panel response rate (completed panel interviews divided by the number of willing respondents in 2001) of 51 percent.

To calibrate the differences between our original survey of 935 respondents in 2001 and the 474 participants who could be contacted one year later and who agreed to a second lengthy survey, we examined demographic characteristics among those who participated in both surveys (our panel members) and those who participated in 2001 but did not participate for whatever reason in 2002. Table A1.1 compares panel members with their counterparts in the 2001 survey who did not participate in 2002.

Table A1.1: Comparing Attributes of Panel and Non-Panel Members (2001)

Total n = 935 Non-Panel Panel Attribute (n = 461) (n = 474) p-Value Age 41.60 47.57 < .0001 (Mean years in 2001; range 18–92) Gender 50.71 47.73 .3943 (% women) Education (Mean: 1 < H.S. graduate, 2 = H.S. graduate; 3 = some college/vocational school; 4 = col- 3.13 3.68 < .0001 lege graduate; 5 = some post-graduate work; 6 = any Master’s degree; 7 = any doctorate) Household Income in Year 2001 $40,000– $50,000– .0004 (Median Range: 0 to >$100,000 in $10,000 increments) $50,000 $60,000 Political Ideology 4.27 4.39 .2595 (Mean: 1 = strongly liberal—7 = strongly conservative)

Compared to other respondents in 2001, panel members were, on average, 5.97 years older, somewhat better educated, and reported higher household incomes. These types of distinctions typically are associated with differences in population mobility, and given the difficulties we experienced in contacting non-panel members in 2002, we conclude that our panel members probably were less mobile than their counterparts. The two groups did not differ systematically in gender proportions or in mean self-rated political ideology.

Weighting is a statistical method for accounting for differences in sizes or other systematic distinctions when comparing groups. For comparing central tendencies between the 935 participants in 2001 and our 474 panel members in 2002, we employed a weight calculated for each response value for each question that normalizes the panel members to the larger original group based on responses in 2001. The weights were calculated by dividing the percent of responses from the full sample of 935 participants in 2001 for each response category for each question by the corresponding percent of responses in 2001 among only the 474 members of the sample who also participated in 2002. The resulting dividend was used as a weight factor to normalize distributions and central tendencies for the same panel members in 2002. In Appendix Two, we show distributions of responses and central tendencies for each of the following groups: (1) the full sample of 935 respondents in 2001; (2) the subgroup of 474 participants in 2001 who became panel members in 2002; (3) the unweighted responses of our 474 panel members in 2002; and (4) the weighted responses for our 2002 panel. We employed weighted distributions and means when making most group level comparisons, and we used unweighted statistics for individual level comparisons among the 474 panel members across the 2001 and 2002 surveys.

Section 4: Sampling

For each of the surveys in 1995, 1997, and 2001, sample frames of randomly selected and randomly ordered households having one or more telephones were purchased from Survey Sampling, Incorporated, of Fairfield, Connecti- cut. Each sample frame was drawn from a random digit database, stratified by county, in which each telephone exchange and working block had a probability of selection equal to its share of listed telephone households. This was accomplished as follows. All blocks within a county were organized in ascend- ing order by area code, exchange, and block number. After a proportional

quota had been allocated to all counties in the frame, a sampling interval was calculated by summing the number of listed residential numbers in each eligi- ble block within the county and dividing that sum by the number of sampling points assigned to the county. From a random start between zero and the sampling interval, blocks were systematically selected in proportion to their den- sity of listed households. After a block was selected, a two-digit random number in the range 00–99 was appended to the exchange and block to form a ten digit telephone number. Known business numbers were eliminated.

Each sample frame was loaded into a computer assisted telephone interviewing system that selected and dialed the individual numbers. Each household in each sample had an equal chance of being called. Probability sampling was extended within each household by interviewing only the member of the household over the age of 18 with the most recent birthday. Up to ten attempts were made to contact the individual selected for the sample. No substitutions were made.

Table A1.2 compares key demographics characteristics of the 935 participants from our 2001 survey to national and regional population parameters.

Table A1.2: Demographic Representativeness of Respondents in 2001

Demographic Category US National Population (%) 2001 Survey (%)

Gender3 Men 48.34 47.1 Women 51.75 52.9 Age6 18–24 13.07 9.6 25–54 58.78 64.9 > 54 28.39 25.5

3 U.S. Census Bureau, 2001a. 4 The proportion of men 18 years old and above is used for comparison, because by design we excluded individuals below the age of 18 from participating in our survey. 5 The proportion of women 18 years old and above is used for comparison, because by design we excluded individuals below the age of 18 from participating in our survey. 6 U.S. Census Bureau, 2001a. 7 The proportion of the total US population 18–24 years of age is 9.6 percent. Of all those 18 or older, 13.0 percent are 18–24 years of age. The latter number is used for comparison with our respondents, because by design we excluded individuals below the age of 18 from participating in our survey. 8 The proportion of the total US population 25–54 years of age is 43.6 percent. Of all those 18 or older, 58.7 percent are 25–54 years of age.

Table A1.2 (Continued): Demographic Representativeness of Respondents in 2001

Demographic Category US National Population (%) 2001 Survey (%)

10 Education H.S. Graduate or Higher 83.111 95.5 College Grad. or Higher 23.212 40.4 13 Race / Ethnicity White, non-Hispanic 75.1 80.6 Black 12.3 5.2 Hispanic (any race) 12.5 5.6 Am. Indian / AK Native 0.8 2.9 Asian 3.6 2.3 Other NA 3.4 14 Household Income $0–49,999 59.1 48.6 $50,000–99,999 28.7 38.5 $100,000 and above 12.2 12.9 15 Region Northeast16 19.3 20.0 Midwest17 23.0 23.5 South18 35.7 34.5 West19 22.0 22.0

9 The proportion of the total US population over 54 years of age is 21.1 percent. Of all those 18 or older, 28.3 percent are over the age of 54. 10 U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2001b. 11 The proportion of the population 18 years of age and above having graduated high school or having attained higher levels of education is used for comparison, because by design we excluded individuals below the age of 18 from participating in our survey. 12 The proportion of the population 18 years of age and above having a Bachelor’s degree or higher is used for comparison, because by design we excluded individuals below the age of 18 from participating in our survey. 13 U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2001a. Total exceeds 100 percent due to multiple race category counting. National population data include all ages. 14 U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2001c. National population data represent all ages. 15 U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2001d. Alaska, Hawaii, Micronesia, Guam, Marshall Islands, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Puerto Rico, Midway Islands, and the Virgin Islands were not included in the sample frame. Regional population data include all ages. 16 States included in the Northeast region included Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. 17 States included in the Midwest region included Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. 18 States included in the South region included Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.

The sample size and random selection procedures provide plus or minus 3.0 percent sampling error for the surveys in 1995, 1997, and 2001.

Section 5: Data Collection

The data collections in 1995, 1997, 2001, and 2002 all were telephone surveys conducted by the University of New Mexico’s Institute for Public Pol- icy (IPP). Before each data collection process began, an extensive review of the respective survey instrument was conducted by the IPP’s senior interviewing staff, survey research center supervisors, and the research design team. During this step each survey was checked for content that might be culturally insensitive or threatening to different socioeconomic or demographic groups. This process reduced the likelihood that an instrument would inadvertently induce respondents from different groups or classes to drop out before completing the survey. Also during this step, the skip patterns used in each survey were checked to ensure that the specified research parameters were met. Then a verbal protocol test was conducted with senior interviewers to identify any remaining problematic question wording or computer programming errors.

When each instrument was in final form, training was conducted with each of the interviewers and supervisors to ensure they were proficient in the standardized procedures and terminology of the survey instruments. This process en- tailed oral reading of the survey instruments in group training sessions to make sure that proper and consistent emphasis was given to the various words and phrases specified in the surveys, and to assure that respondents were interviewed using consistent phrasing, emphasis, and protocols during the data collection process. The respective data collections did not begin until each inter- viewer demonstrated thorough competence with the survey instructions and reading aloud the questions.

The interviews were conducted in the IPP Survey Research Center by experienced interviewers using a computer assisted telephone interviewing system that recorded data in a centralized collection file. Rigorous supervi- sion and quality control measures were applied throughout the data collection processes. No interviews were conducted without the presence of a su-

19 States included in the West region included Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Mon- tana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.

pervisor. A silent monitor was used by supervisors to evaluate individual interviewers and to ensure high quality and continuity in application of the survey protocols throughout the data collection phase. The quality of the data collected was continually monitored to assure that intended collection standards were maintained. These procedures included daily downloading and analysis of responses, and diagnostics such as the degree of “reluc- tance” of survey participants, the proportions of collections by region, and standardized recording of verbatim responses where appropriate.

Section 6: Cooperation Rates

Using calculation formulas in accordance with the American Association for Public Opinion Research guidelines, type four (highest) cooperation rates for each survey were as follows: 1995–57.5 percent; 1997–54.8 percent; and 2001–53.7 percent.20

Eleven of the 935 respondents to our survey in 2001 are known to have died or become physically incapacitated prior to our follow-up survey in 2002. The type one (lowest) cooperation rate for the 2002 panel study was 51.3 percent. If phones not in service and individuals who were traveling during the period of the 2002 survey are excluded, the type four (highest) cooperation rate increases to 76.8 percent.21

20 The American Association for Public Opinion Research, 2000. 21 Ibid.

Appendix 2 Questions, Distributions, and Means

Definitions: 2001: 935: Responses in 2001 from those individuals who agreed to be recalled in the future 2001: 474: Responses in 2001 from those individuals who again participated in 2002 2002: 474: Responses in 2002 from those individuals who participated in 2001 and 2002 2002: 474-wtd: Responses in 2002 from those individuals who participated in 2001 and 2002 weighted for variable differences between 2001: 935 and 2001: 474

1. (t1_EDU; tt1_edu_2) We need to start with a few general questions. First, what is your highest level of education?

< High H. Sch Some Col./ College Some Grad Any Any Other Sample School Graduate Voca Sch Graduate Work Master’s Doctorate Degree % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Median 2002: 474 3.8 17.8 29.2 23.7 6.8 14.8 3.8 0.2 3.0 2001: 474 3.6 18.2 30.2 23.3 7.2 14.0 3.4 0.2 3.0 2001: 935 4.5 23.8 31.3 22.7 4.8 10.5 2.4 0.1 3.0

2. (t2_AGE; tt2_age_2) How old are you?

Means 2002: 474 48.57 2001: 474 47.57 2001: 935 44.64 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p < .0001 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .0005

3. (t3_GEND; tt3_gend_2) As part of the survey, I am required to ask: are you male or female? % Female = 0 Male = 1 2002: 474 51.48 48.52 2001: 474 51.48 48.52 2001: 935 52.94 47.06

We want to begin by asking you some questions about how you think the world may have changed since the end of the cold war. We are interested in your perceptions. There are no right or wrong answers.

4. (t4_NATSEC; tt4_natsec_2) First, considering the international environment as a whole, and using a scale from one to seven where one means the world is much less secure, and seven means the world is much more secure, how do you think international security has changed since the end of the cold war? Much Less Secure Much More Secure % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2002: 474 –wtd 9.9 11.1 23.2 16.1 27.8 8.0 3.9 3.80 2002: 474 8.8 12.2 23.7 16.9 27.4 7.5 3.6 3.79 2001: 474 6.5 10.0 21.2 21.4 27.9 9.1 3.9 3.97 2001: 935 8.5 8.3 20.1 20.2 26.4 9.4 7.3 4.05 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .0745 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .3923

5. (t5_USSEC; tt5_ussec_2) Focusing more specifically on the U.S., and using the same scale from one to seven where one means much less secure, and seven means much more secure, how has U.S. security changed since the end of the cold war? Much Less Secure Much More Secure % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2002: 474 –wtd 6.8 12.3 18.9 16.4 25.3 14.5 5.7 4.08 2002: 474 6.9 12.4 19.5 16.5 25.9 13.9 4.9 4.04 2001: 474 10.3 12.0 22.3 20.4 19.7 10.1 5.2 3.78 2001: 935 11.0 9.9 21.1 18.6 20.8 10.7 7.9 3.92 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .0042 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .1573

6. (t6_USWAR; tt6_uswar_2) Turning now to nuclear considerations, on a scale from one to seven where one means the chances have decreased greatly, and seven means the chances have increased greatly, how has the breakup of the Soviet Union affected the chances that the U.S. will be involved in a war with any country in which nuclear weapons are used? Decreased Greatly Increased Greatly % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2002: 474–wtd 4.3 11.2 14.0 17.1 22.8 17.3 13.3 4.47 2002: 474 4.1 11.1 15.1 17.9 22.7 16.8 12.2 4.43 2001: 474 5.9 15.9 20.3 17.0 17.0 11.3 12.6 4.08 2001: 935 6.3 14.0 17.0 14.9 20.0 13.0 14.7 4.26 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .0001 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .0750

7. (t7_NUCWAR; tt7_nucwar_2) Using the same scale from one to seven, how do you think the breakup of the Soviet Union has affected the possibility that nuclear weapons will be used by any country against any other country? Decreased Greatly Increased Greatly % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2002: 474–wtd 2.8 6.9 12.9 20.8 25.9 18.5 12.2 4.64 2002: 474 2.8 6.8 13.1 21.0 26.6 18.1 11.6 4.62 2001: 474 5.0 7.6 14.6 21.4 24.0 11.8 15.7 4.50 2001: 935 4.5 8.6 12.7 18.6 23.8 15.0 16.7 4.60 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .1665 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .2737

8. (t17_TERNOW; tt17_ternow_2) Now I would like to know about your perceptions of today’s threat of nuclear terrorism. On a scale from zero to ten where zero means there is no threat of nuclear weapons being used by terrorists, and ten means there is extreme threat, how do you rate today’s threat of nuclear terrorism occurring anywhere in the world?

No Threat Extreme Threat % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2002: 474–wtd 0.4 0.4 2.1 4.8 5.6 8.4 9.4 14.8 21.4 13.3 19.4 7.28 2002: 474 0.4 0.4 2.2 5.2 5.9 8.5 9.8 15.0 22.2 12.6 17.8 7.19 2001: 474 0.6 1.7 3.4 7.4 4.9 11.4 12.1 13.5 16.3 11.0 17.8 6.81 2001: 935 0.4 1.3 3.2 6.9 5.5 9.9 10.4 12.5 17.1 10.1 22.8 7.05 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .0024 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .0864

9. (t18_10YRS; tt18_10yrs_2) On the same scale from zero to ten where zero means no threat, and ten means extreme threat, how do you rate the threat of nuclear weapons being used by terrorists anywhere in the world during the next ten years?

No Threat Extreme Threat % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2002: 474–wtd 0.3 0.7 2.5 5.1 3.4 7.6 9.4 16.6 21.5 13.8 19.1 7.33 2002: 474 0.2 0.6 2.6 5.4 3.7 7.8 9.7 16.9 21.6 13.6 17.7 7.26 2001: 474 1.1 1.7 3.4 4.2 5.7 11.4 11.6 13.7 17.8 11.0 18.4 6.92 2001: 935 1.1 1.6 3.1 4.2 5.0 11.6 9.2 13.5 18.8 9.6 22.3 7.08 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test; 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .0067 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .2459

10. (t24_NDET; tt24_ndet_2) The next two questions ask about your perceptions of nuclear deterrence, which means preventing someone from using nuclear weapons against us, because they expect that we would retaliate by using nuclear weapons against them. Using a scale from zero to ten where zero means not at all important, and ten means extremely important, how important are U.S. nuclear weapons for preventing other countries from using nuclear weapons against us today?

Not At All Extremely Important Important % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2002: 474–wtd 1.6 0.6 1.9 4.3 2.2 11.3 7.9 14.6 15.8 12.1 27.5 7.43 2002: 474 1.7 0.7 2.0 4.6 2.6 11.1 8.0 14.6 15.4 12.2 27.2 7.39 2001: 474 1.1 0.4 2.8 3.2 3.2 8.9 9.6 10.8 17.4 10.6 32.1 7.61 2001: 935 1.6 0.5 2.0 2.5 4.5 7.8 8.7 12.3 16.8 11.5 31.7 7.62 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .1148 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .9394

11. (t26_DETCB; tt26_detcb_2) Now we want you to think about preventing the use of chemical and biological weapons against the U.S. today. Using a scale where zero means not at all important, and ten means extremely important, how important are U.S. nuclear weapons for preventing other countries from using chemical or biological weapons against us today?

Not At All Extremely Important Important % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2002: 474–wtd 4.1 3.7 6.4 6.2 8.2 11.6 10.0 10.1 14.1 7.8 17.7 6.17 2002: 474 4.6 3.7 6.8 6.4 8.1 11.5 9.9 10.4 14.1 7.3 17.2 6.08 2001: 474 9.2 4.7 7.5 8.3 5.5 9.2 5.8 12.4 13.2 6.2 18.1 5.76 2001: 935 8.2 3.7 6.7 8.0 5.6 11.7 5.9 11.2 11.9 6.0 21.1 5.96 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .0188 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .2760

12. (t36_RETAIN; tt36_retain_2) On a scale from zero to ten where zero is not at all important, and ten is extremely important, how important is it for the U.S. to retain nuclear weapons today?

Not At All Extremely Important Important % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2002: 474–wtd 1.7 1.3 2.3 3.0 3.0 11.9 7.9 15.5 13.1 7.9 32.4 7.42 2002: 474 2.0 1.5 2.4 3.1 3.1 11.8 8.3 15.1 13.3 7.9 31.5 7.35 2001: 474 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.1 3.6 9.5 7.6 16.5 14.2 7.6 35.3 7.66 2001: 935 1.4 1.3 0.9 1.6 3.4 10.1 6.8 18.3 12.5 6.3 37.4 7.72 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .0362 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .6417

13. (t71_TERROR; tt71_terror_2) Now I am going to ask a series of questions about terrorism. Con- sidering both foreign and domestic sources of terrorism, and considering both the likelihood of terrorism and its potential consequences, how would you rate today’s threat of all kinds of terrorism in the U.S. on a scale from zero to ten where zero means no threat, and ten means extreme threat?

No Threat Extreme Threat % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2002: 474–wtd 0.2 0.0 0.6 2.1 2.0 6.4 8.5 14.8 21.0 11.9 32.4 8.02 2002: 474 0.2 0.0 0.7 2.3 2.0 6.8 9.2 14.9 21.2 11.5 31.3 7.95 2001: 474 0.4 0.4 1.3 1.5 1.1 4.7 4.9 10.8 17.1 9.3 48.6 8.47 2001: 935 0.8 0.3 0.9 1.4 0.8 3.8 4.4 11.0 14.8 10.3 51.7 8.59 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p < .0001 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .2576

14. (t72_TERROR10; tt72_terror10_2) Turning to the future, and using the same scale from zero to ten, how would you rate the threat of all kinds of terrorism in the U.S. during the next ten years?

No Threat Extreme Threat % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2002: 474–wtd 0.0 0.2 0.6 1.5 2.4 7.2 7.5 12.3 22.3 13.9 31.9 8.06 2002: 474 0.0 0.2 0.7 1.6 2.5 6.8 7.7 12.5 22.4 14.3 31.3 8.05 2001: 474 0.2 0.6 1.3 2.8 1.9 6.8 4.9 12.8 18.7 10.6 39.4 8.11 2001: 935 0.8 0.4 1.0 2.7 2.5 6.8 5.1 11.2 18.1 10.1 41.3 8.13 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .4096 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .8921

The terrorist bombing in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995 and the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC on September 11, 2001 have raised questions about what can be done to stop terrorism. Using a scale from one to seven where one means you strongly disagree, and seven means you strongly agree, please respond to the following statements:

15. (t73_STOPTER; tt73_stopter_2) There is nothing the government can do to stop determined terrorists.

Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2002: 474 –wtd 30.1 14.6 10.0 7.2 14.5 8.5 15.1 3.47 2002: 474 30.1 14.8 10.3 7.4 14.2 8.3 14.8 3.45 2001: 474 42.1 11.8 8.7 5.5 7.0 9.9 15.0 3.13 2001: 935 41.4 11.9 7.4 5.0 8.8 9.2 16.2 3.20 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .0095 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .5942

16. (t74_NOINTRDE; tt74_nointrde_2) The government could stop terrorists, but only with unacceptable intrusions on people’s rights and privacy.

Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2002: 474 –wtd 13.0 12.3 13.8 9.8 18.1 13.0 20.1 4.27 2002: 474 13.1 12.2 13.7 9.9 18.0 13.3 19.8 4.27 2001: 474 21.2 11.5 11.3 9.8 14.4 12.3 19.5 4.00 2001: 935 20.1 11.4 11.8 9.5 15.2 10.5 21.5 4.06 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .0227 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .6305

17. (t75_YESINTRDE; tt75_yesintrde_2) The government must try to stop terrorists, even if it intrudes on some people’s rights and privacy.

Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2002: 474 –wtd 8.0 7.7 6.4 9.8 16.9 19.1 32.2 5.06 2002: 474 8.4 7.9 6.5 9.9 17.4 19.0 30.9 5.01 2001: 474 6.8 5.9 4.9 7.4 12.7 17.4 44.8 5.45 2001: 935 7.5 4.0 5.5 7.1 12.4 15.8 47.7 5.51 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p < .0001 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .5655

Using a scale where one means strongly oppose, and seven means strongly support, how would you feel about giving the federal government the following powers to prevent terrorism?

18. (t76_EXPEL; tt76_expel_2) The power to quickly expel from the U.S. any citizen of another country who is suspected of planning a terrorist act, even if the person has not been convicted of any crime.

Strongly Oppose Strongly Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2002: 474 –wtd 8.3 4.7 5.8 7.6 17.8 16.9 38.9 5.28 2002: 474 8.5 4.9 5.8 7.6 17.9 17.2 38.0 5.25 2001: 474 8.5 5.3 6.4 7.9 13.6 13.8 44.5 5.32 2001: 935 8.0 5.1 6.8 7.6 13.3 13.3 46.1 5.37 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .3542 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .6580

19. (t77_SPY; tt77_spy_2) The power to infiltrate and spy on organizations in this country that the government suspects of planning terrorist acts, even if the groups have not been convicted of any crime.

Strongly Oppose Strongly Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2002: 474 –wtd 6.9 3.6 5.4 10.2 19.2 21.8 32.9 5.28 2002: 474 7.4 3.8 6.0 10.3 19.0 21.5 32.0 5.22 2001: 474 6.2 5.3 5.6 6.6 17.3 15.4 43.6 5.44 2001: 935 5.4 4.3 5.7 6.5 16.0 16.1 46.1 5.56 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .0270 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .2553

20. (t78_SEIZE; tt78_seize_2) The power to search for and seize weapons from groups that are suspected of planning terrorist acts, even if the groups have not been convicted of any crime.

Strongly Oppose Strongly Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2002: 474 –wtd 7.1 7.7 5.7 9.2 14.6 20.6 35.1 5.19 2002: 474 7.4 7.9 6.1 9.7 14.8 20.9 33.3 5.12 2001: 474 7.2 3.4 6.6 8.1 17.2 14.7 42.8 5.40 2001: 935 6.5 3.3 6.0 7.8 15.5 14.9 46.1 5.51 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .0102 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .2703

21. (t79_ID; tt79_id_2) The power to require national identification cards for all U.S. citizens.

Strongly Oppose Strongly Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2002: 474 –wtd 14.8 7.6 6.3 9.3 12.3 14.1 35.6 4.81 2002: 474 15.8 8.1 6.5 9.7 12.6 14.0 33.3 4.70 2001: 474 14.9 8.1 6.8 7.6 11.9 12.3 38.4 4.84 2001: 935 13.3 6.8 5.7 7.0 12.8 10.9 43.5 5.06 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .2321 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .0894

22. (t80_RADIO; tt80_radio_2) The power to ban people from speaking on radio or television if they advocate anti-government violence.

Strongly Oppose Strongly Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2002: 474 –wtd 29.5 13.0 10.0 8.8 9.6 9.0 20.1 3.63 2002: 474 30.6 12.8 9.9 8.8 9.5 8.8 19.6 3.58 2001: 474 31.9 9.3 8.0 7.6 10.1 8.2 24.7 3.78 2001: 935 29.4 10.4 7.6 8.2 10.9 8.0 25.6 3.87 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .1182 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .5201

23. (t81_CNET; tt81_cnet_2) The power to ban information about bomb-making from computer networks.

Strongly Oppose Strongly Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2002: 474 –wtd 12.1 5.3 6.9 4.2 7.1 11.2 53.2 5.35 2002: 474 12.8 5.4 7.2 4.5 7.4 11.2 51.5 5.28 2001: 474 9.9 6.1 5.7 2.7 7.0 10.1 58.4 5.55 2001: 935 8.3 5.2 5.5 3.9 6.5 9.0 61.7 5.69 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .0099 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .2148

24. (t82_WITHIN; tt82_within_2) The power to restrict travel within the U.S.

Strongly Oppose Strongly Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2002: 474 –wtd 40.6 16.8 8.7 9.3 10.4 4.6 9.6 2.84 2002: 474 41.3 17.1 8.9 9.1 10.5 4.3 8.7 2.78 2001: 474 32.3 13.8 8.1 10.6 11.7 8.7 14.9 3.41 2001: 935 31.9 12.6 7.4 9.3 11.9 8.6 18.3 3.56 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p < .0001 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .2584

25. (t83_TOFROM; tt83_tofrom_2) The power to restrict travel to and from the U.S.

Strongly Oppose Strongly Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2002: 474 –wtd 19.1 10.5 9.9 11.6 13.1 14.4 21.6 4.18 2002: 474 19.5 10.7 10.0 12.0 13.4 14.1 20.4 4.13 2001: 474 14.5 7.0 7.9 10.4 18.3 12.2 29.6 4.66 2001: 935 13.6 6.8 6.9 11.1 16.7 12.2 32.6 4.77 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p < .0001 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .3519

26. (t84_INTO; tt_84_into_2) And finally, using the same scale from one to seven, how would you feel about the U.S. government restricting immigration into the U.S. to prevent terrorism?

Strongly Oppose Strongly Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2002: 474 –wtd 8.8 6.5 5.3 7.5 13.6 17.8 40.5 5.26 2002: 474 9.5 6.8 5.4 7.7 13.3 17.2 40.0 5.20 2001: 474 9.4 6.4 7.5 9.0 11.1 11.5 45.2 5.21 2001: 935 8.3 5.3 6.7 8.5 12.9 12.2 46.1 5.33 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .7368 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .2958

The next series of questions deals with critical infrastructures in the U.S. such as telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil supplies and services, banking and finance, transportation systems, water supply systems, emergency services, and continuity of government.

First I want to know your perceptions about potential threats to these kinds of infrastructures as a group. On a scale from zero to ten where zero means no threat, and ten means extreme threat, please rate each of the following as potential threats to critical U.S. infrastructures.

100

27. (t85_CIFOR; tt85_cifor_2) Significant damage to critical U.S. infrastructures resulting from terrorism sponsored by foreign groups or individuals.

No Threat Extreme Threat % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2002: 474–wtd 0.0 0.7 1.7 3.3 5.0 10.3 13.2 21.1 19.4 10.1 15.2 7.11 2002: 474 0.0 0.7 1.8 3.4 5.2 10.9 13.6 20.8 19.0 10.0 14.7 7.05 2001: 474 0.0 1.3 1.7 2.8 4.3 11.3 10.4 21.5 16.2 6.8 23.8 7.28 2001: 935 0.4 0.9 1.5 2.2 3.3 11.6 10.9 18.9 16.3 6.6 27.5 7.44 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .0318 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .2168

28. (t86_CIUS; tt86_cius_2) Significant damage to critical U.S. infrastructures resulting from terrorism sponsored by U.S. groups or individuals.

No Threat Extreme Threat % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2002: 474–wtd 0.0 2.3 5.1 9.3 13.0 22.6 15.8 14.0 9.6 3.1 5.1 5.54 2002: 474 0.0 2.5 5.5 9.8 13.2 22.8 15.7 13.4 9.6 3.0 4.6 5.47 2001: 474 1.5 3.2 6.0 10.8 12.3 19.9 12.7 11.4 9.7 1.9 10.4 5.52 2001: 935 2.1 3.0 5.6 9.8 10.6 18.9 13.0 12.2 10.0 2.0 12.9 5.71 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .6143 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .1914

Turning now to individual types of U.S. infrastructures, some people have suggested that terrorists might pose physical threats to property and people and electronic threats to computer networks and other technologies. On a scale where zero means no threat, and ten means extreme threat, please rate the threat that you think terrorists pose to each of the following categories of essential services in the U.S. Please consider both the likelihood of such terrorist acts occurring and their potential consequences.

29. (t87_TELE; tt87_tele_2) Telecommunications such as telephones, television, radio, and the internet.

No Threat Extreme Threat % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2002: 474–wtd 0.3 1.9 5.2 6.4 7.5 15.7 13.0 17.8 12.6 6.6 12.8 6.32 2002: 474 0.4 2.0 6.1 7.0 8.5 16.0 13.0 17.5 12.8 5.8 10.8 6.13 2001: 474 0.8 3.6 4.7 7.4 7.6 17.3 11.4 14.2 13.3 5.1 14.6 6.18 2001: 935 1.2 2.7 4.8 6.3 7.2 15.6 11.1 13.4 13.3 7.4 17.1 6.42 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .5671 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .1040

101

30. (t88_ELEC; tt88_elec_2) Electrical power systems, including generating, transmitting, and distributing electrical power.

No Threat Extreme Threat % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2002: 474–wtd 0.0 1.6 2.9 6.8 6.0 12.6 13.0 17.7 14.1 7.0 18.2 6.75 2002: 474 0.0 1.6 3.1 7.2 6.5 13.2 13.2 17.9 14.3 6.7 16.1 6.63 2001: 474 0.4 1.7 4.9 7.8 8.0 12.9 13.3 16.7 12.7 7.4 14.3 6.39 2001: 935 1.0 1.7 4.0 7.6 6.3 13.5 11.9 15.3 13.6 7.1 18.0 6.57 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .0690 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .2079

31. (t89_OIL; tt89_oil_2) Gas and oil supplies and services, including producing, refining, transporting, and distributing petroleum products and natural gas.

No Threat Extreme Threat % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2002: 474–wtd 0.0 1.2 3.4 4.8 6.1 14.2 12.6 16.2 15.7 8.7 17.1 6.82 2002: 474 0.0 1.1 3.4 4.9 6.5 14.6 13.0 16.6 15.7 8.7 15.5 6.75 2001: 474 0.6 1.5 2.1 5.9 6.8 12.3 10.8 16.7 15.9 11.0 16.5 6.84 2001: 935 0.9 1.4 2.6 4.2 5.7 12.2 10.1 16.9 16.2 9.4 20.5 7.01 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .4667 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .2113

32. (t90_BANK; tt90_bank_2) Banking and finance, including checking services, credit cards, and stock markets.

No Threat Extreme Threat % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2002: 474–wtd 0.2 2.4 5.8 6.1 7.1 15.0 14.2 17.0 13.2 6.5 12.4 6.29 2002: 474 0.2 2.7 6.5 6.5 7.4 15.3 14.2 16.7 13.1 6.1 11.3 6.15 2001: 474 0.6 3.6 7.0 7.0 8.0 14.4 11.6 15.2 13.1 5.7 13.7 6.12 2001: 935 0.9 2.9 5.4 6.8 7.9 13.1 11.7 14.8 12.2 6.2 18.1 6.40 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .7571 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .0612

33. (t91_TRAN; tt91_tran_2) Transportation systems, including capabilities for all forms of travel and freight shipments.

No Threat Extreme Threat % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2002: 474–wtd 0.0 1.2 3.7 4.4 9.3 13.9 12.8 18.6 15.0 6.6 14.5 6.60 2002: 474 0.0 1.3 4.0 4.7 9.9 14.2 13.0 18.7 14.6 6.5 13.0 6.49 2001: 474 0.2 1.7 4.4 4.0 6.8 13.7 10.1 19.2 15.0 8.0 16.7 6.73 2001: 935 0.4 1.5 3.9 3.2 5.3 13.3 10.8 17.6 14.9 8.5 20.5 6.96 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .0374 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .0937

102

34. (t92_H2O; tt92_h2o_2) Water supply systems, including watersheds, aquifers, water treatment, and water distribution for all purposes.

No Threat Extreme Threat % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2002: 474–wtd 0.3 0.7 2.4 4.3 6.1 9.1 11.5 19.3 17.3 9.1 19.7 7.10 2002: 474 0.2 0.7 2.5 4.5 6.3 9.7 11.9 20.0 17.6 9.0 17.6 7.02 2001: 474 0.6 1.7 4.7 4.9 5.3 12.7 12.7 19.0 13.3 7.8 17.3 6.70 2001: 935 1.0 2.4 4.1 4.3 5.3 11.9 11.4 16.5 13.3 7.8 22.2 6.86 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .0032 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .2474

35. (t93_EMER; tt93_emer_2) Emergency services, such as medical, police, fire, and rescue.

No Threat Extreme Threat % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2002: 474–wtd 1.0 5.1 8.1 9.8 10.2 20.0 12.4 11.8 8.2 3.2 10.1 5.44 2002: 474 1.1 5.6 9.0 10.8 10.8 20.0 11.9 12.1 7.8 2.7 8.3 5.25 2001: 474 2.8 5.7 9.3 11.4 9.3 19.1 10.0 11.2 9.7 3.4 8.1 5.19 2001: 935 2.6 4.7 8.4 9.3 9.0 17.1 10.7 10.8 10.0 4.3 13.0 5.60 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .2479 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .0074

36. (t94_GOVT; tt94_govt_2) Continuity of government, meaning preserving institutions and functions of government at all levels.

No Threat Extreme Threat % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2002: 474–wtd 1.5 4.9 9.3 9.0 9.4 17.1 13.8 11.6 9.5 5.1 8.7 5.47 2002: 474 1.8 5.8 10.3 9.4 10.1 17.5 13.3 11.0 9.0 4.5 7.2 5.24 2001: 474 2.1 8.3 9.5 10.6 9.1 15.0 10.6 10.6 10.4 4.4 9.3 5.25 2001: 935 2.1 5.2 8.3 9.0 8.7 14.9 9.7 12.6 10.6 4.8 14.2 5.74 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .8422 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .0019

Responding to the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC in September 2001 poses difficult choices involving a range of options. The next several questions ask how you think the U.S. government should respond given certain conditions.

103

37–41. (t95_PERS1,2,3,4,5; tt95_pers1_2, 2_2, 3_2, 4_2, 5_2) If our government determines to a high degree of certainty that another country actively participated in the acts of terrorism by providing personnel or training for the terrorists, which of the following U.S. responses would you support? Please answer yes or no to each of the following options.

2001: 474 2002: 474 2001/2002 Response Options (%) Chi Sq No Yes No Yes p-Value 1. Apply strong diplomatic and political pressures against that country. 2.7 97.3 2.7 97.3 .9616 2. Apply strong economic and trade sanctions against that country. 4.7 95.3 5.8 94.2 .4266 3. Conduct air strikes against that country using conventionally armed 20.3 79.7 30.0 70.0 .0008 weapons such as bombs and cruise missiles. 4. Use U.S. military forces to invade that country. 19.3 80.7 31.4 68.6 < .0001 5. Attack that country using U.S. nuclear weapons. 78.5 21.5 83.3 16.7 .0654

42–46. (t96_FUND1,2,3,4,5; tt96_fund1_2, 2_2, 3_2, 4_2, 5_2) If our government determines to a high degree of certainty that another country actively supported the acts of terrorism by providing funding to the terrorists, which of these same U.S. response options would you support? Again, please answer yes or no to each of the following options.

2001: 474 2002: 474 2001/2002 Response Options (%) Chi Sq No Yes No Yes p-Value 1. Apply strong diplomatic and political pressures against that country. 3.2 96.8 2.0 98.0 .2731 2. Apply strong economic and trade sanctions against that country. 3.4 96.6 4.3 95.7 .4916 3. Conduct air strikes against that country using conventionally armed 28.9 71.1 49.2 50.8 < .0001 weapons such as bombs and cruise missiles. 4. Use U.S. military forces to invade that country. 36.5 63.5 53.7 46.3 < .0001 5. Attack that country using U.S. nuclear weapons. 83.3 16.7 88.1 11.9 .0389

47–51. (tt97_SANC1,2,3,4,5; tt97_sanc1_2, 2_2, 3_2, 4_2, 5_2) If our government determines to a high degree of certainty that another country provided sanctuary to the terrorists, which of these same U.S. response options would you support?

2001: 474 2002: 474 2001/2002 Response Options (%) Chi Sq No Yes No Yes p-Value 1. Apply strong diplomatic and political pressures against that country. 3.2 96.8 2.9 97.1 .8256 2. Apply strong economic and trade sanctions against that country. 5.1 94.9 7.2 92.8 .1833 3. Conduct air strikes against that country using conventionally armed 24.6 75.4 38.7 61.3 < .0001 weapons such as bombs and cruise missiles. 4. Use U.S. military forces to invade that country. 26.5 73.5 42.3 57.7 < .0001 5. Attack that country using U.S. nuclear weapons. 81.4 18.6 88.8 11.2 .0021

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52. (t98_CERTAIN; tt98_certain_2) We are interested in how certain you think the government should be in the future that a country supported terrorist acts against the U.S. before we take military action. Using a scale from zero to ten where zero means not at all certain, and ten means completely certain, how certain should the government be before it retaliates using military force?

Not At All Completely Certain Certain % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2002: 474–wtd 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 2.0 3.3 7.3 18.8 19.9 48.3 8.94 2002: 474 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 2.0 3.2 7.4 18.9 20.0 48.0 8.94 2001: 474 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 2.8 2.1 8.7 20.4 20.0 44.3 8.77 2001: 935 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3 3.4 2.4 8.2 18.7 18.9 46.1 8.74 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .0928 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .7452

53. (tt99_aptsec) Since the terrorist attacks on the U.S. in September 2001, the government has taken several actions intended to improve airport security. On a scale from zero to ten where zero means not at all effective, and ten means completely effective, how do you rate efforts to improve U.S. airport security thus far? Not At All Completely Effective Effective % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2002: 474 3.9 2.7 7.7 9.6 7.7 20.3 15.0 15.5 11.2 2.5 3.9 5.28

54. (tt100_dhs) The president has asked Congress to create a new cabinet-level department for homeland security where government efforts to prevent terrorism would be consolidated. On a scale from one to seven where one means you strongly oppose creating this new government agency, and seven means you strongly support its creation, how do you feel about creating a U.S. Department of Homeland Security?

Strongly Oppose Strongly Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2002: 474 7.9 4.8 6.8 7.2 13.8 16.3 43.2 5.36

55. (tt101_warnow) Immediately following the terrorist attacks in September 2001, President Bush declared that the U.S. was beginning a war on terrorism. Since that time, the U.S. has engaged in a range of actions overseas and at home to combat terrorism. Using a scale from one to seven where one means you strongly disagree, and seven means you strongly agree, I would like you to consider the actions of the U.S. over the past year and tell me how strongly you either disagree or agree with the statement: “The U.S. is engaged in a war on terrorism today.” Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2002: 474 1.8 3.6 1.6 3.8 10.6 18.0 60.7 6.14

105

56. (tt103_vic) Views differ about what it would take to win the war on terrorism. Using a scale where zero means no reduction in the terrorist threat since September 2001, 50 means reducing the terrorist threat by half, and 100 means completely eliminating the terrorist threat, what reduction in threat would mean winning the war on terrorism to you? % 0–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 51–60 61–70 71–80 81–90 91–100 Mean 2002: 474 5.8 0.4 1.7 0.7 21.3 2.2 4.3 18.2 7.4 38.0 74.73

57. (tt104_wot) On a scale from zero to ten where zero means not at all effective, and ten means completely effective, how effective do you believe U.S. efforts in the war on terrorism have been thus far?

Not At All Completely Effective Effective % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2002: 474 1.1 3.4 2.3 5.9 9.3 22.2 17.0 19.9 11.5 3.4 4.1 5.78

For the next two questions, suppose that winning the war on terrorism is defined by a reduction in the threat of terrorism by half of that which existed immediately after the September 2001 terrorist attacks.

58. (tt105_win) First, on a scale from zero to ten, where zero means not at all confident and ten means completely confident, how confident are you that the U.S. will eventually win the war on terrorism?

Not At All Completely Confident Confident % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2002: 474 4.0 2.5 4.0 4.3 7.6 17.8 9.9 18.0 17.8 5.8 8.3 6.06

59. (tt106_long + tt107_years) Next, assuming that the U.S. can win the war on terrorism, how many years do you think it will take to win?

Already YEARS TO WIN Can Never % Won 1 2 3 4 5 6–10 11–20 21–30 > 30 Mean be Won 2002: 474 0.2 0.8 1.4 2.8 0.6 18.0 34.8 22.8 9.5 9.0 16.92 10.1

60. (tt108_outlook) Using a scale from zero to ten where zero means not at all likely and ten means extremely likely, how likely do you think it is that we will be able to prevent all large-scale terrorist attacks against the U.S. in the next five years?

Not At All Extremely Likely Likely % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2002: 474 10.8 5.9 7.4 12.4 5.9 20.1 10.2 11.5 10.2 2.9 2.7 4.58

106

On a scale where zero means the terrorists who attacked the U.S. on September 11, 2001 were not at all successful and ten means they were completely successful, how successful do you believe the terrorists were at bringing about each of the following?

61. (tt109_suspic) Causing Americans to be more suspicious of other people? Not At All Completely Successful Successful % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2002: 474 0.7 0.7 0.7 2.5 3.6 10.5 7.6 15.5 18.4 8.7 31.2 7.68

62. (tt110_rights) Causing Americans to give up important rights and freedoms? Not At All Completely Successful Successful % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2002: 474 6.8 7.9 12.9 8.4 8.4 14.0 5.9 12.0 9.9 4.3 9.7 4.96

63. (tt111_fear) Causing Americans to become more fearful in their everyday lives?

Not At All Completely Successful Successful % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2002: 474 2.9 2.0 7.6 7.4 6.5 13.5 9.2 11.7 13.0 7.4 18.8 6.28

64. (tt112_life) On a scale where zero means not at all changed and ten means completely changed, to what degree, if any, has your way of life changed as a result of the terrorist attacks in September 2001? Not At All Completely Changed Changed % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2002: 474 14.3 12.1 15.7 13.9 7.2 13.2 5.6 6.7 7.0 0.9 3.4 3.58

On a scale from one to seven where one means greatly decreased, four means no change, and seven means greatly increased, how has the threat of terrorism affected your willingness to engage in the following activities?

65. (tt113_flyus) Flying on commercial airliners within the U.S. Greatly No Greatly Decreased Change Increased % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2002: 474 10.5 4.8 3.2 64.3 5.7 3.0 8.6 3.93

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66. (tt114_abroad) Traveling outside the U.S. Greatly No Greatly Decreased Change Increased % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2002: 474 12.8 4.8 5.5 47.8 6.9 5.9 16.2 4.14

67. (tt115_crowds) Attending public events or visiting public places where there are large crowds of people, such as sporting events, shopping centers, parades, and political rallies. Greatly No Greatly Decreased Change Increased % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2002: 474 11.7 5.0 3.8 63.1 7.4 2.7 6.3 3.83

68. (t116_ZIP; tt116_zip_2) What is the zip code at your residence?

69. (t117_RESIDE; tt117_reside_2) Including yourself, how many people currently live at your residence? Means 2002: 474 2.75 2001: 474 2.70 2001: 935 2.75

70. (t118_OVR18; tt118_ovr18_2) How many of those are 18 years of age or older? Means 2002: 474 2.21 2001: 474 2.20 2001: 935 2.22

71. (tt119_info) To the best of your knowledge, what was your primary source of information about the events of September 11, 2001 in the week leading up to the anniversary of the terrorist attacks? [If more than one] What is the most important source?

Television Newspapers Radio Magazines Friends/Relatives Other 1 2 3 4 5 6 2002: 474 66.9 14.2 9.4 1.8 1.6 6.2

72. (tt120_infoshow) To the best of your knowledge, how many times in the week leading up to the anniversary of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks did you watch a television program, listen to a radio program, or read a newspaper article that focused on the events of that day?

Mean 2002: 474 13.21

108

73. (t121_PARTY; tt121_party_2) With which political party do you most identify?

Democrat Republican Independent Other % 1 2 3 4 2002: 474 44.9 45.1 6.4 3.7 2001: 474 44.7 46.9 4.7 3.7 2001: 935 43.1 47.0 7.1 2.8

74. (t122_IDEN; tt122_iden_2) Do you completely, somewhat, or slightly identify with that political party? Slightly Somewhat Completely % 1 2 3 Mean 2002: 474 10.1 57.5 32.4 2.22 2001: 474 8.0 51.9 40.1 2.32 2001: 935 8.2 52.4 39.4 2.31

75. (t123_IDEOL; tt123_ideol_2) On a scale of political ideology, individuals can be arranged from strongly liberal to strongly conservative. Which of the following categories best describes your views?

Strongly Slightly Middle of Slightly Strongly Liberal Liberal Liberal the road Conserv. Conserv. Conserv. % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2002: 474 –wtd 4.8 13.2 13.2 24.1 16.3 19.8 8.5 4.28 2002: 474 4.3 13.6 12.7 22.7 16.1 21.3 9.3 4.34 2001: 474 3.0 14.1 11.5 24.1 15.7 22.4 9.1 4.39 2001: 935 3.9 12.9 11.0 27.8 16.6 18.8 9.1 4.33 Paired t-test: Unpaired t-test: 2002_474 vs. 2001_474: p = .1911 2001_474 vs. 2001_935: p = .5221

76. (t124_RACE; tt124_race_2) Which of the following best describes your race or ethnic background?

American White Something Indian Asian Black Hispanic Non-Hispanic Else % 1 2 3 4 5 6 2002: 474 3.2 2.0 2.7 3.2 85.7 3.2 2001: 474 2.6 1.9 4.3 3.9 84.8 2.6 2001: 935 2.9 2.3 5.2 5.6 80.6 3.4

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77. (t 125d_COMBINC; tt125d_combinc_2) Please indicate which of the following income categories approximates the total estimated annual income for your household for the year _____.

< $10K $10–20K $20–30K $30–40K $40–50K $50–60K % 1 2 3 4 5 6 2002: 474 2.5 6.6 12.1 9.6 10.9 13.6 2001: 474 4.8 6.5 8.7 9.9 13.3 13.5 2001: 935 4.0 9.8 12.7 9.2 12.9 12.2

$60–70K $70–80K $80–90K $90–100K > $100K % 7 8 9 10 11 Median 2002: 474 10.4 7.6 2.8 5.1 18.9 6.0 2001: 474 11.3 6.0 5.3 5.1 15.7 6.0 2001: 935 9.7 7.2 4.9 4.5 12.9 6.0

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