United Nations - Geneva
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UNITED NATIONS - GENEVA READER TABLE OF CONTENTS Henry S. Villard 1958-1960 Representative, European Offi e of the United Nations, Geneva Winston Lord 1965-1967 Negotiator, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Geneva ,ohn ,. Harter 1966-1970 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Team -em.er, Geneva Walter Ro.erts 1967 Pu.li Affairs Adviser to USUN Am.assador, Geneva ,ames 0. Leonard 1969-1971 Assistant 2ire tor, Arms Control and 2isarmament Agen y, Geneva Idar 2. Rimestad 1969-1973 Representative, European Offi e of the United Nations, Geneva -a6 W. 7raus 1971-1975 Pu.li Affairs Advisor, European Offi e of the United Nations, USIS, Geneva Walter 8. Smith, II 1973-1974 2elegate, -iddle East Pea e Conferen e, Geneva Howard -eyers 1977-1978 US Representative, Conferen e of the Committee on 2isarmament, Geneva ,ohn A. 8u he 1978-1981 Refugee Affairs Offi er, Geneva Gerald 8. Helman 1979-1981 Representative, European Offi e of the United Nations, Geneva Stephen E. Palmer, ,r. 1979-1981 Chief of Humanitarian Affairs, Geneva 2avid -i hael Wilson 1979-1984 Pu.li Affairs Counselor, USIS, Geneva ,ohn ,. Harter 1981-1983 2elegate, United Nations Conferen e on Trade and 2evelopment, Geneva -elville 8lake 1983 2elegate, US 2elegation to International Tele ommuni ations, Geneva Ronald 2. 0la k 1983-1984 Politi al Counselor, European Offi e of the United Nations, Geneva ,oan -. Plaisted 1983-1985 US Trade Representative, Geneva 8eauveau 8. Nalle 1984-1986 Counselor for Refugee and -igration Affairs, Geneva Ronald 2. 0la k 1984-1987 2eputy Chief of -ission, Geneva Warren Zimmerman 1985-1986 2eputy Chief = Arms Negotiations, Geneva Charles E. Rushing 1985-1991 E6e utive Assistant to the Am.assador, European Offi e of the United Nations, Geneva Ri hard - 7ee 1986-1988 Politi al Counselor, Human Rights Offi er, European Offi e of the United Nations, Geneva 2avid T. ,ones 1987-1989 IN0 Negotiations -em.er, Geneva G. Clay Nettles 1991-1993 E onomi Counselor, Geneva Stephen ,. Ledogar 1990-1997 US Representative, Conferen e on 2isarmament, Geneva Peter 2avid Ei her 1991-1995 Politi al Counselor, Geneva Leon Weintrau. 1993-1997 International Relations Offi er, US -ission to the UN, Geneva Sally Grooms Cowal 1995-1999 2elegate, UN Program on HIV and AI2S, Geneva HENRY S. VILLARD Representative, E ropean Office of the United Nations Geneva (1958-1960- Henry S. Villard was born in New York City in 1900. After receiving his bachelor s degree from Harvard University he did post graduate work at Magdalen College at Oxford University. His career includes positions in Tehran, Washington D.C., Rio de Janeiro, Vene.uela, Norway, Libya, and ambassadorship to Senegal and Mauritania. Ambassador Villard was interviewed by Dmitri Villard in July 1991. Q: So in 1901 you were sent abroad again, this time to 2eneva, Swit.erland. What was your assignment there3 VILLAR2: The title of my position in Geneva was United States Representative at the European Offi e of the United Nations and other International Organizations. This, as the title implies, involved hiefly representing of the United States vis a vis the other ountries represented at the UN in Geneva. 0or the other organizations in Geneva, su h as the World Health Organization, I had dire t relations with themA they in luded the Offi e of Refugees, the International La.or Organization, et . It is an e6ample of multi-national diploma y at its best. Q: It was also the site of innumerable conferences dealing with trade and tariffs, communications. VILLAR2: Also, for e6ample, the high-level politi al onferen e on surprise atta k, the pea eful uses of atomi energy, and so forth. Q: How do you feel the effectiveness was of your organi.ation and staff in 2eneva3 VILLAR2: I think that we had an e6 ellent organization, mostly spe ialists in various su.Be ts, all of whom knew their business. We were unfortunately not a.le to represent the United States as effe tively as we might in a so ial sense be ause of the a tion of the hairman of the House of RepresentativeCs appropriations ommittee, Congressman Rooney. He held the purse strings and for personal reasons he resented the fa t that the in um.ent onsul general lost his jo. when I arrived at the post. He took out his ire at this by depriving me of all representation and housing allowan es and we had to move out of a very satisfa tory villa where we used to entertain our various diplomati opposite num.ers and move into a small apartment, whi h reated a bad impression in Geneva. It was very em.arrassing. Q: How do you feel the interest was of the Department in your work at that time3 VILLAR2: I think only a ertain se tion of the 2epartment was really interested. The trade agreements se tion of the GATT DGeneral Agreement on Tariffs and TradesE in the E onomi area of the 2epartment was ertainly interested, but not so mu h interest on the politi al side was apparent. Q: In 1950 you were then appointed ambassador to Senegal and to Mauritania. If I am not mistaken you were originally appointed ambassador to the Mali Federation which included the country of Mali as well. What happened3 .INSTON LORD Negotiator, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Geneva (1965-1962- Ambassador Lord was born and raised in New York City and earned degrees at Yale University and the 6letcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He entered the 6oreign Service in 1951.After serving in Washington and 2eneva, Mr. Lord was assigned to the Department of Defense before joining the National Security Council, where he was involved in China and Indonesia matters. He subse8uently served on State s Policy Planning Staff. In 1910 Mr. Lord was named US Ambassador to China, where he served until 1919. From 1993 to 1997 the Ambassador held the position of Assistant Secretary of State dealing with Far Eastern Affairs. Ambassador Lord was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1991. Q: What was the overall thing3 LOR2: This was the negotiations under the GATT, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. There had been every few years a general negotiation. The GATT was one of the post-World War II organizations set up to regulate trade among nations, and to try to free trade among nations. Every now and then instead of plodding along with various bilateral negotiations around the world, the feeling was to have a glo.al negotiation with everyone who is a mem.er of GATT getting together and try to have a glo.al agreement. It had also the virtue of while you engaged in that, whi h usually took a lot of time, did hold off prote tionist pressures in various ountries .e ause they were saying, well, weCre now going into a negotiation and may.e we an free things up. So it had a way of freezing whatever tariff levels there were at the time, and tariffs were the most important although non-tariff barriers were beginning to get important, and keeping things from getting worse. So President 7ennedy proposed that we have another one of these rounds and try to free up trade. There had been at least one before that in the C50s, I forget what it was alled. We were in the pro ess of getting ready for that. Of ourse, it turned out that - and weCll get into this - it lasted mu h longer than we e6pe ted. When I went to Geneva thinking it was going to be a.out a year, it turned out to be two and a half years, and the only reason it was ever on luded was be ause Ameri an legislative authority to negotiate, granted by the Congress was going to run out on ,une 30, 1967. So that turned out to be a deadline whi h speeded up the negotiations the last si6 months or year. Q: As you were getting ready on your team, were you, I mean you and your team, looking ahead to see what the problems were going to be with the European Economic Community3 LOR2: Fes, it was true that year, but it be ame even more frustrating when we got to Geneva. It was a very slow pa e in negotiations, and the primary reason was be ause the EEC ould not get its a t together, primarily be ause of 0ran e. Generally you had the 8ritish, the 2ut h, et , traditionally looking for fairly forth oming li.eral trading positions, and the 0ren h to a ertain e6tent and I believe the Italians were dragging their feet. I guess the Germans also were for free trade. 8ut they had to get a onsensus and so we really spent a good part of ertainly that year waiting, when things were still preparatory, so it wasnCt so vivid. 8ut on e we got to Geneva it was mu h more lear that we were just waiting on the Europeans to ome forward with de ent positions. Sin e they were so entral to the negotiations, they held up the overall 7ennedy Round. The fa t is that you were Buggling several balls at on e. The fa t that no.ody ould negotiate with the EEC was holding up the overall negotiation. So we essentially treaded water while they .attled within the EEC, and the 0ren h were always introdu ing a prote tionist element. Getting ready in Washington onsisted, as I say, of ompiling statisti s, figuring out what our o.Be tives were, what tariffs and other barriers to trade we wanted to try to remove, what we were willing to give up, onsulting ICm sure with domesti interests, dealing with Congress, and just generally shaping strategy for the negotiations.