ISSN: 2560-1601

Vol. 30, No. 1 (ME)

June 2020

Montenegro political briefing: Political outlook after COVID-19 Vojin Golubovic

1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11.

+36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: Chen Xin

Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01

Montenegro Political outlook after COVID-19

The Corona virus pandemic affects the health systems of the country, but also political systems around the world are not immune. Parties on power in the countries in which parliamentary elections are planned this year depend in particular on the response to the pandemic. Montenegro is among them. And this event, the upcoming parliamentary elections, will mark the rest of 2020 in Montenegro. But also stricter requirements regarding Montenegro's negotiations with the EU.

Parliamentary elections in the time of COVID-19 pandemic

The elections are expected at the end of August, although it is still questionable who from the opposition will participate in them. Regardless of the fact that the majority of the opposition claims that the announcement of the elections by the President of Montenegro was unconstitutional, it would not be surprising if the same opposition participates in them. It seems that everything depends on the political assessment of the leadership of those parties, some of which seem to be receiving signals from outside as well.

In particular, the outcome of the elections is ungrateful to predict, bearing in mind that, unexpectedly, Montenegro under the influence of various internal and external factors, has become an area where the will of citizens, ie public opinion, is changing very quickly. This primarily refers to the following factors - the disputed Law on freedom of religion (passed at the beginning of the year) and the pandemic of the COVID-19 virus. While the disputed law is mostly used as argument by the opposition, the initial reaction of the government in the fight against the pandemic and the achieved results have certainly led to an increase in the rating of the parties in power. Thus, public opinion polls also varied, and it is expected that the two factors mentioned before will affect the great inconsistency in the electoral will of the citizens until elections. After the return of the epidemic (that was initially suppressed), possibly new good results of the health system could raise the rating of the ruling coalition again. If that happens before the elections, the ruling parties will surely use it in the election campaign, trying to avoid the negative economic consequences brought by COVID-19, above all huge borrowing and putting the national economy in an unenviable position. A very likely post-election budget rebalance should probably not be mentioned.

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On the other hand, the protests of members of the Serbian Orthodox Church are politicized, so that they contribute to creating an atmosphere like before the 2006 referendum when Montenegro's independence was voted on. And while many think that only the opposition benefits from such tensions caused by the Law on freedom of religion, it seems to suit the largest ruling party (DPS) as well, because they always won elections when they played in the election campaign on the emotions of those who voted for the independence of Montenegro. On the other hand, it seems that most opposition parties are now neglecting everything they should be focusing on, primarily reforms and the agenda for a better standard of living. Probably due to the lack of such a systematic agenda to offer to the people, opposition leaders are also focusing more on the emotions of the people when it comes to the church and on the mass protests launched by the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro. Pro-Serbian opposition parties will unequivocally try to build a better rating and a better election result using the topics related to the mentioned Law.

The Democratic Front (DF), the most radical pro-Serbian structure, faced with a drop in ratings during the pandemic, will probably try to take advantage of the Serbian Orthodox Church's conflict with the government and present itself as the exclusive supporter and organizer of religious protests. The announced religious protests, which will surely be held, with a large number of citizens, after the lifting of measures, will be presented by the DF as its own political platform, whose key goal is to be the strongest in the opposition. For that purpose, the plan will go in the direction of gathering all Serbian organizations to appear at elections together in a coalition. In addition to the DF, the list could include several minor parties. According to some political analysts, the inflammatory rhetoric of the leaders of the DF, as well as threats of civil war and inappropriate behavior in parliament, will certainly spill over into the election campaign, which will probably be the dirtiest in last 20 years. Apart from the inflammatory rhetoric between the government and the opposition, one should expect a dirty campaign within the opposition itself, especially between the lists that will be led by the DF and the Democrats because they share an important part of the voters. It is expected that these two parties will play a dominant role among the opposition parties.

On the other hand, the part of the opposition that does not consider itself "pro-Serbian" - above all, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the civic movement URA seem to be the only opposition parties that will focus their election propaganda more on economic than religious issues. Therefore, it is possible to expect that their focus will be on criticism of the government based on insufficient reforms in those areas that the European Union recognizes as key - the fight against corruption, insufficient reforms in the judiciary, high public debt of Montenegro

2 and the like. The URA will likely base its election campaign on advocating for an open list system, conducting lustration, opening secret files, reforming the economic, education and health systems, and passing property origin laws. Especially, one can expect that URA will put the emphasis on environmental protection, because this political movement has become a part of "green" parties of Europe.

However, it seems that these two parties - SDP and URA, if they do not appear in a coalition, will fight to pass the census, and the question is whether they will manage to enter the parliament. They simply do not cope enough and do not take a sufficient stance on the current religious situation (although the SDP voted for the government's Law on freedom of religion). It is not excluded that pre-election coalitions will be formed in order to neutralize the possibility of not passing the census. However, it is unlikely that any of these parties will be in a coalition with the Democrats or the Democratic Front. A coalition with the Demos or the Socialists of Montenegro is more likely.

In any case, it seems that political disagreements in 2020 will be very conflicting, despite the fact that the COVID-19 virus pandemic has shown all the absurdity of irreconcilable conflicts, especially those based on "national" or religious sentiments. Although the pandemic has shown how limited politicians can actually be in their plans, as well as how (un) creative they are in proposing solutions to the real problems caused by the pandemic (especially some opposition parties that were not active in making concrete proposals), in the coming period these parties will continue to try to fascinate the masses.

The political scene in 2020 after the election

If the currently strongest ruling party still has the opportunity to form a government after these elections, it will be faced with difficult decisions. The same awaits any other party if it wins power. This is especially true because, in addition to economic problems (almost certainly the economic downturn will be the largest among the countries of the region, huge public debt growth, the unavailability of the euro), the country will almost certainly face new demands from the European Union.

The so-called Non-paper of the European Commission for Montenegro emphasizes that the COVID-19 pandemic has created additional challenges in the field of judicial reform and contributed to certain objective delays in Montenegro's work on its rule of law agenda. However, it is clear that this document predominantly emphasizes some problems that need to be urgently resolved, such as pressures in judiciary and media in Montenegro. Therefore, after

3 the elections, it is possible to do something about this issue, in order to at least formally show the progress in this area.

The new methodology in the process of negotiations with the EU should already in 2020 show whether politicians are ready to face real problems, i.e. are they able to show a higher degree of responsibility when it comes to key reform issues. Although the Montenegrin government is satisfied with the fact that the European Parliament adopted the Report on Recommendations for the Enlargement of the European Union to the Western Balkans, which calls for faster closing of negotiation chapters with Montenegro, a progress in the rule of law is expected as soon as possible. However, as things stand at the moment, there are unlikely to be any significant shifts this year, as politicians have skilfully shifted the ball to other pitches. However, it is clear that the EU will not sit idly by because it has imposed on itself the obligation to be more engaged in the region, especially in the fight against corruption, increasing various freedoms (for example, the media, etc.). The issue of enlargement will be conditioned by the implementation of reforms and concrete results. However, by the end of 2020, significant progress should not be expected.

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