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Operation SOHIL LARAM II, Kandahar Province, February 2008 Canadian Military History Volume 18 Issue 1 Article 8 2009 Operational Manoeuvre Group: Operation SOHIL LARAM II, Kandahar Province, February 2008 Sean M. Maloney Royal Military College of Canada, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Part of the Military History Commons Recommended Citation Maloney, Sean M. "Operational Manoeuvre Group: Operation SOHIL LARAM II, Kandahar Province, February 2008." Canadian Military History 18, 1 (2009) This Feature is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Maloney: Operation SOHIL LARAM II Operational Manoeuvre Group Operation SOHIL LARAM II, Kandahar Province, February 2008 Sean M. Maloney t is natural for military historians vehicles (UAVs), various Intelligence ABSTRACT: In February 2008 Regional Battle to focus on purely national issues Surveillance and Target Acquisition Group (South) in Afghanistan, based on Iand national history. Indeed, The 1st Battalion, The Royal Gurkha Rifles (ISTAR) capabilities, Civil-Military writing about coalition warfare is supported by Canadian “enablers” and Cooperation (CIMIC) and artillery notoriously difficult, particularly working with Afghan national security operate everywhere in RC (South) when it comes to using sources from forces, conducted a mission known as depending on where they are needed, Operation SOHIL LARAM II in the Maywand all of the key national players, sources but usually come under the control of district of Kandahar province. A weak subject to uneven availability. Then NATO presence coupled with a corrupt a provincial brigade headquarters for there is the Canadian proclivity police force had allowed the Taliban the duration of a given operation and towards making up for lost time to turn Maywand into a safe haven. then they revert to national control. in military history affairs, which Following the dismissal of the police force, Consequently, few operations in Op SOHIL LARAM II was successful in generates gravitation towards Afghanistan are conducted by a disrupting Taliban operations, reasserting examining Canadian combat arms government authority and regaining the single country on its own. units to the exclusion of the activities confidence of the local population. In In January 2008, Canada took of higher headquarters and support addition, the disruption of Taliban forces command of RC (South) Headquarters. units. Indeed, we expect our larger allowed the relief in place of Canadian Led by Major-General Marc Lessard, battle groups to proceed without the usual allies, with their more robust history RC (South) HQ deployed resources interference. production apparati, to take care of in Kandahar Province in order to themselves and our coalition history. that conform to the main provinces in supplement operations already As a result, a danger exists that we southern Afghanistan: TF Helmand underway commanded by Brigadier- may overlook critical aspects of our (British); TF Oruzgan (Dutch); TF General Guy Laroche, the commander military history particularly when we Zabol (Romanian and American) and of Task Force Kandahar. One of have allied forces under Canadian TF Kandahar (Canada). In addition, those resources was an entity called command. an Afghan corps headquarters, 205 Regional Battle Group (South) or In addition to providing a battle Corps, is the counterpart to RC RBG(S). The RBG(S) acted as a regional group, a provincial reconstruction (South) and each province boasts reserve force and could be employed team, special operations forces, an Afghan National Army (ANA) by RC (South) HQ anywhere in the and mentoring teams to the war brigade. For the most part, each ANA region it deemed necessary. The only in Afghanistan, Canada holds brigade is twinned with each ISAF self-imposed caveat was that the force rotating command of the NATO-led brigade and will control between had to be used to generate enduring International Security Assistance one and four kandaks, or Afghan operational-level effects, not only Force’s (ISAF) Regional Command battalion-sized forces. short-term tactical or provincial-level (South) Headquarters. RC (South) Scarce national resources or effects. is responsible for four brigade-sized “enablers” like helicopters, close The United Kingdom assigned national commands or task forces air support, unmanned aerial the 1st Battalion, The Royal Gurkha © Canadian Military History, Volume 18, Number 1, Winter 2009, pp.61-78. 61 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 18 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 8 Rifles as RBG(S) in the fall of 2007 The Operational Level off balance elsewhere. Zabol, recently “without strings,” meaning that the Situation taken over by a Romanian battle usual restrictive national caveats group, still boasted an American were lifted for the duration. This he situation in RC (South) in Provincial Reconstruction Team light infantry battalion, composed Tearly 2008 was calm relative to (PRT) and for the most part kept the of Nepalese Gurkhas led by British previous years. The United Kingdom vital Ring Road South (RRS) open. officers and supplemented with had, since 2006, tripled the size of its In Kandahar province, the Canadian “enablers,” proved to be forces in Helmand province, from Canadian battlegroup and an Afghan a formidable and agile asset and a battle group to nearly a brigade. National Army company kicked the significantly contributed to achieving Headway was made in the Musa Taliban out of Arghandab district, less ISAF’s aims in Kandahar Province. Qala area and even some senior than five kilometers from Kandahar This article will examine Operation Taliban commanders were starting City. This last move was the latest SOHIL LARAM II, an operation to join the PTS amnesty programme. in a campaign to block Taliban conducted by the Regional Battle In Oruzgan province, the Dutch task attempts to take control of a district Group (South) in Maywand district of force controlled the main population that abutted Ring Road South and Kandahar province in late February centres, while an Australian special the city. The enemy had, since 2006, 2008. operations task force kept the Taliban tried to interdict the four main routes into Kandahar City. Zharey district was, in January 2008, garrisoned by ANA and Afghan National Police and there was a substantial amount of development taking place. Over in Panjwayi district, the Taliban that had been pushed out of Zharey mounted an IED (improvised explosive device) campaign on the main roads there. Taliban still operated in Zharey, but unlike back in 2006-07, they were unable to seriously control the population. There was virtually no enemy activity around Kandahar Air Field (KAF), nor was the enemy operating along Highway 4, the main trade route between Afghanistan and Pakistan in the south. Task Force Kandahar and the ANA’s 205 Corps did not have the forces nor the resources to garrison the entire province, so they focused on districts that were vital ground. Northern districts like Khakriz, Ghorak and Sha Wali Kot had varying levels of Taliban influence but for the most part that influence remained local. The 1st Battalion, The Royal Gurkha Rifles, acted as the Regional Battlegroup (South) reserve force in 2007-08. 1 RGR developed a close working relationship with the Canadian task force. 62 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol18/iss1/8 2 Maloney: Operation SOHIL LARAM II The Taliban maintained training sites, weapons dumps, and command nodes inside Pakistan, notably in and around the city of Quetta, where the Taliban command for the south, the Quetta Shura, was located. The modus operandi was to infiltrate fighters individually or in small numbers into Afghanistan, smuggle in weapons and ammunition separately, mate the two and then fight. Suicide bombers had a separate but parallel system. To mount any sort of operation inside Kandahar City or in the adjacent districts took time. A command node (or nodes depending on the size of the force) had to be established first, followed by a logistics node to stockpile weapons and ammo. “Rat lines” consisting of safe houses, sympathizers in the transportation community, and facilitators of all types had to be positioned and activated. Notably, the rat lines sometimes worked in reverse for Taliban casualty evacuation. These shadowy networks were notoriously difficult to track down, in part because the police forces (the exception was the National Bechthold ©2009 Mike by Map drawn Directorate of Security (NDS – Afghan Secret Police), which was small but fairly effective) were not capable of taking a sophisticated approach to there were “wandering Mullahs” Kandahar Air Field. The highways doing so. Checkpoints and police proselytizing in the rural areas, and the airfield are absolutely critical patrols could be bribed, others could all backed up with a sophisticated to the ISAF, OEF and Afghan efforts be intimidated, still others adopted a intimidation campaign that made in RC (South). Second, the Taliban “live and let live” policy. ISAF and the Taliban look more powerful had not taken Kandahar City. Control OEF forces, however, maintained then they actually were, especially of Kandahar City is critical to the steady pressure on the enemy system in the rural areas. In other districts, control of southern Afghanistan both to generate as much friction as the Taliban co-opted corrupt local geographically and psychologically: possible within it. leaders, or other men who played not only is it a transportation hub, it The Taliban also tried their hand both sided against the middle for is also the religious/political centre at establishing a parallel government, sheer survival or profit or both. These of the region. Weakened in all the but this generally took negative people tended to overlap with the adjacent districts, thwarted in their forms as opposed to competitive narcotic producers in certain areas latest endeavour in Arghandab forms.
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