Operation SOHIL LARAM II, Kandahar Province, February 2008

Canadian Military History

Volume 18 Issue 1 Article 8

2009

Operational Manoeuvre Group: Operation SOHIL LARAM II, Kandahar Province, February 2008

Sean M. Maloney Royal Military College of Canada, [email protected]

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh

Part of the Military History Commons

Recommended Citation Maloney, Sean M. "Operational Manoeuvre Group: Operation SOHIL LARAM II, Kandahar Province, February 2008." Canadian Military History 18, 1 (2009)

This Feature is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Maloney: Operation SOHIL LARAM II

Operational Manoeuvre Group Operation SOHIL LARAM II, Kandahar Province, February 2008

Sean M. Maloney

t is natural for military historians vehicles (UAVs), various Intelligence Abstract: In February 2008 Regional Battle to focus on purely national issues Surveillance and Target Acquisition Group (South) in Afghanistan, based on Iand national history. Indeed, The 1st Battalion, The Royal Gurkha Rifles (ISTAR) capabilities, Civil-Military writing about coalition warfare is supported by Canadian “enablers” and Cooperation (CIMIC) and artillery notoriously difficult, particularly working with Afghan national security operate everywhere in RC (South) when it comes to using sources from forces, conducted a mission known as depending on where they are needed, Operation SOHIL LARAM II in the Maywand all of the key national players, sources but usually come under the control of district of Kandahar province. A weak subject to uneven availability. Then NATO presence coupled with a corrupt a provincial brigade headquarters for there is the Canadian proclivity police force had allowed the Taliban the duration of a given operation and towards making up for lost time to turn Maywand into a safe haven. then they revert to national control. in military history affairs, which Following the dismissal of the police force, Consequently, few operations in Op SOHIL LARAM II was successful in generates gravitation towards Afghanistan are conducted by a disrupting Taliban operations, reasserting examining Canadian combat arms government authority and regaining the single country on its own. units to the exclusion of the activities confidence of the local population. In In January 2008, Canada took of higher headquarters and support addition, the disruption of Taliban forces command of RC (South) Headquarters. units. Indeed, we expect our larger allowed the relief in place of Canadian Led by Major-General Marc Lessard, battle groups to proceed without the usual allies, with their more robust history RC (South) HQ deployed resources interference. production apparati, to take care of in Kandahar Province in order to themselves and our coalition history. that conform to the main provinces in supplement operations already As a result, a danger exists that we southern Afghanistan: TF Helmand underway commanded by Brigadier- may overlook critical aspects of our (British); TF Oruzgan (Dutch); TF General Guy Laroche, the commander military history particularly when we Zabol (Romanian and American) and of Task Force Kandahar. One of have allied forces under Canadian TF Kandahar (Canada). In addition, those resources was an entity called command. an Afghan corps headquarters, 205 Regional Battle Group (South) or In addition to providing a battle Corps, is the counterpart to RC RBG(S). The RBG(S) acted as a regional group, a provincial reconstruction (South) and each province boasts reserve force and could be employed team, special operations forces, an Afghan National Army (ANA) by RC (South) HQ anywhere in the and mentoring teams to the war brigade. For the most part, each ANA region it deemed necessary. The only in Afghanistan, Canada holds brigade is twinned with each ISAF self-imposed caveat was that the force rotating command of the NATO-led brigade and will control between had to be used to generate enduring International Security Assistance one and four kandaks, or Afghan operational-level effects, not only Force’s (ISAF) Regional Command battalion-sized forces. short-term tactical or provincial-level (South) Headquarters. RC (South) Scarce national resources or effects. is responsible for four brigade-sized “enablers” like helicopters, close The United Kingdom assigned national commands or task forces air support, unmanned aerial the 1st Battalion, The Royal Gurkha

Rifles as RBG(S) in the fall of 2007 The Operational Level off balance elsewhere. Zabol, recently “without strings,” meaning that the Situation taken over by a Romanian battle usual restrictive national caveats group, still boasted an American were lifted for the duration. This he situation in RC (South) in Provincial Reconstruction Team light infantry battalion, composed Tearly 2008 was calm relative to (PRT) and for the most part kept the of Nepalese Gurkhas led by British previous years. The United Kingdom vital Ring Road South (RRS) open. officers and supplemented with had, since 2006, tripled the size of its In Kandahar province, the Canadian “enablers,” proved to be forces in Helmand province, from Canadian battlegroup and an Afghan a formidable and agile asset and a battle group to nearly a brigade. National Army company kicked the significantly contributed to achieving Headway was made in the Musa Taliban out of Arghandab district, less ISAF’s aims in Kandahar Province. Qala area and even some senior than five kilometers from Kandahar This article will examine Operation Taliban commanders were starting City. This last move was the latest SOHIL LARAM II, an operation to join the PTS amnesty programme. in a campaign to block Taliban conducted by the Regional Battle In Oruzgan province, the Dutch task attempts to take control of a district Group (South) in Maywand district of force controlled the main population that abutted Ring Road South and Kandahar province in late February centres, while an Australian special the city. The enemy had, since 2006, 2008. operations task force kept the Taliban tried to interdict the four main routes into Kandahar City. Zharey district was, in January 2008, garrisoned by ANA and Afghan National Police and there was a substantial amount of development taking place. Over in Panjwayi district, the Taliban that had been pushed out of Zharey mounted an IED (improvised explosive device) campaign on the main roads there. Taliban still operated in Zharey, but unlike back in 2006-07, they were unable to seriously control the population. There was virtually no enemy activity around Kandahar Air Field (KAF), nor was the enemy operating along Highway 4, the main trade route between Afghanistan and Pakistan in the south. Task Force Kandahar and the ANA’s 205 Corps did not have the forces nor the resources to garrison the entire province, so they focused on districts that were vital ground. Northern districts like Khakriz, Ghorak and Sha Wali Kot had varying levels of Taliban influence but for the most part that influence remained local.

The 1st Battalion, The Royal Gurkha Rifles, acted as the Regional Battlegroup (South) reserve force in 2007-08. 1 RGR developed a close working relationship with the Canadian task force.

62 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol18/iss1/8 2 Maloney: Operation SOHIL LARAM II

The Taliban maintained training sites, weapons dumps, and command nodes inside Pakistan, notably in and around the city of Quetta, where the Taliban command for the south, the Quetta Shura, was located. The modus operandi was to infiltrate fighters individually or in small numbers into Afghanistan, smuggle in weapons and ammunition separately, mate the two and then fight. Suicide bombers had a separate but parallel system. To mount any sort of operation inside Kandahar City or in the adjacent districts took time. A command node (or nodes depending on the size of the force) had to be established first, followed by a logistics node to stockpile weapons and ammo. “Rat lines” consisting of safe houses, sympathizers in the transportation community, and facilitators of all types had to be positioned and activated. Notably, the rat lines sometimes worked in reverse for Taliban casualty evacuation. These shadowy networks were notoriously difficult to track down, in part because the police forces (the exception was the National Bechthold ©2009 Mike by Map drawn Directorate of Security (NDS – Afghan Secret Police), which was small but fairly effective) were not capable of taking a sophisticated approach to there were “wandering Mullahs” Kandahar Air Field. The highways doing so. Checkpoints and police proselytizing in the rural areas, and the airfield are absolutely critical patrols could be bribed, others could all backed up with a sophisticated to the ISAF, OEF and Afghan efforts be intimidated, still others adopted a intimidation campaign that made in RC (South). Second, the Taliban “live and let live” policy. ISAF and the Taliban look more powerful had not taken Kandahar City. Control OEF forces, however, maintained then they actually were, especially of Kandahar City is critical to the steady pressure on the enemy system in the rural areas. In other districts, control of southern Afghanistan both to generate as much friction as the Taliban co-opted corrupt local geographically and psychologically: possible within it. leaders, or other men who played not only is it a transportation hub, it The Taliban also tried their hand both sided against the middle for is also the religious/political centre at establishing a parallel government, sheer survival or profit or both. These of the region. Weakened in all the but this generally took negative people tended to overlap with the adjacent districts, thwarted in their forms as opposed to competitive narcotic producers in certain areas latest endeavour in Arghandab forms. Attacking schools and the of RC (South). district, the Quetta Shura was at a health care system in order to deny The situation as it stood in late crossroads. effective government services was January 2008 was that the enemy was If the Quetta Shura hoped to not the same as actually providing incapable of interdicting the main move back to the heady days of parallel services, but there were small highways throughout RC (South) and 2006 when they seriously contested numbers of Taliban “judges” and failed to interfere with operations at coalition control of Zharey and

63 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009 3 Canadian Military History, Vol. 18 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 8

Ch-47 Chinooks like this one conducted the night airmobile insertion of 1 RGR into the Band-e Timor communities in Maywand district during the opening stages of Op SOHIL LARAM II.

Panjwayi districts, mounted an was the upcoming relief-in-place to revitalize their networks, they incessant suicide bomb campaign (RIP) of the 3rd Battalion, R22eR would work out of those seams first, in the city and showered Kandahar battlegroup with 2nd Battalion, use them as staging areas, and then Air Field with rockets nearly every Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light infiltrate and support their forces night, the networks, command nodes, Infantry. In the past, the enemy in districts adjacent to the city. The and logistics nodes had to be re-built exploited less than seamless RIPs to combination of these factors pointed nearly everywhere. The cells in place the detriment of the departing and the planning staffs from RBG(S), had to be revitalized, reinforced, arriving forces. The arriving force TFK, and RC (South) towards one and resupplied. Consequently, the was usually inexperienced and took particular district – Maywand. networks in the districts in the next time to get up to speed with the deep Maywand district lies, from east ring away from the city had to be nuances of operating in the districts to west, between Zharey district revitalized first as a precondition. As and communities. Disruptive activity and Helmand province; Ring Road it stood in early 2008, if the Taliban by coalition forces could shield the South runs straight through the were unable to achieve the saliency RIP and buy the incoming forces time middle of the district, through the they had in 2006, they would lose even to acclimatize. prosperous agricultural community more credibility with the population. At the same time, enemy forces of Hutel. From north to south, That credibility was eroded daily with in the peripheral districts tended to Maywand is sandwiched between each new government reconstruction operate in “seams.” They understood the mountainous Ghorak district and or governance initiative. the problems of coordination between the Arghandab river and then the The generalities of this situation coalition partners on the artificial inhospitable Reg Desert. The Dasht, were known in RC (South) and in boundary lines established by staffs as the wide open plain is called, is a Task Force Kandahar in early 2008 and understood that coalition control millennia-old trade and transit route – the pressure had to be kept up in an lessened the further away from between the Indian subcontinent and overall sense across the region. The the main population centres that Persia. issue in Kandahar province, however, they operated. If the Taliban hoped

64 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol18/iss1/8 4 Maloney: Operation SOHIL LARAM II

Operationally, Maywand was a fall, but these were independent and occupation was not optimal, but seam between Task Force Helmand temporary operations generally not there was no apparent solution to that and Task Force Kandahar, right smack coupled with Afghan efforts in the problem in the initial stages of the dab in the middle. The district had a district. planning process, so SOHIL LARAM reputation as a singularly large rat The potential operational-level II started off conceptually as a large- line connecting extensive infiltration effects of inserting the Regional scale RBG(S) raid. routes in the Helmand river valley Battlegroup (South) into Maywand that came in from Pakistan, to the district were considerable. It would Task Organization western edge of Zharey district and disrupt the ratline into Zharey and the western-most point of Panjwayi Panjwayi districts, especially during BG(S) or Task Force TIGER district. Intelligence analysts assumed the RIP. It would demonstrate to Rwas based on 1st Battalion, The over the years that the southern part the Taliban that coalition forces did Royal Gurkha Rifles (1 RGR). Led by of the district, an elongated series of not fear operating in districts they Lieutenant-Colonel Jonny Bourne, communities called Band‑e Timor, did not traditionally operate in and 1 RGR normally had three light was a Taliban stronghold, out of that coalition forces would operate infantry companies. In Afghanistan, reach because of the priorities to with impunity. Such an operation however, 1 RGR detached one protect the city and far enough would also enhance security along company to Helmand province, south from the main highway to be Ring Road South, the link between leaving two infantry companies off the beaten path. Word filtered Kandahar Air Field and Task Force available for RBG(S) operations: out the previous year that there was Helmand. “A” Company led by Major Paul even a functional Taliban shadow The main problem, as the “Pitch” Pitchfork, and “C” Company government complete with judges planners knew, was that without led by Major Will Kefford.1 There operating there. an enduring coalition presence the was a support company broken The district leader and his police enemy would eventually re-infiltrate down into two Fire Support Groups had a reputation for being brutally the district and be back in business. (machine guns, snipers) and a mortar corrupt but because he had been “Emptying the garbage” as the platoon of six 82 mm mortars. 1 RGR appointed by the current governor, Canadians called it, or as the British had its own doctor and medical he appeared untouchable. Rumours named it, “mowing the lawn” had its team. In terms of mobility, one abounded that his police hi-jacked uses, however. Disruption without company was transported in Vector World Food Program (WFP) aid trucks with impunity and even executed their drivers back in the summer of 2007 because WFP refused to pay him off. There was no Afghan National Army presence. Tribally, Maywand was dominated by Noorzai and familial connections between the district and the border city of Spinboldak reportedly involved narcotics smuggling. in short, it was an ideal district to house a Taliban logistics node and rat line. There had been two coalition forays into Maywand back in 2007. The 2 RCR battlegroup conduced operations through the eastern portion of Band-e Timor with a company group in May, while the 1 RGR’s predecessor RGB(S), the Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2009 Mike by Map drawn 1st Battalion, Royal Welsh (The Royal Welsh Fusiliers) essentially conducted a similar operation in the

65 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009 5 Canadian Military History, Vol. 18 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 8

“A” Company 1 RGR conducts a compound search on Objective CHELSEA. This action would stimulate enemy movement and make their leaders more vulnerable to other coalition action.

The Plan

lanning SOHIL LARAM II was a Pessentially a three-way dialogue between the 1 RGR, TFK, and RBG(S) staffs. That dialogue established the justification as to exactly why the Gurkha battalion would be employed in Maywand district; conceptually how the battle group would be employed, with several options depending on transportation availability; and the coordination and deconfliction aspects. All of this had to be approved by Major-General vehicles, essentially a six-wheeled, Gurkhas were equipped with a Marc Lessard after his multinational uparmoured Pinzgauer truck, and variety of mortars, Lieutenant- staff at Regional Command (South) WMIK Landrovers armed with .50 Colonel Bourne requested and gave the thumbs up. cal machine guns and M-19 grenade received a two-gun detachment of Op SOHIL LARAM II was launchers. The other company was M‑777 155 mm guns, two 81 mm designed to achieve a number of carried by a squadron of Viking mortars and a troop of TLAV APCs2 effects. The most obvious was the tracked oversnow vehicles armed led by Lieutenant Candice Dunn disruption of enemy activity in with 7.62mm general purpose from the newly-arrived “B” Battery, Maywand district, flushing out machine guns and crewed by Royal 2 Royal Canadian Horse Artillery. and destroying leadership targets Marines. Small portable bridges and Since 1 RGR was the regional mobile which would result in positive fascines were carried to assist in reserve, it normally did not have its effects both Helmand and Kandahar moving across water obstacles that own specialist “enablers.” Canadian provinces. As for the district itself, criss-crossed the areas near the river. Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) the operation was designed to leave 1 RGR had also just conducted two and Tactical Psychological Operations the local population with a positive airmobile operations, one in northern Teams (TPT or PSYOPS) teams impression of the coalition forces, Kandahar province, and the other were also attached. For intelligence ANA and ANP with the hope that into the Chora Valley in Oruzgan collection and liaison purposes, this would serve as a basis for future with the Australian SAS Regiment, the Afghan National Directorate operations intended to establish and was proficient in those types of of Security attached a number of a permanent Afghan government operations as well. officers. A Canadian Joint Terminal presence throughout the district. 1 RGR had also worked closely Air Controller (JTAC) from Air Finally, the operation was designed with the Canadian battlegroup on Command and another from the RAF to improve the police presence at least two occasions in Zharey and Regiment (a squadron of which was along Highway 1 by reconstructing Panjwayi districts. In each operation, protecting Kandahar Air Field) with ANP checkpoints, many of which a Gurkha company operated under their specialist communications gear were rudimentary at best, partially- Canadian battlegroup command. also joined the force so 1 RGR could mannned and nearly indefensible. 1 RGR was short on long-range communicate with close air support There were a number of other firepower, however. Though the and attack aviation resources. reasons to conduct a Maywand

66 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol18/iss1/8 6 Maloney: Operation SOHIL LARAM II

operation at this particular time. opportunity to renew the district. could be substantial, especially on the One particular event on 13 February Rather than just raiding into the Maywand population. 2008 was significant. A Sperwer remoter parts of Maywand, the The assessment of Taliban TUAV (Tactical Unmanned Aerial RBG(S) would be able to generate forces in Maywand suggested that Vehicle) observed three World Food synergy by facilitating a combined the Band‑e Timor strip north of Program trucks being hijacked in coalition forces-police presence the Arghandab River concealed a broad daylight just east of Hutel. and help the new police establish facilitation network plus a line of The attackers bogged one truck themselves which would be a critical arms dumps and an intelligence down attempting to escape while step towards improving governance node on the boundary with Zharey an RG-31 Nayala and a section from in the district. There was an operating district. An enemy IED cell was the Canadian Operational Mentor theory that the district chief and known to operate in Ghorak district, and Liaison Team (OMLT) and two the corrupt police were in cahoots north of the Garmabak Pass, but had platoons from 2nd Kandak in Howz-e regarding aid convoy shakedowns, sortied south previously and killed Madad raced to respond. With a B-1B but no action had been taken against both British and Canadian troops in support, and the TUAV tracking the district chief for a variety of passing through the district. The the movements of the hijackers, the reasons. The removal of “his” police presence of static enemy fighting OMLT and the Afghan National meant that he would lose “muscle” forces could not be confirmed. The Army determined that police from and therefore be more compliant. Taliban generally moved through Maywand district were responsible. As the planning process progressed, the area singly or in small groups, This latest attack was the final straw 2nd Kandak was brought into the but sometimes coalesced to shoot up and resulted in the replacement of all operation, initially at company the Maywand district centre for info 160 police in Maywand district by the strength. A second company was ops effect. Enemy medium value Kandahar provincial Chief of Police, later added. Even though 2nd individuals (MVIs), or leadership General Saquib. Kandak would be committed for targets, were present from time to The unplanned wholesale a limited period, the information time, most likely using the Band-e replacement of the Maywand police operations and governance benefits Timor area as a rat line. Significant during the operational planning that could be derived from highly movement of coalition forces into process now provided a window of visible joint ANA-ANP patrolling the district would set these pieces in

“A” Company 1 RGR moves out from Objective CHELSEA. The terrain in this photo is typical for the southern Maywand district.

67 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009 7 Canadian Military History, Vol. 18 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 8

left – In the field the 1 RGR battalion tac headquarters has the ability to link to imagery provided by a variety of unmanned aerial vehicles, including MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper.

below left – Influence operations include the use of Key Leader Engagements. In this case, a local shura in Band-e Timor sits down with Lieutenant-Colonel Jonny Bourne for a chat about local expectations and conditions.

NATO ISAF, depending what was going on elsewhere in the country, so availability had to be confirmed. There were legal aspects that men like Lieutenant-Colonel Marc Gendron, the LEGAD (Legal Advisor) at RC(South), had to sort out. What rules of engagement were going to be used - Canadian, British, NATO? Under what conditions would they change? Who would approve those changes? What could be blown up and what couldn’t? At Task Force Kandahar, control measures between the battle groups’ forces operating in neighbouring Zharey district and the RBG(S) had to be established. For example, the templated range of a 120 mm gun on a Leopard 2 A6M was in excess of four kilometers. If the tanks were firing at something to the west of Zharey, could they accidentally hit the manoeuvring units? Or, if the Van Doos used artillery on a target in Panjwayi, nobody wanted lumbering CH-47’s flying through the rounds as they arced through the airspace. motion, either to escape or to engage, For example, at least three types These are not mundane matters when and then tactical responses by 1 RGR of special operations forces, none millions of dollars of helicopters and battlegroup would be generated of them belonging to RC(South), several hundred priceless human accordingly. With a dispersed enemy operated throughout the region. lives are at stake. hiding amongst the population, this They possessed their own ISTAR One of the main issues in planning was one of several ways to flush them resources and air support, and those SOHIL LARAM II revolved around out. resources had to be coordinated with the early warning problem. The Much of the staff effort dealt ISTAR and air support assigned to expansion of the cell phone network in with coordination and deconfliction RC(South). To make matters more Kandahar province since 2003 meant to avoid situations like the Tarnak complicated, some of these platforms that any person with a cell phone Farms tragedy in 2002 where four were the same, ie: they worked for was a potential sensor. The Taliban Canadian soldiers were killed by NATO ISAF as well as the other had non-insurgent insurgents (locals a bomb dropped by a US aircraft. entities. The priority was not always paid to do a specific, one-time task),

68 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol18/iss1/8 8 Maloney: Operation SOHIL LARAM II

ideological sympathizers from the old airmobile force would emerge out of evening of 20 February elements of days or people coerced into providing the desert from the south and surprise 2nd Kandak moved to Camp Roberts, information. In effect, each district them. The first course of action was the 1 RGR camp on Kandahar Air had an insurgent reporting network second best but the planners came Field, to link up with the Vikings that was activated the moment up with a scheme to use air power to and Vectors. The weather cleared coalition forces arrived on the scene. take out any enemy forces trying to enough by then and the airmobile The network could communicate escape the area. insertion was approved. The convoys in a variety of ways. This reporting The elongated nature of Band‑e departed around midnight while network extended from Maywand Timor posed some challenges. There the two infantry companies awoke to the gates of Kandahar Air Field were clusters of compound complexes from forced rest, prepared their (and probably within the base itself). all along the river for some 15-20 equipment, and were bused to the Deception, therefore, was a critical kilometers. There were irrigation helicopter hanger area. component in the plan. systems, including a canal with At 0235 hours IFF (identification When 1 RGR wargamed the fast running water moving through of friend or foe) control measures operation it became clear that the and between the complexes. Each (glow sticks and min-beacons) were presence of 100-plus vehicles on compound cluster was separated activated and attached to helmets Ring Road South during the day or by rolling but open arid terrain. and weapons checked. RAF ground night would be more than enough to The planners decided that the two personnel mustered the chalks in activate the enemy warning system. companies would be inserted on the dark as the crews of the CH-47 The enemy would not know exactly either end of the Band-e Timor river and Lynx helicopters prepared their where the force was going, however. zone and work towards the centre. aircraft. The APUs whined as they To get from the highway and into An Artillery Manoeuvre Area (AMA) started the engines, and soon the loud Band-e Timor would take time – it is for the Canadian guns and the 1 RGR whop-whop-whop of the huge blades over 12 kilometers with no roads. It logistics echelon would be established smacked the air. The Gurkhas filed would be enough time for the enemy on the Dasht in part to act as a block in, and when everybody was loaded, to hide or disperse before the force but also to give the artillery reach to RAF Chinooks and Army Air Corps arrived. the south. Lynx taxied into a line and lifted off The obvious answer was to On the way through Hutel, one the runway into a sharp banking conduct an airmobile insertion at platoon would be dropped off and turn that took the force into the night to achieve surprise. There start working with the new police, Reg Desert. British Army Air Corps were two problems with this course while the battalion command post AH‑64 Apache attack helicopters, of action. The first was helicopter would be set up in the district centre. already in the air, joined up to escort availability and the second was the Part of one of the companies would the force. Helicopters are loud by perfidious weather situation. Night later be brought north to Hutel and nature so everything possible was airmobile operations are complicated. join in operations there when the done to mask the noise signature Throw dust into the mix and the Afghan National Army arrived. If and achieve surprise. In this case, risk level rose dramatically, as the enemy forces appeared in the north the desert was empty and the enemy Americans found out during the near Ghorak, a contingency plan early warning net does not extend Desert One disaster in 1980.3 There was formulated to respond to that to the south out of the built-up areas were only so many helicopters and move. between Kandahar and Maywand. they were heavily tasked. 1 RGR The circuitous route also gave time generated two courses of action – a Execution: Insertion and for the slower convoys moving along ground move and insertion, and a Pursuit Ring Road South to get into position. combination ground move and Indeed, enemy “eyes” were focused airmobile insertion. uring the afternoon of 20 on the Vikings and Vectors as they The second course of action was DFebruary the weather situation drove towards Helmand. the best. The ground convoys would was not good as the infantry With the doors open and gunners move along Ring Road South, the companies rehearsed embarking with night vision leaning out checking enemy would activate the early and disembarking their helicopter the ground, the temperature inside warning system and watch the chalks in an open field. A small the Chinooks was near freezing for vehicles. As the ground force moved dust event was moving into the the 40 minutes it took to fly from off the roads south towards Band-e Kandahar area and the hills that were KAF to a point south of Maywand Timor, the enemy would be fixated normally visible from the airfield district. The full moon bathed the on its progress. Without warning the were obscured with dust. On the desert sand so it looked like an ocean

as the helicopters surfed the ground checked the surrounding area with in parallel and there were some shots effect at low level. At this point the night vision and when satisfied, fired. The company commander force split into two and headed for started to move off in the dark moved 9 Platoon in a leapfrog to the their respective company helicopter towards the objective compound complex to the south of where the landing sites (HLS). The loadies held complexes. There was no contact at enemy was, but while this was in up two fingers – two minutes to the first. progress, the Taliban continued to HLS – and the Gurkhas tapped each “A” Company got into complex move south. At this point, they could man ahead of them with two fingers. CHELSEA without incident and not be engaged from the air because Everybody stood up and seconds initiated several searches. “C” of an ROE (rules of engagement) later the machines’ noses lurched up Company, on the other hand, issue, so the pursuit continued. to flare into the HLS. “A” Company immediately bumped into the Taliban The Taliban force, numbering had a rough time – its Chinooks hit after insertion near NEWCASTLE some 17 personnel, crossed the river. the ground hard, probably because and BATH. 7 Platoon and 9 Platoon 7 Platoon engaged with 7.62 mm of the moon-dust-like powder that disembarked on the HLSs, with 7 machine gun fire when the Taliban obscured the distance to the ground. Platoon to the north. A group of silhouetted themselves on the skyline There were several injuries including enemy in a compound complex south and then the enemy split up. One broken noses and twisted knees. of 9 Platoon’s HLS were spotted by group of six struck southwest into the The Gurkhas poured out into a an orbiting MQ-1 Predator. 7 Platoon desert, while the remainder dodged defensive posture as the Chinooks swung into a blocking position to 9 Platoon and swung north, trying to and Lynxs lifted off, showering the the west of the complex as 9 Platoon cross the river and flank them. At this soldiers with large rocks and dust moved in, but the enemy pulled point, they were engaged by a B-1B for several seconds. Once the birds out to the south to another group of using three GBU-38 500-lb bombs. were gone the company commanders compounds. 7 Platoon moved south The strike, conducted around 0810

70 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol18/iss1/8 10 Maloney: Operation SOHIL LARAM II

right – Close air support was used during Op SOHIL LARAM II including a successful strike by a US Air Force B-1B on a Taliban group attempting to exfiltrate the engagement area.

centre right – The Viking oversnow vehicle was adapted for use in Afghanistan. Crewed by Royal Marines, this Viking troop acted as a mobile screen during cordon and search operations around Band-e Timor.

bottom right – Moving along Highway 1 from the DERBY box to Hutel, the battalion tac Vector vehicles halt so the Gurkhas can conduct a defile drill to deter IED attack.

hours, was estimated to have killed four and wounded three Taliban. The survivors turned east, heading towards Zharey. 7 Platoon moved east, south of the river, and 9 Platoon moved east, while the Fire Support group manoeuvred into several blocking positions to the north. In time the pursuit turned up nothing as the enemy hid their weapons and melted away in the compound complexes near BATH. The effects of the dance between “C” Company and the Taliban in Objectives NEWCASTLE and BATH was immediate. ISTAR resources reported that there was an enemy leadership target in the area. The combination of the Predator and the B-1B were kept on station as long as possible in case more enemy presented themselves. Meanwhile, “A” Company’s searches continued in CHELSEA. The NDS team working with the company discovered suspect materials of what might be IED production materials of a new type, but it turned out not to be the case. Of more interest was the discovery of a modified white Toyota Corolla, a type commonly associated with SVBIED’s (suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device) in RC (South). Numerous papers, ID cards, and notebooks were uncovered and sent off for translation. Then ISTAR resources reported that another enemy medium value target was

71 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009 11 Canadian Military History, Vol. 18 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 8

located in a compound complex while the operation was in progress and people what the coalition forces adjacent to CHELSEA. That made with the aim of positively influencing were doing in the area and why. In two significant enemy leaders present the population. Fundamentally, there theory, follow-on CIMIC activities in Band-e Timor. “A” Company then are local dynamics that cannot be and then development assistance detained an individual who was part captured by the broader examination from the Provincial Reconstruction of the Taliban early warning network. of tribal dynamics or provincial Team would follow but in the case of It was 0845 hours on the first day. political processes in southern a foray like SOHIL LARAM II, only Afghanistan. The only way to do so assessments within the constraints of Execution: Influence is through immediate close contact the tactical situation could be made. Operations with the population. Development could only take place The primary tool in the case with the long term domination of n important aspect of operations of SOHIL LARAM II was the Key the area by Afghan national security Alike SOHIL LARAM II is how Leader Engagement (KLE) where 1 forces the manoeuvre force relates to the RGR sought out local leaders and 1 RGR conducted numerous population. The intended effects met with them in shuras with other KLEs and shuras in the Band-e of this relationship were built into local elders and power brokers. Using Timor communities during the the plan. Indeed, the deployment interpreters and the accompanying course of SOHIL LARAM II. The of the battalion CO and his tactical NDS personnel, the meetings presence of the 1 RGR CO and his headquarters early in the operation in yielded valuable information on the tactical headquarters on the ground part related to influence operations. attitudes of the community as well with “A” Company was useful. These operations essentially as their needs, in addition to tactical Having an older head man from the combined information operations and information on enemy activities. The coalition meeting with the local elders CIMIC assessments with on-the-spot meetings also permitted PSYOPS to facilitated dialogue in ways that were assessments of the religious/political, disseminate their messages in subtle not as effective with younger men tribal and community dynamics ways and explain to the local leaders meeting with older men in certain

A pair of M-777 155 mm guns from “B” Battery, 2 Royal Canadian Horse artillery firing from the DERBY box in support of “A” Company, 1st Battalion, The Royal Gurkha Rifles.

72 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol18/iss1/8 12 Maloney: Operation SOHIL LARAM II

circumstances. Respect goes a long to prevent him from interfering with leaders were located somewhere in way and it is generation-based in the the shura. there. At least one was ordered by Pashtun culture. The insertion and manoeuvre of his high command in Pakistan to The picture that emerged after the 1 RGR battlegroup had a number leave and avoid being captured at several KLEs, though generalized, of other effects on the enemy forces all costs. Other enemy groups in Op was at odds with the perception throughout Band-e Timor-Hutel Boxes BURMA and MALAYA were that the communities were pro- triangle. ISTAR resources detected ordered by their higher headquarters Taliban and had been for several enemy activity consistent with a plan to escape while they could. “A” years. The message transmitted to to screen the escape of leaders, some Company was ordered to prepare the coalition forces was that the of whom appeared to be in Objective for a future tasking in that area. As bulk of the population would in fact YORK. One enemy group or observer ISTAR assets scoured the district, the welcome an Afghan National Army had “eyes on” the Canadian 155 mm 155 mm guns were readied and more presence, even ANA strong points. gun position and Gurkha echelon air power was requested, just in case They were generally not supportive located at DERBY. The CO was anything moved. The ISTAR priority of the Taliban, but they had no concerned that the enemy, though remained Objective YORK. choice because there was little or no psychologically off balance, would The enemy knew there were government presence. They did not, stay put and wait out the operation, so coalition forces in CHELSEA and however, want an Afghan National he pressed for more manoeuvre with he could see that the cordon and Police presence. The population had the intent to get the enemy moving, searches had been extended from the extremely poor relations with the get him to make mistakes and make compounds in CHELSEA to those in ANP in Hutel, and even referred to him vulnerable to strikes or capture. LEICESTERSHIRE. To the enemy, them as “bastards.” They informed The low level of civilian pattern of it looked like “A” Company was coalition personnel that they had life was surprising and was a possible plodding its way east through the problems getting produce to the indicator that the population was various complexes. The 1 RGR plan markets in Hutel. Whether this not interested in providing cover for was to finish with LEICESTERSHIRE was the result of actions by corrupt enemy movement out of fear of being and then “tab” (route march) to police, insurgents dressed as police, targeted by coalition forces. DONCASTER, make it look like the or a combination was difficult to As the day progressed, force was bedding down to deceive determine, but practically all elders more attention was paid to the observers, and then conduct a rapid called for the removal of the current compounds in Objective YORK by night approach march along the district leader. The people were ISTAR resources. It was increasingly Arghandab river and arrive at YORK interested in improved health care apparent that one or more enemy at first light to search the compounds. and an education system, but the attitude of “we’ll believe it when we see it” prevailed. Indeed, the CIMIC teams learned that, surprisingly, many landowners lived in Kabul and rarely visited Band-e Timor. Note that KLE’s were not always a matter of just sitting down and drinking tea. On one occasion personnel accompanying the CO were menaced by a disheveled, crazed young man wielding a pick. He was tied to a tree by two elders

A joint Afghan National Army-Maywand District police patrol prepares to deploy into Hutel from the district centre. These patrols are crucial in establishing government presence in this volatile district.

73 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009 13 Canadian Military History, Vol. 18 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 8

The Viking squadron would depart coalition forces they welcomed a The joint patrols discovered that DORCHESTER just before first light ANA but not an ANP presence, that there were hard feelings towards to establish a screen north of YORK the enemy moved through the area coalition forces dating back to at least to catch any “leakers.” but the locals would not let them 2002 when the poppy eradication Meanwhile, the Fire Support stay in the area out of fear of coalition programme was initiated by the Group snipers screening to the north air strikes. It appeared as though Afghan Interim Administration. of “C” Company were observing the Taliban acquiesced to the locals At some point around 20 farmers people moving about Objective without a lot of intimidation because were killed during demonstrations. DOVER but were unable to determine this was the only route to resupply its The patrols immediately explained whether they were enemy forces. forces in Zharey district and they did that the coalition and the Afghan When “C” Company got into the not want a hostile population on such security forces were not in Maywand compounds, they determined that vital ground. Interestingly, the local to eradicate poppy, that they were the leadership target that had been leaders explained that Taliban forces there to improve security and hunt there had slipped away, possibly moving through their complexes Taliban. This impromptu information headed north to Hutel. The presence spoke Punjabi, not Pashtun, and that operation countered the prevailing of two Harrier GR-7 close support this was a common occurrence. Taliban information ops message aircraft flying up and down the river There were no contacts and that the coalition presence would disappeared to have deterred any enemy ISTAR resources detected no enfranchise and starve the farmers movement south. leadership target movement in that and their families. While “A” Company was laying objective area, though it looked like Hutel bazaar was a thriving up in DONCASTER and preparing the DONCASTER contact wanted to collection of establishments, despite for the night tab, ISTAR resources make his way to Helmand province Taliban attempts to intimidate the identified one of the leadership to the west. “A” Company was populace. The latest attempt was targets as a logistics facilitator but he ordered back to LEICESTERSHIRE six weeks prior when 16 policemen was located west of DONCASTER, with the Viking screen to try and hunt were executed after their checkpoint about a kilometer away. This target the DONCASTER contact. was seized west of the town. ISTAR appeared to be different from the ISTAR then reported that another resources discovered that there were one(s) in YORK. Should the plan be leadership target that had been in in fact enemy present in the western altered to take him out or not? The YORK was on the move and was part of Hutel and they had 1 RGR decision was made to search for him no longer in YORK. How he got under observation. An enemy cell but to carry on with YORK. Attempts out was a mystery, but clumps of planned to place an IED on Highway were made to get an American newly-shaven hair were discovered 1 but the plan was thwarted by the Pathfinder Platoon from TF EAGLE near a compound he may have presence of the joint patrols. ASSAULT and insert them to get him, been hiding in, so he may have The joint patrols also turned up or if that were not possible, bring altered his appearance and departed. some significant finds on day three. in a section of US Army OH-58D ISTAR resources reported yet another Two white Toyota Corollas were Warrior recce helicopters, but the medium-value leader who evacuated discovered in a wadi concealed with forces were not available. To the east, Op Box BURMA as the Gurkhas a tarp. They were full of fuel and in “C” Company reported the seizure of moved towards it. Unfortunately, good running order. There were no a small number of weapons in their the resources needed to identify and weapons found, but it was likely that areas. The locals claimed the Taliban engage him were not available. these vehicles were pre-positioned so “left yesterday.” This was most likely they could be quickly modified for the group engaged by the B-1B. More Execution: Consolidation SVBIED use or as getaway cars for importantly, “C” Company reported enemy leadership. Indeed, ISTAR that the locals were hostile to coalition oncurrent activity in Hutel and reported that there were enemy forces the closer they were to Zharey Cthe surrounding area on the nearby but details remained vague. district. Thus far, it looked like there second day of the operation produced The vehicles were confiscated and were at least three leadership targets immediate results. The Gurkha none of the locals complained. on the loose south of Hutel. platoon and Canadian CIMIC and “C” Company continued with its “A” Company’s night tab and PSYOPS initiated a series of joint operations to the south east. A sniper early morning entry in YORK was patrols with the newly-arrived ANP lay back observation post spotted two anti-climactic. A major KLE was and awaited engineering resources pick up trucks behaving suspiciously held, however, late in the morning to start the reconstruction of the in the evening near the locations of at YORK. The elders here told the ANP checkpoints on Highway 4. the B-1B strikes. They appeared to be

74 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol18/iss1/8 14 Maloney: Operation SOHIL LARAM II

Two of the ubiquitous white Toyota Corollas were seized by one of the joint patrols before they could be converted for use as suicide improvised explosive devices.

cleaning up the remains of the strike CANTERBURY. As there was a lack along BURMA, MALAYA and or looking for wounded, The vehicles of “fidelity” on the target, 1 RGR SINGAPORE. disappeared into the desert before battlegroup remained focused on The plan for SOHIL LARAM they could be engaged by a pair of securing the district centre in Hutel II took into account the possibility F-16’s that were on station. and working on the checkpoints that Afghan National Army forces “C” Company remained before expanding the joint patrols might participate but the 2nd ANA interested in the area, as there were outwards prematurely. Kandak in Zharey district was itself indications from KLE’s that the Then the enemy detonated preparing to rotate out and it was not locals were annoyed with coalition an IED amidst an ANP convoy, clear what forces would be available operations, probably special wounding four. Incredibly, the ANP or for how long. Lieutenant-Colonel operations forces operations, that apprehended two insurgents who Shareen Shah, the CO of 2nd Kandak, bothered them at night. The NDS had other devices or components determined that two companies detachment confirmed from the on them. They were brought to the would deploy from Howz-e Madad locals that leadership targets had district centre for interrogation by in Zharey to Hutel for two days. The been moving through the area, that the ANP. Not to be outdone, “A” idea was to conduct as many joint it was a waypoint for personnel, Company searches to the southwest ANA-ANP patrols as possible in the not weapons storage. They also uncovered IED components in a area to demonstrate to the population developed a theory that the Taliban village west of DERBY. Two more that the ANA and new Maywand groups that took off during the first prisoners were taken, both were ANP were going to cooperate night were a protection party for a in possession of cell phones and effectively from now on, cement significant Taliban leader and their coughed up useful information on the linkages procedurally between starburst actions were designed to enemy movements in the district the two forces and get them used to distract the coalition forces from and the types of vehicles they were working together. locating and engaging the enemy employing. On day four, around 0830 leader. At this point, the shift of hours, a seeming endless stream of Other information developed by emphasis was confirmed by the CO. ANA vehicles started to arrive in the NDS and various ISTAR resources “C” Company would focus solely Hutel – Ford Ranger pick up trucks, confirmed that there were still on influence operations with the International 2.5-ton trucks, and even leadership targets in the area between ANP in and around Hutel awaiting several mottled Hummers equipped the river and Hutel and learned that the arrival of the ANA, while with 12.7 mm machine guns. At the there was a safe house that catered “A” Company would search and end of the column, several Canadian to Taliban commanders somewhere exploit any information it collected RG-31 vehicles discreetly entered the near Objectives SINGAPORE and district headquarters compound. This

75 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009 15 Canadian Military History, Vol. 18 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 8

left – Gurkha medics, under the direction of Dr. D.F. Reid, and members of the Canadian Operational Mentor and Liaison Team work to save the lives of wounded Afghan soldiers.

above – A US Army UH-60 prepares to lift off with some of the Afghan National Army casulaties.

significant low-level intelligence related to Taliban activities in the area. Then the Royal Marines bagged a “leaker” from one of the searches, who was identified as Taliban. This individual gave up a relative and the NDS identified both as local Taliban leaders. They were passed on to Hutel for exploitation with the hope they would give up more elements of the facilitation network. The NDS exploited several document and laptop finds and found lists of enemy personnel, and a list of was the 12-man Operational Mentor people that they were surprised and judges that had been paid off by and Liaison Team (OMLT) led by even proud that the ANA was in the Taliban to release captured Major Corey Frederickson from 3rd Hutel. This psychological effect was insurgents. Other documentation Battalion Princess Patricia’s Canadian identified and exploited as soon as detailed links to support areas in Light Infantry, who mentored possible. Lieutenant-Colonel Shah Pakistan. There was so much material elements of 2nd Kandak. The stream immediately linked up with the Hutel it had to be transported elsewhere for of vehicles continued for some time ANP and launched a series of foot exploitation. The hunt continued. and the entire population turned out and vehicle patrols throughout the Canadian CIMIC and PSYOPS to watch. These ANA soldiers, unlike area with the police and with “C” teams accompanied the joint Gurkha- their predecessors from two years Company. ANSF patrols throughout Hutel. The ago, wore helmets, body armour, While the Afghan national security picture they developed, confirmed by chest rigs and carried themselves force (ANSF) saturation of Hutel ISTAR, was at odds with previous with some professionalism. The and environs was underway, “A” assessments. Only the northwest ANP were visibly envious. The Company continued its movements quadrant of Hutel was seriously PSYOPS team working the crowds to the south west near DERBY and pro-Taliban. For the most part, 75 detected a feeling that approximated around LEICESTERSHIRE and percent or more of the population to “the cavalry has arrived.” It was CHELSEA. Using the Viking squadron was supportive of the government. evident from conversations with the as a screen, “A” Company collected As before, they were intimidated by

76 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol18/iss1/8 16 Maloney: Operation SOHIL LARAM II

the previous Maywand police forces get as close as possible to the enemy US Army UH-60 and a USAF HH-60 and tended to sit on the fence. Indeed, leader. A chase ensued, doors were flew in to evacuate the wounded. the local clinic sold medical supplies kicked in, and some rounds fired. Unfortunately, seven of the eight to the Taliban to keep them away. Unfortunately, the target escaped. stricken Afghans eventually died 7 Platoon deployed west along The next morning, a Gurkha of their wounds. ISTAR determined Highway 1 with engineers and patrol with Canadian CIMIC and that the enemy had “eyes on” the ANP and continued to refurbish the PSYOPS personnel went back into whole process and steps were taken checkpoint system. The Gurkhas this community to conduct effects to deter their planned actions against conducted a series of clearance patrols mitigation. The patrol offered the MEDEVAC helicopters. and vehicle checkpoints to clear each compensation to house owners The Taliban immediately site to facilitate construction. ISTAR who had property damaged during exploited this event for information reportage also identified possible the pursuit. Interestingly, nearly operations purposes and spread the enemy leaders in a compound every citizen had doors kicked in word throughout Hutel that they complex south of the district centre, and all demanded compensation. had attacked the ANA and caused so Lieutenant-Colonel Shah deployed Despite some hard feelings, the patrol the casualties. The situation was two of his platoons, accompanied by assessed that this community was complicated by the fact that 2nd Gurkhas and Canadians, to conduct still pro-government and were not Kandak was leaving. This could searches. knowingly hiding the enemy leader. become an information ops victory for ISTAR reportage continued It appeared that a non-governmental the Taliban if they could portray the throughout the evening. First there organization that had an office in scheduled withdrawal as a response was a threat warning of possible IED this community was assisting this to the casualties they suppposedly placement west of the district centre individual move around and hide. inflicted and thus reduce the positive on the highway. This IED attack was The day 2nd Kandak was effects generated by the joint ANSF to be accompanied by an ambush. scheduled to re-deploy back to Zharey patrolling. The Canadian PSYOPS ANSF foot patrols flooded into the was wrought with tragedy. An ANA and CIMIC operators deployed with areas and successfully deterred this soldier had a negligent discharge Gurkha and ANP patrols to counter attack. The device was found and with an RPG launcher inside a the enemy message during the course blown up, which really annoyed concrete room which essentially of the next day. Surprisingly, the the local Taliban cell leader. Further shredded the lower extremities of teams learned that local people, reportage indicated that an enemy eight Afghan soldiers. Gurkha medics some of them four kilometres from medium value leadership target was led by Dr. D.F Reid rushed to the site Hutel, already knew that the blast present somewhere in the compounds while the Canadian OMLT soldiers was an accident and was not Taliban east of the district centre. worked to stabilize the wounded. A action. While night was falling “C” Company developed an outline plan to go after him. The problem was the complexity of this particular built-up area, which amounted to a rabbit warren of compounds, alleys, walled cultivated areas and streams. It would be difficult to seal off the area, this would require the whole battalion, but the close proximity to the district centre weighed in favour of an audacious move. A platoon from “C” Company went in trying to

During a night raid in Hutel, private property was damaged. A Canadian PSYOPS/CIMIC team accompanied by a Gurkha patrol conducts compensation activities with the local population.

77 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009 17 Canadian Military History, Vol. 18 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 8

One of the other enemy medium presented itself. Sufficient forces disrupted whatever plans they were value leadership targets was moving were not available for a complete working on at the time. between NEWCASTLE and a position occupation of the district, but creative Operation SOHIL LARAM II south of the district centre. There was ways to maintain the momentum confirmed that the posession of an some concern that he might collect generated by Op SOHIL LARAM II operational manoeuvre capacity by fighters and, emboldened by the were explored and implemented in Regional Command (South), when RPG tragedy, mount a night attack March 2008. wielded properly, could generate against the district centre to profit As with any operation in positive operational as well as tactical from the situation and enhance Afghanistan, determining specific effects in the complex environment of the Taliban’s stature with both the long or short term effects is no easy southern Afghanistan in the face of an Taliban-supportive population and task. One of the most important was insurgent enemy. To commemorate to intimidate the pro-government the relative lack of enemy action the new link forged between the population. The attack failed to directed at the relief in place of the Canadian army and the Gurkhas, materialize for unknown reasons. Canadian battlegroup in Zharey 1 RGR was awarded the Canadian Other cells to the west of the district and Panjwayi districts, short of Forces Unit Commendation in May centre, thwarted in their activities some IED activity. When the enemy 2008: and frustrated, were trying to bring did attempt to engage Canadian For outstandign elan and exemplary RPGs and another IED into the area to forces in western Zharey/Panjwayi combat skills that directly contributed ambush coalition vehicles traveling he lacked the ammunition to do to the overall success of Task down Highway 1. Foot patrols sent so effecively and even complained Force Kandahar during Operation into the area coupled with the low about that fact. Similarly, there was ATHENA, Afghanistan, Sep 07 to level pass of a pair of Mirage 2000 almost no ambush or IED activity Mar 08. fighters deterred this activity. directed against forces travelling ISTAR reportage indicated that along Highway 1 between Helmand Notes one of the enemy leaders had made and Kandahar for some weeks. Again his way to Helmand province, while determining exactly why this was the A Note on Sources – The author observed another was trying to get out of the case is open to some interpretation, the operational planning process for SOHIL area south east of the district centre. but a tentative conclusion can be LARAM II at Regional Command (South), Op SOHIL LARAM II was winding made with some confidence. Task Force Kandahar, and 1 RGR battlegroup and then accompanied the Gurkha battalion down and the resources to conduct Substantial information on the into the field for the duration of the operation. a detailed search for this individual Taliban’s structure in Maywand Certain control measures have been altered were not available, but it was clear district was collected during the and intelligence sources blurred for operational security considerations. that the raid to the east of the district course of the operation. There was also centre looking for the third leader increased confidence demonstrated 1. The Helmand-deployed 1 RGR company unsettled the enemy that remained by the Afghan police and army occupied a forward operating base near Garmsir. Not coincidentally, the Joint in the Hutel area. In effect, they outwards towards the population Terminal Air Controller assigned to that ordered their people to go to ground, and internally between the two company was a certain “Captain Harry Wales,” better known as Prince Harry. stop communicating, and cease organizations. Taken together, this 2. The TLAV is a dramatically re-engineered operations. provided any follow on force or M-113A3 APC. security measures a solid base for 3. This was the failed US operation to rescue the American hostages held in Iran in Resolution future action. Demonstrating to April 1980. The mission was aborted with the enemy that Maywand was no the loss of eight US lives, seven RH-53D fter seven days of operations in longer a safe haven or a seam though helicopters and a C-130 transport aircraft. One of the main contributing factors Maywand district, Task Force A ambiguous on the surface, has the to the disaster was an unexpected dust TIGER re-deployed to Kandahar potential to contribute positively storm in the Iranian desert. Air Field and made its preparations towards a pro-government orientation to depart Afghanistan and return later on as well. Dr. Sean M. Maloney is the historical advisor to its home station in Brunei. The Finally Operation SOHIL LARAM to the Chief of the Land Staff. He has travelled annually to Afghanistan since 2003 Canadian CIMIC and PSYOPS teams II forced several enemy commanders to observe coalition operations. He is the were sent back to Maywand almost to scatter from what they viewed as author of several books including Enduring immediatley once RC (South) and the Freedom: A Rogue Historian in Afghanistan a comfortable no-go zone. This in and the forthcoming, Confronting the Chaos: TF Kandahar assessed the situation turn made them vulnerable to other A Rogue Historian Returns to Afghanistan. and realized that an opportunity coalition action and at the same time

78 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol18/iss1/8 18