Afghanistan Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for 2018-2021

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Afghanistan Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for 2018-2021 HUMANITARIAN HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMME CYCLE 2021 RESPONSE PLAN ISSUED JANUARY 2021 AFGHANISTAN 2018-2021 01 HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN 2018-2021 About Get the latest updates This document is consolidated by OCHA on behalf of the Humanitarian Country Team and partners. The Humanitarian OCHA coordinates humanitarian action to ensure crisis-affected people receive Response Plan is a presentation of the coordinated, strategic the assistance and protection they response devised by humanitarian agencies in order to meet the need. It works to overcome obstacles acute needs of people affected by the crisis. It is based on, and that impede humanitarian assistance responds to, evidence of needs described in the Humanitarian from reaching people affected by crises, and provides leadership in mobilizing Needs Overview. assistance and resources on behalf of the humanitarian system PHOTO ON COVER www.unocha.org/afghanistan Photo: Jim Huylenbroek twitter.com/ochaafg The designations employed and the presentation of material in the report do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Humanitarian Response aims to be the central website for Information Management tools and services, enabling information exchange between clusters and IASC members operating within a protracted or sudden onset crisis. afg.humanitarianresponse.info Humanitarian InSight supports decision- makers by giving them access to key humanitarian data. It provides the latest verified information on needs and delivery of the humanitarian response as well as financial contributions. www.hum-insight.info The Financial Tracking Service (FTS) is the primary provider of continuously updated data on global humanitarian funding, and is a major contributor to strategic decision making by highlighting gaps and priorities, thus contributing to effective, efficient and principled humanitarian assistance. fts.unocha.org 02 Table of Contents 05 Foreword 07 Response Plan Overview 09 Crisis Context and Impact 13 Response by Strategic Objective 14 Planned Response 15 HRP Key Figures 16 Historical Trends 21 Part 1: Strategic Response Priorities 22 1.1 Humanitarian Conditions and Underlying Factors Targeted for Response 26 1.2 Strategic Objectives, Specific Objectives and Response Approach 38 1.3 Cross-Cutting Response Priorities 42 1.4 Costing Methodology 44 1.5 Planning Assumptions, Operational Capacity and Access 51 1.6 Accountability to Affected People 55 1.7 Consolidated Overview on the Use of Cash and Vouchers 57 Part 2: Response Monitoring 58 2.1 Monitoring Approach 60 Part 3: Cluster/Sector Objectives and Response 61 Overview of Sectoral Response 64 3.1 Education in Emergencies 70 3.2 Emergency Shelter and NFI 76 3.3 Food Security and Agriculture 82 3.4 Health 87 3.5 Nutrition 92 3.6 Protection 103 3.7 Water, Sanitation and Hygiene 109 3.8 Coordination and Common Services 111 Part 4: Refugee Response 115 Part 5: Annexes 116 5.1 Participating Organisations 117 5.2 Planning Figures by Sector and by Geography 120 5.4 Sectoral Activities and Costing 127 5.5 What If We Fail To Respond or Mobilise Enough Resources? 138 5.6 How to Contribute 139 5.7 Logframe 153 5.7 Acronyms 155 5.8 End Notes 03 HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN 2018-2021 HIRAT, AFGHANISTAN In response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Afghanistan, IOM partnered with the Hirat Provincial Public Health Directorate to deploy Rapid Response Teams and social mobilisers to provide COVID-19 awareness messaging in schools when classes resumed in September 2020. Teams are also responsible for carrying out COVID screening and sample collection. Photo: IOM 04 Foreword When the first edition of this multi-year Humanitarian escalating conflict. I am proud to say that despite Response Plan (HRP) was published four years ago, the logistical challenges created by COVID-19 and it envisaged a very different and much improved the worsening security environment, humanitarian situation for the people of Afghanistan by 2021, with organisations have proven their commitment to humanitarian needs declining as people rebuilt their stay and deliver, complementing the efforts of the lives and began their recovery. Sadly, however, a Government, and actually increasing their footprint deadly combination of COVID-19, surging conflict to provide assistance in 99 per cent of districts in and a hostile climate have left that promise far out of 2020. Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) are the reach. The trajectory of needs and scale of response backbone of this response and I see a strong and over the life of this HRP paint a shocking picture of vibrant role for NGOs and the civil society sector in escalating suffering, hunger and danger. expanding this reach even further. We go into 2021, with 18.4 million people in In 2021, humanitarian organisations have an humanitarian need – nearly half the population. ambitious plan to reach 15.7 million people with There are nearly six times the number of people life-saving assistance. This is up from a target of 2.3 needing humanitarian assistance in 2021 compared million people four years ago. The 2021 HRP requires to four years ago when this multi-year HRP was first $1.3 billion and people’s survival depends on the 162 developed. The health and socio-economic impacts dedicated humanitarian organisations operating in of the COVID-19 pandemic have seen the number of Afghanistan receiving sufficient financial resources to people in need almost double in the past year alone, deliver a response on this scale. The consequences with food insecurity soaring as people’s livelihoods of late or inadequate funding are very real. Significant were lost and their limited financial reserves were unmet needs in 2020 due to funding shortfalls and the depleted. Afghanistan now has the second highest acute focus on COVID-19, as well as the slow rollout number of people in emergency food insecurity in of complementary development assistance, have all the world, while nearly one in two children under- been factors in the worsening outlook for 2021. five will face acute malnutrition in 2021. While enduringly resilient, people are increasingly desperate, While we have made significant strides in working resorting to debt and other more dangerous coping more collaboratively with development actors in 2020 mechanisms to survive including marrying off their using a COVID-19 lens to produce a common needs young daughters and sending their children to work. analysis, the situation demands that we do more Against this backdrop of acute poverty, there are now in 2021 to ensure our programme delivery is also 30.5 million people who require social assistance complementary across the humanitarian-development from the Government and development actors to spectrum. I look forward to seeing the outcomes help them cope and prevent them slipping into worse from the Inter-Cluster Coordination Team's (ICCT's) humanitarian need. work in this regard in 2021, with a particular focus on more integrated humanitarian action and agreement Over the course of the multi-year HRP, the on common outcomes with development actors for humanitarian community has proven its capacity to people in long-term displacement, especially in urban scale-up to meet new needs, initially caused by the areas and addressing the socio-economic impact 2018-2019 drought and now COVID-19 coupled with of COVID-19. Initiatives like these are critical to 05 HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN 2018-2021 supporting the kind of recovery originally envisaged at end to civilian deaths and suffering. A permanent the start of this multi-year HRP. ceasefire or a persistent reduction in violence would provide the opportunity for humanitarians to carry The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and the out comprehensive assessments in hard-to-reach ICCT are committed to applying a strong gender and (HTR) areas to gain a deeper understanding of protection lens to their work in 2021, acknowledging existing needs. Credible needs assessments are the the disproportionate impacts of the conflict and critical first step in any response to ensure the right the pandemic on women, children and people beneficiaries are supported with the right assistance. with disability. Given the scale of vulnerability in Afghanistan, this effort will be guided by a range of Until this much hoped for peace becomes a reality, the both new and well-established technical working humanitarian community stands beside the people groups focused on gender, disability inclusion, gender- of Afghanistan during what surely must be one of based violence (GBV), child protection, accountability the country’s difficult periods. Given the sheer scale to affected people (AAP) and protection from of needs, we all must do more, stretch higher and sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA). Increasingly do better to deliver life-saving assistance to those we also are working to address these protection who need it most. I urge donors to show solidarity, and accountability issues in a more unified and give early and give generously to humanitarian coordinated way with development colleagues organisations at this pivotal moment, helping us to which will ensure more effective action. Sustained reduce immediate suffering but also set people on humanitarian access to people in need, free from the so far elusive road to recovery. I am confident interference by parties to
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