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What Is the Turkish Military's Strategic Identity After

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What Is the Turkish Military's Strategic Identity After S E P T E M B E R 2 0 1 6 IPC–MERCATOR POLICY BRIEF WHAT IS THE TURKISH MILITARY’S STRATEGIC IDENTITY AFTER JULY 15? Metin Gurcan and Megan Gisclon September 2016 Metin Gurcan is an IPC Researcher specializing in security issues. Megan Gisclon is the Managing Editor of IPC. CONTACT INFORMATION Istanbul Policy Center Bankalar Caddesi Minerva Han No: 2 Kat: 4 34420 Karaköy–İstanbul T. +90 212 292 49 39 [email protected], ipc.sabanciuniv.edu WHAT IS THE TURKISH MILITARY’S STRATEGIC IDENTITY AFTER JULY 15? | SEPTEMBER 2016 Gurcan, Metin Gisclon, Megan What Is the Turkish Military’s Strategic Identity after July 15? 16 p.; 30 cm. - (Istanbul Policy Center-Sabancı University-Stiftung Mercator Initiative) ISBN: 978-605-9178-64-8 Cover Design and Pagelayout: MYRA 1. Edition: 2016 Printed by: İmak Ofset Basım Yayın San. ve Tic. Ltd. Şti. Atatürk Cad. Göl Sok. No : 1 Yenibosna Bahçelievler/İSTANBUL Tel: 0212 656 49 97 ISBN: 978-605-9178-64-8 Istanbul Policy Center Bankalar Caddesi Minerva Han No: 2 Kat: 4 34420 Karaköy-Istanbul T. +90 212 292 49 39 [email protected] ipc.sabanciuniv.edu SEPTEMBER 2016 | IPC-MERCATOR POLICY BRIEF Introduction a half, this new revolutionary civilianization can also be taken as “predatory civilianization.” With the in- volvement of the deep-seated “parallel state” struc- Turkish civil-military relations (CMR)1 have been ture of the Gülenist Terror Organization (FETÖ), the undergoing a revolutionary civilianization process militant followers of the U.S.-based imam Fethullah since the attempted July 15 coup.2 Purges in the Gülen, the TSK, once a coup-wielding organization Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) began on July 27 un- capable of severe political pressure turned more der a state of emergency decree law in the Official professional and less political, or one could say less Gazette and continue to uproot each branch of the Huntingtonian and more Janowitzian,6 has once military. Most affected by these summary dismiss- again become one of the largest political concerns als were the commanding elites of generals and in Turkish government and society. The presidential admirals. civilian government is now exerting a force on the Of the 325 generals in the army, navy, and air force, military reciprocal to that of the force the military 149 (45.8%) were discharged. Among them were once exerted on civilian governments. Although an two four-star generals, nine lieutenant generals, 30 extensive purge of coup plotters in the TSK is the major generals and vice admirals, and 126 briga- optimum end, the process has struck a blow to the dier generals and rear admirals.3 Among those 149 morale of the TSK and its institutional identity. generals, nearly 44% of land force generals, 42% of As the ideologies and worldviews of the military air force generals, and 58% of navy admirals were are not often cited by government or academics, formally discharged.4 An additional 586 colonels the ideological underbelly of the military is a “black were retired by the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) box” waiting to be opened. This paper will invite on August 23 to make the officer corps younger.5 a brief look into this black box as it appears after Among the discharged TSK generals and colonels July 15. were some important names leading the TSK’s transformation process. There are strong suspi- cions that one of the leaders of the coup attempt Typologies and Outlooks: The TSK’s was Maj. Gen. Mehmet Dişli, the chief of the stra- tegic transformation office at the Turkish General Identity in the Post-July 15 Setting Staff (TCGB) who was responsible for the mon- itoring of all active transformation projects and Right now there is a need to understand a more for designing the new project. He was running the detailed profile of the Turkish officer corps in or- transformation process of the Turkish military’s per- der to foresee the possible directions in which the sonnel policies. Also among the expelled were Lt. TSK might pivot after July 15. As the civilians have Gen. Salih Ulusoy, the chief of TCGB’s Command of taken control of the Armed Forces, the TSK might Plans and Principles (J5), an important command reinforce or disengage from preexisting military in charge of relations with NATO, strategic fore- reform plans and move forward on a path toward sighting and future planning, budgetary planning, new ones. Continuing transformation may be sup- and the TSK’s relations with other militaries of the ported by civilians; however, if the rapid rate of world; Maj. Gen. Nevzat Tasdeler, the commander civilianization in the TSK continues, these shifting of the Staff College; Maj. Gen. Salih Sevil, serving as balances of power within the military may exclude Turkey’s representative at NATO; and Maj. Gen. Ser- the military voice itself. hat Habiboğlu, responsible for force development When Chief of the General Staff Hulusi Akar as- at TSK headquarters. The list of expelled generals sumed office in August 2015, he had in mind hun- further shows most were officers who gave priority dreds of plans to institutionally transform the TSK to Atlantic ties and held strong pro-NATO stances, — a plan reminiscent of the Cold War machine re- which no doubt will have major effects on the TSK’s garding culture, organizational structure, mentality, strategic identity and organizational culture. and job positions. Before the failed coup attempt Although the military has been undergoing a grad- on July 15, the mentality and need for transforma- ual civilianization process for the past decade and tion behind the chain of command was clear-cut; | 1 WHAT IS THE TURKISH MILITARY’S STRATEGIC IDENTITY AFTER JULY 15? | SEPTEMBER 2016 however, the question of how this transformation while remaining vulnerable in light of this extreme would unfold was ongoing. The deficit of intellec- politicization? Will the TSK go back to the status tual capacity left by FETÖ members who nested quo, or will the transformation process and the cur- themselves into the Turkish army has yet to be ful- rent situation turn it into “something” else? In order ly felt and understood. By infiltrating the transfor- to answer these questions particularly from the in- mation efforts of the TSK, FETÖ also embarked on stitutional transformation perspective, it is possible designing the institution in light of its own secret to delineate three different types of senior officers. agenda. Now the question is simple: How much of Symbionts (senior officers who have a parasitic re- this capacity for institutional transformation re- lationship with the TSK): This type of senior officer mains in the minds of those in the TSK’s chain of thinks that they have already paid their dues for command, and furthermore, how resolute are they their past service and that they are entitled to kick in achieving this aim? back while it is the system’s turn to look after them. The institutional transformation of the TSK became In this way, there is a one-sided relationship with politicized following the events of July 15. Adopt- the institution. The indolent officer, who staunch- ing an ideological lens makes it difficult to examine ly defends the status quo, is uncomfortable with the current picture from a technical or apolitical the prospect of transformation, something that standpoint. For instance, one cannot question the would inevitably lead to more risk and more work. fact that the TSK became a “warehouse for colo- The symbiont tries to do away with these trans- nels” before July 15. As of April 2016, there were formation initiatives by wasting time and attend- about 5,500 (12%) colonels for every 40,000 offi- ing meetings. The symbiont, who would defend cers.7 This proportion skyrocketed in the land forc- the status quo until death, is the embodiment of es command as there were 4,000 colonels for ev- the saying “you can’t teach an old dog new tricks” ery 21,000 officers. This means that there was one and is adverse to innovation. Symbionts do not en- colonel for every five officers, so questioning the joy taking risks, and they very strictly follow in the fact that this number had increased in past years is footsteps taken before them. not a matter for political debate. Comparing these Pragmatists (senior officers who only think of their numbers to modern armies throughout the world, careers and have opportunist relationships with the there is one colonel for every 100 officers in the TSK): This type of senior officer consistently follows U.S. Army and an average of three colonels for ev- the status quo or trends that are happening inside ery 100 officers in the British and Israeli armies. It is the institution and falls on the side of what would obvious that there are hundreds of “photocopier” be the best for their career. Out of all the types of colonels in the TSK, i.e. colonels whose only task senior officers, the pragmatists are most vulnerable is to make photocopies at headquarters. In this to being politicized and emphasize the short term sense, the colonel cadre has become replaceable. instead of the values of the institutional system or Why has this issue become political? Prior to the long-term strategic vision. A pragmatist who has coup, putschist Mehmet Partigöç carried out a plan been at work for two or three years and tends to to retire 1,500 colonels who had been in their po- follow popular trends can appear to be either a sitions from 1985 to 1988. Due to the ideological follower of the status quo or a transformationalist.
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