The Road to July 15 in the Turkish Armed Forces and Combat Effectiveness in Its Aftermath

ANALYSIS JULY 2017 NO: 37

THE ROAD TO JULY 15 IN THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS IN ITS AFTERMATH

MURAT YEŞILTAŞ, MURAT ASLAN

ANALYSIS JULY 2017 NO: 37

THE ROAD TO JULY 15 IN THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS IN ITS AFTERMATH

MURAT YEŞILTAŞ, MURAT ASLAN COPYRIGHT © 2017 by SETA All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Layout : Hasan Suat Olgun Printed in Turkey, İstanbul by Turkuvaz Haberleşme ve Yayıncılık A.Ş., 2017

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CONTENTS

ABSTRACT 7 INTRODUCTION 8 THE CHALLENGE OF FETÖ 8 THE EFFECTS OF AK PARTY REGULATIONS AFTER THE JULY 15 COUP ATTEMPT 14 CONCLUSION: STEPPING FORWARD FOR COMBAT READINESS AND EFFECTIVENESS 19

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Murat Yeşiltaş He has completed his BA and MA at the Department of International Relations of Sakarya University, in 2003 and 2009, respectively. He earned his PhD at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Marmara University in 2012. Yeşiltaş was a visiting researcher at the Department of European Studies and International Politics of Lancaster University and Virginia Tech’s Institute of Government and International Relations between 2008 and 2009, and 2010- 2011 respectively. Currently, Yeşiltaş is an Assoc. Professor in the Middle East Institute at Sakarya University. He also holds the position of Director of Security Studies at SETA Foundation, Ankara, Turkey. Dr. Yesiltas current researches are on ethnic and religious radicalization, the geopolitics of non-state conflicts, and the Kurdish affairs. He is currently working on the following research projects Kurdish Geopolitical Space: coopera- tion, conflict and competition and the New Regional Security Project (NRSP). His most recent books are Geopolitical Mentality and the Military in Turkey, Ankara: Kadim, 2016 and Non-State Military Actors in the Middle East: Geopolitics, Ideology and Strategy, Palgrave, 2017.

Murat Aslan He has 26 years of military experience along with his academic researches in the Interna- tional Relations discipline. He earned his PhD at the Department of International Relations at Middle East Techinical University in 2017. He has focused on security studies with a special interest in intelligence and propaganda.

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ABSTRACT

Analysis will Turkey has experienced, for the first time in the Republic’s history, a coup at- scrutinize the tempt by a religious community, known as the Fetullahist Terrorist Organization challenges and probable courses (FETÖ), who secretly flourished in the cadres of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). to steer the TAF The significant issue is that the infiltrating body of FETÖ-members were well- out of the current known in so far as their presence, but were not well identified in terms of their dilemmas, and will exact identity and network. The overall discourse of the FETÖ infiltration of the offer a perspective TAF, the July 15 coup attempt, and the imposed measures of the AK Party govern- on the combat ment challenged the combat effectiveness of the TAF, especially in the realm of readiness and the the witnessed crises in the Middle East. This paper will scrutinize the challenges transformation of and probable courses to steer the TAF out of the current dilemmas, and will offer the civil-military a perspective on the combat readiness and the transformation of the civil-military relation in the post- relation in the post-July 15 Turkey. July 15 Turkey.

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The TAF are experiencing a transition period to augment their combat effectiveness. In this sense, a functional division of the TAF will be examined in regards to the infiltration and prac- tices of FETÖ and the measures taken by the AK Party government after the July 15 military coup attempt. Hence the main questions to be investigated are: To what extent did FETÖ challenge combat effectiveness? How did the imposed measures of the AK Party government affect the INTRODUCTION combat readiness of the TAF during the last year? For this purpose, four core military functions, Turkey has experienced, for the first time in the namely command and control, personnel, mili- Republic’s history, a coup attempt by a religious tary intelligence, and operations, will be assessed community, known as the Fetullahist Terrorist in the context of the transformation of the Turk- Organization (FETÖ), who secretly flourished in ish military after July 15. the cadres of the Turkish Armed Forces. In other words, the coup attempt was not a hierarchically organized and committed undertaking, but an THE CHALLENGE OF externally controlled attempt based on the mobi- FETÖ lization of the brainwashed cells of FETÖ.1 The The Gülenist project is neither new nor a sur- significant issue is that the infiltrating body of prise for Turkey. FETÖ started to infiltrate the FETÖ-members were well-known in so far as Armed Forces at the beginning of the 1980s by their presence, but were not well identified in finding needy military cadet nominees and pre- terms of their exact identity and network. The paring them for the admittance examinations. Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) were partially cap- Military high schools were the primary targets tured internally by a civilian-military group of such attempts since TAF leadership had whose goal was to bring to life the utopic teach- opened a fourth military high school to stop ings of Fetullah Gülen. The overall discourse of the admittance of graduates of civilian high the FETÖ infiltration of the TAF, the July 15 schools in order to educate a military genera- coup attempt, and the imposed measures of the tion more devoted to republican values. Al- AK Party government challenged the combat ef- though the FETÖ movement was not in the fectiveness of the TAF, especially in the realm of foreground but “Nur Cemaat”,2 hundreds of the witnessed crises in the Middle East. This pa- military cadets were dismissed from the Mili- per will scrutinize the challenges and probable tary High Schools and War Colleges since they courses to steer the TAF out of the current dilem- were consciously educated to qualify for the mas, and will offer a perspective on the combat Military High Schools or the Police College by readiness and the transformation of the civil-mil- the private schools and classes of the Cemaat itary relation in the post-July 15 Turkey. run for this purpose. A military cadet, who 1. “Fettullahçı Terör Örgütünün (FETÖ/PYD) 15 Temmuz 2016 could hide his FETÖ affiliation, graduated Tarihli Darbe Girişimi ile Bu Terör Örgütünün Faaliyetlerinin Tüm Yönleriyle Araştırılarak Alınması Gereken Önlemlerin Belirlenmesi from these schools and assumed active duty in Amacıyla Kurulan Meclis Araştırması Komisyon Raporu”, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, Ocak 2017; “İşte FETÖ ilgili MİT Raporu- nun Tamamı,” Hürriyet, 26 Mayıs 2017. 2. Nur Cemaat is the society devoted to the teachings of Said-i Nursi.

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the army, but under the guidance of FETÖ The general strategy of FETÖ was to create mentors. The wide network of army personnel a check mechanism on the TAF members and was under the tight control of FETÖ imams, direct them in accordance with the agenda of who shaped the overall structure of the TAF as FETÖ, heavily influenced and collaborated by far as their secret student network occupied foreign intelligence services. The character of crucial positions in the TAF cadres. The FETÖ such an intervention was to hamper the required imams seized the personnel, counterintelli- discourses against the policies of TAF leadership, gence, and critical staff positions in order to while FETÖ strategists injected their organiza- influence the decision-making processes behind tion’s interests in the TAF. For instance, crucial a ‘curtain’ as students were not aware of other decisions such as promotions of officers, appoint- FETÖ members in the TAF due to a ‘cell’ struc- ments, and counterterrorism operations were ture.3 It was a perfect sample of a functionally planned and executed to favor FETÖ members designed network of which the cells reported to and the future network of FETÖ leadership. As a their civilian cell leaders. result of the intense control of the system, the FETÖ had examined the traditions of the TAF was in the hands of FETÖ, as was witnessed TAF and perceived its traditions and customs as in the structures of other state apparatuses. vulnerabilities. The prominent and privileged FETÖ’s influence had devastating, subversive ‘staff officer’ system was identified as the core and destructive effects on the affairs of the TAF, target of FETÖ efforts to capture the command as will be examined below. and control of the TAF after the 2000s. Once War Academies were captured, the whole army Command and Control was in the hands of Gülen’s imams, suppressing TAF has a very centralized command system, the potential commanders and the ‘other’ offi- which has been usually subjected to criticism cers by perpetrated plots. The Ergenekon, due to the lack of adequate initiative to any Balyoz and espionage trials after 20084 appear start action. Commanders at all levels build a to have been the course of an elimination pro- command system to monitor friendly troops, cess with the collaboration of FETÖ’s police track the changes in the operational environ- forces, military personnel and prosecutors/ ment, and act in accordance with develop- judges to purify the TAF of officers. As a result, ments. In this frame, the headquarters and the the group of soldiers and police officers who operation center are the main apparatuses that initiated the July 15 coup attempt were system- commanders could keep a tight grasp of their atically located in the cadre of the TAF. subordinates’ actions. Units directly receive orders from commanders; the headquarters and 3. For more historical works about the evolution of FETÖ within the Turkish Armed Forces see Ahmet Zeki Üçok, Tek Başına, (Do- operation centers usually coordinate subordi- ğan Kitap, İstanbul: November 2016); Çetin Acar, FETÖ’nün TSK nate commands ‘in the name’ or ‘by the order’ Yapılanması, (Truva, İstanbul: May 2017); Yavuz Selim Demirağ, 5 İmamların Öcü: Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri’nde Cemaat Yapılanma- of the commander. The key staff officer who sı, (Kırmızı Kedi Yayınevi, İstanbul: 2015), 11th edition; Musta- oversees command and control activities is the fa Önsel, Ağacın Kurdu, TSK’de Şakirtlerin İşgali Mi? Fethullah’ın Askerleri, (Alibi Yayıncılık, Ankara: August 2016), 28th Edition; Chief of Staff of the military formation, espe- Selahattin Günday, “FETÖ TSK’yı Nasıl Ele Geçirdi?,” Al Jazeera cially by means of the Chief of Operations, Turk, 6 March 2017. 4. In order to see a detailed analysis regarding the process of Er- genekon and other military trials in Turkey see Middle East Cri- 5. These two terms are used to disseminate orders to respectively tique’s special issue “The Ergenekon Counter-Terrorism Investi- adjacent or subordinate commands, mostly by the initiative of a gation in Turkey: Representations and Implications,” Middle East Department Chief of Headquarters under the guidance of Chief Critique, Vol. 21, (2012). of Staff.

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both of whom are usually graduates of the War pushed out of the competition in the admission Academy. Hence the critical posts in command examinations. As a result, the command system cadres, headquarters and operation centers are of the TAF was captured by unqualified staff of- the staff officers who exercise a certain control ficers in order to consolidate FETÖ’s own power over other officers, directly shaping the opera- and network. tions and daily routines. In accordance with The command system was vulnerable in two such customary exercises, distinguished battal- different aspects that were exploited by FETÖ. ions and (air-naval) fleets were usually com- Initially, commanders, whether they were FETÖ manded by War Academy graduates to prepare members or not, were in direct contact with staff them for further leadership positions and direct officers. Hence, they were exposed to the possi- responsibility was given to ‘more educated’ of- bility of being informed by these officers of their ficers in operations planning and execution. A FETÖ prejudices. FETÖ members would have noteworthy number of regiments and equiva- challenged engagements that occurred by pre- lent units were commanded by staff officers be- senting selected information. For example, the fore their nomination to flagged ranks. In other mandatory retirement of colonels7 with limited words, it was vital to command a battalion and compensation was facilitated by the project regiment in order to be a brigadier. Hence, “Transformation Department” of the General FETÖ identified the War Academy and staff -of Staff whose chief is allegedly one of the main per- ficer cadres as prioritized positions especially petrators of the coup attempt. The main goal of after the 2000s.6 the Colonel haymaking project was not efficien- FETÖ, in the light of its prominence, con- cy, but to have FETÖ members occupy the criti- quered the staff officer system that offered vast cal seats at the headquarters by eliminating alter- opportunities to shape the whole of the TAF. The native candidates. decision makers in the high ranks of the TAF, The second aspect of FETÖ’s command along with critical posts in the headquarters of embedment was to draft orders especially in the General Staff and subordinate Services (Army, electronically signed formats that could facili- Navy and Air Force), adjusted personnel, opera- tate FETÖ members mobilization of units as tions, logistics and general planning policies in was witnessed on July 15. The authorization of accordance with the priorities of FETÖ, which drafting an order for a hidden purpose would was also aligned by the policies of their foreign shape the conditions of interjecting FETÖ’s mentors. Staff officers who had qualified at the priorities. For instance, the Force Development War Academy in the beginning of the 2000s, on Department of Land Forces Command, later the other hand, lacked adequate skills in com- renamed the Transformation Department, had manding troops since skilled officers had been the opportunity to draft orders “in the name” or “by the order” of a commander without ade- 6. For instance, 89 officers who graduated from the War College quately informing him on the exact nature of in 1994 succeeded in War Academy admittance; 66 of whom were active in the July 15 coup attempt. They were admitted to a military the order. The chief of this department was also high school in 1986 where most Gülenist officers were accepted as involved in the direct execution of the coup at- military students; “TSK’ya Adım Adım Sızmışlar! Meğer Planla- rı...,” Gazete Vatan, 6 March 2017; Interviewed officers claim that tempt in Istanbul and Akıncı.8 Besides, the or- officers of the class 1994 were the most privileged in regards to their admittance to the War Academy and profitable tasks such as the high salaries offered abroad. The other privileged graduation date 7. Mehmet Tezkan, “İşte FETÖ’nün Siyasi Ayağı,” Milliyet, 9 from the War College for Gülenist officers is 1990 –these officers March 2017. advanced in the greatest number to Gülenist generals following the 8. “Eski Albay Muzaffer Düzenli: Akıncı’ya İş Yemeği Meselesiyle 2014 High Military Council’s decisions. Çağrıldım,” NTV, 8 June 2017.

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der of martial law clearly indicates the extent to Personnel Affairs which FETÖ members made use of the TAF FETÖ had captured cadres of the personnel de- command system. Previously coordinated mili- partments more effectively than other depart- tary units were mobilized across the country ments within the TAF.9 Personnel departments with a ‘legitimately’ drafted and released mar- are units where critical processes such as pro- tial order. The command and control system, motion, appointment, conscription, personnel then, was vulnerable to FETÖ’s illegal and un- admission, records and qualifications are authorized incursions. Put another way, the planned and implemented. To some extent command system lacked the required control these departments have certain independence as mechanisms to prevent the illegal attempts of they attribute their suggestions to digitally run directing the army. assessment parameters that commanders will Eventually the command and control sys- not access to check the details. They could pres- tem of the TAF was investigated by FETÖ to ent some portion of the parameters to justify such an extent as to capture the whole body of their preferences while concealing other ones. the military. As far as the agenda of FETÖ and Hence, sensitive personnel procedures can be its linkage to intelligence services were con- manipulated, directly affecting the combat cerned, the TAF could be (and probably was) readiness of the TAF. hindered in its military commitments. The claim of the involvement of intelligence services remains, however, an allegation as concrete evidence is lacking; yet, the probability of such The general strategy of FETÖ was to create a a capacity is worrisome and requires taking check mechanism on the TAF members and necessary measures. The July 15 coup attempt direct them in accordance with the agenda of is a consequence of FETÖ’s destructive capa- FETÖ, heavily influenced and collaborated by bilities; we do not know the extent of their foreign intelligence services. other undertakings, achieved by occupying key posts in the command structures before July 15, especially when one considers the number of arrested generals. The initial challenge of FETÖ was to build Finally, the actual damage of the July 15 commissions for interviews to review the ad- coup attempt in terms of command and con- mittance applications for the military schools. trol is the erosion of trust. The members of the These commissions were built after the selec- subordinate military may start to question ev- tion process of personnel departments which ery order by the higher echelons after the upris- were under the dominance of FETÖ members ing since prosecutors filed against every officer to arrange admittance of FETÖ students.10 Ad- who complied to the orders. Any situation may ditionally, FETÖ members imposed strict rules be perceived as a coup attempt in the future to show the ‘impartiality’ and ‘objectivity’ of that a systemic military mechanism need to be the commissions by increasing the number of built to prevent misunderstandings. It is be- commission members from three to five (with a yond doubt that combat effectiveness is directly related to the sense of trust and, therefore, an 9. “FETÖ TSK’yı Nasıl Ele Geçirdi?,” Yeniçağ, 29 July 2016. efficient command and control system needs to 10. İsmail Hakkı Pekin, “Mülakat Komisyonları FETÖ Militan- be put in place. larından Oluşuyordu,” TRT Haber, 5 August 2016.

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voting power of three); having nominees draw Military Intelligence lots to determine which commission will con- Military intelligence can be gathered in two duct the interview; and, finally, adding two functional tiers. The first is combat intelligence staff officers to show the importance of the that it is a process of heavy duty with maps, op- nomination process. But the majority of the in- erational planning and briefs. The second is terviewing commissions were identified as counterintelligence, which focuses on the per- FETÖ members, especially the staff officers sonnel’s reliability in terms of loyalty to the val- who discharged all apparent measures. ues of the state. Combat intelligence was direct- The appointment strategy was based on oc- ed to ordinary intelligence officers with the cupying critical positions with the appropriate heavy burden of the daily routines of the head- FETÖ members rather than appointing candi- quarters. But counterintelligence officers were dates who are loyal to the constitution or hold selected among FETÖ members by the FETÖ- anti-FETÖ sentiments. FETÖ members, on guided personnel departments to prevent prob- the other hand, were appointed to promising able filing and hinder the elimination process of posts that allowed them to present themselves FETÖ members while discrediting skilled staff. to high-level commanders while they had con- The prominent outcome of this strategy trol of the daily schedules of their superiors. Po- was the targeting of personnel and the activities sitions outside of Turkey, especially military at- of combat intelligence - despite underlining its tachés and NATO posts, were offered to FETÖ vitality – by diverting the main efforts of the members so as to profit from the high salary counterintelligence of honest officers by accus- and pay himmet11. Personnel records were under ing them with gambling, depravity, or betrayal the tight control of FETÖ members. Early pro- as was witnessed in the Ergenekon, Balyoz and motions and the suspension of personnel rights espionage trials. were planned in these sections while the personnel’s appeals to courts against subjective deci- Operational Capability sions were examined by FETÖ’s military judges The operational capability of the TAF was again while truly qualified personnel was denied ac- controlled by the staff officers most of whom cessing the judicial system. were FETÖ members. The questions of wheth- The dominance of FETÖ in the personnel er FETÖ members hindered counterterrorism departments led to the admittance, promotion, operations and whether they started any mili- appointment and military decoration of unquali- tary action against the interests of Turkey are fied personnel. Officers with limited capacity still unclear. would command units, profit from privileges Indicators like the detention of two PKK and pretend to be skilled officers in the eyes of members in Manisa, hosting 14 FETÖ suspects the higher echelons simply because they were in their homes,12 may be offered as proof of the somehow chosen for distinguished positions. linkage between FETÖ and the PKK and could The discrimination in favor of FETÖ members further prove FETÖ’s capacity to downgrade the had granted the vast capabilities of the TAF to TAF’s operational capabilities. The PKK did not unqualified officers, downgrading the TAF’s act against the Turkish Security Forces around combat power. July 15 in a manner that would indicate a coor-

11. Himmet is a certain percentage discharged from the salaries as 12. “FETÖ-PKK Işbirliği Böyle Deşifre Oldu,” Sabah, 22 Febru- donation to FETÖ. ary 2017.

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dination between the two terrorist organizations with the findings regarding staff officers, who as a result of bargaining process at the expense of plan and activate operational capabilities, it can Turkish national interests.13 The linkage of the be argued that FETÖ was aware of the TAF’s PKK and the U.S. is also an indicator of the pos- operational decisions. Probable linkage to the sible linkage of FETÖ and the U.S. PKK and foreign intelligence services could The July 15 military coup attempt was bring to light the leak of sensitive information proof that FETÖ members were in charge of on the activities of the TAF that could damage distinguished TAF units. The Special Forces, a the efforts of the organization and waste Tur- remarkable number of pilots in the air force key’s resources. and army aviation were heavily populated by FETÖ members. FETÖ’s Destructive Effect on Combat Furthermore, a considerable amount of Readiness marine and naval officers participated in the FETÖ’s distinct effect on the combat readiness coup attempt. Twenty-nine naval vessels sailed of the TAF was to fill the cadres with unquali- into the sea at 9 pm on July 15 – this number fied personnel lacking skills to plan and execute constitutes 70 percent of Turkish sea power.14 military tasks. The positive prejudice of flag of- Naval staff officers who assumed command ficers towards the loyalty, hardship and dignity due to an alleged terror threat called the per- of staff officers enabled FETÖ to infiltrate the sonnel on duty and cruised into Turkish terri- cadres very close to the commanding generals torial waters. who facilitated the promotion of these officers. Additionally, members of FETÖ mobilized Meanwhile FETÖ obtained the opportu- 35 aircrafts, 37 helicopters, 246 tanks and ar- nity to control generals while extracting infor- mored personnel carriers during the night of mation on the course of events with the help of the military coup attempt. The TAF announced the assisting personnel. Hence, the TAF was the number of overall personnel who partici- actually under the tight control system of pated in the uprising as 8,651; this number in- FETÖ which would manipulate its knowledge cludes soldiers who were unaware of the coup of TAF’s situation, its capabilities, develop- attempt or uprising, but were informed about a ments, or probable course of engagements. military exercise or counterterrorism mea- Under the shade of findings on TAF’s person- sures.15 An unknown number of soldiers were nel, intelligence and operations functions, later released from custody. FETÖ decreased TAF’s combat readiness. This picture indicates that FETÖ was ca- Betraying the system with the infiltration pable of mobilizing, halting, manipulating the of FETÖ-affiliated members will never serve assets and operational capability of the TAF, al- the benefits of Turkey or the TAF – it only though it is not clear if FETÖ committed such serves the interests of FETÖ. Consequently, acts before the coup attempt. In accordance the combat readiness of the TAF after the 2000s was bound to the vital consent of FETÖ, 13. Mehmet Tezkan, “Darbeyi PKK Bile Biliyormuş,” Milliyet, 8 rather than to its actual capabilities. Moreover, September 2016. July 15 eroded the combat effectiveness of the 14. Mesut Hasan Benli, “Askeri Gemilerin Yüzde Yetmişi Darbeye Katıldı,” Hürriyet, 15 January 2017. TAF by breaching the trust and manipulating 15. Most indicted soldiers claim that they were called on duty be- the psychology of honest soldiers. The AK Par- cause there was an exercise or there was a threat by DAESH. This ty government needs to treat these soldiers claim needs to be confirmed by the courts after a thorough investi- gation of the relevant evidence. fairly, leaving all prejudices aside.

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THE EFFECTS OF AK cific period of rehabilitation in order to restore itself and move forward. In this context, the TAF PARTY REGULATIONS will need to prioritize regaining the confidence AFTER THE JULY 15 of the people while simultaneously strategizing COUP ATTEMPT an in-house reconstruction. Above all, the TAF needs to review its combat readiness and take the The main target of the reparation period after necessary measures under the leadership of the July 15 was, first, to expel the putschists and the Turkish government. The following section will members of FETÖ who have been infiltrating scrutinize the states of command and control, the military since the 1980s. The active support- the personnel, military intelligence, and the op- ers of the coup will also be prosecuted; they can eration functions following the measures taken be defined as opportunists within the army who after the July 15 uprising to assess the combat have anti-Erdoğan or anti-AK Party senti- effectiveness and determine additional measures ments.16 This lustration policy aims at the total that can be taken. dismissal of FETÖ members from the armed forces. The FETÖ members who infiltrated the Command and Control TAF did so at different levels (particularly within The government started to restructure the TAF the cadets) and thus the process of removing and the whole defense of Turkey as soon as the them entails a process of arresting them for be- July 15 military coup attempt was defeated in ing members of a terrorist organization. The accordance with the principle of civilian su- state of emergency, which was implemented premacy. In this sense, the decrees after July 15 shortly after the military coup attempt, is meant brought devastating changes in the command to expedite the lustration period in accordance links and military structure. The Decree No. with the laws and the constitution. On July 16, 668 (Dated July 27, 2017) puts the Gendar- as a first reaction, the government arrested 2,839 merie and Cost Guard Commands under the soldiers of various ranks.17 full authority of the Ministry of Interior, like The most significant dimension of the chal- the police forces, with the exception of the mil- lenge at hand is the fragile process that the TAF itary duties of mobilization and wartime. It was is currently undergoing. Given that the TAF as a revolution in terms of weakening military an institution has been experiencing a turbulent posture. The Decree No. 669 was very compre- period since the Ergenekon trials, what hap- hensive in terms of subordinating the Services pened on July 15 made this process even more to the Ministry of Defense and revolutionizing fragile. It also damaged the credibility of the its authority by means of personnel policies. In army in the eyes of society. On the other hand, it fact, the shift after July 15 was in compliance is also observed that the TAF is experiencing a with the military traditions of Western armies significant breakthrough in terms of its institu- in terms of civilian supremacy and effective- tional social psychology because of the terror ness. The Ministry of Defense quickly replaced created by the attempted military coup. It can critical high-level positions with ‘ranked’ civil- only be expected that the TAF will enter a spe- ians while restructuring its headquarters. The transformation efforts of decades were sudden- 16. Burhanettin Duran, “FETÖ Tasfiyesinde İki Kritik Husus,” ly materialized after July 15, although the TAF Sabah, 23 July 2016. still needs further transformation in a revolu- 17. “Başbakan Yıldırım’dan Açıklama: Kalkışma Bastırıldı, 161 Şehit Var,” NTV, 16 July 2016. tionary spirit.

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The constitutional amendments also chal- On September 8, for the first time since the lenged the command and control system of the discharges began, the official website of the Chief TAF. The amendments, however, do not have di- of Staff provided a breakdown on the true num- rect effect on the transformation or the structure bers of the TAF personnel. According to the fig- of the TAF; they define the Chief of General Staff ures given, approximately 351,000 personnel as a constitutional authority responsible for the serve in the Turkish army, navy and air force: 206 defense of the country against the President. But generals; 29,949 officers; 67,476 non-commis- the decrees after July 15 indicate the Minister of sioned officers (NCO); 48,879 specialist soldiers; Defense as the Chief of all Services. Hence a 15,888 contractual soldiers; and 188,611 con- ‘double headed’ leadership can be claimed due to scripts. Accordingly, 46% of the TAF are profes- the presence of two Chiefs upon the Services. The sionals, while 54% are conscripts. When these General Staff, which is limited by intelligence numbers are compared to March 2016 figures, and operational planning, and the Ministry of we see a 38% reduction in the number of gener- Defense with overall responsibility may end up als, who then numbered 325 in all three branch- holding countering stances. As a result, strategic es, and an 8% reduction in the numbers of offi- level command and control needs to be arranged cers who censuses as 32,451. There were no for further betterment. In this spirit, a centralized major changes in the other ranks. According to headquarters structure and well-integrated force the most recent figures available, more than posture need to be considered in the frame of a 7,000 officers of different ranks have been ar- revolutionary defense reform. The same reform rested while 6,511 officers have been dismissed process can be applied to the medium- and low- from the armed forces as of March 2017.19 level military force structures beginning with flexible, wise thinking in military engagements and capacity possession for combat readiness. The TAF needs to review its combat readiness Personnel Affairs and take the necessary measures under the In the aftermath of July 15, there have been nine leadership of the Turkish government. waves of major discharges: July 27, July 30, Sep- tember 2, September 7, October 29, November 22, January 6, February 7, and April 29. Each of these days brought the dismissal of thousands of officers and non-commissioned officers from the Personnel recruitment and education was TAF. The Decree no. 667 (Dated July 23, 2017) another field to imminently be reformed, since facilitated the dismissal of personnel affiliated FETÖ had dominated these processes. The Min- with FETÖ by the Ministry of Defense, while istry of Defense assumed the authority and re- leaving the Gendarmerie and Cost Guard to the sponsibility of recruitment of all personnel types authority of the Ministry of Interior. The Decree (students, officers, non-commissioned officers, No. 668 (Dated July 27, 2017) delivered the first specialists, clerks, contractors and other employ- list of soldiers to be deported from the cadres of ees) by attaching the Personnel Recruitment De- the TAF, including 149 generals, 1,099 officers, partment of all Services to the General Personnel and 436 non-commissioned officers.18 19. “Bakan Işık TSK’dan İhraç Sayısını Açıkladı,” En Son Haber, 17 March 2017, http://www.ensonhaber.com/bakan-isik-tskdan-ihrac- 18. The Decree No. 668, (Dated 27 July 2017). sayisini-acikladi-2017-03-17.html, (Access date: 7 July 2017).

setav.org 15 ANALYSIS

Directorate of the Ministry of Defense.20 Reli- tributed at the initiative of Service commands. able and retired officers and non-commissioned The amendments by the Decree No. 669 built a officers are called on duty and authorized to National Defense University to overcome the ex- make interviews in the interview commissions pansive education system and have a bolder hand after their security clearances are confirmed by on personnel recruitment while shutting down the Intelligence Agency and the Security Forces. military high schools.21 The recruitment process has been established on The interviewed officers argued that the idea objective parameters based on physical and of a National Defense University was a long-term health proficiency, academic success and reliabil- desire of the officers and that the education cur- ity. Success in the recruitment process relies on a ricula of the War College were always in dispute. wide spectrum of criteria and scrutiny, mainly Once-educated ‘system engineers’ of the War focusing on probable affiliation to terror organi- Colleges could meet the requirements of troop zations, criminal acts, morality, dignity, and loy- management. According to the claims of retired alty. There was a risk for the infiltration of the personnel, these ‘system engineers’ sought per- TAF’s cadres by FETÖ in a second attempt after sonnel career advancement rather than being de- July 15. Despite many difficulties and the intense voted to military tasks. Hence a new and pro- recruitment process, the Ministry of Defense gressive curricula would prepare officers and succeeded in filling the gaps after the dismissal of non-commissioned officers to command troops. FETÖ members from the TAF. But the infiltra- On the other hand, July 15 exposed another risk. tion attempts of other religious communities ap- Recruited military students can still be admitted peared to be another issue in the recruitment by FETÖ after the military coup attempt for the process since these societies were also keen on further terror colonization of the TAF. For this having their followers be members of the TAF. reason, the AK Party government removed all ex- Hence loyalty to the constitution appears to be a isting cadets from military education institutions vital prerequisite for personnel recruitment. and offered them admittance to civilian schools Education was the second field of concern pending their academic success. after July 15. FETÖ was very attentive in filling Military high schools were also a sensitive the cadres of the military schools and in favoring issue since the 1980s. The question of whether FETÖ members while humiliating military ca- the closure of military high schools would prove det. Many students were forced to leave school or a challenge to the combat effectiveness of the were dismissed with disciplinary acts. Addition- TAF is not a disputed issue. Military high ally, all Services were in direct charge of their per- schools are good for having devoted military sonnel training and education, while military generations, but are not a prerequisite for having high schools, vocational schools for non-com- warriors.22 Contrary to general belief, the inter- missioned officers, and war colleges were under viewed officers argued, that a comprehensive oc- the authority of these Services. The War Acade- cupational training program in War Colleges my, on the other hand, was subordinated to the and Vocational Non-Commissioned Schools is General Staff, comprising the Armed Forces, adequate to raise a warrior generation; this was Land, Air and Naval Academies. As a result, cur- conveyed despite their romantism in favor of ricula and personnel education policy was dis- military high schools.

20. Personnel recruitment was under the authority of the Services 21. The Decree No. 669, (Dated July 31, 2017). before the July 15 coup attempt. Article 37 of the Decree No. 668 22. Merve Seren, “Askeri Liseler Tartışması,” Al Jazeera, 16 August, passed the authority to the Ministry of Defense. 2016.

16 setav.org THE ROAD TO JULY 15 IN THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS IN ITS AFTERMATH

What presents a challenge is not the trans- dier. The Ministry of Defense has the approval formation of the military education system, but authority of appointments in so far as all Services filling the numeric gap of the dismissed cadres. are subordinated to the Ministry by Article 35 of The positions that require qualified education The Decree No. 669. Democratic norms impose and training cannot spontaneously be replen- such a practice: civilian supremacy needs to be ished. If the dismissal of all War College cadets is based on a check mechanism regarding appoint- concerned, at least four years of education need ments. But in the post-July 15 period, as expect- to pass in order to replace the eliminated offi- ed, it could be a thorny issue to find appropriate cers. Besides the graduates after July 15 will be officers for the relevant posts – it should be junior officers - senior positions will not be pointed out, however, that this transition period filled. If Turkey does not face a security chal- is about to end. The coming years will be smooth- lenge, the current numbers of military personnel er as combat efficiency can be supported by indi- can address its needs. But it is highly probable vidually appointing a soldier to the position that that Turkey will face serious threats of both a s/he fits. On the other hand, the timing and conventional and unconventional nature, and methodology of the appointments should be re- personnel recruitment and training deficiencies viewed by additional arrangements. The appoint- will downgrade the combat effectiveness of the ments are usually prepared in winter and an- TAF. A course to respond to such a challenge nounced in April or May. Personnel move to would be to shorten the training processes with their new position in June and July. School terms optimum timings and calling back the retired, and appointments of spouses regulate these reliable and skilled officers whom the Turkish schedules. Similarly, the promotions of flag offi- government can easily employ in the short term. cers are decided at the beginning of August. The Apart from education, the Ministry of De- summer period is very intense in terms of per- fense is authorized to have the final word on pro- sonnel mobility and unfortunately counterter- motions and appointments other than in the rorism operations as well. Appointments and Services. The ranks of flag officers are a matter of promotions do not have to be at one time and in strategic preference, but the issue is to select the summer. The winter season, especially during most skilled officers with merits. The interviewed school semester breaks, may be an option for retired officers have doubts about the qualifica- families not to suffer from new appointments. tion process of flag officers who were recruited Combat effectiveness has no time restrictions; a before July 15. The danger is that the July 15 psy- continuous process of appointments and promo- chology may push the government to favor offi- tions should depend on the variable of continu- cers with known associations to certain ideologi- ous combat effectiveness. The post-July 15 ar- cal and religious societies. The profile of an ideal rangements need to be furthered by pragmatic officer for flag officer positions must rid itself of and reliable regulative touches in these fields. loyalty and gratitude to outsider societies. Hence the promotion system, which has been handed Military Intelligence over to the Ministry of Defense, needs to be fair- Military intelligence, which was designed to as- er, more transparent and merit-based since gen- sist the decision makers of military planning, has erals will possess power which will only increase long been an ignored function in the TAF. Mod- as they get promoted. ern armies have efficient military intelligence Appointment, on the other hand, is an issue capabilities including headquarter branches and that affects families and the morale of every sol- data collection assets. The TAF, parallel to the

setav.org 17 ANALYSIS

structural transformation of most armies, built a gence organization is reliant on the need of coor- military intelligence branch. FETÖ, as was dis- dinating and integrating all of TAF’s counterin- cussed in the first section of this paper, occupied telligence organizations. Besides a ministry the counterintelligence posts in order to have an responsible for all Services and the defense of the upper hand on the elimination of officers oppos- whole country requires a more comprehensive ing the presence of FETÖ members. Combat military intelligence institutionalization and one intelligence, on the other hand, was not a field of that is operational, capable and deployable. On interest for FETÖ since the collection capability the other hand, the establishment of such an or- of the TAF was not at the desired level. The Na- ganization in the Ministry can be controversial tional Intelligence Agency, which assumed sig- since the same capability exists in the General nals intelligence, appears to be the main infor- Staff and the Services. As a result, a new ap- mation provider in accordance with Act 2937; proach has become urgent for military intelli- however, it does not offer support on any tactical gence after July 15. Combat effectiveness dic- and operational level. The post-July 15 arrange- tates such a capability and a reform-type ments did not bring any change to the nature of undertaking must be initiated for an efficient military intelligence except in terms of a new military intelligence. undertaking to review personnel reliability. Operational Capability The operational capability of the TAF has not The main function of the TAF, which is diminished after July 15, but was strengthened combat readiness and combat against all by eliminating the putschists. There is a consen- types of threats, needs to be developed in sus that Turkey’s military capacity, in terms of accordance with democratic norms. man power, officers, and its deterrence capacity against threats from the PKK and DAESH was not affected by the lustration period. Turkey’s ongoing conflict with the PKK and Operation Euphrates Shield (OES) are examples of how The Ministry of Defense had no intelligence Turkey’s military was able to react against threats. capability in place to monitor the reliability of Many in Turkey, including the military itself, its personnel before July 15; the Minister an- also believe that the OES should be seen as an nounced his intention to build a personnel intel- opportunity to raise motivation and moral with- ligence branch of what was not a term in coun- in the military in the aftermath of the bloody ter-intelligence standards worldwide. The actual coup attempt. need was to coordinate the information gaps in Despite promising success in countering ter- the investigations on the reliability of personnel rorism and the OES, the elimination and dis- with Security Forces and the Intelligence Agen- missal of FETÖ members seems to be a challenge cy. The Minister’s quest is legitimate since the in certain military functions, like the Special Ministry of Defense covered the Services in ad- Forces, Air Force pilots and army aviation, in the dition to the Ministry’s headquarters, Defense short term. Measures to erase such vulnerabilities Institutions, the Conscription Department and can be taken by additional regulations. For in- other affiliated institutions. Hence, counterin- stance, a mobilization system can be built up to telligence has become an urgent need for the benefit from retired officers and civilians in their Ministry. But the issue is that counterintelli- fields of expertise. Private companies can be en-

18 setav.org THE ROAD TO JULY 15 IN THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS IN ITS AFTERMATH

couraged to serve the military in a competitive CONCLUSION: STEPPING manner. Personnel policy can be reviewed to replace appropriate military cadres with civilian FORWARD FOR COMBAT personnel while military personnel can be divert- READINESS AND ed for combat and combat support tasks. The EFFECTIVENESS TAF needs time to build up capacity in qualified personnel training and in order to reach the There was a consensus on the need for the trans- point that these personnel are operational. formation of the Turkish military long before the July 15 military coup attempt. The post-July 15 Combat Efficiency after July 15 term offers opportunities to realize such a reforma- The July 15 uprising was a trauma not only for tion of the TAF. The reformation is as urgent as the Turkey’s democracy, but also for the TAF. The elimination process of FETÖ members. Turkey is measures taken afterwards were necessary steps at the stage of engaging imminent threats along- to establish civilian supremacy over the TAF. side PKK-DAESH terrorism and hence there is no But the main function of the TAF, which is room for delaying a reform. In this sense, the gov- combat readiness and combat against all types ernment needs to start a process of augmenting of threats, needs to be developed in accordance the TAF while displaying its trust in it. Augmenta- with democratic norms. The transition period, tion may start from armament procurement, orga- naturally, has been experienced with difficulties nizational transformation or capacity building. especially in terms of command and personnel Meanwhile the morale and motivation of the functions. But the issues are being overcome in TAF are as important as these material transfor- the short term. mations. The trust of the Turkish public and gov- Command and control capability need to ernment appears to be the top priority of the be rearranged due to the contradictions between military personnel. There are arguments claiming the decrees and the constitutional amendments, that 90 percent of the military are FETÖ mem- while the betterment of headquarter structure is bers – these claims have no evidence or basis. a prerequisite. Personnel policy needs to be Such claims can diminish combat effectiveness in based on merit and success alongside devotion the short run. The current personnel of the TAF to the values of Turkish Republic and the consti- were loyal to the constitution and did not partici- tution. Any additional incursions from actors pate in the uprising. To the contrary, the current other than the Turkish government need to be cadre resisted the undertaking and some found suppressed and stripped of any value. The TAF’s themselves trapped by the FETÖ conspiracy. In- operation capability has been breached in cer- terviewed soldiers of currently retired were most- tain aspects such as the downsizing of qualified ly influenced by the negative atmosphere against personnel, but this can be overcome by addi- the military in the country and claimed that oth- tional measures. Military intelligence, on the erwise they would have continued to serve. The other hand, needs to be restructured for an effi- psychology of the military appears to be the most cient Armed Forces. The elimination of FETÖ decisive issue for combat effectiveness. members did not downgrade the TAF’s combat Consequently, combat effectiveness has mi- effectiveness since a single member of FETÖ’s nor challenges but has not been majorly affected can sabotage the overall effort of the TAF. A while responding to the current threats. Further small but devoted personnel number is an ad- measures should be taken via comprehensive vantage in comparison to high numbers, mixed planning and implementation with the aim of a with betraying cells. better defense system. setav.org 19

urkey has experienced, for the first time in the Republic’s history, a coup attempt by a religious community, known as the Fetullahist Ter- Trorist Organization (FETÖ), who secretly flourished in the cadres of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). The significant issue is that the infiltrating body of FETÖ-members were well-known in so far as their presence, but were not well identified in terms of their exact identity and network. The overall discourse of the FETÖ infiltration of the TAF, the July 15 coup attempt, and the imposed measures of the AK Party government challenged the combat effectiveness of the TAF, especially in the realm of the witnessed crises in the Middle East. This paper will scrutinize the challenges and probable courses to steer the TAF out of the current dilemmas, and will offer a perspective on the combat readiness and the transformation of the civil-military relation in the post-July 15 Turkey.

ANKARA • İSTANBUL • WASHINGTON D.C. • KAHİRE