ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol21, No 5, pp 8 49 – 869, 2000

Thecontinuing Kurdish problem in Turkeya fterO ¨ calan’s capture

MICHAELM GUNTER

ABSTRACT Turkey’s suddenand dramatic capture of Abdullah (Apo) O ¨ calan in Nairobi,Kenya on 16 February 1999, far from endingthe odyssey ofthe longtimeleader ofthe KurdistanWorkers Party ( PKK),has led toa process of continuingimplicit bargainingbetween the Turkish governmentand the PKK that holdsout the hopeof awin – winresult for all the parties involved.Turkey’ s EU candidacy,future democratisationand economic success haveall become involvedwith the stay of O ¨ calan’s executionand the continuingKurdish problem.

Far fromending the odysseyof the longtime leader ofthe KurdistanWorkers Party (PKK),Turkey’ s suddenand dramatic captureof Abdullah (Apo) O ¨ calan in Nairobi,Kenya on 16 February 1999 signalled awholenew beginning in the attempt to solve Turkey’s continuingKurdish problem. The purpose of this article is toanalyse this evolvingsituation. 1 Despite his earlier reputationas aStalin-like, murderousterrorist, O ¨ calan, in retrospect, haddone more to re-establish asense ofKurdish sel f-esteem and nationalism inTurkey (and possibly elsewhere) thanany other Kurdish leader in recent years.This was aptly illustrated bythe dismay most Kurdsand their supportersthroughout the worldshowed upon hearing that hehad been appre- hendedby the Turkishauthorities. Inthe process O ¨ calan onceagain illustrated the oldadage that oneperson’ s freedomŽ ghteris another’s terrorist, becauseto most Turks O¨ calan seemed benton destroying Turkey’ s territorial integrity throughterrorist methods. TheTurkish authorities arguethat their citizens ofKurdish ethnic heritage (whoprobably number as muchas 20%ofthe total populationin Turkey)enjoy full rights as Turkishcitizens andthat, therefore,there is noKurdishproblem in Turkey,only a terrorism problem.Since the mid-1970s, however,an increas- inglysigniŽ cant proportionof Turkey’ s Kurdshas actively demandedcultural, linguistic, andpolitical rights qua Kurds.The government has ruthlessly sup- pressed these demandsfor fear theywould lead to the break-upof the state itself. This ofŽcial refusal tobrook any moderate Kurdish opposition helped encourage extremism and,in August198 4,O ¨ calan launchedan insurgency that bythe end of1999 had resulted in morethan 3 1000deaths, as manyas 3000villages destroyed,and some 3000000 people internally displaced.

MichaelM Gunteris at theDepartment of Political Science, Tennessee TechnologicalUniversity, Collegeof Arts andSciences, Box5175, Cookeville, TN 38505-0001,USA. E-mail: [email protected].

ISSN0143-6597 print; 1360-2241 online/ 00/050849-21 Ó 2000 ThirdWorld Quarterly 849 MICHAEL MGUNTER

Domestically, the Kurdishproblem impedes the implementation ofdemocratic andhuman rights reforms,while harmingthe economythrough the expensesit involves.The Kurdish problem also limits Turkishforeign policy by giving foreignstates apowerfulopening with which to pressure the country,while alienating the democratic West andEuropean Union (EU) Turkeyhas long aspired to join.Arguably, the Kurdishproblem has becomethe main sourceof political instability in Turkeyand the biggest challengeto its veryf uture. Fora short periodin the early 1990sO ¨ calan actually seemed close to achievinga certain degreeof military success. Inthe end,however, the over-extendedhimself, while the Turkishmilitary sparedno excesses incontain- inghim. Slowly but steadily, the Turksmarginalised the PKK’smilitary threat. O¨ calan’s ill-advised decision inAugust 1995 to also attack MassoudBarzani’ s IraquiKurdistan Democratic Party innorthern Iraq, because of its supportfor Turkey,further sapped his strength.The Ž nal blowcame whenTurkey threat- enedto go to war against Syria inOctober 1998 unless Damascus expelled O¨ calan fromhis long-time sanctuaryin that country. After ashort surreptitious stay inRussia, Ocalanlanded in Italy on1 2 November1998, where for a brief periodit lookedlike hemightbe able to turn his military defeat intoa political victoryby havingthe EuropeanUnion try him andthus also try Turkey.But in the endUS pressure onbehalf of its NATO ally pressuredItaly andothers to reject O ¨ calan as aterrorist undeservingof political asylum ornegotiation. Indeed for years the USAhadgiven Turkey intelligence training andweapons to battle against whatit saw as the ‘bad’Kurds of Turkey, while ironically supportingthe ‘good’Kurds of Iraq against SaddamHussein. Forcedout of Italy on16 January 1999, O ¨ calan becamenot only a man withouta country,but one lacking even a place to land.During his Žnal hours offreedom, Russia, the Netherlandsand Switzerland all rejected him.Rather pathetically, O ¨ calan hadbecome like the ‘FlyingDutchman’ of legend, whose ship was condemnedto sail the seas until JudgmentDay. Desperate, O ¨ calan Žnally allowedthe Greeksto take him to their embassy in Nairobi,Kenya, where USintelligence agents had oodedinto the countryfollowing the USembassy bombingthere the previoussummer. The USA thenprovided Turkey with the technical intelligence topinpoint his whereaboutsand capture him. 2 Duringthese Žnal hoursthe USAironically stoodby Turkey in part because the USAneededTurkey as arunwayfor US planes to bombIraq in supportof the Iraqi Kurds.The USA hadto give its Turkishally somethingtangible like O¨ calan becauseat that verymoment Iraq’ s deputyprime minister, TariqAziz, was inTurkey in a futile attempt toend Turkey’ s supportfor the USA.Given O¨ calan’s fate, the Iraqi Kurdsmust nowwonder how much longer the USAwill continueto supportthem onceSaddam Hussein is eliminated. O ¨ calan’s Žnal hoursof freedom illustrate againthe oldKurdish maxim: ‘the Kurdshave no friends’.

Initial violence Against abackdropof Turkish national pride,O ¨ calan’s captureinitially led to a widespasm ofKurdish violence in Turkeyand Europe. Osman O ¨ calan, O¨ calan’s 850 THE CONTINUING KURDISH PROBLEM INTURKEY youngerbrother and a senior PKK commanderin his ownright, called upon Kurdsthroughout the worldto ‘ extract aheavyprice from[the] Turkishstate for the conspiracyit has engagedin against ourleadership. Let norepresentative of [the] Turkishstate havepeace at home.’3 The PKK’ssixth congressauthorised its military arm,the Peoples LiberationArmy of Kurdistan ( ARGK)‘to wagea Žght against this plot inthe true spirit ofan Apo f edayee… byattacking all kinds ofenemy elements …towage a warthat will makethe enemytremble …[and] toproceed incessantly with the serhildan [Kurdish intifadah]…bymerging it with the guerrillas.’4 InBerlin, Germany,Israeli guardskilled three Kurdsand wounded another 16 whenthey tried to storm the Israeli consulate.A groupcalling itself the ‘RevengeHawks of Apo’ killed 13people when it set Žre toa crowded departmentstore inIstanbul. Further protests occurredin London,Paris, Mar- seilles, Brussels, Copenhagen,The Hague, Strasbourg, Stockholm, Cologne, Bonn,Hamburg, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Hanover,Dusseldorf, Bern, Geneva, Mi- lan,Vienna, Leipzig, Moscow and Yerevan, among other locations. Despite variousreports ofa powerstruggle between‘ the PKK’s mountain [Middle East] cadres andits Europeanwing’ , 5 ora‘leadership struggle …being wagedamong [longtime numbertwo] Cemil Bayik,Osman O ¨ calan,and Mustafa Karasu’,6 the PKK quicklyreconŽ rmed Abdullah O ¨ calan as its president or generalsecretary andnamed a temporary10-member presidential councilto act forhim: Cemil Bayik,Osman O ¨ calan,Halil Atac,Mustafa Karasu,Riza Altun, DuranKalkan, Nizamettin Tas,Ali HaydarKaytan, Murat Karayilanand Nizamettin Ucan. 7 Althoughall 10appeared to bemilitants basedin the Middle East, howlong such a relatively large groupcould hold together remained unclear.Also uncertainwas the allegiance of PKK members in Europeto a leadership groupbased solely in the Middle East. Indeed,further initial reports suggested(erroneously it turnedout) that suchhigh-ranking European leaders as KaniYilmaz might evenhave been executed by the organisationfor having failed to Žnda sanctuaryfor Abdullah O ¨ calan while hewas inEurope. 8 These problemsand Abdullah O ¨ calan’s subsequentcalls toabandon the armedstruggle andseek ademocratic republicnotwithstanding, the PKK continuedto maintain its unity.

Turkish nationalelections ApparentlybeneŽ ting fromthe nationalist prideO ¨ calan’s capturehad elicited amongmany Turks, ultra-nationalist parties madea strongshowing in Turkey’s national parliamentary elections heldon 18 April 1999.Ecevit’ s nationalist but leftist Democratic LeftParty ( DSP)ranŽ rst withsome 22.6%of the vote,but the real surprise was the showingmade by the Devlet Bahceli’s extreme right National ActionParty ( MHP),which garnered 18.6% and came in second.In the previouselections the MHP hadnot even won enough votes to enter parliament. Now—in a coalition with Ecevit’s party—the MHP formedthe coreof the new government.On the otherhand, the Islamist Virtue Party andthe twomore moderateparties ofthe right—Mesut Yilmaz’s MotherlandParty ( ANAP) and TansuCiller’ s TruePath Party ( DYP)—all saw signiŽcant declines in their vote 851 MICHAEL MGUNTER totals frombefore. The result was anultra-nationalist governmentwith a seeming mandateto try O ¨ calan quickly,execute him andthus successfully end the PKK’sstruggle.Instead, a completely different scenario was alreadyin progress.

Initial violence ends Whenhe was Žrst captured,O ¨ calan,amazingly and not without some conster- nationamong his ownf ollowers,declared: ‘Ireally loveTurkey and the Turkish people.My motherwas Turkish.Sincerely, I will doall Icanto beofservice.’ 9 Asheawaited trial in his prisoncell onthe island ofImrali nearIstanbul, O ¨ calan nextaverred: ‘ Asolutionbased on the unityand independence of Turkey, which wouldguarantee peace and real democracy… is also ourinnermost wish.’10 He also called uponhis followers torefrain fromviolence in the run-upto the Turkishparliamentary elections that wereheld on 18 April 1999.Despite the attitude ofmany, including some Kurds,that O ¨ calan was merely tryingto save his ownneck and had shown himself acoward,the initial violencethat had brokenout upon his capturestopped almost overnight. Interestingly, while the imprisonedO ¨ calan hadbegun calling fora democratic solution to the Kurdishproblem, Ahmet Necdet Sezar, the president ofthe TurkishConstitutional Court,openly criticised the Turkishconstitution forthe restrictions it placedon basic freedoms.Sezar speciŽcally mentionedthe necessity to defendfreedom of speech and eliminate the use ofwhat some have called ‘thoughtcrimes’ to imprison as terrorists those whocalled forKurdish cultural rights. Healso lashed outat the restrictions still existing against the use ofthe Kurdishlanguage, insisted onthe needto conformto the universal standards ofhuman rights, andasked f orthe appropriaterevision ofthe Turkish constitution, amongother points. 11 Oneyear later— and largely onthe basis of these comments—Sezer was elected the newpresident ofTurkey. InSeptember 1999 Sami Selcuk,the chief justice ofthe TurkishSupreme Courtof Appeals, made similar pleas to democratise the Turkishconstitution. Indeed,Selcuk went so far as to assert that the present (1982)Turkish constitution was illegitimate becauseit was dictated bythe military, andno serious debateagainst it hadbeen allowed. SpeciŽ cally, heargued that the constitution limits personalf reedom,rather thanlimiting the powerof the state, andthus makes Turkeya state witha constitution butnot a constitutional state. 12 Thesimilarities betweenO ¨ calan’s recommendationsfor democracy to solve the Kurdishproblem and the proposalsof these twoeminent Turkishjurists were striking. Indeed,the PKK respondedthat ‘we,as apartyand a people,are ready tolive with pridein aTurkey,on the essential lines drawnby the chief ofthe appeals court’. 13

O¨ calan’s evolution Wheninterviewed in March 1998, O ¨ calan admitted hehad used some terrorist methods,but argued that if youlooked at the historical recordhonestly you wouldsee that Turkeywas the real terrorist. 14 Indeed,since its creation in the 852 THE CONTINUING KURDISH PROBLEM INTURKEY

1920s, Turkeyhas tried to obliterate the veryexistence ofthe Kurdsby assimilating them,claiming theywere just ‘MountainTurks’ , andlegally banningtheir language,culture andgeographical place names,among numerous othertactics. Duringthe 1960sTurkishpresident Cemal Gursel praised abook that claimed that the Kurdswere Turkish in origin,and helped to popularisethe phrase‘ spit inthe face ofhim who calls youa Kurd’as awayto makethe very word‘ Kurd’an insult. 15 Peaceful democratic attempts to protest against such policies landedone in prisonor worse. By pursuing such actions, Turkeyitsel f radicalised its ethnic Kurdishpopulation and sowed the seeds ofO ¨ calan’s movement. O¨ calan beganhis struggle as aviolent Marxist committed toestablishing an independentpan-Kurdish state forthe some 20 – 25million Kurdsin the Middle East (half ofwhom live in Turkey)and who constitute the largest nationin the worldwithout their ownindependent state. Overthe years his ideas evolved,so that bythe early 1990s,O ¨ calan was askingonly for Kurdish political and cultural rights within the pre-existing Turkishborders. In part hehad mellowed in the face ofthe hardrealities imposedby the Turkishmilitary andthe outside world,hostile toany independent Kurdish state whichmight destabilise the volatile butgeostrategically important Middle East. TheTurkish state, however, saw O¨ calan as insincere andf elt that, if it relented evenslightly in its anti-Kurdishstance, the situation wouldescalate intothe eventualbreak-up of Turkeyitself, as happenedto its predecessorthe OttomanEmpire. 16 Manywho really knowhim understandhow O ¨ calan has cometo believe that boththe Turksand the Kurdswould be better offliving together in aTurkeythat has becomef ully democratic.When he declared a unilateral ceaseŽre in March 1993,forexample, O ¨ calan stated, ‘Turkish –Kurdbrotherhood is about1000 years old,and we donot accept separation fromTurkey’ . 17 Rather,the Kurdsin Turkey‘ wantpeace, dialogue, and free political action within the frameworkof ademocratic Turkishstate’ . Complete democracywould not only solve the Kurdishproblem within Turkey,but also fulŽl the ultimate goalof Ataturk— the founderof the TurkishRepublic— for a moderndemocratic Turkeythat would beaccepted as amemberof the West. Thekey to Turkey’s futureis to resolve the Kurdishproblem democratically. Froma zero-sumgame that pitted Turksagainst Kurds,O ¨ calan’s struggle had developedinto awin – winproposition f orboth. Given Turkey’ s paucityof able political leaders, O ¨ calan—who after all was bornin Turkey and spoke Turkish better thanKurdish— ironically might beseen as abetter Turkthan the Turkish leaders themselves. Duringhis recent trial O ¨ calan repeatedhis position.He offered ‘ to serve the Turkishstate’ by ending the Kurdishinsurgency in returnf orreal andcomplete democracywhich, i fTurkeyspared his life,he arguedhe couldthen accomplish. Herewas aclear strategy toachieve a just democratic peacefor everyone within the existing Turkishborders. After all the Kurdsare notthe onlyones suff ering fromthe lack ofTurkish democracy and justice. TheSusurluk scandal in 1996,for example, demonstrated how Turkish authorities hiredright-wing criminals onthe runto murderhundreds of per- ceivedcivilian enemies ofthe state inreturn for turning a blindeye to their drug 853 MICHAEL MGUNTER trafŽcking. 18 In1999 Oral Calislar, aleadingTurkish journalist, was sentenced to prisonas aterrorist becauseof a critical interview with O ¨ calan he had publishedmore than Ž veyears ago.Akin Birdal, the president ofthe Human Rights Association inTurkey who was shot morethan 10 times andnearly killed byultra-Turkishnationalists in1998, was sentencedto prison in 1999 for calling fora peacefulsolution to the Kurdishproblem. The state claimed Birdal was guilty of‘ inciting peopleto hatredon the basis ofclass, race,or regional differences’. MerveKavakci, a female memberof the Islamist Virtue Party,was expelledfrom her newly won seat inthe Turkishparliament in1999 for wearing aheadscarfinto that body.Supposedly, her actions demonstrateda desire to overthrowthe secular TurkishRepublic and establish areligious dictatorship. Shewas also stripped ofher Turkish citizenship onthe groundsthat she had illegally obtainedUS citizenship.

O¨ calan’s call fordemocracy Instead ofissuing ahard-lineappeal for renewed struggle duringhis trial for treason that endedon 29 June 1999 with asentence ofdeath, O ¨ calan issued a remarkablestatement that calls forthe implementation oftrue democracyto solve the Kurdishproblem within the existing bordersof a unitaryTurkey, and thus fulŽls Ataturk’s ultimate hopesf ora strong,united and democratic Turkey that canjoin whatis nowthe EuropeanUnion. As the centrepiece ofhis new attempt toreach a peacefulsettlement ofTurkey’ s Kurdishproblem, it wouldbe useful to analyse O ¨ calan’s statement at some length: ‘Thehistorical conclusion Ihavearrived at is that the solution forthis [Kurdish]problem which has grown sobig, is democratic unionwith the democratic,secular Republic.’19 ‘The democratic option… is the onlyalternative in solvingthe Kurdishquestion. Separationis neither possible nornecessary’ (p 18). Throughoutwhat is actually his defenceagainst chargesof treason and separatism, O ¨ calan appeals to ahigher,more equitable natural law overwhat he sees as the narrowpositive orman-made law ofthe Turkishstate. ‘Iam not concernedwith alegalistic defencefor myself’ (p 10 )because‘ the laws [ofthe Turkishstate] …havebecome an obstacle beforesociety’ (p 46). ‘ Needless to say …legally speaking,[my] punishment is called for’(p 1 23).However, ‘ the real dishonestyand the real treason hereis notto see whatis right andnot to undertakeany effort towardssuch ends’ (p 136).‘ Thenarrow articles ofcriminal law …expose… the needfor a democratic constitutional law’(p 1 44). ‘Thereforewe cantalk aboutits [the PKK’s] moral andpolitical legitimacy even if it was illegal’(p 145).‘ It shouldnot be seen as aawor a dilemma that Ihave tried toarrive at moral andpolitical values andsee them as asolutionrather than deliveringa defencein the legal sense ofthe word’(p 153 ).‘ Inspite ofmy conviction… Ihaveno doubt that Iwill beacquitted morally andpolitically by history’(p 155). Earlyin his exposition,O ¨ calan declares that ‘Leslie Lipson’s TheDemocratic Civilisation [NewYork; Oxford University Press, 1964]… contributedto my understanding’(p 11). Lipson analyses howmulti-ethnic states that are truly democratic suchas Switzerland cansuccessfully transcendnarrow ethno- 854 THE CONTINUING KURDISH PROBLEM INTURKEY nationalism andachieve peace, justice andprosperity for all their citizens. O¨ calan cites longpassages fromLipson to illustrate whyhe now believes that ‘the right ofnations forself-determination …whichin practical terms meant establishing aseparate state, was,in fact, ablindalley …in the case of Kurdistan’(p 11). Independence, federalism andautonomy are ‘backwardand sometimes evenobstructive …incomparison to the rich modeof solutions democracyoff ered’(p 11)‘ Theidea ofsetting upa nationstate …employed… mainly armedstruggle andnational wars ofliberation …Thestruggle that is currentlygoing on in the Balkans clearly showswhat a diseased approachthis is’ (p 55). Inthus nowarguing, O ¨ calan freely admits that hehas beenmightily impressed with the coldwar victory of the USAandthe West overcommunism. ‘ Victory belongsto democracy … This is clear whenone looks at the waythe USand Great Britain lead andshape the world’(p 56). ‘ Democracy… led to the supremacyof the West. Western civilisation can,in this sense, betermed democratic civilisation’(p 59). ‘ It seems that the democratic system has insured its victoryinto the 2000sandcannot be stopped spreading in depthto all societies’(p 17). O¨ calan also readily admits tohaving made costly errors: ‘Manymistakes have beenmade by us, by myself. Theyhave caused great pain’(p 11 4.)‘ IŽndthat myprinciple [sic] shortcomingwas duringthe ceaseŽre episode[presumably March–May1993 ],innot seeing andevaluating the preparationsthe state was makingand therefore missing anhistoric opportunity’(p 104).‘ Inits programme andits practice as well [the PKK]bears the marks ofthe dogmaticand ideological approachof the radical youthmovement of those [coldwar] years’ (p 1 27). ‘Especially in1997, under the nameof an off ensive against village guards,there wereattacks oncivilians, amongthem womenand children, that shouldnever havebeen the target ofmilitary attacks’(p 130 ). O¨ calan evenpraises Ataturk,the founderof modern Turkey and the Turkish leader most oftenidentiŽ ed with the policyof trying to obliterate the Kurds. ‘Someprimitive Kurdishintellectuals …couldnot share their programmewith Mustafa Kemal [Ataturk]and became narrow-minded separatists …Theyended upparticipating in the [SheikhSaid] uprisingof 19 25… aweakaffair, without aprogramme,disorganised and leaderless’ (p 24). O ¨ calan arguesthat ‘it is well knownthat the latter [Kurdishfeudal lords] werenot really acting outof nationalist fervorbut were interested inachieving local dominancefor their tribe’(p 5 4).‘ Onecannot ascribe to Ataturkeither aparticular oppositionto democracyor to Kurds’(p 25). ‘ Theacceptance of Turkish as the ofŽcial languageand its developmentwere only natural’ (p 73 ).However, ‘ imposinga banon the Kurdishlanguage until 1992…is notconsistent with Ataturkism … If Ataturkwere alive today,he would take the most appropriatestand, the one that supportsa democratic unionwith the Republic’(p 8 2). Finally, the PKK leader also Žndspraise forthe Turkisharmy. ‘ Thearmy is moresensitive thanthe most seemingly democratic parties …Thearmy has takenupon itself to bethe protectorof democratic norms… Todaythe armyis nota threat to democracy,but on the contrarya forcethat guaranteesthat democracywill moveon to the nextstage in ahealthymanner’ (p 68). 855 MICHAEL MGUNTER

Originally achild ofsocialism andMarxism, O ¨ calan furtherspends consider- able time musingphilosophically over their practical failures. ‘Socialists were preyto vapidgeneralisations andwere slipshod in practice’(p 3 8).‘ Coupled with adogmaticoutlook, Marxism lessened the chanceof a creative approachto the challenges whichfaced us’ (p 10 6).He still feels, however,that ‘this of coursedoes not mean that socialism left nopositive legacy’(p 36), since ‘the socialist experiment… left agreat experiencebehind it …andwill forma synthesis betweenits achievements andwhat it has toachieve’ (p 3 7).Indeed, Marxist thoughtpatterns clearly remain,as O ¨ calan explains how‘ anew synthesis will bebornout of the thesis andantithesis. TheState –PKK opposition will lead tothe synthesis ofa Democratic Republic’(p 46). O¨ calan still maintains, however,that ‘the PKK’srebellion usingits own methods,and leading the movementas amilitary forcewas legitimate’(p 13 4). ‘Nowadayseverybody talks aboutthe radicalism ofthe methodsof the PKK withoutactually seeing howthe rulers behavedhistorically andpolitically’ (p13 4).‘ Thelegitimacy ofuprising against anysystem ofrepression as extensive as the “languageban” of the 1982Constitution shouldbe keptin mind whendiscussing this illegal movement’(p 1 23).‘ Therewas astruggle to legitimately live like humanbeings and … manysacriŽ ces weremade for a more democratic society andrepublic’ (pp 13 2 –33).‘ History will demonstrate that this movement[the PKK]didnot target the founderof the republicbut was a movementaiming at curinga decaying,sick entity …Weoppose[d] … the oligarchic,undemocratic, feudal values andstructures in Turkishsociety’ (p11 4).‘ Theexisting legal system andConstitution are animpediment to democratic rights’(p 121).As forblame, ‘ everybodyfrom the highest organsof the state tothe most backward,stupid, cruel persons,are all ofus responsible’ (p 133). Howthen does O ¨ calan nowsee the Kurdishproblem and what does he seek? ‘If the obstacles tothe use ofthe Kurdishlanguage and culture [are removed]… integration ofthe Kurdishpeople with the state will occur. Negativeperceptions and distrust ofthe state will changeto positive perceptions andtrust. Thebasis forrebellion andconfrontation will beŽ nished’(p 97).Such a‘solutionwill bringwealth, unity and peace’ (p 95). ‘ Towin the Kurdsas a peopleis to winthe Middle East’(p 1 48)and ‘ aTurkeythat has solvedits internal problemsin this mannerwill be[a] Turkeythat has wonthe capacity to emergeas aninternationally powerfulforce’ (p 151). O¨ calan himself readily admits that his analysis is ‘repetitious at times’(p 11). This is especially true ofhis conceptof a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem.Although he complains that in writing his declaration,‘ Ihavenot had muchopportunity [to haveaccess to research materials]’(p 11), others might remarkon the liberality ofthe Turkishstate in allowinghim to write anything, let alonepublish it. Indeed,some haveargued that, since Ocalanhas been incarcerated bythe Turkishauthorities, anythinghe now says is suspect. To alleviate this problem,these critics suggest that the PKK shouldhave declared at the moment O¨ calan was capturedthat hewas nolonger in a positionto speak forthe organisation. Replyingto sceptics, Ocalanmaintains that his declaration ‘is neither atactical 856 THE CONTINUING KURDISH PROBLEM INTURKEY attempt tosave the dayor an unprincipled turn-around’ (p 1 29).‘ Myeff ort to endthe armedcon ict is notan attempt tosave myskin’ (p 1 45).Indeed, his argumentsare notwholly new. As mentionedabove, he discussed most ofthem in amoreembryonic form with the present authorwhen he interviewed O ¨ calan in March1998, 11 monthsbefore the Turkishauthorities capturedhim. As early as 1991 O¨ calan was arguingthat independencewas aninappropriate solution to the Kurdishproblem in Turkey.O ¨ calan hopesthat his declaration ‘will leave for future[generations] a veryprecious legacy of solving the problem’(p 10 ),and avers that ‘ifIam giventhe opportunity,I will direct all myefforts towards attaining, andrepresenting the democratic unionof free citizens andpeoples with the republic,in peace and fraternity’ (p 110 ). SurelyTurkey is strongand wise enoughto take upO ¨ calan’s offer.Yasir Arafat,Nelson Mandela, Yitzhak Shamir andGerry Adams were all oncereviled as terrorists, butnow are called statesmen. Thus,not executing him is in Turkey’s national interest because,alive, O ¨ calan might just beable to take the steps that will endthe Kurdishinsurgency in Turkey. If heis executed, however,it is likely that Turkeywill simply buyf oritself anothergeneration ofembittered Kurdsand a struggle that challenges sounnecessarily its very political, social andeconomic f oundations.As analysedbelow, not exe- cuting O¨ calan wouldalso probablyfacilitate Turkey’s long-cherisheddream ofadmission into the EuropeanUnion, as well as helpingthe long-suffering Turkisheconomy escape furtherdamage from a never-endingguerrilla struggle. Inaddition, Turkey should recall that the Kurdssit ona great deal ofthe Middle East’s water andoil resources andhave become increasingly conscious oftheir nationality. As the Arab – Israeli dispute windsdown, the Kurdswill increasingly bethe onesdestabilising the geostrategic Middle East—unless some simple butbasic reforms are takennow. It wouldbehoove Turkey’ s friends such asthe USAto advise the Turksdiscreetly alongthese lines andencourage it to institute some long-overduecultural reforms that will appearmagnanimous and satisfy the legitimate demandsof most ofTurkey’ s Kurds.

Implicit bargaining O¨ calan’s deathsentence begana process ofimplicit bargainingbetween the state and the PKK that intruth had already begun shortly after his capture.It will be recalled that O ¨ calan toldhis captors onthe ight backto Turkeythat hewanted tobe ofservice tothe state. Afewdays later Prime Minister Ecevit declaredthat the state wouldconsider changing its policies towardsthe Kurdsif the PKK wouldlay downits arms: ‘If andwhen conditions become more conducive to solvingcertain problems,then new approaches may prevail. A substantial decrease interrorism wouldbe conducive to improvements and ref orms inthe social, economicand political life ofthe country.’20 This process ofimplicit bargainingcontinued once O ¨ calan’s trial actually beganand the PKK leader set forwardhis vision ofa ‘democratic republic’. The PKK presidential councildeclared that O ¨ calan ‘has madeall-embracing state- ments concerning… the solutionof the KurdishQuestion in a spirit ofpeace … 857 MICHAEL MGUNTER

His approachis mature,respect ful andresponsible. Great warriors also know howto begreat peacemakersand how to take realistic initiatives.’21 The council also claimed that O ¨ calan ‘behavesrespect fully towardsthe Turkishpeople’ , but pointedlyadded that ‘wehave suffered the greater devastation’. O¨ calan’s deathsentence on29 June 1999 probably produced a restrained reaction frommost Kurds—incontrast to the furyhis initial capturein February hadelicited— because they realised that the court’s action was just aninitial step in whatwas goingto be a continuingprocess ofimplicit bargaining.The PKK presidential councilnoted, however, that ‘this decision will neverbe acceptable toour people and our party’ , warned‘ that this dangerousverdict has potential consequencesthat couldignite anarea far widerthan that ofTurkey and Kurdistan’, butfor the time beingat least called foronly ‘ restrained protests’. 22 Aweeklater anotherstatement fromthe PKK councildeclared that ‘the death sentence …is a…continuationof the conict betweenthe Turksand Kurds into the dawnof the 21stCentury’ , claimed that it ‘will notserve the Turkishnation butwill onlybeneŽ t forces whotrade in war’, andmaintained that ‘O ¨ calan, despite all the difŽculties, is tryingto opendoors to the resolution ofthe Kurdish Question’.23 Ina wide-ranginginterview, Duran Kalkan, a memberof the PKK’s presidential council,concluded that ‘eachpositive step [fromthe Turkishside] will beanswered with a positive step fromour side’ . 24 Surveyingthe situation, the prominentTurkish journalist Mehmet Ali Birand wrotethat ‘Turkishpublic opinion is changingdramatically in the wakeof the AbdullahO ¨ calan trial’. 25 Birandargued that ‘the most important sign ofthis changewas evidencedwhen Ertugrul Ozkok, the editor in chief of Hurriyet,Turkey’s highest-circulation daily anda championof pro-government opinions,urged that the deathsentence bemet withcircumspection’ . Birand addedthat ‘anothersign ofchange is that some prominentpeople known to be close to the state are loudlydeclaring that the Kurdishidentity must be recognised’. Shortlyafter his conviction,in astatement announcedby his lawyers,O ¨ calan orderedhis guerrillas to evacuateTurkey by the endof the yearand declared that this indicated his sincerity towardsending the conict: ‘Icall uponthe PKK to endthe armedstruggle andwithdraw their forces outside the bordersof Turkey, forthe sake ofpeace, from September 1, 1999’ . 26 Althoughresponding ‘ the Turkishside will nevernegotiate with anyoneor any organization [on the Kurdishproblem]’ , TurkishPrime Minister Bulent Ecevit implicitly didso anywaywhen he added: ‘ Toend separatist terrorism everyonewho cares for Turkeymust contribute.We donotknow how much will beachieved.Time will tell.’27 Analysingthe developingprocess, BrieŽ ng,whichdescribes itself as a Turkish‘ weeklyinside perspective onTurkish political, economicand business affairs’, concludedthat ‘whetherthe state likes it, admits it, oreven realizes it, it is now,in anindirect fashion,sitting downto the negotiatingtable with AbdullahOcalan’ . 28 At almost the exact same time, the USAssistant Secretary ofState for Democracy,Human Rights, andLabor, Harold Hongju Koh, visited Turkeyand met awidevariety ofpeople. Although recognising Turkey’ s right to defend itselfagainst the PKK,heupset manyTurkish ofŽ cials with his strongand 858 THE CONTINUING KURDISH PROBLEM INTURKEY eloquentrecommendations concerning some ofthe verythemes O ¨ calan was now broaching.29 Kohargued, f orexample, that ‘onecan oppose terrorism andstill supporthuman rights’ . Headdedthat ‘most Kurdsin Turkey… wantto remain Turkishcitizens, while enjoyingthe basic humanrights guaranteedto all people underinternational law,including f reedomto express one’s languageand culture,and freedom to organize political parties that represent their interests’. Hemaintained that ‘far fromhurting Turkey’ s territorial integrity, aninclusive policythat acknowledgedthese rights wouldstrengthen the Turkishstate by givingthe Kurdishcommunity a genuinestake in their country’s future’. Inother words,Koh seemed tobe saying that, nowthat O ¨ calan hadbeen captured and hadoff eredto withdraw his Žghters fromTurkey, Turkey had no furtherexcuses notto moveforward on human rights anddemocratisation. It was time for Turkeyto reconcile withits citizens ofKurdish ethnic heritage byrecognising their linguistic, cultural andpolitical identity. Surveyingthe scene,one could not help but notice that, whereonce any quotationprinted from O ¨ calan oranother PKK Žghtermight haveleft ajournalist opento prosecutionon the groundsthat hewas aidingan illegal organisation, nownone of the media seemed to fear quotingO ¨ calan at length.This even includedhis denials that recent violencein Turkey’s southeast was the PKK’s work.Rather, O ¨ calan explainedit as the workof ‘ provocateurs ’anddeclared throughhis attorneys that this was onereason he had called onhis Žghters to withdrawfrom Turkey. Once this was accomplished,it wouldbecome clear who werethe true provocateurs ,andthey would no longer be able to playthe state offagainst the PKK.30 August1999 saw yet anotherevent that signalled anew,softer attitude onthe state’s part whenPresident SuleymanDemirel receivedseven People’ s Democ- racy Party (HADEP)mayorsin the presidential palace in Ankaraand engaged them in broaddiscussions. HADEP hadbeen founded in 1994asalegal Kurdish partyafter its predecessorthe DemocracyParty ( DEP)hadbeen closed and several ofits MPs, includingLeyla Zana, imprisoned for supposedly supporting the PKK.Althoughit hadnot received enough votes inthe April 1999national elections to enter the Turkishparliament, it hadhad numerous mayors elected in the local elections that hadbeen held at the same time. Byreceiving some of these mayorsin Ankara, Demirel was sendinga clear signal that the state was nowwilling torecognise openly the legitimacy ofcertain forms ofKurdish political activity. 31 Ironically creating aneven greater impression, especially onthe Turkish publicthat hadalways heldthe state andits institutions in reverentrespect, was the devastating earthquakethat struck the western part ofthe countryon 17 August1999. As manywas 20000or morepersons perished, mostly becauseof substandardbuildings that corruptofŽ cials hadallowed to beconstructed and whichcollapsed like sandcastles, killing their inhabitants beneaththeir rubble. Theuniversal outrageand indescribable grief was thencompounded when the state seemed virtually paralysedin its lack ofresponse, while oftenreviled foreignerssuch as the Greeksquickly responded with aid that savedthousands. Forthe Žrst time ever,the averageTurk seemed to questionthe sanctity ofthe so-called Devlet Baba orDaddyState. Oneunspoken lesson herewas that maybe 859 MICHAEL MGUNTER the Kurdshad legitimate grievancesagainst the state if averageTurks themselves werenow questioning it. Fromhis prisoncell onImrali, O ¨ calan announcedthat, to showits sympathyfor the victims ofthe earthquake,the PKK wouldbegin its withdrawalfrom Turkey immediately.

Kivrikoglu statement At the beginningof September 1999 General Huseyin Kivrikoglu, the chief of the Turkishgeneral staff ,seemingly furtheredthe process ofimplicit bargaining with his comments onthe PKK’spartial withdrawalf romTurkey during an interview witha select groupof journalists: ‘Theleader ofthe terrorists [O ¨ calan] admitted, the terrorists haverealized theywill get nowherewith the use ofarms. Nowthey are contemplatinga solutionthrough political means’. 3 2 The general continued,‘ they[the PKK]donot want federation, either. Whatthey want are cultural rights’, andadded, ‘ some ofthese rights havealready been given to them.Kurdish newspapers and cassettes are free.Despite the fact that it is banned,radio and TV stations are operatingin Kurdishin eastern andsouth- eastern Turkey.’Kivrikoglu also notedthat ‘HADEP controls the municipalities in 37cities andmajor townships… Noone challenged their election. As longas theydo a decentjob and serve the people,no one will raise anyobjections. Turkeyhas alreadygiven them [the Kurds]many rights.’ Kivrikoglu also refrainedf romcalling forO ¨ calan’s execution:‘ Thearmy should remain silent. Weare apartyto the conict. Andwhen our opinion is sought,we might respondemotionally.’ O¨ calan welcomedKivrikoglu’ s statement as a‘positive step indeveloping cultural freedomand democratization’ , 33 while Cemil Bayik,long seen as the PKK’snumbertwo man, declared that ‘inrecognition of our positive steps, the TurkishGeneral Staff has nowmade a gesture in this direction too’. 3 4 Bayik addedthat the general’s words‘ are in asense ananswer to ourparty’ s declaration.We see them as suchand follow them veryattentively.’ Giventhe resulting speculation that it was implicitly bargainingwith O ¨ calan and the PKK,however,the generalstaff quicklybacked off: ‘It is outof the questionthat the generalstaff accept the PKK terror organizationas aninterlocu- tor,discuss its suggestions,or make any concessions’ . 35 Themilitary declared that ‘whatthey [the PKK]really must dois surrendertheir weapons… andturn themselves in’. Shortlyafterwards, the armyfurther dismissed the PKK’s peace offers as ‘propagandaspread by the terrorist organizationin order to maneuver itselfoutof the deadend it has reached’, anddeclared that ‘forthis reasonthe Turkisharmed f orces are determinedto continuethe battle until the last terrorist has beenneutralized’ . 36 Inreply, the PKK presidential councilstated: ‘While weare makinggreat sacriŽces forpeace and democracy we reject capitulation’, anddeclared: ‘We expectpositive contributionsto peaceand democracy from the civil institutions ofthe state andespecially fromthe TurkishArmed Forces.’ 37 Forhis part Ecevit peevishlydeclared: ‘Scarcely wehavea daywithout a statement fromAbdullah O¨ calan.He has almost becomeone of our mainstream politicians. This is alittle bit toomuch.’ 38 860 THE CONTINUING KURDISH PROBLEM INTURKEY

Tokensurrenders Torestart the process ofimplicit bargaining,O ¨ calan nextcalled onasmall group ofhis militants to surrenderto the Turkishauthorities. Themove coincided with Ecevit’s visit to Washington,DC tomeet USPresident Bill Clintonat the end ofSeptember 1999, and was intendedto winthe PKK publicity as the bearerof peace,democracy and human rights beforea full complementof the local and foreignpress. TheTurkish authorities refusedto playthe game,however. Only areducedgroup of eight militants led byAli Sapan,the former PKK spokesman in Europewho had since beendemoted, ended up obscurely turning themselves inon 1Octoberafter crossing the borderinto southeastern Turkeyfrom northern Iraq.On 29 October 1999, a secondeight-member group  ewin fromVienna, Austria andsurrendered in Istanbul. AlthoughEcevit was quotedas saying: ‘If the armedmilitants in the mountainsdeliver themselves to justice, wewould regard that as apositive development’, 39 the state largely choseto ignorethe tokensurrenders. Silence after all canbe an effective tactic. Whatis morethe state apparentlysaw itself in a win– winsituation. It couldsimply effect to ignoreO ¨ calan’s movestowards dismantling his military struggle,while sitting backand watching the PKK itself possibly fall intointernal Žghtingover the tactics ofits imprisonedleader. Theso-called ‘Peace andDemocratic SolutionGroup’ that turneditself in to the Turkishauthorities on1 Octobercarried letters addressedto Demirel, Ecevit, Kivrikogluand Yildirim Akbulut,the speakerof parliament. Giventhe bitterness ofits longstruggle against the state, the contentof these letters demonstrated how far the PKK nowclaimed its position hadchanged. 40 The PKK declaredthat it wishedto contributeto ‘the onehundred and Ž fty years ofdemocratic people’s struggle bythe peopleof Turkey’ , andowned that ‘whateverits rights and wrongs, the PKK serves the same purposeas part ofthe Turkishpeople’ s struggle toachieve a contemporarysociety’ . Continuing,the PKK arguedthat ‘ourparty realised that it couldnot isolate itselffromthese developments.Therefore, it decidedto change its cold-warinspired political strategy.’ After promisingthat ‘this changeof strategy will beofŽcially approvedat its extraordinary[seventh] congress which will beheld in the nearfuture’ , the PKK declaredthat ‘ourPresident [O ¨ calan] has beenaware since 1993that continuing the armedstruggle is meaningless andexpressed the viewof uniting with Turkey withinthe frameworkof democracy’ . Attempting to putthe best possible face on its diminished position,the PKK wrote‘ this couldnot be achieved until our President was broughtback to Turkey. We believe that nowthat ourPresident is closer tothe Turkishstate andits peoplesomething good will comef romit. As the Turkishsaying goes “ Thereis somethinggood in every incident” .’ After praising Demirel forhaving met the HADEP mayorsthe past Augustand forrecognising the ‘Kurdishreality’ in 199 2,the PKK suggestedthat ‘ageneral amnesty as part ofthe democratisation ofTurkey will helpremove the protracted tension.Also it is obviousthat anylegal changesconceding cultural and languagefreedom will assist.’Returning to its process ofimplicit bargaining,the PKK asserted that ‘weare awarethat the armedstruggle andsufferings have created aproblemof conŽ dence’ , butclaimed that ‘ourcurrent approach and 861 MICHAEL MGUNTER steps havebrought a positive developmentto this issue. Thereare many examples where,af ter longwars andcon icts, peoplehave managed to live togetherin peaceafter the conict ended.’In closing, the PKK letter averredthat ‘the Kurdishand Turkish people are like esh andblood and are inseparable’, wishedDemirel well, andwas signed‘ with respect andsincere feelings’.

Europe Eversince Ataturkhimsel fproclaimedmodern Turkey’ s goalto bethe achieve- ment ofthe level ofcontemporary civilisation, Turkeyhas soughtto join the West. Inrecent decadesthis has ultimately meant membershipin whathas now becomethe EuropeanUnion (EU). For many years this seemed to bethe impossible dream.O ¨ calan’s captureand subsequent proposals for a democratic republicin which the Kurdishproblem would be solved, however, suddenly madethis visiona possibility. On 18– 19November 1999 Istanbul hostedthe Žnal major conferenceof the twentieth centurywhen the representatives ofmore than 50 states gatheredthere fora summit meeting ofthe Organisationfor Security andCooperation in Europe (OSCE).Althoughthe Kurdishproblem was notofŽ cially broached,it was certainly onthe minds ofmany. After all, 11ofthe 15members ofthe EUwere currentlybeing ruled by leftist governmentswhich regarded the Kurdishques- tion as amoral cause akinto that ofKosovo, for which NATO hadjust waged war.Until Turkeysuccessfully implemented the OSCE’sCopenhagenCriteria of minority rights forits Kurdishpopulation, and broad human rights reforms as demandedby the EU,Turkeycould not hope to breakthrough the membership logjam set bythe EU.Inshort, Turkish EU membershipdepended on solvingits Kurdishproblem to the satisfaction ofthe EU.Andi fthe truth betold,this was largely anotherway of declaring that Turkey’s EUfuturedepended to anironic degree on O¨ calan. O¨ calan andhis associates werecertainly awareof this situation. Thusthe PKK presidential councilsent alongletter to the OSCE leaders gatheringin Istanbul.41 ‘It is nomorethan an illusion to expectthe democratisation ofTurkey withouta resolution ofthe Kurdishproblem … Countries whichhave not resolvedthe Kurdishproblem have inevitably hadto shapetheir laws and institutions in ananti-democratic mannerin orderto keepthe Kurdsunder control.This has meant that these countries,and primarily Turkey,have remainedauthoritarian andoppressive regimes.’ If Turkeycould solve its Kurdishproblem, however, ‘ there will nolonger be a needfor such anti- democratic laws andinstitutions’ . Fromhis prisoncell, O ¨ calan concurred: ‘Again,I wish to reiterate myconviction that solvingthe Kurdishquestion and creating the groundsfor democracy in Turkeywill bea guaranteefor peace in the Middle East andfar beyond’. 42 On25 November 1999, however, the Turkishcourt of appeals rejected O¨ calan’s appealagainst his deathsentence. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)—to whichTurkey belonged— quickly issued interim measures askingTurkey to suspend the executionuntil it couldrule onhis appeal,a process that might take as longas twoyears. At this point,Turkish candidacy 862 THE CONTINUING KURDISH PROBLEM INTURKEY forEU membershipentered the picture as the organisationgathered in Helsinki, Finlandto considerednew members. On 11 December 1999 Turkey was Žnally acceptedas acandidatemember. It was clear, however,that Turkey’s candidacy hingedon the satisfactorysolution ofits Kurdishproblem and speciŽ cally its suspensionof O ¨ calan’s deathsentence. As the Germanambassador to Turkey, HansJoachim Vergau,had already bluntly declared, ‘ if youexecute O ¨ calan, you canforget Helsinki’ . 43 The PKK presidential councilwas quickto claim some ofthe credit. 44 ‘The acceptanceof Turkey’ s candidacyis the result ofa process initiated byour President, AbdullahO ¨ calan …[and]was implemented with the intense efforts ofour party.’ The PKK arguedthat ‘ourpush for a democratic solution of Turkey’s problemsplayed a keyrole in creating aclimate that was conducivefor the recent EUdecision …Kurdishdiplomacy was mobilised to makeTurkey’ s candidacyto EUmembershipa reality andEU countries overcametheir doubts concerningTurkey largely as aresult ofsuch Kurdish eff orts.’ Mesut Yilmaz, aformerprime minister andcurrently the headof one of the three parties formingthe Ecevit coalition government,seemed toagree with this assessment ofthe importanceof the Kurdsfor Turkey’ s EUfuturewhen he declaredthat, ‘the roadto the EUpasses throughDiyarbakir’ . 45 Soundingmuch like O¨ calan himself, Yilmaz asserted, ‘Žrst ofall wehave to strengthen democracy,not only in its formbut in its substance as well’, andemphasised that ‘his partydoes not see the broadeningof rights andfreedoms as adangerthat threatens the state …that this would,on the contrary,strengthen the state apparatus’. AlthoughEcevit himself was morecautious, his foreignminister, Ismail Cem, seemingly secondedO ¨ calan bydeclaring that Kurdishbroadcasting should be allowed: ‘Everyoneshould have the right tospeak on television intheir native language,just as Iam sitting heretoday speaking in my own native tongue.’46 Whena private citizen petitioned anAnkara state security courtto try Cem for breachingarticle eight ofthe anti-terror law prohibitingseparatist propaganda, the complaint was dismissed onthe groundsthat in ademocracysuch topics wereopen to discussion. At the same time President Demirel continuedthe conŽdence-building process bynow inviting a groupof prominent human rights activists fromthe southeast tothe presidential palace.There some ofthem made speeches that wouldhave landed them injail hadthey been uttered afewyears earlier. Onthe otherhand, someone ordered the police to raid the ofŽces of HADEP in Diyarbakirand four other smaller cities. Police arrested 11party leaders and seized documentsand cassettes. Lawsthat limited free debateof the Kurdish problemremained in eff ect. Ozgur Bakis,the largest pro-Kurdishdaily in Turkey,was still bannedin the Žveprovinces under emergency rule, while the distribution oftwo Kurdish magazines was also recently halted.Kanal 21, a television station inDiyarbakir, remained shut downfor broadcasting music deemedto incite Kurdishseparatism. Nevertheless, the process ofimplicit bargainingnow continued with anew sense ofimportance. Murat Karayilan,a memberof the PKK presidential council, declaredthat ‘this is abigchance f orTurkey’ , butwarned that O ¨ calan’s 863 MICHAEL MGUNTER

‘executionmeans the executionof the Kurdishpeople … arevival ofthe armed conict …andit wouldmean to preventTurkey from entering the European Union’.47 Hefurtherargued ‘ it wouldbe a fatal errorto think that the PKK has beendefeated … Wealso havethe powerto escalate the war’. ErtugrulOzkok, aleadingTurkish journalist with ahotline toof Žcial thinking,also spokeout against executingO ¨ calan: ‘Thethree hangingincidents in ourhistory have broughtno happiness to our country … Wouldit betoo much if wejust once tried toattain this [happinessand tranquillity] bynot hanging?’ 48 General Kivrikogluowned that Žghtingin the Kurdishregion had declined ‘ by90 %’49 since O¨ calan hadordered his guerrillas to beginwithdrawing the previous summer. Ismet Berkan,an important leftist journalist, elaboratedon the subject of domestic peacewhen he asserted that ‘this problemhas nothingto do with Europe.It is mostly to dowith internal politics.’50 Heclaimed that ‘the agencies providingreports tothe governmenton this issue donotquote European reaction atthe topof their concerns’. Instead,‘ it is felt stronglythat O ¨ calan’s execution wouldundermine the domestic peace… [and]rekindle terrorism’ . President Demirel also urgedpostponement of the executionin deferenceto ‘Turkey’s higherinterests’ . 51 Others arguedthat executingOcalan would hurt the Turkisheconomy by refuelling gallopingin ation andcalling into questionthe government’s very stability, seen as necessary tomaintain the economy’s fragile recovery.The allusion tothe government’s stability referredto the opendisagreement between Ecevit,who was against execution,and his deputyprime minister Devlet Bahceli, the leader ofthe ultra-nationalist MHP,whofavoured it. Finally, in a seven-hourcoalition summit meeting ofthe twoon 1 2January2 000,the governmentagreed to comply with the request ofthe ECHR for a stay of executionuntil it hadruled on the case. Ecevit warned,however, that ‘wehave agreedthat if the terrorist organizationand its supportersattempt to use this decision against the highinterests ofTurkey, the suspensionwill endand the executionprocess will immediately begin’. 52 Althoughthis warningpartially appeasedBahceli, hehad clearly compromiseda great deal,given his original hard-lineposition that hadinitially carried himto such political prominence duringthe April 1999national elections. Theprocess ofimplicit bargaininghad reacheda newlevel. O¨ calan describedthe conditionalstay ofhis executionas ‘important’and ‘historic’. 53 Boldly,he asserted that ‘if theyexecute me, the EUcandidacy,the economyand peace will all dodown … Theseall dependon my staying alive. Iam asynthesis ofvalues, not just aperson.I represent democracy.’Then, however,he adopteda moremodest position.‘ Let usbehumble. Let usdisplay achangeof heart andmentality’ , andpromised that ‘if the governmentand state ofŽcials adopta correct attitude, weshall nottake anywrong steps.’ He declared: ‘Nowthat this summit is over,the most important task awaiting Turkeyand needed is carryingout the reforms that will also fulŽll the requirements ofEU membership.’He explainedthat ‘there is aneedfor general amnesty’and ‘ becauseeveryone has suffered… the healingmust bedone all together’. 864 THE CONTINUING KURDISH PROBLEM INTURKEY

The PKK central committee termed the government’s action a‘decision ofthe century’that ‘comfortedand created morehope for peace among the two peoplesof Turkey’ . 54 Respondingto the government’s warningthat it would restart the executionprocess if the PKK ‘use[d]the decision against the highest interests ofTurkey’ , the central committee afŽrmed: ‘Turkishleaders with commonsense, democratic forces andnationalists canbe sure that ourparty will nottolerate anyf orceto weakenTurkey … orharm its interests.’The central committee also movedquickly to furtherthe implicit bargainingprocess towards O¨ calan’s eventualrelease, however,by declaringthat ‘free andhealthy environ- ments needto be created forO ¨ calan sohe can work for a Democratic Turkey andsolving the Kurdishissue ina peacefulway’ . Obviouslyirritated andnot yet willing to grantO ¨ calan anylegitimacy, Ecevit responded:‘ O ¨ calan andhis supportersare tryingto dictate tothe Turkish government,and they are makingstatements withthis aim. This is unacceptable. It wouldbe to his advantageto keep quiet …Wecannot allow O ¨ calan to use Imrali as apolitical pulpit.’55 Nevertheless, this is, ofcourse, exactly what O¨ calan was doing,while Ecevit’s warningswere largely his responses in the evolvingprocess ofimplicit bargaining. Althoughthe ultra-nationalists andIslamists still called forO ¨ calan’s ex- ecution,most observers,such as Sedat Ergin,a prominentjournalist writing in Hurriyet,concludedthat ‘thus O ¨ calan has beenturned into astrategic cardwith which… to discouragethe PKK fromaction’ . 56 Otheranalysts asserted that the conditionalstay ofexecution would saf eguardthe government’s stability as it beganto implement acrucial three-yearanti-in ationary package backed by $ 4 billion inloans fromthe International MonetaryFund. Indeed, the Istanbul stock market jumped5% upon hearing about the government’s O ¨ calan decision.

Conclusion O¨ calan’s suddenand dramatic captureby Turkishcommandos in February1999 has led to aprocess ofcontinuing implicit bargainingbetween the Turkish governmentand the PKK that holdsout the hopeof a win –winresult forall the parties involved.If handledskillfully andsincerely, it couldnot only result inan endto the longand bloody PKK insurgency,but also lead to amorehealthy economyand much needed democratisation ofTurkish politics that wouldsatis fy the requirements foradmission into the EU.Oncethis was effected,Turkey’ s Kurdishproblem would also becomethe EU’sproblemand responsibility. In addition,EU admission wouldhelp guarantee Turkey’ s territorial integrity, the verypoint that has always preventedthe governmentfrom initiating the steps that wouldsolve its Kurdishproblem. Much,of course, remains tobe accomplished, and it is uncertainwhat paths the continuingprocess ofimplicit bargainingwill take.Ahmet Turan Demir, the generalchairman of HADEP,has suggestedthat ‘Žrst ofall, generalamnesty shouldbe declared’ . 57 Then,‘ anewconstitution with aconsensusin accordance with today’s universal standards [and]the democratization ofall laws, primarily criminal law,will bethe issues that wewill pursue’. SpeciŽcs ‘includethe recognitionof the Kurdishidentity, practicing cultural rights, andthe right to 865 MICHAEL MGUNTER haveeducation in Kurdish’ . Othergoals involvethe right ofKurds to return to their villages, the lifting ofEmergency Rule ( OHAL)andthe village guard system, andchanges in the electoral system that will permit everypolitical party to berepresented in the parliament accordingto the voteit has received.This latter provisionmeant rescindingthe 10%rule that eliminated parties suchas HADEP fromreceiving any representation at all. At its extraordinary7th party congressheld 2 – 23January2 000,the PKK adopteda ‘Peace Project’which incorporatedseveral ofthese points. 58 Othermain points announcedby the PKK includedsecuring the life andfreedom of O ¨ calan,increased investment in the southeast, andpreservation of historic andenvironmental treasures threatenedby the Ilisu Damin the southeast. TheTurkish government, of course, will pursueits ownagenda. Unf ortu- nately,there are still powerfulforces in Turkeywhich do not seek further democratisation, noreven an end to whatfor them continuesto be a proŽtable war.On 19February2 000,forexample, three main HADEP majors weresuddenly arrested andaccused of supporting the PKK:FeridunCelik ofDiyarbakir, Selim Ozalpof Siirt andBingol mayor Feyzullah Karasslan. Althoughthey were quicklyreleased andallowed to return to their jobs,their trial begantwo months later. Daniel Cohn-Bendit,the co-chairmanof the Turkey – EUParliamentary Commission, was initially deniedpermission tovisit the imprisonedLeyla Zana, adecision thenreversed. The CNN TVafŽliate in Turkeywas orderedoff the air for24 hours because it askedwhether history might oneday regard O ¨ calan as aTurkishversion of Nelson Mandela. O ¨ calan himself was nolonger permitted to makestatements to the press, andaccess to his lawyers was reduced.Ecevit continuedto arguethat Kurdishwas nota language,only a dialect, andthat there was noKurdish ethnic problemin Turkey,only a questionof economic developmentin the southeast. Despite the PKK’sabandonmentof the guerrilla struggle,emergency rule in several southeastern provincescontinued and the village guardshave not been disbanded. Indeed, in April 2000the Turkish military attacked PKK units innorthern Iraq. In addition, it appearedthat there wouldbe no peace dividend, as the Turkishmilitary plannedto increase spendingon modernisation and the purchaseof tanks andhelicopters. Furthermore,the Marchcelebration ofthe Kurdishholiday Newroz in Istanbul was bannedby the governorErol Cakir becausethe application forpermission usedthe non-Turkishletter ‘w’in the word‘ Newroz’, instead ofthe preferred Turkishspelling ‘Nevroz’, Ludicrously,of course, the letter ‘w’appeared on the doorof virtually everypublic toilet inTurkey. Crude threats led to prominent Turkishsociologist SerifMardindeciding not to participate in aninternational conferenceon the Kurdssponsored by the AmericanUniversity in Washington, DCon17 April 2000.Andin May2 000state minister Mehmet Ali Irtemcelik, whohad been instrumental in obtainingTurkey’ s EUcandidacythe previous December,resigned, citing deepdifferences in the understandingof democracy betweenhimself andEcevit. Onthe otherhand, the unexpecteddecision bythe Turkishparliament in April 2000not to extend President Demirel’s term foranother Ž veyears, despite the Turkishmilitary’ s clear preferencefor him, might be seen as implementing oneof the most critical ofthe Copenhagencriteria requiredfor EU 866 THE CONTINUING KURDISH PROBLEM INTURKEY membership—civilian controlof the military. It also demonstrateda willingness to moveon from Demirel’ s tired oldplatitudes in search ofnew, bolder approaches.That this indeedwas the case becameclear whenthe Turkish parliament elected AhmetNecdet Sezar, the president ofthe TurkishConsti- tutional Court,as the newpresident ofTurkey in May2 000.As detailed above, Sezar hadŽ rst cometo the attention ofthe Turkishpublic a yearearlier by criticising the Turkishconstitution forthe restrictions it placedon basic free- doms,including usage of the Kurdishlanguage, and advocating greater constitu- tionally protectedf reedomof thought and expression. It remains to beseen,of course, whether Sezar will beable to implement any ofthese principles, especially since hehas expressly declaredthat hedid not believe in astrongpresidency that wouldchallenge parliamentary democracy. Nevertheless, the symbolism ofthis reformer’s election must fornow at least be seen as apositive sign forTurkey’ s futureEU prospects andsolution of its continuingKurdish problem. Another positive sign occurredin March2 000 whenthe GeneralBoard of the Civil Panels ofthe SupremeCourt of Appeals forthe Žrst time permitted the use ofnames ofKurdish origin after alonglegal battle. And,despite the problemin Istanbul notedabove, March 2 000also saw ageneralwillingness throughoutTurkey to tolerate Newrozcelebrations previ- ouslybanned because of their association with the Kuridshnational cause.This ‘bizarre bazaar’59 ofimplicit bargainingand uncertain policy responses within the Turkishpolitical system overhow to proceedwith its continuingKurdish problemand now closely related EUcandidacywill probablycontinue f orthe foreseeable future.

Notes 1 Forbackground, see HenriJ Barkey& Graham EFuller, Turkey’s KurdishQuestion ,New York:Rowman &LittleŽeld, 1998; Michael M Gunter, TheKurds and the Future of Turkey ,New York:St Martin’ s Press, 1997;and Kemal Kirisci &Gareth MWinrow, TheKurdish Question and Turkey: AnExample of a Trans-stateEthnic Con ict ,London:Frank Cass, 1997.See alsoIsmet GImset, ThePKK: A Reporton SeparatistViolence in Turkey (1973 – 1992),Istanbul:Turkish Daily News Publications,1992; and Imset, ‘The PKK:terroristsor freedom Žghters?’, InternationalJournal of Kurdish Studies ,10(1 & 2),1996, pp 45– 100. 2 Fordetails, see thestatement byDylanSemsi Kilic—aclose associate ofO ¨ calan’s andan eyewitness tohis capture—broadcast over the PKK’s MED-TV andaccessed overthe Internet, 21 February 1999; Tim Weiner, ‘UShelpedTurkey Ž ndand capture Kurd rebel’ , New YorkTimes ,20February 1999; Marcus Gee, ‘The odysseyof a Kurdishhot potato’ , Globeand Mail (Toronto),24 February, 1999; Helena Smith,Chris Morris &EdVulliamy, ‘ Globalplot that lured Kurds’ hero into trap’ , Observer (London),21 February 1999; and Ismet Berkan,‘ Thestory of Apo’ s capture’, Radikal (Istanbul),17 February 1999. Turkish Prime Minister BulentEcevit declined to elaborate onany of the details, and merely citeda Turkishproverb: ‘ Let useat thegrape and not ask where itcame from.’ 3 ‘Osman O¨ calan’s statement aboutthe arrest’ , 18February 1999, accessed overthe Internet. 4 ‘MED TVreportsmore on PKK statement oncongress results’ , London MED TVTelevisionin Turkish, 1900 GMT,4 March1999, as citedin ForeignBroadcast Information Service— Near East/SouthAsia (FBIS– WEU-1999–0304),hereafter citedas FBIS– WEU. 5 ‘PKK members onmountains pitted against those in Europe’ , Hurriyet (Istanbul),14 March1999, as cited in FBIS–WEU. 6 ‘Experts:execution possible in PKK member’s disappearance’, AnkaraAnatolia in Turkish, 0826 GMT, 18 March,1999, as citedin FBIS–WEU.Yet anotherreport claimed thatCemil Bayikhad been named the ‘highestauthority in the organization’ . ‘O ¨ calan removed,Bayik Tasked’ , Hurriyet,3March,1999, p 14,as cited in FBIS– WEU. 867 MICHAEL MGUNTER

7 ‘Presidencycouncil replaces Apo’, Milliyet (Istanbul),27 February 1999, as citedin FBIS–WEU. 8 FBIS– WEU.See note6 forthe full citation. 9 ‘Turksvs Kurds: turning point?’ , New YorkTimes ,21February, 1999, p 8. 10 ‘Statement from PKK leader AbdullahO ¨ calan’, released viahis lawyers, 18March 1999, accessed overthe Internet. 11 ‘Sezer: “thoughtcrimes” have no place ina democracy’, BrieŽ ng (Ankara),3 May1999, pp 10 –12. For furthercomments onthese problemsin Turkey,see ‘Humanrights in the Republic of Turkey: testimony of theHonorable Harold Hongju Koh Assistant Secretary forDemocracy, HumanRights and Labor Before the Commissionon Security and Cooperation in Europe’ , mimeo 18March 1999. 12 ‘Theycalled itanother earthquake’ , BrieŽ ng,13September 1999, pp 9 – 12. 13 PelinTurgut, ‘ Kurdrebels see Turkishchange of tack’ , Reuters,7 September1999, accessed overthe Internet. 14 MichaelM Gunter,‘ Interview:Abdullah O ¨ calan, headof the PKK’, MiddleEast Quarterly , 5, 1988, pp 79– 85.In this interview, O ¨ calan broachedin embryonicform many of the ideas hemore fullydeveloped duringhis trial in June 1999 and analysed below. 15 Derk Kinnane, TheKurds and Kurdistan ,London:Oxford University Press, 1964,pp 32 –33;and Ismail Besikci, Kurdistan& TurkishColonialism: Selected Writings ,London:Kurdistan Solidarity Committee and KurdistanInformation Centre, 1991, p 34. 16 Forbackground, see BernardLewis, TheEmergence ofModern Turkey ,London:Oxford University Press, 1968,and Stanford Shaw & Ezel Shaw, History ofthe Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey , Vol II: Reform, Revolution,and Republic: The Rise ofModern Turkey, 1805 – 1917,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press. 17 Thisand the following citation were takenfrom Kamran QurrahDaghi, ‘ O ¨ calan explainspeace overtures’, Al-Hayah,17March 1993, pp 1, 4, as citedin FBIS–WEU,22March 1993, p 42. 18 MichaelM Gunter,‘ Susurluk:the connection between Turkey’s intelligencecommunity and organized crime’, InternationalJournal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence ,11,1998, pp 119 – 141. 19 Abdullah O¨ calan, Declarationon the Democratic Solutionof the Kurdish Question ,transfrom the Turkish originalby the Kurdistan Information Centre, London: Mesopotamian Publishers, 1999, p 85.The following citationsare alsotaken from this source. Their page references are listedin the text above. 20 StephenKinzer, ‘ Turkishpremier hintsat new approachif rebel Kurdsend violence’ , New YorkTimes , 22 February1999, accessed overthe Internet. 21 KurdistanInformation Centre (London),‘ Press Statement issuedby the PKK PresidentialCouncil on 2 June 1999on the Trial of Kurdish National Leader AbdullahO ¨ calan’. 22 PKK Executive[Presidential] Council, ‘ Statement tothe Press andGeneral Public,29 June 1999’ , accessed overthe Internet. 23 ‘PKK PresidentialCouncil Statement’ , 6July1999, accessed overthe Internet. 24 ‘Interviewwith PKK CommanderDuran Kalkan’ , KurdishMedia ,19July1999, accessed overthe Internet. 25 Thisand the following citations were takenfrom Mehmet AliBirand, ‘ Turkishpublic opinion is softening towardthe Kurds’ , InternationalHerald Tribune ,8July1999. 26 ‘O¨ calan urgesKurd rebel peace as clashes rage’, Reuters,4 August1999, accessed overthe Internet. 1 Septemberis observedas WorldPeace Day inmany places aroundthe world. 27 ElifUnal, ‘ Turk PM says “Time willtell” on O ¨ calan call’, Reuters,4 August1999, accessed overthe Internet. 28 ‘PKK:defeat andretreat ormaster stroke?’, BrieŽ ng,9August1999, p 11. 29 Thefollowing citations were takenfrom ‘ OpeningStatement ofHarold Hongju Koh’ , Press conference at USEmbassy,Ankara, Turkey, 5 August1999, accessed overthe Internet. 30 ‘PKK:defeat andretreat ormaster stroke?’, p12. 31 Forbackground on thetrials andtribulations of recent legalKurdish parties inTurkey, see Nicole FWatts, ‘Allies andenemies: pro-Kurdishparties inTurkishpolitics, 1990 – 94’, InternationalJournal of Middle East Studies,31,1999, pp 631 – 656. 32 Thefollowing citations were takenfrom Ilnur Cevik, ‘ Militarynot mellowing on Kurdish rights’ , Turkish Daily News,10September 1999, accessed overthe Internet. 33 Turgut,‘ Kurdrebels see Turkishchange of tack’ . 34 Thisand the following citation were takenfrom ‘ Kurdishrebels hailTurkish general’ s wordsas goodwill gesture’, Agence France-Presse 6September1999. 35 Thisand the following citation were takenfrom ‘ Topgeneral’ s remarks misinterpreted,General Staffsays’ , Agence France-Presse, 11September 1999, accessed overthe Internet. 36 ‘PKK rejects Turkishcall forsurrender, rules out further concessions’ , Agence France-Presse, 29September 1999,accessed overthe Internet. 37 PKK PresidentialCouncil, ‘ Press Release’, 26September 1999, accessed overthe Internet. 38 ‘Rights—Turkey: media is latest venuefor talks on the Kurds’ , Inter-Press Service,13 September 1999, accessed overthe Internet. 39 ‘Army launchescross borderoperation and rejects PKK peace call’, Turkey Update ,1October1999, accessed overthe Internet. 868 THE CONTINUING KURDISH PROBLEM INTURKEY

40 Thefollowing citations were takenfrom the ‘ Letter fromthe PKK CentralCommittee tothe President of the Republicof Turkey, Suleyman Demirel on1 October1999’ , accessed overthe Internet. The letter was dated ‘20September 1999’ , 41 Thefollowing citations were takenfrom PKK PresidentialCouncil, ‘ Letter tothe OSCE andthe International Public’, 15November 1999, accessed overthe Internet. 42 Abdullah O¨ calan, ‘Letter tothe Presidency of the OSCE’,18November 1999, accessed overthe Internet. 43 ‘Noplans to execute O ¨ calan, butstill trying to come outon topin thesituation’ , BrieŽ ng,6December 1999, p 8. 44 Thisand the following citation were takenfrom ‘ 11December 1999 PKK PresidentialCouncil Statement’ , accessed overthe Internet. 45 Thisand the following citations were takenfrom ‘ Yilmaz: roadto EUpasses throughDiyarbakir’ , Turkish Daily News,17December 1999,accessed overthe Internet. Diyarbakir is thelargest cityin Turkey’ s southeastand has longbeen considered the unofŽ cial capital ofthe Kurdish provinces in Turkey. 46 ‘Theroad to the EU’ , BrieŽ ng,20December 1999,p 11. 47 Thisand the following citation were takenfrom ‘ Interviewwith PKK’sMuratKarayilan’ , Kurdish Observer/OzgurPolitika ,11January 2000, accessed overthe Internet. 48 ErtugrulOzkok, ‘ Let ustry not hanging’ , Hurriyet,11January 2000, accessed overthe Internet. 49 AmberinZaman, ‘TurksŽ ndit in nation’ s interestto befriend foe’ , LosAngeles Times ,14January2000, accessed overthe Internet. 50 Thisand the following citations were takenfrom Ismet Berkan,‘ Peace wouldbe threatened’ , Radikal, 11 January2000, accessed overthe Internet. 51 StephenKinzer, ‘ Turkeydelays the execution of rebel Kurd’, New YorkTimes ,13January 2000, accessed overthe Internet. 52 ‘Kurdishrebel leader O ¨ calan at themercy ofthe PKK’,Agence France-Presse, 13January 2000, accessed overthe Internet. 53 Thisand the following citations were takenfrom ‘ AbdullahO ¨ calan’s publicstatement: Press Release 16 January2000’ , accessed overthe Internet. 54 Thisand the following citations were takenfrom ‘ PKK CentralCommittee pledgessupport’ , 14January 2000,accessed overthe Internet. 55 StephenKinzer, ‘ Governmentrefuses todeal withO ¨ calan onKurdish issue’ , New YorkTimes , 18 January 2000,accessed overthe Internet. 56 Citedin Steve Bryant, ‘ Turkey’s Demirel hailsOcalan decision’, Reuters,13 January 2000, accessed over theInternet. 57 Thisand the following citations were takenfrom ‘ Donot create chaos’, KurdishObserver/ OzgurPolitika , 11January 2000, accessed overthe Internet. 58 ‘Brief statement on PKK “Peace Project”’, released bythe Kurdish Information Centre, London, 4 April 2000,accessed overthe Internet. 59 Thephrase is Jannin Sakellariou’ s, a Greek – German deputyof the European Parliament SocialistGroup whichmonitors the developing situation in Turkey. ‘ Dialoguelimps along with EU visitors’, BrieŽ ng, 10 April2000, p 12.

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