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Security and Humanitarian Situation Country Information and Guidance Pakistan: Security and humanitarian situation Version 1.0 November 2015 Preface This document provides country of origin information (COI) and guidance to Home Office decision makers on handling particular types of protection and human rights claims. This includes whether claims are likely to justify the granting of asylum, humanitarian protection or discretionary leave and whether – in the event of a claim being refused – it is likely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under s94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Decision makers must consider claims on an individual basis, taking into account the case specific facts and all relevant evidence, including: the guidance contained with this document; the available COI; any applicable caselaw; and the Home Office casework guidance in relation to relevant policies. Country Information The COI within this document has been compiled from a wide range of external information sources (usually) published in English. Consideration has been given to the relevance, reliability, accuracy, objectivity, currency, transparency and traceability of the information and wherever possible attempts have been made to corroborate the information used across independent sources, to ensure accuracy. All sources cited have been referenced in footnotes. It has been researched and presented with reference to the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), dated April 2008, and the European Asylum Support Office’s research guidelines, Country of Origin Information report methodology, dated July 2012. Feedback Our goal is to continuously improve the guidance and information we provide. Therefore, if you would like to comment on this document, please e-mail us. Independent Advisory Group on Country Information The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up in March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to make recommendations to him about the content of the Home Office‘s COI material. The IAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office‘s COI material. It is not the function of the IAGCI to endorse any Home Office material, procedures or policy. IAGCI may be contacted at: Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, 5th Floor, Globe House, 89 Eccleston Square, London, SW1V 1PN. Email: [email protected] Information about the IAGCI‘s work and a list of the COI documents which have been reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector‘s website at http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/country-information-reviews/ Page 2 of 23 Contents Preface ...................................................................................................................... 2 Guidance ................................................................................................................... 4 1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Basis of Claim .......................................................................................... 4 2. Consideration of Issues ................................................................................... 4 2.1 Is the person’s account credible? ............................................................. 4 2.2 Does the person have a well-founded fear of persecution? ..................... 4 2.3 Does the person fall to be excluded from a grant of protection? .............. 5 2.4 Is the humanitarian situation in Pakistan so severe that removal would be a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR? .................................................................. 6 2.5 Is there indiscriminate violence in Pakistan, which is at such a level that substantial grounds exist for believing that the person, solely by being present there, faces a real risk of harm which threatens their life or person? ............... 6 2.6 Are those at risk able to internally relocate within Pakistan? .................... 7 2.7 If refused, is the claim likely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’? ....... 7 3. Policy summary ............................................................................................... 8 Country Information ................................................................................................. 9 4. The protagonists .............................................................................................. 9 5. Nature and levels of violence ........................................................................... 9 5.2 Trends in 2013/2014 .............................................................................. 10 5.3 Trends in 2015 ....................................................................................... 11 5.4 Drone strikes .......................................................................................... 14 5.5 Impact on women and children ............................................................... 15 6. Counter-terrorism strategies .......................................................................... 17 6.1 Military operations .................................................................................. 17 6.2 National Action Plan (NAP) .................................................................... 18 7. Humanitarian situation ................................................................................... 19 7.1 Internally displaced persons (IDPs) ........................................................ 19 7.2 Afghan refugees ..................................................................................... 20 7.3 Aid workers, journalists and and human rights defenders ...................... 21 Version Control and Contacts ............................................................................... 23 Page 3 of 23 Guidance Updated: 6 October 2015 1. Introduction 1.1 Basis of Claim 1.1.1 That the general humanitarian situation in Pakistan is so severe as to make removal a breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); and/or 1.1.2 That the security situation in Pakistan presents a real risk which threatens life or person such that removal would be in breach of Article 15(c) of European Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 (‘the Qualification Directive’). 1.1.3 That the person is at real risk from the Taliban or other militant groups in Pakistan. 2. Consideration of Issues 2.1 Is the person’s account credible? 2.1.1 For guidance on assessing credibility, see sections 4 and 5 of the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. 2.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview. See the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants 2.1.3 Decision makers should also consider the need to conduct language analysis testing. See the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis. Back to Contents 2.2 Does the person have a well-founded fear of persecution? 2.2.1 There are several interrelated armed conflicts between militants and the government, and between militants and international forces, in Pakistan. Most fighting between militants and the government takes place in the northwest of Pakistan though civilians have also been affected across the country. However, a state of civil instability and/or where law and order has broken down does not of itself give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. Simply living in an area where the Pakistani Taliban or other militant groups are active, either wholly or partly, may not give rise to a protection need. The level of risk will depend on the particular profile of the person, the nature of the threat and how far it would extend. 2.2.2 Where a person comes from a place where there is a state of civil instability and/or where law and order has broken down and/or where Pakistani Taliban or other militant groups are active, they may have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. 2.2.3 The risk will be highest in areas where those armed anti-government groups are operating or have control. The most affected areas are: Page 4 of 23 • Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and the semi-autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that have a strong Taliban presence; • Balochistan, where separatists are seeking greater political autonomy and control over local mineral resources; and • Some areas of Sindh and Punjab. 2.2.4 The Pakistan Taliban and other militant groups are able to reach persons outside of those areas, depending on their profile and the area in which the person resides (see Nature and levels of violence). Primary targets for militants include political and/or tribal leaders, security forces, minority religious groups and perceived political opponents, including journalists, NGO and aid workers. In addition, ordinary Pakistanis, including students and those perceived to be opposing the Taliban and other militant groups, or not following sharia law, have also been targeted by these groups. 2.2.5 Where decision makers conclude that the person is at real risk of the Pakistani Taliban or other militant groups it is likely to be for a Convention reason, most notably (imputed) political opinion. If the applicant is unable to acquire effective protection or relocate internally a grant of asylum will be appropriate.
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