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Pakistan Security Report 2015 Pakistan Security Report 2015 Table of Contents 11.3 Pak-Iran ..................................................... 39 List of Acronyms .............................................. 02 12. Drone Strikes ....................................................... 40 Methodology and Variables ........................... 03 13 State Response ................................................ 40 Glossary ............................................................. 04 13.1 Operational Front................................... 40 1. Introduction .......................................................... 05 13.1.1 Military Operations .................... 41 2. Overview .......................................................... 07 13.1.2 Security Forces Clashes and 2.1 Comparison ............................................... 08 Encounters with Militants ........ 42 3. Major Actors of Instability in 2015 ....................... 10 13.1.3 Terrorists Arrested ...................... 43 3.1 Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan ...................... 10 13.2 Political and Administrative Front ...... 43 3.2 Local Taliban .............................................. 11 13.2.1 National Action Plan .................. 43 3.3 Lashkar-e-Jhangvi ...................................... 11 13.2.2 Military Courts/ATC ................. 44 3.4 Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan .................. 12 13.2.3 NACTA ........................................ 44 3.5 Balochistan Liberation Army ................... 13 13.2.4 Banned Groups & Individuals .. 44 3.6 Baloch Republican Army .......................... 13 13.2.5 FATA Reforms ............................. 45 3.7 Lashkar-e-Balochistan ............................... 13 13.2.6 Refugees and IDPs ...................... 45 3.8 Balochistan Liberation Front ................... 13 13.2.7 Madrassa Reforms ...................... 45 3.9 United Baloch Army .................................. 13 13.2.8 Terror Financing .......................... 46 3.10 Sindhu Desh Liberation Front (SDLF) .. 13 13.2.9 Security of China-Pakistan 3.11 New Actors of Violence in 2015 ............. 13 Economic Corridor (CPEC) ........ 46 3.12 ‘Unidentified’ Militants ........................... 13 13.2.10 Other Initiatives ........................ 47 4. Security Landscape in 2015................................... 13 13.3 Legislative Front .................................... 48 4.1 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA ............ 13 14. Challenges ............................................................. 48 4.1.1 Attacks on Security Forces/Law Enforcement Agencies ................. 15 14.1 Critical Areas ............................................ 49 4.1.2 Attacks on Pro-Government 14.1.1. FATA ........................................... 49 Tribesmen and Tribal Elders ..... 16 14.1.2. Balochistan .................................. 49 4.1.3 Attacks on Civilians ..................... 17 14.1.3 Interior Sindh and Karachi ....... 49 4.1.4 Attacks on Political 14.1.4 Punjab .......................................... 50 Workers/Leaders ......................... 17 14.2 Critical Internal Threats .......................... 50 4.2 Balochistan .............................................. 18 14.2.1 Changing Dynamics of Terrorist 4.2.1 Attacks by Baloch Insurgents ...... 19 Groups & Recruitment Patterns . 50 4.2.2 Attacks by Militants ...................... 21 • The Islamic State Inspiration ....... 50 4.2.3 Sectarian-related Attacks ............. 21 • Al-Qaeda in Pakistan .................... 50 • Dealing with Banned Groups ..... 50 4.3 Sindh .......................................................... 21 • Changing Recruitment Patterns . 51 4.3.1 Karachi............................................ 22 4.3.2 Interior Sindh ................................. 23 14.2.2 Sectarian Violence ....................... 51 4.3.3 Ethno-political Violence 14.2.3. The Madrassa Challenge .......... 51 in Karachi ....................................... 24 14.3 Critical Policy Initiatives ......................... 52 4.4 Punjab ...................................................... 24 14.3.1 FATA Reforms ............................ 52 4.5 Gilgit-Baltistan ....................................... 25 14.3.2 A Multifold Reintegration 4.6 Islamabad ............................................... 26 Program ......................................... 52 14.3.3 Better Policing ............................. 52 5. Suicide Attacks ...................................................... 26 14.3.4 Jail Security and Reforms ........... 52 6. Sectarian Violence ................................................. 27 14.3.5 Illegal Weapons .......................... 52 6.1 Attacks on Shrines ................................. 31 14.3.6 Securing Cyber Spaces ............... 52 7. Violence against Political Leaders & Workers .. 31 14.3.7 Terror Financing ......................... 52 7.1 Terrorist Attacks on Political Leaders ..... 31 15. Recommendations .............................................. 53 7.2 Ethno-political Violence ........................ 33 • Effective Implementation Mechanism of the NAP ................................................ 53 8. Violence against Religious Minorities ................ 35 • Counter-Extremism Strategy ............... 53 9. Violence against Journalists ................................ 36 • FATA and KP ......................................... 53 10. Attacks on Educational Institutions ................. 36 Notes ............................................................................ 54 11. Border Attacks ...................................................... 37 Annexure ..................................................................... 65 11.1 Pak-Afghan ............................................... 37 * The figures on the title page are based on the data from 11.2 Pak-India ................................................... 38 January 1 to December 23, 2015 List of Acronyms AGP: Attorney General of Pakistan Kid: Kidnapping AM: Ansarul Mujahideen KP: Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa ANP: Awami National Party LeJ: Lashkar-e-Jhangvi APS: Army Public School LeT: Lashkar-e-Taiba AQSA: Al-Qaeda in South Asia LI: Lashkar-e-Islam Arm: Army LM: Landmine Blast ASWJ: Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat LoC: Line of Control ATC: Anti-Terrorism Courts Lvs: Levies Force BH: Beheading MQM: Muttahida Qaumi Movement BLA: Balochistan Liberation Army MQM-Haqiqi: Mohajir Qaumi Movement BLF: Balochistan Liberation Front MWM: Majlis Wahdatul Muslimeen BNP-M: Balochistan National Party-Mengal Group NACTA: National Counter Terrorism Authority BRP: Baloch Republican Party NAP: National Action Plan BSF: Indian Border Security Force NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization CCNS: Cabinet Committee on National Security NI: Nationalist Insurgents CID: Criminal Investigation Department NP: National Party Civ: Civilians NPP: National People’s Party COAS: Chief of Army Staff NTFIC: National Terrorists Financing Investigation CPEC: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Cell CT: Counterterrorism PAT: Pakistan Awami Tehreek DGMOs: Directors General of Military Operations PkMAP: Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party DSP: Deputy Superintendent of Police PML-N: Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz ETIM: East Turkistan Islamic Party Pol: Police FATA: Federally Administered Tribal Areas PPP: Pakistan People’s Party FC: Frontier Corps PTI: Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf FCR: Frontier Crimes Regulation QWP: Qaumi Watan Party FIA: Federal Investigative Agency RA: Rocket Attack FIF: Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation RCB: Remote-controlled Bomb FMU: Financial Monitoring Unit Rng: Rangers Fr: Firing SA: Suicide Attack FR: Frontier Region SDLF: Sindhu Desh Liberation Front HG: Hand Grenade SIMs: Subscriber Identification Modules HRCP: Human Rights Commission of Pakistan SMP: Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan IDPs: Internally Displaced Persons SP: Superintendent of Police IED: Improvised Explosive Device SSD: Special Security Division IMU: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan SSP: Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan ISAF: International Security Assistance Force ST: Sunni Tehreek ISI: Inter-Services Intelligence TA: Terrorist Attack ISIS: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria TNFJ: Tehreek-Nifaz-e-Fiqha Jafaria ISPR: Inter-Services Public Relations TNSM: Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi JA: Jamaatul Ahrar TTP: Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan JI: Jamaat-e-Islami UBA: United Baloch Army JuD: Jamaatud Dawa UN: United Nations JUI-F: Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl Methodology and Variables The PIPS conflict/security database and archives are and dynamics from security landscape in other the basic sources relied upon for this report. The parts of the country. For this purpose the archives and the database are the outcome of a mentioned sub-set of variables is carefully monitored and analyzed in the security report with meticulous monitoring process on every relevant a view to suggest specific counter-strategy for each incident in the country on a daily basis. A regular type of attack in these areas. follow up is conducted in liaison with PIPS correspondents in the regions in order to keep track of 2. Clash: Another variable used is of clashes which daily developments on such incidents. PIPS compiles include four sub-variables, i.e., (i) inter-tribal; (ii) data from sources including newspapers, magazines, sectarian; (iii) clashes between security forces and militants; and (iv) militants’ infightings. The journals, field sources and screening of official record. number of such clashes and their geographic More than 30 English and Urdu dailies, magazines, location is taken as an indicator of parallel trends
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