Determinism and Meaningfulness in Lives
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DETERMINISM AND MEANINGFULNESS IN LIVES Trevor John Trifonio Pisciotta Submitted in total fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy March 2013 Department of Philosophy The School of Historical and Philosophical Studies The University of Melbourne ABSTRACT If determinism – roughly the thesis that at any instant there is exactly one possible future – were true, then we appear to be simply cogs in a larger causal machine. We would invest nothing of ourselves in our actions and our lives. As such, the potential truth of determinism seems to threaten strongly held conceptions about the nature and values of our lives. This problem – the problem of determinism – has come to be dominated by two groups of disputants: compatibilists and incompatibilists. Importantly, while compatibilists and incompatibilists disagree fundamentally about the impact that the truth of determinism would have, they broadly agree about how the problem should be framed. According to the traditional dialectic, the key question is whether, if determinism were true, an agent could be free or morally responsible with respect to particular actions. But we care about so much more than whether we are free or morally responsible for individual instances of action. In taking such a narrow focus, the traditional dialectic fails to respond to important aspects of our pre-philosophical concern regarding the problem of determinism. In particular, the traditional dialectic fails to adequately respond to our concern that the truth of determinism would be a threat to our conception of our value and place in the universe, including, I argue, our conception of our lives as potentially meaningful. It might be thought that there is little connection between the issues of freedom, responsibility and agency on the one hand, and meaningfulness on the other. I argue that this is not the case. In particular, I argue that when we examine plausible accounts of meaningfulness, we realise that they must assume that an agent is relevantly active with respect to the meaning-conferring features of their life. Further, I argue that a range of compatibilist accounts of agency lack the theoretical resources to provide for the requisite connection between an agent and the potentially meaning-conferring features of their life. By shifting focus away from the traditional dialectic, my discussion of agency and meaningfulness helps illustrate what is at stake in the problem of determinism. I do not argue that compatibilists fail in any task that they set for themselves, but I do argue that their accounts do not do all the work that is required. We care not only about whether we are morally responsible or free with respect to individual actions, but also about the kind of people we are, the kind of lives we lead, and the difference that each of us will make, in our own finite way. The truth of determinism would seem to undermine this concern, and compatibilists have not done enough to show us why it should not. iii DECLARATION This is to certify that: i. the thesis comprises only my original work towards the PhD except where indicated in the Preface; ii. due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used; iii. the thesis is fewer than 100 000 words in length, exclusive of tables, maps, bibliographies and appendices. v PREFACE A version of Chapter 3 of this thesis was published as “Meaningfulness, Hard Determinism and Objectivity,” in Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility, edited by Nick Trakakis and Daniel Cohen. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008. I acknowledge that I engaged the services of Ms Helen Bethune Moore to edit the entirety of this thesis. My principle supervisor, Dr Karen Jones, approved my engaging a professional editor. In accordance with the Institute of Professional Editors’ Guidelines for editing research thesis, Ms Bethune Moore’s services were limited to proofreading and copyediting (Standards C and D of the Australian Standards for Editing Practices). Any remaining errors are entirely my own. vii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I owe thanks to many people for their support over the course of the many years it has taken to complete this thesis. Versions of Chapters 3, 4 and 7 were presented at the University of Melbourne Philosophy Postgraduate Society’s regular Tuesday night colloquia. The questions and discussions were always thoughtful, probing and above all kind. A draft of Chapter 3 was presented to the Monash University conference on free will and moral responsibility in 2005. Thanks to all who attended for their questions, and in particular to Derk Pereboom for his generous comments. In 2006 I was lucky enough to spend a semester at the Philosophy Department of the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. I couldn’t have enjoyed a more welcoming, supportive and, above all, stimulating environment. Thanks in particular to Professor Susan Wolf, who provided comments on drafts of Chapters 2, 3 and 4 and with whom I shared a number of helpful and stimulating discussions. Both Graham Oppy and Nick Trakakis read a draft of Chapter 7 and I am indebted to them for making sure I was not making a fool of myself in an area in which I do not usually work. To my employer for much of the course of this thesis – the Victorian Department of Premier and Cabinet – thank you for supporting me in such a seemingly impractical endeavour as a PhD in philosophy. Thanks in particular to my numerous ‘bosses’ over the last few years – Peter, Seb, Mark, Helen, Eugenia, Matt and Max – for their understanding and support. To my philosophy research group, past and present – Alex Serrenti, Nicole Saunders, Sam Gates-Scovelle, Phillip Dragic, Judy Chambers, Belinda Prakhoff, Tim Grace and Katinka Morton – thank you for listening patiently to so many early, unclear drafts and helping me work out what I should say. And thank you – to a number of you – for showing me that theses can, in fact, be finished. I am forever indebted to my supervisor, Karen Jones. Not only has Karen taught me more about philosophy and philosophical writing than anyone else, but she has also shown almost boundless patience and support. Thank you, Karen; you believed I could get it done, even when I didn’t. ix To my wife, Katie, thank you. I had hoped not to be able to write that sentence. I had hoped we could start our married life without the seemingly never-ending intrusion of my thesis. That wasn’t to be, but I got there; we got there. You never stopped supporting me and you never stopped believing in me, even in the face of the challenges that life has thrown at us – and especially at you. Thank you. To my parents – who have supported me in every way over the last 26 years that I have been engaged in formal education – thank you. Thanks Mum, for all the proof reading, for all the study snacks, for all the late night coffees and above all for your support. It meant and means the world to me and I couldn’t have got here without you. And finally to my dad. Up until the age of about twelve, it seemed to me that my dad and I agreed on very little. Every time I would state my opinion on something, my dad would raise objections, challenge my premises and argue for a contrary point of view. Gradually I realised that he was, of course, teaching me how to think and how to argue. I doubt very much that I could have achieved half of what I have, were it not for all that he has taught me over my life. Not bad for a tailor with 5th grade education who came to Australia as a 12 year old without a word of English. Thank you, Papa, for everything. x CONTENTS Abstract ................................................................................................................................................ iii Declaration ............................................................................................................................................ v Preface ................................................................................................................................................. vii Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................... ix Contents ................................................................................................................................................ xi Chapter One: Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 Chapter Two: The Traditional Dialectic .................................................................................. 12 I. THE INCOMPATIBILIST’S CONCERN ................................................................................................ 15 II. ANALYSING INCOMPATIBILISM AWAY: CONDITIONAL ANALYSIS ............................................... 17 III. FRANKFURT AND THE PRINCIPLE OF ALTERNATE POSSIBILITIES ............................................ 22 IV. REACTIVE ATTITUDES AND MORAL JUDGEMENT ........................................................................ 27 V. CONCLUSION: REVIEWING THE TERRAIN ...................................................................................... 31 Chapter Three: Meaningfulness, Hard Determinism and ObjectivitY ............................ 34 I. HONDERICH: LIFE-HOPES AND OUR ATTITUDINAL RESPONSES TO DETERMINISM ..................... 35 II. PEREBOOM: HARD INCOMPATIBILISM AND MEANING IN LIFE .................................................... 40 III. MEANINGFULNESS