Russia-Algeria : a Flexible and Pragmatic Partnership

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Russia-Algeria : a Flexible and Pragmatic Partnership 22.01.2021 Russia-Algeria : a flexible and pragmatic partnership Adlene Mohammedi, strategic research officer for AESMA and author of a thesis on the Arab politics of post-Soviet Russia ABSTRACT: On September 29, 2020, a few days before the visit of the then U.S. Secretary of Defence Mark Esper, the director of the Russian federal service of technical-military cooperation visited Algiers. Dimitri Shugaev was received by the Chief of Staff of the Algerian Army, Said Shengriha, and together they discussed the state of military cooperation between both countries. If military cooperation is central to relations between Moscow and Algiers, while economic relations are developing quite discreetly, the two countries share common priorities and representations. Vladimir Putin slowed down a little to take an interest in the Middle East and North Africa after he was elected as President of the Russian Federation in 2000. His first term (2000-2004) was more focused on the United States and Europe, and he only began his diplomatic campaign in the Arab world during his second term (2004-2008). He went to Algiers in March 2006, and was replaced by his ephemeral successor, Dmitri Medvedev, who visited the Algerian capital in October 2010. Even before Russian diplomatic efforts towards the Arab world from the second half of the decade 2000, Abdelaziz Bouteflika – then the new Algerian President – went to Moscow to sign a declaration of strategic partnership and an agreement between both Ministries of Defence in 2001. Vladimir Putin's visit to Algiers in 2006 is even more significant as it takes place some thirty years after the last visit of a Soviet leader1. The origins of Russian-Algerian relations stem from the Soviet era, even if the Soviet Union first showed caution in the aftermath of Algerian independence in 1962. Nikita Khrushchev is said to have declared to the first president of independent Algeria Ahmed Ben Bella: "We cannot support two Cuba; you have a good partner, General de Gaulle, keep him!"2. A decade later, President Houari Boumediene (who succeeded Ben Bella following the 1965 coup d'état) 1 Mansouria Mokhefi, « Alger-Moscou : évolution et limites d’une relation privilégiée », Politique étrangère, Autumn, no. 3, 2015, pp. 57-70. 2 Mohammed Harbi, L’Algérie et son destin : croyants ou citoyens, Paris, Arcantère, 1992, p. 188. hosted the 4th summit of the conference of non-aligned countries in Algiers (5 September 1973), while maintaining good relations with Moscow. These good relations are notably reflected in the delivery to Algeria of Russian military equipment in a context of tension between Algiers and Rabat. At the end of the 1970s, 90% of Algerian military equipment was of Russian origin3. Algerian-Soviet relations go beyond arms deliveries. Moscow contributes to the development of the mining sector in Algeria and opens its training centres and universities to young Algerian graduates – among other African and Arab graduates. Many executives, engineers and officers of the young Algerian republic benefit from Soviet training, which is accompanied by matrimonial (mixed marriages) and cultural (language learning) connections. Today, while the opening of Soviet universities to Arab and African students continued until the fall of the USSR, traces of this influence – in competition with French and Anglo-Saxon influence – are becoming increasingly rare. Moreover, executives trained in the Soviet Union are rarely the best-off. If we take the example of the energy sector, and more precisely the oil giant Sonatrach founded in 1963, its presidency is regularly entrusted to engineers trained in the United States (Chakib Khelil, in particular). On the other hand, executives trained in the USSR are well represented in the army staff. The current Chief of Staff, Said Chengriha, was trained at the Russian academy in Voroshilov during the 1970s. His predecessor, Ahmed Gaïd Salah (who died at the end of 2019), the strongman of Algerian power after the first months of the popular uprising (Hirak) and architect of the ousting of Abdelaziz Bouteflika, was also trained in the Soviet Union. Of all the centres of Algerian power, the army – which remains the first of them – appears to be the one where Russian influence lasts the longest. The young generation of generals is, however, less Russophile than the previous ones. In order to grasp Russian-Algerian relations in their globality and complexity, beyond the myths about an unfailing alliance, it is necessary to look at three sectors (energy, economic and commercial, arms transfers) and two themes: common geopolitical representations and the Russian position regarding the Algerian popular uprising (Hirak). COMPETITION, TENSIONS AND COOPERATION IN THE ENERGY SECTOR When it comes to oil, relations between Russia and Algeria are first and foremost relations between the Kremlin and OPEC. On this point, two contradictory representations coexist: on the one hand, a permanent arm wrestling, fuelled by a role attributed to OPEC in the fall of the USSR (strong production in the 1980s having favoured a fall in prices);; on the other, the spectre of Russia’s membership in this organisation. Moscow has participated in OPEC discussions since 1993 while affirming its independence; but the essential trust needed for a genuine partnership is not always there. In 2001, divergences were already visible. First, OPEC was confronted with an expanding Russian oil sector, with important investments. As the increase in production and exports weakened prices, OPEC hardened its stance with non-member producing countries. Russia nevertheless ended up agreeing to a symbolic reduction in production. With the rising price of oil, the need for cooperation was lessened between 2003 and 2007. At the end of 2008, the idea of a possible Russian membership arose, at a time when the price per barrel had fallen. Even if the discourse may have seemed ambiguous as the 3 Nicole Grimaud, La politique extérieure de l’Algérie (1962-1978), Paris, Karthala, 1984, p. 133. 2 idea of having quotas imposed has always been a major issue from Moscow. Otherwise, OPEC considers that Russia's falls in production are symbolic and that the organisation alone bears the burden of stabilizing prices. In 2009, faced with major budgetary problems, Russia announced a drop in production, justified by the situation of its oil industry rather than by coordination with OPEC. For Russia, as long as prices are considered "normal" (above $80 per barrel), dialogue and exchange of information is sufficient. Today, while world demand is being squeezed by the health crisis, the price per barrel is less than 50 dollars and the terms of tension between Russia and OPEC remain the same: OPEC is demanding Moscow's collaboration to stabilize prices. Currently under Algerian presidency, OPEC is continuing its negotiations with Russia to further reduce production in order to keep prices stable4. As for gas, here again, the relations are ambiguous. Intuitively, the hypothesis of competition between Algiers and Moscow imposes itself: in a desire to escape an excessive dependence on Russia, European clients are tempted to encourage an increase of imports from Algeria. However, the hydrocarbons sector in Algeria is not doing very well, as is shown by the waltz of the presidents of Sonatrach (four in three years). Beyond the present context, between a domestic demand which is increasing and a production which remains limited, Algeria seems attracted by shale gas, including within the framework of partnerships with American companies. But with a socio-political context already marked by the distrust of the Algerian population, the exploitation of shale gas could exacerbate the current crisis. Anxious to multiply the explorations and exploit new deposits, the Algerian government has relaxed its legislation in order to attract foreign investors5 – European, American, but also Russian actors. For example, on May 5, 2020, the Algerian national company Sonatrach signed a protocol of agreement with the Russian company Lukoil6. Nothing specific has been planned for the moment. Finally, in the field of civil nuclear power, relations are less ambiguous. Russia makes no secret of its intention to export its expertise in this field throughout the Arab world. In 2014, an Algerian-Russian agreement was signed. It provides for the assistance of the Russian agency Rosatom to the Algerian Ministry of Energy in the development of a civil nuclear industry in Algeria. In 2016, Rosatom and the Algerian Atomic Energy Commission (COMENA) signed a declaration of intent to build Russian- designed nuclear power plants in Algeria. This bilateral cooperation, which is set to develop, has also been discussed at the International Nuclear Energy Forum of Sochi in 2018. The construction of these plants is planned for 2025-2030. 4 “OPEC and Russia study deeper oil cuts – two sources”, Reuters, November 3, 2020. URL : https://www.reuters.com/article/opec-algeria-idUSKBN27J27X. 5 « En Algérie, adoption d’un projet de loi controversé sur les hydrocarbures », Le Monde, November 14, 2019. URL : https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/11/14/en-algerie-adoption-d-un-projet-de-loi-controverse-sur-les- hydrocarbures_6019170_3212.html. 6 “Algeria’s Sonatrach signed a MoU with Russia’s Lukoil”, Neftegaz, May 5, 2020. URL : https://neftegaz.ru/en/news/companies/547017-algeria-s-sonatrach-signed-a-mou-with-russia-s-lukoil/. 3 A TRADE BALANCE LARGELY FAVOURABLE TO RUSSIA In order to encourage the development of commercial exchanges between Russia and the Arab world, an agreement in 2002 between the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry – chaired at the time by Yevgeni Primakov7 whose role is central here – and the General Union of Arab Chambers gave birth to the Russian-Arab Business Council. Since 2003, this Council has multiplied initiatives (sessions, forums, business trips) throughout the Arab world (from Mauritania to Oman), and Algeria is one of the privileged destinations.
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