What Is to Be Done? - Print Document - Proquest
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
11/10/11 What is to be done? - Print document - ProQuest Back to document What is to be done? Kotkin, Stephen. FT.com (Mar 3, 2004): 1. Find a copy http://sfx.princeton.edu:9003/sfx_pul? genre=article&sid=ProQ:&atitle=What+is+to+be+done%3F&title=FT.com&issn=&date=2004-03- 03&volume=1&issue=&spage=1&au=Kotkin%2C+Stephen Full Text Translate [unavailable for this document] A country ravaged for seven decades by the secret police elects a former colonel of that police as president: after one term, he's more popular than ever and is on the verge of a landslide re- election. A few weeks before that election, he fires his entire cabinet. This is seen as an act of wisdom. The country's communists, who sometimes march bearing portraits of Stalin, stand up for the prerogatives of parliament and protest against creeping dictatorship - only to be trounced at the ballot box. Would-be barons grab on a continental scale and, when expropriated by the state, get defended by NGOs dedicated to the memory of millions of political prisoners. Such is the paradoxical nature of Vladimir Putin's Russia. After the Soviet state cracked open, a freewheeling media, NGOs, new religions and billionaires arose in the cracks. Little of this was based upon secure private property, an independent and powerful judiciary, or genuine parliamentary (as opposed to "presidential") rule. The illiberal state institutions that were inherited by the newly independent countries began to regroup, and these hyper- executive bodies found few obstacles to closing the cracks - a grim process, first visible in Central Asia. Non-state media were shut down or taken over, NGOs forced out of existence or underground, private enterprises confiscated, internet routing points policed. The newly elected elites found that governing a modern society - encouraging private investment, building public infrastructure, combating crime and Aids - was extremely hard. But for them, surveillance and persecution are second nature. All this has provoked howls about the overturning of "democracy". It's an understandable lament, but it emanates from a misinterpretation of the 1990s, when disarray rather than institutionalised rule of law prevailed. The present offensive on the part of the central state (less successful than either proponents or critics claim) cannot be credited solely to Putin - any more than Ukraine's can be attributed to Leonid Kuchma, Belarus's to Aleksandr Lukashenka, Uzbekistan's to Islam Karimov, Kazakhstan's to Nursultan Nazarbaev, Turkmenistan's to Saparmurat Niyazov, and the rest. The phenomenon is not Putin, it is structural - a Soviet hangover. It is with this in mind that we have to assess the Russian president's anticipated sweep at the polls on March 14, as well as the future of Eurasia. Just two decades ago, in the great Orwellian year, Konstantin Chernenko, then dying of emphysema, succeeded Yuri Andropov, who had just died of kidney failure. In a semiconscious state, Chernenko became the fifth general secretary of an empire with nearly 300 million souls, more than half-a-dozen dependencies on three continents, nearly six million soldiers, comparable legions in overlapping administrative agencies, 40,000 nuclear warheads, an even greater cache of chemical and biological weapons, and tens of thousands of elephantine factories mass-manufacturing toxicities in 11 time zones. It was utterly out of sync and a throwback to the epoch between the world wars, yet still very formidable: a wheezing dinosaur, but one with fearsome teeth. Almost alone, the political- prisoner-then-exile, Andrei Amalrik, forecast demise - in Will the search.proquest.com/docprintview/228891078/fulltext/132F60167D83F7E01F/50?accountid=13314 1/8 11/10/11 What is to be done? - Print document - ProQuest Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? - but he foresaw collapse resulting from a cataclysmic war with China. Such a confrontation may come to pass, but it will be too late for the Soviet Union. Chernenko's brief, oxygen-tank rule expired in 1985. That same year, Saudi Arabia abruptly cranked up oil production, knocking down the price of crude to one of its lowest levels since the second world war - a bruising lesson administered to non-Opec producers, including the Soviet Union. With the world transfixed by the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev, the vigorous new general secretary, Riyadh's move drew less attention than it should. But for the Soviet Union, it was momentous: it meant that Gorbachev's incipient perestroika was instantly fleeced of much of its hard-currency receipts. Most Soviet crude was being consumed at home, profligately, or supplied at a fraction of market prices to the Communist bloc, but exports to the capitalist world, around two million barrels a day, filled Kremlin coffers and paid for imports of strategic technologies, from state-of-the-art electronics to soap. The plunge in prices was a disaster: perestroika was indelibly joined to privation. Less than six years after the Saudi action, the Soviet Union was gone, and its successors were broke. And you thought the Polish pope brought down Communism? Mendacity hollowed out what turned out to be an easily toppled edifice, lies having enveloped every aspect of the Soviet system. Dissident and secret policeman agreed on this; Alexander Solzhenitsyn had long insisted on it, and later so did Nikolai Leonov, the KGB's chief analyst. But hydrocarbons - which had looked like a Soviet strong point - proved to be an unexpected Achilles heel. In retrospect, it's clear that the 1980s involved a petroleum price war over world-market share that Riyadh won and that Moscow - possibly without being fully cognisant of the contest - lost. The Soviets' calamitous loss of oil revenues was worsened by a steep decline in extraction, a consequence of the perverse incentives and exploitative practices of the command economy. By the mid-1990s, production in the Commonwealth of Independent States had plummeted to fewer than seven million barrels a day, from a high of 12.5 million in 1987/88. Of that, Russia's output accounted for around six million - a fall-off of 5.5 million, which equalled the total output of all but one Opec producer. Russia not only surrendered world-market share: it faced the expensive prospect of oil imports. Toward the end of the 1990s, though, something else astonishing took place. Russia's oil sector - privatised via insider deals that might make Wall Street blush, or more likely, turn green - emerged re-energised by new drilling techniques and management. In 2003, having increased output for the fifth straight year, Russia produced between seven and eight million barrels a day. And whereas high-end estimates of combined output within a decade for Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan - Kuwaits on the Caspian - come in at five million barrels a day, Russia's production could rise to double that, the immediate limiting factor being transport. True, world prices have remained high for some time, but achievements in cost-cutting could cushion Russian producers in the event of a world price decline. Overall, Big Oil in Russia has some distance to go in developing new fields and attending to a despoiled environment, but its surprise rejuvenation is a very big story, with global implications for some time to come. No country anticipating economic growth over the next half- century can ignore Russia. Saudi Arabia is credited with 25 per cent of "proven oil reserves", but Russia's estimates are lowballed because of the presumed costs of extraction in rugged locations. Because extraction costs with current technology exceed projected revenues, Russia's full underground holdings do not count as proven reserves - until new extraction technologies emerge. Factor in natural gas: Russia commands one-third of the global gas reservoir, more than double second-place Iran. Keep in mind, too, that geography and geopolitics render Turkmenistan - with among the largest proven gas reserves in the world - a wholly owned subsidiary of Russia. Ditto for Uzbekistan's natural gas. As the full scope of Russia's fossil fuel holdings and distribution powers slowly sinks in, it has been undergoing a shift from a regional to a global energy provider. Geographically, Russia could scarcely be better positioned, abutting expanding markets in Europe and especially Asia. Stalin never possessed such leverage, because Russia's biggest oil and gas discoveries were made after his death. Politically, the feared bogey in 1990s Russia was Communist restoration. This spectre stirred Washington to open up the IMF's sluices to support not macroeconomic stabilisation but the re- election of the unpopular Boris Yeltsin to a second presidential term. The slogan for the oft-hospitalised, resolutely anti- Communist Yeltsin could well have been "Better Dead than Red." In any case, it suited many people's interests inside Russia, too, to cast the election in Manichean terms: democracy - however imperfect - versus revanche, whose scariest incarnation entailed a red-brown coalition, or fascist-communist crossbreed. Yeltsin won with the help of discriminatory media and unchecked recourse to administrative resources: above all, the state budget. Who foresaw that his victory in 1996 over the Communist presidential candidate, in the name of preserving democracy, would be followed by the apparent revival a few years later of authoritarianism under the tutelage of Communist-era KGB men? Surprises can be fun, but I doubt this development would qualify (as a surprise). That's because the Soviet Union, besides having been a hydrocarbon colossus, also was search.proquest.com/docprintview/228891078/fulltext/132F60167D83F7E01F/50?accountid=13314 2/8 11/10/11 What is to be done? - Print document - ProQuest a social formation. Contrary to the prevailing view that totalitarianism eliminated organised society, the Soviet system created its own society: immense social facts on the ground, rooted in institutional structures such as the KGB.