CHAPTER EIGHT

Terminology

In this chapter I clarify the theoretical frameworks of the theodicies by relating them to the theoretical framework of Puntel and Pannenberg. Parallel to this I define important terms and distinctions, and place the terminology of the theodicies within my more comprehensive, nuanced and precise terminology. All of this is important in order to under­ stand the theodicies more precisely and avoid misunderstandings, even if there is not room for an evaluative discussion of the content of their frameworks. Developing a common terminology will make com­ parison clearer and the discussion more precise. Concerning termino­ logy and placing within a framework, focus will be on how the scholars understand the problem of evil and the attributes of God. But before I present this, I will briefly show that the scholars think similarly enough on the two criteria, language and ontology, so that they fit in the larger framework and that evaluating them by these criteria is fair. I start with how the scholars relate to the criterion of coherence, then the criterion of authenticity, then how they understand ethical lan­ guage, theological language and finally ontology.1 Concerning the criterion of coherence, all five scholars have as goals the three aspects of coherence (consistency, cohesiveness and compre­ hensiveness), even if they use the word ‘coherence’ differently.2 When it comes to the second criterion – authenticity – the scholars are more different. Hygen believes that if there is an interpretation that is ‘more biblically right’ than another, then that interpretation is theologically

1 For a long and detailed version of this chapter with references and arguments, see Søvik, The Problem of Evil and the Power of God, 110–192. When I use the expression ‘the four scholars’ I refer to Swinburne, Ward, Griffin and Hygen, while ‘the five schol­ ars’ refer to those four and Pannenberg. 2 Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, Rev. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 11–50; Swinburne, The Existence of God, 1; Keith Ward, Religion and Revelation: A Theology of Revelation in the World’s Religions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 320; Ward, God, Chance & Necessity, 190; Ward, Pascal’s Fire, 118; Griffin, Evil Revisited, 52–53, 118, 250, n. 186; Griffin, Reenchantment without Supernaturalism, 355; Hygen, Guds allmakt og det ondes problem, 123–124; and Johan B. Hygen, Trekk av religions- filosofien (Oslo: Land og kirke/Gyldendal, 1977), 30. terminology 113 obligating. For him, what the Bible says on an issue is binding, although it is not very clear how he reaches a conclusion on what is ‘more bibli­ cally right’. Hygen also gives authority to church confessions. Swinburne too argues that it is highly plausible that the Bible is a witness of revela­ tion from God, and that no other purported revelations are nearly as plausible. He places great weight on what the Bible says, and focuses even more on church doctrines when it comes to the interpretation of the Bible. Ward argues that God has revealed unique knowledge in Christian revelation, but stresses more than the two previous that this must be critically appropriated. He argues that the Bible testifies about God’s self-revelation, and sees Jesus as an anticipation of the end of history, so that Christians intelligibly can claim a final revelation. But Ward also argues that God has revealed himself in other religions, although there are specific things that God has only revealed through Jesus. Griffin is probably the most critical reader of the Bible. He believes that the Christian truth has been distorted already in the Bible, but he uses the Bible also to defend that claim, and he does want to give a trustworthy interpretation of the Bible which includes revelation in Christ. He does not believe that Jesus was God who became a human being, but rather he believes that God persuaded Jesus so strongly that it is nevertheless correct to say that Jesus deci­ sively reveals God.3 In general, the scholars do not spell out their relation to Christianity and theological method at the same level of detail as Pannenberg. However, they do care about the goal of the criterion of authenticity, which is the most authentic interpretation of Christian revelation, and the means of that criterion, which is a coherent presentation of that revelation. They all fulfil the minimum requirement that they believe in a decisive revelation through Christ, and want to interpret this as coherently as possible. I consider this to be reason good enough to claim that an evaluation of the theodicies by the criterion of authentic­ ity is fair. Concerning both criteria, I have found that all the scholars are sufficiently concerned with them in the way that they are used, so that they can be fairly evaluated and compared with regard to these.

3 Richard Swinburne, Revelation : From Metaphor to Analogy, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Ward, Religion and Revelation, 221–222, 245–246; Keith Ward, Re-Thinking Christianity (Oxford: Oneworld, 2007), viii, 232, 254, 258, 280; Griffin, A Process Christology, 156–159; Griffin, Two Great Truths, 29–31, 35–36, 108–111; and Hygen, Guds allmakt og det ondes problem, 69, 170.