BIOTERRORISM Thinking the Unthinkable 1

Post Conference Key Insights

24-25 March 2021

Co-hosted by Pool Reinsurance Company Ltd and The Biosecurity Research Initiative at St Catharine’s College University of Cambridge Version 9 @ 22/04/21 Pool Re SOLUTIONS BIOTERRORISM Thinking the Unthinkable 2

Contents

3 4 5 7 8 9 Foreword The threat: Improving our Key questions Appendix 1 Appendix 2 by Julian Enoizi and a clear and resilience to a arising from the Participants: Programme of Lord Des Browne present danger? bioterror event: conference. Keynote Events what more needs Speakers, Chairs, to be done? Panelists and Forums Pool Re SOLUTIONS BIOTERRORISM Thinking the Unthinkable 3

Foreword: by Julian Enoizi, CEO Pool Re and Lord Des Browne, former Secretary of State for Defence.

We were delighted to co-host the first large-scale virtual BioTerrorism Over the last 3 years, Pool Re, the Biosecurity Research Initiative at Brown; Tom Hurd; The Rt Hon Amber Rudd and Dr Karin von Hippel, (re)insurance conference. It attracted some 640 participants from St Catharine’s College (BioRISC), the Nuclear Threat Initiative and as well as the many other experts who supported this event. across the business community, (re)insurance industry and other Cranfield University have been working collaboratively, through Even in this virtual world there are costs associated with putting on a sectors. They were joined by counter-terrorism professionals and sophisticated scenario development and modelling, to better global, livestream event and we are very grateful for the generosity of representatives from international terrorism pools, academia, security understand the malicious use of biological pathogens by terrorists to our two principal sponsors: Emergent BioSolutions and Guy Carpenter. directors and colleagues from various government departments. The cause mass casualties and significant economic damage. quality of the conversation and engagement throughout the conference Well before the global pandemic struck, we decided that a conference was evidence that this would be a germane event, particularly given the should be held to raise awareness of the bioterrorism threat, to assess attention the COVID-19 pandemic has drawn to the spread of deadly appropriate response management strategies and to identify key pathogens and the need for governments to step in as the insurer of decisions for government, business, and the (re)insurance industry to last resort for a difficult-to-insure peril. mitigate and close any protection gaps relating to bioterrorism. The intent of terrorists to use biological weapons is not new and they One of the recurring messages from the event is the need for even would have been observing closely the effect of the current pandemic greater collaboration. The importance of enduring strategic partnerships on our government, health system, economy, security, and society between government, business—especially the insurance industry— at large. We therefore need to ensure that we are prepared for and and academia to identify, respond to and mitigate the health and able to mitigate such a catastrophic event. The recently released UK economic losses caused by a bioterrorism event cannot be overstated. Integrated Review, echoing statements made by Secretary of State for Catastrophic and systemic risks, such as a CBRN type event, are Defence, Ben Wallace, earlier this year, chillingly stated that “it is likely too all-encompassing to be owned by one stakeholder; moreover, that a terrorist group will launch a successful CBRN attack by 2030”. catastrophic risks have an economic and societal impact which needs This should be seen in the context of the 500 CBRN events recorded cross-sector support from businesses, government and academia. in The Profiles of Incidents involving CBRN and Non-state Actors (POICN) database since 1990. The public health, economic and social We are hugely grateful to all the guest speakers and panelists who impact of COVID-19 has demonstrated clearly how vulnerable we are gave up their time to support this event by attending live or providing to the systemic consequences of a natural or man-made pandemic. pre-recorded video contributions. We would particularly like to thank Additionally, a main focus of consideration should be the scale of the the following: Ambassador Juan Ramón de la Fuente; Mr Vladimir event as opposed to the frequency of such events. Voronkov; Lord Mark Sedwill; Lord Alistair Darling; Bruce Carnegie- Pool Re SOLUTIONS BIOTERRORISM Thinking the Unthinkable 4

The threat: a ‘clear and present danger’?

Rising terrorist intent? their use in state biological warfare programmes. Notwithstanding the Even with novel technologies, advanced bioengineering is, however, greater likelihood of bioterror scenarios, such as the small release of a still very complicated, and terrorists are likely to need abundant As identified in the recent UK Integrated Review assessment that a conventional biological agent or toxin such as ricin, we cannot afford to resources and operational freedom to develop successfully high-impact terrorist group “will launch a successful CBRN attack by 2030”, there be complacent about a large-scale bioterror attack. bioweapons. Advanced terrorist bioweapon programmes are therefore is no doubt that the threat of terrorists using a biological and/or a likely to be identified and disrupted in advance of any attack. This high The greatest danger, and a growing risk, is the intersection of the intent chemical or radiological device is a clear and present danger. Moreover, barrier to entry could, however, be overcome if a hostile state or state- and capability of a terrorist group to acquire bioweapon capabilities. there is a general consensus that terrorists, who will have been proxy provided a terrorist group with material or technical support (Similar intersections exist between cyber and data security risks.) watching and learning from the current pandemic and observing the which facilitated its acquisition of biological agents. A key mitigation Given access to bioweapons, whether by chance or design, many health and economic consequences of a global virus, could be inspired factor will be a coordinated and multifaceted approach to dissuade to stage ‘copycat’ releases of a pathogen. In the past, terrorists have terrorist groups would have no reservations about using them. potentially capable individuals from trying to weaponise a pathogen. been inspired by the media attention focused on natural disease Complex attack methodology outbreaks. The key attraction for a malicious actor seeking to impact Insider threats and global security concerns Western economies is the potential of a human-transmissible agent Fully understanding the peril is, however, challenging given the as a ‘force multiplier’ to scale an attack – the epitome of asymmetric complexity of achieving the capabilities necessary for a successful The ‘insider threat’ cannot be discounted and is considered a real risk conflict that terrorists have practised hitherto. biological attack. Consequently, there is limited academic consensus (especially at universities and other research institutes), as is accidental about the extent of the threat. Even within relevant government circles, release of dangerous pathogens from one of the 150 global, private Commensurate with the increased likelihood of a bioterror weapon this assessment is compromised by the complexity of the issues biolabs (which in many cases self-regulate), or from one of the poorly being used, is the need for the terrorism (re)insurance industry to and the highly specialised nature of research in bioterrorism risk. secured Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) laboratories around the world. The improve its awareness and knowledge of this peril and its associated Furthermore, this complexity, and the attendant poor understanding proliferation of poorly secured or under-regulated research facilities in and sizeable tail risk. This understanding cannot be achieved by of the subject matter, complicate communication within and between the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic increases these risks. the industry in isolation, hence the driving need for truly joint and government, academia, the private sector, and the public, ultimately collaborative partnerships with experts from the public and private It remains unclear if and when terrorists will tire of or acknowledge the undermining the coordination necessary to increase resilience sector, both nationally and internationally. The costs of a successful limits of low complexity methodologies and devote more energy to to biothreats. CBRN event could not be met by the industry alone and therefore developing sophisticated capabilities, including pathogens. Terrorists government involvement is needed to underwrite this catastrophic risk. may, however, be spurred by the inherent limitations of knives or Barriers to entry vehicles as weapons to pursue bioweapon capabilities; if they do so, Terror multiplier The main concern now is how advances in life sciences and related it is most likely to be at the lower end of the threat spectrum, utilising fields are reducing barriers to achieving more sophisticated capabilities, ricin or anthrax. By its very nature, a biological weapon is the ultimate terror weapon, many of which are open to misuse. Terrorists have always been and a ‘terror multiplier’; the fear factor alone may cause more harm innovators and thus there is no guarantee they will not move further than the agent itself. This is not a new threat; some terrorists have up the biotech development chain, although, unless facilitated by a been using biological agents and toxins for the last 30 to 40 years, hostile state actor, scaling up to new weapon systems is hard for most albeit in small, low-impact scenarios, and there is a longer history of terrorist groups. Pool Re SOLUTIONS BIOTERRORISM Thinking the Unthinkable 5

Improving our resilience to a bioterror event: what more needs to be done?

Collaboration and Cooperation Preparedness and Mitigation Deterrence and Dissuasion All of our speakers and contributors highlighted the need for greater The need for better preparedness and investment in mitigation and Deterring and dissuading bioweapon attacks is possible through collaboration and cooperation between the public sector, businesses protection measures has been amply demonstrated. Such measures capacity building, resilience planning and communication but there is a and academia, including better engagement with the international include: a global biological early warning system; sufficient contingent distinction between deterrence and dissuasion: deterrence is based on community, if we are to develop and maintain an effective and practised capabilities to deal with pandemics or other catastrophic events within threat of retaliation; dissuasion aims to convince an adversary that it is response to the risk of a bioterrorism attack. The strategic tail risk our public health systems and the National Health Service; improved not worth their time pursuing this specific avenue of attack. and cascading effects of any such event is just too large for any one global regulation and enforcement, including the empowerment and stakeholder or state to manage on their own. better resourcing of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Role of Terrorism (Re)Insurance (which compares unfavorably to the Chemical Weapons Convention As with all catastrophic events, no one stakeholder can deal with the The (re)insurance industry has a significant role to play in improving (CWC)); and better intelligence to prevent the deliberate or accidental consequences of a pandemic, and therefore the private sector and the resilience of the economy and country to a biological or other CBR release of a deadly pathogen. Furthermore, there is a concern that the insurance industry need to be more fully engaged in providing an event – including a pandemic. This is as much about raising awareness UK Government’s response to biothreats has been ‘desecuritised’ integrated and joint solution to this threat, working alongside and with of novel and emerging threats, building models that create a pathway and is now being treated primarily as a medical issue rather than a government. This effort should be underpinned by academic research, to insurability and working with government and academia to develop security one. with each field bringing their own particular experiences and expertise. risk management techniques that help mitigate future losses. The Equal, if not more, responsibility rests with the government to ensure Medical countermeasure (MCM) development is fundamental to scale of potential pandemic losses suggest that catastrophic biological that it provides the industry with as much information and data as they a sustained and successful response to a bio-attack. We need to events are well beyond the ability of (re)insurers to pay, but insurers still are able to provide on this esoteric peril so that the sector can better consider the benefits of domestic production and supply of MCMs have a role to play in education and awareness and risk management evaluate and quantify the risk. Potentially, this will allow the government and avoid increasing our reliance on easily disrupted supply chains measures. Separating the uninsurable systemic pandemic losses from and industry to differentiate between uninsurable pandemic risk and or unreliable international supplies. We must avoid politicised more localised disease/pathogen outbreaks might allow (re)insurers insurable disease. confrontations between countries over medical supplies, such as those to deploy capital and develop products for events that are capable of we have witnessed during 2020 and 2021 over vaccine supply. funding through traditional insurance techniques, such as premiums. The objective should be for disease to be treated differently depending on its nature and potential for transmission versus mortality. Insurers need help from government and academia to resolve this issue. Pool Re SOLUTIONS BIOTERRORISM Thinking the Unthinkable 6

Improving our resilience to a bioterror event: what more needs to be done?

Pandemic and/or bio-pathogen events can correlate perfectly across Building Better Resilience Resilience is also a state of mind and we need to ensure our leaders geographies, industry sectors and insurance classes and until are fit and trained for all eventualities. Preparedness is key to resilience (re)insurers can start to see separation, they will be restricted in the Our response, built on resilience, needs to be centred around raising and we now need to make sure that we build resilience into our capital they can commit. The insurance industry could also help to awareness of the peril, learning the lessons from the current pandemic, economies, societies and citizens. Perhaps now is the time to create improve security at life science research establishments and biological as well as previous CBR attacks such as Salisbury, and increasing a Civilian Resilience Force, which can respond to natural disasters as or chemical agent producers by incentivising risk reduction measures public-private and international collaboration and cooperation. We well as pandemics. Everyone needs to familiarise themselves with the such as employee and customer screening/monitoring. need to be creative in building our defence and deterrence against the subject, learn from each other and trust each other more effectively to malicious release of pathogens. tackle this pressing issue. The industry will not, however, provide the capital to underwrite systemic shock events, such as disease and pandemic, and that will Finally, how do we achieve resilience against CBR attacks? There are only change with some form of government support. Pool Re provides many views on this and it is not just the responsibility of the insurance unlimited CBRN coverage and requires an unlimited guarantee from industry or government to pick up the bill. The private sector has a key HMG for CBRN events if it is to continue offering such cover. responsibility in building resilience to a bioterrorism related event; this There is clearly merit and support for the creation of a Pandemic or is also best achieved through public-private partnerships. Part of this Catastrophic Re, along the lines of Pool Re, to manage and limit these can be achieved by being sensitive to change in all fields dealing with types of liabilities. We must bear in mind that as a bio-attack may not this complex subject. These include the threat, policy, science and be attributable or certifiable as terrorist we therefore need to think more technology, industry and response fields. The COVID-19 pandemic has broadly too. shown that for resilience to be effective our response needs to be agile and fast-learning. Every decision we make changes the environment Historically, insurance models have taken their inspiration from the and we need to be responsive to this. Successful resilience depends scientific approach of weaponised agent behaviours in the environment. on having established crisis management and risk frameworks, which As we have seen, the complexity of biosecurity events, particularly are well resourced, properly tested and fed by timely and accurate with an infectious disease, suggests that we now need to build in intelligence. Consideration should be given to the creation of a National contemporary lessons on political and societal responses to get a CBRN Centre, based on an all-hazards approach, along the lines of the view on the realistic losses. Furthermore, we need to make sure that National Cyber Security Centre. we understand the most likely events and not just the sensational, catastrophic events. Pool Re SOLUTIONS BIOTERRORISM Thinking the Unthinkable 7

Key Questions emanating from the two-day event:

What research should be undertaken to understand whether there is From a loss perspective, how will governments and authorities respond What improvements to global regulation of laboratories handling a relationship between the increasing frequency of global pandemics given that most COVID-19 losses were caused by the government dangerous pathogens might mitigate associated biosecurity and and increasing likelihood of terrorists deploying a successful biological response to the pandemic and not the pandemic itself? biosafety risks? Should the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention attack? (BTWC) be further empowered and better resourced?

How can international preparedness for a bioterrorism incident be What is the acceptable level of resilience to a biosecurity or bioterrorism Should there be more focus on raising awareness of the broader pivoted more towards raising the awareness of the peril and learning incident and ‘how clean is clean’ for biological incidents, as opposed to biosecurity issues, beyond concerns about natural pathogens, in the lessons from the current pandemic (and previous biological weapon chemical or radiological events? particular the potential for malign misuse of the life sciences and and chemical weapon attacks such as Salisbury and the Tokyo sarin advanced biotech? In the light of emerging lessons from the COVID 19 attack) and what further steps can be made to increase public-private pandemic, what improvements are needed to global bio-risk monitoring and international collaboration and cooperation? and early warning systems?

Has enough thought been given to deterring and dissuading a Is there sufficient contingent capability to deal with pandemics and Is the time right to establish a Civilian Resilience Force to respond to all bioterrorism incident and should more effort be invested in the other catastrophic events which impact on public health and the national emergencies? prevention of an attack? National Health Service?

Predicting and modelling the scale of a bioterrorism event is hugely How can government and local authority communications, aimed at Should consideration be given to the establishment of a National complex, especially given the variety of pathogens and their associated mitigating the impact of a bioweapons attack, be made more agile and CBRN Centre, along the lines of the National Cyber Security Centre, dispersion and infection pathways. Is it time to move away from trying with more appropriate messaging? Is sufficient attention being paid based on an all-hazards approach? to forecast the likelihood of an event and focus instead on the likely to countering the increasing volume and intensity of misinformation, manifestation of such an attack and our vulnerability to both the direct disinformation and hoaxes? and indirect impacts? Pool Re SOLUTIONS BIOTERRORISM Thinking the Unthinkable 8

Appendix 1. Participant Biographies

Ambassador Juan Ramón de la Fuente - Chair of the UN Security Brigham Bechtel - Founder, Pelorus Consulting LLC. Brigham served Christopher W. Frech - Senior Vice President, Global Government Council 1540 Committee and Permanent Representative of Mexico to over 30 years in the United States intelligence community, retiring from Affairs. Chris is responsible for managing global government affairs, the United Nations. He is a former Minister of Health and former Rector the CIA in 2017, after over 26 years where he served as both an analyst public policy, community engagement, and the Emergent BioSolutions of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), where he is and then in operations with positions as Chief of Station in South Asia, employees PAC. He first joined the company in February of 2009 as the currently an Emeritus Professor of Psychiatry. Africa, and the Middle East. Vice President of Government Affairs. Mr. Vladimir Voronkov - Under-Secretary-General of the United Hamish de Bretton-Gordon OBE RE(V) - Chemical Biological Peter Hearn - Chief Executive Officer, Guy Carpenter and a member Nations Office of Counter Terrorism and Executive Director of the Radiological & Nuclear (CBRN) expert, Humanitarian operations in of the Marsh McLennan Executive Committee. Throughout nearly four United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT). Mr. Voronkov is also warzones expert and Director of Doctors Under Fire. Hamish was decades in the reinsurance industry, Peter has served in a number of a member of the UN Secretary-General’s Executive Committee and Commanding Officer of the UK CBRN Regiment and NATO’s Rapid senior leadership roles. Most recently, he was Global Chairman of Willis chairs the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact Task Reaction CBRN Battalion. Re from March 2011 to June 2015. Peter began his reinsurance career Force on behalf of the UN Secretary-General. in 1978 with Willis Faber and Dumas. Bruce Carnegie-Brown - Chairman, Lloyd’s of London, Vice- The Rt Hon Amber Rudd - Advisor to Pool Re. Amber is a former Chairman of Banco Santander and Chairman of Cuvva. Bruce has Dr. Karin von Hippel - Director-General, Royal United Services Institute Work & Pensions Secretary and the Home Secretary who oversaw the also been a Non-Executive Director of JLT Group plc, Non-Executive (RUSI). Karin spent 6 years in the US Department of State as a Senior UK’s response to the terrorist and cyber-attacks in 2017. She is now a Chairman of Aon UK Ltd, Senior Independent Director of Catlin Group Adviser in the Bureau of Counterterrorism, then as a Deputy Assistant Senior Advisor to international CEO advisors Teneo, an Advisor to Pool Ltd and CEO for Marsh UK and Europe. Secretary in the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, and Re and Darktrace, a leading cyber security company. finally, as Chief of Staff to General John Allen, Special Presidential Dr. Andrew Coburn - Chief Scientist, Cambridge Centre for Risk Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter-ISIL. The Rt Hon Alistair Darling - Alistair is a former Chancellor of the Studies. Andrew leads the research activities at the Centre, which Exchequer who oversaw the management of the 2008/09 Financial examines the potential for systemic risk to businesses and the Hayley Robinson - Chief Underwriting Officer, Zurich. Hayley is an Crisis, and was Labour MP for Edinburgh Central, then South West, economy. The Centre’s research work extends across a broad remit of underwriting leader with over 30 years of general insurance experience from 1987 to 2015. He was one of three ministers who served global threats, including pandemic risk, climate change, and technology both in the UK and international markets. Hayley joined Zurich continuously in the Cabinet between 1997 and 2015. disruption. Insurance plc in March 2018 as the Chief Underwriting Officer and is responsible for the leadership of the Underwriting and Pricing function. Lord Browne of Ladyton - Des is a British Labour politician who Professor Audrey Kurth Cronin - Founding Director, Center for served in Cabinet positions as Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Security, Innovation and New Technology and Professor at American Jason Schupp - Founder and Managing Member, Centres for Better Secretary of State for Defence and Secretary of State for Scotland. University. Her latest book, ‘Power to the People: How Open Insurance (CBI). CBI is an independent, self-funded organization A member of the House of Lords since 2010, he is also Vice-chair Technological Innovation is Arming Tomorrow’s Terrorists’ won the 2020 committed to optimizing the value the insurance industry delivers to all of the Washington DC based Nuclear Threat Initiative and a Visiting Pool Re sponsored Airey Neave book prize. stakeholders. Prior to founding CBI, Jason served for over two decades Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk at Cambridge. in various legal and regulatory roles, including Group Compliance Julian Enoizi - Chief Executive Officer, Pool Reinsurance Company Officer, with a Swiss based multinational insurance group. Lord Mark Sedwill - Chairman, Atlantic Futures Forum and Chairman, Ltd. A multi-lingual lawyer, he sits on the Advisory Board of the G7 Panel on Global Economic Resilience and a senior adviser to OECD International Network on Financial Management of Large- Rothschild & Co. Mark was Cabinet Secretary & Head of the Civil scale Catastrophe. In 2018 he became visiting Professor University of Service and National Security Adviser. He was also the UK Ambassador Cranfield and in 2019 was recognised by Insurance Day as Industry and NATO Representative in Afghanistan. Achiever of the year for his leadership and innovation. Pool Re SOLUTIONS BIOTERRORISM Thinking the Unthinkable 9

Appendix 2: Programme of Events

Day One: Day Two: Bioterrorism: A clear and present danger? Improving our resilience to a bioterror event: 14:00 - 14:10 what more needs to be done? Introductions 14:00 - 14:10 Julian Enoizi Introductions Chief Executive, Pool Re Lord Browne of Ladyton Christopher W. Frech Former UK Secretary of State for Defence SVP Global Government Affairs, Emergent BioSolutions Peter Hearn Chief Executive Officer, Guy Carpenter 14:10 - 14:20 Keynote Address 14:10 - 14:20 Mr. Vladimir Voronkov Keynote Address Under-Secretary-General of the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism The Rt Hon Alistair Darling Former UK Chancellor of the Exchequer 14:20 - 16:00 Panel Discussion and live Q&A 14:20 - 16:00 The Rt Hon Amber Rudd Panel Discussion and live Q&A Former UK Home Secretary and Advisor to Pool Re Dr. Karin von Hippel Lord Mark Sedwill Director-General, Royal United Services Institute Former UK National Security Advisor and Cabinet Secretary. Hamish de Bretton-Gordon OBE RE(V) Professor Audrey Kurth Cronin CBRN and Humanitarian Expert Founding Director, Centre for Security, Innovation and New Technology Dr. Andrew Coburn Brigham Bechtel Chief Scientist, Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies Founder, Pelorus Consulting LLC Hayley Robinson Bruce Carnegie-Brown Chief Underwriting Officer, Zurich Chairman, Lloyd’s of London Jason Schupp Founder and Managing Member, Centres for Better Insurance, LLC Pool Re SOLUTIONS BIOTERRORISM Thinking the Unthinkable 10

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