BIOTERRORISM Thinking the Unthinkable 1 Post Conference Key Insights 24-25 March 2021 Co-hosted by Pool Reinsurance Company Ltd and The Biosecurity Research Initiative at St Catharine’s College University of Cambridge Version 9 @ 22/04/21 Pool Re SOLUTIONS BIOTERRORISM Thinking the Unthinkable 2 Contents 3 4 5 7 8 9 Foreword The threat: Improving our Key questions Appendix 1 Appendix 2 by Julian Enoizi and a clear and resilience to a arising from the Participants: Programme of Lord Des Browne present danger? bioterror event: conference. Keynote Events what more needs Speakers, Chairs, to be done? Panelists and Forums Pool Re SOLUTIONS BIOTERRORISM Thinking the Unthinkable 3 Foreword: by Julian Enoizi, CEO Pool Re and Lord Des Browne, former Secretary of State for Defence. We were delighted to co-host the first large-scale virtual BioTerrorism Over the last 3 years, Pool Re, the Biosecurity Research Initiative at Brown; Tom Hurd; The Rt Hon Amber Rudd and Dr Karin von Hippel, (re)insurance conference. It attracted some 640 participants from St Catharine’s College (BioRISC), the Nuclear Threat Initiative and as well as the many other experts who supported this event. across the business community, (re)insurance industry and other Cranfield University have been working collaboratively, through Even in this virtual world there are costs associated with putting on a sectors. They were joined by counter-terrorism professionals and sophisticated scenario development and modelling, to better global, livestream event and we are very grateful for the generosity of representatives from international terrorism pools, academia, security understand the malicious use of biological pathogens by terrorists to our two principal sponsors: Emergent BioSolutions and Guy Carpenter. directors and colleagues from various government departments. The cause mass casualties and significant economic damage. quality of the conversation and engagement throughout the conference Well before the global pandemic struck, we decided that a conference was evidence that this would be a germane event, particularly given the should be held to raise awareness of the bioterrorism threat, to assess attention the COVID-19 pandemic has drawn to the spread of deadly appropriate response management strategies and to identify key pathogens and the need for governments to step in as the insurer of decisions for government, business, and the (re)insurance industry to last resort for a difficult-to-insure peril. mitigate and close any protection gaps relating to bioterrorism. The intent of terrorists to use biological weapons is not new and they One of the recurring messages from the event is the need for even would have been observing closely the effect of the current pandemic greater collaboration. The importance of enduring strategic partnerships on our government, health system, economy, security, and society between government, business—especially the insurance industry— at large. We therefore need to ensure that we are prepared for and and academia to identify, respond to and mitigate the health and able to mitigate such a catastrophic event. The recently released UK economic losses caused by a bioterrorism event cannot be overstated. Integrated Review, echoing statements made by Secretary of State for Catastrophic and systemic risks, such as a CBRN type event, are Defence, Ben Wallace, earlier this year, chillingly stated that “it is likely too all-encompassing to be owned by one stakeholder; moreover, that a terrorist group will launch a successful CBRN attack by 2030”. catastrophic risks have an economic and societal impact which needs This should be seen in the context of the 500 CBRN events recorded cross-sector support from businesses, government and academia. in The Profiles of Incidents involving CBRN and Non-state Actors (POICN) database since 1990. The public health, economic and social We are hugely grateful to all the guest speakers and panelists who impact of COVID-19 has demonstrated clearly how vulnerable we are gave up their time to support this event by attending live or providing to the systemic consequences of a natural or man-made pandemic. pre-recorded video contributions. We would particularly like to thank Additionally, a main focus of consideration should be the scale of the the following: Ambassador Juan Ramón de la Fuente; Mr Vladimir event as opposed to the frequency of such events. Voronkov; Lord Mark Sedwill; Lord Alistair Darling; Bruce Carnegie- Pool Re SOLUTIONS BIOTERRORISM Thinking the Unthinkable 4 The threat: a ‘clear and present danger’? Rising terrorist intent? their use in state biological warfare programmes. Notwithstanding the Even with novel technologies, advanced bioengineering is, however, greater likelihood of bioterror scenarios, such as the small release of a still very complicated, and terrorists are likely to need abundant As identified in the recent UK Integrated Review assessment that a conventional biological agent or toxin such as ricin, we cannot afford to resources and operational freedom to develop successfully high-impact terrorist group “will launch a successful CBRN attack by 2030”, there be complacent about a large-scale bioterror attack. bioweapons. Advanced terrorist bioweapon programmes are therefore is no doubt that the threat of terrorists using a biological and/or a likely to be identified and disrupted in advance of any attack. This high The greatest danger, and a growing risk, is the intersection of the intent chemical or radiological device is a clear and present danger. Moreover, barrier to entry could, however, be overcome if a hostile state or state- and capability of a terrorist group to acquire bioweapon capabilities. there is a general consensus that terrorists, who will have been proxy provided a terrorist group with material or technical support (Similar intersections exist between cyber and data security risks.) watching and learning from the current pandemic and observing the which facilitated its acquisition of biological agents. A key mitigation Given access to bioweapons, whether by chance or design, many health and economic consequences of a global virus, could be inspired factor will be a coordinated and multifaceted approach to dissuade to stage ‘copycat’ releases of a pathogen. In the past, terrorists have terrorist groups would have no reservations about using them. potentially capable individuals from trying to weaponise a pathogen. been inspired by the media attention focused on natural disease Complex attack methodology outbreaks. The key attraction for a malicious actor seeking to impact Insider threats and global security concerns Western economies is the potential of a human-transmissible agent Fully understanding the peril is, however, challenging given the as a ‘force multiplier’ to scale an attack – the epitome of asymmetric complexity of achieving the capabilities necessary for a successful The ‘insider threat’ cannot be discounted and is considered a real risk conflict that terrorists have practised hitherto. biological attack. Consequently, there is limited academic consensus (especially at universities and other research institutes), as is accidental about the extent of the threat. Even within relevant government circles, release of dangerous pathogens from one of the 150 global, private Commensurate with the increased likelihood of a bioterror weapon this assessment is compromised by the complexity of the issues biolabs (which in many cases self-regulate), or from one of the poorly being used, is the need for the terrorism (re)insurance industry to and the highly specialised nature of research in bioterrorism risk. secured Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) laboratories around the world. The improve its awareness and knowledge of this peril and its associated Furthermore, this complexity, and the attendant poor understanding proliferation of poorly secured or under-regulated research facilities in and sizeable tail risk. This understanding cannot be achieved by of the subject matter, complicate communication within and between the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic increases these risks. the industry in isolation, hence the driving need for truly joint and government, academia, the private sector, and the public, ultimately collaborative partnerships with experts from the public and private It remains unclear if and when terrorists will tire of or acknowledge the undermining the coordination necessary to increase resilience sector, both nationally and internationally. The costs of a successful limits of low complexity methodologies and devote more energy to to biothreats. CBRN event could not be met by the industry alone and therefore developing sophisticated capabilities, including pathogens. Terrorists government involvement is needed to underwrite this catastrophic risk. may, however, be spurred by the inherent limitations of knives or Barriers to entry vehicles as weapons to pursue bioweapon capabilities; if they do so, Terror multiplier The main concern now is how advances in life sciences and related it is most likely to be at the lower end of the threat spectrum, utilising fields are reducing barriers to achieving more sophisticated capabilities, ricin or anthrax. By its very nature, a biological weapon is the ultimate terror weapon, many of which are open to misuse. Terrorists have always been and a ‘terror multiplier’; the fear factor alone may cause more harm innovators and thus there is no guarantee they will not move further than the agent itself. This is not a new