DOCSLIB.ORG

Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis (CPRA) –Pretoria

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis (CPRA) –Pretoria Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis (CPRA) –Pretoria CPRA Daily Briefings Week 30 Tuesday, 7 August 2012 The CPRA Daily Briefings are held weekday mornings in the CPRA Pretoria’s Situation Room and the Briefing Notes are the minutes of this meeting during which CONTENTS each regional expert of the Programme reports on the latest human security developments in his/her region, followed by general discussions around the table. An Southern Africa intern then compiles a summary of the meeting, which is reviewed by the respective • South Africa researchers, and a senior researcher edits o The difference between the ANC the report and provides quality control before National Conference in 2007 & returning it to the intern to prepare it for 2012 dispatch to the mailing list to which you have subscribed. o Inability to act against powerful elites hinders attempts to fight CPRA-Pretoria research team corruption o Speaking truth to power Dr David Zounmenou (W. Africa) Mr Andrew Atta-Asamoah (E. Africa & the Horn) Ms Dimpho Motsamai (S. Africa) Dr Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa (S. Africa) Ms Refiloe Joala (Intern) Ms Naomi Kok (Intern) Ms Tarryn Warries (Intern) Today’s Briefings Compilation Ms Tarryn Warries Summary of Briefings Southern Africa South Africa The difference between the ANC National Conference in 2007 & 2012 In a recent article by political commentator Karima Brown in the Sunday Independent on 5 August, she points out that there are a number of differences between the dynamics that were in place in the run-up to the African National Congress’s (ANC) National Conference in Polokwane in 2007, which saw the ousting of President Thabo Mbeki, and the National Conference that will be held in Mangaung this December. These differences, according to Brown, make it likely that President Jacob Zuma’s campaign to remain the president will be successful. The key reason according to Brown, is that ‘[i]n reality, patronage rather than ideology is now the key driver of internal politics inside today’s ANC’. In the run-up to Polokwane, Brown argues that ‘it was still possible to discern some ideological coherence’ in relation to the factions that coalesced around Mbeki and President Zuma. Mbeki had ushered in ‘a right-leaning policy hegemony on the ANC’, and those opposed to him included the left-leaning COSATU and the South African Communist Party (SACP). However, the run-up to Manguang is primarily about access to state resources for the benefit of particular interest groups irrespective of their ideological stances. It is for this reason that the SACP has nailed its colours firmly to President Zuma’s mast while COSATU is largely split. It also explains why the ANC Youth League’s efforts to replace President Zuma with Vice-President Kgalema Motlanthe have left the body adrift with some of its key leaders expelled. While there are factions within the ANC who are dissatisfied with President Zuma, Brown points out that those against him have ‘not consolidated into a coherent faction, and comprises a swirling, confused and frequently realigning mess, still without an agreed champion’. Indeed, Motlanthe has not confirmed his desire to campaign for ANC president in Mangaung. She claims that, unlike the anti-Zuma lobbyists, Motlanthe is aware that he will need to be certain of a win if he decides to compete. President Zuma’s power base is such that he continues to muster a sizable amount of support within the ANC. The recent collapse of the conference of the powerful Eastern Cape OR Tambo Region highlights how close the split is between pro- and anti-Zuma supporters. If Motlanthe runs against President Zuma and doesn’t win he will most certainly lose his position within both the ANC and the government. Inability to act against powerful elites hinders attempts to fight corruption Concern was expressed this week when the Business Day reported that Transnet appeared to have abandoned its ‘ground-breaking civil litigation to recover R95 million in ‘fruitless and wasteful expenditure’ from Abalozi Risk Advisory Services — formerly General Nyanda Security Risk Advisory Services. In 2007 this company, which is closely associated with President Zuma’s former Minister of Communications General Siphiwe Nyanda, was awarded the contract to provide security to ensure a decrease in copper theft. The contract was controversial as it was found to have been awarded fraudulently by Siyabonga Gama, the head of Transnet Freight Rail at the time. He and two other employees were subsequently fired in June 2010. Gama had halted the competitive tender process that was in place to ensure that Nyanda’s company received the lucrative tender. As is often the case with this type of tender fraud, Transnet later stated that Abalozi had neither the employees nor the skills or resources to undertake the security work required and had in contravention to the agreement sub-contracted the work out to other CPRA Daily Briefing, Tuesday, 7 August 2012 1 agencies. Transnet alleged that the required services were never provided and started litigation under the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) to recover the money. Surprisingly, even though Gama was fired for this incident, the ANC rallied to support him and he was reinstated to his position in April 2011. The legal case was withdrawn a week before it was due to start in court with Transnet spokesperson Mboniso Sigonyela saying, ‘A decision has been taken to allow parties to complete the discovery process and the exchange of documents.’ As Carol Paton highlighted in the same newspaper, the state has been unable to use the PFMA to act against corruption and misappropriation. To date there has not been a conviction of a politically connected person in terms of this act since its promulgation in 2000. It is therefore not surprising that as much as R30 billion is lost due to corruption in SA government procurement each year. Speaking truth to power Former President of Ireland, member of ‘the Group of Elders’ and current Commissioner of UN Commission on Human Rights Mary Robinson was the keynote speaker at the 10th Annual Mandela Lecture last week in Cape Town. A long-standing friend of South Africa and an anti- apartheid activist, Robinson stated that she felt slightly daunted about giving the lecture as she saw her challenge being ‘to speak to you, South Africans, as your friend. A true friend tells you not only what you want to hear but what you need to hear.’ She recognised that the ANC had managed remarkable achievements in its hundred years of existence, ‘from the defiance campaign, the resistance movement, armed struggle, banishment, to becoming the governing political party since 1994, leading the way in transforming the country’. However, she stated, ‘Sadly, though, in recent years my South African friends tell me the ANC’s moral authority has been eroded, tainted by allegations of corruption; a temporary betrayal of its history.’ After pointing out the various paradoxes that characterise South Africa, she ended with the plea, ‘Your admirable constitution opens with stirring words: “We, the people of South Africa … believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity.” As you approach your early twenties – and you are a young democratic country in that sense – you have a great opportunity to draw on your strengths, renew that inspirational vision that the world stood in admiration of in 1994, and continue to build your rainbow nation, block by block.’ Let’s hope that the ruling elite, as well as all South Africans, were taking notes. The End CPRA Daily Briefing, Tuesday, 7 August 2012 2 .
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration
    12 NOVEMBER 2018 – DAY 21 COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO STATE CAPTURE HELD AT PARKTOWN, JOHANNESBURG 10 21 NOVEMBER 2018 DAY 21 20 Page 1 of 124 12 NOVEMBER 2018 – DAY 21 PROCEEDINGS HELD ON 12 NOVEMBER 2018 CHAIRPERSON: Good morning Mr Pretorius. Good morning everybody. ADV PAUL PRETORIUS SC: Morning Chair. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. ADV PAUL PRETORIUS SC: Today Ms Barbara Hogan will be led by Advocate Mokoena. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Before, Mr Mokoena before you do that, I just want to attend to one matter that I want to deal with and basically it relates to the media statement that the Commission issued on Thursday. I want to read this media 10 statement again and make an appeal to the public and to the media to please respect the processes of the Commission and to abide by the law. The statement reads: “Since the commencement of the public hearings of the Commission in August 2018, various sections of the media have disseminated and published contents of witnesses statements submitted to the Commission in connection with the inquiry the Commission before witnesses give evidence before the Commission and without the written permission of the Chairperson. The latest incident relates to the statement submitted to the 20 Commission by Minister Pravin Gordhan, Minister of Public Enterprises. The same thing also happened with the statement submitted to the Commission by former minister of Public Enterprises, Ms Barbara Hogan. Both minister Gordhan and Ms Hogan are yet to give evidence before the Commission. An investigation is to be conducted
    [Show full text]
  • 12 November 2018 Zondo Commission: Hogan Describes Zuma's Meddling in Transnet CEO Appointment It Was Siyabonga Gama Or Nothin
    12 November 2018 Zondo Commission: Hogan describes Zuma’s meddling in Transnet CEO appointment It was Siyabonga Gama or nothing for former president Jacob Zuma, when in 2009 Transnet needed a new Group CEO (GCEO) following the departure of Maria Ramos. Public enterprises minister at the time, Barbara Hogan, had presented a different candidate to lead the state freight utility, but this recommendation was rejected on the spot by Zuma. Hogan wanted Sipho Maseko – who was GCEO of BP Southern Africa at the time, and had been recommended by the board of Transnet. Ramos left Transnet in February of that year, having served her notice since November of the previous year. The current public enterprises minister Pravin Gordhan had impressed the board as a candidate, but withdrew owing to his impending appointment as finance minister by Zuma. Transnet CFO Chris Wells was appointed to act in the GCEO position upon Ramos’s departure and the board set out on their new search. The months that followed, however, would be characterised by what Hogan described as undue pressure from Zuma to appoint Gama, and other senior politicians painting Gama as a victim of abuse of power by whites. Hogan was testifying at the commission of inquiry into state capture, which resumed its public hearings on Monday morning after a month’s break. Maseko, she told the inquiry, had been considered during a second look at candidates, after Gordhan had withdrawn from the process. All the necessary processes had been followed by the board to attain a suitable candidate, and rigorous assessments were run both internally and through an independent professional agency, and Maseko got a glowing report that Hogan then took to Zuma in June.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 the South African National Defence Force Integration
    1 The South African National Defence Force integration Thandi Modisei The history of South Africa is littered with conflicts – cultural, ethnic and racial. Different wars were fought during different eras, in different geographical spaces using different arms and systems. South Africa’s negotiated settlement took place over a period of time. Some people believe that the negotiations began with discussions between the African National Congress (ANS) leadership in prison and the South African government of the time as early as the late 1980s. The negotiated settlement has been under discussion and in the public domain since the early 1990s. We know that the armed forces of the two major political actors, the South African government and the ANC, became involved in direct and structured negotiations only in November 1993. Clearly, there was a ‘gap’ between the political and the military talks. The pace of the negotiations also tended to be slower and to ‘follow’ the political talks. There were two reasons for this ‘time gap’: º Both parties saw the retention of their armed forces as a ‘security fallback’, an asset necessary to appease their respective constituencies. º Retaining their armed capabilities was seen, in very pragmatic terms, as a physical guarantee that could be utilised should the negotiation process falter or fail. Considerable debate had preceded the formal military negotiations between the primary actors - the South African Defence Force (SADF) and Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) - and the other armed forces present in South Africa at the time: the Azanian Peoples’ Liberation Army (APLA); the Transkei Defence Force (TDF); the Ciskei Defence Force (CDF); the Venda Defence Force (VDF) and the Bophuthatswana Defence Force (BDF).
    [Show full text]
  • Zuma's Cabinet Reshuffles
    Zuma's cabinet reshuffles... The Star - 14 Feb 2018 Switch View: Text | Image | PDF Zuma's cabinet reshuffles... Musical chairs reach a climax with midnight shakeup LOYISO SIDIMBA [email protected] HIS FIRST CABINET OCTOBER 2010 Communications minister Siphiwe Nyanda replaced by Roy Padayachie. His deputy would be Obed Bapela. Public works minister Geoff Doidge replaced by Gwen MahlanguNkabinde. Women, children and people with disabilities minister Noluthando MayendeSibiya replaced by Lulu Xingwana. Labour minister Membathisi Mdladlana replaced by Mildred Oliphant. Water and environmental affairs minister Buyelwa Sonjica replaced by Edna Molewa. Public service and administration minister Richard Baloyi replaced by Ayanda Dlodlo. Public enterprises minister Barbara Hogan replaced by Malusi Gigaba. His deputy became Ben Martins. Sport and recreation minister Makhenkesi Stofile replaced by Fikile Mbalula. Arts and culture minister Lulu Xingwana replaced by Paul Mashatile. Social development minister Edna Molewa replaced by Bathabile Dlamini. OCTOBER 2011 Public works minister Gwen MahlanguNkabinde and her cooperative governance and traditional affairs counterpart Sicelo Shiceka are axed while national police commissioner Bheki Cele is suspended. JUNE 2012 Sbu Ndebele and Jeremy Cronin are moved from their portfolios as minister and deputy minister of transport respectively Deputy higher education and training minister Hlengiwe Mkhize becomes deputy economic development minister, replacing Enoch Godongwana. Defence minister Lindiwe Sisulu moves to the Public Service and Administration Department, replacing the late Roy Padayachie, while Nosiviwe MapisaNqakula moves to defence. Sindisiwe Chikunga appointed deputy transport minister, with Mduduzi Manana becoming deputy higher education and training minister. JULY 2013 Communications minister Dina Pule is fired and replaced with former cooperative government and traditional affairs deputy minister Yunus Carrim.
    [Show full text]
  • Transcript of an Interview with Siphiwe Nyanda, Johannesburg, 5 November 2015
    Transcript of an interview with Siphiwe Nyanda, Johannesburg, 5 November 2015 Contents Before the election .............................................................................................................. 1 Meeting the SADF top five .................................................................................................. 2 Integration ............................................................................................................................ 3 Consultation within MK ........................................................................................................ 3 Integration diffculties ........................................................................................................... 5 No other way ........................................................................................................................ 7 Transformation strategy ...................................................................................................... 8 Meiring report ..................................................................................................................... 10 Mandela at the Staff Council .......................................................................................... 12 Lesotho intervention - background ................................................................................. 13 Lesotho intervention decision .......................................................................................... 14 South Africa’s regional military stance ..........................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Sadf Conscript Generation and Its Search for Healing, Reconciliation and Social Justice
    THE SADF CONSCRIPT GENERATION AND ITS SEARCH FOR HEALING, RECONCILIATION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Philosophiae Doctor in the Practical and Missional Theology department Faculty of Theology and Religion University of the Free State Pieter Hendrik Schalk Bezuidenhout Study leader: Prof. P. Verster Bloemfontein January 2015 Translated by Suzanne Storbeck (June 2020) DECLARATION (i) I, Pieter Hendrik Schalk Bezuidenhout, declare that this thesis, submitted to the University of the Free State in fulfilment for the degree Philosophiae Doctor, is my own work and that it has not been handed in at any other university or higher education institution. (ii) I, Pieter Hendrik Schalk Bezuidenhout, declare that I am aware that the copyright of this thesis belongs to the University of the Free State. (iii) I, Pieter Hendrik Schalk Bezuidenhout, declare that the property rights of any intellectual property developed during the study and/or in connection with the study, will be seated in the University of the Free State. i ABSTRACT The former (Afrikaner) SADF conscript generation is to a large extent experiencing an identity crisis. This crisis is due to two factors. First of all, there is a new dispensation where Afrikaners are a minority group. They feel alienated, even frustrated and confused. Secondly, their identity has been challenged and some would say defeated. What is their role and new identity in the current SA? They fought a war and participated internally in operations within a specific local, regional and global context. This identity was formed through their own particular history as well as certain theological and ideological worldviews and frameworks.
    [Show full text]
  • 2688 ISS Monograph 127.Indd
    SSOUTHOUTH AAFRICANFRICAN GGUERRILLAUERRILLA ARMIESARMIES THE IMPACT OF GUERRILLA ARMIES ON THE CREATION OF SOUTH AFRICA’S ARMED FORCES ROCKY WILLIAMS ISS MONOGRAPH SERIES • No 127, SEPTEMBER 2006 CONTENTS LIST OF ACRONYMS ii FOREWORD iv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY vi CHAPTER 1 1 Introduction CHAPTER 2 5 The political context and the transition to war: Anti-colonial struggles CHAPTER 3 13 The military strategy and doctrine of the Boer Republics and Umkhonto we Sizwe: Two types of people’s war CHAPTER 4 37 The influence of guerrilla armies: The creation of modern national defence forces CHAPTER 5 51 Conclusion ii Rocky Williams iii RENAMO Mozambican National Resistance (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) SADF South African Defence Force LIST OF ACRONYMS SAIC South African Indian Congress SAP South African Police ANC African National Congress SWAPO South-West Africa People’s Organisation APLA Azanian People’s Liberation Army TBVC Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei CBD Civilian-based Defence TDF Transkei Defence Force CPSA Communist Party of South Africa TSA Transvaal Staats Artillerie ESKOM Electricity Supply Commission UDF Union Defence Force FRELIMO Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frente de Libertação de Mozambique) UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) JMCC Joint Military Co-ordinating Council ZAPU Zimbabwe African People’s Union MK Umkhonto we Sizwe ZAR Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek MKIZA MK Intelligence Division ZIPRA Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) ZNLA Zimbabwe National Liberation Army NAT ANC Department of National Intelligence and Security NEC National Executive Committee NP National Party NSF Non-Statutory Forces OFS Orange Free State PAC Pan Africanist Congress PMC Political Military Council iv Rocky Williams v The death of Rocky Williams is a great loss to all concerned with security sector transformation in Africa and to all who knew Rocky as a friend.
    [Show full text]
  • Nuclear Proliferation International History Project The
    Nuclear Proliferation International History Project The African National Congress and Apartheid South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program By Jo-Ansie van Wyk and Anna-Mart van Wyk NPIHP Working Paper #16 November 2020 THE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT WORKING PAPER SERIES Christian F. Ostermann and Leopoldo Nuti, Series Editors This paper is one of a series of Working Papers published by the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project. The Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (NPIHP) is a global network of individuals and institutions engaged in the study of international nuclear history through archival documents, oral history interviews and other empirical sources. Recognizing that today’s toughest nuclear challenges have deep roots in the past, NPIHP seeks to transcend the East vs. West paradigm to work towards an integrated international history of nuclear weapon proliferation. The continued proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the most pressing security issues of our time, yet the empirically-based study of international nuclear history remains in its infancy. NPIHP’s programs to address this central issue include: the annual Nuclear Boot Camp for M.A. and Ph.D. candidates to foster a new generation of experts on the international history of nuclear weapons; the NPIHP Fellowship Program for advanced Ph.D. students and post-doctoral researchers hosted by NPIHP partner institutions around the world; a coordinated, global research effort which combines archival mining and oral history interviews conducted by NPIHP partners; a massive translation and digitization project aimed at making documentary evidence on international nuclear history broadly accessible online; a series of conferences, workshops and seminars hosted by NPIHP partners around the world.
    [Show full text]
  • Watching the Watchdog: Security Oversight Law in the New South Africa
    Michigan Journal of Race and Law Volume 3 1997 Watching the Watchdog: Security Oversight Law in the New South Africa Christopher A. Ford Governmental Affairs Committee of the U.S. Senate Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjrl Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, National Security Law Commons, and the Rule of Law Commons Recommended Citation Christopher A. Ford, Watching the Watchdog: Security Oversight Law in the New South Africa, 3 MICH. J. RACE & L. 59 (1997). Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjrl/vol3/iss1/3 This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of Race and Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. WATCHING THE WATCHDOG: SECURITY OVERSIGHT LAW IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA ChristopherA. Ford* This Article attempts to assess the experiences of post-apartheidSouth Africa in the realm of national security law by examining key issues from constitutional, statutory, and policy perspectives. It observes that South Africans now have a great "window of opportunity" that allows them to establish the habits and mores necessary to a working security oversight regime, and argues that the way in which South Africa strikes a balance between the requirements of nationalsecurity and the preservation of personal liberties is of enormous importance to the Republic's future. It further contends that South Africa's choices in this arena could have significant implications and/or hold important lessons for other democracies aroundthe world.
    [Show full text]
  • The South African National Defence Force: from Here to Where? ______
    89 PARADIGM SHIFTS, SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE POLICY AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE: FROM HERE TO WHERE? ___________________________________________ Lt Col Francois Vreÿ Subject Group Military Strategy Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University Abstract Elements of Kuhn's theory on scientific revolutions and its applicability to the political domain also promote explanations of military change. In this regard, changes in the South African defence realm during the past decade and the rise of the South African National Defence Force need not be viewed as inexplicable. These developments represent an opportunity to explain a prominent example of military change in Africa through an established theory. By making use of indicators drawn from the theory developed by Kuhn, an explanatory framework can be established to co-explain certain adjustments of the South African defence paradigm over the past 10 years. Of particular relevance is Kuhn’s view of an initial dominant shift, which continues to evolve with the assistance of subsequent incremental shifts. The South African paradigm that guided the pre-1994 Total Strategy defence outlook was later opposed and ousted by one that was more explanatory and embracing of the democratic features permeating and envisaged for South African society. This democratic imperative drove the dominant shift in the South African defence paradigm during the middle 1990s as it dramatically and extensively began to adjust the policy environment regarding the role and utilisation of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). In explaining his theory, Kuhn avers that a range of smaller adjustments towards maturing the initial shift soon follows the earlier dramatic shift.
    [Show full text]
  • Commission of Inquiry Into State Capture Held At
    COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO STATE CAPTURE HELD AT PARKTOWN, JOHANNESBURG 10 15 JULY 2019 DAY 133 20 15 JULY 2019 – DAY 133 PROCEEDINGS COMMENCE ON 15 JULY 2019 CHAIRPERSON: Good Morning Mr Pretorius, good morning everybody, good morning Mr Zuma. ADV PAUL JOSEPH PRETORIUS SC: Morning Chair. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Before we start I have a few remarks to make. Today the former president of the Republic Mr Jacob Zuma appears before this commission without having been compelled to do so and in response to a request from the commission to give an undertaking that he would appear before it this week which he gave. 10 The commission appreciates that he is here. I accept that through his lawyers he had indicated that he has certain reservations about the commission and that he reserves his rights in appearing before the commission. The commission has no difficulty with this and accepts that everyone is entitled to have an opinion about the commission. I just want to make it clear that the former President is not the only leader in this country who is going to be appearing before the commission. There are others who will be appearing before the commission and I also wish to point out that the commission is not 20 mandated to prove any case against anybody but it is mandated to investigate and enquire into certain allegations and as I have indicated over a long period it invites everyone who has information or knowledge of matters that fall under its terms of reference to make that information available to it so that it can investigate those matters.
    [Show full text]
  • South African Guerilla Armies
    SSOUTHOUTH AAFRICANFRICAN GGUERRILLAUERRILLA ARMIESARMIES THE IMPACT OF GUERRILLA ARMIES ON THE CREATION OF SOUTH AFRICA’S ARMED FORCES ROCKY WILLIAMS ISS MONOGRAPH SERIES • No 127, SEPTEMBER 2006 CONTENTS LIST OF ACRONYMS ii FOREWORD iv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY vi CHAPTER 1 1 Introduction CHAPTER 2 5 The political context and the transition to war: Anti-colonial struggles CHAPTER 3 13 The military strategy and doctrine of the Boer Republics and Umkhonto we Sizwe: Two types of people’s war CHAPTER 4 37 The influence of guerrilla armies: The creation of modern national defence forces CHAPTER 5 51 Conclusion ii Rocky Williams iii RENAMO Mozambican National Resistance (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) SADF South African Defence Force LIST OF ACRONYMS SAIC South African Indian Congress SAP South African Police ANC African National Congress SWAPO South-West Africa People’s Organisation APLA Azanian People’s Liberation Army TBVC Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei CBD Civilian-based Defence TDF Transkei Defence Force CPSA Communist Party of South Africa TSA Transvaal Staats Artillerie ESKOM Electricity Supply Commission UDF Union Defence Force FRELIMO Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frente de Libertação de Mozambique) UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) JMCC Joint Military Co-ordinating Council ZAPU Zimbabwe African People’s Union MK Umkhonto we Sizwe ZAR Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek MKIZA MK Intelligence Division ZIPRA Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) ZNLA Zimbabwe National Liberation Army NAT ANC Department of National Intelligence and Security NEC National Executive Committee NP National Party NSF Non-Statutory Forces OFS Orange Free State PAC Pan Africanist Congress PMC Political Military Council iv Rocky Williams v The death of Rocky Williams is a great loss to all concerned with security sector transformation in Africa and to all who knew Rocky as a friend.
    [Show full text]