The Syntax, Semantics and Pragmatics of Conditional Clauses in Tonga and English: a Comparative Analysis
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The Information Status of English If-Clauses in Natural Discourse*
The Information Status of English If-clauses in Natural Discourse* Chang-Bong Lee 1. Introduction Haiman (1978) once argued that conditionals are uniformly defined as topics. His argument had to suffer from some substantial problems both empirically and theoretically. Despite these problems, his paper was a trailblazing research that opened up the path for the study of conditionals from a discourse point of view. The present paper studies conditionals from a particular aspect of discourse functional perspective by analyzing the information structure of conditional sentences in natural discourse. Ford and Thompson (1986) studied the discourse function of conditionals in the similar vein through a corpus-based research. This paper also attempts to understand the discourse function of conditionals, but it does it under a rather different standpoint, under the framework of the so-called GIVEN-NEW taxonomy as presented in Prince (1992). In this paper, we focus on the definition of topic as an entity that represents the GIVEN or OLD information to be checked against the information in the preceding linguistic context. By analyzing the data of the English if-clauses in natural discourse both in oral and written contexts, we present sufficient evidence to show that conditionals are not simply topics (GIVEN information). It is revealed that the if-clauses *This research was supported by the faculty settlement research fund (Grant No. 20000005) from the Catholic University of Korea in the year of 2000. I wish to express gratitude to the Catholic University of Korea for their financial assistance. The earlier version of this paper was presented at the 6th academic conference organized by the Discourse and Cognitive Ilnguistics Society of Korea in June, 2000. -
Understanding Conditional Sentences
GRAMMAR AND MECHANICS Understanding Conditional Sentences When a dependent or subordinate clause is introduced by words such as “if,” “when,” or “unless,” the complete sentence expresses a condition. The dependent or subordinate clause states a condition or cause and is joined with an independent clause, which states the result or effect. Conditional sentences can be factual, predictive, or speculative, which determines the form of the condition and the choice of verb tenses. TYPES OF CONDITIONAL SENTENCES Factual In a factual conditional sentence, the relationship between the dependent or subordinate clause and the independent clause describes a condition that is or was habitually true: if the condition applies, the independent clause states the result or effect. Both clauses use simple verb forms either in present or past tense. If you find a blue and white sweater, it belongs to me. When he plays his music too loud, the neighbors complain. Unless there is a question, the class is dismissed. Predictive In a predictive conditional sentence, the relationship between the two clauses is promised or possible but not certain. Use a present-tense verb in the dependent or subordinate clause, and in the independent clause use modal auxiliaries “will,” “can,” “may,” “should,” or “might” with the base form of the verb. If the weather is good tomorrow, we will go to the park. If your roommate decides not to come with us, we can go by ourselves. When the lease on the apartment ends, we may want to move to another building. When she misses one of the meetings, she should notify her supervisor. -
Layers and Operators in Lakota1 Avelino Corral Esteban Universidad Autónoma De Madrid
Kansas Working Papers in Linguistics, Vol. 36 (2015), 1-33 Layers and operators in Lakota1 Avelino Corral Esteban Universidad Autónoma de Madrid Abstract Categories covering the expression of grammatical information such as aspect, negation, tense, mood, modality, etc., are crucial to the study of language universals. In this study, I will present an analysis of the syntax and semantics of these grammatical categories in Lakota within the Role and Reference Grammar framework (hereafter RRG) (Van Valin 1993, 2005; Van Valin and LaPolla 1997), a functional approach in which elements with a purely grammatical function are treated as ´operators`. Many languages mark Aspect-Tense- Mood/Modality information (henceforth ATM) either morphologically or syntactically. Unlike most Native American languages, which exhibit an extremely complex verbal morphological system indicating this grammatical information, Lakota, a Siouan language with a mildly synthetic / partially agglutinative morphology, expresses information relating to ATM through enclitics, auxiliary verbs and adverbs, rather than by coding it through verbal affixes. 1. Introduction The organisation of this paper is as follows: after a brief account of the most relevant morpho- syntactic features exhibited by Lakota, Section 2 attempts to shed light on the distinction between lexical words, enclitics and affixes through evidence obtained in the study of this language. Section 3 introduces the notion of ´operator` and explores the ATM system in Lakota using RRG´s theory of operator system. After a description of each grammatical category, an analysis of the linear order exhibited by the Lakota operators with respect to the nucleus of the clause are analysed in Section 4, showing that this ordering reflects the scope relations between the grammatical categories conveyed by these operators. -
(2012) Perspectival Discourse Referents for Indexicals* Maria
To appear in Proceedings of SULA 7 (2012) Perspectival discourse referents for indexicals* Maria Bittner Rutgers University 0. Introduction By definition, the reference of an indexical depends on the context of utterance. For ex- ample, what proposition is expressed by saying I am hungry depends on who says this and when. Since Kaplan (1978), context dependence has been analyzed in terms of two parameters: an utterance context, which determines the reference of indexicals, and a formally unrelated assignment function, which determines the reference of anaphors (rep- resented as variables). This STATIC VIEW of indexicals, as pure context dependence, is still widely accepted. With varying details, it is implemented by current theories of indexicali- ty not only in static frameworks, which ignore context change (e.g. Schlenker 2003, Anand and Nevins 2004), but also in the otherwise dynamic framework of DRT. In DRT, context change is only relevant for anaphors, which refer to current values of variables. In contrast, indexicals refer to static contextual anchors (see Kamp 1985, Zeevat 1999). This SEMI-STATIC VIEW reconstructs the traditional indexical-anaphor dichotomy in DRT. An alternative DYNAMIC VIEW of indexicality is implicit in the ‘commonplace ef- fect’ of Stalnaker (1978) and is formally explicated in Bittner (2007, 2011). The basic idea is that indexical reference is a species of discourse reference, just like anaphora. In particular, both varieties of discourse reference involve not only context dependence, but also context change. The act of speaking up focuses attention and thereby makes this very speech event available for discourse reference by indexicals. Mentioning something likewise focuses attention, making the mentioned entity available for subsequent dis- course reference by anaphors. -
Conditionals in Political Texts
JOSIP JURAJ STROSSMAYER UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES Adnan Bujak Conditionals in political texts A corpus-based study Doctoral dissertation Advisor: Dr. Mario Brdar Osijek, 2014 CONTENTS Abstract ...........................................................................................................................3 List of tables ....................................................................................................................4 List of figures ..................................................................................................................5 List of charts....................................................................................................................6 Abbreviations, Symbols and Font Styles ..........................................................................7 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................9 1.1. The subject matter .........................................................................................9 1.2. Dissertation structure .....................................................................................10 1.3. Rationale .......................................................................................................11 1.4. Research questions ........................................................................................12 2. Theoretical framework .................................................................................................13 -
Why Grammar Matters: Conjugating Verbs in Modern Legal Opinions Robert C
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal Volume 40 Article 3 Issue 1 Fall 2008 2008 Why Grammar Matters: Conjugating Verbs in Modern Legal Opinions Robert C. Farrell Quinnipiac University School of Law Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Robert C. Farrell, Why Grammar Matters: Conjugating Verbs in Modern Legal Opinions, 40 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 1 (2008). Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol40/iss1/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Why Grammar Matters: Conjugating Verbs in Modern Legal Opinions Robert C. Farrell* I. INTRODUCTION Does it matter that the editors of thirty-three law journals, including those at Yale and Michigan, think that there is a "passive tense"? l Does it matter that the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth2 and Eleventh3 Circuits think that there is a "passive mood"? Does it matter that the editors of fourteen law reviews think that there is a "subjunctive tense"?4 Does it matter that the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit thinks that there is a "subjunctive voice'"? 5 There is, in fact, no "passive tense" or "passive mood." The passive is a voice. 6 There is no "subjunctive voice" or "subjunctive tense." The subjunctive is a mood.7 The examples in the first paragraph suggest that there is widespread unfamiliarity among lawyers and law students * B.A., Trinity College; J.D., Harvard University; Professor, Quinnipiac University School of Law. -
Towards a Pragmatic Category of Conditionals
19th ICL papers Chi-He ELDER and Kasia M. JASZCZOLT University of Cambridge, United Kingdom [email protected], [email protected] Conditional Utterances and Conditional Thoughts: Towards a Pragmatic Category of Conditionals oral presentation in session: 6B Pragmatics, Discourse and Cognition (Horn & Kecskes) Published and distributed by: Département de Linguistique de l’Université de Genève, Rue de Candolle 2, CH-1205 Genève, Switzerland Editor: Département de Linguistique de l’Université de Genève, Switzerland ISBN:978-2-8399-1580-9 Travaux du 19ème CIL | Travaux 20-27 Juillet 2013 Genève des Linguistes, International Congrès 20-27 July 2013 Geneva of Linguists, Congress International 1" " Conditional Utterances and Conditional Thoughts: Towards a Pragmatic Category of Conditionals Chi-Hé Elder and Kasia M. Jaszczolt Department of Theoretical and Applied Linguistics University of Cambridge Cambridge CB3 9DA United Kingdom [email protected] [email protected] 1. Rationale and objectives The topic of this paper is the pragmatic and conceptual category of conditionality. Our primary interest is how speakers express conditional meanings in discourse and how this diversity of forms can be accounted for in a theory of discourse meaning. In other words, we are concerned not only with conditional sentences speakers utter in discourse (sentences of the form ‘if p (then) q’), but predominantly with conditional thoughts, expressed in a variety of ways, by discourse participants. The category of conditionality has given rise to many discussions and controversies in formal semantics, cognitive semantics and post-Gricean pragmatics. In formal semantics, pragmatic considerations have often been appealed to in order to demonstrate that conditionals in natural language do, or do not, essentially stem out of material conditionals on the level of their logical form. -
Dissertations, Department of Linguistics
UC Berkeley Dissertations, Department of Linguistics Title A Cognitive Approach to Mandarin Conditionals Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5qw934z5 Author Yang, Fan-Pei Publication Date 2007 eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California A Cognitive Approach To Mandarin Conditionals By Fan-Pei Gloria Yang B.A. (National Taiwan Normal Univeristy) 1998 M.A. (University of California, Berkeley) 2003 A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the Requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Linguistics in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Eve Sweetser, Chair Professor George Lakoff Professor Jerome Feldman Spring 2007 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. A Cognitive Approach To Mandarin Conditionals Copyright © 2007 By Fan-Pei Gloria Yang Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Abstract A Cognitive Approach To Mandarin Conditionals By Fan-Pei Gloria Yang Doctor of Philosophy in Linguistics University of California, Berkeley Professor Eve Sweetser, Chair This dissertation provides a description of some of the common Mandarin conditional constructions, with a focus on describing the contributions of the linking devices to the conditional interpretations and their interactions with other elements in constructions. The analyses are based on corpus data and include studies on the pragmatic uses of conditionals. The discussion endeavors to show how cognitive structures link to linguistic structures and how spaces are built and frames evoked. Consequently, the research does not just provide a syntactic description, but offers an in-depth discussion of epistemic stance and grounding of information indicated by the linking devices. -
Robert C. Stalnaker*
ROBERT C. STALNAKER* A THEORY OF CONDITIONALS I. INTRODUCTION A conditional sentence expresses a proposition which is a function of two other propositions, yet not one which is a truth function of those prop ositions. I may know the truth values of "Willie Mays played in the American League" and "Willie Mays hit four hundred" without knowing whether or not Mays. would have hit four hundred if he had played in the American League. This fact has tended to puzzle, displease, or delight philosophers, and many have felt that it is a fact that calls for some comment or explanation. It has given rise to a number of philosophical problems; I shall discuss three of these. My principal concern will be with what has been called the logical problem of conditionals, a problem that frequently is ignored or dismissed by writers on conditionals and counterfactuals. This is the task of describing the formal properties of the conditional function: a function, usually represented in English by the words "if ... then", taking ordered pairs of propositions into propositions. I shall explain informally and defend a solution, presented more rigorously elsewhere, to this problem.l The second issue - the one that has dominated recent discussions of con· trary-to-fact conditionals - is the pragmatic problem of counterfactuals. This problem derives from the belief, which I share with most philosophers writing about this topic, that the formal properties of the conditional function, together with all of the facts, may not be sufficient for determining the truth value of a counterfactual; that is, different truth values of conditional state ments may be consistent with a single valuation of all nonconditional state ments. -
An Analysis of Use of Conditional Sentences by Arab Students of English
Advances in Language and Literary Studies ISSN: 2203-4714 Vol. 8 No. 2; April 2017 Flourishing Creativity & Literacy Australian International Academic Centre, Australia An Analysis of Use of conditional Sentences by Arab Students of English Sadam Haza' Al Rdaat Coventry University, United Kingdom E-mail: [email protected] Doi:10.7575/aiac.alls.v.8n.2p.1 Received: 04/01/2017 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.7575/aiac.alls.v.8n.2p.1 Accepted: 17/02/2017 Abstract Conditional sentences are made of two clauses namely “if-clause” and “main clause”. Conditionals have been noted by scholars and grammarians as a difficult area of English for both teachers and learners. The two clauses of conditional sentences and their form, tense and meaning could be considered the main difficulty of conditional sentences. In addition, some of non-native speakers do not have sufficient knowledge of the differences between conditional sentences in the two languages and they tried to solve their problems in their second language by using their native language. The aim of this study was to analyse the use of conditional sentences by Arab students of English in semantic and syntactic situations. For the purpose of this study, 20 Arab students took part in the questionnaire, they were all studying different subjects and degrees (bachelor, master and PhD) at Coventry University. The results showed that the use of type three conditionals and modality can be classified as the most difficult issues that students struggle to understand and use. Keywords: conditional sentences, protasis and apodosis, mood, real and unreal clauses, tense-time 1. -
A Note on Conditionals and Restrictors∗
A note on conditionals and restrictors∗ Daniel Rothschild Introduction Within linguistic semantics, it is near orthodoxy that the function of the word `if' (in most cases) is to mark restrictions on quantification. Just as in the sentence `Every man smokes', the common noun `man' restricts the quantifier `every', in the sentence `Usually, if it's winter it's cold', `it's winter' acts as a restrictor on the situational quantifier `usually'. This view, originally due to Lewis (1975), has been greatly extended in work by Heim (1982) and, most notably, Kratzer (1981, 1986) into a rich theory of almost all uses of the word `if'. I call this the restrictor view of `if'. Despite its linguistic prominence, this view of the word `if' has played little role in the philosophical discussion of conditionals. Fairly recent philosophical surveys such as Bennett's (2003) book-length introduction or Edgington's (1995; 2008) review articles do not even mention the restrictor view. Stranger still, in his seminal work on conditionals and probability, Lewis (1976, 1986) does not mention the restrictor view which he pioneered, despite the intimate relation noted later by Kratzer (1986).1 This paper tries to fill in the gap left by these omissions.2 I make four main points. First, I argue that given the current state of things our best bet is to accept the `restrictor view' and to assume that `if' is not ambiguous, so ∗This paper was written for a conference in honor of Dorothy Edgington at the Institute of Philosophy, London in May 2011. I am grateful to Dilip Ninan, Scott Sturgeon, and Seth Yalcin for useful discussion of this topic, and particularly to Justin Khoo, whose recent draft (cited below) prompted me to think about these issues. -
1 Craige Roberts LSA 7/30/15 Lecture 6: Cleaning out the Wastebasket: Criteria of Adequacy for a Theory of Linguistic Pragmatics
Craige Roberts LSA 7/30/15 Lecture 6: Cleaning out the wastebasket: Criteria of adequacy for a theory of linguistic pragmatics Syntax and semantics study expressions of a language: Syntax investigates the structure of acceptable expressions of the language. Hence it determines which expressions are grammatical. Semantics studies the conventional CHARACTERS of grammatical expressions of the language, determined compositionally as a function of the structure of the expression and the CHARACTERS of the words it contains. Hence it determines the regular, conventional contribution of an expression to any meanings that may arise with its use. Pragmatics is the study of utterances—the use of expressions of the language in particular contexts. In particular, it attempts to explain how a given meaning arises as a function of conventional structure and content plus context of utterance. Recall: An utterance is an ordered pair of an expression under a linguistic analysis and a context of utterance. Bar-Hillel (1971) 1. Desiderata Desiderata for an adequate pragmatic theory: • in keeping with general criteria of adequacy for scientific theory: o a falsifiable theory, one that makes testable, replicable predictions (controlling for the identified parameters of variation with clear diagnostics) about the kinds of interpretations that will arise for particular contents in particular contexts o a theory that’s non-ad hoc, using for the analysis of a particular phenomenon structures, tools and principles that are independently motivated • in keeping with general criteria of adequacy for linguistic theory: o Empirical adequacy: predict all and only the attested meanings of an expression in particular contexts of use, doing so 1.