Fighting Joe Martin in British Columbia

FIGHTING JOE MARTIN

IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

Peter Jeff ry Brock Bachelor of Arts Univereity of British Columbia, 1967

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILWEXI' OF

THE REQUIREMEM'S FOR THE DLiX3RE.E OF

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department of History

@ Peter Jeffry Brock 1976

August 1976

All righta reserved. This thesis may not be

reproduced in whole Qr in part, by photocopy % or other means, without permission of the author. T!~,r,e: Peter Jeff l*,r Rrock %gee: '.'aster of Arts

Title of Thesis: Pi~htingJoe !:artin in Sritish Zoluqbia

%airperson: 1brtin Kitchen

~,$d;:.!,~ohnston Senior Supervisor

Robin Fisher

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Title of Thesis /~issertation: FIGHTING JOE WRTXN IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

Author :

(signature )

PETER JEFFRY BROCK

(name )

21 Julv 1976

(date)

B-?cause there are no Martin pzpers, the material in This

LC...-' ' , ,L;., I 5 $5 ti:.czd prlmri l y on newspaper sources and printed pvernmen? p--::-2:-:s zi~ho~ghsome insights have been gained fr-cm a small body of

ti n !,t ..--I ,ors found in the cot lections of his principal corresponients.

Iwish to ?s:cnowled~ethe help and advice of 3.C. ...bQST?, .'i3T.,,...... iii

Th?s thesis is essenti.,a:l;- ri. :kzrti.nl.zation of the 3ritish

rriany interesting themes th2t T omitted, such as Tlartin's rel.2tionship with the radic3.l l-abour movement of his tjme, but the tgmnny of rel-evance pre- cllided srch ar! 11ndert~JiJn:. 5: felt h~mperedbzr the absence of work on the other mni n ch'?ract,ers of the era: Turner, Cemlin, I'cTnnes, C~rter-Cotton,

'31r1;2s, and cspeci:l.ll;. Jxnes hnsmrli.r xre near?y historical blanks. The newspapers I fo..mcl confusinc ,mrl rr.ls.l.ezdin=: In the bsginn!.ng T put & lot of effort into trying to m~kesense out of the stories, but towards the end I concluded th2.t the stories were sonetimes intendod to be publicity releases I for railwq pronoter*~,and so not distinguished for their accuracy. There were no f7arti.n papws. The L~urierpapers were by far the largest collection of ?'artin's writinp that were zvs3 1-zble. Some sources that could have been of ?reat help were reluctant to rehase the mriterial that I asked for: The

Xsqxinalt and Vaneimo Railway in Victoria and the Jmea J.Hill Xamorial Lib- my in St Paul. sent little or nothing; and the documents sent by the C.P.9.

Oorporat e Archives in Xontrcal seemed to be incon-plete.

?'his work reall-y soes bepmd the direct evidence that could be

.in con?] ict seems comp2et ely reasonab1.e. Roth Margaret Ormsby and Martin Robin .,. s:q~est that pwcrfu.7. outssde I.nterest,s had the power to rmke, or !m(zake, the ;ovsmrzent of the day in ?ritish Colimbin, but they give few specific emmples. I have put tojether the S. P.?.. - Grext Northern fizht wfth the Omsby - ?ob:!n ~.llilsionsand tried to construct a reasonable case for tho plitical manifestations cf the corzl,p~xystri..q,nle from the viewpoint of 'r' 1..;htins' ,Joe '%r%in.

T hope that everyone who comes to know Joseph !Tartin the rebel dl?. see a little hit of hirn in t-hemselvos. Both Martin Robin and Margaret Ormsby, the authors of the two general histories of British Columbia, characterize the period at the end of the ninteenth century as a time of confusion and tumult culminsting in the introduction a formal party system and a return to stability under 1 the new administration of Richard &Bride and the Conservatives in 1903. The early studies of Edith Dobie and W.N.Sage have focused on the creation of political groupings after Confederation and on the Smithe dynasty of

Premiers from 1883 to 1898, largely dismissing the end of the era in a 2 paragraph or two as a time when "group government was breaking down".

Later writers like C.F. G.Stanley, J.T ,Saywell, and others, have attributed much of the upheaval to the new Lieutenant Governor who appointed a nurnber of Premiers who had little support fromthe established political channels of the province and so precipitated a constitutional crisis which brought 3 about his own dismissal by the Governor General. But all of theee views neglect to include the effects of the railway boom then gathering force in the West and the powerful presence of Joseph Martin, The period of the Smithe dgnasty coincides with the appearance of the Canadian Pacific Rsilw and its growth into being the dominating economic power in British Columbia. The period of tumult which followed Martin's arrival on the coast can best be understood by tracing his activ- itkes in organizing a behind-the-scenes revolt against the domination of the C.P.R. and its political friends. With the backing of the Great Northern

Railway of the United States, VIrt3.n brought about %hedismissal of the 2 Lieutenant Governor, seized cont~olof the embryonic provincial Liberal

Party, plunged the established political figures of British Columbia into a series of scandals thereby upsetting the traditional patterms of the province, and for the first time in the province's history, brought a

Conservative Party government into power which struggled to restore order* And all these events were a product of the railway struggle for control of the mineral wealth of the Kootenays for use in the developing trade with the Orient.

Fifteen years earlier, Martin had led a similar fight against

the C.P.R. in Manitoba at the time hen the Great Northern was trying to 4 establish a branch line into Winnipeg. Elected to the Manitoba Legislature in the spring of 1883, Martin plunged into local politics with vigmr,

espousing the farmers' cause against the C.P.R. monopoly there, and, with

Thomas Greenway, he became a leading light in the formation of the Manitoba

Liberal Party. After bitter fights, lasting some years, the Liberals defeated

Premier Norquay and his Conservatives and in January, 1888, with Greenway

becoming Premier, Nartin became Attorney General, Minister of Education, 5 and Cdrtvnissioner of Railways. Prime Minister ilacdonald was facing growing

pressure not to interfere in Manitoba politics and to allow the abrogation

of the C. P.R. Ts monopoly position in the West (in return for substantial compensation, of course), so that when Greenway and Martin arrived in

' Ottawa in April of 1888, bcdonald acceded to their demands and the two 6 Manitobans returned home as heroes, A line connecting Winnipeg into the '7 1 Great Northern system was completed a few years later. In 1889 Martin launched into his campaign to deny the local

French state funding for their parochial schools. The next year he intro- 3 duced his set of bills creating the Manitoba Schools ~C&estionwhich bedevil- led Canadian politics for the next decade. He defended his legislation through to the Privy Council in London and went into federal politics in

1893 to fight the Conservatives and their Remedial Bill in the Dominion House, but in the general election of 1896 his old fight with the C*P.R. caught up with him and the railway company orchestrated his defeat in his 8 home power base of Winnipeg. This time, however, the C.P.R. saw the wisdom of trying to control their Manitoban bete noir rather than simply fighting him: they offered him a job,

Martin was in a rather isolated position, He had earned the hatred of the ~onservativesby fighting them so vociferously in Manitoba and Ottawa, but he had also earned the hatred of many Liberals. He had tried to seize the Premiership from Creenway but lost his attempted coup to Cllf ford Sifton and others who eased him out of party and power in Manitoba.

During his Ottawa fight against the federal Conservatives he had alienated many Quebec Liberals who resented his actions against the Manitoban French, and so Prime Minister burier was not keen to help his former Western Liberal lieutenant. Martin was passed over for Sifton in the appointment of the new

Minister of the Interior and he bitterly declined a consolation appointment 9 to the Bench, It would surely have appeared to Martin that his political career was finished, so, in the best Liberal tradition, he accepted the highest paying offer that was available; namely, company solicitor to the 10 Canadian Pacific Railway,

Perhaps the C.P.R. was as surprised that Hartin would accept their offer as Hartin would have been that they would have made it, but nevertheless, having come to terms on employment, Martin was dispatched to 4 their most remote area of operations; British Columbia.

Needless to say, Martin's pacific posting was not greeted with unreserved enthusiasm in all quarters of the province. British Columbia 11 based federal Conservatives like Edward Gawlor Prior (in the Tupper cabinet ) 12 and Frank Stilman Barnard , who had reeled under Martin's attacks in Ottawa, would be bitterly hostile to him and doubtless would convey their feelings to their friends on the coast. And British Columbia being a rather conservative place, their friends would be legion. Typical of the response to

Martin's arrival in 1897 was an incident concerning Martin's application for a call to the British Columbia Bar. Quite naturally, in his position as solicitor to the C.P.R., Martin would want to be admitted to the law union as quickly as possible, but the conservative Benchers of the Law Society did not seem equally anxious to have him. The Benchers then were:

C.E.Pooley, a Conservative N.L.A. since 1882, (and also a Director and Secretary to the Esquimalt and Naniamo Railway, owned by the powerful

Dunsmuirs of Vancouver Island) ; L. G.McPhillips , brother of A E.Ne Phillips, an enemy of Martin's from their days at the Manitoba Bar; Charles Wilson, President of the Vancouver Conservative Association; Dallas Helmcken,

President of the Victoria Conservative Association; E.V.Bodwel1, a keen federal Liberal, and probably another anti-Martinit e; F. B. Cregory, later a prominent Liberal (and in 1910 a Supreme Court ~udge)who was to protest

Nartin's activities in the Liberal Party three years later; J .Stuart Pates, a prominent Victoria laver and later in the Martin cabinet (a possible 13 sympathiser to Martin) ; E. P.Davies; and E. A. Jens. Martin had supposedly written a letter in which he prop4rted to be a Member of the Bar and the

Benchers decided to prosecute. They ~nstructedCordon Hunter, a Crown 5 Prosecutor, to proceed against KaPtin and his friend from Manitoba, Smith Curtis, without even a preliminaq hearing. They apparently expected to

send the two llanitobans to jail. Curtis was away in Rossland in the Kootenays

setting up his new law practise, but in Vancouver, got wlnd of the intentions of the Benchers and immediately went to Victoria to insist on a hearing before their action went further. He was quickly able to convince the Eenchers that thay had no case against him and they dropped their suit, but they continued against Curtis. 14artin took the extraordinary step of publicizing the issue. In a letter to the editor of The Province on the thirtieth of October, 1897, Martin noted how unfair it was to pursue Curtis when another Rossland lawer had been jpilty of graver offences but had 14 not even been charged with them. Curtis* case was dismissed in court , but the trend of events was clear: the conservative elements of British

Columbia were determined to make Martints stay as brief and as unpleasant

as possible,

In contrast to the federal Liberals, who were annoyed with

Martin over his anti-French crusade in Ottawa, what few Western Liberals

there were thought rather well of him. In the three years that Martin was the only Liberal E4.P. in the :Jest he had tried to organize the party as best he could. His notoriety as a radical of sorts had endeared him to the Labour leaning Uberals, and at the close of the nintedh century, British 15 Columbia was noted as the centre of radical kbour activity. With the

support of Senator Thomas R.McInnes of British Columbia, Martin had produced good results from his organizing efforts, In the 1896 election, four out of the six M.P.*s alloted to the province were Liberals - the first

since Confederation. The most notable of these new M.P. 9s was Willlam Wallace Burns McInnes, a young Nanabo laver and a son of Senator McInnes. Others were George Tbell, a Vancouver Presbyterian minister ; Hewitt Bostock, a

Cambridge man, Cariboo lawyer and newspaper publisher; and Aulay Morrison, a young New Westminster lawyer. William Templeman, publisher of the Victoria

Times, the first Liberal paper in British Columbia, was not successful in 16 the election, but still had considerable influence in coastal Liberal circles.

These new M.P.*s would certainly have some feelings of gratitude to Nartin for his efforts in helping them get elected.

Thua Martin arrived in British Columbia in the anornolous position of solicitor to his old enemy, the C.P.R. His backround included the UMihoad that he had worked with James J.HiL1 and the Great Northern Railway in Manitoba, and he had an established national reputation as a pugnacious champion of the rights of the West in Confederation, While he had a great many enemies he still had considerable political potential in the more radical atmosphere of British Columbia, FOOTNOTES l.cf APPENDIX for a full discussion of these points

2. Mith Dobie, "Party History in British Columbia 1871-1903tt3 and WeNa Sage, "Federal Parties and Provincial Political Groups in British Cloumbia 1871-1903t1. The quote is from Sage, p.167 3 .G.F.G.Stanley, "A Constitutional Crisis in B.C ." and J.T.Saywel1, "The PlcInnes Incident in B. C ." 4.J. G. Pyle, The Life of James J.Hill, p. 298 T.Schofield, "The Fight Against the IZailway Monopoly", The Stow of Manitoba, p. 351-63 6. Creighton, John A .Macdonald, the Old Chieftan, p. 509

7. vle, op cit, p. 299-300 $.Martin to Van Home, 23 >fay 1896, 10 June 1896, and 3 July 1896; Van Home to bhrtin, 28 Fly 1896, 18 June 1896, and 15 July 18%. (Martints detailed compliants and Van Hornets bland denials) C. P.R,Corporate Archives. see also Laurier to Martin 28 June 1896, noting C .P. R. intervention in Xartin's election, and Kartints reply 2 July 11396. Laurier Papers, PAC

9,Dafoe, Clifford Sifton, p.103 l0,for $1500 in advance. cf Vancouver World, 25 Oct. 1908 1l.information drawn from Jackmants Portraits of the Premier% and The Men at Cam Castle

12,information drawn from Jackmants The Xen at Cam Castle *.

13.the last tvm men are unknowns 14,The Province, 26 June 1897, p.403. Archer Martin appearing for Curtis 15,Robin, Radical Politics, and Canadian Labour

16.information drawn from the 1898 Parliamentam Guide 8

2- ATTO2NE?S GENERAL

The headquarters of the Canadian Pacific Railway in British Columbia was in the lower mainland area of the province. There, Harry Abbott, who had been western general superintendant of the company for many years, had come to exercise an influence akin to that of James Douglas of the 1 Hudson's Ray Company in an earlier era. But Abbott had retired just before Martin's arrival on the coast and the new superintendant, Richard Marpole, was beginning to grapple with far larger problems than Abbott had had to contend with. Many years earlier, the Hudson's Bay Company had struggled in 2 vain to establish a regular trade with the Orient and the C.P.R. was taking up the old struggle again. So too was James J.Hill of the Great Northern Railway, which had arrived in Seattle in 1893, and was now trying to generate the huge mounts of traffic which would be required to mske a profit out of 3 the western section of the line. And Martin, as company solicitor to the

C.P.R., would certainly be quite aware of the grand designs of the railway giants, but as a reformer and prairie populist, he would also be concerned with the parochial outlook of the local politicians. But British Columbia was quite new territory to him and ft would take him quite some time to discover what his opportunities were in his very changed circumstances.

On the provincial scene, the regime of Premier Turner ( the latest incumbent in the Smithe dynasty), was tottering from numerous 4 allegations of corruption and the Semlin Oppositionists published their platform calling for redistribution, Civil Service reform, more control 9 over the provincial aid going to the railways, and land grants for settlers 5 only, Several of the Oppositionist items were from the Liberal platform 6 of 1893 but there was no formal link between the provincial group and the federal party structure. Talk wa8 gr~wingof a provincial election. Lieu- tenant Governor Cewdneyt s term of office was just about to expire and the new appointment would be Prime Minister Laurierts first in British Columbia.

Rumours were rife that the job was to go to a man from Quebec: someone who had been Premier there during a constitutional crisis about twenty years 7 8 earlier; Sir Henri Joly de Lotbiniere. The Toronto Wenina Tele~ram suggested that Martin was wrong to launch any venture with the C.P.3. and confidently predicted that he would soon be back in politics, but Martin had to be quite cautious in the new and confusing political atmosphere on the coast, In British Columbian provincial politics, there were no clearly identifiable labels for the various factions contending for power.

There was a vast range of individuals standing for office under a confusing array of titles, At the end of the ninteenth century, these labels included Turnerit es, Semlinites, Cottonites (each denoting the leader of the particular ticket), 'straight ' Conservatives, various Labour and socialist groups backed by different trades unions, and a wide range of candidates who called themselves Independents. Once elected, these diverse individuals normally became either Government supporters, or Oppositionists, but this tended to add to the public confusion, for different men might be 'straight' &mservative Oppositionists or 'straight ' Conservative Government men. But labels aside, there was a party system in the Legislature and it worked 10 9 rather well, although Martin could not be expected to see this right away, for he was familiar with the traditional formal party system such as existed at the federal level.

The national political system had not yet penetrated British Columbia politics. In line with Laurier's policy at the 1893 National Convention of Liberals, the provincial organizations were to be the working units of the party: this arrangement was to placate Quebec's fears of being dominated by an English national setup, but the policy applied to British

Columbia too, and the net effect was that little attention was devoted to the coast from national circles. What organizational work that had been done was attended to largely by &&in during his three years as the only

Liberal M. P, in the West, assisted to some exbent by Senator 14cImes, but a11 this work had an exclusively federal orientation. Little thought had 10 been given to organizing a provincial party with provincial goals. Martin would therefore be quite unsure of how his federal Liberal connections could be used in the provincial arena. With the return of four Dominion M.P.ts in 1896 and a new federal Liberal administration, considerably more effort went into the

British Columbia party, but all still with a federal character. This drive was not without opposition: the Nanaimo group haughtily rejected the call of the federal men, but under the leadership of William Tmpleman, the first convention of the British Columbia Liberals went ahead. The province was divided up into federal constituencies and an entourage of Liberals was 'encouraged in each locale. At their meeting in October of 1897, tele- grammes of congratulations went out to Laurier for his knighthood, adderss- ing him as t'..,our respected and esteemed leader..." and they established 11 an executive according to the Dominion constituencies , but however strong the federal thrust of the new party, there were obvious provincial implic-

ations. The popular feeling for federal party labels to introduce some clarity into British Columbia elections would be accelerated by the presence

of a disciplined nationally recognized party which could become a clear

alternative to the existing framework of the Smithe dynasty, and the Opp-

ositionists. This was a sufficient threat to draw out nay-sayers like C. B.Sword. He was a provincial Oppositionist and so felt quite entitled to

\ attend the meeting but he was also an ardent federal Conservative and per-

haps anxious to impress Charles Tupper and Xackenzie Bowell who were touring

the province at the time, Sword objected vigoruosly to the creation of a

federal party presence in Dritish Columbia (especially a Liberal ~resence) but the assembly pressed on notwithstanding. William Templeman was eleated

to lead the British ?olumbia wing of the party and a platform nearly ident- 12 icsl to Semlin's was adopted, Joseph Martin also went to the founding

convention of the party and was given an enthusiastic greeting fromthe

floor but in view of his employment with the C.P.R., he could say nothing. It would have been gratifying for him to be well received by the Liberals,

but this would have little real signifigance for him as the federal channels

were essentially closed to him and the Liberals were then not a real force in provincial politics either. The new provincial Liberals at once began

to exercise their power in Ottawa: by November it was released to the British Colhbia press that the local man, Senator NcInnes, would be the new

Lieutenant Governor, not the Quebec man that was the original ~U~OUT,and that lrJill5.m Templeinan, the new provincial leader,would take NcfnnesT place 13 in the Senate.

Nartin would have been quite impressed with the apparent show of power of the British Columbia Liberals and in view of his popularity with them he probably began to ponder how to use his position to the maximum advantage. Martin was upset over the continuing press criticism

of his employment with the C.P.R. and felt that he must get out somehow.

If he were strong with the local Liberals, perhaps they could get him a patronaze appointment from Ottawa too. In December he went to Ottawa to

discuss the vacant judgers position (on the resignation of Xccreight) with

David I.fi.lls, the Minister of Justice. Martin did nut get the appointment, Uc but he still kept his low profile. By the spring of 1898, another seat

on the bench was available, this time the chair of the Chief Justice, and 15 once again, stories emanated from Ottawa suggesting Martin for the job. Senator Templeman and three of the new M.P.Ts (~~ll,McInnes and ~ostock) 16 recommended Martin for the job but the Ottawa establishment was not dis-

posed to do Hartin any favours and he was passed over again. This clearly

indicated that the coastal Liberals could do nothing for him federally and

that if he were to capitalize oh his popularity he would have to resume a

provincial career. The old fire blazed again. Martin was back in action.

A provincial general election was called for the ninth of

July and on the tenth of June, Martin was nominated as an Oppositionist 17 in Vancouver City along with three others in the four seat riding. His running mates were Francis L.Carter-Cotton who had held the seat since it

had been &wjted in 1890; he was one of the founders of the Vancouver Board 13 of Trade and the publisher of the _Nsws; Robert Nacpherson, a carpenter, and a Liberal anti-Asiatic free trader of Labour sympathisa.

He had held a Vancouver seat since 1m4. The other new-comer was C.E.Tisdal1, vice president of the Vancouver Board of Trade, an arms importer and al- 18 though a Consemrative, he was an opponent of Turner. There were only fifty people at the nominating meeting, but enthusiasm ran high and Premier Turner must have felt that hia worst fears were about to be realized. Turner had offered to appoint Martin as his Attorney General, but at the time of the negotiations the federal judicial appointment had been in the offing and 19 they had not come to terms .\ Now Martin was running as an Oppositionist and his immense energy and organizing ability were regarded with apprehension by the Government men. His opponents in Vancouver were Garden, the mayor of the city; Carroll; McDonald; and William J-Bowser, a Conservative lawyer who had been unsuccessful in the 1896 federal election, but was 20 later to be Attorney General and Premier of the province.

At the June nominating convention, Yartin displayed his flair for antagonizing everyone. In his speech, he admitted to having negotiated with Turner; he confessed to a profound respect for Sdn, but proffered his doubts on the ability of the man to be an effective Leader of the Opposition. He proclaimed that he had agreed to run as an Oppositionist on the understanding that the man to be Leader of the Opposition would be decided upon after the upcoming general election. Clearly, he had himself 21 in mind for the job. *%rtin toured the province campaigning on behalf of all the 22 23 Opposition men. The Conservative press compared Martin with Satan and carried reports of Thomas Greenway of Manitoba describing Martin as a man 24 .with neither a heart nor conscience. The venom of the past poured out again; it was a particularly bitter campaip. The Independent, Labour and Oppositionist forces were bouyed up by the widespread public disgust of Turnerism which meant to them mounting public debt, extravagance, reckless favouritism, give-aways and kick-backs. The popular feelings ran so high that none of the Government supporters ran as Turnerites except a new-comer to the provincial political scene, Richard McBride, who only a few years later was to be Premier. It is possible that Martin could have obtained some campaign money from the Great Northern Railway. Martin would likely have raised as much money as he could, and Hill, knowing Martin's power for retribution, would be unlikely to refuse Martin some kind of donation - more likely, Hill would have contributed to both sides so that he was sure to be backing a winner - but as is almost invariably the case, any documen- tation of campaign funding is not available.

All four Oppositionists in Vancouver were elected by a substantial margin, as were the kbourites R.F.Green, ex-mayor of Kaslo; Ralph Smith, that September to be elected President of the Dominion Trades and Labour Congress; and Dr.R.D.McKechnie, vice president af the B.C.College of Physicians and Surgeons and President and Treasurer of the B.C.Libera1 25 Association, but the overall results were not clear. Press reports differed, but it appeared that about seventeen Government Members and about the same number of Oppositionists were returned. The doubts about the elect-

ion results were further increased by the wholesale legal challenges to various constituency reports for the first time in British Columbia politics. This leqal manoeuvering was undoubtedly the product of Martints fine legal 26 hand in the organization of the campaign of the Oppositionists. In the rather uncertain atmosphere surrounding the election results, Martin had a very clever scheme for trying to appear as though he had won. He would try and create as much confusion GS possible and continue the electioneering after the balloting was over. Should he be able to build up enough of a bluff that his side had won, and should his old colleague from Ottawa (who was now the Lieutenant Cbvernor) call them to office, there was no bar to them accepting the call and bargaining for supporters from a position of strength pending the summoning of the Legislature. To do so, he had begun to appear as though he were the leader of the Oppositionist forces and he thereby earned the hostility of the official leader, Semlin,,,Semlin stated 27 his dissatisfactions to the press , a bad blow to Nartints strategy of creating a strong impression for the public, but he kept up his plans.

Through the offices of Senator Templeman a call went out for all Opposition candidates to meet in Martints law office in the Hotel Van- couver, The meeting produced a statement to the press proposing a cabinet with Yartin as Premier and Attorney General; Carter-Cotton as Provincial Secretary and Ninist er of Education; J .D. Prent ice as Treasurer and Minister of Finance; Semlin as Minister of Agriculture (as an insult?) ; T.W.Pater- son as Chief Commissioner of Lands and Works; James M.Martin (no relation) as Xnister of f4ines; Thorns Forster as President of the Council; and R.G.

Yacpherson as Speaker of the House. This statement was issued almost as thdugh Martin had already been called to office and would have contributed to the general doubt as to who was Leader of the Opposition and who was en- 28 titled to form the government. The names mentioned are quite impressive: 16 particularly those of Semlin, Carter-Cotton md Paterson and had they endorsed the statement, the group would indeed have stood a fair chance of forming a government, but there is no mention of who attended Martints meeting. Presumably very few men did. In an accompanying interview, the hostility of the press becomes evident. J+hrtin is portrayed as being dis- dainful of Ralph Smith, the Labour leader. Later events suggested that the two men did dislike one another but they stuck together politically and the press report was likely an attempt to split the two men up. It did highlight one of the features of the election results, though. If the Oppositionists were to be called to office, they would have to get the support of the Labourites, and Xartints proposal for his cabinet did not , include anyone who held Labour support.

Premier Turne~,obviously, and quite reasonably, expected to continue in office until the election results were finaliaed and a meeting

of the Legislature called where he could face a vote of confidence, but

he was not of the same mind as the new Lieutenant Governor. It was some-

thing of a tradition in British Columbia for the Lieutenant Governor to exercise a kind of supervisory initiative . The first Lieutenant Overnor, Joseph Trutch, had done so to quite a remarkable degree, as had Hugh

Nelson in 1892, and in 1896, the Governor General, Lord Aberdeen (who lived in the ~kana~an),had refused to allow some of Prime Ninister Tupprta

appointments. 14cInnes certainly felt that it was quite within his prerog-

ative to choose a Premier in an ambiguous situation, and he proceeded to 29 do so. He asked for Turnerts resignation. Volumes of letters changed

hands, but I4cInnes stood by his decision. Turner was out. 17

14cTnnesT decision as to who to call to replace Turner requires some explanation as well. ?*fanyyears earlier, XcInnes had speculated heav- ily in real estate in Port Noody in anticipation of the arrival of the C.P.Rb on the coast. When the C.P.R. shifted its declared terminus to Vancouver fram Port Xoody, IkInnes was ruined and he became an outspoken advocate sf government ownership for rail.ways and reciprocity, both anathema to the 30 C. P.3. I.4cImes* anti-C. P.R. feelings made him work well with Nartin while they were trying to organize the Liberal Partg in thw West and with PlcInnest new appointment as Lieutenant Governor of British Columbia, he apparently resolved to do what he could to shake up the interests of the C.P.R. in retaliation for their earlier blow at him. To simply appoint 2.larti.n as

Premier would look too much like a Liberal conspiracy and Martints recent national notoriety would make such an appointment appear extravagant at the minimum. Carter-Cotton was a long standing M .L. A. from Vancouver and McInnes undoubtedly suspected him of being rather too sympathetic to the power baron of his constituency, Richard I,Iarpole, and the C.P.R., and from Carter- Cottonts prominence in Oppositionist ranks, and the personal weakness of Semlin, and appointment of the Oppositionists to office mi&t not have quite the desired effects that lbInnes wished to create. As an alternative to the obvious choices, 14cInnes picked Robert Beaven. 31 Beaven seemed a very odd choice to eveqone, but lilcInnest reasoning was probably as follows: Beaven was the last of the Premiers of

British Columbia before the Smithe dynasty began and IJlcInnes was probably convinced that Beaven was not much influenced by the C.P.R. Beaven was widely noted for his skills as (s parliamentarian, and in the fractious would be able to trade on his status as a former Premier and bring the disputatious Opposition men together and form a reliable ant i-C .P. R. ministry. It was true that Reaven had Just been defeated in the election, but as Premier he would have been constitutionaly required to be re-elected anyway, to provide popular endorsement for his appointment, and it would probably not be too difficult to win such an election if he were the head of the government when he went to the polla again. Anyway, the plan did not work. After four days of trying, Reaven could not get the backing I necessary to carry on with a government and had to resign. An excited press 32 reported Martin attending Government House to see FilcInnes. Was Martin going to be asked to try where Reaven had failed? IvIoInnes would have told

Martin that the business community of the province was already sufficiently alarmed at the simple fact of his election, and that any appointment to the

Premiership would have to await a more favourable climate of opinion. * The next day NcInnes decided that whatever his misgivings over the railway attitudes of the Oppositionists, he would have to offer them a chance to form a government, and he asked the Leader of the Oppos- ition, Sharles SemZin, the rancher from the Cariboo, to be Premier. Sdin had to get support fro@his recent rivals on the Opposition benches, and this might not be easy. Martin at first declined Semlinvs offer of a portfolio, probably out of pique that he had not been invited to try and form a government himself, but under the pressure of time, and the realization that the Turnerites would have to be recalled if they were unable to agree 33 amongst themselves, Yartin finally agreed to support Sdin. This time the rumour was that Yh%in had accepted office with the intention of 34 ousting Semlin within a few months, Knowing Martints record, this was 35 probably a good bet. The Montreal Witness, a Liberal paper, castigated Martin for his antics. It recalled the Black Tarte - Yellow Martin deys in the national capital when the two men had amused nearly eveqone in Ottawa with their indiscretions, but that the situation in British Columbia was serious, An Opposition gadfly could be funny, but if the political stability of the province was to come into question, then Martin must act in a responsible way. Iiieutenant Governor McInnes gazetted C.A.Sem1in as Chief

Commissioner of Lands and Works; F.L.Carter-Cotton as Minister of Finance, Xinistes of Agriculture and Acting Minister of Mines; Joseph Martin as Attorney General and Acting Provincial Secretary with interim responsibility for F'ublic Schools; and Dr,i?.S,McKechnie as a Member of the Executive Council without portfolio. Nartints position was downgraded a bit with the entry into the cabinet a few days later of J.F.Hume, a Cottonite, taking over Martin's acting portfolio of the Provincial Secretaryship and also Carter-Cottonts acting position in Mines, but with uncertain backing from the Legislature, and in some public turmoil, the new reform administration 3 6 was in office.

No one knew quite what to expect. Semlints platform called for redistribution, Civil Service reform, more provincial control of railways, and some smaller items, but that was hardly relevant now. Joseph ~aitinthe radical was in the cabinet and that might mean anything, Also the ministry had to depend on Labour support and although the Labour 20 in the cabinet did not have any direct responsibility, he would doubtless use his influence for as much socialism as possible. In any event the new group was a startling change from the old style of governments that they were used to and it looked like a new era in British Columbia politics. And, of course, the C.P.R. would have prepared for the worst.

Attorney General Martin seemed quite taken with his regained importance. He appeared in his official capacity in Judge Walkem's ~0urt to speak to an election petition the judge was hearing, but the judge wss 37 not about to be upstaged in his own court- and I&rtin's unorthodox effort I to assist his political friend backfired on them as was predictable. But he was re-elected by acclamation in the Vancouver by-election after his 38 appointment to the cabinet and soon after, his friend from Manitoba who had defended Smith Curtis from the Law Society's proceedings, Archer Martin, 39 was appointed to the vacant seat on the bench. The federal Liberals were probably making a concilliatory gesture to their newly restored colleague in British !Columbia. Also, Joseph's brother, Edward Daniel Martin,a wealthy drug manufacturer in Winnipeg, was elected President of the Manitoba Lib- 40 erals. It certainly began to look as though Martin were quickly rs-establishing his old influence in the West.

William Van Home, President of the C. P.R., came to Vancouves 41 to confer with the new government, doubtless apprehensive over their intentions concerning 'more provincial control on aid to railwayst. It would be of great concern to him that their old enemy from Manitoba was back in power in his place of exile and he would be anxious to know what

Nartints now plans were. Martin would have been too shrewd a politican to discuss his plms with the President of the C.P.R. but one thing that none of them knew at the time was that Van Horne had a secret arrangement with one of the men\bers of the reform cabinet. If KcInnes had suspected Carter-

Cotton of C, P.R. sympathies, he would have been right. The nature of the secret deal between Carter-Cotton and the C.P.R. was only to come out years later when Kartin chaired a Select Committee of the House to begin an in- 42 quiry into the Columbia and Western scandal,

Rut the new reformers were primarily concerned with imple- menting their programme of action, Attorney General Elartin began a yigor- ous campaign for financial retrenchment and Civil Service reform, Not having much confidence in the local people, Martin brought in his deputy Attorney 43 General, KcLean, in from Yanitoba to assist in the housecleaning. The

British Columbia Civil. Service had grown lax under the Smithe masty and

Martin wished to put things right. He promulgated that regular nine to five hours must be kept; that there were to be no more bribes; and that 44 no more outside businesses were to be run by government employees. These reforms did not rouse much enthusiasm from the Civil Service itself and some of them were to become so hoatile that Martin would later find it difficult to carry on the administration of his department. All 14artints political experience had been as a Liberal, and he was only too well aware of the power of a well organized party structure. After the founding convention of the Liberal Party in October of the previous year, the various constituency organizations began to appear and Xahin knew very well that if he could capture the backing of his own Van- couver group that it would augur well for his political future. J.C.Xcbgan, 22 4 5 editor of The Vorld newspaper, and a prominent Vancouver businessman, was starting to setup the Liberal machine in his city, and in keeping with the character of the party generally, the new group was to be oriented towards federal politics, Nartin still felt that the federal Uberala were implac- ably opposed to him and that therefore he had to undercut lwlcLagants influence in Vancouver. At the first meeting of the Vancouver Liberals, Martin did try td keep McLsgan out of any position in the party, but quite without, 46 success. In the meeting the next month (~ovember1898) Martin tYied to get a clause inserted in their constitution prohibiting the packing of meetine;~, but (probably at a packed meeting) the anti-%artinites, led by 47 J.C .XcLagan, laughed him down. The split in the Vancouver Liberals became even more apparent in December. A dinner was held in honour of DOC.Fraser featuring Joseph $hrtin as the principle speaker, butthis dinner was only a prelude to the full scale gathering the following night which was attended 48 by all the prominent local Liberals, but only by Josephtis wife, Elizabeth, The group was so badly split that they could not even sit down to hold party dinners together. This incideht was typical of YartinTs grim abrasive attitude, If he had a lighter touch in his dealings with other people and some sense of reasonable compromise he would not have let the occasional slap at his dignity interfere dth his overall goal of establishing a power base in his home territory. Had he accepted 14cclapants right to organize for the federal Liberals and asked in return that M~bganrespect his right to organize provincially the two men could have been of great help to each other, but instead Martin made an enw out of the man. Luckily for Hartin, &Lagan was a good politican and saw the value of co-operating for mutual ends and in spite of it all he was to be of considerable assistance to Xartin at a critical juncture in the future.

3y the the the Legislative session opened in the New Year a workable majority for the reformers had been formed with the support of Semlin and Carter-Cotton, >fartin, and the Labour group under Dr. 1.lcKechnie. The party numbered about twenty, facing the displaced Turnerites, who now 49 counted only about fifteen. Important new men in the House were James

Dunsmuir, inheritor of the coal kingdom of Vancouver Island. ~Ges*father, Robert, was the first powerful local man in British Columbia. In co-operation with the Royal Navy he had established the 'dellington coal collieries, and with support from the Colonial Secretary in hndon and the Governor General in Ottawa, he had obtained the backing of the Pacific Quartet (the 50 big four financiers of California) to build the Esquimalt and Nanaimo

Railway. At the time of Robert's rise to power, Vancouver Island was the only region of importance in the province and he had used his industrial might to dominate the politics of his time. But by the time his son James succeeded him there were two other regions of importance in the rapidly developing province. The lower ,minland area had mushroomed with the arrival of the C.P.R. in 1886 and the Kootenays region was undergoing a mining boom, While 3unsmuir continued to dominate the Vancouver f sland region (to the counter point of near open warfare with the mining unions), and the

C.F.R. was pre-eminently influential in the lower mainland area, the Kod- 51 enays were the subject of, contention. D. C .Corbint s Inland Ehpire centred in Spokane Washington was bringing down much of the mineral walth of the

Kootenays for use in the United States. Similarly, Jamgs J.Hill and the Great Northern Railway were a.nxious for their share of the valuable ores and were competing with Corbin in the exploitation of the area, as was the

C.P.R.,but overshado&ng the whole struggle was the violent and bitter labour battle to establish some rights for the miners. Perhaps the most dramatic labour fight in Canada. was the trial of the Western Federation of

Niners to create some safety standards for the mines, get some proper wages for the men who actually dug up the mineral wealth and to stop the company I stores selling foodstuffs at highly inflated prices. These union men would look to the new Semlin administration for help in their fi&t wlth the big companies that ran the business of the area, and the Semlin men were q~te prepared to do what they could to be of assistance.

The session of 1899 was to be a momentous one for the province.

The reformers had prepared a thorough and profound redirection for the government and for British Columbia as a whole. They would face a backlash from the business community of major proportions, angry foreign governments, and an exasperated federal administration, all of whom tried to reverse their policies but they stuck together and saw things through as best they could . Nuhe brought in a bill to set up the Department of Mines and to establish an office of Inspector of Mines which reported directly to the Nbister, Presumably, Hume felt that his staff in the Civil Service was not completely in tune with Me new policies. The Metallfferous Mines

Inspection Act was the famous eight hour bill. It was introduced by Kellie

(frlbm the West ~ootenags)who was Chairman of the Mining Committee, and subsequently carried by Carter-Cotton. This Act was cedainly what the ;;liners in the Kootenays wanted, It set up some safety standards that the

Inspector was to enforce, together with the explosive Chapter Four which

provided that the miners were only to work an eight hour day. The big metal mining men were furious about the bill and some even closed their 53 mines rather than subscribe to the new law. As a further concession to the labour demands, the Semlinites also yielded to their antidrf ental proclivities. b!cKechnie introduced the Coal Unes Regulation Act which

prohibited Japanese and Chinese from working underground in any provincial mine. This was another direct threat to the mining mag;antss who depended

on cheap Oriental labour to operate their mines at a higher profit than they would get if they were forced to pay reasonable wages to the more demanding white miners, Rut while the bill annoyed the coal magnates (such as James ~unsmuir),it also embarrassed Prime Ydnister Laurier. The Act 54 drew an official protest from the Ehperor of Japan and Laurier came under

pressure to disallow the legislation.

The Act was simply another entry in the long histom of such Eritish Columbian legislation. The Coal Hines Regulation Act of 1888 had been held intra vires an reference to the Supreme Court of British Columbia,

inclusive of the section proscribing Chinese from the mines, The Coal rP3nes

Regulation Amendment Act of 1890 prohibited boys under twelve, feaales, and

tChinamenf from working underground, and it went on reference as far as the

Privy Council, but the definitive ruling was made in the Union Colliery Co.

of B.C. v Bryden (1899) Case in which the Supreme Court of Canada held that 5 5 the Amendment Act was ultra vires. The McKechnie amending Act of 1899

was just another entry in the complicated legal tangle of the British Sol- 26 ~unbiansto enforce their racist feelings against an embarrassed federal government and a disapproving court system. blartin was well known for his stand against any federal interference in provincial matters, and given the probability that the courts would strike sown the protested law, Laurier felt that the wisest course would be to avoid antagonizing Martin and let the matter be handled by the judiciary.

\ Carter-Cotton's bill extending Free I4iners' rights to pro- spect on railway lands was of most signifigance to D\msrnuir's Esquimalt and Naneimo Railway and this proved to be another hot public issue, but the only bill to be federally disallowed was Hwne's Act to amend the Placer llining Act. Popularly known as the Alien Exclusion Act, the bill provided that only Rritish subjects could take out a Free Miners licence or hold an interest in any mineral claim. The provision cut off many Americans who held such minin,g interests in the Atlin and Rennett Lakes area near the

Yukon border. This was another very complicated problem. Martin wrote to

Taurier that the legislation was a consequence of the %?ry bad behaviour of the Americansw in failing to remove bonding restrictions at Dyea and

Sksgway in the trade with the Yukon which had been promised the previous year. The American miners circulated a petition which they sent to President l

Hays invited Laurier to recommend an amendment to the Alaska law under whlch the Secretary of the Interior had issued a regulation in essence for- bidding Canadians from exercising their supposedly reciprocal mining rights 27 in Alaska. The recommended amendment to the Alaska law failed to pass and the TJnder Secretary of the Colonial Office in Iondon noted that the American position was a 'shnmf, but hurier wished to use his right to disallow as a chip in the Alaska boundary dispute then coming to a head, and on the theory that if you are nice to them, they will be nice to you, he quashed 50 the provincial statute. Before a11 these events transpired, Xartin anti- r- cipated the fuss over the exclusion and in a concilliatory gesture he introduced an Act to provide for the cheap and speedy adjudication of whatever individual complaints that might arise, but his effort was overtaken 57 by the international reaction to the original bill. Indeed, althaush !-!artin's cabinet colleagues put through le,$slation which aroused storms of protest, Xartinfs bills were by contrast quite modest, reasonable and progressive. His vindictiveness showed ' up quite clearly in the way he treated the Law Society. He amended the Legal

Professions Act to repeal the six month residency requirement that had 58 annoyed him in 1897. Another Act set up the Department of the Attorney

General, and Martin pleased the Vancouver Bar by amending the Supreme Court

Act to repeal some restrictions on the appointment of judges and broadening the court(s Jurisdiction so that it could hear cases in Vancouver. There was then a provincial rights dispute wlth Ottawa concerning the appointment 59 prerogative for 2ueenfs Counsel. Until that point, the prerogative of

appointment had rested with the national government, but along with several other provinces, I4artin passed an Act reserving the right of appointment

the provincial administration. But he went further than that and made

contempt of court for any barrister to wear his silks in court if he 28 held only a federal appointment. This would have antagonized many members of the British Columbia Ear. The senior members of the Bar insisted that i.t could not be contempt for them to claim the privileges bestowed upon them by the Governor Senera1 and decided to ignore the change in proceedure.

IIartin also created a list of seniority for the appointments made that 60 year and placed himself close to the top of the list. But notwithstanding

\ his pettiness to the Law Society, he did introduce the bill which was to prove the most enduring importance to the province for that session. This 6 1 was the Act establishing the Torrens Land ?egistry System, The Act received comparatively little attention at the time because of the ~xplosivenature of the other measures, but it was a Amdamentnl change in the land titles systexi for nritish Columbia. The bill replaced the old English system, known to solicitors as the trunk-full-of-deeds systeq. When anyone wished to sell his property, he would have to present all the deeds and conveyances of the title going Sack to the original crown grant of the land. The buyer would then have to engage a conveyancing solicitor to check every deed who would assure the contemporary p~rrchnseras to the va1idi.t~of each item, and draw up a new conveyance. Should the solicitor discover a flaw anywhsre along the line of deeds, all subsequent conveyances would come into question and the last unfl.awed owner would have a sight of action for recovery against all the questioned owners, This tangled antiquation proved to be an excell- ent source of income for laa~ers,but of little benefit to the owners of the land, and :Qwt,ints action in dispensing with the old system would greatly benefit everyone who owned or wished to buy land. The Torrens system was simply a government guarentee as to the valid title of each 29 owner as soon as his deed was accepted for registry, so that each new buyer would only have to check one deed for mortgages or restrictive covenants. Thus although Kartin would have antagonized some members of the Bar, his general record as Attorney General for the 1899 session was moderate, productive and beneficial to British Columbia. The government9 s major project of reforming the Civil Service was expedited considerably by Carter-Cotton's Appointments Act terminatinc all appointments made to Boards on the thirtieth of June 1899. This freed their hands to make their om appointments and facilitated the implementation of their new policies. The Turner Opposition was greatly distressed by this

Act and to pacify them the government agreed to table a report of all those dismissed by the Act, which :?artin did later in the session.

The SeniLinites did little in terms of legislation that was of much direct consequence to the railways. Premier Sdin rescinded a deal that !qillia,m Naokenzie and Donald Xann had negotiated 4th Premier

Turner concerning the Victoria, Vancouver and Eastern Railway project. The cancellation resulted in litigation in Exchequer and a judgement for a 62 refund of their $250,000 deposit and $329,000 in damages, but the law suit did not seen to prejudice the railway prmters with the S&n regime. They were still able to obtain passage of an Act extending for one year their time limit for performance of several contractual obligations on the Col- 63 umbia and {Jestern Railway probably over the objections of the C.P.R. which controlled the line. Also their clever lobbying showed up in their express exemption from an Act which repeilled some minor governmental obligations to aid the railways. Indeed, if the under-the-table dealings with the C.P.R. 30 and Csrter&otton be taken into account, the Semlinites were positively mapanamous to the railways, considering what they mie;ht have done. The primary thrust of the Semlin men had been against the minim magnates. In a bid for support from the Kootenay mining unions and the Vancouver Island colliery workers, they had enacted the eight hour law, safety standards, government inspection of the mines, and the anti-

Oriental provisions that the miners wanted. There were also rumours that Xartin had blocked certain government payments to the Cmts Nest Pass 64 Soal Company. If thie were true it was likely an effort on Hartin's behalf to assist tJames J.Hill in his efforts to buy out the company in line with Hill's plans to link up the Kootenay coal with the iron de 65 posits in eastern Washington State to create a steel smelter. This is only spec~lative,but it may indicate Nartints connection with Hill at this early a date. It would also help to explain the strong personal emnity between 6 6 Martin and Carter-Cotton: each suspected the other of acting for outside

railroad interests. In Rossland, in the heart of the Kootenays mining region,

Martin's old friend from Ifanitoba, Smith Curtis, was thinking of mine 67 for office should the occasion arise. It would certainly redound to his

credit if he were able to mollify the outraged mining operators and reduce their hostility to the Semlin government. He pursuaded Martin to come and

address a dinner that he had arranged so that the local captains of industry would at least hear the government's side of the story, and from their most moderate member. The dinner was to be a classic Wartinesque fiasco. As

Martin spoke at the gathering, he was continuously heckled by the mine owners. As the din rose, Xartin lost his temper end shouted that he would not bevsil enced by hobos in evening dressfr. In the brawling com~mftyof Rossland, those were fighting words, and Attorney Fenera1 or no, a scuffle ensued. 'Fighting Joe? earned his name once again. It would he Just too galling for him that he should be called to account for the actions of a man that he thought to be a scoundrel even though the man be a cabinet colleague and when the fracas was over, Martin denounced Carter-Cotton, accusing him of all sorts of sleazy dealings, and departed Rossland in a 68 huff. Naturally, this put an end to his aspirations for calming the Kootenay mine owners, and it would have sl.mllarly hurt Smith Curtis, and made him rather annoyed with Martin, but when the incident was reported in the press it was to have far larger ramifications. ;+Tartin had broken cabinet solidarity and embarrassed the government. Premier Semlin really could not tolerate such behaviour and still try and maintain his om political dignity. lie must act. He probably had a choice between firing Nartin or seeing Carter-Cotton resign in protest, so the mild mannered Semlin gathered his courage and demanded Martin's resignation. Martin was not about to go gracefully. Once again he could not swallow his pride and accept a compromise and he instead turned on his allies. After a steaw confrontation with Semlin, Xartin demand& that the Premier resign, but after a caucus vote supporting Semlin, Martin was expelled from 69 the party, He had just alienated his reform allies. And considering the split Liberals he was once again in the position that he had been in in Hanitoba only a few years earlier: almost completely isolated from all the established political channels in the province. 3 2 Ry this time, both Martln and the C.P.R. would have realized that their attempt to control him was a failure; that Martin had considerable popular appeal in British Columbia; that if he continued in elected office he would be able to hurt the companyts interests (if he had not done so already) ; and that the company would be well advised to help defeat Martin at the polls as they had in 1896. Martin would be anticipating the C.P.Ravs acting against him again and would be making every effort to establish new political allies. His obvious alternative in Rritish Columbia w~ldbe to try and get the support of the Dunsmuirs of Vancouver Island and to look to large outside interests who mi@t be interested in supporting a fight against the C. P.R. : this outside interest would almost certainly be James J.Hi.11 and the Great Northern !?ailway. 1.cf. Qrmsby, British Columbiz: A History, p.305 (she refers to the C.P.R. as the government of the lower mainland)

2.0rmsby, op cit, p.66

3.Pyle, The Life of James J.Hil1, ch,24, "Again the Orient 3e~kons" 4.cf The Province, 1.0 April 1897, p.193 5 .The Province, 31 July 1897, p.468. The Platform was: 3. rediatribution 2.reorganization of the Civil Service 3.more public works 4.discourage oriental immigration 5.amend land act on timber and coal claims - land for settlers only 6.repeal the mortgage tax 7,amend Free Miners' licencing laws 8.more provincial control on aid to railways the platform was later condemned as being without back- bone. -cf. The Province, 7 August 1897, p.486 6.cf 1898 Parliamentam Guide, p.353

7.The Province, 19 June 1897, p.1 8,reprint in The Province, 25 Sept. 1@7, p.8

9.cf APPENDIX

20,Dwyer, Laurier and the 9.C.Liberal Parts, p.15 1LVancouver Daily Fkrld, 9 kt. 1F397, p.2

12.Dnyer, op cit, p.33-4 13.The F'rovince, 6 Nov. 1@7, p.773 ll+.$emi-Weekly World 17 Dec. 1W7, p.6

15.=, 26 April 1898, p.8

I6.W, 29 April 1@8, p.2 17.ST;JW, 10 June 1898, p.4 18.infornation from the 1898 Parliamentary Guide 34 19.reprint from Toronto 'nlorld, The P~ovince, 31 :larch 1898, p.3

20.%, 17 June 288, p. 1

21.SW3, 17 June 1W8, pol 22,3obin, The Rush For SwiI.s, ~~69-70

23.m, 28 June 1898, p.2

25.information from the 1898 Parliamentam Guide. The characterization of the Turner redme and the identification of the Labourites

26.ST;Jlrl, 13 July lW8, p.8

3O.cf. Jackman, The "den kt Cary "stle, p.67

31.cf. !Iorgan, Canadian Ken and Women of the Time, p.78

32.m, 12 Aug. 1898, p.6. It is important to note that there was no sig- nificant blow back on XcInnss for the Beaven appointment.

33.a kind of double shuffle in reverse?

38.%, 20 Sept, 1898, p.1

39.\iatts, Histolr of the Law ~ocietyof, p-106 4Q.W, 21 Oct. 1898, p.3

41,=, 11 Qct. 1848, p.4

42.cf. Appendix of the Journal3 of the Legislature for 1902 & 1903 35 f+?.Vann,ouver Daily World, 18 Aug. 1890, g.3 l+&.SVJ, 20 Sept,. 1898, pel

45.from rIcDonald, Business Leadershir, in Vancouver

46.m, 25 Oct,. 1.898, p.3 1&7.WJ, 29 Mov. 1878, p.3

5O.cf. Tlorris, "Lord Dufferin's VisLt to 9.C." rl.Fahey, Inland &pire: D.C.CorSin and Swkane

52,all this infomation on the proceedings from the Journalg and Statutes for 3,C. in 1899

53.0rmsby, op city p.320 54.l.lartin to Laurier, 7 Feb. 1899, p.30325-7, Laurier Papers, PAC 55.Dominion Reuort Service vol 3, p.407

56. Penlington, 3anada and Tmperialisn 1896-1894, p. 202-3 57.m inference from the Journals, 1899, p.65 and the Statutes, 1899, p.16

58.cf. the Act, Statutes, 1899, p.9

60. Ibid, p.70

62. Stevens, Canadian Tht ional Rai1mys vol 2, P. 86

63 .cf. Journals, 1899, Petit ion #4 64.cf. D.A.llcGre~or, The Province, 20 Sept. 1955 ('lancouver City ~rchives) and the News Advertiser, 18 March 1900 (also in Ecartints file in Vancouver City ~rchives),and Soywell, The Office of Lieut enmt Governor, p. 139

65.cf. Ormsby, op cit, p.333. The coal could have been intended for use with the iron ore shorn on geological maps across the border. 67.an inference from the fact that he did run the next year, and that Martin would have lit,tle other reason to go to Xossland. @.Robin, op cit, p.71; Omby, op cit, p.320

69 .cf. G.F. G.Stanley, "A Constitutional Zrisis in B.C .'I, p. 285, ftnt 16 Martin could have followed parliamentary tradition and paid for his fall from grace with a period of penn~mceon the backbenches of the party, but his overpowering vindictiveness prevented from doing so. He determined to bring down the government that had expelled him and so continued to be a powerful disruptive force in the province. He carried on hi.s vendetta against Carter-Cotton, the Xinister of Finance, by accusing him of al.terin; some government documents in the embroligo concerntng Dead- 1 2 mants Island in Stanley Park but after some press coverage the issue died, resulting in further alienation of public support for the ex-Attorney Cen- 3 eral. '&at he could not do by puhlic campaigning, he attempted by private means. He would know that Lieutenant Governor ?4cInnes was less than enthusiastic with Semlinfs performance in office, %Innes would have wanted the 4 reformers to try 2nd regulate the activities of the C.P.R. more closely but instead they had devoted themselves to assisting the mining unions and antagonizing the Americans rather than dealing with the railways much at all.

14artin wou1.d be csrtain that Premier Semlin could no longer count on twenty supporters in the House and that if an election were held soon, the reforners would be the target of their best campaigner rather than the vehicle as Xartin had been for them only the previous year. Rut time was of the essence.

He must exploit his advantage before Semlin had the opportunity to recruit more support. Probably reminding McImes that he was the most reliable anti-

S.P.R. man in the country, Martin would have encouraged the Lieutenant Gov- 313 5 emnr to mite to Premier Sernlfn that. I do not think that I should any longer ignore the existing political conditions in the province, and the unrest and uncertainty resulting from recent political changes ... It is sufficient I think, that grave doubt now exists as to whether your administration retains the confidence of the Legislative Assembly, And for this reason 1 believe it to be my duty to insist that you either meet the Legisll.ative Assembly on or before the 20th day of October next, ...or that the Legislative Assembly be dissolved, and a general election be held on or before the said date. McInnes was probably using the oldest parl.iamentary threat of' an election to get SemZin to come to terms with Martin, but the Premier would not be 6 pressured into any deal. He replied

f hasten to assure Your Honour that the Council has the utmost confidence that it will be able to satisfy you that there is no cause for apprehension respecting the general poli.tica1 conditions now existing in the province. As regards the relations of the Government to the Legislative Assembly, I have no reason to believe that the Government will not command a majority of the House.

Thus Hartin could not force the reformers to take him back through either public arousal or private pressure. Following Mart in's expulsion from the Semlin ministry, n I runours reached Ottawa that McInnes was quite sympathetic to brt3.n and the federal government began to follow the Lieutenant Governor's actions with growing alarm. Laurier was relieved that there was no major row over HcInnes' disrnj.ssal of Turner and Reaven in 1898, but these new ventures on McInnest part in trying to pressure the Premier might be indicative of an undesirable pattern. The Secretary of State, R.W.Scott, wrote to the Ueu- tenant Governor to advise a much more cautious approach to his political e decisions, He indicated that the federal authorities were axurlous that YcTnnes not behave in a precipitous fashion again and so cause an awkward constitutional problem that would have national implications. Scott 's letter, wr4 tten on the same day as the YcInnes-Seml.in exchange, advised against allowing any pressure from Martin move the Lieutenant Cavernor act in a way that would exploit SemlinTs temporary weakness - particularly an early calling of the Legislature. Largely as a result of the federal interest in the matter, YcTnnes decided to eccept Sem3.in's reply to his warning and he 9 agreed to the next session being called for the fourth of January, 1900.

Thus arqv immediate assistance that Xclnnes might have been to Kwtin was effectively spent.

The Lieutenant Governor could still be of value to Martin in the longer term. Senator horge A.Cox, a very prominent financier and national 10 Liberal fund raiser, in company with Robert Jaffray, another national figure, and a director of the Crow's Nest Pass Soal Sompany, visited NcInnes to warn him that they would 'skin him alive' if he called on Martin to replace 11 Semlin. 'fiat they did not anticipate, was that given the Scots temperment of the Lieutenant avernor, such an approach would be likely to be counter- productive, Fy this time it was generally known that the Semlinites had conveyed to the British Columbia Southern Railway Oompany, formerly the

Craw's Nest Pass Railway Company, and now a subsidiary of the C.P.R., a 12 land grant of over six hundred thousand acres known to be coal bearing.

31artin denounced the grant as a "robbery of public assets and an outrage 19 A.2 on the people of British Columbiatt. XcInnes would have had similar feelings, and probably about this time the two men secretly agreed that if

Kartin were able to rally sufficient strength in the Legislature, and defeat Premier Semlin, then Nartin himself would be given the opportunity to 14 form his own administration.

During the last fall of the ninteenth century it became clear- er that Semlin's confidence that he could produce a majority in the House 1 E r/ was rather opt om is ti.^. His party was much more unified now that Nartin was gone, but D.W.Higgins had defected from the government ranks along with 16 !,fartin, and hie working majority now depended upon J.D.Prentice, an un- reliable ally at the best of times. Prentice had been absent for twelve of the ninteen divisions in the 1839 session and had voted with the Turner- ites once. W.C.Wells had frequently been absent as well, but could probably be counted on to support the government much more loyally than Prentice.

In the tightest spots the vote of the Speaker could be relied upon, but the trick of success wwld lie in accomodating Prentice's vital vote somehow. One bright spot was that Turner's positlon in Opposition was not all that solid either. James Dunsmir was almost always absent and others, like

Ilallas Helmcken, were not resolute followers of Turner's lead. With some hick they stood a fair chance of gettimg through the business of the House unscathed. They just had to keep things short and uncontroversial.

??artin was short but he was not uncontroversial. Hartin had 17 formed a tacit alliance with James hmsmuir and the Turner Opposition, who were only too hapw to help defeat the Semlin government - all the while quite unaware of the secret agreement between PIartin and the Lieuntenant

Governor as to who would be the next Premier. Sdinfs parliamentary tactics could not have allowed for the bitter and dogged holmdim of his group by 18 his ex-4-ttorney General, Proceedural votes carried, but there were maqy 41 of them as ?-!artin tried to fame as many divisions as possible, ,hoping that each mieht defeat the government. Sometimes the casting vote of the Speaker carried the day for Senil.in, but the substantive measures seemed stuck. A general election seemed inevitable, but the long standing cry for redistribution wes still unsatisfied. According to a front page report in the Daily World of the twentieth of February 1900, an election was to follow the passage of redistribution, This was a good strategy for Sdin to follow for it put 14artin in an awkward spot. To oppose redistribution would be to oppose the strong popular demand for it, but if Xartin allowed the bS.11 to pass, it w~uldgive Semlin a considerable advantage in the enslring election, )lot only would the newer and probably more progressive co~jnunitiesbe more likely to vote for the reform administrati.on, but Semlin would then have the upper hand in callins the election on his own initiative and on his most convenient date. The balance of alternatives pointed to forcing a defeat on redistribution, if he could muster the strength, and hope that the more conservative older sidings would support those running against Semlin. On the twenty third of February the redistribution bill came up for second reading, and with :.fartin leading the Opposition forces, the bill was defeated by one vote - Prenticets. Defeat in the House did not have any automatic consequences as it did in the Dominion House, Semlin would have been quite in order to carrr on and face 3. direct vote of confidence (and bargain for more support) but once a~3i.nEkclnnes stepped in. He ordered the ~rderto make up his 19 mind within three days as to whether he tmu1.d resign or ask for dissoluti.on.

Semlin was furious. He was sure that, given the time to recover, he could negotiate a deal with some of the more 3.ndependent members of the Opposit- 20 ion and regain his majority, but l+icInnesrefused a request for a delay, and on the twenty seventh of February he wrote to Semlin that he could not 21 continue to be guided by his advj.ce. He was dismissed? Ikrtin would have reminded the Lieutenant Governor of their secret arrangement : he had established a reasonable record as Attorney General; Semlin had not tried to restrict the 7,P.R. as YcInnes had hoped when he celled Semlin to office in the first place - quite the contrary; Martin did have a clear anti-C. P.3. record and would do what he could to bring the rail giant into line; he had successfully led the House Opposition into defeating Semlin; and he now wished to try his own hand at the Premiership.

Semlin knew that the House deeply resented the interference of the Lieutenant Governor in its operations and he at once asked for a resolution on I*!cInnes' latest action. The division was nat quite as decisive as Semlin would have wished for, Twenty two Ibnbers condemned the dismissal but fifteen were in support of the action. There was still some potential. in the House for a new Premier to work with. McInnes would have felt that he had established his right to select the Pramier, and he would exercise that right again. The day after their condemnation of Semlinrs dismissal, the House was extremely tense, awaitinz the outcone of this latest crisis, They were not kept long in suspense. Joseph :4artin rose to a stunned iiouse and announced that he had been called upon to form a 22 government 1 The arrangement that the new Premier had made with the Lieu- tenant hernor was that as soon as Martin had arisen to make the announcement of his appointment, McInnes would appear immediately to prorogue the Youse to preclude my repition of the previous day's tactics of passins 23 inconvenient resolutions which would hpede their plans. Rut their timine was n little bit out. The House instantly passed a motion of no confidence 9.n the Honourable third %nber for Vancouver who has been called upon to 24 form a governmentn, by a majority of twenty eight to one. k moment too late, YcInnes arrived to prorogue, but once again the Yembers acted quickly to indicate their refusal to accept the situation. Led by James Dunsmuir, all the ?fembers trooped out of the chamber, leaving !.!artin alone with the 25 Tiieut enant Governor, FJemrously, 14clnnes took his seat. Realizing that the ceremonies surrounding this event might be a trifle strained, and amid a crowing chorus of jeers and catcalls from the crowded galleries, IIcInnes stammered through his official prorogation and hurredly left the House to an uncertain crowd outside. Immediatew the Xembers returned to the chamber an4 joined in a r0.w of disapprobation. Someone announced the news of the relief of Ladysmith in the Boer War then dominating the news and another 26 roar of joy went up for the Pritish Army. The scene was without parallel certainly in ths British Columbia House, and perhaps in the entire Cominon- 27 wealth. The tumult was reported as far afield as the London Times. Laurier had his dreaded constitutional crisis. Martin and McInnss could not have anticipated the depth of hostility to their actions. The Provincets front page cartoon the next day entitled "Take The Head of Himll (suggesting his execution?) typified the reaction of the country. lfndoubtedly they were both shaken by the twenty &htt to one vote of no confidence from the House and by Dunsmuirts parade of X.L.A.ts out of the chamber, but while NcXnnes carried on a lengthy Circulation Books Always Open 1'%\ 44

1900. '- . .. I' hama. The qr;trrror wu aUBrte. . - BE HAIID 8lDU CC- r of War.-After hcPlgh_tt Burflng Tbe Dcrd -.d yrkk Dummk rrcrlrcd tbe lollo~lng brlel kl- Dee. Hutchlngs. No. 703. locmlonteln. mtd date6 Aprll #iulchlnm~or "Sam" wan WwoUver conttngent on the !en ur(mtnt't&(yu tn Alrlca IM em6 valued cmplnyee of @bc. and he evldcntly IID- ~f.employer. Mr. Itutch- ... -. . -You wlll have doubtlecrs 'I,. [he nrrhtlne In which the :I pgfmcnt twk part. BO I nccd i dctnllr. Our compnny "A" L an heavy M any. but thq Iumbla n:cn rufferwl most. Flrlwin, they had lour kill- ) notlndrcl: Vancouver one lwo rounded. The ~phthall L hottwt part'ot the nght i* boa\ p I~rnaer. It wan a $t to see 80 many fall. I Iury 80 of the Gordon. and @hmen ncxt day. Prom the 1 hardplwr~tlll we arrlyecl irchd 76 mller, nnd nince hnvr on several long Oundlng up the noern. I'm t n). I am In the best oC \ I trurt that you are wrll $urtnwn Is brlsk et CMna Ok lor the ads In the Ro- Id and Ad\ ertlner. and wns leu1 11%oec the chanae. I 7 n fvw darn am from bee. re#ards.

h-n. the man \tho tost th- I \! 41'11 hnJ HI\ I-II I IWIII in ba &q~tIn the rrf* In tb*, @ late I? imam r, Wetr, ti4- b~kl~q.+S~UI - 8nte.11 IN b1t.h .,,.I II,,~~,.) VFPO n..t I. Itl,. r*fq +- .lr n1n.nc.l 11 ttpcl IIUI I Iw 1181,lte~kvn IIIw~, $MI h**artlI,, ,III~I.I~I~-ILhs* l*rt ~~en~nl:~11.rr tl~. u H~Ih <'*t* f.,,lll,l I*,h,l,

sources, !-!artin quickly recovered. Here was z new Goliath to fight,

Fightin2 Joe Xartin believed that he could call a convention of the Dritjsh Columbia Liberals, get their endorsation as leader, and

respond to the long standing call for party lines in elections. He would

thereby force al.1 the Liberals into the fold for a contest that he was sure 29 he stood a eood chance of winning, The scenario did in fact beein to unfold

that way. Tn Vancouver, Ilartinfs stronghold, the Liberals held an executive

meetinz on the third of thrch, and al.though they had earlier been badly split

they were convinced by the federal man, J.C.NcLagan, to endorse Xartin and 30 call for party lines in the el ction that everyone knew had to cone, Clearly, Nartin had spent some time mending fences. Charles Wilson, bes- 3 1 ident of the ?onservatives, called for party lines too- and it looked as

though they might in fact be adhered to. ?3ut within a few days any Liberal solidarity vanished. The provincial execthive, composed of federal party

men led by Senator Templeman, met and asserted that these would be no party 3 2 lines in 2. Xartin led contest. The Conservatives did not appear eager

to follow Wilsonfs lead either, and all the old labels of the pst re-app eared. Iiewitt Bostock, the Libera.1 W.P., noted at least six competing

groups : the 'straight t Conservatives; the Turner Party; the ~ottonites(or

ProvLncial Party as they were soxcetimes referred to as) ; the Independent 33 Liberals; the Independent Conservatives; and the various Labour candidates.

As time went on it became clear though, that the labels really meant nothing: the important positions were either pro or anti Martin. As his Goliath grew in stature, ;:artin had great difficulty settin,: help in his role as David: no one wanted to join his cabinet. He had become son-ethinz oE ,a political p~riah.His old friend, Smith Curtis, came down from ?Lossland to accept the protfol.io of Ikister of Kines, but others were not, forthconing. There were a number of stories of Xartin walkin2 around Victoria. tryins to recruit men to accept office, but there were few takers. In desperation, t?artl.n abandoned traditional political channels and turned to the eeneral public. There is the story of a grocery clerk, Cory S.Ryder, complimenting Martin dur3ng a train ride and of f.'.artints 34 response - asking him to join the cabinet but whatever the @h surround- in3 the appointment, Fyder soon became an embarrassment and on the third

of :!a3 he was replaced by a more credible Incumbent in the Finance port- ? c: folio, J.C .*own, former mayor of and 1:. L, R. for Xew Westminster. Another 3 6 unknown, George Iiashln& on geebe, a farmer, became Provincial Secretary but Ilartin had Setter luck with the remaining recruits. J.Stuart Yates,

a prominent Victoria lawyer, ex-?encher, and former Liberal alderman, be-

came Chief Somissioner of Tands and Works (resigning on the twenty fourth 2 'Y 2 1 of Iqarch but remaining a ~lartinite). The press dubbed them a 'cabinet of curios* - even I4arti.n himself did not take them too seriously, regarding -38 them as merely constitutional fillers-in pen din^ his success at the polls.

The Secretary of State was rather inore serious about the appointments than 39 the Rritish Zolumbians were. He later wrote to Lieutenant, ?fivernor KcInnes ...not a single member of the existing Government had then, or even has up to the present time, received the approval of the people. Only one of them had even been a member of the Legislature, and he had no following; and I think it is without parallel in the history of constitutional government that a body of men, five sixths 02 whom had never been members of the Le,~islature, should be perniitted to carry on a Government for three months without any pub1i.c sanction or approval. It is useless now to comment on it, f was very sorry at the line taken, and as you n\ust have observed by the public press all over the Dominion, the propriety of the action taken has been very severely criticized.

The Secretary of State was quite right,. The absence of real.1~SV support for the Yartin administration was underscored by the lack of any signif- icant business for them to transact, What little correspondence that was received was stamped by the Attorney Ceneralts office - the last publicly endorsed position that Phrtin had held, Probably even Xartin himself did 40 not really feel entitled to call himself Premier. Of the 123 letters received, only one proffered encotiragement . That one wzs from A .A .Cavidson, 41 President of Zonsolidated Fire ?+!ounta.i.nsI.li.nes Ltd. A letter from F. J. Deane, President of Sopper ',lines Ltd,, and a Vancouver Liberal, carried the notation on its letterhead that Ih+, tn Deacon were their solicitors (this was Josephts firm). Fut Deane w2s Sernlints most loyal supporter, and of course he did not offer Xartin any help. Other local notables writing on minor routine matters wese ??.Lr~snell, on behalf of the Greenwood %ard 4 2 of Trade, ?allas Helmcken, who was concerned about a !%rine Hospital 43 problem, and Charles Semli.n, the former PreMier, recommending someone as 44 a Justicc of the Peace tor the 'been 3arlotte Islands. Hardly the stuff of .:reat thinp or indicative of the drama going on around the hapless Premier. All the circumstances surrounding !4artints appointment as Premier - the vote of no confidence, the repudiation of the Liberals, the makeshift cabinet - clearly demonstrated that Martin was quite without support in Rritish Columbia, yet he still planned on winning an election. To do so rmuld reql~l-rea. m.~ssj.vsanount of fjnanc! el and pol-itical support froir, somewhere. For the money, :4artin went to James J.I.Ii11 and the Great 45 ?Jo,-thern Rai.?way,

)!ill had becnne interested in Mtish 7olumbia in the early

1890ts and had persuaded Prenier Davie to let him build into the most 46 strate,tic areas of the province. With the beginnings of regular trans-

Pacific shipping to the Orient in 1897, Hill saw the value of the minerals of the Kooten%v and Yomdary regions and tried to set Premier Turner to support the construction of a coast to Kootenay rail link. In line with the Matior1n7 Policy, however, Turner's supprt went to the C. P.R., which blli.1.t a li.ne from the I:ootena;rs t.hro:qh the Crow's ?lest Pass to Lethbrid~e I m for bringin;: the val~mhleores out in50 the elstern reeion of Canada. 48 Thus with D.17 .Corb2~ndr,zvdn:: the I:aot,enay wealth down to Spokane and the

S.P.2. shippin: the ores into esstern Can?&, I!ill?s best access to the

.region would be bldl.ding di rectl;. west to the Pacific coast. He would be nost desirous of Sui1di.n; the line in 3ritish Columbia, so that he wolfid qi~a~ifyfor the ~overnmentsubsidies given for rail construct5on, hut to

As so, he wttld obviously need the backing of the provincial government.

IUll had known 'Jartin fron thgir ?:mitoba days and he knew that Yzrtin was a bitter enaw of the C. P.?, Ibrtints sudden appointment as Premier of F3ri.t:sh ZoI-mI>ia could be a golden opportmity for Hill. If he were to zive Ya,&in the proper backins so thgt Xartin could win an electi.on, or zt least, get, enongh seats to hold a strong influence in the House, and if ?.'artin were to promise to obtain the required backjng for the coast to

Koot enay ~ailwcy,then the campaign investment could be turned into s to 4 1 fortune throu,;h sellin; the i;ooten,?.:r minerals in the Orient. Hill would hherefore be deli~htedto subscribe to :!artin's cairnpai~nfund. The donation wodci be most advantageoils, however, if it were kept as quiet as possible.

Rot only was there an anti- Ameri canism preval ent %n Briti.sh Columbia, but as is traditional in politics, no politician wishes to be seen to be acting on behalf of any private interest. As well, it woir1.d be the wisest policy to minj mize the information avail.&] e to %!artin's political enemies, in- cludfns the C.P.?.

?or polltical support, Nz?rtin once again turned to the Liberals.

J.C.XcLqan, manager of the ilaily World, the only Xartinite paper, and the man who had supported Eartin a month ear1i.e~in the at,tempt to declare party I.ines in the election, wrote to Prime Xnister Iaurier to ask what (4 9 ought to be done. He noted that thjn;s could be very awkward for the Lib- ersls in Rrit, ish Col tunhia in considerati on of the federal election expected 50 for later in the year. Should Yartin effectively respond to the popular demnnd for party lines in the provincial election and rally the local. Ub- erals, and zet elected, he would be of peat help i.n the federal general election fol.lowing. Should !?artin try and fail to bring in party lines, the

Liberals would probably split anti that would have dire repurcussions for the federal elect,ion, Yclagan concluded by advising Iaurier to send a telegramme supporting the Liberals in 3.C. This would indirectly support fhrtin thrmgh its implied call from Ottawa for party lines in the provin- 51 cia1 election. Laurier replied that he could not support b!artin in spite of' his feelings of good will towards him, because KcInnest action in appoint- in3 Ihrtin might have to be reviewed in Ottawa 2nd because Xart in insisted on a Japanese exclusion plank in his election platform in direct conflict with federal policy on the matter, Laurier sent a teleeramme the same day 52 declarin,~no intervention in Rritish ?olwnbia politics, 53 The distinctive items of Xartincs platform were: the abolition of the two hundred dollar deposit for candidature to the Legis- lature (supposedly 3.t was this item which induced John Oliver - later 54 Premier - to run RS R l.!artinite); implementation of the Torrens Land Reg- istry System (which had not been proclaimed); a balanced budget for the government; the repeal of the Alien Exclusion Law (which was just about to be federellp disal.lowed Qul,ynay); and, most signifigant, a coast to

Kootenay railway. Ilis items on lagging, real estate speculation, and

Ori.entals were essent inlly carrrovers from the Liberal. (and ~emlin)platform of lW7. There was nothinz that was unusmlly anti-Oriental, knti- tt:ongolianT (as they were then called) items 2t election times were a cnmmonp3.ace in British ?oS.unbia poll tics, and ?Tartin did not specifically mention the Japanese at all. The source of J~uriertsobjections was probably 'kKechniets Coal ?fines ?egulation Act of 1R?9 which had drawn the Imperial Japanese protest, . Xartin could quite reasonably feel. that burier was beinq less than candid wjth him, The real reason for Laurier's refusal of suppxt probably lay in the hostility to Martin of the business elite of the whole country. Itartin attempted to override the declaration of the provincial executive of the Liberal party. He arranged for the second convention of'the party to be held in Vancouver on the sixth of April to try and get the direct support of the rank and file members. The anti-Martinites were 52 equnl.ly determined to stop Ihrtin from invoking the party's name. About three hundred people turned o~tto the meeting and there was an immediate proceedural fight over who was an accredited delegate and who was not. Delay worked against Martin, and so right from the stad things went rather badly. Ihrtin's choice for chzirman of the conventior, was Alderman James l?ckC&een, but this was immediately challenged, and Fred Peters, the former

Li.bern1 Premier of Prince "ward Island, was elected chairman instead of llc'2ueen. C)bviously, from I:krtinfs point of view, thi rigs were going from bad to worse. h fi@ broke out and the police had to be called in to 5 5 restore order, but nothins could really be decided in such an atmosphere.

Peters sdjourned the convention to the neKt day, but another fight broke out a~ainthen and the meeting t,tlrned cha.otic. T;.P.Cavis, a solicitor for the C.P.IZ., introduced a resolution that the Jdber~.lsdid not suppod

!.!artin, but before anythjn~could be done, the order was lost and the 5 6 convention dissolved. The pro-Xartinit,es, including Ralph Smith the Labour leader, held thei.r own meetin~afterwards and pledged loyalty to hurier and Fkrtin, but the whole purpose of the commntion ms lost to him. He was not able to c~errul-ethe provincial executive, 1-!artin played his final card. l?e appealed directly to Lmrier, but this only brought the sharp retort that he had Seer, remiss in dismissi.ng the House and that he must 57 ~eton with an election without further delay.

The first public news of an election came in a front page story of The Province on the eleventh of JLpril. It was revealed that

Ia&ier had told XcInnes to either call the House or dissolve it, and that the Ideutenant Cavernor had taken the latter course. An election was called 52 for the ninth of Jme.

It was an e;ctremeb dirty campaign. The news was generally dorLn2ted by the news of the 3oer \Jar, but Iz;hat second string coverage that there was traced the various groups in their travels around the province drummin:: up sqprt for their tickets. :,!artin drew large crowds and handled them very well, but the press seolr,sd decisively against him. His personal contempt for 17.al.ph Smith was widely reported in an attempt to split away the Labour vote from the Xartin camp; he ms also accused 58 of being bxked by the Jspmose government; and that the coast to Koo~- enay rai1wa.y was really going to be built because Xartin and Smith Curtis 57 mmed half of the Sunset Xine in the Sirnilkameen and that the line was to carry their ores. Rit the most damaging story was the revelation of the source of Xartin's campaim funds. Cn the front page of The Province, two days before election day, there was an affldavit fron E,A.Gardiner, of

Seattle, declarin~that Xartin had accepted $100,000 from J.J.Hill in return for a promise that effective control of the proposed coast to Koot-

enay ra.i1wczy wo~xldbe in Hill's hands, !'artin's secret was probabLv dts-

covered by the 3. P;3. and pubXished to discredit hlim, which it likely did. 'Iartints performance in the brief time that was available to him is tremendousl;. inprcssive. Eot only did he struggle with the Liberal

PaWj for recognition znd help, but he toured the province getting twenty

seven men to stand for election on his ticket. He or3anized a platform, obtained the finances to fight the campaign and at the same time carried

on*nearly rill the offices of the cabinet as best he could. This in the face of hostility from nearly everyone. The election results, keenly followed& the17.P.3., drifted fn in the days following the nfnth of June. ?.Tartin was personal.ly re-elected in Vancomrer, but defeated in the holdin2 action that he ran in Vict- orin.. His cabinet qenera.11~did well too: J.?.Rrown was elected in New

TrJest,ninster (but a.l.so defeated in 'dictoria); Curtis was elected in Ross-

?and; J.S.Yates was defeat.ed in the Oppsition ~tron~~holdsof Victoria and ?lnn~i.mo;and Ye&e put on a very strong showins in Yale l?est, but lost to the 3unsrluir man, Denis Ii~wphq. T?.? .Gi. lmour was retwned in Vancouver with Ikrtin, b11t the other h,al.f of the ti~ket,:?c"heen and 2.G.Kacpherson

(who hnci been s7iccessf;il with Yartin in the 1R93 election) did not make the qrade. Yith John Oliver frorz Jk1t.a and 2. C.Snith from "ast Kootenav South, six decl~redIhrt i nites were elected. Yzrt.i nism probably captured the

'radical' vote of the time, but ,just exactly what 'radical' rrieant then is myhti ng but clear. The ter9 then probably included evevone from an- archists and atheist,^ through nudists to vegitarians, but if Xartin did cn.rry the fra.di.c,z!f vote, then the constit,ilency results show that they were susprisi-ngly strone in the election, thouzh not deci sive. Snodyass ran very we2 l ;?<~lin$tthe Okanagan catt1.e king, Price Cllison. Other Ihrtinites were close too: Vheth,m came close to ?ichard YccErj.de .in Dewdney; %owan cane withfn seven votes of dawning iCi.dd 5.n 3chmond; :Ic%ee did well against the Dunsmuirlte ?Iomce in Comox; and Sanfster lost by only fifty votes to

3berts in Vi ctori? South. P .W. Howay characterized %rtin's effort as i7com- 61 prehensive, his campai~nstrong, vi-tarous, brilll ant,, .'I and his opponents cei-tain2y felt the power of his attack. Carter-Cotton, running under the Provincial Party label in Vancouver, was personally defeated. He had 39 d Circulation Books Ahys Open * , I TvltDAY, JJJNE 2, 1900. 123 PAGE&

18 lndcocndcnce to the P colonlrts k Jlowed ,pdntmenl of lbc pv- :dmy. tbw obvlaUn# w twplnu a standln# ubllrnnr would k pre- the etrlJnl8t8 to r-tst 48In Puuch Afrtca. Idrum1 and loyally to mrold. FUI ap~'O(ntCI)to vlrlt )nlrdn and AuslralaalS @err or those rrpre- wnr. pw of the mnFcu (Yrr Conr right), sb- W. P. Bchrcln?r. the t Cnlnny. ntadc an Im- I In n hlrh she pnblcl- uch Africa rcpublla }Ir Indrpcndcncr. LW REPORTS. 3,-(10.30, a. m.)-Lord

I, May 31.-French's W- WlOnb durln~May 2Rth 8 me lo-Jar. He wu hthi$ march. but re Ibc unemy from thm (bey rurrerlrlvely held lhr* and Is now hold- bkb 1 dlrwcted him to Unnwb.urg. TWO O~C- Fd and two men we- iunded." 1 h8d aIm1mcived the l@r4 Il~herlsunder rerburg, Junr 1.--"Rlr rr;*~rIlt~gtkc arrival I btlgude at Nrllbrun, b that he W(U t~ppootd I rhde wry from Vcn- t mm rrre kllled and md 32 men wouniled. ar hcubtrc bttcm J dld dxcellcnt work. mns were moat valu- nw MR~la rmwt llirou#ht~utthe tryln(r ~ekurs~~hsthat ws 32 Ullcd and 150 men bebnd~t-r1:uardn mere ~Pt-rrrsduring Crnrvd V They lurt bhlrty kd- U4 at untied " biand. May 31.-Orn- " This boy," said the Constable, "nlthoityh he's repeatedly told to, wont move on-7 prartlrnlly rurrnund- '' I'm al\va},s a-moving on, sir," cries the boy, wiping away his grimy texs with hls Re triilrs nutq\tI~ of '5nl) sldr (apn for the rum; " I've alw;~ySbecn a-moving and a-moving on, ever sillit. I w~sburn." * lh* 1l:reutolsnd Imr- Ihd8 4.1 Ilwutcra undel -.. - --- 9 CII* wr~t\h~went8 the Inhrl~ltnnIrIt, ~utrjvctlnn. and st* It rn~nrlt I: rht~k4 n pvx. 2. total 9. Z be. fh~.thb tn lhv t ,r.v durlng the ln~ntii ?-it I* crnirlnlly nn- $\Ill pmb~t>l)'.allh the Trat14x'anl. ; *mai rtsl\!IIP at. the orr\tpatlnn 14 Prvtorta and Jfbhnn- hro~ tnurthn.er of nrrbur~hclnK f~~llnwrclby oprnll~me - Mr. -1. T Ilrnan , Vrhl ,nhut'V*r. Ikc Orar>pv rl\e r rol- ~lmllsrtn thorr unlntrre@tlng ntwe- rr,..rtc the. rslofn 1 dut n* thr mo~tw mrntr now undertaken hs UP 4 il Ins her Therr WPM lj a8.t ~l~hareat opp- Itundl? end Urebant In the ~rullwn \ JI ULU ?tX11 I Jet* r*lt whwh nn =..in fell and en %.. rr I 'vtl-ny (la) c tlwre u ILL rn*srr or leu rnolrlurtS! M.v.I! \IVI~OI{I~. -- I rr.n~s A! I I ' 7h.a havte81 runfall In twmt, -four) lnd"lnm inn nw *rrrr Ibnr@rtu*8 'W J~IIW: t'rmldvnl rc.r rlnt F 11,. Iraft thr rapI:aI IC . ri-nlorl# h. \IT. u.~rttr Mgr .;I h ulwn (S Incbr# nas .tl:l III >lwh ~,,mpfil~,.~prl.,n 8 stf ***. M-...ere-llosrn #np8r pa , I. II ,ram the hour. $42 to 7 O'clock (p 111 n .I, t ~tvern pte. 1 Aslcd 1 I 1110 I mmd Nurd~r~e*~l#n~r. .t r.0 TII), Ow tfi--tiin~. . . "~WII*ke fmntler, un Rdlulmry v 111 connltb~rhfm to he pr*-?1 r~. I . "*rl the T~nn.\hnl dent 0, the tW~thAtrtr.tt. YPP.IIIIII.u.1 I I C* Al. I*RtKF(L 'WW ~RJ).anat BMI IA,nl H~.ht.r&*ID read, t*) nrttr. x 1111~1 Tlru Tell1 Junt .' - The. I'trr~.h * nn- W T A lnW.d#*ll rf. 1ny lht QW :t:/lh. I~WJ melt lirld (errlgoty. .]lenre, uGr, \vr l'r- *$dent iwtlatr her wr-lvm \I\~O,.I. nthn ftw 1' .\ 1 -01,' I . m-rum" the dutll~ot Ocrltinrv md hMk Xmwtf ma9 b. rrrn ti hr g.,co Inq * ' thv 'a Aavthrr Inr~rr.m )'III~U@UCDF tvrt-tlit~ r- , .. recmiteri el even candidates 2nd only five of them zot elected. Semlin was not even able to secure re-nomination in Yale and Charles Wilson of 0 2 the 2onservat ives went down to defeat against !.:art in in 'Jancouver . Tbrtin could probably have bargained for nore support, b~t

The Provinc2's cartoon of Little Joe the Orossing Sweeper beine pushed away by the const,abIe labeled 'publ3.c opinion' illustrates the general out;aome of the election, albeit i.n a hostile way. Althoush Ilartin had probably obtxined the l.arcest followins of my leader, it was not a majority and althau;7h *,he others were divided on most issues, the7 could ail agree on opposition to ::artin, so he h3d to go.

Yastin would be partic1172rl.y nnxious thst someone as independent from the C.P.?. as possible should tdce over, and after having worked with James Dunsmuir in the fight to defeat Semlin, and considering the

~JancoirverTsiand fjpre to he sozething of a power in his own right, he 63 recomenried the .appointment to the I,i e7it enant Tavernor, who agreed. He tendered his resignation on the fourteenth of June, and, tired and lonely, 612 he went to see his mother and farnily in 3etroit for a rest. 1ZcInnos' fate had become tied to :krtin's, The Nembers-elect met in :Jancouver, md on t,he ei~hteenthof June they endorsed s resolution from ?,.G.Tntlon and iichard :,'cnride requesting the dismissal of the Ueu- tenant kvernor. 1,aurier wrote to zsk for I lc Innos f resignat ion, but Xc hnes refllsed, c?a,ixing that his decision to disxiss Semlin had been sustained i.n the election. He insisted that the Legislature be assembled before any dec'islon be taken on the propriety of his actions, but under pressure from

2.C. Prior, the Conserva.tive Y. P. from Victoria, and many others, Laurier sent a wire to 'kfnnes on the twentieth of dune infomrinj him that he rms 6 5 diaraissed and that the man originally rumoured for the appointment would now zet the post. Sir !!enri ,Joly de Ilotbiniere was the new Lieutenant

?x>verr,or of the province. The Vmcouvor qnd Victorit? Liberal. Associc?tions 6 6 p~ot,est,edthe dismiswl, but to no avai3. Joly was to be just as srbit- ram as ?IcInnes had been, but he was not to make the fatal mistake of appointin,: lFart in to anything. From :.laytints viewpoint (2nd certainly from ~c~nneat),the

Preniership experiment had been a failure, but from the viewpoint of J. J.

TIi31., the results were yit,e ~~tisfacto~j.I5wtj.n had created a group of support crs in the Fhuse that \muld 1Jkely be bf considerabl e i.nf hence, and a.lthot~shthe Premiership was now out of friendly hands, it was also

91lt, of the control of the 7.P,!'. , and i.f %..rtin could establish a good tmrkine re1 stionship with the new Premier, then the m~inproject of the might st2.11. be si~ccessfullycompleted. 3.%lonist., 57 Sept. 169, p.\ 8 - /+.an inference from ?kInnes back round and Sen7 i nt s performance

?.quote from Stanley, "A Constj.tut.i.ona1 Crisis in n.C.", p.282. see also Saywell, The EXcInnes Tncident in F.C." and The flffice of Lieutenant Chvernor, and Ormsby, Brit ish Columbia : A History, p.331 6,Stanley, op cit, p.283

7.?tnnley, op c3 t', p.?R3

7. Tbid

10, information on Sox deduced from !>organ, Canadian Men and Women of the Time, and Houston, The Annual Ptnancial Y.eview

Il ."cioin, The %sh For Swi l s, 11.72, and 9.A .*ircGre~or,The Province, 20 Sept. 1955 (clipping in Vancouver Cifly ~rchives)

2.2. Ibid, p.72

I!+. an inference from the3 s simi lnr backround and beliefs and the manner in which the announs ement of %rtl n' s appointment and the arrival of YcInnes to prorogue took place in a co-ordinated fashion.

15.c: RPPI3lDlX, table for Senlin 1900 session

16.cf AP?3DTX, table for Semlin 1900 session

1.7.9n inference fronthe defection of Prentice to the Turnerites to defeat S~?ml.inand hls subsequent appointment to the Dunsmuir cabinet. Preritice had been 8n independent reform man who did provide the key swing vote to down Semlin. ?.!artin was leading the effort to defeat Semlia, and if Dunsmuir promised Prentice a cabinet spot if he would defect (as did happen) then Yartin and Ilunsrn11i.r must have been working together at least tacitly. This kind of hference is typical of much of the reasoning in the thesis. In the absence of hard information, much in- ferential reasoning was necessary to make some sense out of the very odd sequences of events of the time. 18.from the Legislative Journals 1900

1?.Stsnley, op c$t, p.2e5

%.Robin, op cit, p.72

21..StanZey, op cit, p.285

22. Journals 1300, p. 43

23.an inference from the co-ordination of the announcement and the arrival to prorowe. see footnote 14

21,. Journals 1900, p. 43

25, The Journal s 3.300 records J .I-! .?dartiri as being the sole vote supporting

27,Times,- 1 March 1900, p.5; 3 :larch 1900, p.8; etc* ?8.Stmley, op cit, p.287

;?9,Nartin to Xoncrieff (an old friend of his who was editor of the Winni~ep; ~ribune)6 Farch 1900, Xorlcri sff Papers, XPA

30.Colonist, 4 March 1.900, p.1 \

31..Ibid

?2.Solonist, 8 Narch 1900, p,e

33.0rmsby, op cit, p.323

34,as told by C.Norrnan Senior, Colonist, 4 h!arch 1962, p.10. Senior apparently worked for Xartin on the even in^ Journal experiment in 2915.

35. information fron the 1901 Parliamentary Guide 36 .F.W.Howay, nPoLitica.l History 1871-19131', p. 225 49

37. c f Inwarrf Zorrespondence, Premi ers Papers 1900, PARC

38.an inference from the mznner of their appointment and their later behaviour, Kart,in was no fool. and he would certainly know that his appointments were not cordon bleu.

39.Stanler, ap cit, p.288 40. c f . Inward Correspondent e, Premiers Papers 1900, PARG !+l,Ibid, letter rec'd 7 Xarch 1900

42.Tbid, letter rec'd 29 !larch 1900 4?.Ibid, letter rec'd 3 April 1900 , 44.Tbid, letter rec'd 9 April 1900 b5.cf affidavit of E.A.Gardiner, The Province, 7 June 1900, pel 46,0rmsby, op cit, p.?.U,

l~7.&id, p. 317

&?.Ibid; p. 316 -% 49 .&Lagan to Laurier, 3 Yarch 1300, p.42937, Laurier Papers PAC

50.llch.gan to Laurier, 2? Tbrch 1900, p.42938, Laurier Papers PAC 51. Jaurier to ?kLtlgan, 4 April 1900, p,1+2945, Laurier Papers PAC 52,Laurier to I~cLa~an,4 April. 1.900, p.42948, Laurier Papers PAC

53.as published in the !forld of 9 ??arch 1900, p.1, for a comparison, see the Conservative platform in The Province of 4 June 1900, pel

54.Xorton, Honest John Oliver, p.61

55.The Province, 6 April 1900, p.1 56,The Province, 7 April. 1900, p.1 5?.0rmsby, op cit, p.322

56.,The Province, 2 June 1900, p.4 59.The Province, 4 June 1900, p.1 6o.cf. telegramme file #60356, C .P.E1.Corporate Archives 61.?.W.How,zy9 op cit, p. 226

62,rcturns a composite of information published in both the Colonist and The Province from 23 !ky 1900 to 11 June 1900 63,both Robin (p.74) and Ormsby (pe?23) indicate that :4cImes chose Dunsmuir. It is my inference that )!artin chose Dunsmuir and secommended him to fkInnes based on how the two men must have co-operated in the Ilouse and from the fact that E.G. Prior, an old friend of Dunsrnuir's was the leading advocate of removing KcInnes. The Lieutenant Governor would be unlikely to choose a man who was tryin: to have him removed. 6t+.from a letter of Xrs. Xaurice James (~ose~htsniece) in the possession of Xrs. Kaq Nairn (another niece of ~osephts)

65.Stanley, op cit, p. 291 bh.Omsby, op cit, p.324 While in the YJnited States, Xart5.n undoubtedly conferred with J.J.Hi.11. A number of internatLona1 developments were confirming tTillts vision of a 3ucratlve trade with the lands across the Pacific. Tons of inval.uable art relics from China were on their way to Vancouver to be trans- shipped by the Z.P.3. to the Royal Ontario Ftuseum - booty seized by the european Imperial pwers during their savage repression of the Boxer Reb- 1 ellion. Hill's asents had reported that wheat and lumber would be valuable 2 tredinz goods as well as the rnlnera.1~for Japan - his timber operations 3 in British Columbia now looked very attractive indeed. Further, the Zhinese 4 &stern Railway through Xanchuriz was now finished and the t ransaiberian 5 milway, ten years in the construction, was due to be completed in 1901,

These lines would open up the cheap labour pool of Asia to the capital, expertise, and raw resources of North America. The potential was immense.

The 7. P.R. was quite aware of the possibilities too, and was preparing to send William Xhyte, second vice president of the C.P.9. (and an old enemy 0 of riIartints from Manitoba ), to Nosoow to enquire into the technicalities of establishi nz a cortunercial interchange at Vladivostok with C. P.R. steam- 7 ships out of Vancouver, Other railway promoters such as Mackenzie and Ihnn of the Canadian Northern and Charles M.Hays of the Grand Trulk Pacific must have been quite cognizant of the Orient trade as well, but they all had a coriimon interest in keeping as much of their plans from the public as they

could. Government subsidies would appear necessary and reasonable if they were thou~htto be inducements to open up a vast new country that might have a peat future but little in the way of immediate returns that would

allow capitalist investors a chance to profit from their risks. But if those same subsidies were seen as giveaways to political friends to build small links in vast t rans-Pacific trading sbhemes, then popular enthusiasm

for the subsidies would probably be dimmed somewhat. Hill would therefore want the coast to Xootenay railway to appear as purely a local project,

perhaps capitalizing on anti-east ern senthent s in British Columbia to

siqgest that Vancouver was to be n major beneficiary of the line, If Xartin were able to arranee this, generous financing for his activities would be

available. Surely there would be some local provincial business men who would profit from such a line? And surely the Dominion government could be persuaded to help in the financing for the line? Wartin returned to Rritish 3olumbia determined to continue

and enlarge upon the working relationship that he had established with

Dunsmuir with a view to getting government support for the coast to Koot-

enay project. His last officfal .?ct as Premier had been to issue a. proclam- ation, under the signature of Lleut enant Governor Kc Jnnes, summoning the House for the fifth of July. The political turmoil of the last gear had

preoccupied the Legislat,ure and there had been little attention to routine

government business for quite some time. There tes 3 backlog of bills to

pass, including a vote for suppl.y, so that the Sivil Service could carry

on properly, so an early meeting of the House was indispensible. Premier

3unsmuir's first official zct was to issue a new proclahstion, postponing

the call to the ninteenth of July. The election results had clearly shown that ";ar*ti.n was not acceptable 2s Premier but they had not endorsed anyone

else i.n particul-ar to assume office in his own right. Dunsmuir(s appoint-

ment to the Pr&ershi.p 3ave him the risht, to exercise the office, but he

still had to ;=et the backing of a majoriti in the House. There were mav

new faces in the Legislature, and they needed time to ndJust to the personal touch of Yritish 2olurnbia politics, After so ,mry,7 years of radicals and instability, bmsmuir did not have much trouble getting the support he wanted. John Turner was taken into the czh3.net to secure the backing of his old friend, and J.D.Prentice, the swing voter who had defeated Semlin

in the win ter session past, went to his reward of ministerial office, as 8 did Semlinvs other party problem, W.C.Wells. Together with TE,F.Green, Thomas

Kidd, and such re~ionalchi.eftnns as Price ~lisonof the Okanagan and J. F.Garden, ex-mayor of Vzncwver and sometime lobhiest for the C.P.R., the

new Premier had created a strong group of twenty four supporters as against

only eleven Oppositionists under IIartin. Kartin was just accepted as Leader

of the Opposition mainly for lack of any serious alternative, ,and he was 9 frequently zbsent from his post. Jn his stead, his ex-ministers, Brown

and krtis, attended to most of the duties of leading the Opposition in the House, and they had a fractious group to mznage: Nunm, Houston, and Neill were often either absent or voting aeainst their lead. Martin was

not the best e:mple for them to point to. Re was engaged in securing the

confidence of Dunsmuir and company,

A great deal of bftterness towards Martin still existed, and in a concilliatory gesture from Dunsmir, )kBride, one of his ministers, got a House resolution allowing the appointment of the Leader of the Opp- &I+ 10 osition to the :'cinin,lr, and Railway Committees and it was on the Railway

obtained its adoption by way of an amendment to the 3ules of Order to the 11 House. C .E, Poal.ey, the Chairman of the Committee (and a Director and Sec- retary to I)unsmuirrs hquimalt and Nanaimo Railway at the same time), had recommended that some standard be set for the rush of applications for rail charters that the hnmittee was being called upon to deal with and fbrtin saw this as his chance, In offering his widely admired legal skills for drafting a railway application form, he could move towards obtaining the confidence of the government : the government, of course, would be happy to have the Leader of the Opposition engaged in some technical legal job instead of opposing them in the House and accepted Martin's offer of help.

1.7arti.n used this opportunity to point o~tto Dunsmuir that the federal government, ought to be of more help in subsidizing provincial railway projects and got the Premier to start the pressure on Ottawa for better 12 consideration, He also wrote in some of his pet ideas on the regulation of freisht rates and passenger fares as a corollary to subsidization, in- terpreting his srraneemant wlth Hill in the li$t of his own beliefs. The adoption of the bill did not necessarily nczn that Dunsmuir accepted Xarti-nts outlook, !'%my of the railway chaders that the Legislature passed were never acted upon in the sense of actually building anything on the ground. Sometimes they were just triggers for waves of real estate speculation along the publicly announced routes for the new lines, which the backers 13 of 'the rail charter would have bough2; up before hand, but those projects that were serious could easily be granted any exceptions thought desirable 6 5 at the time, The main point of the bill, though, was the demonstration that, the two men wished to get alonz with one another: Dunsmuir did not wish to play another hliath to lukrtin*s David a$ had been the case with Semlin, and Hartin wished to obtain the co-operation of the Premier for the coast to Kootenay rail line. '&en Dunsinuir had been a backbencher in 1899, his main task 14 had been to prevent :brtin from assuming power, a task in which he had conspicuously failed, and his new concilliatory attitude to Iulartin did not wash well with many other members of the House. By December of 1900, the Oppositionists organized a conference in Vancouver to try and replace

>krtin with Smith Curtis as Leader of the Opposition "in consideration of 15 Xartfn*s failin2 healthw. There surely was a feeling that someone else would organize and represent their interests more effectively, so that their concern for Ftwtin*shealth was not fully real, but !&irtin was indeed ill. As a child on his father's farm in Cm;.da Vest, Xahrtfn had fallen off

a wagon and damaged his left knee. It h&d never healed completely and after

all the electioneering, it was acting up again. Yartin quashed the revolt 16 and then went into the hospital for en operation on his leg but in so doing he further altenated his Oppositionists - including his old friend Curtis. Two months later, Martin was still in hospital, this time trying to neeotiate through his new conffdante, H.TLGilmaur, to try and convince

his old running mate 3.G.l!acpherson to stay on as a Martinite. He could not, 17 and Xacpherson ran as an Independent Labour candidate, against J.F.Garden

His collusion ~5ththe government was blowing his pup apart.

By the second sitting nf the Legislature in late February of 1901, 2artL.n was back on his feet again, burstins with the old confidence, and now acting like an attorney general, He introduced ten bills, obtaining , passage of seven of them, nearly a11 of a technical legal nature. Fxamples

amending the Absconding 3ebtorrs Act (bi.11 #37) ; and an Act amending the Smictry Convictions kt (bill #39). Rartin was also having another tiff with the Iaw Society, He stated to the press that many British Columbia 18 1-avgers practised champerty and over the objections of the gar fissociat ion he introduced an Act to amend the Legal Professions Jet (bill #34) to 19 legalize the custon. This was another instance of his unfailing vindictiveness. There were several items pertaining to railways too, such as an Act amending tho Tramw.~1ncorporat.l.on Act (bill #35) and an Act to amend the pointing inexorsbly to the fact that not only did have the co-op eration of the government, he was even coming to dominate it, His influence

WBS such that he was finally able to acheive his maJor goal: at the end of the session a vote of no confidence put forth by some dissident N.L.A.Ts which, stripped of its procedural i~plications,was a vote on the Lorn Bill 20 providing support for the coast to Kootenay railway. 12wtfn had demonstrated tremendous prliamentarj prowess in manoeuverint: the eovernment as he had.

He wes successful in achoiving Pi7lfs objective af setting support for the railway, and he now set about acheivinz his am goals. The press seemed particularly slow in perceiving the budding romance between the hader of the Opposition and the Govermnt. arb I hints were articles like flScandalufi magnatumtt in the twentieth of Earth edition of the Colonist (3unsrruirfs own nm;spaper). This article posed as bein;: ? reprint from the Mew Yoyk Iforld (an allusion to Hill, who was vice president of the New York Chamber 0s. ~mertce)',and vas very 0bXquely

rased, reflecting serious dissention in# the,. 'huismuir camp at %rtints

*. ' ,I positioh of power and influence .among them. R ws: ',,fipt'tmtil the fall of 1901, however, th~tthe story of Xartinfs collusi& was kpelled out in print. Zberts was &out, to retire (de jws) as Attorney General, and Xartin 21 wns runloured a3 his swcessor. IIe did announce his support for the ~OV- erment , ht his Y op.! 15 eut enant, J .L?rrown, went i nto the czbinet instead ,? 7 o.f Yartin himself, It was a clever scheme. Xf ?:artin could dominate the

:overnment and the Opposttion too, then dissident voices could not be easib heard.

Thc d.lbnce of the ;:nrtinik,es wnd, thc forrral. nccefiance into the csbinet of Yrom wot~ldh.ve occ'-islonecl the ;?r~.vestalarm to the C.P.2.

It wou1.d hrve scened iniqlito~~sto ther? that 'hrtin had re-asserted himself efter so decisive a reverse only one year aso, lye now was dominating both the yvernmcnt and the Opposition. This sinp?;r wov1.d not do. They needed , someone to .forcefl~ll.~~presen% their viowa in the 1Touse and in politics penerallp. :%o coo3d it be? John Turner hnd gone to Tandon as the Agent 23 Cenerrl there; Prentice ad'Jells were of doubtful reliability; Tberts wanted to retire; and ihursmuir wns very nuch his own man. Who was left?

?.?chard ::a?ridel lie was sharninc, zffnbl-c?, had no enertdes, and had a solid base in his constituency. He h~dnever shown any perticular belief in any- 2b thinr. ;lust the nan for the job! The entry of Drown into the cabinet had elic5-ttad a stmnz denunciation from the provincial Zonservat ives, who had Seen 3x5 Xin: their pnrtr zlong with the Tiibera1.s. YcYride denounced the 76 appointment 3.s we13. and redwed in protest. ldth his new and powerful backer, T-kErido set about capturing the leadership of the Conservatives, becoming a real Leader of the Opposition, and above all the immediate goal of defeating 3rown in the elect5on that had to cone upon his acceptance of office. He acted with vigour and secured the return of Thomas Gifford ouer Rrown in the New Westminster by-election; through this he began to be publicly viewed as the red Leader of the Opposition; but he lost the Tonservative lezdership to Charles Vilson at the fall convention of the 27 28 party. The press tool: up the cry azainst the Zunsrntdr-Kart in combinat ion , without, of course, bein;: aware of its prpose, and the tide began to turn

against :(artin and his plans.

It was well known to pol-itical insiders that Dunsmuir was 29 rather unhappy with his job as PrerEler and wanted to get out. The struggle as to who would replace him was taking shape, liIcBride was trying to build a viable group of backers and several others were Jockeying for position

&thin gavernment circles. The ,momolous figure in the whole thhg was

Xartin. He was officially the Leader of the Opposition and so was shutting out a thnrst against the government from that quarter and that was the vital

road to office for !Ic3ri.de if he were not to waft for an election. He: knew

that he must, unseat Xartin in *,he House. Things were closing in on Xartin from the Iiiberals as well.

Honburary President of the 'Jancouver Tiiberal ilssociation, and his aide,

H .B. Gihour, was defeated ns President. Instead, Robert Kelly, the wealthy

grocery wholesaler, got in as Honourary President, setting off a feud that t:? was to kst for many years between the two men. TZ.G.l~~acpherson,the former

? 1arti.nite and Tndependent Tabour mzn, topped cXlmour for the President 7s 30 post, ?.?artin's home base was fa1.li.n~into hostile hands. He simply could not allow that to happen. !it once he began to orgenize the third convention of the Liberals for s showdown over wfio was going to sw the provincial wins of the party. About this time, Joseph Xarti.n Senior, an uncle, who had come from the home town of ?ISlton to be with some of his family that had come 31 to settle in Harrison 'El3.s in nritish ?olumbis, died. The death must have affected Joseph tTunior verj deeply for he tried to ;?et out of politics xltozether with an application to Iaurier to be appointed to the Supreme 3 2 Court of Canada, but the application was not received with favour and

?!t;rtin had to carry on with h3.s R.C. career.

tlsrtin must have convinced Hill that the control of the local

IJibernl party vmuld be a valuable thlng to have, for when the convention opened in Februar;t of 1902, his augmented power W~Squite evident. Senator

Templeman was still the recngnj zed leader of" the p-rtp from the first convention in 1397, and 'Tartints first objective would be to get rid of him.

'?uite predictablv, there was a h0tl.y contested credentials fight, but the

Yartlnites now held the upper hand from the start. Senator TemphmI was expelled from the hall and nearly all the federal people went alonc with hh.

Ia!artin then addressed the throng, making a concil,liatory speech, promising 33 to "bend his cowse in the interests of the Liberal Partytr - a party which he anticipated to be under his direction. The remaining M.L.A. rs spoke in favour of party lines in the next election and they all endorsed ??lartin as their leader.

The plat form they adopted reflected !Jartin's intentions for the hediate future: they cal led for redistribution; government ownership of public utilities (subtly changed from govement ownership of railways); guarding against monopoly interests (that is, the C. P.R. ); taxation on "privilege rather than industryt1 (an ambiguous phrase which could be intended to attract the labour vote, but, could mean taxing the C.Pb3.vs priv- ileged position rather than industrious p ill); supression of land speculation; cash grants to railways only; and encoura~ingnon-Oriental immigration. The presence of the McLean brothers (more supporters of ill's) can be detected

in the call for more dyking (the ?!cLern brothers were the leading dyking

contractors in Sritish ~olumbia);and the statement that they did not plan

any radical chanps in the mining laws would be directed at local men like

F. J .Deane, President of Copper Vines Ltd., and a prominent Liberal, as well 3 4 as the larger promoters like IIi.l.1.

Martin had captured the local Liberals, but he had done it

ham handedly and alienated the federal connections. Iaurier wrote to Xartin

and W.W.9.McXnnes that the federal Liberals were completely neutral in the 3 5 affairs of the Rrit,ish 7olumbia party, That is, they were being restrained

from attacking Ihrtin from Ottawa? And no federal ministers visited British

Columbia during the period of Martin's domination, and no federal money was 36 forthcoming for local promotional activity. Xeanwhile, F.IcRride was dbinq rather well in Opposition circles.

There were quite a few men who did not like either rXvlsmuir or Martin and were receptive to NccRride persuasion to defect to his aide. Kidd switched 7 5 back, away from Dunsmjtir, and Tat 3 ow, Taylor, !lurphy, Garden, McPhillips, and Fulton saw the li.cht as well. Together with Gifford, newly elected from

New Westminster, the I.lcBri.de group had risen to fifteen and they were a ?7 2 I much more united group thm ?tartints fo7.lowing had ever been, The Oppos- ition caucus met before the spring session started and voted confidence in YcRride as their new leader* Flushed with success, &Bride turned to the awkward problem of actually disposing of Xnrtin. There did not seem to be any easy way. Mhen the ?.:embers arrived for the opening ceremonies of the Legislature, they were surprised to see Ik3ride already in the chamber, sitting in the chair of the Leader of the Opposition! Yartin was also flushed with his recent success in capturing the R.C.Libera1s and he was outraged at NcSridets usurpation of his coveted chair. During prayers, he slipped in behind Xc3riAe and recovered his chair. then prayers were over, bIc!kide turned to see Yartin slarinc up at him, and, ili a fit of pique, he grabbed the unabashed Martin and tried ta physically throw him out of the seat. P scuffle ensued and in the shocked House, the supporters of each man 38 tusseled with one another to right their aggrevernent. A petty episode, but , conclusive evidence that Martin could not contin~tehis claim to be any real

Lender of the Oppsition.

Incredibly, i'artin used his influence with the government to 39 obtain a ITouse resolution reasserting hie right to the Opposition post. He retained the name only, however, and was really driven over to the gavemment ranks. With him he took Stables, Gilmour and XcInnes, so that with the

Opposition strength up to fifteen, and Dunsmuir himself being often absent, Martints voting bloc became vital to the survival of the government, He 7 2 40 had secured the incorporation of the Vancouver ad Coast Kootenay Railway

Company 2nd had obtained the passage of the Loan 95.11 to authorize the government to borrow the money to finance the project. The remaining i legislation would be to pass a bill actually appropriating the money that was borrowed to the railway company, (the aid bill) and this Xartin set

about arranging, A great many complications had arisen, arid many items

remained to be solved, but the main project itself seemed to be well on the

A 2. Pyle, The Life of Jmes J.Hill, ch 24, "Again the Orient Seck~ns~~

3.0rrnsby, British Columbia: A Historv, p.339 (the lSt Pault interests that she mentions must be those of ~111)

4,S1m, Shinese Railways and Pritish Interestg, p.149 (~mericanpurchase of)

p*' b !?.Gibbon, op cit, p.354-6 6. cf . Shafe, Wraordinnry Tales from Ranitoba Histoq, particularly "The Dattle of Fort ?hyteTT- ):artin leads a mob against tho COP,??. ?.Gibbon, op cit, p.355

8. an inference from the P PPTNDIX. see footnote 17, 7hnpter 3 9.from the APPENDIX table for Martin 1900

lloIbid, p-175

12.cf. Ormsby, op cS t, p.333 plus the inference that Martin was the pusher for the new policy - which, given the character of Dunsmuir, seems an eminently reasonable assumption 1.3.an inference from my studies of the inn\unerebla charters granted and the absence of construction durins the real estate boom

1&.0rmsby, op cit, p.330 15.The Provincq, 15 Dec. 1900, p.1

'I.6.both from the viewpoint that he was not doins the Job properly to start, but also he would not allow even a stand in while he was in the hospital. cf. The Province, 1e Dec. 1900, p.2

17.The Province, 2 Feb. 1901, p.5

I.9.c.f. Colonist, 15 P.ug. 1899, p.8 X).cf. nobin, The Rush For S~oils,

21,The Province, 5 Sept. 1901, p.1 23.I'bld

?4.cf, Ormsby, op cit, p.333 for description of Yc3ride

25. for a brief treatment of this era from the Conservative viewpoint, see Hunt, The P~liticsl7areer of Sir %.chard XcRrjde, p.12-3

2R. see "A Shower of 3ouquetst', The Province, 7 Sept . 1901, pa 4 a.Ja,ckman, The Men at, Tam ?ast3e, p.87. see also Jackman's chapter on Dunsmuir in hi.s Fortraits of the Premiers

3O.The Province, 11 Oct. 1901, p.1

37.Xartin to Iaririer, 21 Jan, 1902, p.61750, Taurier P ers PAC 33 .Hopkins, The Canadian knnual Review of Public AfEairg 1902, p*62

34, Ibid, p. 82

35.1,aurier to Martin, 20 Jan. 1902, p.61513, hurier Papers, PAC

36.!?a,rd, Federal Provincizl, Re1 &ion:; LJithin the Liberal P~~Yof B. C., p.36 37.cf. APPTJnIX far comparison of tables for 1?Ol-l9Q2

39. Journals 1902, p. 5 bO. the Vancouver and 'hst Koot enay ?ailway was thought by some to be just a renaminfi of the Victoria, Vancouver and Fastern Railway - see Hopkfns, Cenadinn ?,nnunl !?eview, p.79 (for 1902). The WQE was known to be owned by Hill - see Noway, Saee Rc Angus, British Sol.umbia and the Unitec? States, p.252, and go on to p.257 for the exploitation of the Xootenays by the Great h'orthern, etc, CHAIPRAN OF THE RAIWAY CQ*2CITTFZ

On the same day that Martin was affirmed by the government as Leader of the Opposition, Premier Dunsmuir brought his old friend, E.G.

Prior, into the cabinet to fill the vacancy occasioned by RrownTs resig- 1 nation the previous September, This new :,lin.ister ww an anti-Martinite, but the appointment was not all. bad for ?Partin. Prior was later to run in a by-election against E.V.Bodwel1 (and win) both campaigning on a Canadian Northern ticket, so that Prior was an 4.1~for what was becoming ?.!artin's railway grand desl-gn, Further, XcRride's seizure of the Opposition Leader's chair was awkward for Martin, as now there was an effective avenue for protest in the House against, his plans. Bein& driven into the governmentrs ranks really forced hirn to act before he was fully ready, but with his bloc providing vital support for the Dtmswtirites, he had to move then or risk not moving at all.

?4artin?s efforts to impl-ement Hillts plans for the coast to

Kootehay railway were becomin~enormously complicated, and in effect, turning into a grnnd design. There seemed to be a never-ending stream of people to orchestrate into a workable deal, each having his own objectives. Dunsmuir was anxious to sell his Zsquirnalt and h'anaimo Railway on Vancouver Island 2 but Hill was not really interested in buying it. Plartin saw that Dunsmuf r' s goodwill and free co-operation came at the price of arranging an advantageous sale of his railway, so, somewhere, a buyer had to be found, Luckily, he did not have to look too far: the irrepressible team of Nackenzie apd 3Iann were eager to build a line into British hl1mbia to complete their 3 route to the Pacific and were quite prepared to negotiate a deal with Dunsmuir if he would aeree to provide governmental backing for their line across the province. The problem here was that, as always, Nackenzie and

Mann did not have the funds to put up for the purchase of the Esquimlt tc and Nanaimo. The financing for the pwchase had to be kept quiet as well so that Dunsmuir could easily buy out his father's pzrtners in Zalifornia for a reasonable price. Yartin strug&d to convince ?Till. that he ought to put up the money so that the local arrangements could be proceeded with, and he would have pointed out to Hi3.1 that Kackenzie and Mann could repay the loan of the money with Canadian wheat from the prairies that could be 5 used in the overall. trans-Paci.fic scheme.

The public was kept in the dark by a spate of confusing press stories, and natusnlly, as nuch inforrratior, had to be kept from the C.P.R. as could be managed so that they would not be able to anticipate their plans and organize against them. In a sense, the new lines that had to be worked into the overall plan were helpful as they served to further confuse the structure of the main plan. In the past year, Xartin had made great strides in recruiting 6 supporters for his railway projects. With the help of John Hendry, Pres- ident, of Hill's Victoria, Vancower and Eastern Eaihay, and the McLean brothers, who expected to get a substantial portion of the rail construct- 7 ion business, brtin had convinced Prank Stilman Darnard to take a big gamble and emulate ?4ackenzie and Mann on a provincial basis. Barnard had 8 agreed to sit on the Roard of their Vancouver and Coast Kootenay Rail~w and lend what influence he could nuster to support the plan. In return, Xartin promised to help Rarnard, He was on the Board of the Pacific North-

ern and Ordneca Railway (captain John Imting(s project) which was arrang- ins for extensions of its Wonton to Kitimaat route to build up into the 9 gold rush area. Yfrtin promised to assist this plan of theirs by increas-

ing their subsidy from the government to $5000 per mile, and as an added benefit, he was prepared to help Sarnardts Okanagan Land Development Cow 10 pany. In this ancilliary deal he had also recruited Price Ellison, the 11 cattle king of the Okanagan. Martin projected a line from Midway (the

gateway from the Kootenays to the coast) to run up into Vernon in the Ok-

anagan. This new railroad would provide the long sought after competition for the C.P.R., and greatly increase land prices in their region - a factor which would redound handsomely to the two men,

Vociferously opposed to the railway deals were the ex4Jfartin-

ites Smith Curtis and John Oliver. Oliver was publicly pressured to support

the coast to Kootenay U.ne by Thomas Ellis Ladner, a highly influential

constituent, who stood to gain great17 from where the line passed through 12 his ares. Oliver was a former Methodist minister and his sense of right- eousness drove him into two of the major scandals of the year, one of them blowing up far larger than he originally thought that it could.

The public had railway fever, Railways appeared as a symbol

of (progress* and (cEvil.ization( and the politicians of the era rode the

wave of popular demand for their construction. All three levels of govern- mentwere active: municipal councils did what they could to encourage rail-

whys to pass through their cities on an advantageous route; the provinces

viewed the railroads as a means of turning their potential into prosperity 78 and they fo1.lowed a policy of encouraging the lines with generous grants of cesh and land; the federal government shar-ed the same outlook with the same policy and was additionally concerned with trying to tie Confederation together. In Ottawa, the !?,ailwpy Cons~Atteeof the Privy Council considered the various applications for federal aid, but it was coming under increasing criticism Prom an indignant pub15c which felt that the governmentts largesse was often more concerned with the benefits to accrue to the friends of the prty in power rather than the benefits to the nation as a whole. E3y 1904 the 3oard of Railway Cornml.ssi.oners took r;iS.lway financing an armts length away from immediate party politics, but in 1302, the old system was still in effect. Successful rail* promoters in nritish Columbia were expected to e<,to the federal Committee for aid under 3unsmuists policy, but in 1902 the federal. body did nothing of much signifigance for British Columbia, so for that year, the primry fociis of rdlway activity for the P~cificpro- 1 Q vince was on the Railway CoNnJ.ttee of the British Columbia Legislature. The Sritish Columbia Legislative session of 1902 was long and contentious. The main issues were railways, alien and immigration mat- 14 ters, redistributian. Some of the bills had wide implications which peripherally related to railways, such as the measure which repealed the prohibition on the employment of aliens on government subsidized railway projects. There was ~IAXIconsiderable railway hoopla which did not emanate from the House. The opening of the Kettle Xver Valley Railway on the twelfth of April was greeted ~5thmuch accl.aim. The line was imtgurated by one Tracy :'J.Holland wht, was similtaneously Ilayor of Grand Forks and General 15 Nanager of the railway. There was no suggestion that it might be improper for him to hold the dual employment. There wazs also the report of the

Nanaimo Board of Trade upon "returning from Ottawa to Victoria to persuade 10 James hulsrn~~irto build the :omox and Cape Scott TZailway", and an even 17 more fanc9ful proposal to bui.ld a railway under the Bering Straits, but the really signifigant projects, unbeknomst to nearly all the people of the province, were the three bills that Martin was orchestrating in the House. On the Railway Committee in 1902 were eighteen men. Martin was the Chairman, and his aide, Sf.W.B,l~lcInnes, was the Secretary. With the support of his follower, H.B.Gilmour, and the help of Price mlison, Ma.rtin held the balance of power on the Cormittee as he did in the House.

Joseph lltmter, vice president of the Esquimalt and Nanabo

Railway, and Xchard Tlall, probably the exclusive distributor of Dunsmuir coal on Vancouver Tsl.and, led the hnsrnuir faction of John Houston, C.W.D* Xifford, S.A.3ogers and A.W.Srdth.

X33ride'*s Oppositionists were I.ed by A*E*McPhfllips, *o, with

E. C .Smith, the ax-??artinit e, had previously acted on behalf of Senator 18 George A .Cox. They were supported by Thorns Taylor and PoJ. Fulton, Thomas

Giff ord, Deni s 3lurphy, C .';J.PZunro, and J. ?.Garden were other Oppositiodsts who defect,ed to vote in favolar of the key aid bill for the coast to KO&- enar line. Small items they considered were bill #29, an amendment to the C. P.2. ts charter for the Vancouver and Westminster Railway Company to extend their deadline for completion of their work; and bill #93, the aid and tax exemption for the ??.idway and Vernon nailway Company fulfilling

?.brtin*s pledge to Price Xllison. With bill #30, the increase in aid and rodifinition of route for the Pacific Northern and Mneca, the promises to Frank Barnard were also co~pleted.The vital. bills, however, were 19 numbers 86, 85A, and 34. Bill #% was the Act to provide subsidy funds to build the

Vancouver and Coast Xootenay Railway, or as the project had come to be called, the Xidway to Vancouver bill. Edway was the gateway to the Kootenays and the change of name for the bill created the impression that this was a new pro2ect quite seperate from the earlier Vancouver and Soast Kootenay project, but it was, in fact, one and the same thing. This was also the bill that five Oppositionists broke ranks to vote for. John Oliver got the bill amended to prohibit any crossing of the line into the United States, but to do so would indicate that he did not fully understand the intent of the bill. KO crossing into the kited States would be necessary or even desirable. Hill would build the line right down to the coast in British

Columbia to get the maximum subsidy for the project. Hill's real intentions thereafter were guessed at in some newsppper stories of the time. The Pro- -vince, in a front page story on the ninteenth of Jvme suggested that in essence, the Vancouver and Coast Kootenay Railway was the same as the Vict- oria, Vancouver and Eastern 2ail.way (a subsidiary of Hill's Great ~orthern).

There were many other stories on the rail deals of that year, but the best one was Wade's as pub2ished in The Province of the seventh of May. wade took a rather jaded view of the intentions of the Dunsmuir government. He insisted that the Vancouver mentioned in the bill was not Vancouver City at All, but rather Vancouver Island: that the line was to link with the

Great Northern line in Ladner (thus benefitting ~.~.~adner]with only a spur R 1 line north into TJ~ncouver3ity; that the ferry system in the bill. would

cross to Sidney on Vancouver Island and there Ilnk up with the Great

Northern's Victoria and Sidney Railway, thus making Victoria the real ter-

minus of the line. Wade was likely only partly right. Vancouver would not

be the terminus of the line. Premeir Dunsmuir probably insisted that the

ferry system make Victoria the real terminus of the line, but Hill's intentions more probably were focused on his Ladner link, the New Westminster Southern, to trans-ship the Kootenays ore down to Seattle and thus bypass knsmuir and Victorla altogether and save himself the cost of the ferry 20 system which would rea1l.y only be a burden to Hill. Thus Hill's British

Columbia. phase of his great trading plans was set.

5131 #85A was a replacement on the order paper far the ori.3- ha1 bill #85, the Queen Charlotte Islands Railway bill which was inexplfc- ab1.y dropped, Perhaps the importance of the replacement was sufficf ent to simply crowd out the lesser bill.

During an interview with Iifackenzie and Mann, Premier Dunsmuir produced his fathert s old 7anadian Western Central Railway charter which 21 granted him the right to build from the Yellowhead Pass to Rute Inlet (a harbour 11.0 miles north of Va.ncouver). The route had been rendered rather obsolete by the rise of Vancouver, but 3imsmilir had a new idea. If the line were built, and a ferry system linked it to the Island, then victoria would stand a chmce of recapturine its old pre-eminence over the mainland* The ferries could further mesh with Dunsmuirfs plans to sell the Esquimlt and

Ranairno. If the ferries landed at Nanairno, then the Island railway could be the last link in the new trans-provincial route into Victoria. If Hill were goin5 to tedn&,e hi.s const Kootenay line in Victoria, then how could 22 Mackenzie and Xann be reticent to do the sme? They agreed.

Bill #Ff5A was the legislation to implement their agreement.

It is entitled An Act to Aid the Zonstruction of a Railway from Victoria to Yellowhead Pass, and the statute envisaged a line to run from the Yellow- head Pass to Rute In1et - & Victoria as the title would suggest. The line was to be built by the honton, Yukon and Pacific Railway, which was owned by 3kckenzie and Yann. A careful reading of the statute shows their intentions quite clearly: ". .. it being the true meaning and intent of this Act to provide for the construction of a continuous line of transportation from the eastern boundary of British Zolumbia at or near the Yellowhead Pass to a point on the seaboard at or near Bute Inlet; thence by ferry to Vancouver

Island; thence by the Victoria and Seymour ra~rowsRailway or the FsaWlt 23 and Nan~limoRailway to Vi~toria..,~ The statute provides aid to the Ed- monton, Yukon and Pacific and to the Victoria and Seymour Narrows Companies to the tune of $5000 per mi.le, and the whale plan is contingent upon the granting of aid by the Dominion government, as was Dunamuir's policy. Pichard Hall introduced bill #34, An Act to Incorporate the

Victoria and Seymour Marrows Raflway Company, and touched off a storm of protest. Smith Curtis charged in the Rouse that the campany was simpb a 24 device to raise the $3 rni.llions of its capital stock. This is just exactly what it was. Hill could quietly put up the money to buy the stock of the Victoria and Seymour Narrows which would be used by Mackenzie and Mann (as the quid pro quo for the coast Rootenay line) for the purchase of the &- quimalt and Nanaimo, thus satisfying the terms of their own statute. Thus, Hil,l. would end up with his subsidized coast Kootenay railroad, PIUSthe indirect ownership of the Zsquimalt and Nanaimo which would be held as a kind of mortgage pending his repayment by Nackenzie and Mann as they ship ped wheat into Hillts trans-Pacific trading scheme. Dunsmuir would sell his railway at a handsome price as he wanted to do, and Xackenzie and b.nn would end up with their Pacific link for their national rail network. And the general public, throu~htheir taxes, would contribute generously to the scheme. A very neat arrangement, In total, the railway packaee that

Xartin had put together was a kind of revolt against the C.P.3. They would now have competinq lines tor the Canadian bilsiness as well as for their own efforts to establish a trans-Pacific trading empire. This they could not tolerate. Zichard !farpole, the western general superintendant of the C.P.R. would be under tremendous pressure to kill the package any way he could,

1 If he were unable to arrange the defeat of the deal in the House, then another way would have to be found.

James N.Greenshie1.d~ was proposed for the Board of Directors 25 of the Victoria and Se,vmc>l~rNarrows Railwi~y and he was to prove to be

Marpole's key to success and Xartinr s undoin,:. Karpole probably passed

along to Richard TkRride the information that Greenshields was a solicitor for the Canadian Northern nailway 4.n Nontreal, and I4cBride discovered that Oreenshi elds had been appointed by Dunsrnuir as the provincial gover&ent

agent to negotf.a.te the deal for the Victoria and Yellowhead Pass line Kith 26 the monton, Yukon and Pacific, a Sanzdim Northern subsidiary. Was it

not improper, 17cBride asked in the House, for the solicitor of the Canadian

Northern Railway to be appointed as a provincial agent to arrange a contract with a Canadian Northern subsidiary? And could Greenshields then reasonably be on the Board of one of the lines envisaged in the resultant legislation? He pressed for an inquiry into the issue and the press picked it up, strong- 27 ly indignant at such a state of affairs. With newspzpers printing indignant stories, and 3k3ride pushing in the House, an. inquiry loomed large. Dunsmuir, already unhappy in his role as Premier, would not w,mt to face a scandal, And scandals started to break out everywhere. In an effort to neutralize John Oliver**s support for the coast to Kootenay line, it was revealed (pobably thro~izhthe graces of the C.P.R.,whrr)l would be best able to obtain the information) that Oliver was bidding on some railway construct- 28 ion contracts on behalf of the Olalla Xining Company of New York and

Oliverts reply was Lo press certain questions in the House over the propriety of sorne government payments to the Columbia and Western Railway (a

C. P.R. subsidiary). A Select Committee of the Ifause was struck to inquire

into the matter, with Joseph ::artin as 2hairmzm, and Oliver, XcBri.de, A.W.

Smith and Joseph Hunter as members. Obviously, ~5thsuch important M.L.A.fs 29 sitting on the inquiry, it was to be a major investigation, and a strong blow at the C.P.R.

As it happened, the investieat ion concerned F. L. Carter-Cotton

end his relationship with the 2. P.3. while he had been Unister of Finance in the Semlin e$mi.nist rztion, As Cart er-Cotton was interrogated in the

Ledslative Committee room, the issues seemed to get broadas rather than bein& resolved. The investigation led to the all-engulfing Colmbia and

Western scandal of the nett year. The details of the matter are quite corn- 85 plicated as one mi9t expect. Very briefly, the allegations developed as follows: the C.P.Z., throush its subsidit?ry, the Columbia and Western, was dissatisfied ~5thsome of the land that it had been granted under a construction agreement with the government of Brj-tish Columbia for a railway in the interior of the province. Popular feelings had heen growlne; that land grants were just too nuch of a eiveaway and that grants ought to be on a cash only basis. With this as one of their committments, the Semlin group was installed 5.n office after the 1898 election. Carterdotton, as

Xinister of Finance, was responsible for disbersing the grants as the railways became entitled to receive them. The C.P.S., however, was not interested in the cash, It wanted to select alternate blocks of land not dir-

ect?~ contiguous to its trackage in replacement for the land that it had alreaqv been granted and had I.ated been follnd to be worthless. Further, the Columbia and !?estern was bound by its contract to complete its line ria% through to Penticton before it would be entitled to any grant of hnd at all. The line had not in fact been built through to Penticton, but stopped

9.n the mineral rich Soundary Creek area. The Select Sommittee &shed to

discover by what sequence of events the C. P.3. had received its land grants to which it was not legally entitled; a-vld how it had obtained the land not originally set aside for it in the contraot, but rather the land it wanted which was reputed to contain oil. Further, how had ?

able to sell what were suppsed to be the C.P.R.(s obligations to build through to Penticton, to tho Victoria, Vancouver and F~sternZailway of 30 Ja&s J.Nill? A provoc&ive question Indeed. :!artin had earlier made

allegations that Cart er-Cotton had falsified the minutes of the .Executive 9t'l

Cowslf j $hat he had aowftted breach of trust &th asme valuable praperty

in his care; and that he had earlier fled the State of Colorado over 31 certaPn finapcial problem, Hartin seamed to be suggest in^ that Carter-

Cotton and the Zolmbia and Iiest ern con~mdrwnwere illicitly connected.

The puzzle was not sdved with Xartinfs Select Committee and by the time the full inquiry got underway the next year, I4artin was out of power and unable to influence its proceedines ,

I'leantJhile, Premier Dmsmuir, under the threat of the Green- shields inquiry, delayed the as ].ongas he could to give himself

time to buy out the Pacific 2ua.rtet From their interest in the Esquhalt

and Nanaimo, but he could not hold out long enough, In November of 1902, he decided to resign gracefully and pass on his office to his heir apparent, X.G.Prior, "who had only Joined the cabinet to assist the passage ofthe 32 Y ellowhead Pass billt1.

Olearly, Prior, from the C. P.R. 1s viewpoint, was just -as un-

acceptable as Dunsmuir had been, and Prior was in a weaker position. Along

with XcBride, Prior had been unable to secure the provincial leadership

of the Conservatives and Dmsmuirf s early resjgantion forced him into the Premiership before he was really ready for the spot. He had detached bZc-

Innes from Xartin by getting him to accept a cabinet post and Stables arld Giilmour stayed on the government benches too. Rut even with this support he

only had 2, majority of one in the House. He would have to go to an election soon, And Priorfs weakness was the product of a split in the Great North-

erh camp.

Ilmtinls leg had swollen up again and he was back in the ?7 33 hospital. Ye had an operation to perlove some bones which were not properly in place and the oper?,tlon WLS a failure, During 1-Iartints absence from politics, Prior had come to terns with his foll-owers. His personal dislike for Hartin mzde him try to dispose of the importance of the man, but Prior was to find that ':artin's vindictiveness, once aroused, was a full Opposition 3 4 in itself. Denis :IurpQ, a Prior minister, had resigned without explanation

(prob2bly for some special consideration from the G. p.3.) and Prior needed n replacement quicku. I!artin*s doctors mivised him that he would need six months to recover from the oprztion, but Thrtin decided to have his leg 3 5 amputated so that he could camy on with politics iImediately. He came out of the hospital fighti.ng: he denounced Prior, insisting that he stood for nothing except obstruction to tho party line movement (end the Cons- ./TA .' ervatives agreed). Of course, as provincial leader of the Uberals, :*Iartin would want party lines to amplify his om position.

A by-election was called in Xurphyts seat of West Yale and the Prior men nominated n Dr. Sanson to contest the seat, but Charles Semlin, the Premier that %rtin had fousht, so viciously, was nominated for the 37 Oppositionists. The C.P.R. would also likely support anyone who was running against Prior, so 1Iartin was faced with FIobsonts choice: who to supprt?

A diplomat might su~gestdoing nothinz, but that wrcs not Martin's style.

I+Ie could not all-ow Prior to get away with seducing his followers &y from 38 him and he Iwpd fnto the cmpaip on hahalfof Semlin. This action would be seen with soce anger by Hill: Prjor was a supporter of his railway plans and now 'Iartin, hf s Yrltish Columbia lieuten,mt, was fighting him. Semlin was handily elected, and the survival of the Prior government now looked doubtful indeed. Hill would be furious, and would c?Laost certainly cut off Br?

Xartints fundinz. At once, everythjn~bezan to slide for the hapless warrior.

%en the Howe cane into the 1903 session, the Columbia and

Vestern scandal dorinated its proceedings, but Prior hung on and could not be defeated on any floor vote. Again scanda.1. reared its head. Prior was

discovered to have influenced the zwarding of government contracts to his own firm, and without trial, Lieutenant Sovernor Joly dismissed him and

called itichard ;IcBri.de to tho Preriiiershlp. .4 very convenient sequence of

events for the C.P.R. XcBride was not the le~.derof the Conservatives, and

due to the vital supprt that, he had from both Liberals and Conservatives,

everyone just assumed that he would carry on with the old partg system.

At this time, however, :?artin's leadership of the Liberals

was comine under serious question. His home base, Vancouver, now under the

leadership of his opponents Tobert Kelly and R .C ,Macpherson, moved that the provincial executive be asked to hold a convention with the implication 39 that Martin*s status be reviewed. If party lines were coming, then liartin would be particularly anxious to retain his position with the Liberals so

that he could implement the railway deal himself and recoup his backing

from Hill.. At a stormy meeting of the Vancouver Liberals on the seventeenth

of Xarch, Kartin was unable to ,set then1 to rescind their request for a con- 40 vention. !!en like John Ollver, J C .Brown, F. J .Denne, J. A .Macdonald, ~t11hl"t

Henderson and W.W.S.kInnes were widely thnught'of as possible successors 41 to Martin. Xith the federal Liberals openly split away from the party (they

had walked out of Ilartin' s convention when he hod ousted Senator Templeman

AS ieader of the party) and even the provincials fighting amongst themselves,

any pretense of Liberal unity was a joke. This could not have escaped the wily ?kf3ride and hia advisors. Should he declare party lines and rally the

Sonsemratives to his side, he could not help but, benefit f,mm the chaos in

Liberal ranks. I-Te would lose some val~iahl..esupporters to be sure, but by being seen respondin3 to the popular call for party lines and running a strictly C~nse~mwtiveticket, he would stand a good chance of regaining 1+2 the foregone support. This gamble he took, On the second of June he formed an exclusively Conservative cabinet, pih through a couple of routine bil.ls, 43

The day following Ti!cBride's formation of the cabinet ahd the election call, the provincial executive of the Iliberals met to consider the call for convention. lifter a heated debate on the issue, Xartin suddenly 44 stunned them all by resigning as leader on the spot. This can only be understood in the Ij-zht of I7nrtin's impulsive rebelliousness and the frust- ration that he wou7.d be feelin2 at watchins his carefully crafted grand railway plans being brou~htdown by people who knew little of what they were doing. Thc exgcutive unnnimotlsly o?ted for no leader at all for the 45 upconing election.

In a l.ast desper~teeffort to save his scheme, Hartin applied 46 for the Chaimanship of the federal nailways Commission, but, of course, no federal favours were forthcoritin~, and, in weakened health after his

amputation, the gloom seemed 81.1-pervasive,

?!adin had lost his sp5.ri.t. He did little campaigning, and

on electfan dar, in a surprise upset, the Conservzt4ves swept Vancouver, 1,7 downing l?artin bsdly. 3ut the provincial results were not so conclusive. The f:c%Fdc ~Corrservr.t,iveselected ninteen men, the Liberals eighteen, and 48 the Soci.dists two. The returns did not establ.ish KcI3ri.de as a winner with a clear majority. Tn reaction to his personal defeat, Ilarti-n bitterly tt9 declared that he was finished with politics forever and without any recomized lender to dispute :?cDride's claim to power, the Liberals lost by default. Liberal-Iabour coal.itions were within the traditions of the

Liberals and they could have created a partnership with the Socialists and formed the government, so Prom this viewpoint, 1'9rtin effectively handed over power to the :oneervatives, and all as a product of his failed railway deal.. 2.

FCOTNOTZ l.Hopkins, Canadian Annual Zeview 1902, p.76; ?olonist, 28 Feb. 1902, p.1 2. cf, Hopkins, Canadian Annual Review 1902, ~~78-m

3. cf. Skelton, The Railway ?3ui?.ders, p. 108-9

4. Ibid •˜.An inference deduced From the nrtture of the overall scheme. It was commonly runloured at the time that FTill was backing Yackenzie and Mann. 6. cf. Rarnse~r, m, p. 8; by, ?ailways, Politicians and. ,. .Vancouver, p.65 ; The hovince, 28 April 1902, p.1; The Province, 23 Feb. 1903, p.1

?,backround infamition on Rarnard from Jackman, The Nen i?t Cam Castle. The inference of "artin k Hendry convincing Sarnard to come in with them i.s derived from the repeated appearance of Barnard's name in the incorporat5ng statutes of these projects.

8,cf. the incorporatin& statute of the V R C.K. in Statutes of B.C. for 1901

9 .cf. Gosnell, The,Year 3ook of ReC. 1903, p.321; Journals 1902, p.141

10. cf . XcDonald, "Business Leadershin in Vancouverl'(Phl) ehegiq in prog U Vie. ) 3arnard's company would benefit from the rail line into the area. ll..h inference from Ellisonfs position in the Okanagan and his activity in helping %rtin in the House with the bills.

1.2.The Province, 8 April 1902, p.7; The Provincq, 31 Xarch 1902, pol 13,cf, Skelton, op cit, p.243; Paper #20, Sessional Pa~ersof the Parliament of Canada, 1903; no records of the provincfal corr~ni.tteesurvive

1.4./h inference from the bilh themselves. see tJournals 1902

15,The Province, 12 April 1902, p.3 16,The Province, I!+ Yay 1303, p.1; Gosnell, ap cit, p.321

L7.The Province, 26 P.pril 1.902, p.1 l8,cf. Journals 1901 for Smith on Sox's Crow's Nest Pass Southern Iiailway, and MePhillips on %x's Granby IJines bill 19,fnferences from studying the bills, the Journals, the newspapers, etc.

X).Hill would not want to bother with local ferries to Victoria; they would be quite irrelevant to his tz*ading plans and too expensive.

21. Stevens, 7anadian Nat tonal !?ailways vo3. 2, p. 87-92

22.which Hill was not, unbeknownst, to Winsnuir: see footnote 20 PI. Regehr, Canadian Fhrthern !?ailwas, p. 253-5

23.Statutes of 3.C. 1702, p.2?7 24.9ourna18 1902, p.?8 25.a~ listed on their incorporating statute - cf. Journal% 1902 26.cf, 3e~ehr,op cit, p.255 - the reference to the Z.P.9, is mine 27.cf. The Provincq, 30 April 1902, p.3; Zolonist, 10 April 1902, p.4, 15 April 1902, p.l+, 16 April 1.702, p. 5; Journa3.s 1902, p080,1Z7,135

28,Morton, Honest John C)l iver, p.75-7 9r 80-1; Jourrialg 1902, p.94; The Province, 72 April 1902, p.7

2Y.Journals 1302, p.l.67

3O.cf. Appendix to JournaJs of 1.302 ?r 1903; I!orton, op cit, p.74; ~essional Papers of the Province of 9.C., p.l.2/+5, & 1375

31 .cf. Journals 1900, p. 67-8

33.The Province, 23 ),pi11903, p.11 Colanist, 23 April 1903, p.7 34.Hopkins, Canadian Annual Tleview 1903, p. 2O9

35.Colonist, 25 April 1903, p. 5 36 .~opkins', Canadian Annual Xeview 1903, p. .X9 37 .Ibid 38,IM-d - aLlusion to vindictiveness is mine 39 .The Province, 12 14arch 1903, p. l+

40.The Province, 17 Karch 1903, p.5

41.Hopkins, Canadian Annual Review 1903, p. 222

42.cf. Hunt, The Political. Career of Sir Richard FfcBride, p.15 33

43.The Province, 2 ~Jtne1903, pel- l+l+.The Province, 3 June 1903, p.3.

45. Ibid

48. Ibid It clear13 appears that no explanation of this period can accorvlt Fully for the upheavd of tfle tines withogt including the activities of Joseph ]:artin and the rai.l.my ha,ttle for control of the Kootenays min-

eral. wealth. Tt is extreme& difficult to trace the railway battle with much precision or certainty because ad1 of the partjcipnnts wfshed to concesl their activitieo from each other and from the puhl.ic to the extent that they were able to do so. Yo one wished to be seen nanipulatin~the Legislature to their own prfvate advnnta~o, md, of course, no :.Tenher of the Legislature

to be seen xting jn the private interests of the railways, but in consideration of the extent to thir,h the politics wore disrupted, the mast reasonable cxplanati on must, be that new, power5rl outside interests attempt-

ed to upset the estab!ished interests of the province. That is, the Great Tlorthern Rai.lwa.7 tried to upset the domination of the Canadian Pacific ;?ail- my in Sritish Coltmbia for control of the Rootenay ores for use in the developing Orient trade. Joseph :?artin had a national reputation for his rebel3ious attitude to the established interests of Canada, both for his stand on the

Manitoba Schools question and his fight aesinst the C. P.R. monopoly in Ilan-

itoba. Li e'rt,ensnt ravenlor Kc fnnes had a ~ooddeal of bitterness towards the

C.P.3. after he lost, 2 sma: 1 fortme from speculating in real estate when the

C. Pix* shifted its west ern t erninus to TTanco~lverfrom Port Iloody. men the two men mt in gritish 1703.urnSia 2nd 'kInnes appointed Xartin Premier, Hartin had alienated both the conservative snd reform elements in the province, and so 75 he turned to an old nccpzintence, Jams J.%11 of the Great Northern bilw~,

for campaign financing. "artin lost his vital election in 1900 and I-TcInnes

was dj.smissed for sppintin: him, but Hill had a continuing interest in set- tins a rail link to tho coast from the Kootenays md so he continued to back

2lartl.n in a further effort to set pvernment subsidies for the line. Ifartin had to set, the srxpprt of Premter Junsnuir throu$ orchestratirq a number of railw,?y deals and as they devel-oped they came to be a direct threat to

the near-:nonoply of the C.P.P. in the province. The Canadian rail giant

therefore opposed "krtin and I-Iil.1 snd the struggle led to turmoil that the

province had never seen before. And, as each railway company manipulated the

legislators to their own advantage, they slso made every effort to keep their

activities as quiet as they cou1.d: thi.3 gave the appearance of confusion and disintegrati.on of po3.iticnl groupings. Thus, the characterizations of this period must be seen within

the context of a behlnd the scenes railway revolt, led by Joseph Martin. Political partiea can be defined as simply as institutions to gat people elected, and in that case, there would have been more political parties at the turn of the century in British Columbia than there were msmbera of the Legislature. The -ern popu;lsr same of the phrase

'political partiest envisages large on-going instituti~fl~lof varying popularity and success which provide the h.8mdwork for elections and the brokerage of power in the interims, An acadeaaic analysis of politiaal parties ought to include such things as finances (fram wham an8 to whom and why); pressure groups; ideology; structure; and nomination processsa (patterns of recruitment); together with ra compariron of the data with comparable data of other parties existing in the system, end how the various group interlock and struggle for power. Such analysis would be of conaiderabla difficulty within the context of early British Columbia, for vsrg little work has been published on the era 80 far, Studies like COM~U'~on the Union House or like S .D.Clarkts on the Canadian Marmiaot~er*sAssociation have not baa circulaLed which relate to British Columbia in this tima period. What literature that is available characterizes ,1898 to 1903 (ad an of confusion culminating in the hbroduction of party gorerwnant by Richard 1 McBride, ,." Recent work foll~i~~the sme line: ",. .party line nwff~ment emerged in response to political instabiUty which besat the province 2 fol&owfng the defeat of Turnerism in ...1898., Cezltainly pahies were based on systems of individual gain and personal loyalty with a variated 97 rate of recruit& and atratification. But to date, no mpidcal evidence has established the norm Prom which the period is reputed to havo deviated nor yet established a norm for the period itself, The common assupbi~n seams to be that the systsaa of pcrmonslitSas hab ceased to Au#ttion effectively and that the formal party sgstam mes s nwlrrrsarg ordsrbg of what had bwoms an unslrursgeable Hawe, In an attempt to e8tabUsh some guSde3ines by which fhe operation of the political machfnew of the tb judgad, f have done an analysis of the voting records of the KaaS>em oi the Srom 1897 to 1904 to tw to clarifp the causes of the crrisw pad British Colwnbia st the time. The ase,umptior~and n&hobology of the analysis are as follows:

1.The Journals of the wvsAm of ~OVIIXCBof British Columbia were scanned and all the divisional vates of the vasiow Members were recorded. Not all Meeabem who were dscted are listedb SOB^ never recorded a vote and so were ignored. Mr. Utclian, of Sd.hTs group in 1897, voted three times and then took ill and died, I felt safe in assuming that this was not a politically motivated a& and so I excluded him from consideration, 2.Cornell knew of the existence of a nWhar of groups In the Union Houae and proceeded to establish their aiae and performance, There were many plitioal tickets in those days but rarely -8 snyone specifically idedified with any particular ticket. Having few narnes to work with, 1 asawed that there were two groupings in the House: those who vatad with the Premier and everybody else, If a sufficiently high varianue had been gsneratsd from this assumpbion it would have indicated that the assumption of the two groups wss a poor one. 3,A prewlook at the rmord indicated that some degree of variance was definitely going to have to be anticipated. They did not vote in rigid blocs aa is the case today. Anyone who voted againat the Premier occasionally might still be counted as a member of the frderta party. Indeed, preconceptions about eventhe cabinet voting aa a bloc were soon disspelled, Cabinet ministers and party whip taidd to rank around the middle of the party in term of coheulion and loyalty. Thus having accepted the need for some variance, the size of the variance became a measure of the cohesion of the my. High variance indicated law cohesion and loyalty, and low variance indicated high cohesion, &.The Frenriarta group was identified on the basis of theis voting record and not with reference to the published claim of the Membar as to party affiliation, This then provided soms msasura of the signif-, igance of the claim to party affiliation once voting p&t%emwere est- abliahed. 5. Everyone not included irr the Prdtsrtrrr group was then gre- sumed to be in the Opposition group. One off& of thir grouping assumfiian would be to create the pbabllity that the Opposition ~)uldhave a higher variance than the Rderts group, or Government P&y. This did tura out to be the case, and it is not ah unreasonable result. The ~~er would have far more favours and pun;L~sat his dispolsd. than the

Leader of the Opposition and ao could probably ensure greater discipUne in his awn party. It is also possible that there were two or mre Oppasition group. The auswngtion of a single Opposition was made in the first Mance for the sake or corwenlsnce owand wuuld hmbear in- valldatsd had the Oppolrition had a large enough variaxme fram the Govern- ment Party to make a comparative analysis doubtful. This waa not the ewe anb the assumption of a single Opposition Party seem to have been vitkiicatod. Whatever loose Msh that axisted muld be tho haberr wlth a high variance wlthin one of the two groupsc 6,Afier listing all the diviaioml vote8 beside -h Mmberr8 name, hie pattern wss compared with that of the Pradw. Those appiroxir& ating the Prderts record were assigned to him and the instances in which the Memberfs vote wss contrav to that of the Premierts were totaled aad conetituted the total variance for that Mamiber for that scwaion. Then the patterns of the remining Menbars were scorsd agahst whother anb the Mernber chosen as Leader of the Oppodtian was the one who ndx&drasd the variance for the group. Summing the total variance and then avemCping the figure wer the number of Members of the party and the der09 divisions recorded for the session plvwided the numeral representing the coheaion figure for the party for that session. hturaUg, there were

groblarne, Ones McBride was Premier, he seamed to command lees loyalty than his back room boss, her. Variance was aignifQantly lower if

Barser was presumed to be Prasier, but in keeping dth the general meth- odology, X selected McBride as the appropriate yardstick. Not surprising-

ly, Joseph Martin was a ststistical problun. We was sxpalled Prota the ' ---_s& gmup in the nupmer of 1899 Md when the Legislrtun recornend

the next yar, Markin led the fight to defeat S*m'i'in, but his voting 100 reoord did not place him as Leader ctf the Opposition. Also, Martinfa abssnae figure was so high as to make him an unfair choiee to compere votiag records with, so where indi~ated,I chose in8tead the record of his known friend aad confidant, J.C.Brown, Martin mur also Prder of the Avwirree for soms three mrrths, but no Legislative test appears for

Mm because only one vote wsr, taken under his rulminl-stration and that one was a 28 to 1 motion of no coniidence in him. Processing sueh data would gmerate a statistical enonso3.y oquivalsnt to his ministrg, but as the avemging quotients would thereby be unfairly skewed, I ch06e to deal with hi8 mlniatrg only in proae. Incidentally, the Journal rcworda the Member voting for Martin as J.M,Win, a man of no relation to the newly appointed Premier. This I thought must be in error for J.M.Martin appeared to have no motive for stancling alone against Ma colleagues, so the more likely explanation would be that the single vote of support wa~ Joseph Martints own. 7,Absemes of the Members werecorded as nsll, on the asawption that they would provide a measure of the reliability of the Memberts voting pattern, For instance, if a Member always voted wfth the

Premier but was frequentlgr abeent, it could be infarred that on sme of those occasions of absence the Me&er would have voted oontrary to the Premier had he been in arttandsnce, and that the absence is therefore reaUy an abstention, Further, a Msmrber is of little me to his party if he is not there, so some measwe of party discip;lfne is derived 8~8wsll; is, how'effective tho apparatus of the party was at turning out the We. To be sure, absences might be explsined by the Mderbe- &sen% on official out whaa comwthe figurea with dher, and w the absence figure is used in placing the Mimber in party loyalty rankiags a6 rr sscondarp conarideration to his varisnce, A pmblsm mra how to treat those Were wfio resi(P1sB their seats &dway through a swsion and then were rdeeted to the same rpession, In the 1899 session this applied $0 Turner, %Phillip, Tikdall and Hums, I chose to ignore thdr absawss for the periods of their elections, 8,The test also gives a rough meesure of the value ot the party to the individual Member. Thorre w%th hi@ loipslty p%tWZMwho kept re-appearing in the record obviously gat re-elected. Ono inference to be drawn fram thie is that the psrty lnay have he1psd him gerti rdectcrd in reward for hia loyalty. Members with high loyalty ratings who did not re- appear may have been defeated or may have been givcm a pstromge appointment. If the party member had a low loyalty rating, p~?wumbbv%he party would not be quick to augment his campaign funds, so it he crontinued to get re-elected, it might imply that he had his wn rsrruvuroes, lnaking the party of Uttle value to him. This aspect ol the st* ~ouldsimply be suggeutive for -her resetarch.

9,Each seasion followe with a list of the voting Manbars orhered in degree of loyalty to the party leader. On a summary page, the variance of the variance is calculated for each leader to iuuminate the differences in loyalties accorded to each leader. If the leader scores beyorad the range considered %ormal* (greater than average variance from the average variance or more than one atmdwd deviation) then that leader's score is judged to be signifigantly high or low as the css6 mey be. If the score is two or mare stuard deviations away from the norm, than the leader is judged 'very high' or ?very low*. 10,Aateriaks beside a Mamberts name indicate that he is a cabinet minister. U,Sosae oomnent on the r-on for selwting the Legisl&itive voting record would be appropr%ateto ctonclude the preface to the test, The Legislature was, in those days, a verg real arema of decision amldng.

It was the crucible of the political forces of the pmtnnce, Politicians might say one thing atad mean another in their speeches, but thei~vote in the House can only be interpreted one way on any given imue and that is the met reliable record of their conmittments. For instance, Hawthorn- thwaite, an avowad SociaUst, appears wlth high vcarbnae in opposition to the government in 1901 through to 1903, but dth the amM88ion of McBride to power in 1903, he and his colleague Parker William appear as moderately loyal government men, The amst important weakness of the test is the treatmait of all diviaions as being squaw Important. Obvioursly, smw divisions were of far greater sipifigance than others, Matters of Uttle signifigance would at the same time carry little pressure to conform but also little prebsure to deviate. Similarly, matters of great mom& would carrg much party pressure to conform, but high inducments to deviate, Taking thia factor into amount woS1 provSde some avwaging tendency in the weighting of the bills, besidee the obvious faator of the inmsdiate importance of the bill itscalf. Mher, my weighting proceedwe would have an arb- it r?ny element to it that would be dif'fioult to introdwe and just%@. How oould one adequate3g weigh J .ID. Prsnticets vote in Fdbrmarg 1900 wNch defeated the Saul5.n gavemment and put Martin into prmer? Avoicling comp lieations of thb sort do- not fntrodwe an unreal sfarpllcity into the teat. It seem quite reasonable to anow the avers- flurtor of my pressurea and greater or lesser importancr of the bill or vote act i# the breadth and number of the divisions and consider then a8 equal for the purpo119ea of this test, In the following tables, the figures at the snd of th4 pafty trabulations are the most important onea. The average variame overall was 0.100 with a standard deviation of 0.036; that is, the average variance figure for each sessional group would have to be less than 0,063 or greater than 0.136 before the figure would be conaidered beyond the norm for the teat. Similarly, the abaence figure was 0.152 overall with a standard deviation of 0,025 making O.lU and 0.177 the ut6of 8i&nif- iganc e . Government Party variance Prder Turner 1. Hunter 2 .Brgden 3 .Nth& %$.G.B.&rtin +5 .Ebertlr

9.Baker 10. Irv'ing U.Mutter 12.Booth 13. Braden

15.A.W.Smith 16. Huff

Totals 98 Average Variance = 98/18x43 = 0.125

Average Abmnae = 105/18X4* 0.19 Session of 1897 - 43 Mvisiona Opposition Party Variance selliun 1, J.BeKme 2.Kidb

3 .wiUI81138 4.Macrphemon 5 ,Forstor 6, Graham ?.Sward 8.Walkam 9,Ccrrter-Cotton 10. Hum 11.KelU.e Totals

Average Variance = 41/llx43 = 0.087

Average Abermce = 89/%3 = 0.188 Absence

Prsmier Turner 0 3 2 13

42 1 3 2 2 6 32 2 3 *13,~,~.wh 5 l.4, Hunt er 6 15, Stoddart 7

Average Variance = 73/19x43 .= O.W2

Average Absence -163/19~53 = 0.161 i- Hi1~ginsSpeaker to 9 March 1898, so he is measured on orily W, Mvisiom 197 Seersion of 1698 - 53 Mvisime Opposition Psrrty Variarpce Sanlfn - 1.Carter-Cotton 1 2oKidd 2 3,Macpherson 3 Absence 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Z

16. Henderson 17. Kinchant 18,Tisdall

Average Variance = 28/20xl9 - 0,071 Average Absence = 33/=9 = 0,083 Opposition My Varfirnce Abar-e Turner + lezbsrts

7eCliffoPd

8. Wer 9JkBrfd~ 10 .McPhfUip 11. Robertson 12.bth

Totals 31 40

Average Variance = U/15xl9 3 0.026

Average Absence = 40/15x19 = 0.134

+&ertfa record used in place of Tulnerfs bscaulse of Turner*s absences G

3. Wells

7. Green *8. Carter-Cotton 9. Helgear en 10.KWe

UeKidd

Average Variance = 18/18x36 = 0.028 Saslsfon of 1900 - 36 Mttisima Opposition Psrty Turner I. Ellison 2.A oWoSrPfth

3 0 Bak~ 4.-r S.frving 6,RM)I.w 7. Eberts 8.Booth 9 .&Phillip 10 .&Bride

11 b Hall 12. Bmen 13. Robert aon U.Clifford

15 .Uggins 16. Helmken 17 ,Jas.Martjn Totals Average Variame = 67/1731;36 -- 0,109 Average Abwmee = 54/17~36= 0.088 Session of 1900 - 38 Divisions Government Party Variance Absence Prder hsmuir 8 1.Mounce 1 "2. Hall 5 *3. Wells 5 4. Rogers 1 *S .McBride 2 beClifford 2 7 .Helmcken 3 8. Heyward 4 9 *Mu* 4 6

11. Fulton 7 12 0 1 1

16. Garden 4 17. Hunter 5 18. holey 6 19. Taylor 7 20. Tat low 10 21.McRillips 1 Session of 1900 - 38 Divisione (continued) Oovernment Perty VaPianc e Absence 22, Ellison 3 4 23 Kidd 24. Green Totals

Average Variance = 48/2k38 = 0,053

Average Absence =102/uL1238 = OeU2 Opposition Party Variaric e Absence Martin 4- 1.Brown

4,Stablea 5.GilmOur 6. Oliver 7 .Mc Innea

10. Houston ll.Nei.11 Totals 57 72

Average Variance = 57/1lx38 = 0.136

Average Absence = 72/21x38 = 0.172 +Browits record used in place of Martints becauae of PJIsrtints absences Variance

5,Clifford

*8. Wells 9. Rogers 10. Fulton 11 .Mc Phillips

16. Hunter 17. Mckie 18 .Kidd

21. Garden Session of 1901 - 41 Divisions (continued) Covemcmt Party Variance Absence 22, Houston 6 9 23. Hall 7 6

24, Tat low 7 13 Totala 73 u7

Average Variance = 73/~1= 0,074 Average Absence =147/2&1 = 041W Session of 1901 - 41 Divisions Opposition Party Variance 4

4.Mm 5,Stables 6 .Pat Innee

10. Hawthornthwait e 16

Totals 120 Average Variance =l20/1lxl,l - 0.266 Average Absence = 73/lk&l = 0.162

+Brownts record used for Martints Session of 1902 - U6 Divisions Government Party Variance Absence

1 ' 47 ... 2 23 4 55 22 6 7,Clifford 18 8. Houat on 51 9. Rogers 15 *lo, R4or 15 11.Hall 24

12, Stablea 20 13 Gilnour 33 14 .McInnea 11 I5 ,Hunter 16 ,Martin 17. Ellison

18 Hsyw~rd 19, Helmcken Totals

Average Absence = k41/19~116 0.198

+Eberts record wed for DuxmmirtS 1I C Session of 1902 - 116 Mviaiona Opposition Party Variance McBrPde - 1,Tatlaw 2 2.- 4 3. Taylor 7 4.hrPt5y 7 5.Gifford 6. NelU 7. Garden 8. Curtie 9 *McPhillips 10. Fulton 11.E.C.Smith

12. Green

13, Hawthornt hmit e L$.Kidd 15. Oliver 33 Totals 183

Average Variance = 183/15fl6 = 0.104

Average Abaence = 4~/15x116= 0.269 Irn Session of 1903 - 11, Divisions Government Party Variance Absence Premier Prior -

2.Clif'ford 1

*3 Prentic e 1

9,Eluson 10. Hall

12, Rogers 2

*18 .well8 4 Totals 33

Average Variance 33/1w a 01124

Average Absence = 35/lW = 0,139 Session of 1903 - U Divisions Oppos%tianParty Absence McBride 1. Garden 2,Creen 3. Pat erson 4Sdin 5. Tat low 6,Gifford 7. Oliver 8,Taylor 9.Kicld 10. Fulton 11.McPhi llf pa 12*PZunro 13 .Hawthornthwaite 4,Curtis lS,E,C.Smith 16. Neill 17 .Hartin Totals

Avesage Variance = U/17x14 = 0.059

Average Absence = 52/17xl4 = 0.219 Seasion of 1903-4 - 24 Divisions Cavemmt Party Variance Absence Prder McBride 0 1,Gifford 2, McDonald *3. Wilson 4.Roes 5. Grant 6 ,Bowaer 7,Shatford $.Garden 9.MacCowm 10 ,Taylor 11 Wright

13 .HaWthornthwait e 3 l.4 .Wflliemer 3 15, Cart er-Cottan 3

2L. Davidson 5 22, Houston 5 Totals 56 Average Varisnce = 56/22a = 0.105 Sesaion of 19034 - 24 Mvisiona Opposition Party Absence Macdonald

1.w 2.Murphy 3 .Me Innes 4.- 5. Cameron 6.Bm 7. Tanner 8,BfcNivan 9. Jones 10. Oliver 11. Paterson

Totals 30 Average Variance = 30/1?x26 = 0eW4

Average Absence = 66/17x24 = 0.162 Summsry and Inference Leader Loyalty Absenteeism 1. Turner o .os3 0.128 normal normal

28s- 0.100 very low 3,Martin 0.201 0,167 verg low normal 4,Z>unsnnair

5 Prior 0.124 0 139 normal normal

6. &Bride 0 8 ZL3 very high 7.Macdonald 0,074 0.162 normal normal

Average Variance Overall = 0.100 / Standard Deviation 0.036 Average Absence Overall = 0.152 / Standard aviation 0,025

Thus a rough sketch of House tnonnalcyt eppears. John Turner was the last member of the Smithe dynasty bf hand-picked sucueasors to the FYemiership which had run since the Canadian Pacific Railway began its construction in British Columbia, He was supposed to be the last of the tstablet Premiers before the troubled times of the turn of the cent- period, yet he acheived only normal loyalty from pa&y followers with a normal absenteeism which ddindicate adequte reliance on the logalty

In spite of Semlints' personal weaknessee as a party leader and the strong rivalrg of Martin and Carter-Cutton fa his cabinet, he obtained the highest loyalty from his followers and the lawest absenteeism by far which mad indicate a strong reliance on the loyalty figure. Per- haps his party were unified by their dislike of Turnerism and dedicated to the reforms that they were tlrging to effect.

Martin got a very low loyalty figure and a normal absence rate Indicating adequate confidence in the loyalty quotiant. The analysis does bear out the usual ramarks of Martin being the stom petrel of Canadian politics.

"\ Dunsmuir, the new coal king, obtained normal loyalty and a normal ablaence rate indicating adequate reliance on the measure of loyalty. This suggestion of stability under Dtvlsmuir is further reinforced by the quantity of legjislation paseed during his ministry and hi8 normal 1engP;h of tenure in office.

Prior, although in power rather briefly, did get normal loyalty and normal absenteeism indicating a party functioning quite within the standards for the period. kBri.de, the man who was generally thought to be the first of the new line of restored stability, only obtained normsl loyalty and a very high abaence rate. This would be some evidence that his stability was not based in a cohesive party during the first year of his finis- tration. It is true that he had to rely on two Socialists who held the balance of power in the House, but they were of middlinp: loyalty to him. His cabinet ministers were among his lea& loyal supporters. How &Bride graaually introduced party diseipline into the House, and the province, would have .to be the stuff of a further study. Macdonald, the Liberal Party leader who took over from Martin, did well to acheive nornral loyalty and absenteeism so quickly. The statistics do seem to indicate that the instability of the peAod could be attributed to causes other than a disintegration of the party uyatern. R.M. Dawson has argued that "Lieutenant Governor McInnes .,. succeeded in getting the affairs of that province into hopeless con- 3 fusion in 1898 to 1900 through a misguided use of the power of dismissd"b That is only a partial explanation of the problam. McInnes dismissed Turner, Beaven and Semlin without any major reaction, He only got into serious difficulty when he appointed Joseph Martin to the Premiership in 1900. Martin's political career in British Columbia coincides with the period of instability and it is the contention of this thesis that his activities were the major destabiliaing element of the time. 2.?obin, The Rush For Smils, p.35

3 .Sn;well., "The lkfnnes Tncident 5r. 7.C ,", requoting 2.1i,Datrson, "The Ind- dependent c of the Lieutenant 7overnorTv,p, 239 I PRIMARY SOURCES A Governat Documents

3.*, 3.*, King's Printer, Victoria

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