DOI Issues Report on the NYPD's Response to the Protests in New
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The City of New York Department of Investigation MARGARET GARNETT COMMISSIONER 180 MAIDEN LANE Release #16-2020 NEW YORK, NY 10038 nyc.gov/doi 212-825-5900 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: DIANE STRUZZI FRIDAY, DECEMBER 18, 2020 NICOLE TURSO (212) 825-5931 DOI ISSUES REPORT ON THE NYPD’S RESPONSE TO THE PROTESTS IN NEW YORK CITY AFTER GEORGE FLOYD’S KILLING BY A MINNEAPOLIS POLICE OFFICER Margaret Garnett, Commissioner of the New York City Department of Investigation (“DOI”), issued a Report today detailing the investigation into the response of the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) to the George Floyd protests held throughout the City from May 28, 2020, through June 20, 2020. The Mayor directed DOI to conduct a review of the NYPD’s response, a directive that was later codified in Executive Order 58 and signed on June 20, 2020. In addition, on May 31, 2020, DOI received a request from City Council Speaker Corey Johnson and Councilmember Ritchie Torres, Chair of the Oversight & Investigations Committee, to investigate the NYPD’s approach to policing the protests. DOI’s investigation focused on the NYPD’s institutional and operational response to the protests, including but not limited to its planning, strategy, enforcement actions, intelligence collection and dissemination, training, and police-community relations. As part of the investigation, DOI also examined the history and current structures of civilian police oversight in New York City. The Report made 20 recommendations to the NYPD to improve their response to mass protests and two recommendations regarding streamlining and improving police oversight in the City. A copy of the Report is attached to this release and can be found at the following link: https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doi/newsroom/public-reports.page DOI Commissioner Margaret Garnett said, “This investigation sets out DOI’s findings on the important issues of how the NYPD responds to mass protests, and the structure of civilian police oversight in this City. Our hope is that these factual findings, analysis, and recommendations will contribute to meaningful changes at the NYPD, as well as provide a map toward greater police transparency through a comprehensive and coordinated police oversight approach. I urge the NYPD and elected officials to implement the recommendations outlined in this Report and embrace the opportunity for reform.” DOI’s investigation identified several deficiencies in the NYPD’s response to the protests that undermined public confidence in the NYPD’s discharge of its responsibility to protect the rights of the public to engage in lawful protest. Specifically: • The NYPD lacked a clearly defined strategy tailored to respond to the large-scale protests of police and policing. The NYPD largely defaulted to application of “disorder control” tactics and methods, without adjustment to reflect their responsibility to facilitate lawful First Amendment expression. • The NYPD’s use of force and certain crowd control tactics to respond to the Floyd protests resulted in excessive enforcement that contributed to heightened tensions. more • Some policing decisions relied on intelligence without sufficient consideration of context or proportionality. The NYPD collected specific intelligence that warranted consideration in making policing judgments; however, intelligence alone does not dictate a particular police response, which was, at times, disproportionate. • The NYPD deployed officers who lacked sufficient, or sufficiently recent, training on policing protests. With the exception of officers in specialized units, most officers responding to the protests had not received recent relevant training for policing protests. • The NYPD lacked a centralized community affairs strategy for the Floyd protests. The NYPD Community Affairs Bureau was not part of the planning or strategy for policing the Floyd protests. • The NYPD lacked a sufficient data collection system to track relevant protest data. DOI determined that the NYPD lacks a reliable, consistent method to capture relevant protest data including the total number of protest- related arrests. DOI’s 20 recommendations called on NYPD to improve its policies and procedures relating to policing protests, including: • Drafting a Patrol Guide policy specific to policing protests and protecting First Amendment activity, as well as consulting on this policy with individuals and entities outside of the NYPD, including civil rights attorneys, community organizations, and police reform experts; • Creating a new Protest Response Unit to lead the planning and strategy for response to large protests, to collaborate with the Community Affairs Bureau on community engagement, and to coordinate with other divisions, borough commands and precincts on response; • Establishing reasonable limitations in a written policy on the use of disorder control tactics, such as encirclement and mass arrests, specific to their use at First Amendment-protected protests; • Consulting with community organizations and issue-advocacy groups on the content of protest policing training and considering an invitation to civilians with relevant experience organizing protests or other First Amendment events to participate in such training; • Promoting transparency around NYPD policing of protests by reporting to the public regarding NYPD’s responses to these recommendations and any additional changes or plans relating to policing of future protests within 90 days. As part of this investigation, DOI also examined the structures and systems for external oversight for the NYPD and whether they can be improved. That examination found that independent police oversight is essential to establishing trust between the community and the police. In the Report, DOI urges the NYPD to accept that self- policing is not enough to restore trust with the public and that they should seek a true partnership with strong and effective civilian oversight. The Report outlines both historic and current police oversight structures, specifically the Civilian Complaint Review Board, the Commission to Combat Police Corruption, and the Office of Inspector General for the NYPD. These three separate civilian entities conduct regular oversight of the NYPD and have been created over time through varying means, and thus derive their authority from differing sources. Their jurisdiction overlaps in some respects, but remains distinct in others. None has the power to bind the NYPD to any specific policy recommendation or disciplinary outcome. Specifically, DOI found: 2 • Police oversight would be strengthened if existing functions were consolidated into a single agency, headed by an independent board. • No executive within the NYPD is accountable for ensuring that the Department meets its obligation to facilitate and cooperate with its oversight agencies. To address these findings, DOI recommended: • The Mayor and City Council should consider consolidating existing police oversight functions into a single agency that combines the authority to (i) investigate complaints from the public and recommend discipline of individual officers; (ii) conduct systemic reviews of NYPD policy and practices and making recommendations for reform, including publishing regular public reports about complaint statistics and public tracking of progress on recommendations; and (iii) periodically audit NYPD’s internal discipline and anti-corruption efforts. A single agency, headed by an independent board with a mix of members, could create a centralized and comprehensive police oversight agency, and conduct effective public outreach and education to reinforce that identity and promote public trust. It could reduce inefficiencies and redundancies and thus use civilian oversight resources most efficiently in a time of fiscal challenge. • The NYPD should streamline its interface with external oversight under the authority of a single Deputy Commissioner, with a mandate from the Police Commissioner and real authority within the NYPD to collect records from all divisions and bureaus and direct interviews with members of service as necessary. Commissioner Margaret Garnett thanks the Review Team responsible for this Report, including for Part I: Inspector General & Counsel to the Commissioner Andrew Brunsden, Deputy Inspector General Arturo Sanchez, Assistant Inspector General Michael Garcia, Assistant General Counsel Christopher Tellet, Senior Policy Analyst Justyn Richardson, and Confidential Investigator Mariah Jno-Charles; and for Part II: First Deputy Inspector General Jeanene Barrett and Special Examining Attorney Eric del Pozo (the Commissioner extends additional thanks to Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance, Jr., for the loan of then-ADA del Pozo to this project). Commissioner Garnett also thanks the other members of DOI's staff who assisted in certain aspects of the project: Data Analyst Ari Lewenstein, Special Investigator Adrain Gonzales, Confidential Investigator Gabriel Lipker, Special Investigator Zachary Toner, Confidential Investigator Harlyn Griffenberg, Confidential Investigator Alex Davie, Assistant Inspector General Brad Howard, Special Investigator Shakina Griffith, Special Investigator Alex Lai, Assistant Inspector General Matin Modarressi, Confidential Investigator Rushelle Sharpe, Special Investigator Julian Watts, and Confidential Investigator Katherine O’Toole. Finally, the project benefitted considerably from the wise counsel of First Deputy Commissioner Daniel Cort, Deputy Commissioner & Chief of Investigations Dominick Zarrella,