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Issue No. 477 JULY 2021 Issue Brief ISSUE NO. 477 JULY 2021 © 2021 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, copied, archived, retained or transmitted through print, speech or electronic media without prior written approval from ORF. India Calibrates its South China Sea Approach Premesha Saha Abstract India has historically taken a neutral position in the disputes along the South China Sea involving China and countries of Southeast Asia, even as the tensions have threatened the security in the region. In more recent times, however, there has been a noticeable change in India’s stance. This brief ponders this shift: the rationale behind India’s responses vis-à-vis the disputes, and their implications on the country’s ‘Act East’ and Indo-Pacific policies. Attribution: Premesha Saha, “India Calibrates its South China Sea Approach,” ORF Issue Brief No. 477, July 2021, Observer Research Foundation. 01 he territorial and maritime disputes along the South China Sea (SCS) remain unresolved and continue to impede the path to peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region. Beginning in the 1970s, these conflicts have involved China and countries of Southeast Asia, primarily Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, TTaiwan, Brunei, and the Philippines: these countries claim that China has been encroaching on their sovereign territories and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) with its aggressive land reclamation and island-building activities. China, too, has been conducting military surveillance in these areas, and building communications and logistics infrastructure in the form of port facilities, military installations, and airstrips.1 China maintains that these territories are an integral part of its “core interests”, taking an uncompromising stance on the question of sovereignty and its determination to protect the domain militarily.2 Extra-regional countries like India and the United States also have stakes in securing the SCS—an endowed ecosystem that is home to rich biodiversity and varied resources, including an estimated 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 11 billion barrels of oil in proved and probable reserves, most of which lie along the margins of the South China Sea rather than under disputed islets and reefs; much more are potentially undiscovered.3 India, while not a South China Sea littoral state, is invested in the maintenance of the rules-based order and freedom of navigation in these sea lanes of communication (SLOCs). Recent statements from the Ministry of External Affairs illustrate that India intends to move away from its historical “balanced” approach towards China and the SCS disputes, and play a more proactive role, guided by its Act East policy, in particular, as well as its overall Indo-Pacific vision. Indeed, India has economic, diplomatic and strategic interests in the vital waters of the SCS. Yet, for long, New Delhi adopted a neutral stance in the SCS disputes, refraining from even making official statements that could provoke China’s ire. What India has done is to encourage the competing nations to establish a code of conduct that would ensure “freedom of navigation” and “access to resources”.4 As ORF analyst, Abhijit Singh, sees it: “A tendency to view the region through a prism of geopolitics and ‘balance of power’ makes Indian decision makers wary of taking a stand on China’s aggressive posturing. Yet the costs of saying and doing nothing are rising for India as China’s firming grip over disputed territories in the South China Sea portends greater power projection in the Eastern Indian Ocean.”5 Introduction 3 While India intends to maintain its neutrality when it comes to the issue of sovereignty in these disputes, New Delhi has become more vocal in the recent months, primarily after the June 2020 Galwan Valley clash between Indian and Chinese troops.a At the 15th East Asia Summit in November 2020, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar stated: “Chinese actions and incidents in the South China Sea had eroded trust in the ongoing negotiations on the proposed code of conduct in the region.”6 The negotiations, he added, should not be “prejudicial to legitimate interests of third parties and should be fully consistent with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).”7 This brief examines the apparent shift in India’s position on the SCS disputes. It outlines the determinants of such a shift; highlights India’s maritime engagements and activities in the region; and analyses the implications of India’s stance on its relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The brief explores the impacts of India’s SCS approach on the country’s overall Indo-Pacific vision. Extra-regional countries like India and the US have stakes in securing the South China Sea—an endowed ecosystem that is home to some 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 11 billion barrels of oil. a On 15 June 2020, Chinese and Indian troops faced-off along the Galwan River Valley. The clash, exact circumstances of which remain unclear, led to the deaths of 15 Indian and 5 Chinese soldiers. They were Introduction the first casualties in either side along the Sino-Indian border since 1975. 4 ndia uses the SCS waterways—the second-most used in the world— for trade worth nearly US$200 billion every year. Nearly 55 percent of India’s trade with the Indo-Pacific region pass through these waters.8 Overall, one-third of the world’s shipping pass through these SLOCs, carrying over US$3 trillion worth of trade each year, including most of Ithe world’s requirement for vital commodities like energy and raw materials. India itself signed an agreement with Vietnam in October 2011 to expand and promote oil exploration in the South China Sea. While China has always objected to India’s oil exploration activities in the Vietnamese waters in the SCS, India reaffirmed its intent to pursue such activities.9 In July 2019 China deployed as many as 35 ships to the area to escort Haiyang Dizhi 8, a ship operated by the China Geological Survey. A Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said at that time that China was conducting “provocative activities” near several oil blocks, including where India’s ONGC was involved in oil and gas production.10 For India, its economic vitality rests on assured supply of energy and safe and secure trading routes in the region, including the Straits of Malacca. It has high stakes in keeping the sea lanes open in the SCS—the junction between the Indian and Pacific Oceans—and many other countries do as well. As David Scott, Lecturer in international relations at Brunel University, points out, “The South China Sea is becoming a factor in India’s own strategic calculations and strategic debates, and India is becoming a factor in the strategic calculations of South China Sea states.”11 India engages with the region through regular naval deployments, visits and exercises in these waters, through established and growing strategic-military partnerships with the littoral states, involvement in oil exploitation in these waters, and diplomatic discussions.12 As the Indian Navy also operates in the Western Pacific, secure access through the waters of the South China Sea becomes important.13 The SCS has the potential to enhance regional growth and further India’s engagement with Southeast Asia.14 India’s interest in the Indo-Pacific is known, and India views the region as “an integrated and organic maritime space with the ASEAN at its centre.”15 ASEAN and the far-eastern Pacific are the focus areas of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Act East policy, and the Southeast Asian commons are s Stakes in the s Stakes in the a “vital facilitator of India’s future development.”16 ’ As ASEAN countries’ relations with China come under more strain, India is eager to play the role of a responsible regional stakeholder that can help find a balance amidst the disputes. India South China Sea 5 Diplomatic tact ew Delhi has tried to balance the many competing interests in the South China Sea and not offend Beijing. India’s concern is that if it wades too deeply in SCS affairs, China might heighten its own naval operations in N 17 the Indian Ocean. India’s stance in the South China Sea disputes was indicated in the joint ASEAN-India Vision Statement of December 2012. It stressed “India’s role in ensuring regional peace and stability, and for that we agree to promote maritime cooperation to address common challenges on maritime issues.”18 The same statement said, “We are committed to strengthening cooperation to ensure maritime security and freedom of navigation, and safety of sea lanes of communication for unfettered movement of trade in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS.” A year later, at the 8th East Asia Summit (EAS) in Brunei Darussalam in October 2013, then Prime Minister Manmohan India’s concern is Singh declared, “A stable maritime that if it wades environment is essential to realize our collective regional aspirations. too deeply in SCS We should reaffirm the principles of maritime security, including the right of affairs, China might passage and unimpeded commerce, in heighten its own accordance with international law, and peaceful settlement of maritime disputes. naval operations in We welcome the collective commitment the Indian Ocean. by the concerned countries to abide by and implement the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and to work towards the adoption of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea on the basis of consensus. We also welcome the establishment of the s Historical s Historical Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum for developing maritime norms that would ’ reinforce existing international law relating to maritime security.”19 Such statements have been carefully worded to reflect New Delhi’s stand that while the issue of freedom of navigation and the establishment of a mutually agreed Code of Conduct (COC) had been raised, it will not impinge upon China’s sentiments.
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