DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE ~ TUFTS UNIVERSITY
STUDENT RESEARCH BRIEFING SERIES
VOLUME II, ISSUE I SPRING 2011
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM & HUMAN RIGHTS OUTCOMES: A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS LINDSAY HELFMAN
TABLE OF CONTENTS Welcome to the second issue of our Student Research Briefing Series which is designed to publish a broad range of topics in American Politics, ABSTRACT 1 Comparative Politics, Political Theory and Philosophy, and International Relations. The briefings are intended to enhance student appreciation of ABOUT THIS PAPER 1 student research completed in the Department of Political Science. In addi- tion, the publication hopes to serve as outreach to interested undergradu- ates and prospective students considering a major in Political Science. CHAPTER 1 3
If you are a student interested in contributing to the Student Research Briefing Series or a professor, within the Department of Political Science, CHAPTER 2 7 and have a student paper you would like to highlight, please contact [email protected]. CHAPTER 3 16 The following publication is student-produced and the research was con- ducted during their undergraduate studies. CHAPTER 4 33
About the author CHAPTER 5 40 Lindsay Helfman graduated from Tufts in May 2011 with a major in Politi- cal Science. Following graduation, she will be working in New York City before pursuing a J.D./M.B.A. CHAPTER 6 47
REFERENCES 50
APPENDIX 56
The Department of Political Science, Tufts University, Packard Hall, Medford, MA 02155, USA Phone: 617-627-3465 Fax: 617-627-3660 http://ase.tufts.edu/polsci/default.htm Institutional Reform & Human Rights Outcomes: A Systematic Study of United Nations Rights Institutions Lindsay Helfman (T ’11)
Abstract
After the atrocities of World War II, the international community came together in 1946 to establish the UN Commission for Human Rights. Over the course of its sixty years, the Commission was riddled with politicization and often criticized for being counterproductive in its efforts to protect and promote human rights. While the institution had its fair share of accomplishments, it was abolished in 2006 and subsequently replaced by the UN Human Rights Council. This institutional change is worthy of discussion because, as this thesis will demonstrate, it is an institutional improvement that positively influenced human rights work. Additionally, this change demonstrates the institutional capacity and value of the United Nations for dealing with human rights.
This thesis proceeds first by examining and comparing the institutions. The main differences can be divided into the following categories, pertaining to: status, membership, action (meetings, voting procedures), and institutional mechanisms. While all of these differences bear significance, specific emphasis will be placed on the changes to membership. Using the Cingranelli and Richards Index Human Rights Data Project, the methodology incorporates human rights statistics to evaluate the human rights records of either institution’s corresponding membership.
By demonstrating that the replacement of the Commission with the Council is, in fact, an institutional improvement in a variety of ways, I argue, not only, that institutions are useful for promoting and protecting human rights, but also that they are necessary for doing so. While denigration of the United Nations is common, many of the opportunities and mechanisms embedded in this international institution are overlooked or undervalued. Though the United Nations is by no means perfect, the story of the adoption of Resolution 60/251 will demonstrate why this institution is a worthwhile investment, and that it is capable of changing for the better.
About this paper:
Choosing to study abroad in Geneva, Switzerland was no coincidence: I was eager to spend the spring semester of my junior year interning in the United Nations. As an intern for the Conference of NGOs in Consultative Status with the United Nations (CoNGO) I was responsible for covering human rights activities that took place in the United Nations Palais. My semester abroad extended through the summer, as I spent the better part of my eight months following the UN Human Rights Council. Soon enough, my frustrations with the bureaucratic aspects of this institution constructively developed into questions. I began asking experts: human rights lawyers, prominent NGO leaders, government officials what they thought about the Council. Though many echoed similar frustrations, they were convinced that this institution was a vast improvement over its predecessor. To investigate further, I developed more questions, and a methodology that would provide some answers: is the UN Human Rights Council, in fact, better than its predecessor institution? How is it possible to know, and what does that mean for human rights work today? The finished product was my senior honors thesis, in which I discuss the relevant academic literature and incorporate human rights statistics as an option for institutional assessment.
Table of Contents
Abstract: The Story of Resolution 60/251
Chapter 1: An Institutional Change Worthy of Discussion
Chapter 2: Lessons from the Literature Foundational Literature Historical Literature Methodical Literature Professor Snyder’s Pragmatic Approach to Human Rights Concluding Discussion
Chapter 3: From the Commission to the Council The UN Commission for Human Rights Kofi Annan’s “Credibility Deficit” The UN Human Rights Council Comparison and Concluding Thoughts
Chapter 4: Designing a Study Using Human Rights Statistics Is Quantifying Human Rights a Worthwhile Endeavor? Which Human Rights Data and Why? Combining Membership Data with Human Rights Statistics
Chapter 5: Modest Trends with Considerable Implications
Chapter 6: The Value of International Human Rights Institutions
References
APPENDIX Tables 1-8 Graphs 1-4 Charts 1 & 2
Chapter 1 An Institutional Change Worthy of Discussion
“With such architecture, there is no doubt that, in legal and institutional terms, we are better placed today to act collectively to protect human rights than we were just a few years ago.”–Statement by Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary General, June 23, 2010
In 2006, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 60/251, which replaced the
United Nations Commission for Human Rights with the United Nations Human Rights Council. The adoption of this Resolution marks a crucial change in institutional machinery. This change is worthy of discussion because, as this thesis will demonstrate, it is an institutional improvement that positively influenced human rights work. Additionally, this change demonstrates the institutional capacity and value of the United Nations for dealing with human rights. The broader purpose of this thesis is to unite two important conversations: the first concerning international institutions and the second regarding human rights work. I argue not only that institutions are useful for promoting and protecting human rights, but also that they are necessary for doing so.
The scope of this thesis is limited to these two institutions: the Commission and the Council. The aim is to compare them; to explore their differences and similarities; and finally to demonstrate whether the replacement of the Commission with the Council can be considered an “institutional improvement.”
Why do these institutions deserve attention? In the area of human rights, it is necessary to rely on a forum that consists of governments, civil society, and legitimacy. Furthermore, “human rights work” in particular demands government effort and involvement, for the protection and promotion of human rights.
The Commission and the Council, as appendages of the United Nations, have these attributes.
This thesis proceeds first by examining and comparing the institutions. The main differences can be divided into the following categories, pertaining to: status, membership, action (meetings, voting procedures), and institutional mechanisms. While all of these differences are significant, specific emphasis will be placed on the changes in membership. Perhaps the most crucial difference between the two, the Council was designed to take the human rights records of member states into account when determining accession to membership. In addition, though there was a decrease in membership from the
Commission to the Council, it was not indiscriminate, as three geographic regions gained member seats while two other geographic regions lost representation. How do these changes relate to the institution’s work, and potential for success?
I posit that that these institutions were designed to facilitate human rights ideals and norms by promoting a specific set of human rights and aiming to influence their member states. Therefore as the creators of the new institution and the chief recipients of its influence, any institutional improvement should be exhibited in member states’ human rights records. Therefore, I am looking to find institutional improvement that exists in the corresponding member states of either institution. In other words, in order to determine if the Council is in fact, “better” than the Commission, the member states of the Council should have “better” human rights performance.
The methodology is designed to gauge the impact that the change in institution has had on respective member states. First, I am most interested in determining how human rights can be
“measured.” I explore the validity of various approaches to quantifying human rights; investigate how to best quantify the human rights records of the UN member states; and determine the merits of doing so.
Next, in order to quantify human rights outcomes for assessing the member states of either institution, I combine membership data from the UN with human rights statistics provided by the Cingranelli and
Richards Index (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project. Using CIRI’s Physical Integrity Index, I examine the change over time in member states’ respect for Physical Integrity Rights: each country is assigned a score annually that ranges from 0 (no government respect for citizens) to 8 (full government respect for citizens) regarding [to not conduct] Extrajudicial Killings, Disappearances, Political Imprisonment, and
Torture.
If I am correct that the alterations to membership reflect an institutional change for the better, then there should be a corresponding overall improvement in the average CIRI scores by geographic region under the Council, as compared to the Commission. When graphing the average CIRI scores by geographic region, as they have changed over time, trends should be exhibited in the form of regressions: the groups who lost membership representation should display a more pronounced improvement in their average CIRI scores while the geographic regions who gained membership representation should display a more modest improvement in average CIRI scores, if at all.
In the case of human rights, I recognize that the data should be assessed with a critical eye.
Relying on the Cingranelli and Richards Index, or any other Index, it is important to understand the source. In the case of CIRI, their data is based on information provided by the U.S. State Department and
Amnesty International. Though both are reputable, they are by no means omnipotent or immune to human error. Additionally, scoring violations to human rights does not tell the whole story: knowing that a zero is the worst CIRI score, is not necessarily as powerful as anecdotal evidence recounting instances of extrajudicial killings, disappearances, political imprisonment, or torture. My purpose for incorporating human rights statistics is to engage with a new form of institutional assessment, not to advocate that standardizing human rights violations is the best way to assess them.
Ultimately, the data did in fact reveal trends, though they are modest. Among the groups that lost representative seats from the Commission to the Council, two of the three groups (only the African Group and the Group of Latin American and Caribbean states) exhibited the most pronounced improvement in scores. Of the two groups that gained representative seats from the Commission to the Council (Asian
Group and the Eastern European Group), there was a slight decrease in their average CIRI scores. The
Western European and Others Group is the only geographic region that does not follow a trend according to new restrictions to representation, as it lost seats from the Commission to the Council and there was a very slight decrease in average CIRI scores.
Though the changes over time in the human rights statistics were not overwhelmingly revealing, they are modest and deserve attention. Bearing in mind the limited timeframe for studying the Council (it is only five years old), there is room for improvement in many areas. The data analysis portion of this thesis will focus on other aspects of the data as well as a variety of qualitative changes over time exhibited in member states. While the results presented in this thesis are preliminary in terms of making conclusions about the Council, this thesis does demonstrate that this institution can be considered an improvement when compared to its predecessor.
Well-respected critics like Professor Jack Snyder emphasize exclusivity in the human rights arena: that human rights work should be left to either the whistle-blowing non-governmental organizations, the passionate grassroots movements, or government structures that are in dire need of improvement. As this thesis will demonstrate, what human rights work requires is a forum that serves as a nexus for the governments, NGOs, and ordinary citizens to interact and function together, otherwise known as an international institution.
Chapter 2 Lessons from the Literature
I begin with a review of previous research. The literature serves a variety of purposes: foundational, historical, and methodical. Some of the most important theorists and experts referenced in this chapter help to provide a basic understanding for the subject matter addressed and also to establish the value of conducting research for this thesis. The most important pieces of literature are highlighted according to their contributions. This literature review is not exhaustive, as I only highlight the authors and works I found to be the most relevant.
Foundational Literature
I conjecture that the two human rights institutions being studied were designed in a specific way, with the aim of promoting a specific set of human rights and influencing their members. I posit that these institutions were designed in order to facilitate human rights ideals and norms, reflecting the agendas of their member states. For this reason, the methodology emphasizes the role of member states when evaluating the two institutions. Wendt, Abbott and Snidal, and Barnett and Finnemore also advocate a similar position, referred to as constructivism.
Wendt argues that institutions shape identities and interests, and not just actors’ behavior in the international system. 1 Abbott and Snidal address the inadequacy of international theory when it comes to explaining states motivations for joining and participating in international organizations, essentially combining institutionalism with social constructivism. They explain, “that IOs (International
Organizations) are – in part – both reflections of and participants in ongoing social processes and prevailing ideas.”2
1 Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics.” International Security 20, (1) (Summer): 71-81. 2 K.W. Abbott, and D. Snidal. “Why states act through formal international organizations.” Journal of Conflict Barnett and Finnemore focus on state actors, explaining that international organizations “…create new interests for actors (like “promoting human rights”) but can ultimately lead to inefficient, self-defeating behavior.3 In a similar vein, Risse highlights state motivations for joining international institutions, and highlights the challenge of legitimacy and accountability of member states. 4
Researching from a constructivist perspective, the literature highlighted aims to directly respond to some of the constructivist concerns mentioned above. For example, literature that focuses on state motivations for joining international institutions, member states’ accountability, and legitimacy of international institutions. The next body of literature contextualizes the international institutions, analyzing the transformation of institutions over the past century as well as the specific ones being studied.
Historical Literature
The historical literature can be divided into two categories, either broadly focusing on institutions in general, or with a specific emphasis on the two institutions being studied. Martin and Simmons, Cox and Jacobson address institutions in general, while Alston, Flood, Hannum, Lauren, Terlingen, and Mutua specifically focus on the two UN human rights institutions. Martin and Simmons provide a review of the scholarship focused on international institutions; address the way international politics should be treated relative to domestic politics; and finally look at the “problem of research agendas.”5 Cox and Jacobson aim to assess how influence is exercised in international organizations, using eight international organizations as case studies. They also highlight membership, structure, and saliency as the institutional attributes that should be examined for studying and comparing them.6 Though Cox and Jacobson’s work
Resolution 42 (1): 3. 3 M.N. Barnett and M. Finnemore. “The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations.” International Organization 53 (04): 699-732. 4 Thomas Risse, “Transnational governance and legitimacy.” A.Benz and I. 5 Lisa Martin and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories and empirical studies of international institutions.” International Organization 52 (4, International Organization at Fifty: Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics) (Autumn): pp. 729-757. 6 Robert Cox and Harold Karan Jacobson, The anatomy of influence; decision making in international organization. New Haven: Yale University Press. was composed decades prior to this thesis, their precise analysis of international institutions still bears relevance and provides lessons for my own assessment.
Turning to more institutionally specific pieces of literature, Alston, Flood, Hannum, Lauren,
Terlingen, and Mutua provide invaluable insights about the Commission and the transition to the Council.
A well-respected expert of the United Nations, Alston “critically appraises” the United Nations human rights system as a whole, aptly conveying the specific weaknesses and accomplishments of the
Commission in its historical context. Flood has a similar firsthand experience, after having served as the
U.S. Department of State representative to the Commission. Flood also highlights the phases of the
Commission and how they influenced the work of the institution. Both Alston and Flood conducted their analyses of the Commission in the nineties, focusing on the first fifty years of the Commission’s lifetime.
Though there is no comparison to the Council or focus on specifically why the Commission was replaced, both Alston and Flood provide very useful information from their unique viewpoints.
Both Hannum and Lauren focus more on the transition from the Commission to the Council, and why the Commission needed to be replaced in the first place. Hannum demonstrates a clear understanding of the integration of human rights work in the context of UN bodies, aptly noting the important aspects of various member states, voting blocs, and the history of the two institutions under study here. Lauren provides a very detailed account of the transformation of the UN human rights work contained within each human rights institution. By assessing specific institutional shortcomings and incorporating the role of NGOs, Lauren does a more thorough assessment than Hannum. While both Hannum and Lauren highlight the why the Commission needed to be replaced, neither include a thorough comparison of the two institutions analyzed in this thesis.
Yvonne Terlingen is one of the foremost experts in UN human rights institutions. She has served as Amnesty International’s leader and has participated extensively in various aspects of the United
Nations. In The Human Rights Council: A New Era in UN Human Rights Work she discusses the institutional transition that is the focus of this thesis. She explains why the replacement of the
Commission was necessary, and highlights specific problems of either institution. Her unique insights about the institutional change are invaluable for this research, especially for comparing the Commission to the Council.
Mutua assesses human rights norms: where they came from, their value, and how they contribute to the foundation of human rights institutions. Mutua’s work seeks to “interrogate the processes and politics of standard setting in human rights” by tracing the transition from the Commission to the Council.
7 Perhaps most importantly, Mutua focuses on the obstacles of UN human rights work and makes a thorough assessment of the UN Commission on Human Rights compared to the UN Human Rights
Council. Additionally, Mutua addresses the intricacies of the UN human rights approach and defines some of the most important concepts in this area of research, namely norms, standards, and rights.
However, Standard Setting falls short: the research is geared inwards, addressing the standards that exist within the UN, without addressing the impact those standards have on UN member states or relevant human rights situations. Even though the evidence used for this more formal comparison is different from what this thesis incorporates, it is valuable nonetheless.
Looking at the direct relationship between United Nations work and human rights, Frederic
Megret and Florian Hoffman look at the UN as a whole and how the UN conducts its human rights work.
Looking at the Commission on Human Rights and the Human Rights Council, Megret and Hoffman explain why the UN is the preeminent institution in terms of human rights work, supporting the emphasis being placed on the United Nations human rights institutions.
What Alston, Flood, Hannum, Lauren, Terlingen and Mutua provide is the crucial background information for this thesis: why the Commission needed to be replaced; how the transition took place; and the reasoning behind the Council’s specific design. The next set of literature is valuable for different reasons. Rather than providing background information – whether theoretical or historical – the following authors directly contributed to the methodology design.
Methodical Literature
7 Mutua Mutua, “Standard setting in human rights,” Human Rights Quarterly 29 (3): 547-630. Whether or not human rights can be quantified for “measurement” has been heavily debated. A variety of studies have incorporated human rights statistics, and debated their significance. Some of the most valuable research has been conducted by Hafner-Burton and Ron; Cingranelli and Richards;
DeNeufville; Edwards, Scott, Allen, and Irvin; Simmons; and Jabine and Claude, as they provide necessary information for determining how to best incorporate human rights statistics.
Hafner-Burton and Ron demonstrate how to empirically assess human rights, given its largely subjective and changing nature: they reference studies that incorporate statistics for analyzing human rights topics and also address “statistical skepticism.” This study points to the four preeminent sources for cross-national human rights data, most notably the Political Terror Scale (PTS) and the Cingranelli and
Richards Index (CIRI).8 After reviewing all four, and the information provided by Cingranelli and
Richards, I chose to rely on data from the Cingranelli and Richards Index Human Rights Data Project for this thesis.
David Cingranelli and David Richards provide more background information, discussing CIRI in
The Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project. In this work, the authors provide an overview of their project and a summary of the fifteen human rights indicators used for quantification.
Finally, Cingranelli and Richards explain how the CIRI data is produced.9 Additionally, Judith De
Neufville assesses the quality of the statistics provided by the U.S. State Department – one of the main sources for both the CIRI Index and the Political Terror Scale (PTS). By discussing the “consistency in definition, accuracy in measurement, and comprehensiveness in coverage,” De Neufville demonstrates why relying on the State Department data (as both CIRI and PTS do) is worthwhile. 10
In Sins of Commission? Understanding Membership Patterns on the United Nations Human
Rights Commission, Martin Edwards, Kevin Scott, Susan Allen, and Kate Irvin incorporate a
8 Emilie Hafner-Burton and James Ron, “Review: Seeing double,” World Politics 61 (2) (Apr.): pp. 360- 401. 9 David L. Cingranelli, and David L. Richards. 2010. “The Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) human rights data project,” Human Rights Quarterly 32 (2): 401-24. 10 Judith Innes De Neufville, “Human Rights Reporting as a Policy Tool – an Examination of the State Department Country Reports,” Human Rights Quarterly 8(4): 681-99. methodology that combines empirical human rights data from CIRI and PTS, with UN membership data to determine the pervasive membership patterns that existed among UNCHR member states, stressing
“the role that regional dynamics play in shaping membership on the Commission.”11 While this study is insightful in terms of assessing the Commission on Human Rights and providing a methodological roadmap for my own research, it lacks an assessment of the Human Rights Council altogether. This is because this work was conducted just two years after the Council’s establishment. Additionally, this work fails to “link changes in membership with changes in the effectiveness of international organizations.”12
Simmons couples quantitative analysis with case studies that demonstrate how “the ratification of one of the six core human rights conventions can influence agendas, litigation, and mobilization…in particular, the domestic politics of the ratifying country.”13 One of the more challenging aspects of government ratification as addressed by Simmons is exposing and explaining the governments that are
“False Negatives” and those that are “False Positives.” An example of “False Positives” used by
Simmons, are the countries of Burundi, Uzbekistan, and Cambodia who have ratified all six of the core human rights treaties but “are not paragons of respect for human dignity.”
Perhaps most helpful is the way Simmons synthesizes her methodology. She combines U.N. ratification data (which governments ratify which treaty and when) with specific human rights indicators geared to link domestic changes and mobilization with the treaty ratification. In summary, Simmons is able to demonstrate the theoretical and practical implications and incentives for government ratification of treaties; why a formal enforcement mechanism may not even be preferable for ensuring treaty compliance; and that “ratification of human rights treaties has had positive consequences in much of the world.”14
11 Edwards, Martin S., Kevin M. Scott, Susan Hannah Allen, and Kate Irvin. 2008. “Sins of commission? understanding membership patterns on the united nations human rights commission. “Political Research Quarterly 61 (3) (Sep.): pp. 390-402. 12 Martin S. Edwards et.al, “Sins of Commission,” 390-402. 13 Beth Simmons, Mobilizing for human rights: International law in domestic politics, Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press 14 Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights, 380. Beth Simmons’s study is useful because of the parallels that can be drawn for the methodology of this thesis. Simmons primarily seeks to determine why governments ratify international human rights treaties; how treaties can be effective without a formal enforcement mechanism; and whether a specific relationship exists between international human rights treaties and particular human rights situations around the world. Though this thesis does not place explicit emphasis on international human rights treaties, their role in human rights work is certainly relevant.
Jabine and Claude make the best case for using human rights statistics in general. They discuss
“both the opportunities and limits for exploring human rights questions with the aid of statistical data gathering and analysis techniques” in order to demonstrate that “statistics applied to human rights issues can make a difference.”15 They also conclude by summarizing twenty-nine human rights data sources.
Though their book was written in 1992, their lessons still apply, even today. Jabine and Claude provide invaluable information for incorporating and analyzing human rights statistics – a broad enough focus with specific enough examples for current application.
Professor Snyder’s Pragmatic Approach to Human Rights
I was able to attend a lecture by Professor Snyder in the fall of 2010, where he elaborated further on his “Pragmatic Approach to Human Rights.” Professor Snyder says that right now, human rights work operates through a skewed lens, and this has major drawbacks:
universalism, legalism, and Western-based moralism may often hamper efforts to persuade communities whose political and cultural leaders have a vested interest in resisting alien normative revolution.
He also argues that human rights work relies too heavily on treaty signing, naming and shaming, and moralistic rights campaigns. Snyder says research indicates that human rights treaties only work in successfully democratic countries that have stable court systems and a strong civil society, and that trade
15 Jabine, Thomas B., and Richard Pierre Claude. 1992. Human rights and statistics : Getting the record straight. University of Pennsylvania press Pennsylvania studies in human rights. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. treaties with human rights clauses are only efficient with significant monitoring and penalties that force compliance.
Using the issue of transnational justice as an example, Snyder explains that legalism is not always what we should rely on in the international system, pointing to the ineffectiveness of the International
Criminal Court and referencing the advantages that come with amnesty, particularly in the cases of
Mozambique, El Salvador, and South Africa. In the case of child labor, Snyder turns to the case involving the International Labor Organization and Bangladesh where the ultimate goal was to improve working conditions for children, not to make child labor illegal altogether, which consequently had severe backlash in Bangladeshi society.
Instead, Professor Snyder argues for placing more emphasis on what he calls the “pragmatic” approach to human rights:
1) persuasion by engaging with the community’s own normative discourse; 2) providing rewards and sanctions linked to human rights compliance; 3) efforts to change underlying circumstance (like poverty and war).
Snyder believes that human rights work demands that we take into account the power and interests of key players; engage with the local communities to strengthen their own normative framework (instead of imposing Western notions); and address the underlying circumstances that directly relate to human rights
(like poverty and war as mentioned above).
The argument articulated by Professor Snyder in his lecture has great merit because it addresses a major problem in human rights work. Professor Snyder believes that the current approach, is “top-down”: relying too heavily on instituting laws, standards and norms born out of a Western ideology (which is not always welcome), international courts, treaties, and negotiations. He believes that relying more on what I am labeling a “bottom-up” approach will be more efficient: working directly with individual communities to discern and support their ideology, incorporating more incentives for human rights compliance, and directing efforts at changing underlying circumstances rather than simply following an international code of conduct to ensure that “justice follows.” As I will seek to demonstrate in my thesis, the mechanism for combining Snyder’s pragmatic, largely bottom-up approach with the more pervasive top-down approach to human rights exists in the form of international institutions, more specifically in the UN Human Rights Council. The mechanisms embedded the United Nations human rights institution include mechanisms like Special Procedures and the Universal Periodic Review. Through these pieces of institutional machinery, the international system can observe a nexus for all of the methods Snyder highlights: relying on treaty signing, naming and shaming, moralistic rights campaigns as well as the opportunity to engage with individual communities in discourse, to construct rewards and sanctions linked to human rights compliance, and to attempt to change underlying circumstances (like poverty and war).
Concluding Discussion
Many scholars have addressed aspects of the research being pursued in this thesis, and much of their literature has proven to be especially useful. Many experts have articulated the specific shortcomings of either the UN Commission for Human Rights or the UN Human Rights Council, or have gone further to compare the two by looking at their structural differences. Some scholars have looked at the bigger picture: looking at institutions largely resting on theoretical expectations and arguing for what should be accomplished by international institutions like the United Nations. Scholars have also found worth in the statistical side of human rights analysis, and some have examined different human rights indicators allowing for comparison of different UN member states. Even more importantly, a handful of scholarly works incorporates human rights statistics to link international institutions with human rights work, a variation of the methodology I use in this thesis.
While assessing international institutions, understanding relevant theoretical paradigms, investigating human rights standards and norms, and demonstrating the worth of human rights statistics greatly contribute to my own knowledge base, a comprehensive incorporation of each of those subject areas has yet to be produced. The design of this thesis is unique and original because of its particular institutional comparison methodological design. Therefore, in a largely multidisciplinary fashion, this thesis compares the UN Commission for Human Rights to the UN Human Rights Council by incorporating human rights statistics in order to demonstrate the value of international institutions for protecting and promoting human rights.
Chapter 3 From the Commission to the Council
The main purpose of this section is to systematically compare the UN Commission for Human
Rights to the UN Human Rights Council, and establish the scope of this research. Their similarities and differences can be divided into four categories, pertaining to status in the United Nations system, accession to membership, action (voting procedures), and institutional mechanisms. The methodology is designed to specifically focus on the changes to membership and this chapter demonstrates why that is.
While I argue that all four of these institutional changes either improve or maintain the capabilities of the
Commission, the changes to membership are particularly worthy of attention.
This thesis has been broadly targeting “UN Human Rights Institutions,” which refers to Charter- based bodies and separately, to Treaty-based bodies. Charter-based bodies include the Commission and the Council, Special Procedures, and the Universal Periodic Review.
Charter-based mechanisms constitute an element in the external policy environment of factors that a state takes into account in its domestic and foreign policy making…Their effectiveness is also enhanced by the sustained commitment to the community of states to a particular mechanism, as expressed in periodic reaffirmation of its mandate.16
Additionally, there are nine Treaty-based bodies that monitor implementation of the core international human rights treaties. The International Bill of Human Rights is the foundation for international human rights work. It consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (including two Optional Protocols); and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
The Treaty-based bodies include: the Human Rights Committee (CCPR); the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR); the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERD); the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); the Committee against Torture (CAT); the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC); the Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW); the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); and the
Committee on Enforced Disappearance (CED). This thesis will focus solely on the Charter-based bodies: the Commission and its replacement body, the Council. Special Procedures will be discussed in the context of both the Commission and the Council, and the Universal Periodic Review in the context of the
Council’s adopted Institution-Building Package.
16 Patrick James Flood, The effectiveness of UN human rights institutions, Westport, Conn.: Praeger. The UN Commission for Human Rights
On June 26, 1945, the Charter of the United Nations was signed, its Preamble proclaiming its purpose “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.” The Charter also outlines the responsibility of “making recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.”17
In 1947, the Economic and Social Council voted to create the Commission for Human Rights, to exist as a subsidiary body of ECOSOC. Since its first session in 1947, the Commission
firmly established itself as the single most important United Nations organ in the human rights field, despite its subordinate status as one of several specialized (‘functional’) commissions answerable to the Economic and Social Council and, through it, to the General Assembly.18
It is important to note that the designated status of the Commission did not matter as much over the decades of its existence. In his appraisal of the Commission in 1991, Philip Alston noted that
In the early years, ECOSOC was an important force and so was the Assembly. Over time, the role of the former waned so that by the 1980s it had become a virtual rubber stamp for the Commission.19
In addition to the changing significance of its status within the United Nations, the membership of the
Commission also changed drastically over the years.
Originally, the Commission was comprised of only eighteen members and chaired by Eleanor
Roosevelt. Members were elected by ECOSOC through a majority vote and served three-year terms.
The membership of the Commission has been expanded gradually from eighteen in 1946 to twenty-one in 1962, thirty-two in 1967, forty-three in 1980, and fifty-three in 1992. On each occasion the rationale has been to ensure a more equitable geographical balance (i.e., to diminish the role of Western and Eastern Europe and enhance that of the Third World).20
17 “Charter of the United Nations” (1945), Preamble
18 Philip, Alston, The united nations and human rights: A critical appraisal, Oxford [England]: Clarendon Press 19Alston, The united nations and human rights, 201. 20Alston, The united nations and human rights, 195. By 1992, membership expanded to fifty-three members and was apportioned by geographic region: fifteen members were designated to represent the African Group, twelve to represent the Asian Group, five to come from the Eastern European Group, eleven from the Latin American and Caribbean Group
(GRULAC), and ten from the Western European and Others Group (WEOG). Additionally, Non-member states, National Human Rights Institutions, and Non-Governmental Organizations (though this was not the case at the beginning) were able to participate by submitting proposals, or speaking at designated times, although they were not allowed to vote.
Over the course of its lifetime, the Commission received strong criticism regarding its member states, which was often very well deserved.
The Soviets could support economic and social rights with enthusiasm – but not if they threatened to impose any restrictions on Stalin’s dictatorship. The Chinese could strongly advocate the right of self-determination and racial equality in European colonial possession – but not if this forced domestic reforms at home…Jan Smuts of South Africa could enthusiastically draft the language about the rights of all people for the preamble of the UN Charter – but not if it committed his country to giving equal treatment to blacks.21
In addition to the hypocrisy that grew to be characteristic of the Commission’s members was the intense politicization of its work.
During the Commission’s annual session of this year [2001], Sudan, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Togo were all elected to membership despite their well-known human rights abuses against domestic political opponents. 22
Similarly in 2003, the Libyan representative was elected to chair the Commission and the representative from Zimbabwe was elected to membership.
Also towards the end of the Commission’s lifetime, “no meaningful resolutions were passed to condemn human rights violations by China, Cuba, Indonesia, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, or
Syria.”23
21 Paul Gordon Lauren, "To preserve and build on its achievements and to redress its shortcomings," Human Rights Quarterly 29 (2): 307-45. 22 Lauren, “To preserve and build…,” 307-345 23Lauren, “To preserve and build…,” 307-345 The Commission’s principal tangible output consists of resolutions and decisions. The methods by which these are negotiated have changed significantly over the years as a result of the expanded membership, the vastly more active role of observer States, and the increasing resort to consensus decision-making.24
The only state that was consistently targeted by Commission action is Israel. According to UN scholar
Anne Bavefsky,
almost thirty percent of the resolutions passed by the UN Commission on Human Rights to condemn specific states have been directed at Israel, which also has the distinction of being the only state to which the commission has devoted an entire item on its agenda.25
Additionally, the Commission’s design proved to contribute to its politicization, with the influence of voting procedures and informal voting blocs.
Under Article IX, the Commission’s meetings were to be held in public. However, there was also usually a week of confidential sessions “from which the press and public, including nongovernmental organizations, are barred.”26
Here also, governments are “charged” with various offenses against human rights and given an opportunity to defend themselves…For those in the dock, the aim is to have one’s country’s case dropped or, at worst, merely “kept under of review” and not made the subject of an in-depth investigation by a special rapporteur or similar mechanism, even under these closed door rules.27
According to Article XI, Rule 56, each member of the Commission had one vote, and decisions were made by a majority of members present and voting (members abstaining are considered not voting).
Voting was conducted by raising hands, though members were given the option to request a roll call. An opportunity to explain a vote was allowed during the procedure.
During most of its existence, the Commission met once a year, in Geneva, Switzerland in the spring for about six weeks. Otherwise, there were five Special Sessions.
The Commission on Human Rights was authorized by the Economic and Social Council, in its Resolution 1990/48 of 25 May 1990, to meet exceptionally between its regular sessions, provided that a majority of the members of the Commission so agreed, mindful of the need for the
24Alston, The united nations and human rights, 197. 25 Anne Bayefsky, “The UN and the Jews,” Commentary 117 (2): 42. 26 Flood, The effectiveness of UN human rights institutions, 40. 27 Flood, The effectiveness of UN human rights institutions, 40. Commission on Human Rights to deal with urgent and acute human rights situations in the most expeditious way.28
The first and second Special Sessions were called in August and December of 1992 pertaining to the territories of the former Yugoslavia; the third pertaining to the situation of human rights in Rwanda in
May 1994; the fourth regarding the situation in East Timor in September 1999; and the fifth in October
2000 concerning Israel.
What does the Commission have to show for its sixty years? The Commission first sought to establish a universal framework for human rights. According to Alston, in 1948, the UN General
Assembly produced a monumental document after just two sessions of work, known as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The UDHR is known as “the first pillar of twentieth-century human rights law and the cornerstone of the universal human rights movement.”29
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights…explicitly recognizes the link between rights and dignity. Human rights, then, are titles, rooted in the intrinsic value – the dignity – of every human being, to live and to have or to do things that are essential to lead a life in keeping with this dignity.30
In addition to producing the UDHR, the Commission also established institutional mechanisms.
In 1965 decolonization produced many newly independent African and Asian states, demanding alterations to the UN Charter. “Only three years after the Commission itself was given formal authority to debate gross violations of human rights anywhere in the world,” 31 two procedures were created.
These developments resulted in the adoption of what eventually turned out to be two separate procedures. The procedure established under ECOSOC Resolution 1235 (XLII) established the principle that violations could be examined and responded to, and provided the necessary authorization for the Commission to engage in public debate on the issue each year. The procedure under ECOSOC Resolution 1503 (XLVIII) provided a carefully and deliberately constrained procedure by which situations which appear to reveal ‘a consistent pattern of gross
28 “Commission on Human Rights: Special Sessions,” http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/special- sessions.htm 29 “Human Rights and the United Nations,” http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/humanrights/about/history.asp 30 Flood, The effectiveness of UN human rights institutions, 1. 31 Hurst Hannum, “Reforming the Special Procedures and Mechanisms of the Commission on Human Rights,”. Human Rights Law Review: 73-92. and reliably attested violations of human rights’ could be pursued with the governments concerned, but in private.32
The “1503 Procedure” “was a watershed in the attempts of the United Nations to more actively promote human rights.”33 Since this procedure requires filing complains secretly, it was often criticized for being slow and for excluding NGOs. However, “the 1503 procedure also makes it possible for individuals or persons with reliable knowledge of violations to file communications,” perhaps its most important attribute.34
The Commission also constructed a system of Special Procedures, “the general name given to the mechanisms to address either country specific situations or thematic issues in all parts of the world.”35
Special procedures are either an individual (called “Special Rapporteur,” “Special Representative of the Secretary-General,” or “Independent Expert”) or a working group usually composed of five members (one from each region). The mandates of the special procedures are established and defined by the resolution creating them.36
At the time the Commission was replaced, the Council was tasked with reviewing the remaining twelve mechanisms created by the Sub-Commission, and the remaining forty-four created by the Commission.
Thirteen of the Commission’s experts, rapporteurs or representatives are concerned with particular countries; most of the remaining mechanisms could be described as thematic, with the exception of the two working groups that are part of the 1503 procedure.37
The Commission’s final institutional mechanism worthy of discussion, effectively served as its think tank.
The Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights was an appendage of the
Commission, established in 1947 with twelve members. Originally, this body was named to focus specifically on the “Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,” renamed in 1999. Its “main functions
32Alston, The united nations and human rights, 144. 33Hannum, “Reforming the Special Procedures and Mechanisms,” 73-92 34Alston, The united nations and human rights, 145 35 “Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council,” http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/special/index.htm
36 “Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council,” http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/special/index.htm 37 Hannum, “Reforming the Special Procedures and Mechanisms,” 73-92 are to undertake studies on human rights issues, to make recommendations concerning the prevention of discrimination of any kind.”38
The overview of the Commission discussed its status in the UN system, its membership, the way it conducted its action, and finally the mechanisms it established. All four of these attributes changed over the course of the Commission’s lifetime, as the status as a body of ECOSOC grew to be irrelevant; membership expanded according to geographic region; voting blocs grew in strength; and finally the institutional mechanisms were adjusted to directly confront the changing international system.
Unfortunately,
the CHR lost its integrity and direction over time; with much of its membership decisions, powers and focus coming to be fuelled by disreputable goals rather than motivated by the aim of promoting, protecting and advancing human rights. In order to recapture its fundamental purposes, therefore, the need for reform became crucial.39
As a result in 2004 the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan sought to replace the Commission.
Kofi Annan’s “Credibility Deficit”
In 2003, the Secretary-General convened a High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change
“to evaluate how our existing policies and institutions have done in addressing those threats; and to make recommendations for strengthening the United Nations.” The full report is available online in the UN archive. During the fifty-ninth session of the Commission in 2004, Kofi Annan presented the report “A
More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.” In this report, Annan highlights “six clusters of threats” which include war between States; violence within States; poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation; nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organized crime. In the executive summary, mention of the success of the institution is included:
The good news is that the United Nations and our collective security institutions have shown that they can work. More civil wars ended through negotiation in the past 15 years than in the previous 200. In the 1960s, many believed that by now 15-25 States would possess nuclear weapons; the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has helped prevent this. The World Health
38 “Sub-Commission on the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights,” http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/subcom/index.htm 39 N. Ghanea, “From UN Commission on Human Rights to UN Human Rights Council,” International & Comparative Law Quarterly 55 (03): 695-705. Organization helped to stop the spread of SARS before it killed tens of thousands, perhaps more. 40 In March 2005, Kofi Annan’s “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All” was published, circulated, and considered by many in the human rights world to be a
“bombshell.”41
In Section V, Strengthening the United Nations, Kofi Annan explained the need for an institutional change.
…the Commission’s capacity to perform its tasks has been increasingly undermined by its declining credibility and professionalism. In particular, States have sought membership of the Commission not to strengthen human rights but to protect themselves against criticism or to criticize others. As a result, a credibility deficit has developed, which casts a shadow on the reputation of the United Nations system as a whole.42
Pointing to a solution, Annan explained that if the United Nations “is to take the cause of human rights as seriously as those of security and development – then Member States should agree to replace the
Commission on Human Rights with a smaller standing Human Rights Council.”43 More specifically,
Annan outlined a human rights institution that would function as a subsidiary body of the General
Assembly. States elected to membership would “abide by the highest human rights standards” and be approved to membership by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly.44
Kofi Annan’s proposals for the replacement institution were considered at the World Summit in
2005, and heavily debated. The U.S. Ambassador John Bolton was one of the more outspoken critics, demanding that the members of the Security Council be “guaranteed seating.”45 In the end, the transition from the Commission to the Council was not necessarily smooth, but on March 15, 2006, the General
Assembly voted to abolish the Commission and establish the Council. One hundred and seventy nations
40 “Executive Summary: A More Secure World,” http://www.un.org/secureworld/brochure.pdf 41Hannum, “Reforming the Special Procedures and Mechanisms,” 73-92. 42 “In Larger Freedom: Report,” http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/chap5.htm 43 “In Larger Freedom: Report,” http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/chap5.htm 44Lauren, “To preserve and build…,” 307-345. 45 Lauren, “To preserve and build…,” 307-345. voted yes in support, three abstained (Belarus, Iran, and Venezuela), and four voted no (Israel, Marshall
Islands, Palau, and the United States).46
The UN Human Rights Council
The UN Human Rights Council was established in 2006 as a replacement for the Commission.
The UN General Assembly, led by vocal Security-General Kofi Annan, passed UN Resolution 60/251.
One of the most important attributes of the Council’s founding was its particular placement in the United
Nations: now the human rights body would be a subsidiary body to the General Assembly, to be considered a peer to rather than an auxiliary organ of the Economic and Social Council. The two most important pieces of legislation pertaining to the UN Human Rights Council are UN Resolution 60/251 as well as the Council Resolution 5/1 which instated an “Institution-Building Package.”
General Assembly Resolution 60/251 founded the Human Rights Council, reaffirming the universality and importance of its work to protect and promote human rights. It also specifically recognizes the work of the Commission and the need for improvement. The Resolution encourages the founding principles of the Commission. It also stipulates the need for a Universal Periodic Review and significant adjustments to membership, meeting time, and procedures for action. The Institution-Building package is the newest institutional attribute of the Council. It outlines the Universal Periodic Review mechanism; the changes to the Special Procedures; the establishment of the Human Rights Council
Advisory Committee; the changes to the Complaint Procedure; and the agenda, framework, and procedures for the Programme of Work.
The Council has two major organizational tasks before it…It is to undertake a “universal periodic review” ...and it is to “review, and, where necessary, improve and rationalize all mandates, mechanisms, functions and responsibilities of the Commission on Human Rights.47
As the Council set out to accomplish these organizational tasks, it was the hope of its creators that the important changes to its membership would also contribute to its improvement.
46Lauren, “To preserve and build…,” 307-345. 47Hannum, “Reforming the Special Procedures and Mechanisms,” 73-92. The changes put in place for accession to membership of the Council are arguably the most important. The Commission’s fifty-three members were whittled down to make the Council an institution of forty-seven, which “marks the first time that membership of any United Nations body has ever been reduced in order to achieve greater effectiveness.”48 The states would be elected by secret ballot by an absolute majority of the General Assembly after a strong consideration of human rights records.
Members of the new Council will serve for a period of three years and will not be eligible for immediate re-election after two consecutive terms. As a consequence, there are term limits and rotations that ensure against any state holding a permanent seat. 49
Other restrictions to membership aimed to distribute seats equitably across geographic regions.
Similar to other UN bodies, membership was distributed by geographic region. This is a crucial change regarding accession to membership of this institution.
With reference to the critical and sensitive issue of eligibility criteria for membership on the Human Rights Council, several important decisions were made. One of these is geographical distribution that reflects the political and population life in the twenty-first century and the membership in the United Nations itself.50 Thirteen members were designated to represent the African Group, thirteen from the Asian Group, six from the Eastern European Group, eight from the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC), and seven from the Western European and Others Group (WEOG). However it is important to note that
…each individual candidate must still win an absolute majority from the entire United Nations membership. Of much greater importance was the determination that the actual behavior of governments would serve as the ultimate criteria for membership.51
As exhibited by the Commission’s history, membership designations by geographic region can greatly contribute to the politicization of the institution and hinder its work, making membership stipulations particularly important.
According to the Hudson Institute, the one hundred and ninety-two UN member states are broken up into their regional groups producing fifty-four total members of the Asian Group, fifty-three of the
48Lauren, “To preserve and build…,” 307-345. 49Lauren, “To preserve and build…,” 307-345. 50Lauren, “To preserve and build…,” 307-345. 51Lauren, “To preserve and build…,” 307-345. African Group, twenty-three of the Eastern European Group, thirty-three of GRULAC, and twenty-eight of WEOG. The United States participates in WEOG, and Israel is the “only UN member state denied full membership in a regional group”52 though depending on circumstance, Israel participates as a member of the WEOG. From those designations, membership to UN organs (like the Human Rights Council) is determined.
Other groups also exist within the Council: G-77 & China, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the League of Arab States, the African Union, the
European Union, and JUSCANZ (essentially the WEOG with the U.S.). The Hudson Institute summarizes these groups and their missions very efficiently. That information is displayed below, in Table 2. With the shift in representation from regional groups from the Commission to the Council, there is a corresponding shift in the voting contributions relating to the following groups that exist within the UN system.
Table 2, Information provided by the Hudson Institute53 Group Purpose # Members/ % UN MISC Membership, total=192 G-77 & China A loosely affiliated 132; 69% group of developing countries, whose goal is to advance the economic wellbeing of the Third World, established in 1964. Non-Aligned Movement Originally formed as a 117; 61% (NAM) bloc of countries that would remain neutral during the Cold War, first gathering in 1961. Organization of the Intended to work 56 Largest bloc in NAM & Islamic Conference together to promote the G-77 (OIC) interest of Muslims worldwide, established in 1969 with the aim of “Islamic solidarity” and
52 “Eye on the UN: A Project of the Hudson Institute New York,” http://www.eyeontheun.org/view.asp?p=55&l=11 53 “Eye on the UN: A Project of the Hudson Institute New York,” http://www.eyeontheun.org/view.asp?p=55&l=11 “non-interference in the internal affairs of member states.” League of Arab States Focusing on 21 Largest bloc in OIC cooperation and stronger relationships among its member states. African Union An internal organization 53 that coordinates cooperation among member states on issues such as trade, development, and security. European Union (EU) Formerly the 25 Organization of African Unity, formed to encourage independence, and advancing stability, development, trade and the well-being of the African continent. JUSCANZ A Sub-set of the WEOG 14/15 Including the U.S. (sub-set of WEOG) regional group, sometimes including Israel.
Because of the impact that membership has on voting procedures, it has the potential to heavily influence the action of the Council. For example, when voting on membership “…election will require an absolute majority of the General Assembly, or ninety-seven votes out of one hundred and ninety-two.”54
Unlike the Commission, the Council is mandated to meet no fewer than three times a year, for no less than ten weeks in Geneva, Switzerland. Since its inception, the Council has had fourteen special sessions displayed in Table 8 below.
Table 8: Human Rights Council Special Sessions Subject Date of Special Session Pertaining to the “Situation of 1st Session: July 2006 Human Rights in the 3rd Session: November 2006
54Lauren, “To preserve and build…,” 307-345. Palestinian territories occupied 6th Session: January 2008 since 1967. 9th Session: January 2009 12th Session: October 2009 Commission of Inquiry on 2nd Session: 2006 Lebanon Concerning Darfur 4th Session: December 2006 Concerning Myanmar 5th Session: October 2007 Access to Food 7th Session: May 2008 Concerning the Democratic 8th Session: November 2008 Republic of the Congo Impact of the Financial Crisis 10th Session: February 2009 Concerning Sri Lanka 11th Session: May 2009 Concerning Haiti 13th Session: January 2010 Concerning Cote d’Ivoire 14th Session: December 2010
Otherwise, the Council meets regularly throughout the year, with Universal Periodic Reviews taking place in between the High-Level sessions. There have been a total of fifteen full sessions of the Council, and the sixteenth session concluded in the spring of 2011.
The Human Rights Council follows the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly. The more important guidelines and mechanisms are outlined in the specific UN Resolutions that pertain specifically to the Council, namely Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1: the Human Rights Council Institution- building package. The Agenda for the Human Rights Council has ten standing items, addressed in order over the course of the session. The agenda is as follows:
1. Organizational and procedural matters; 2. Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary General; 3. Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development; 4. Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention; 5. Human rights bodies and mechanisms; 6. Universal Periodic Review; 7. Human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories; 8. Follow-up and implementation of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action; 9. Racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related forms of intolerance, follow-up and implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action; 10. Technical assistance and capacity-building.
In addition to the standing Agenda, Resolution 5/1 also provides for the review of the Commission’s institutional mechanisms and the opportunity to instate new ones. According to Resolution 5/1, the Universal Periodic Review Mechanism was instated in order to
“promote the universality, interdependence, indivisibility and interrelatedness of human rights.”
Resolution 5/1 also mandated that the UPR be “conducted in an objective, transparent, non-selective, constructive, non-confrontational and non-politicized manner.” According to the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights,
The Universal Periodic Review is a unique process which involves a review of the human rights records of all 192 UN Member States once every four years. The UPR is a State-driven process, under the auspices of the Human Rights Council, which provides the opportunity to declare what actions they have taken to improve the human rights situations in their countries and to fulfill their human rights obligations. As one of the main features of the Council, the UPR is designed to ensure equal treatment for every country when their human rights situations are assessed.55
By 2011, every country will have been reviewed at least once. This mechanism is unique and provides a forum for open dialogue that includes National Human Rights Institutions and Non-Governmental
Organizations. With a permanent spot on the Council’s Agenda, following-up on country reviews is regularly incorporated into the Council’s work.
There are an additional six procedures, mandates, and organs of the Human Rights Council outlined by Resolution 5/1. After reviewing the Special Procedures of the Commission in 2007, all thematic mandates were extended (which include the right to non-discrimination, arbitrary detention, enforced or involuntary disappearances just to name a few) and established others regarding slavery, access to water and sanitation, and cultural rights. Country mandates for Belarus, Cuba, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Liberia were terminated. The mandates for Burundi, Cambodia, North Korea,
Haiti, Myanmar, the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, Somalia, and the Sudan were extended.
The “Advisory Committee” was established under Resolution 5/1. It is “composed of eighteen experts, and was design to function as a think tank for the Council. The Advisory Committee essentially serves as a replacement for the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights.
55 “United Nations Human Rights: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,” http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRmain.aspx Similar to upholding a think tank mechanism, the Complaint Procedure was maintained for the Council.
Resolution 5/1 explains that the Complaint Procedure exists with the purpose
to address consistent patterns of gross and reliably attested violations of all human rights and all fundamental freedoms occurring in any part of the world under any circumstances. It retains its confidential nature, with a view to enhancing cooperation with the State concerned.56
There are two working groups: one on Communications and one on Situations, which examine complaints and highlight them for the Council.
Unlike the Special Procedures, Advisory Committee, and Complaint Procedure, the Expert
Mechanism on the rights of indigenous peoples, the forum on minority issues, and the Social Forum are completely new developments. It is important to note that the Social Forum was “originally an initiative of the former Sub-Commission” discussed since 1997, but initiated in 2006.
The renewed Social Forum has a number of distinguishing attributes, compared to its predecessor: It is not linked to the Advisory Committee which replaced the Sub-Commission; Its Chairperson is no longer a member of the Advisory Committee, but a government representative; It will meet for three days instead of two days; Four mandate holders of thematic procedures have been asked to assist the Chairperson as resource persons.57
Comparison and Concluding Thoughts
After reviewing the Commission and the Council separately, it can be concluded that their most pronounced differences pertain to their status in the UN, accession to membership, their procedures for action, and their institutional mechanisms. These differences are highlighted in Table 1 below:
Table 1 United Nations United Nations Commission for Human Rights Human Rights Council Establishment 1946 by UN Charter as subsidiary 2006 by UN Resolution 60/251 as body of ECOSOC subsidiary body of UN General Assembly Membership (terms, voting) Elected for 3 years terms by Elected for 3 year terms (cannot minimum of 28 ECOSOC be re-elected after 2 consecutive members by open ballot, terms) by minimum of 97/192
56 “UN Human Rights Council: Human Rights Council Complaint Procedure,” http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/complaints.htm 57“The Social Forum of the Human Rights Council,” http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/poverty/sforum.htm nominated by regional group; 53 General Assembly members by members; “selection by secret ballot; 47 members; acclamation”58 individual, direct voting; ultimate criteria for membership is behavior of governments59 Membership (UN Regions) African Group 15 African Group 13 Asian Group 12 Asian Group 13 E. European 5 E. European 6 Group Group GRULAC 11 GRULAC 8 WEOG 10 WEOG 7 Meetings, Action Once a year, six weeks; Adopting At least three times a year, for at decisions, resolutions by voting least ten weeks each session Institutional Mechanisms Sub-Commission on Promotion Advisory Committee and Protection of Human Rights Revised Complaints Procedure Special Procedures Special Procedures “1503” Complaint Procedure Institution Building Package (UPR)
While all of the differences between the Commission and the Council are important, differences to membership matter most for two reasons. First: the other three adjustments did not prove to be especially significant or restricted to influencing the specific member states of the institution. Second, changes to membership were especially profound and directly influence the work of the institutions, especially given the strength of voting blocs. When Special Procedures determine which mandates to instate, extend, and cancel; when the either institution sought to pass resolutions – membership and voting bloc influence is paramount for outcomes. Highlighting specific countries through “naming and shaming” or voting states onto the Council, too, is greatly impacted by membership and the pervasive voting blocs.
There is a cyclical pattern that exists in the UN system, including the human rights institutions.
Resolutions, decisions, and outcomes are voted upon and membership is determined by the formal guidelines for membership (regional groups) and the informal infrastructure dictated by the groups mentioned above. For this reason, heavy emphasis will be placed on the membership of either institution in the methodology.
58Lauren, “To preserve and build…,” 307-345. 59Lauren, “To preserve and build…,” 307-345.
Chapter 4 Designing a Study Using Human Rights Statistics
The methodology is designed specifically to focus on the member states of the Commission and the Council. The comparison of the Commission to the Council revealed their major differences to be: their status in the United Nations system; membership accession and restrictions by geographic region; institutional action; and finally their institutional mechanisms. The methodology targets the differences in membership to determine “institutional improvement” from the Commission to the Council for three specific reasons: because these institutions were specifically designed by member states; because the restrictions to the Council’s membership are vastly different from the Commission’s; and because this thesis demands looking outside of the institutional realm to determine impact on human rights. To thoroughly determine how this sharp difference in membership between the institutions translates into impacting human rights, the methodology aims to “measure” human rights.
It is important to note that “measuring” the institutional impact of the UNHRC and the UNCHR can be done in many different ways. For example, two options would be relying on ethnography or using survey data. The first requires adopting an anthropological approach: canvassing a variety of viewpoints of individuals directly involved with the two institutions. The second would require the extensive surveying of various human rights workers, government officials, and citizenry to obtain public opinion data regarding institutional impact. The problem with both of these options is the reliance on individuals involved with the two institutions, their transition, and their human rights work. The high turn-over of individuals affiliated with NGOs; the constant shuffling of government officials; and the likelihood that many of the most insightful human rights workers would be in the field or unavailable, prohibit either approach from being especially fruitful.
Is Quantifying Human Rights A Worthwhile Endeavor?
In an effort to evaluate the impact the Commission had on the human rights records of its member states, as compared to the Council, this systematic comparison of either institution employs human rights statistics. The purpose of incorporating human rights statistics is simply to engage with an alternative method for assessing human rights records of the variety of countries that have been members of either institution. Empirical data shows trends over time and provides a basis for a more thorough comparison.
However, quantifying human rights is not a foolproof method for analysis: it is essential to consider the source, the context, and purpose of human rights statistics.
Powerful organizations, including governments and NGOs, have the resources for gathering valuable human rights data. However, obtaining this information about unstable states like Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or Iran is no easy feat. Nations with rogue, oppressive regimes; populations with obscure dialects and widespread illiteracy; and lack of technological resources are just some of the obstacles to gathering human rights data. Therefore, considering the source of human rights statistics is paramount for employing this type of data.
Just how useful are human rights statistics? Their sources are often weak, and often prone to missing data and human error. So what should be avoided? First: making sweeping generalizations founded on human rights statistics. Though the data can reveal trends over time, speculating about trends exhibited in human rights data is dangerous. If human rights scores change from year to year in a given country, there are a multitude of conditions that could be responsible.
In theory, existing cross-national data should allow researchers to distinguish between the effects of policies such as international treaties, “naming and shaming,” or transitional justice and control variables, such as regime type.60
For example, changes in government and economic aspects of society may greatly impact human rights of citizens in addition to changes in international policy. But simply looking at numerical values does not convey all of those considerations.
Second: it is imperative to recognize the context of these statistics and to avoid forsaking other forms of analysis. Assigning a numerical value to represent instances of torture, loss of life, or other severe violations to human rights cannot thoroughly convey the gravity of the subject matter. When studying human rights violations, it is important to recognize the value of qualitative analysis: personal anecdotes of a refugee, whose family was kidnapped and murdered conveys a much more thorough picture of human rights situations than any numerical value assigned could. To better harness the potential for human rights statistics, many advocate case studies and/or combining statistics with qualitative data.
In Seeing Double: Human Rights Impact through Qualitative and Quantitative Eyes, Hafner-
Burton and Ron point to the “optimism of the case study genre bolstered by qualitative studies.” They conclude: “overall, second-generation quantitative work expects only small policy-related improvements in specific countries.”More importantly they echo the notion that “new statistical research has the potential to make an invaluable contribution to the field of human rights when used with care and
60Hafner-Buron and Ron, “Seeing Double,” 360-401. sophistication.”61 In that same vein, according to Jabine and Claude’s Human Rights and Statistics:
Getting the Record Straight, “Each violation of human liberty deserves universal condemnation…that statistics applied to human rights issues can make a difference.”62
Statistics can make a difference in many ways: they can help people to understand and publicize the extent and character of human rights violations, to identify the groups most affected, and to clarify responsibility for violations.63
After expanding upon the challenges to quantifying human rights, similar to those above, Jabine and
Claude demonstrate that the contribution of human rights statistics can be profound. The methodology for this thesis, therefore, combines human rights statistics with qualitative analysis.
Which Human Rights Data and Why?
There are a handful of human rights indices to choose from, as highlighted by Jabine and Claude, and numerous arguments recommending the use of specific indicators rather than a broad scale.64 This thesis uses the Physical Integrity Index provided by the Cingranelli and Richards Index (CIRI) Human
Rights Data Project, whose data covers 1981 to 2007. More specifically, the CIRI Physical Integrity
Index. Emphasis is being placed on physical integrity rights because they are specifically designated by international law, referred to as “personal integrity” or “life integrity” rights.
The Physical Integrity Index is an additive index constructed from the Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, and Disappearance indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for these four rights.)65 Cingranelli and Richards define these four human rights violations for the sake of demonstrating unidimensionalty.
Using these definitions as a basis for analysis, the CIRI Physical Integrity Index demonstrates a sequence of respect for these four rights (to not be killed extra-judicially, to not be “disappeared”, to not be imprisoned for political reasons, and to not be tortured).
61Hafner-Buron and Ron, “Seeing Double,” 360-401. 62 Jabine and Claude, Human Rights and Statistics, 5. 63 Jabine and Claude, Human Rights and Statistics, 6. 64 Cingranelli and Richards, “The Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Data Project”, 401-24 65 “CIRI Human Rights Data Project,” http://ciri.binghamton.edu/myciri/my_ciri_login.asp Torture: refers to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, by government officials or by private individuals at the instigation of government officials. Political Imprisonment: refers to the incarceration of people by government officials because of their ideas regarding religious beliefs, their nonviolent religious practices including proselytizing, their speech, their nonviolent opposition to government policies or leaders, or their membership in a group including an ethnic or racial group. Extrajudicial killings: killings by government officials without due process of law. They include murders by private groups if instigated by government. Disappearances: refers to unresolved cases in which political motivation appears likely and in which the victims have not been found.66
Unidimensionality allows for predicting change in a particular government. That is, if a country’s score decreases or increases from one point in time to the next, CIRI aims to predict for which particular right the government respect has changed.
Using Mokken Scaling Analysis (MSA), Cingranelli and Richards own assessment of unidimensionality reveals that
We found that if a government violated just one of the four physical integrity rights we examined, it was most likely to practice torture occasionally… Holding some political prisoners was almost as common as the occasional practice of torture. Thus, we found that if a government chose to engage in two kinds of violations of the human rights to physical integrity, it usually practiced torture and the taking of political prisoners.67 Because of the breadth of the CIRI data and its capacity for determining unidimensionality, this thesis relies on this scale, more specifically its Physical Integrity Index, for human rights statistics.
Combining Membership Data with Human Rights Statistics
The methodology involves combining two sets of data: membership of the Commission and the
Council provided by the United Nations, and human rights statistics provided by the CIRI Human Rights
Data Project. Data for the Commission will be compiled from 1990 through 2005, and for the Council from its initiation in 2006 through 2009. After determining which states were members of each institution in each year, I will divide up members by their UN geographic region.
66 Cingranelli, David L., and David L. Richards. 1999. Measuring the level, pattern, and sequence of government respect for physical integrity rights. International Studies Quarterly 43 (2) (Jun.): pp. 407-417. 67 Cingranelli and Richards, “Measuring…,” 407-417.
Each member is granted membership as a representative of their geographic region: the African
Group, Asian Group, Eastern European Group, Group of Latin American and Caribbean States
(GRULAC), or the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG). I will assign each state their designated
CIRI score, according to the Physical Integrity Index data compiled by the Human Rights Data Project.
Then, averages will be compiled for each UN geographic region for each year. Ultimately, the data will be used to compare UN regions by examining their respective Physical Integrity averages of either institution’s corresponding member states over the course of the twenty years being studied.
The United Nations structures its organizations to ensure that membership is designated by geographical region. When the Council was created to replace the Commission, its membership was determined to be smaller, though there was not an indiscriminate decrease in member states from all geographic regions. On the contrary, while there are two less member states designated to come from the
African Group, three less from the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States (GRULAC), and three less from the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG), there is one additional representative designated to come from the Asian Group, and one more from the Eastern European Group.
One possible explanation for the indiscriminate change in proportional regional representation is aiming to maintain the percentage of representation of regions that existed under the Commission. This would ensure that each regional group had a similar percentage of representation under the Council as the
Commission. But as demonstrated in Table 3, however, this is not the case. The African Group is the only regional representation that maintains an almost equal percentage of representation from the Commission to the Council. Otherwise, the Asian Group gains one seat, and about five percent; the Eastern European
Group gains one seat, and about three percent; GRULAC loses three seats, and about three percent; and
WEOG loses three seats and about four percent.
Table 3 UN Geographic Scaled Scaled Region Representation in the Representation in the Commission Council African Group 15/53 ~28.30% 13/47 ~27.66% Asian Group 12/53 ~22.64% 13/47 ~27.66% E. European 5/53 ~9.43% 6/47 ~12.77% Group GRULAC 11/53 ~20.75% 8/47 ~17.02% WEOG 10/53 ~18.87% 7/47 ~14.89%
Because the Council was specifically designed to place more emphasis on the human rights records of potential member states and to follow incongruous guidelines for geographic representation, the members elected to membership under the Council should have better Physical Integrity Index scores than those states elected to membership under the Commission. Because of the newly implemented restrictions to membership, the UN regions theoretically should be putting forth member states that more appropriately uphold the mission of this UN human rights institution. Therefore, I would expect that when graphing the average CIRI scores of each geographic region per year, those geographic regions that lost membership representation should display a more pronounced improvement in their average CIRI scores.
On the other hand, the geographic regions that gained membership representation should display a less noteworthy improvement in average CIRI scores.
The main problems with the UN membership data and the human rights records of member states
(according to the CIRI Physical Integrity Indicator) are missing information. Since it was not until 1992 that membership of the Commission expanded from 43 members to 53, the first two years of Commission membership that are studied have fewer members for analysis. Unfortunately there are also gaps in CIRI data, lacking Physical Integrity Index scores for particular countries in only a handful of instances.
Finally, CIRI data goes through 2009, and because it is only 2011 there is very limited data on the human rights records of the UN Human Rights Council members.
Using averages of scores serves as both a control and a solution to some of the problems with the data. Because member states come and go year to year, and some years Commission membership was not filled to capacity, the averages of the members’ CIRI scores by year and region gives a more accurate statistical representation. For example, regarding a gap in available information: in year 1990, the African
Group only had eleven of their fifteen designated seats filled, one without CIRI data. So, scores for the ten African Group member states in 1990 were added and divided by ten (rather than 11 or 15) to give a more accurate representation of the African Group’s respect for Physical Integrity under the Commission in 1990. Thankfully, these problems are isolated, and exist sparsely (mostly in the early years during the period being highlighted for studying the Commission).
The worksheets of the Commission from 1990 through 2005 contain the member states by UN region and year, each member state’s Physical Integrity score (scale of 0 to 8) and each region’s average for each particular year. Similarly, the worksheets of the Council membership from 2006 through 2009 contain the same information. In compiling the average scores of each UN region by year from 1990-2006, I am hoping to find a difference in the average scores from 1990-2005 as they compare to the scores of 2006-
2009. More specifically, I am looking to find trends in the CIRI averages of geographic regions who lost representative seats (African Group, GRULAC, and WEOG), and similar among the regions who gained representative seats (Asian Group and Eastern European Group). Provided in charts are the results: compiled averages of each UN region under the Commission, under the Council, and over the course of the twenty years of data.
Chapter 5 Modest Trends with Considerable Implications
The membership data, by UN region, by year for the Commission is exhibited in Chart 1 in the
Appendix, and for the Council exhibited in Chart 2 in the Appendix. It is important to note that for the
Commission’s membership data, it wasn’t until 1992 that the membership of the Commission was designated to have fifty-three members, so there is a corresponding gap in membership in 1990 and 1991.
The change over time in CIRI averages by UN region, by year is displayed in Table 4.
Table 4: CIRI Averages for UN Regions, 1990-2009 Year African Asian Group E. European GRULAC WEOG Group Group 1990 3.7 3 5.6 2.13 7.3 1991 3.89 3 4.2 3.5 7.4 1992 4.77 2.67 6.25 3.5 7.2 1993 3.64 3.33 5.8 3.7 7.3 1994 3.33 3.33 6.2 3.89 7.2 1995 4.2 2.75 5.4 3.63 7.4 1996 4.27 3.42 4.8 3.09 7.6 1997 4.23 3 5.2 4.18 7.6 1998 4 3 5.4 3.91 7.3 1999 3.69 2.82 6.4 3.73 6.9 2000 3.6 2.27 5.4 3.36 6.9 2001 3.75 3.58 5.6 4 6.9 2002 3.47 3.92 6.6 4.82 7.2 2003 3.67 3.92 5 4.82 6.7 2004 3.8 3.67 4.4 4.45 6.7 2005 3.27 3.42 5 4.91 6.6 Average 3.83 3.19 5.45 3.85 7.14 Scores during Commission 2006 4.15 3 4.83 4.25 7.14 2007 4.46 2.69 4.17 5.13 7 2008 4.31 3.23 5.33 4.75 6.71 2009 4 3.31 5.67 4.75 6.57 Average 4.23 3.06 5 4.72 6.86 Scores during Council
The change over time in the average CIRI scores of the Commission is exhibited in Graph 1 and the average CIRI scores of the Council in Graph 2.
Graph 1: Commission for Human Rights CIRI Averages 1990-2005 8
7
6
5 African Group Asian Group 4 E. Europe 3 GRULAC WEOG 2
1
0 12345678910111213141516
Graph 2: Human Rights Council CIRI Averages 2005-2009 8
7
6
5 African Group Asian Group 4 E. Europe 3 GRULAC 2 WEOG 1
0 1234
The CIRI averages for the 1990-2005 under the Commission, and for 2006-2009 under the
Council are displayed in Table 5, and average CIRI scores from 1990 to 2009 are exhibited in Graph 3.
Table 5: Average CIRI Scores by UN Region, Under Either Institution CHR 90-2005 HRC 2006-2009 African Group 3.83 4.23 Asian Group 3.19 3.05 E. European Group 5.45 5 GRULAC 3.85 4.72 WEOG 7.14 6.855
Graph 3: CIRI Averages 1990-2009 CIRI Scores: 1990-2009 8 7 6 Africa 5 Asia Score
4 E. CIRI 3 Europe 2 GRULAC 1 0 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 Year
The data displayed in the graphs include regression lines, which essentially demonstrates how the change over time impacts the CIRI scores of a given yeaar. The most important graph for determining trends is
Graph 3 in conjunction with Table 5. Though the data was not overwhelmingly persuasive, it does demonstrate somewhat that the Council’s overall geographic regional representation have better human rights records than the Commission’s. Overall, the average CIRI scores of members under the Human
Rights Council were slightly higher and better (4.7725) than the average CIRI scores of members under the Commission for Human Rights (4.692).
In terms of trends, my hypothesis was partially correct: two of the three groups that lost representative seats from the Commission to the Council (the African Group and GRULAC) did display the most significant difference, and improvement in CIRI scores. Though the two groups that gained representative seats displayed a slight decrease in CIRI averages (Asian Group and Eastern European
Group) from the Commission to the Council, they did so together exhibiting a trend in their scores. The only group that did not follow a trend according to its restrictions to membership was the Western
European and Others Group, who lost three seats of representation and had a slight decrease in CIRI scores from the Commission to the Council. But because the WEOG consistently had the highest CIRI averages throughout the twenty years studied, the slight decrease in CIRI averages is not necessarily problematic. It is possible that after reaching the top quartile of the score range (a CIRI score of 6 out of
8) it is much harder to maintain an increasing score.
There were sixteen instances where CIRI did not have available scores. Additionally in 1990 and
1991 the African Group, Asian Group, and GRULAC did not fill their membership capacity. The African
Group had eleven of fifteen members, the Asian Group had nine of twelve members, and GRULAC had eight of eleven members. Overall, there were a total of fifty-three zeros (the worst CIRI Physical Integrity
Index score) under the Commission during the sixteen years studied, and a total of ten under the Council during the four years studied. There were a total of ninety scores of eight (the best CIRI Physical Integrity
Index score) under the Commission, and a total of fifteen under the Council. Because of there are sixteen years of scores for the Commission and only four for the Council, scaling the scores to determine the average amount of zeros and eights per year is more revealing. Over the sixteen years of the Commission that are being studied, there were a total of 746 scores, given missing CIRI data and gaps in membership.
About 6% had scores of zeros, and about 12% scored eights. For the Council, there were a total of 188 scores, with almost 6% scoring zeros, and about 8% scoring eights.
Over the course of the twenty years studied, China, Cuba, France, India, Japan, Mexico, Pakistan and
Russia held consistent membership. Perhaps the most indicative case studies, following the CIRI scores of these eight countries over the course of the twenty year period provides a different perspective for evaluating the institutions. These eight states represent four of the five geographic regions, all but the
African Group. All of the states’ averages decreased from the Commission to the Council, except for
Japan’s, which slightly improved and France’s, which stayed exactly the same. Their CIRI scores are displayed in Table 6, their averages under either institution and by region in Table 7, and their scores over time in Graph 4. Table 6: Consistent Member States Scores ‘90 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 China 2 4 3 3 0 0 3 2 2 2 3 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 Cuba 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 France 5 7 8 6 8 8 8 8 6 6 6 7 7 5 6 7 7 7 6 7 India 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Japan 8 7 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 7 7 7 Mexico 0 1 3 3 1 2 1 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 1 2 2 3 Pakistan 2 3 3 2 3 1 2 2 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 Russia 6 2 3 4 5 1 3 3 3 3 2 1 4 2 1 2 2 1 3 1
Graph 4: CIRI Scores of Consistent Member States 1990-2009 8
7 China 6 Cuba 5 France 4 India 3 Japan Mexico 2 Pakistan 1 Russia 0 1234567891011121314151617181920
Table 7: Consistent Member States Averages, by UN Region UN Region Average under CHR Average under HRC China Asian Group 1.8125 0.75 Cuba GRULAC 4 3.75 France WEOG 6.75 6.75 India Asian Group 0.75 0 Japan Asian Group 7.125 7.25 Mexico GRULAC 2.125 2 Pakistan Asian Group 1.25 0 Russia E. European Group 2.8125 1.75
The data reveals several things. First, there is modest evidence to support the notion that
according to geographic representation, the membership by region contained member states with better government respect for Physical Integrity rights under the Council than under the Commission.
Significant trends were evident in the change over time, as two of the three groups that lost representation received higher CIRI scores, and the two groups that gained representation received lower CIRI scores
(the only outlier being the WEOG).
Tracing the change over time in the eight states that were members of both institutions throughout the twenty-year period being studied, reveals evidence to the contrary. The scores of six out of the eight member states decreased, one stayed the same, and one improved under the Council. It is important to note the relativity of this information: even if Cuba’s scores decreased under the Council as compared to the Commission, its representation may be optimal for its region. In other words, it is possible that Cuba’s score was better than the other possible contenders for the Group of Latin American and Caribbean
States. In other words, looking at individual member states does not provide compelling enough evidence.
Relying on the change over time in average CIRI scores by geographic region provides a more substantial indication that the Human Rights Council members contains governments that exercise more respect for
Physical Integrity rights, relative to their geographic regions.
Chapter 6 The Value of International Human Rights Institutions
More than anything else, this thesis attempts to make a case for institutionalism. An internal comparison of the Commission to the Council reveals sharp differences pertaining to the status of either institution in the United Nations system; restrictions to membership; alterations to procedural action; and finally overhauling old institutional mechanisms, and adding more. Because these institutions are designed by member states with the purpose of improving human rights situations, I argue that if the replacement of the Commission with the Council is an institutional improvement, evidence should be exhibited in the human rights records of the member states subscribing to these institutions and their work. For that reason, human rights statistics were incorporated to assess the impact of either institution on their member states human rights records.
The comparison of the two institutions in terms of their infrastructure leads one to believe that the
Council has a stronger capacity for influencing human rights than the Commission. Its legitimacy is elevated in the United Nations system: the Council functions as a branch of the General Assembly, a promotion from its prior position as a subsidiary to the Economic and Social Council. Voting procedures under the Council are conducted in a way to diminish influences such as voting blocs that were so dominant in the Commission. However, the blocs do still conduct private meetings before and after formal voting sessions, arguably negating any impact that using secret ballots would have on voting outcomes. The Council maintained many of the mechanisms initiated under the Commission, and also implemented mechanisms like the Universal Periodic Review which is administered in a democratic fashion (all 192 U.N. member states are subject to review every four years) for increased transparency. The remaining difference pertains to membership: accession to membership under the Council demands consideration of human rights records, and must follow explicit proportional membership representation by geographic region. In an effort to determine whether these restrictions are put into practice, I compiled the average government respect for Physical Integrity rights of each geographic region, annually over the course of a twenty-year period. In addition to evaluating regional representation and the impact of the Council’s changes, I evaluated the CIRI scores of the eight countries who maintained membership during the entire twenty-year period.
The data indicates that the Council’s membership does consist of better human rights records than the Commission when evaluating by regional representation. When following the eight states with consistent membership, however, for the most part they do not seem to be impacted for the better by the institutional change. Appraising the data through a regional purview lends itself to a different conclusion, that the institutional change impacted regional representation for the better, but not necessarily the individual member states. Though the majority of the states that were members during all twenty years studied experienced slightly lower CIRI scores under the Council than the Commission, they contributed to trends by geographic region. According to the data, the institutional change explicitly impacted trends in regional CIRI scores.
Therefore, this thesis demonstrates many things, the most important being the ability of the
United Nations to change for the better. Even if individual member states do not exhibit improvement in their scores, the direct influence that alterations to regional representation had on the human rights content by region contributes to the legitimacy of the institution. The data demonstrates adherence to the caveat that member states’ human records must be considered for accession to membership. The Human Rights
Council explicitly changed how much representation was allowed from each geographic region, while also stipulating considerations to human rights records. The data confirms that this has been put into practice, as the changes in membership according to region are exhibited in the form of geographic trends: the groups that lost seats did display the sharpest change and increase in scores from the
Commission to the Council. This thesis took a particular route for analysis while acknowledging the fact that there are a multitude of other options for both incorporating human rights statistics and comparing these institutions.
Because the Council is so young, this comparison to its predecessor was perhaps done too soon. But if the data indicates anything at all, the Council is upholding its restrictions to membership for the benefit of the institution – especially when compared to the Commission, as having member states with better human rights records contributes to the legitimacy of the human rights institution.
To thoroughly demonstrate the crux of this thesis, I will conclude by responding to the approach to human rights work that is advocated by Jack Snyder in defense of the UN Human Rights Council.
Snyder is not wrong for highlighting aspects of human rights work that deserve more attention, but the notion that abandoning the approach to human rights that rests on universalism, legalism, and Western- based moralism, is certainly not preferable. I believe that he is naïve to call his approach “pragmatic” when it is simply unfeasible to accomplish the following:
1) persuasion by engaging with the community’s own normative discourse; 2) providing rewards and sanctions linked to human rights compliance; 3) efforts to change underlying circumstance (like poverty and war, without including the aspects of human rights work such as treaty signing, naming and shaming, and moralistic rights campaigns.
The most ideal approach to human rights should incorporate a conversation with governments and individual communities, a benchmark for human rights standards and norms worthy of being upheld by the international community, and incentives for governments to adhere to those standards and norms.
The most conducive forum that will also provide an opportunity to address underlying circumstances is found in international institutions, more specifically in the UN Human Rights Council. Efforts should be geared towards strengthening and improving this United Nations organ, because that would simply be the most pragmatic approach to human rights.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Comparison of the Commission to the Council United Nations United Nations Commission for Human Rights Human Rights Council Establishment 1946 by UN Charter as subsidiary 2006 by UN Resolution 60/251 as body of ECOSOC subsidiary body of UN General Assembly Membership (terms, voting) Elected for 3 years terms by Elected for 3 year terms (cannot minimum of 28 ECOSOC be re-elected after 2 consecutive members by open ballot, terms) by minimum of 97/192 nominated by regional group; 53 General Assembly members by members; “selection by secret ballot; 47 members; acclamation” individual, direct voting; ultimate criteria for membership is behavior of governments Membership (UN Regions) African Group 15 African Group 13 Asian Group 12 Asian Group 13 E. European 5 E. European 6 Group Group GRULAC 11 GRULAC 8 WEOG 10 WEOG 7 Meetings, Action Once a year, six weeks; Adopting At least three times a year, for at decisions, resolutions by voting least ten weeks each session Institutional Mechanisms Sub-Commission on Promotion Advisory Committee and Protection of Human Rights Revised Complaints Procedure Special Procedures Special Procedures “1503” Complaint Procedure Institution Building Package (UPR)
Table 2: Compilation of Data Pertaining to UN Groups by the Hudson Institute Group Purpose # Members/ % UN MISC Membership, total=192 G-77 & China A loosely affiliated 132; 69% group of developing countries, whose goal is to advance the economic wellbeing of the Third World, established in 1964. Non-Aligned Movement Originally formed as a 117; 61% (NAM) bloc of countries that would remain neutral during the Cold War, first gathering in 1961. Organization of the Intended to work 56 Largest bloc in NAM & Islamic Conference together to promote the G-77 (OIC) interest of Muslims worldwide, established in 1969 with the aim of “Islamic solidarity” and “non-interference in the internal affairs of member states.” League of Arab States Focusing on 21 Largest bloc in OIC cooperation and stronger relationships among its member states. African Union An internal organization 53 that coordinates cooperation among member states on issues such as trade, development, and security. European Union (EU) Formerly the 25 Organization of African Unity, formed to encourage independence, and advancing stability, development, trade and the well-being of the African continent. JUSCANZ A Sub-set of the WEOG 14/15 Including the U.S. (sub-set of WEOG) regional group, sometimes including Israel.
Table 3: Scaled Representation in the Commission Compared to the Council UN Geographic Scaled Scaled Region Representation in the Representation in the Commission Council African Group 15/53 ~28.30% 13/47 ~27.66% Asian Group 12/53 ~22.64% 13/47 ~27.66% E. European 5/53 ~9.43% 6/47 ~12.77% Group GRULAC 11/53 ~20.75% 8/47 ~17.02% WEOG 10/53 ~18.87% 7/47 ~14.89%
Table 4: CIRI Averages for UN Regions, 1990-2009 Year African Asian Group E. European GRULAC WEOG Group Group 1990 3.7 3 5.6 2.13 7.3 1991 3.89 3 4.2 3.5 7.4 1992 4.77 2.67 6.25 3.5 7.2 1993 3.64 3.33 5.8 3.7 7.3 1994 3.33 3.33 6.2 3.89 7.2 1995 4.2 2.75 5.4 3.63 7.4 1996 4.27 3.42 4.8 3.09 7.6 1997 4.23 3 5.2 4.18 7.6 1998 4 3 5.4 3.91 7.3 1999 3.69 2.82 6.4 3.73 6.9 2000 3.6 2.27 5.4 3.36 6.9 2001 3.75 3.58 5.6 4 6.9 2002 3.47 3.92 6.6 4.82 7.2 2003 3.67 3.92 5 4.82 6.7 2004 3.8 3.67 4.4 4.45 6.7 2005 3.27 3.42 5 4.91 6.6 Average 3.83 3.19 5.45 3.85 7.14 Scores during Commission 2006 4.15 3 4.83 4.25 7.14 2007 4.46 2.69 4.17 5.13 7 2008 4.31 3.23 5.33 4.75 6.71 2009 4 3.31 5.67 4.75 6.57 Average 4.23 3.06 5 4.72 6.86 Scores during Council
Table 5: Average CIRI Scores by UN Region, Under Either Institution CHR 90-2005 HRC 2006-2009 African Group 3.83 4.23 Asian Group 3.19 3.0575 E. European Group 5.45 5 GRULAC 3.85 4.72 WEOG 7.14 6.855
Table 6: Consistent Member States Scores ‘90 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 China 2 4 3 3 0 0 3 2 2 2 3 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 Cuba 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 France 5 7 8 6 8 8 8 8 6 6 6 7 7 5 6 7 7 7 6 7 India 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Japan 8 7 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 7 7 7 Mexico 0 1 3 3 1 2 1 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 1 2 2 3 Pakistan 2 3 3 2 3 1 2 2 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 Russia 6 2 3 4 5 1 3 3 3 3 2 1 4 2 1 2 2 1 3 1
Table 7: Consistent Member States Averages, by UN Region UN Region Average under CHR Average under HRC China Asian Group 1.8125 0.75 Cuba GRULAC 4 3.75 France WEOG 6.75 6.75 India Asian Group 0.75 0 Japan Asian Group 7.125 7.25 Mexico GRULAC 2.125 2 Pakistan Asian Group 1.25 0 Russia E. European Group 2.8125 1.75
Table 8: Human Rights Council Special Sessions Subject Date of Special Session Pertaining to the “Situation of 1st Session: July 2006 Human Rights in the 3rd Session: November 2006 Palestinian territories occupied 6th Session: January 2008 since 1967.” 9th Session: January 2009 12th Session: October 2009 Commission of Inquiry on 2nd Session: 2006 Lebanon Concerning Darfur 4th Session: December 2006 Concerning Myanmar 5th Session: October 2007 Access to Food 7th Session: May 2008 Concerning the Democratic 8th Session: November 2008 Republic of the Congo Impact of the Financial Crisis 10th Session: February 2009 Concerning Sri Lanka 11th Session: May 2009 Concerning Haiti 13th Session: January 2010 Concerning Cote d’Ivoire 14th Session: December 2010
Graph 1: Commission for Human Rights CIRI Averages 1990-2005 8
7
6
5 African Group Asian Group 4 E. Europe 3 GRULAC WEOG 2
1
0 12345678910111213141516
Graph 2: Human Rights Council CIRI Averages 2005-2009 8
7
6
5 African Group Asian Group 4 E. Europe 3 GRULAC 2 WEOG 1
0 1234
Graph 3: CIRI Averages 1990-2009 CIRI Scores: 1990-2009 8 7 6 Africa 5 Asia Score
4 E. CIRI 3 Europe 2 GRULAC 1 0 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 Year
Graph 4: CIRI Scores of Consistent Member States 1990-2009 8
7 China 6 Cuba 5 France 4 India 3 Japan Mexico 2 Pakistan 1 Russia 0 1 2 34567891011 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
CHART 1: 1990-2005 Commission for Human Rights Membership CIRI Scores 53 90 91 92 93 1 African Group Botswana 7 Burundi 0 Angola X Angola 2 2 African Group Ethiopia 0 Ethiopia X Burundi 5 Burundi X 3 African Group Gambia 8 Gambia 8 Gabon 8 Gabon 5 4 African Group Ghana 4 Ghana 5 Gambia 8 Gambia 7 5 African Group Madagascar 4 Madagascar 2 Ghana 6 Guinea-Bissau 4 6 African Group Morocco 1 Mauritania 0 Kenya 2 Kenya 5 7 African Group Nigeria 2 Morocco 4 Lesotho 5 Lesotho 6 8 African Group Sao Tome and Principe XSenegal 5 Libya 2 Libya 2 9 African Group Senegal 3 Somalia X Madagascar 6 Mauritania 4 10 African Group Somalia 3 Swaziland 7 Mauritania 3 Mauritius 6 11 African Group Swaziland 5 Zambia 4 Nigeria 4 Nigeria 2 12 African Group Senegal 2 Sudan 0 13 African Group Somalia X Togo 1 14 African Group Tunisia 4 Tunisia 3 15 African Group Zambia 7 Zambia 4
TOTAL 37 35 62 51 Avg CIRI Score 3.7 3.89 4.77 3.64 1 Asian Group Bangladesh 3 Bangladesh 4 Bangladesh 1 Bangladesh 5 2 Asian Group China 2 China 4 China 3 China 3 3 Asian Group Cyprus 7 Cyprus 5 Cyprus 7 Cyprus 6 4 Asian Group India 2 India 0 India 0 India 0 5 Asian Group Iraq 0 Indonesia 1 Indonesia 0 Indonesia 1 6 Asian Group Japan 8 Iraq 0 Iran 3 Iran 1 7 Asian Group Pakistan 2 Japan 7 Iraq 0 Japan 7 8 Asian Group Philippines 3 Pakistan 3 Japan 8 Malaysia 6 9 Asian Group Sri Lanka 0 Philippines 3 Pakistan 3 Pakistan 2 10 Asian Group Philippines 2 Republic of Korea 4 11 Asian Group Sri Lanka 0 Sri Lanka 2 12 Asian Group Syria 5 Syria 3 TOTAL 27 27 32 40 Avg CIRI Score 3 3 2.67 3.33 1 E. Europe Bulgaria 3 Czech Republic 8 Bulgaria 6 Bulgaria 3 2 E. Europe Hungary 8 Hungary 8 Czech Republic 8 Czech Republic 8 3 E. Europe Russia 6 Russia 2 Hungary 8 Poland 7 4 E. Europe Ukraine 6 Ukraine 2 Russia 3 Romania 7 5 E. Europe Yugoslavia 5 Yugoslavia 1 Yugoslavia * Russia 4 TOTAL 28 21 25 29 Avg CIRI Score 5.6 4.2 6.25 5.8 1 GRULAC Argentina 4 Argentina 6 Argentina 6 Argentina 5 2 GRULAC Brazil 3 Brazil 4 Barbados X Barbados X 3 GRULAC Colombia 0 Colombia 2 Brazil 3 Brazil 3 4 GRULAC Cuba 3 Cuba 4 Chile 4 Chile 3 5 GRULAC Mexico 0 Mexico 1 Colombia 2 Colombia 2 6 GRULAC Panama 4 Panama 6 Costa Rica 5 Costa Rica 8 7 GRULAC Peru 1 Peru 2 Cuba 3 Cuba 3 8 GRULAC Venezuela 2 Venezuela 3 Mexico 3 Mexico 3 CHART 1: 1990-2005 Commission for Human Rights Membership CIRI Scores 9 GRULAC Peru 1 Peru 2 10 GRULAC Uruguay 7 Uruguay 7 11 GRULAC Venezuela 1 Venezuela 1 TOTAL 17 28 35 37 Avg CIRI Score 2.13 3.5 3.5 3.7 1 WEOG Belgium 8 Australia 7 Australia 7 Australia 8 2 WEOG Canada 8 Austria 7 Austria 7 Austria 7 3 WEOG France 5 Belgium 8 Canada 7 Canada 8 4 WEOG Germany 7 Canada 8 France 8 Finland 8 5 WEOG Italy 7 France 7 Germany 8 France 6 6 WEOG Portugal 8 Germany 8 Italy 7 Germany 7 7 WEOG Spain 6 Italy 7 Netherlands 8 Netherlands 8 8 WEOG Sweden 8 Portugal 7 Portugal 7 Portugal 7 9 WEOG UK 8 Sweden 8 UK 6 UK 7 10 WEOG USA 8 USA 7 USA 7 USA 7 TOTAL 73 74 72 73 Avg CIRI Score 7.3 7.4 7.2 7.3 CHART 1: 1990-2005 Commission for Human Rights Membership CIRI Scores 94 95 96 97 98 Angola 2 Algeria 0 Algeria 3 Algeria 0 Botswana 6 Cameroon 2 Angola 1 Angola 0 Angola 0 Cape Verde X Cote d'Ivoire 4 Benin 8 Benin 8 Benin 8 Congo 3 Gabon 4 Cameroon 4 Cameroon 4 Cape Verde X DRC X Guinea-Bissau 4 Cote d'Ivoire 1 Cote d'Ivoire 4 DRC X Guinea 4 Kenya 4 Egypt 4 Egypt 3 Egypt 4 Madagascar 7 Lesotho 3 Ethiopia 0 Ethiopia 1 Ethiopia 4 Mali 6 Libya 1 Gabon 8 Gabon 7 Gabon 6 Morocco 6 Malawi 6 Guinea-Bissau 7 Guinea 2 Guinea 4 Mozambique 4 Mauritania 5 Malawi 7 Madagascar 7 Madagascar 7 Rwanda 2 Mauritius 6 Mauritania 5 Malawi 4 Mali 7 Senegal 1 Nigeria 2 Mauritius 7 Mali 8 Mozambique 3 South Africa 4 Sudan 2 Sudan 2 Mauritania 7 South Africa 3 Sudan 0 Togo 1 Togo 5 Uganda 2 Uganda 3 Tunisia 4 Tunisia 4 Zimbabwe 4 Zimbabwe 4 Zimbabwe 6 Uganda 5
50 63 65 55 52 3.33 4.2 4.27 4.23 4 Bangladesh 3 Bangladesh 3 Bangladesh 3 Bangladesh 4 Bangladesh 3 China 0 Bhutan 4 Bhutan 6 Bhutan 5 Bhutan 5 Cyprus 6 China 0 China 3 China 2 China 2 India 0 India 0 India 0 India 0 India 0 Indonesia 3 Indonesia 3 Indonesia 1 Indonesia 0 Indonesia 0 Iran 3 Japan 7 Japan 7 Japan 7 Japan 7 Japan 7 Malaysia 5 Malaysia 7 Malaysia 5 Malaysia 5 Malaysia 5 Nepal 5 Nepal 6 Nepal 3 Nepal 1 Pakistan 3 Pakistan 1 Pakistan 2 Pakistan 2 Pakistan 3 Republic of Korea 4 Philippines 1 Philippines 2 Philippines 2 Philippines 3 Sri Lanka 2 Republic of Korea 4 Republic of Korea 4 Republic of Korea 5 Republic of Korea 6 Syria 4 Sri Lanka 0 Sri Lanka 0 Sri Lanka 1 Sri Lanka 1 40 33 41 36 36 3.33 2.75 3.42 3 3 Bulgaria 4 Bulgaria 5 Belarus 4 Belarus 5 Belarus 4 Hungary 8 Hungary 8 Bulgaria 4 Bulgaria 5 Czech Republic 7 Poland 8 Poland 7 Hungary 7 Czech Republic 8 Poland 7 Romania 6 Romania 6 Russia 3 Russia 3 Russia 3 Russia 5 Russia 1 Ukraine 6 Ukraine 5 Ukraine 6 31 27 24 26 27 6.2 5.4 4.8 5.2 5.4 Barbados X Brazil 2 Brazil 4 Argentina 5 Argentina 3 Brazil 4 Chile 4 Chile 5 Brazil 4 Brazil 2 Chile 5 Colombia 0 Colombia 0 Chile 5 Chile 2 Colombia X Cuba 3 Cuba 3 Colombia 0 Cuba 3 Costa Rica 7 Dominican Republic 4 Dominican Republic 4 Cuba 4 Ecuador 6 Cuba 3 Ecuador 5 Ecuador 4 Dominican Republic 4El Salvador 6 Ecuador 6 El Salvador 8 El Salvador 5 Ecuador 4 Guatemala 5 Mexico 1 Mexico 2 Mexico 1 El Salvador 7 Mexico 3 CHART 1: 1990-2005 Commission for Human Rights Membership CIRI Scores Peru 1 Nicaragua 5 Nicaragua 5 Mexico 2 Peru 4 Uruguay 7 Peru 3 Peru 1 Nicaragua 6 Uruguay 6 Venezuela 1 Venezuela 1 Venezuela 2 Uruguay 5 Venezuela 3 35 37 34 46 43 3.89 3.63 3.09 4.18 3.91 Australia 6 Australia 8 Australia 7 Austria 8 Austria 6 Austria 7 Austria 7 Austria 8 Canada 8 Canada 7 Canada 7 Canada 8 Canada 8 Denmark 8 Denmark 8 Finland 8 Finland 8 Denmark 8 France 8 France 6 France 8 France 8 France 8 Germany 8 Germany 8 Germany 8 Germany 8 Germany 8 Ireland 8 Ireland 8 Italy 6 Italy 6 Italy 7 Italy 7 Italy 8 Netherlands 8 Netherlands 8 Netherlands 8 Netherlands 8 Luxembourg 8 UK 7 UK 6 UK 7 UK 6 UK 7 USA 7 USA 7 USA 7 USA 7 USA 7 72 74 76 76 73 7.2 7.4 7.6 7.6 7.3 CHART 1: 1990-2005 Commission for Human Rights Membership CIRI Scores 99 2000 2001 2002 2003 Botswana 7 Botswana 7 Algeria 4 Algeria 2 Algeria 1 Cape Verde X Burundi 1 Burundi 1 Burundi 0 Burkina Faso 5 Congo 0 Congo 3 Cameroon 2 Cameroon 2 Cameroon 4 DRC X Liberia 0 DRC 0 DRC 2 Djibouti 1 Liberia 1 Madagascar 7 *Djibouti 6 Kenya 2 Gabon 7 Madagascar 7 Mauritius 6 Kenya 3 Libya 3 Kenya 3 Mauritius 5 Morocco 4 Liberia 1 Nigeria 3 Libya 3 Morocco 4 Niger 6 Libya 1 Senegal 5 Senegal 6 Mozambique 3 Nigeria 1 Madagascar 7 Sierra Leone 8 Sierra Leone 5 Niger 6 Rwanda 2 Mauritius 5 South Africa 5 South Africa 4 Rwanda 3 Senegal 4 Niger 7 Sudan 0 Sudan 0 Senegal 2 Sudan 0 Nigeria 2 Swaziland 7 Swaziland 7 South Africa 4 Swaziland 5 Senegal 4 Togo 5 Togo 5 Sudan 0 Tunisia 3 South Africa 5 Uganda 3 Uganda 2 Tunisia 6 Zambia 5 Swaziland 7 Zambia 5 Zimbabwe 2 Zambia 5 48 54 60 52 55 3.69 3.6 3.75 3.47 3.67 Bangladesh 4 Bangladesh 2 China 2 Bahrain 7 Bahrain 7 Bhutan 5 Bhutan 4 India 0 China 1 China 1 China 2 China 3 Indonesia 1 India 0 India 1 India 0 India 1 Japan 7 Indonesia 1 Japan 7 Indonesia 0 Indonesia 1 Malaysia 5 Japan 7 Malaysia 5 Japan 7 Japan 7 Pakistan 1 Malaysia 6 Pakistan 1 Nepal 2 Nepal 1 Qatar 7 Pakistan 2 Republic of Korea 5 Pakistan 2 Pakistan 1 Republic of Korea 5 Republic of Korea 4 Saudi Arabia 5 Philippines 2 Philippines 0 Saudi Arabia 5 Saudi Arabia 5 Sri Lanka 4 Qatar X Qatar X Syria 4 Syria 4 Syria 3 Republic of Korea Republic of Korea 5 Thailand 4 Thailand 6 Thailand 4 Sri Lanka 2 Sri Lanka 0 Vietnam 2 Vietnam 4 Vietnam 4 31 25 43 47 47 2.82 2.27 3.58 3.92 3.92 Czech Republic 8 Czech Republic 7 Czech Republic 8 Armenia 6 Armenia 6 Latvia 7 Latvia 7 Latvia 6 Croatia 7 Croatia 7 Poland 8 Poland 6 Poland 7 Czech Republic 8 Poland 7 Romania 6 Romania 5 Romania 6 Poland 8 Russia 2 Russia 3 Russia 2 Russia 1 Russia 4 Ukraine 3 32 27 28 33 25 6.4 5.4 5.6 6.6 5 Argentina 4 Argentina 3 Argentina 3 Argentina 4 Argentina 5 Chile 4 Brazil 2 Brazil 3 Brazil 4 Brazil 4 Colombia 1 Chile 4 Colombia 1 Chile 8 Chile 6 Cuba 4 Colombia 0 Costa Rica 7 Costa Rica 7 Costa Rica 7 Ecuador 3 Cuba 4 Cuba 5 Cuba 4 Cuba 4 El Salvador 5 Ecuador 6 Ecuador 4 Ecuador 5 Guatemala 5 Guatemala 4 El Salvador 6 Guatemala 4 Guatemala 4 Mexico 3 Mexico 3 Guatemala 2 Mexico 2 Mexico 2 Paraguay 6 CHART 1: 1990-2005 Commission for Human Rights Membership CIRI Scores Peru 2 Mexico 2 Peru 3 Peru 3 Peru 3 Uruguay 7 Peru 4 Uruguay 8 Uruguay 8 Uruguay 6 Venezuela 4 Venezuela 4 Venezuela 4 Venezuela 4 Venezuela 4 41 37 44 53 53 3.73 3.36 4 4.82 4.82 Austria 7 Canada 7 Belgium 7 Austria 7 Australia 7 Canada 8 France 6 Canada 7 Belgium 8 Austria 6 France 6 Germany 8 France 7 Canada 7 Belgium 8 Germany 6 Italy 7 Germany 7 France 7 Canada 7 Ireland 7 Luxembourg 8 Italy 7 Germany 7 France 5 Italy 5 Norway 8 Norway 8 Italy 7 Germany 7 Luxembourg 8 Portugal 6 Portugal 7 Portugal 7 Ireland 7 Norway 8 Spain 6 Spain 7 Spain 7 Sweden 7 UK 7 UK 6 UK 7 Sweden 8 UK 7 USA 7 USA 7 USA 5 USA 7 USA 6 69 69 69 72 67 6.9 6.9 6.9 7.2 6.7 CHART 1: 1990-2005 Commission for Human Rights Membership CIRI Scores 2004 2005 TOTAL Burkina Faso 4 Burkina Faso 5 Congo 6 Congo 4 Egypt 2 Egypt 3 Eritrea 4 Eritrea 5 Ethipia 1 Ethiopia 0 Gabon 6 Gabon 5 Mauritania 6 Guinea 5 Nigeria 1 Kenya 3 Sierra Leone 6 Mauritania 3 South Africa 5 Niger 2 Sudan 2 South Africa 4 Swaziland 6 Sudan 1 Togo 4 Swaziland 5 Uganda 2 Togo 2 Zimbabwe 2 Zimbabwe 2
57 49 3.8 3.27 Bahrain 6 Bhutan 6 Bhutan 6 China 0 China 1 India 0 India 0 Indonesia 1 Indonesia 1 Japan 7 Japan 7 Malaysia 5 Nepal 0 Nepal 0 Pakistan 1 Pakistan 1 Qatar 8 Qatar 7 Republic of Korea 5 Republic of Korea 5 Saudi Arabia 4 Saudi Arabia 5 Sri Lanka 5 Sri Lanka 4 44 41 3.67 3.42 Armenia 4 Armenia 5 Croatia 7 Hungary 7 Hungary 6 Romania 6 Russia 1 Russia 2 Ukraine 4 Ukraine 5 22 25 4.4 5 Argentina 4 Argentina 6 Brazil 4 Brazil 4 Chile 6 Costa Rica 7 Costa Rica 7 Cuba 4 Cuba 4 Dominican Republic 4 Dominican Republic 4 Ecuador 4 Guatemala 5 Guatemala 6 Honduras 4 Honduras 5 CHART 1: 1990-2005 Commission for Human Rights Membership CIRI Scores Mexico 3 Mexico 3 Paraguay 5 Paraguay 6 Peru 3 Peru 5 49 54 4.45 4.91 Australia 7 Australia 7 Austria 7 Canada 6 France 6 Finland 7 Germany 7 France 7 Ireland 7 Germany 8 Italy 6 Ireland 7 Netherlands 8 Italy 7 Sweden 8 Netherlands 8 UK 7 UK 5 USA 4 USA 4 67 66 6.7 6.6 CHART 2: 2006-2009 Human Rights Council Membership CIRI Scores
2006 2007 2008 2009 1 African Group Algeria 1 Angola 2 Angola 3 Angola 3 2 African Group Cameroon 4 Cameroon 4 Burkina Faso 6 Burkina Faso 5 3 African Group Djibouti 6 Djibouti 6 Cameroon 3 Cameroon 4 4 African Group Gabon 5 Egypt 3 Djibouti 7 Djibouti 6 5 African Group Ghana 5 Gabon 7 Egypt 2 Egypt 2 6 African Group Mali 6 Ghana 5 Gabon 6 Gabon 6 7 African Group Mauritius 5 Madagascar 6 Ghana 5 Ghana 5 8 African Group Morocco 4 Mali 5 Madagascar 5 Madagascar 3 9 African Group Nigeria 2 Mauritius 6 Mauritius 6 Mauritius 6 10 African GroupSenegal 5 Nigeria 2 Nigeria 2 Nigeria 1 11 African GroupSouth Africa 4 Senegal 5 Senegal 5 Senegal 5 12 African GroupTunisia 3 South Africa 2 South Africa 2 South Africa 2 13 African GroupZambia 4 Zambia 5 Zambia 4 Zambia 4 TOTAL 54 58 56 52 Avg CIRI Score 4.15 4.46 4.31 4 1 Asian Group Bahrain 6 Bangladesh 0 Bahrain 6 Bahrain 8 2 Asian Group Bangladesh 1 China 1 Bangladesh 1 Bangladesh 1 3 Asian Group China 1 India 0 China 1 China 0 4 Asian Group India 0 Indonesia 3 India 0 India 0 5 Asian Group Indonesia 4 Japan 7 Indonesia 3 Indonesia 3 6 Asian Group Japan 8 Jordan 4 Japan 7 Japan 7 7 Asian Group Jordan 4 Malaysia 4 Jordan 3 Jordan 3 8 Asian Group Malaysia 4 Pakistan 0 Malaysia 4 Kyrgyztan 4 9 Asian Group Pakistan 0 Philippines 1 Pakistan 0 Pakistan 0 10 Asian Group Philippines 0 Qatar 5 Philippines 1 Philippines 1 11 Asian Group Republic of Korea 5 Republic of Korea 6 Qatar 8 Qatar 8 12 Asian Group Saudi Arabia 4 Saudi Arabia 3 Republic of Korea 5 Republic of Korea 6 13 Asian Group Sri Lanka 2 Sri Lanka 1 Saudi Arabia 3 Saudi Arabia 2 TOTAL 39 35 42 43 Avg CIRI Score 3 2.69 3.23 3.31 1 E. Europe Azerbaijan 2 Azerbaijan 2 Azerbaijan 3 Bosnia & H 6 2 E. Europe Czech Republic 7 Bosnia & H 6 Bosnia & H 7 Hungary 7 3 E. Europe Poland 7 Romania 5 Russian Federation 3 Russian Federation 1 4 E. Europe Romania 5 Russian Federation 1 Slovakia 7 Slovakia 7 5 E. Europe Russian Federation 2 Slovenia 7 Slovenia 8 Slovenia 8 6 E. Europe Ukraine 6 Ukraine 4 Ukraine 4 Ukraine 5 TOTAL 29 25 32 34 Avg CIRI Score 4.83 4.17 5.33 5.67 1 GRULAC Argentina 5 Bolivia 6 Argentina 5 Argentina 5 2 GRULAC Brazil 2 Brazil 4 Bolivia 5 Bolivia 6 3 GRULAC Cuba 4 Cuba 3 Brazil 4 Brazil 3 4 GRULAC Ecuador 4 Guatemala 6 Chile 5 Chile 5 5 GRULAC Guatemala 5 Mexico 2 Cuba 4 Cuba 4 6 GRULAC Mexico 1 Nicaragua 6 Mexico 2 Mexico 3 7 GRULAC Peru 5 Peru 6 Nicaragua 5 Nicaragua 5 8 GRULAC Uruguay 8 Uruguay 8 Uruguay 8 Uruguay 7 TOTAL 34 41 38 38 CHART 2: 2006-2009 Human Rights Council Membership CIRI Scores
Avg CIRI Score 4.25 5.13 4.75 4.75 1 WEOG Canada 6 Canada 6 Canada 6 Belgium 8 2 WEOG Finland 7 France 7 France 6 France 7 3 WEOG France 7 Germany 8 Germany 7 Italy 5 4 WEOG Germany 8 Italy 6 Italy 7 Netherlands 7 5 WEOG Netherlands 8 Netherlands 8 Netherlands 7 Norway 8 6 WEOG Switzerland 7 Switzerland 7 Switzerland 7 UK 6 7 WEOG UK 7 UK 7 UK 7 USA 5 TOTAL 50 49 47 46 Avg CIRI Score 7.14 7 6.71 6.57