July 2016 Arzu Geybullayeva1

AZERBAIJAN’S SUSPENDED DEMOCRACY: TIME FOR AN INTERNATIONAL REASSESSMENT CAP PAPERS 168 (CENTRAL ASIA FELLOWSHIP SERIES) July 2016 Arzu Geybullayeva1 Over their decades of rule, the Aliyev clan has bypassed every opportunity to lay the foundation for democratic norms and procedures in Azerbaijan. After Heydar Aliyev’s return to power in 1993, and with the prospect of developing the country’s unexploited energy potential, official Baku endeavored to build a system that could navigate the world of international politics without having to develop democratic norms and procedures at home. Thus, if there was a battle between democracy and the country’s untapped potential of energy reserves, the latter definitively won. Political analyst Leila Alieva [unrelated to the ruling family] argues that, in fact, rather than political ideologies, it was the energy reserves that shaped the regime’s policies and played a more fundamental role.2 The results of this deliberate choice were catastrophic: without any internal mechanisms of control, the government of Azerbaijan gradually turned into an authoritarian state in which fraudulent elections, corruption, a dismantled legal system, and a systematic crackdown on 1 Arzu Geybullayeva is a journalist from Azerbaijan, who received the 2014 Vaclav Havel Journalism Fellowship with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. She holds an MSc degree in Global Politics from the London School of Economics and a BA degree in International Relations from the Bilkent University (Turkey). She has spent the past few years writing about the on-going crackdown in Azerbaijan, representing some of the cases of political prisoners at international conferences. 2 Leila Alieva, “Azerbaijan: Power in the Petro-State,” in Democracy’s Plight in the European Neighborhood: Struggling Transitions and Proliferating Dynasties, ed. Michael Emerson and Richard Youngs, Center for European Policy Studies, 2009. critics became the norm. International community efforts to introduce support mechanisms for domestic civil society through various partnerships and domestic initiatives largely failed, as the government refused to see the benefits of a healthy community of civil society actors. The first half of this policy paper is an attempt to understand the factors that prevented Azerbaijan from becoming a full-fledged democracy in the span of the past two decades. The failure of the Western sphere of influence to realize the consequences of its political and diplomatic ignorance in letting official Baku get away with an internal crackdown is the focus of the second part of this paper. The paper is based on a series of interviews conducted at the time of the fellowship between February and May 2016, an overview of the existing literature, and the author’s analysis. Introduction “It was under the great leader that in 1993, the people of Azerbaijan managed to put an end to the economic, political, and military crisis, and Azerbaijan entered the period of development, and embarked on the course of democracy and market economy.” Ilham Aliyev, May 27, 2008 On August 30, 1991, after 70 years of Soviet rule, Azerbaijan declared its independence from the Soviet Union. These were unquestionably difficult times for the new republic as it faced economic collapse, domestic political chaos, and an ethnic war with Armenia over the territory of Nagorno Karabakh. Three years later, in Baku’s Gulustan Palace, the signing of what became known as the “contract of the century,” a production-sharing agreement with a consortium of Western oil companies to tap the deepwater oilfields of Guneshli, Chirag, and Azeri, untouched by Soviet exploitation, seemed to promise a new future for Azerbaijan, with economic growth, new jobs, foreign investments, an anchor for a Western presence, and an opportunity to establish itself as the West’s regional partner. Former U.S. ambassador to Azerbaijan (1994-97) Richard Kauzlarich believes that Heydar Aliyev understood the importance of partnership with the West, and especially with the United States, at the time. He knew he needed the United States as a buffer against Russia, in order to be able to develop the country’s energy resources outside of Russia’s sphere of influence and to resist pressure from Russian authorities to build pipelines through Moscow-controlled territories.3 But rather than laying the foundations for lasting economic and, in parallel, political development, the Azerbaijani leadership fell victim to the ‘resource curse’ or ‘paradox of plenty.’ This is a condition whereby negative economic and political outcomes and misguided interests are able to prevail in the absence of strong domestic institutions and long-term, sustainable growth and development plans. It did not take long before Azerbaijan was branded “one of the most corrupt countries in the world,”4 where power lay in the hands of one family surrounded by powerful elites occupying key government positions. The appointment of millionaires to influential posts solidified their dependence on the president and his powerful clan. Marginal 3 Interview with Richard Kauzlarich, George Mason University, April 26, 2016. 4 Ivan Watson, “The Caspian Pipeline: With New Pipeline, Azerbaijan on Verge of Oil Boom,” NPR, April 18, 2006, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5348075. 2 figures ended up occupying key decision-making positions within the government, many of whom remain there today.5 In her research, Azerbaijani scholar Aytan Gahramanova argues that Heydar Aliyev’s state- building strategy was mostly “shaped by the experience of leaders from the nomenklatura,” which meant resorting “to familiar political techniques of power consolidation through ++++command-administrative leverage rather than pursuing further reforms.”6 At the time, “obtaining hard currency to ensure economic stability” and “building new transportation routes to world markets while decreasing dependence on Russia” shaped the political agenda and minimized the need for democratic reforms. In the absence of democratic reforms and framework, it was only a matter of time until Azerbaijan would witness decline with respect to democracy and freedom, despite Heydar Aliyev’s promise “to protect the independence of Azerbaijan and promote the rule of law, democratic pluralism, and the development of a market economy” in the time left to him by God.7 Witnessing Decline Between Aliyev’s tumultuous return to power and election in 1993 (after the 65-year age limit that had been imposed in order to block him was rescinded), his reelection to the presidency in 1998, and his death in December 2003, Azerbaijan approved a new constitution in 1995 establishing a presidential republic, and critical amendments to the constitution in 2002 that further expanded the president’s power. Anyone who stood up to challenge Aliyev faced persecution.8 The president appointed the prime minister, members of the Cabinet of Ministers, the prosecutor general, and the judges of the Supreme Court—a system perfectly suited for jailing and prosecuting the government’s critics on bogus charges.9 In the year before his death, Heydar Aliyev introduced a number of critical constitutional amendments, including giving the prime minister the power to act as interim president—power that had previously rested with the speaker of the parliament—until a new round of elections. But this was not the most critical change to the constitution. “The most important changes over which the referendum is believed to have been organized were the cancellation of the proportional electoral system, which implied that deputies are to be selected only on the basis of single-member constituencies; the number of votes required for the election of President was reduced to simple majority whereas before two thirds of votes were required; […] and to transfer authority to ban political parties from the Constitutional Court to public courts.”10 The day of the referendum was marred by violations and fraud, and the measure passed with 97 percent of the vote. 5 Ibid. 6 Aytan Gahramanova, “Internal and External Factors in the Democratization of Azerbaijan,” Democratization 16, no. 4 (August 2009): 777-803. 7 “Ex-Kremlin Figure Returns to Power in Azerbaijan,” New York Times, June 16, 1993. http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/16/world/ex-kremlin-figure-returns-to-power-in-azerbaijan.html 8 Human Rights Watch world report, 1997: Events of 1996, Human Rights Watch, http://bit.ly/1SObMs2 9 Hailey Tweyman, “The Democratic Facade in Azerbaijan,” Democracy Lab, http://www.democracylab.uwo.ca/Publications/opinion_articles_/Azerbaijan%20real%20FINAL%20DR AFT.pdf. 10 Anar Valiyev, “Referendum in Azerbaijan: Next Victory of Azeri President,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, September 11, 2002, http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/7016- analytical-articles-caci-analyst-2002-9-11-art-7016.html?tmpl=component&print=1. 3 Azerbaijan under Ilham Aliyev In October 2003, Heydar Aliyev’s son, Ilham, won election to the presidency with over 75 percent of the vote. The OSCE/ ODIHR mission report concluded that the 2003 presidential election, despite the new Election Code, “which could have formed the basis for a democratic election,” “failed to meet OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections.”11 The organization reported “widespread intimidation in pre-election period,” flawed counting and tabulations, post-election violence, and biased state media. Police crushed protests organized by the opposition parties. Over

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