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Mind, Modality, and Meaning: Toward a Rationalist Physicalism

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Mind, Modality, and Meaning: Toward a Rationalist Physicalism UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Los Angeles Mind, Modality, and Meaning: Toward a Rationalist Physicalism A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy by Gabriel Oak Rabin 2013 c Copyright by Gabriel Oak Rabin 2013 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION Mind, Modality, and Meaning: Toward a Rationalist Physicalism by Gabriel Oak Rabin Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy University of California, Los Angeles, 2013 Professor Tyler Burge, Chair This dissertation contains four independent essays (chapters) addressing a cluster of related topics in the philosophy of mind. Chapter 1: “Fundamental- ity Physicalism” argues that physicalism can usefully be conceived of as a thesis about fundamentality. The chapter explores a variety of other potential formula- tions of physicalism (particularly modal formulations), contrasts fundamentality physicalism with these theses, and offers reasons to prefer fundamentality phys- icalism over these rivals. Chapter 2:“Modal Rationalism and the Demonstrative Reply to the Master Argument Against Physicalism” introduces the Master Argument Against Physi- calism and investigates its crucial premise: the inference from an a priori gap be- tween the physical and consciousness to a lack of necessitation between the two. ii I argue against the strong form of modal rationalism that underwrites the master argument and offer a more moderate rationalist view. I offer a novel demonstrative reply to the master argument, according to which a connection between conscious experience and demonstratives, not dualism, is the source of the epistemic gap between consciousness and the physical. Chapter 3: “Conceptual Mastery and the Knowledge Argument” argues that Frank Jackson’s famous anti-physicalist knowledge argument featuring Mary, a brilliant neuroscientist raised in a black and white room, founders on a dilemma. Either (i) Mary cannot know the relevant experiential truths because of trivial obstacles that have no bearing on the truth of physicalism or (ii) once the obstacles have been removed, Mary can know the relevant truths. Chapter 4: “Toward a Theory of Conceptual Mastery” investigates the ques- tion “Under what conditions does a thinker fully understand, or have mastery of, a concept?” I argue against three views of conceptual mastery, according to which conceptual mastery is a matter of holding certain beliefs, being disposed to make certain inferences, or having certain intuitions. I propose and respond to objections to my own “meaning postulate view” of the conditions under which a thinker has mastery of a concept. iii The dissertation of Gabriel Oak Rabin is approved. David Chalmers Mark Greenberg Tyler Burge, Committee Chair University of California, Los Angeles 2013 iv with love and gratitude, for my parents, Pia and Marvin v Contents Introduction 1 0.1 Four Essays . .1 0.2 Chapter 1: Fundamentality Physicalism . .3 0.3 Chapter 2: Modal Rationalism and the Demonstrative Reply to the Master Argument Against Physicalism . .4 0.4 Chapter 3: Conceptual Mastery and the Knowledge Argument . .6 0.5 Chapter 4: Toward a Theory of Conceptual Mastery . .8 1 Fundamentality Physicalism 10 1.1 Fundamentality . 11 1.1.1 The Building Blocks of Reality . 11 1.1.2 Two kinds of creation . 14 1.1.3 The Relata of Metaphysical Generation . 16 1.1.4 The Covering Constraint . 17 1.1.5 Generation and Ground . 19 1.2 Fundamentality Physicalism . 23 1.2.1 Fundamentality Physicalism . 23 1.2.2 Fundamentality Physicalism and the Mathematical . 25 1.3 Modal Physicalism . 28 vi 1.3.1 Two Criticisms of Modal Formulations of Physicalism . 34 1.3.2 Fundamentality Physicalism and Modal Physicalism . 35 1.4 Other Physicalisms . 39 1.4.1 Everything is Narrowly or Broadly Physical: A Schema . 39 1.4.2 Applying the Schema to Fundamentality Physicalism . 40 1.4.3 Applying the Schema to Modal Physicalism . 41 1.4.4 Type Identity Physicalism . 42 1.4.5 Realization Physicalism . 43 1.4.6 Nature Physicalism . 45 1.4.7 Explanatory Physicalism . 46 1.4.8 Definition Physicalism . 48 1.4.9 Concept Physicalism . 49 1.4.10 Summary . 52 1.5 Fundamentality Physicalism and Other Physicalisms . 53 1.5.1 Against Nature and Explanatory Physicalism . 53 1.5.2 The Relevance of Fundamentally Non-Physical Worlds . 54 1.5.3 Fundamentally Non-Physical Worlds are Metaphysically Pos- sible . 55 1.5.4 Space and Time . 57 1.5.5 Lessons from the Possibility of Fundamentally Non-Physical Worlds . 58 1.5.6 Fundamentality Physicalism and the Fundamentally Non- Physical . 61 1.6 Conclusion . 62 vii 2 Modal Rationalism and the Demonstrative Reply to the Master Argu- ment Against Physicalism 64 2.1 Introduction . 65 2.2 The Master Argument Against Physicalism . 67 2.2.1 From Fundamentality to Modality to A Priori Implication . 67 2.2.2 The Master Argument . 71 2.2.3 Premise (P3): From Fundamentality to Modality . 72 2.2.4 Premise (P1): The Epistemic Gap . 72 2.2.5 Premise (P2): From an epistemic to a metaphysical gap . 75 2.3 Supplementation . 76 2.3.1 Covering Your Bases . 76 2.3.2 The Interest of the Base . 79 2.3.3 The Supplementation Question . 82 2.3.4 Naive Modal Rationalism . 83 2.3.5 Strong Modal Rationalism . 85 2.4 Return to the Master Argument . 87 2.4.1 The Strong Modal Rationalist’s Test for Fundamentality . 87 2.4.2 Canonical Expression of the Base: Semantic Neutrality . 89 2.4.3 Semantic Neutrality and the Master Argument . 95 2.5 Motivations for Modal Rationalism . 96 2.5.1 Overview . 96 2.5.2 Some Ideas Behind Modal Rationalism . 97 2.5.3 The View From Above . 100 2.5.4 The Strong Modal Rationalist Link and the View From Above102 2.6 Against Strong Modal Rationalism . 102 viii 2.6.1 The Recipe View . 102 2.6.2 The Trench View . 105 2.6.3 The Recipe View and the Strong Modal Rationalist Link . 111 2.7 The Demonstrative Reply to the Master Argument Against Physi- calism . 116 2.7.1 The Demonstrative Reply . 117 2.7.2 Comparison to other Demonstrative Oriented Replies . 121 2.7.3 The Ineliminable Connection Between Phenomenal Con- cepts and Demonstratives . 126 2.7.4 Phenomenal Concepts, Demonstration, and the Experien- tial Requirement . 132 2.7.5 Toward A More Moderate Rationalism: the Moderate Ra- tionalist Link . 133 2.7.6 Objection: The Hard Problem of Cats . 136 2.8 Conclusion . 137 3 Conceptual Mastery and the Knowledge Argument 139 3.1 Introduction . 140 3.2 Physicalism . 140 3.3 The Knowledge Argument . 142 3.4 Roadmap . 145 3.5 The Missing Concept Reply . 148 3.6 The Conceptual Mastery Reply . 151 3.7 Aside: The Phenomenal Concept Strategy . 155 3.8 The Informational Assumption and the Second Horn . 160 3.9 Lonely Mary and the Pincer Argument . 164 ix 3.10 Objections . 171 3.11 Taking Stock . 175 3.12 Conclusion . 179 4 Toward a Theory of Conceptual Mastery 181 4.1 Introduction . 182 4.2 Preliminaries . 183 4.2.1 Terminology and assumptions . 183 4.2.2 Cores and Conceptual Roles . 186 4.2.3 Precisifying the Notion of Conceptual Mastery . 188 4.2.4 Against Skepticism . 190 4.2.5 Four Theories of Conceptual Mastery . 194 4.3 Deviant Masters: Against the Necessity of Belief, Inference, or In- tuition for Conceptual Mastery . 197 4.3.1 Overview . 197 4.3.2 The Argument . 197 4.3.3 Response 1: Agnes remains disposed to infer . 199 4.3.4 Response 2: BOCHE is not a concept . 200 4.3.5 A Counterexample Without a Defective Concept . 201 4.3.6 Extending the argument against the belief and intuition views202 4.4 The Special Status Problem: Against the Sufficiency of Belief, In- ference, or Intuition for Conceptual Mastery . 202 4.4.1 Overview of the Special Status Problem . 202 4.4.2 Not Merely Belief . 203 4.4.3 Sophisticated Views . 204 4.4.4 The All and Only Problem . 205 x 4.4.5 Moving On . 207 4.5 The Meaning Postulate View . 208 4.5.1 From the Failures of Rivals to the Meaning Postulate View . 208 4.5.2 Taking to Govern Use . 209 4.5.3 Governing Use . 212 4.6 Three Objections . 214 4.6.1 Overview of the Objections . 214 4.6.2 Objection 1: Against the notion of “taking a rule to govern the use” . 214 4.6.3 Objection 2: Mastery Without Taking to Govern Use . 216 4.6.4 Objection 3: Taking to Govern Use Without Mastery . 217 4.7 Conclusion . 220 Bibliography 221 xi Acknowledgements This dissertation would not be possible without assistance and support from a wide variety of individuals over the years. First and foremost, I would like to thank my parents, Pia and Marvin, to whom this thesis is dedicated. They never pushed me to become a lawyer or a doctor or to pursue a career more respectable by traditional standards. They supported me in whatever wild endeavour I chose to pursue. When I skipped about from anthropologist to mathematician to wilderness adventurer to poet to ski bum, their support did not waver (even if their eyebrows did). The same held true when I opted for graduate school in philosophy. Thanks Mom and Dad. Other members of my family played important roles in my success as well. My brothers Micah and Noah are two of the best friends and comrades one could ask for. Whatever the occasion required, they were always ready with a sympa- thetic ear, a funny story, or a cold beer. My aunts, uncles, and cousins deserve gratitude as well. I’d particularly like to thank my grandparents Jack and Millie. Their support - both personal and financial - enabled a poor kid from Vermont with big dreams to pursue whatever intellectual pipe dream caught his fancy.
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