Labor’s Last stand in the refinery: the sheLL oiL strike of 1962-1963

by Tyler PriesT Unless otherwise indicated, all photos from USW Local 4-1, Pasadena, TX. Pasadena, 4-1, Local USW from photos all indicated, otherwise Unless Striking OCAW Local 4-367 employees outside the gate of the Shell Oil Deer Park ❒ Individual: ❒ $15 – 1 yr refinery in 1962. “The true majesty of the oil industry is best seen in a modern along soaring platforms, catwalks, and ladders, the ❒ $30 – 2 yrs refinery,” wrote oil journalist Harvey O’Connor in 1955. catalytic unit affords one of the magic ❒ Student (please include copy Few monuments of industrial architecture could compare to sights of twentieth century technology.”1 of student id): ❒ $10 – 1 yr a refinery’s giant crude oil tanks, topping plants, distilling Today, when driving over the Sam Tollway ❒ Institution: ❒ $25 – 1 yr columns, fractionating towers, platformers, extraction plants, Ship Channel Bridge, even long-time residents of Houston lubricating oils units, and de-waxing units. The centerpiece cannot help gawking at a spectacle that includes not merely Donation: $ of the modern refinery, however, was that “sublime industrial one refinery, but dozens stretching along the Houston cathedral known as a ‘cat-cracker’,” where petroleum Ship Channel and around . Conspicuous molecules were from this vantage point is Shell Oil’s Deer Park complex. Tyler Priest is Clinical Professor Return to: broken down and Built in 1929 and expanded with a giant cat cracker after Center for Public History and Director of Global Studies rearranged to form at the C.T. Bauer College World War II, Deer Park joined Wood River in St. Louis University of Houston of Business, University of high-octane motor and Norco in New Orleans as Shell Oil’s major East-of- Houston, 77204-3003 Houston. He is the author, gasoline and other the-Rockies refineries. A showcase for the latest in postwar most recently, of The Offshore fuels. “By night,” refining technology, Deer Park also became a template Imperative: Shell Oil’s Search for mused O’Connor, for the latest developments in labor relations. As Harvey Petroleum in Postwar America “with a thousand O’Connor, who was once a publicity director for the Oil (College Station: Texas A&M lights pricking University Press, 2007). Workers International Union (OWIU), clearly understood, the darkness Houston History Volume 5, number 2 spring 2008 7

8001157_UofH.indd 7 10/13/10 8:19:13 AM a modern refinery was not just an job security. Most importantly, they that happened at the plant. Plant assemblage of tanks, towers, pipes, and won greater say over workplace rules. managers retained substantial power valves, but a place where more than two These victories were short-lived, well into the mid-twentieth century, thousand workers earned their living. however, as technological changes in even after the rise of organized labor. Oil refining came to Houston after refining undermined labor’s ability to Explained Jim Henderson, a former the construction of the ship channel strike. Management began to push back chemical engineer at Deer Park and and World War I. By 1941, Houston in the late 1950s, forcing confrontations excecutive vice president at Shell Oil, had displaced Beaumont/Port Arthur, with OCAW in contract negotiations. “the refinery or plant manager was next where oil from the great Spindletop The big showdown came in 1962-1963 to God! One really didn’t speak unless 2 field had been processed, as the largest at Shell Oil’s Deer Park refinery and you were spoken to.” Tom Stewart, refining center on the Gulf Coast. The chemical plant, where 2,200 OCAW who joined the Deer Park refinery’s Second World War generated soaring Local 4-337 workers went on strike public affairs department in 1955, took demand for gasoline, aviation fuel, for nearly a year, the longest in the it a step further. “The refinery manager 3 and other petroleum products, and history of the industry. By successfully was God!” he exclaimed. Refineries and spurred the construction of refining restarting the plant with technical chemical plants were organized along and chemical plants up and down and supervisory personnel, Shell rigid lines. The chain of command the Gulf Coast from Corpus Christi Oil’s management removed workers’ began with the manager, ran through to New Orleans. This sprawling main source of bargaining leverage, a superintendent-operations directly landscape of refining under him, and on down to assistant and petrochemical superintendents and plants, the largest managers of the various 4 concentration by far in refinery departments. the world, profoundly The lower an shaped the growth individual was on the and industrialization organizational chart, of the Gulf Coast the less authority he region. For decades, had to make decisions the oil companies who and the fewer duties he owned these refineries had to perform. Plant exerted their influence managers maintained in both subtle and control by virtue of strong-armed ways these narrowly defined over transportation, positions and tasks, education, politics, but they also reserved and labor. the right to alter job duties at any time, not Although petroleum to mention hire and fire refining was a relatively at will. Corporate and capital-intensive Inside Deer Park’s cat cracker control room. plant managers viewed industry, from inception the ability to withhold their labor. refinery work, with its it depended on a stable and compliant relatively high wages, shorter hours, and workforce. During the early decades This proved to be labor’s last stand in refining, the moment management steadier employment in the regional of the century, oil companies enjoyed labor market, as a privilege, not a right.5 unchecked authority over their refinery asserted decisive and enduring workers. Tensions arose during and control over the refinery workplace. During World War I, refinery workers after World War I over workplace The Rise of Unionized began to demand more say in how control. By the end of World War II, Labor in Refining work was organized. Strikes in 1915 at the OWIU, affiliated with the Congress Standard Oil of New Jersey’s plant at In the early years of the industry, oil Bayonne, New Jersey, in 1916 at Gulf of Industrial Organizations (CIO), company management dominated emerged as a powerful representative of Oil’s Port Arthur refinery, and in 1918 their refineries and vigilantly resisted at Magnolia’s Beaumont plant led to the oil workers, especially in the Houston unionization. Foremen often picked area. Through a series of strikes during formation of grievance committees and workers arbitrarily, and plant managers shop rules. In the “labor-management the next decade, the OWIU and its wielded tremendous influence successor, the Oil, Chemical, and accommodation of the 1920s,” oil over hiring, promotion, and labor company management headed off Atomic Workers (OCAW) union, negotiations -- in fact, over everything obtained concessions on wages and outside union organizing through 8 Houston History Volume 5, number 2 spring 2008

8001157_UofH.indd 8 10/13/10 8:19:13 AM “welfare capitalist” measures (i.e. OWIU successfully organized 11 of at Deer Park in 1947, lasting 64 days, eight-hour day, guaranteed vacations, the 12 largest refineries on the Gulf started in reaction to the potential death and injury benefits, shop rules, Coast of Texas. In 1933, the employees pay cut resulting from Shell Oil’s provision of low-cost housing, etc.) of Deer Park organized into the Oil peacetime switch from 48- to 40- and the creation of “independent” or Field, Gas Well, and Refinery Workers hour weeks. Another national strike “company” unions. Modeled on the of America. Shell Oil met with the in 1952 which endured for 73 days employee relations plan instituted at employee’s union committee, but led to a 15 percent wage increase after Humble Oil’s Baytown plant, these refused to recognize the union. a month-long shutdown at many measures improved working conditions, In 1937, the union, now part of refineries that brought oil supplies in and company sponsored labor the OWIU (Local 367) with an many states to dangerously low levels organizations gave employees a limited office in Pasadena, Texas, struck the in the middle of the Korean War. The 6 voice in shaping those conditions. But plant for 34 days in its quest for a industrial union movement gained the companies still made it clear they collective bargaining contract. This strength in 1955 when the OWIU 7 were extending privileges, not rights. strike led to contract negotiations merged with the United Gas, Coke, Racial segregation in Gulf Coast before the National Labor Relations and Chemical Workers (UGCCW) to refining operations bought compliance Board (NLRB) and the signing of form the Oil, Chemical and Atomic from white workers who generally the first formal contract in 1941.11 Workers Union (OCAW). The same harbored racist attitudes. Rather than The unionization of Deer Park and year, CIO and AFL merged, and Shell setting formal rules about segregating other Gulf Coast refineries by the Oil’s Deer Park union became part of 13 their workforce, refineries OCAW Local 4-367. As demand for followed the example set oil and chemical products soared by the local construction during the 1950s, oil companies industry, setting up an grudgingly accepted the new labor informal “two-pool” arrangement as a way, at least, system which channeled to force issues at the bargaining African Americans and table and maintain a stable labor Hispanics into labor gangs supply to staff expanding refinery performing menial work, operations. Strikes had become which at refineries ranged more predictable than in the from ditch-diggers to past, and companies could make janitors, while reserving preparations to deal with them. skilled operating and OCAW would typically target one maintenance work for company, trying to win concessions whites. Shell Oil’s Deer that would establish a national Park plant typically hired pattern in contract language with other companies. “When whites with a high school Picketers at Shell Deer Park refinery, 1963. education and African- our local union met with Shell,” Americans without a high school OWIU shifted the balance of power recalled Roy Barnes, a union official education, and then promoted only between labor and management. An at Shell and later president of OCAW high school graduates to skilled jobs.8 industry-wide strike called by the Local 4-367, “there were two givens: OWIU in the fall of 1945 shut down one was we would give them a strike, The labor-management and the other, they’d take a strike.”14 accommodation of the 1920s dissolved refineries in the region and resulted during the Great Depression. In the in a settlement granting an 18 percent The “Quiet Revolution” early 1930s, thousand of workers wage increase for OWIU workers. As OWIU-OCAW gained strength lost their jobs or saw their wages More importantly, in winning the in the 1950s, refinery operations and benefits slashed.9 Old grievances right to negotiate collectively with experienced a “quiet revolution” that toward supervisors and managers management and backing up its began to undermine that very strength. resurfaced, and anger over the sudden positions with the threat of a strike, the Improvements in refinery technology, loss of job security ripened Gulf OWIU unions could shape contractual such as remote controls, automatic Coast refineries for outside union guidelines on tenure, promotion, controls, digital computers, and new organizing. Oil companies tried to seniority, job titles and assignments, kinds of sensors and instrumentation 12 block the unionization of their refinery and other job-control issues. meant that operations which previously workforces using tactics such as Throughout the late 1940s and required a human hand could now be intimidation, espionage, red-baiting, 1950s, the OWIU unions continued automated; the number of gauges and and racist appeals.10 Still, the CIO’s to use the strike effectively. A strike valves to be checked manually could Houston History Volume 5, number 2 spring 2008 9

8001157_UofH.indd 9 10/13/10 8:19:13 AM be greatly reduced. This substitution even in refineries with OCAW And if the maintenance didn’t work, of capital for labor, or the deskilling of representation, management was able to they would have to call somebody the workforce, was not a direct response chip away at union control in contract else to do it, you understand?”15 to the unionization of refineries, but language, inserting “management The new Amoco contract nevertheless rather a long, steady transformation rights” provisions allowing them relaxed restrictions on combining dating back to World War I. Only to reorganize work to employ new jobs or tasks. By operating part of in the 1950s, however, did this technologies more profitably. the plant without workers, Amoco transformation begin to produce results OCAW could always file grievances not only weakened the union’s dramatic enought to convince refinery to test management rights, and if that bargaining leverage in its own plants managers that technology was making failed, go on strike to resist changes in but emboldened other companies to many operational workers redundant. contract language. However, during a take harder lines in negotiations with In the mid-1950s, oil companies pivotal OCAW strike in 1959 at three OCAW. At its Port Arthur refinery began to reassert control over refinery Standard Oil of Indiana (Amoco) in 1961-1962, Gulf Oil used 600 work. In the traditional refinery, there refineries, the company brought several supervisors and technical people were basically three kinds of positions: units at its Texas City plant back on- to keep part of its plant running, 1) laborers, as mentioned above, stream with technical personnel, clerks, forcing OCAW, after six weeks on the staffed mainly by racial minorities; 2) and supervisors. Union workers came picket line, to agree to management’s operators, who were personnel terms, which included Gulf’s trained to operate all the use of contract workers for various kinds of equipment; many maintenance jobs. and 3) maintenance people, While oil companies who were carpenters, welders, exercised their newly found boilermakers, pipefitters, muscle to alter the postwar electricians, etc. If repairs or arrangements with organized routine maintenance were labor in refining, OCAW required in an operator’s area, sensed its ability to protect jobs he would call in a maintenance and deliver the goods to its man. Refinery management members slipping away. By the came to see this as an inefficient summer of 1962, the stage was way to deploy labor, especially as set for a major confrontation. technology reduced the number of tasks required of operators, The Big Strike who had time and skills to In 1961, during a period of perform work not included in slumping corporate profitability their contractual job description. in the oil industry, a new In refineries without OCAW president took command contracts, management started at , the Monroe Spaght, president of Shell Oil Company, 1961-1965. laying off workers displaced by partially owned U.S. subsidiary technology and altering traditional work back after 191 days and were forced to of the Royal Dutch Shell Group. rules. They also introduced the job of sign a new contract including a “work Monroe Spaght – “Monty” as he “universal mechanic,” a helper who incidental” clause that allowed the was familiarly known – was the first assisted many skilled craftsmen rather company to assign work that crossed U.S.-born president of Shell and the than one particular trade. Increasingly, craft lines. As jobs became more first to come from outside exploration they brought in outside contractors to routine, it was possible to combine and production. A research chemist perform large maintenance jobs rather them. In some cases, an operator could and self-styled “scientist turned than using union labor from the plant. easily add some maintenance duties to businessman,” he was not the typical These changes threatened both his work assignment, but was prevented “oilman” who had spent his career in operators and maintenance workers. In from doing so by union-enforced job the field looking and drilling for oil. some refineries, such as in Humble’s definitions and regulations. From Tall and professorial, Spaght smoked Baytown plant, the only major one the perspective of some workers, a pipe and spoke slowly, choosing his in the area not unionized, these on the other hand, operators could words carefully and properly. Highly actions actually increased the appeal not always do a tradesman’s job. intelligent and self-confident, Spaght of OCAW and led to successful According to Roy Barnes: “It was understood both the oil and chemical union organizing campaigns (OCAW amazing how stupid the operators sides of the business, and he came into organized Baytown in 1959). But were as far as doing maintenance. office aware of the need for dramatic 10 Houston History Volume 5, number 2 spring 2008

8001157_UofH.indd 10 10/13/10 8:19:14 AM changes. Right away, he launched a walked off the job at Deer Park, Wood enough skills to do most anything,” cost-cutting campaign that included River, and Norco, initiating a long and noted John Quilty, vice president for the first significant lay-offs since World painful strike of Shell’s entire East-of- personnel and industrial relations War II. “Monty really had to put the the-Rockies refinery system. By August and Shell’s chief negotiator during knife into the organization,” explained 22, the operations at Deer Park were the strike. “This doesn’t mean they Shell Oil Chairman John Loudon.16 at standstill. Due to its duration and did it efficiently.”22 As workers from Spaght began by trimming payroll. outcome, and the fact that it affected maintenance crafts were reassigned He ordered some salaried employees 70 percent of the company’s refining to fill vacated operating jobs, Shell into early retirement and terminated capacity and about half of its chemical had begun to contract out some plant others. In his first two years, he production, the strike of 1962-1963 maintenance tasks, such as cat cracker reduced the work force by more than proved to be a watershed in the history turnarounds, to outside specialists. 11 percent, saving $21 million in wages of labor-management relations at Shell. Since one out of every two employees and fringe benefits.17 No part of the Shell management was surprised in Shell’s refineries and chemical company was spared. These cutbacks that the different unions at the three plants was engaged in some kind of did not earn Spaght a reputation for refineries could pull off a coordinated maintenance, the threat to the workers’ 23 compassion. But he was not concerned strike. A loose federation of thirteen job security was real. Furthermore, with his popularity ratings. “Monty AFL buildings trade unions represented when a maintenance employee was more like a calculating machine,” workers at Shell’s largest refinery, Wood was transferred to the operations said executive vice president, A.J. River; OCAW represented the Houston department, he maintained his total Galloway. “He was absolutely logical refinery and chemical plant; and Norco company seniority, but his seniority in and followed the logical result down had an independent union. There were operations was zero. He also received to its end which sometimes would not natural lines of communications or a reduction in pay and was required to bring him the wrong result because he necessarily the same problems among work shifts rather than straight days 24 was dealing with people, who are not the three. “We figured we were in as in the maintenance department. logical.”18 “It wasn’t easy,” admitted pretty good shape compared to some of Such changes created ill will toward Spaght. “But I felt I couldn’t sleep the other companies who had OCAW the company among a growing at night unless I got on with it.”19 in all their refineries,” said Shell Oil number of workers. “It had to stop,” 21 said Johnny Garrison, vice president Spaght targeted manufacturing general counsel, Bill Kenney. In 1959, however, the unions representing major of the OCAW refinery workers at for streamlining and cutbacks. Houston. “We had hit a brick wall.”25 Top management believed that Shell oil and chemical installations Shell refineries, like others in the in the East had agreed to pursue a The unions also feared the industry, had become burdened by joint and coordinated program of amalgamation of job assignments underemployed workers, outmoded bargaining. As the Shell refineries made or “cross-crafting.” But from operating practices, and the growing cutbacks and submitted proposals management’s perspective, the need power of the unions to block changes during the 1962 contract negotiations for change was painfully clear in in workforce assignments. In 1957 to remove long-standing contract declining refining profits. Corporate at the Houston Deer Park refinery, clauses regarding work assignments, headquarters in New York voiced Shell had begun a policy of workforce the unions rallied around the issue a new rallying cry: “Time, Tools, reduction by attrition, not hiring of job security and organized an and Talent.” The goal was not to replacements for employees who were unprecedented alliance. Their contracts “speed up” labor, but to improve reassigned, discharged, retired or all expired at the same time, so they efficiency by reducing the number promoted. Shell accomplished these could legally call simultaneous local of workers. The unions naturally reductions through better planning, strikes in all three places. Shell’s West resisted these changes, fearing job overtime work and contracting out. Coast unions were still under contract, losses and safety hazards. “They’ve had not suffered the layoffs that the cut out several jobs and combined Then, in March 1961, after the other plants did, and thus did not them,” complained Jack Cocke, a retirement of refinery superintendent, join in the strike. Nevertheless, the striking chemical plant operator at P.E. Keegan, who had been trusted by East-of-the-Rockies unions felt that Houston. “The combined jobs are the union, the company started laying their alliance could defend the gains too much; they have not lessened 20 off workers. The union responded they had made during the 1950s. the responsibility – you just have to to this challenge to their job security work more things, do more things.”26 in negotiations over new contracts in Job security issues varied from 1962 by going on the offensive. On refinery to refinery. The Houston and Several other issues concerned August 19, 1962, some 5,200 union Norco unions were mainly worried the unions. One was advance refinery and chemical plant workers about contracting out. “A big refinery notification and consultation before with a large workforce possessed layoffs. The unions wanted longer Houston History Volume 5, Number 2 spring 2008 11

8001157_UofH.indd 11 10/13/10 8:19:14 AM notices and detailed explanations In previous strikes, the plants had had restarted the refineries. As for why layoffs were needed, which remained shut down while the two they watched plumes rising from would allow union representatives sides negotiated an agreement. This the plants, strikers at Deer Park to present counterproposals to time, Shell announced it would claimed that the company was management. Increased wages and operate the plants without the just burning old tires, creating the severance pay, the biggest concerns striking workers, as Amoco and Gulf impression that the units were in at Wood River, also came under had demonstrated it was possible operation. But as the strike endured, discussion. Compensation, however, to do. The Shell strike offered “an Shell brought each plant back into was not the main issue in the 1962 opportunity to try new methods production. Within three months, strike. The differences between of operating, new procedures, not the refineries were operating at close Shell labor and management went only on the operating side but to capacity with only one-half the beyond wages and benefits. OCAW on the maintenance side,” said usual complement of people. “We accused Shell of seeking to establish former Shell industrial relations knew when we started that we were “unilateral control” over all working manager Mac McIver.30 overstaffed,” recalled Quilty, “but we conditions.27 Shell sought to reclaim didn’t have the foggiest notion how Shell sent staff to occupy 32 a measure of the authority it had the plants, and obtained court badly.” As a message to the strikers, enjoyed before the rise in union injunctions at Wood River to the staff occupying the plants power after World War II. Monty assure entry past the mass pickets. painted the insides of the control Spaght took an uncompromising Supervisors, engineers, researchers, houses, laid new floors, and changed stand on this. He the lighting systems. did not criticize In Houston, where the workers, but the strike lasted he condemned the longest, plant management’s laxity staff began taking and the union leaders’ vacations during the shortsightedness summer of 1963, in permitting the relieved by employees rise of practices from other refineries. which left workers Tom Stewart, editor underemployed. “He of the Houston ran the flag up to the refinery newspaper, mast and nailed it 28 Shellegram, hard,” said Quilty. published a special Likewise, OCAW strike newsletter, Local 4-637 was the Shellograph, determined to make OCAW Local 4-367 strike schedule meeting during 1962-1963 strike. which reproduced a stand. The union set up pickets clerical workers, accountants, postcards sent back from vacationers. outside the Deer Park refinery and secretaries and stenographers all Explained Stewart: “It was just chemical plant gates on August contributed to getting the plants another way of letting the world 19, 1962, in the middle of a running again. After intensive know that we could take this record-breaking nine-day streak safety training, they worked 12- strike as far as it needed to go.”33 of withering, 100-plus degree hour shifts, seven days a week, Although union officals still temperatures. “We carried picket some even sleeping in the plants suspected that Shell exaggerated the signs back and forth, around the in the beginning. It was a novel degree to which the refinery was clock,” remembered Roy Barnes. and exhilarating challenge for brought back on line, the strikers “And we had no trouble keeping the many people, and not just for gradually realized they were fighting picket lines up or anything like that. the overtime pay they received. a losing battle. Tensions mounted We didn’t have any trouble with “The supervisors, the engineers, on the picket lines and in the our membership. Our membership they’d been wanting to get their communities as the unions, their was behind us. And I say this hands on those units for years,” workers, and their families stretched because I was on the committee. recalled John Quilty. “They’d been incomes, savings, and patience to They were behind us 100 percent. wanting to show these operators 29 31 the limit. But the company now had Well, maybe 99 percent.” that they could run them.” the power, and management the When the battle was joined, Shell At first, the striking workers did resolve, to outlast the strike. Roy unleashed a powerful new weapon. not believe that the staff actually Barnes remembered one co-worker 12 Houston History Volume 5, number 2 spring 2008

8001157_UofH.indd 12 10/13/10 8:19:14 AM exclaiming: “Damn it, if we stay out jobs.”37 Many of the 2,200 striking Dutch Shell officials. OCAW any longer, all we are going to do is union members of the refinery and then agreed to end the strike and make scabs out of some darned good chemical plant found temporary Houston workers returned to work men.”34 Fortunately, there were only work on the Gulf Coast or on the in early August 1963. Lasting 352 a couple of minor confrontations docks. “Shell days, the Houston strike was the and isolated incidents of violence had the finest craftsmen in the longest in the history of the OCAW. between strikers and picket-line country, and they had no problem 38 In the end, Shell Oil management crossers. The Wood River unions getting jobs,” claimed Garrison. extracted significant concessions settled first. Contracting out was The OCAW appealed to the from the unions. Offering severance not the central issue with them, and International Federation of pay and early retirement bonuses, Shell had not proposed new contract Petroleum Workers (IFPW), a the company reduced the workforce language there. In fact, outside worldwide alliance of 120 oil at all three locations, by about contractors performing maintenance unions, to mobilize pressure 400 people at Houston, 240 at for industrial plants usually relied against Shell around the world. Norco, and 250 at Wood River. on laborers represented by the Wood 35 The IFPW threatened sympathy New contract language required River trade unions. Moreover, strikes in Venezuela and Trinidad, operators to do routine maintenance outside employment in the St. Louis ostensibly to cut off crude oil and provided for greater flexibility area was very difficult to find during supplies to Houston. The IFPW in revising jobs and work rules. the frigid winter of 1962-1963, brought together “representatives Hearings before the National Labor discouraging a longer holdout by from the Caribbean area, as well Relations Board upheld Shell’s right the strikers. In February 1963, six as representatives from Holland to contract out some tasks. Assured months after the strike began, the and Venezuela . . . to work out of face-saving limits on the minor two sides negotiated a settlement means of closer cooperation in maintenance required of operators, based on a 5 percent general wage assisting the workers to obtain a the OCAW called the agreement an increase pattern offered in 1962 just settlement.”39 However, the “honorable settlement.”42 Employees throughout the industry. The Wood sympathy strikes did not happen, who kept their jobs were relieved River settlement undermined the and even if they had, the Houston to return to work. Although the tripartite labor alliance, and two refinery’s crude supply, most bitterness built up during the year- weeks later Norco’s independent of which came from Texas and long strike still lingered, as Garrison union settled on similar terms, Louisiana, would not have been points out, “both the company and plus “contract revisions to permit 40 36 affected. Even so, Royal Dutch the union saw that they had to sit better utilization of manpower.” Shell depended on the IFPW to down and try to work out their Houston endured another 5 keep communist members out of differences without a strike.”43 ½ months of strike. Both sides refinery unions in other parts of the The 1962-1963 strike marked were strongly committed to their world, and Group representatives got a turning point in the role and positions. Shell was not happy with involved in negotiations during the strength of unions in Shell’s plants. the OCAW contract at Houston summer of 1963 to keep the strike These unions had emerged victorious and took a hard line, demanding from jeopardizing labor relations in the 1940s and had asserted new language to relax restrictions elsewhere. An IFPW international increasing influence over wages and on job practices, particularly in the strike fund did help pay benefits working conditions in the 1950s. area of cross-crafting. During the to striking workers, and the local The showdown in 1962, however, strike, Shell even added demands to union paid out $10 per week cash in starkly revealed the limits of the its pre-strike negotiating position, the form of two-dollar bills. “Two union’s power. The OCAW could no such as refusing to pay medical dollar bills were just floating all longer shut down a plant. Without and hospitalization premiums. over,” said Roy Barnes. “Every time this weapon, the union had little The OCAW strongly opposed the someone would see one, they would bargaining leverage. In the dawning changes. Its workers had walked say, “there’s a strike fellow.’ That 41 age of automation, the threat to shut out after at least five years of quiet was just simply to publicize it.” down plants with strikes was shown during which job security and By the end of July, after marathon to be hollow, and the unions entered manpower utilization grievances had negotiations mediated by William a new era of gradual decline. In piled up. “This strike was fought Simkin, director of the Federal 1964, the Deer Park refinery reduced bitterly,” said Johnny Garrison. Mediation and Conciliation Service, its workforce again. Although “We adopted the philosophy that Shell Oil retreated to its pre-strike the OCAW came to represent this strike may last forever, and we negotiating position, possibly as a workers at all the major Shell Oil encouraged workers to find other result of an appeal from the Royal refineries except Wood River, its Houston History Volume 5, number 2 spring 2008 13

8001157_UofH.indd 13 10/13/10 8:19:15 AM overall membership fell steadily a messy labor war into a kind of strike, in that it could not even win (meanwhile, President Lyndon moral-rearmament crusade for Shell using a modern public relations Johnson issued executive orders people throughout the country.”44 campaign on issues narrower in 1965 and 1967 that prohibited Aftermath than job control and security. discrimination on the basis of sex As OCAW’s hard-won bargaining In 1971, OCAW introduced health or race in any projects involving a and safety issues into bargaining government contract, forcing Shell power waned, it looked for new issues and new allies in its on-going sessions, and in 1973 it targeted Oil and other refiners finally to Shell for a nationwide strike aimed racially integrate their refineries). struggles with the oil and chemical companies. With the environmental at forcing the company to create Shell Oil did not experience movement surging forward on a joint committee of workers and another work stoppage until January many fronts in the early 1970s, the management with binding authority 1969, when the OCAW called the OCAW joined unions of various on aspects of the management of first industry-wide strike over wages sorts in seeking common ground occupational health. Despite the fact and fringe benefits. But it only with the environmental interest that such committees had become lasted 38 days, as Shell and other groups that had come to political part of the OCAW’s national pattern companies successfully operated prominence in the debates over a of bargaining with the petroleum industry, Shell decided to resist on the grounds that management alone had the responsibility to make decisions on such issues.45 Broad public support was critical to the OCAW’s strategy of winning the strike in the marketplace as much as at the factory gate. The union mounted a vigorous boycott of Shell gasoline and pesticides, including the company’s popular “No Pest Strip.” The slogan “Shell? No!” was the centerpiece of a massive publicity campaign to encourage support for the strike and the boycott. The union’s message was driven home with billboards, newspaper ads, radio spots, and millions of pamphlets and Photo: Houston CHroniCle, © Houston CHroniCle Publishing Company. leaflets. Some of the union’s allies among the environmental groups the plants again with supervisory new wave of federal regulations. also made mass mailings to their and technical staff. In the strike Refinery workers and those memberships calling for support settlement, Shell obtained revisions of the OCAW by boycotting Shell to contract language at its Martinez who lived near refineries feared exposure to a variety of potential products. Union reports in April and Wilmington-Dominguez 1973 claimed that thousands of refineries in California pertaining to environmental hazards, and the OCAW solicited the assistance of Shell customers had returned their work practices, which were similar credit cards to the company, whose to those achieved at the East-of-the- environmental groups in a new crusade against such hazards. gasoline sales were reported to be Rockies plants in the earlier strike. down by 10-25 percent. The OCAW The changes in labor-management Worker safety quickly emerged as an issue that might improve working called publicity for the strike and relations at Shell’s plants in the the boycott “the most massive” in 1960s reduced the power of unions, conditions in the plants while also fundamentally changing the rules American history for a strike of allowing management to improve this size, but it also acknowledged the financial performance and of engagement in what had become a losing battle for the OCAW. The that growing gasoline shortages flexibility of manufacturing. Wrote somewhat limited its effectiveness.46 Fortune magazine about the 1962 failure of the health and safety strike: “In his ratiocinative way, strategy demonstrated the erosion Shell stood its ground in the face Spaght somehow managed to convert of OCAW’s power since the 1962 of the union’s publicity blitz. It 14 Houston History Volume 5, number 2 spring 2008

8001157_UofH.indd 14 10/13/10 8:19:16 AM Total Employment U.S. Petroleum Refining (1947-2005) defense of management’s traditional Total Employment U.S. Petroleum Refining (1947-2005) authority over issues of health 250 and safety, and carried the day. Shell Oil’s victories over OCAW 200 in 1963 and 1973 resolutely asserted management prerogatives in the organization of work in refineries 150 and were replicated throughout the industry. In the years since,

100 technological innovation and

Employees (Thousands) automation further diminished the role of workers and thus the weight 50 of OCAW in refineries and chemcial plants. Faced with steadily declining membership, OCAW has been 0 forced to combine with other unions 1947 1949 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 Year facing the same trend. In 1999, Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics OCAW merged with the United Paperworkers Union to form the minimized the economic impact increasingly skeptical of staying out Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical, of the strike by maintaining for a long period over somewhat and Energy (PACE) International production, but the public relations abstract health and safety issues. In Union, and in 2005 PACE merged impact proved more difficult May, fearing that the Deer Park local with the United Steelworkers to withstand and combat. The might actually move to decertify the Union to form the United Steel, company’s top management believed union, the OCAW agreed to accept Paper and Forestry, Rubber, that an important principle was at a local agreement that included a Manufacturing, Energy, Allied stake, and they were willing to take greatly watered down version of the Industrial and Service Workers some body blows from the OCAW original proposal for a joint health International Union -- or United in order to defeat a proposal that and safety committee. Once this Steelworkers (USW) for short.50 they felt struck at the very heart agreement was signed, other Shell of their capacity to manage their locals quickly accepted similar In October 2007, British Petroleum company. Tom Stewart, a Shell contracts, and the long strike ended. pleaded guilty to felony charges of media spokesman during the strike, Although the union claimed that the violating safety regulations under summarized this sentiment: “If compromise represented a victory, Clean Air Act for a March 2005 you agreed to that, then you were Shell management knew that it had explosion at its Texas City refinery going to delegate to a workman’s won on the key issue of the scope (the one formerly owned by Amoco) committee the right to basically and power of the joint committee. that killed 15 contractors housed in decide how you were going to staff The heart of the new contract a trailer close to the blast site and your plant. And the company wasn’t was Shell’s own version of the wounded dozens more. It may be too about to give away that right.”47 joint committee, and it differed simple to trace a line directly from Company publicity against the fundamentally from that proposed the outcome of labor-management strike made this point in more by the OCAW. In announcing its confrontations in an earlier era detail: “Through this proposal, agreement with the Deer Park local, to this tragic event. Furthermore, the union and third parties could Shell stressed that the new contract management cannot really be faulted control manpower levels, operating assured that workers would have a for asserting its authority over the methods, capital investments, and “viable voice” in matters of health deployment of labor in that era. But many other matters. So in reality, and safety through “continued it seems hard to avoid the question: the issue is not ‘health and safety,’ employee involvement” that built If OCAW had been able to hold its but featherbedding [deliberate on “successful programs already ground on the issue of contracting- overstaffing] in disguise.”48 in operations.”49 In essence, these out in the early 1960s and maintained greater voice in health and safety after As the strike wore on, Shell committees would invite worker 1973, might different organizations negotiators put this principle into input, but they would vest final and practices have evolved in Gulf practice by focusing their efforts on authority to act on this input in the Coast refineries that could have the large local at Deer Park. There, hands of management. Shell had averted the Texas City tragedy? ✯ rank and file union members seemed joined the battle with the OCAW in

Houston History Volume 5, number 2 spring 2008 15

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