ashemi Rafsanjani: The Life, HTimes and Legacy of the Islamic Republic’s Machiavelli Introduction The Rafsanjani Ideology – Moderate, Conservative, or Both? Rafsanjani’s Power and Influence: Both Formal and Informal What Lies Ahead in Post-Rafsanjani Iran A Diffuse Inheritance Jumada I - Jumada II 1438 29 February - March 2017 2 © KFCRIS, 2017 ISSN: 1658-6972 Issue No. 29 - 02/02/2017 L.D. No: 1437/2868 Jumada I - Jumada II 1438 - February - March 2017 3 he Iranian political scene has been deeply affected by the sudden passing away of TAkbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the stalwart political figure at the centre of the Islamic Republic’s politics since early 1979. His death deprives the political elite of a figure who, while not universally revered, was instrumental in the stabilization and strengthening of the post-revolutionary state order and in solving frequent intra-elite crises. This article will provide an in-depth analysis of Rafsanjani’s career, his core beliefs and strategies. In addition, it provides a description of the potential trajectories which are currently available to the political elite in his absence. Jumada I - Jumada II 1438 - February - March 2017 4 Introduction The sudden death of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the storied and influential Iranian statesman, has left a gaping hole in the upper echelons of the Islamic Republic’s political establishment. His heart attack, or cardiac arrest, occurred on Sunday, 8 January. According to some sources, it occurred while he was engaged in a habitual swim in the Saadabad pool of North Tehran. It was so unexpected that his family have announced that it does not appear that the 82-year old had updated his last will and testament, which was produced in 2000 as he was undergoing cardiac surgery. In addition, he apparently had not left clear instructions regarding his preferred burial place, which, after much deliberation, was chosen to be alongside his mentor Ruhollah Khomeini at the latter’s sprawling Haram-e Mottahar complex in South Tehran. Since his death, a few more details over his heart condition have trickled into the public sphere, adding to the rebuttal of inevitable conspiracy theories which claimed that some of Rafsanjani’s many internal opponents might have caused his demise. Continuously active on the political scene from the week preceding the final triumph of the Revolution in February 1979, Rafsanjani embodied politics in the Islamic Republic in ways not dissimilar from Shimon Peres’ role within Israeli statecraft: regardless of the political flavor and moods of the day, he remained an inextricable part of the political landscape until his demise, despite a career full of high and low points. His death undoubtedly marks the second major passing away within the Iranian elite after Khomeini’s in June 1989, but did not come about, as was the case of his mentor, after a period of protracted illness and incapacitation, but rather at a moment in which the veteran statesman was expected to play his usual, central role in the run-up to the presidential elections of May 2017. This article will provide an overview of Rafsanjani’s last period in office, and offer possible scenarios on how the elite will move on from him. It will also discuss the impact, at least in the short term, of his passing, particularly with regards to the upcoming elections. Looking further ahead, we will also analyze how it may affect the selection of the new Leader. It will argue that, irreplaceable as the persona of Rafsanjani is, the Iranian political elite is likely to absorb his passing by maintaining current factional fault lines and balances intact, at least in the short term. The extent of Rafsanjani’s informal weight could, however, alter the equilibrium moving forward, as more of his generation of revolutionaries-turned-statesmen also exit the political scene. The Rafsanjani Ideology – Moderate, Conservative, or Both? While most commentary in the West has, by worldview is one in which the prevailing factor focusing on Rafsanjani’s last decade of activity, is not ideological/factional, but rather a deeply- awarded him the posthumous reformist-pragmatic ingrained understanding of raison d’etat and moniker, a more accurate depiction of Rafsanjani’s one central objective – the preservation and Jumada I - Jumada II 1438 - February - March 2017 5 consolidation of the Islamic Republic – which has security services, by the end of his life he became been his guiding principle through the nearly four a darling and father figure for domestic dissidents decades in which he has featured as a political and opposition politicians, due to his last Friday player of the utmost importance in Iran. Such a prayer speech of July 2009. In that speech, he central target has led him to assume markedly called for an end to the post-electoral repression different stances on policy and at times to oscillate of that summer, and his consistent appeals for between extremes. When, as Majlis Speaker, he lesser restrictions in the intellectual and media announced the result of the parliamentary vote in arenas. Despite adopting the comparison of prison June 1981, which called upon Ayatollah Khomeini conditions in the Islamic Republic and the Shah’s to formally impeach and dismiss the first president, time – with a clear preference for the former – as a Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, from office, he emphatically refrain to reformists who lambasted the continued exhorted the MPs to shelve the discussion on Bani- incarceration of prominent journalists such as Sadr in order to focus all attention on bringing Akbar Ganji in the early 2000s, by the start of “Death to America” to fruition. Within the the 2010s Rafsanjani had to come to terms with following decade, Rafsanjani would be at the heart the jail sentences against his maverick daughter of a clumsy and ultimately debilitating attempt Faezeh, who caused him major embarrassment to bring about an arms-fuelled rapprochement by agitating in favor of the Green movement between Iran and the Reagan administration, press first and then, after encountering its members in for the end of Iran-Iraq conflict on the grounds prison, of the proscribed Bahai faith and meeting that the American intervention, as evidenced by their community leaders. His son Mehdi has, on the shooting down of an Iranian Airbus plane the other hand, antagonized many with rumored over the Persian Gulf in June 1988, was ratcheting kickbacks received during oil deals and has been up on behalf of Saddam Hussein, and offered a on furlough during the funeral proceedings due to major oil deal to the US company Conoco, only the prison sentence he received due to his active for the same to be derailed by the approval of support of the Green movement of 2009-11. the Helms-D’Amato act by the US Congress. By It is therefore arduous to label Rafsanjani as a March 2013, Rafsanjani was openly decrying the figure in favour or against relations with the Great then-status quo in relations with Washington, Satan, or as a serial castigator of the opposition which he described as “neither talking to the or its meek supporter. It would be more accurate US nor having any meaningful relations.” For to think of him as someone who has had the Rafsanjani, this was impossible to maintain and an ability to mould and conform his stances to what anachronism, due to the United States’ dominant he felt was the best way of combining societal position in the world order. Likewise, while in the yearnings with state interest and maintaining an early 1990s Rafsanjani was complicit, or turned a elastic view on the latter. As such, he eschewed blind eye to the repression of dissidents and the the rigidity ordinarily espoused by other senior killing of intellectuals such as Ali Akbar Saidi figures, such as Ayatollah Khamenei, but also the Sirjani or the exile of politicians such as the last more radical ringleaders of the reformist camp. prime minister of the Shah, Shapur Bakhtiar and He often maintained a modus operandi which the Kurdish leaders Abdolrahman Qasemlu and shied away from executive, practical decisions Sadegh Sharafkandi by elements connected to the and was instead mainly consisting of arbitration Jumada I - Jumada II 1438 - February - March 2017 6 – between state and society, within the state and distance himself from public opinion and gaze between the myriad fragmented forces which and court significant controversy. The yearly form the body politic of the Islamic Republic. publication of his personal diaries, which started The exception to this would be the period from over a decade ago with the release of the volume 1990-1997, during which he was president. His pertaining to 1981-82 and have now reached the personal capital came from his continued ability, mid-Nineties, would case weeks of controversy under all circumstances, to make his view known and debate within the press and political circles, to public opinion and influence thinking at the and at times be stymied by obstacles placed on the topmost layers of the state. Besides being a prolific reprint of the early editions, which would usually author of dozens of monographs, ranging from sell out swiftly. Quranic exegesis to analyses of divorce through Rafsanjani’s gaming of the media as a vehicle to the yearly publication of his personal diaries for the expansion of his influence and standing from 1981 onwards, which always caused weeks has also had the effect of elevating his religious of intense media and political coverage and standing. By all accounts, his period at the Qom discussion, Rafsanjani was a keen adopter of seminary was unremarkable from a theological new technologies, albeit at the occasional cost. standpoint and did not result in the elevation to For more than a year, his personal website was the upper ranks of the Shi’i hierarchy.