ashemi Rafsanjani: The Life, HTimes and Legacy of the Islamic Republic’s Machiavelli

Introduction The Rafsanjani Ideology – Moderate, Conservative, or Both? Rafsanjani’s Power and Influence: Both Formal and Informal What Lies Ahead in Post-Rafsanjani A Diffuse Inheritance

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© KFCRIS, 2017

ISSN: 1658-6972 Issue No. 29 - 02/02/2017 L.D. No: 1437/2868

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he Iranian political scene has been deeply affected by the sudden passing away of TAkbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the stalwart political figure at the centre of the Islamic Republic’s politics since early 1979. His death deprives the political elite of a figure who, while not universally revered, was instrumental in the stabilization and strengthening of the post-revolutionary state order and in solving frequent intra-elite crises. This article will provide an in-depth analysis of Rafsanjani’s career, his core beliefs and strategies. In addition, it provides a description of the potential trajectories which are currently available to the political elite in his absence.

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Introduction

The sudden death of Hashemi Rafsanjani, the storied and influential Iranian statesman, has left a gaping hole in the upper echelons of the Islamic Republic’s political establishment. His heart attack, or cardiac arrest, occurred on Sunday, 8 January. According to some sources, it occurred while he was engaged in a habitual swim in the Saadabad pool of North . It was so unexpected that his family have announced that it does not appear that the 82-year old had updated his last will and testament, which was produced in 2000 as he was undergoing cardiac surgery. In addition, he apparently had not left clear instructions regarding his preferred burial place, which, after much deliberation, was chosen to be alongside his mentor at the latter’s sprawling Haram-e Mottahar complex in South Tehran. Since his death, a few more details over his heart condition have trickled into the public sphere, adding to the rebuttal of inevitable conspiracy theories which claimed that some of Rafsanjani’s many internal opponents might have caused his demise. Continuously active on the political scene from the week preceding the final triumph of the Revolution in February 1979, Rafsanjani embodied politics in the Islamic Republic in ways not dissimilar from Shimon Peres’ role within Israeli statecraft: regardless of the political flavor and moods of the day, he remained an inextricable part of the political landscape until his demise, despite a career full of high and low points. His death undoubtedly marks the second major passing away within the Iranian elite after Khomeini’s in June 1989, but did not come about, as was the case of his mentor, after a period of protracted illness and incapacitation, but rather at a moment in which the veteran statesman was expected to play his usual, central role in the run-up to the presidential elections of May 2017. This article will provide an overview of Rafsanjani’s last period in office, and offer possible scenarios on how the elite will move on from him. It will also discuss the impact, at least in the short term, of his passing, particularly with regards to the upcoming elections. Looking further ahead, we will also analyze how it may affect the selection of the new Leader. It will argue that, irreplaceable as the persona of Rafsanjani is, the Iranian political elite is likely to absorb his passing by maintaining current factional fault lines and balances intact, at least in the short term. The extent of Rafsanjani’s informal weight could, however, alter the equilibrium moving forward, as more of his generation of revolutionaries-turned-statesmen also exit the political scene.

The Rafsanjani Ideology – Moderate, Conservative, or Both?

While most commentary in the West has, by worldview is one in which the prevailing factor focusing on Rafsanjani’s last decade of activity, is not ideological/factional, but rather a deeply- awarded him the posthumous reformist-pragmatic ingrained understanding of raison d’etat and moniker, a more accurate depiction of Rafsanjani’s one central objective – the preservation and

Jumada I - Jumada II 1438 - February - March 2017 5 consolidation of the Islamic Republic – which has security services, by the end of his life he became been his guiding principle through the nearly four a darling and father figure for domestic dissidents decades in which he has featured as a political and opposition politicians, due to his last Friday player of the utmost importance in Iran. Such a prayer speech of July 2009. In that speech, he central target has led him to assume markedly called for an end to the post-electoral repression different stances on policy and at times to oscillate of that summer, and his consistent appeals for between extremes. When, as Majlis Speaker, he lesser restrictions in the intellectual and media announced the result of the parliamentary vote in arenas. Despite adopting the comparison of prison June 1981, which called upon Ayatollah Khomeini conditions in the Islamic Republic and the Shah’s to formally impeach and dismiss the first president, time – with a clear preference for the former – as a Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, from office, he emphatically refrain to reformists who lambasted the continued exhorted the MPs to shelve the discussion on Bani- incarceration of prominent journalists such as Sadr in order to focus all attention on bringing in the early 2000s, by the start of “” to fruition. Within the the Rafsanjani had to come to terms with following decade, Rafsanjani would be at the heart the jail sentences against his maverick daughter of a clumsy and ultimately debilitating attempt Faezeh, who caused him major embarrassment to bring about an arms-fuelled rapprochement by agitating in favor of the Green movement between Iran and the Reagan administration, press first and then, after encountering its members in for the end of Iran- conflict on the grounds prison, of the proscribed Bahai faith and meeting that the American intervention, as evidenced by their community leaders. His son Mehdi has, on the shooting down of an Iranian Airbus plane the other hand, antagonized many with rumored over the Persian Gulf in June 1988, was ratcheting kickbacks received during oil deals and has been up on behalf of Saddam Hussein, and offered a on furlough during the funeral proceedings due to major oil deal to the US company Conoco, only the prison sentence he received due to his active for the same to be derailed by the approval of support of the Green movement of 2009-11. the Helms-D’Amato act by the US Congress. By It is therefore arduous to label Rafsanjani as a March 2013, Rafsanjani was openly decrying the figure in favour or against relations with the Great then-status quo in relations with Washington, Satan, or as a serial castigator of the opposition which he described as “neither talking to the or its meek supporter. It would be more accurate US nor having any meaningful relations.” For to think of him as someone who has had the Rafsanjani, this was impossible to maintain and an ability to mould and conform his stances to what anachronism, due to the ’ dominant he felt was the best way of combining societal position in the world order. Likewise, while in the yearnings with state interest and maintaining an early 1990s Rafsanjani was complicit, or turned a elastic view on the latter. As such, he eschewed blind eye to the repression of dissidents and the the rigidity ordinarily espoused by other senior killing of intellectuals such as Ali Akbar Saidi figures, such as Ayatollah Khamenei, but also the Sirjani or the exile of politicians such as the last more radical ringleaders of the reformist camp. prime minister of the Shah, Shapur Bakhtiar and He often maintained a modus operandi which the Kurdish leaders Abdolrahman Qasemlu and shied away from executive, practical decisions by elements connected to the and was instead mainly consisting of arbitration

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– between state and society, within the state and distance himself from public opinion and gaze between the myriad fragmented forces which and court significant controversy. The yearly form the body politic of the Islamic Republic. publication of his personal diaries, which started The exception to this would be the period from over a decade ago with the release of the volume 1990-1997, during which he was president. His pertaining to 1981-82 and have now reached the personal capital came from his continued ability, mid-Nineties, would case weeks of controversy under all circumstances, to make his view known and debate within the press and political circles, to public opinion and influence thinking at the and at times be stymied by obstacles placed on the topmost layers of the state. Besides being a prolific reprint of the early editions, which would usually author of dozens of monographs, ranging from sell out swiftly. Quranic exegesis to analyses of divorce through Rafsanjani’s gaming of the media as a vehicle to the yearly publication of his personal diaries for the expansion of his influence and standing from 1981 onwards, which always caused weeks has also had the effect of elevating his religious of intense media and political coverage and standing. By all accounts, his period at the discussion, Rafsanjani was a keen adopter of seminary was unremarkable from a theological new technologies, albeit at the occasional cost. standpoint and did not result in the elevation to For more than a year, his personal website was the upper ranks of the Shi’i hierarchy. Throughout placed offline after his staff allegedly refused to his period as president, he was referred to, as delete the video footage of his aforementioned July were inter alia Khamenei before the start of his 2009 Friday prayer speech. Rafsanjani also cast a Leadership and throughout wide net over the press, with several prominent his career, as Hujjat al-, the mid-ranking title national publications, such as the dailies which groups together the bulk of the Shi’i clerisy. and Arman-e Ravabet Umumi and the monthlies For the past 10-12 years, he has been, however, Andisheh-Ye Puya and Mehrnameh effectively increasingly referred to by the media as Ayatollah, being unmoving beacons of his thought, staffed a title with which he was rarely, if ever, bestowed as they were by loyalist journalists. Rafsanjani by the higher clerical echelons. Grand Ayatollah would make use of the media, in the past couple Sistani, for example, used the term Hujjat al- of decades, to unexpectedly reveal a seemingly Islam, which was also adopted by Supreme Leader endless stream of na-gofteha, or “untold” factoids Khamenei and former president Ahmadinejad. The and narratives mostly related to Khomeini or persistent use of the term Ayatollah led, however, to important matters of state pertaining to the to awkward coverage even in outlets usually early Islamic Republic period. One of the most critical of Rafsanjani, such as the IRGC-linked Fars sensational of these cases occurred in 2006, News Agency, which used the term “Ayatollah” to when he revealed a secret letter that Khomeini introduce the verbatim reproduction of Khamenei’s had written to members of the elite, in which written statement of condolence. All this goes to he listed the various reasons for accepting UN show the great effort that Rafsanjani placed on Resolution 598 in 1988. Among those reasons curating and strengthening his public and media was the impossibility of equipping Iran with image, the effect it had on domestic coverage suitable weaponry, including atomic ones, before related to him and the intrinsically political, rather 1992. Rafsanjani was therefore never reluctant to than theological, qualities he possessed.

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Rafsanjani’s Power and Influence: Both Formal and Informal

Fully active until his fatal stroke, Rafsanjani was narrowly avoided major embarrassment and a fall at the tail end of a long career which featured a in disgrace when , a close relative presence in virtually all the formal branches of of Khomeini’s maverick successor-in-waiting the Iranian state. It started in early 1979, as he Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, was instrumental became deputy Interior minister of the Provisional in leaking details of the secret mission to Tehran of Revolutionary Government of . an American delegation led by the former National After organizing the first presidential elections Security Advisor of Ronald Reagan. The initially and being instrumental in setting up the electoral bungled management of what became known as law for the first parliamentary poll of Spring 1980, the Iran-Contra affair was, however, ably handled which yielded control over the chamber to his by Rafsanjani who in 1988 was amongst those who Islamic Republic Party (IRP), Rafsanjani settled engineered Montazeri’s downfall. in as Speaker of Parliament, becoming the chief In 1989, Rafsanjani carefully engineered a revision arbiter of Iranian politics throughout the 1980s. As of the constitution, together with his close ally and the initial internal unity of Khomeini’s followers associate, , to swiftly pick up the reins splintered in the aftermath of the ousting from the of power after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. In political scene of the non-religious revolutionary what appears to have been a major faux pas, he was organisations, Rafsanjani gradually positioned instrumental in elevating Khamenei, who he most himself at the centre of the new politics, offering likely considered to be a junior partner who would the emerging right- and left-wing internal factions be satisfied with the trappings of the post, to the a needed arbitrator who was able, at times under Leadership in order to vacate the new, strengthened very testing circumstances, to re-establish a less presidency for himself. Rafsanjani entered a testing bellicose atmosphere. The extension of Rafsanjani’s and ultimately less than successful two-term term in informal powers beyond the legislative branch did office. While being able to effect a significant amount not go unnoticed, however. In early 1988, prime of sazandegi, or “reconstruction”, of a country minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi shocked the elite by battered by eight years of post-revolutionary internal tendering his unannounced resignation, which was strife and the long conflict against Iraq which had motivated, in a secret letter to President Khamenei, both damaged the country’s infrastructure and among others things by the continued encroachment isolated it internationally, Rafsanjani had to come of the Majlis speaker and other state figures into to terms with a series of maneuvers which did not, his realm of authority.1 Between 1986 and 1988, for the most part, end favorably for him. Thrust Rafsanjani became a central figure in the Iranian into an executive, rather than arbitrating role, his war effort against the Baathist regime in Iraq. He risk-taking increased proportionally, not always with the desired success. After spending the first 1 Mousavi specifically complained about the exchange of letters three years of his presidency fending off the spirited between Rafsanjani and the prime minister of Japan, which Mousavi only got wind of through the press. challenge of the internal left to his authority and

Jumada I - Jumada II 1438 - February - March 2017 8 that of Khamenei, Rafsanjani had to deal with the stagnation.2 By doing so, Rafsanjani forced the resurgence of the traditionalist right, whom he had realization, within the reformist camp, that informal a hand in empowering through the elections for influence within non-elective state bodies went the Fourth Majles in 1992. By 1996, Rafsanjani’s hand in hand with the conquest, through popular space for action had been so eroded that he was vote, of a majority in elective institutions such as the compelled to allow his closest associates to form a presidency or Parliament. party specifically dedicated to supporting, for the By 2005, the animosity between the reformists and first time ever, a sitting president, the Executives of Rafsanjani was considered shrunk through force Construction. majeure. ’s disruptive An instinctive conservative, Rafsanjani had little in barging into the scene and his shock win in the common with the “reformist” agenda of Mohammad presidential elections of that year brought about Khatami and voted for his rival, Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri, a severe re-calibration of factional fault lines. In in the 1997 presidential elections. The relationship autumn 2006, as the first Ahmadinejad-era elections deteriorated as muckracking journalists such as were under way, Rafsanjani made the highly symbolic Akbar Ganji published sensational books, often gesture of appearing at his customary polling station, reaching reprints into the dozens, clearly alluding to within Khomeini’s former compound of Jamaran, his role in the killing and torturing of non-violent, together with Mohammad Khatami, to symbolize mostly intellectual dissidents. Rafsanjani’s term as his return within the moderate fold. The image was bete noire of the then-dominant pro-Khatami camp clear: this was to be considered a rapprochement reached its apex in 2000, as he was reinstated in the fuelled by the rise of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and 30th and last available position for election into his antagonistic politics. The shift of the epicenter Parliament in the Tehran constituency following of politics towards the right had therefore the effect the disqualification of a religious-nationalist of lumping Rafsanjani and his erstwhile reformist dissident. After a no-holds barred campaign by foes into the same receiving end of the relentless the boisterous reformist press, Rafsanjani found it attacks of the right-wing against them. For the last expedient to withdraw from the race. The reformist decade of his life, the former president would, at radicals’ victory proved to be almost wholly Pyrrhic. times reluctantly, share much of the worldview and Ensconced in the Expediency Council, of which ideological stances of this faction. He would rail he assumed the leadership after 1997, Rafsanjani together with the them at the mismanagement of effectively transformed this dormant institution into the Ahmadinejad era and the growing international the most effective obstacle to the reformist project isolation of the country, and, in a meeker manner, as he used its key power, that of being the mediator express reservations at the continuous expansion of between Parliament – dominated by the reformists Khamenei’s authority and power. between 2000 and 2004 – and Due to the same elections, Rafsanjani became chair Council, the clerically-controlled body which has of the , the body tasked with the duty to certify the legality of all decrees passed by the Majlis. As the Council rejected all the major 2 As an example, the bill approving of Iran’s accession to CEDAW, the UN convention against the discrimination of women, legislation enacted by the supporters of Khatami, which had been pushed through, amid much acrimony, by the Expediency Council simply refused to progress female reformist MPs, has been with the Expediency Council its examination, leading to protracted legislative since 2004.

Jumada I - Jumada II 1438 - February - March 2017 9 monitoring the Leader and choosing a new one, early August, disregarding the mandatory nature of between 2007 and 2011. As such, he was at the helm his presence, as head of the Expediency Council. of the body and could potentially act against his old During his July 2009 speech he further broke ranks friend in the summer of 2009, as Khamenei veered with the Leader by using a term – bohran, or “crisis” off a path which was markedly different from the – that Khamenei had strenuously refrained from one chosen by Rafsanjani. However, Rafsanjani adopting throughout the previous month. refrained from mounting any decisive action By doing so, Rafsanjani indicated that he was not against the Leader through the Assembly and was immune or neutral towards the popular movement’s comfortably ousted from it by right-wing opponents stance. However, as a testament to the elasticity of his two years later. Besides judging any initiative against political modus operandi, he was able to cling on to Khamenei, even consisting a mild public verbal his incumbency within the state system, retaining his rebuke to be non-expedient, due to Khamenei’s position within the EC and residually maintaining control over most levers of state, Rafsanjani failed to his capacity to exert influence from within, rather coalesce enough support within the Assembly itself, than be forced to the sidelines like Khatami.3 and within the state apparatus at large, for any move This strategy paid off as Ahmadinejad’s second against the Leader. mandate was marred by his inability to confront the In 2009, Rafsanjani entered what was probably the management challenges arising from the intensity most complicated part of his political career. While a of the sanctions imposed on Iran by the UN and veteran defuser of inner-elite infighting, Rafsanjani the West and by the occasionally bizarre in-fighting usually succeeded in ensuring that tensions within and mud-slinging between the president’s camp and the Islamic Republic’s elite would remain mostly other conservative factions. By the spring of 2013, behind closed doors, with a contained spillover into a weary public opinion reacted with fervour to his the public sphere. The sudden eruption of popular belated announcement of entry into the contest in anger over the result of the 12 June 2009 poll led to the last few hours of the registration window.4 The the swift breakup of elite equilibria, forcing nearly all elder statesman was, however, dealt the last surprise senior figures to take sides. Rafsanjani, who appears blow of his career when the to have discreetly backed Mir-Hossein Mousavi refrained from issuing its mandatory approval of prior to the vote, was likely abreast of attempts to his candidacy. The Council is not obliged to provide engineer a result in favour of Ahmadinejad and details for such rejections, but the news that the wrote a much-vaunted warning letter to Khamenei in the days preceding the ballot. Following the 3 After the end of Ahmadinejad’s second mandate in 2013, he ramping up of street protests, Rafsanjani walked a too was effectively thrust into the margins of the political fine line and finally exhibited unprecedented levels scene, thus making of Rafsanjani the only former president of disunity with regards to Khamenei. He did not who was hitherto able to maintain relevancy within the state decision-making process well beyond the end of his mandate. appear in the VIP enclosure at the Friday Prayers of 19 June 2009, when Khamenei delivered his stern 4 The expectations and uncertainty over his final decision had warning for an end to all demonstrations against reached such fever pitch that the licensed currency exchangers in Tehran, which had come to terms with extreme volatility the re-election of Ahmadinejad. He also did not caused by political developments since 2010, resorted to take his place in the customary seating mat behind withholding the announcement of the rates for that day until Khamenei at the inauguration of Ahmadinejad in Rafsanjani’s final decision was made available.

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Council acted, rightfully as it turned out, to block it was too much of a concession in the face of too Rafsanjani’s candidacy on the basis of his advanced little reward, Rafsanjani used a colloquial but very age and uncertain health gained traction. widely adopted proverb to bluntly describe the Rafsanjani’s surprise rejection paved the way, sanctions regime which had been imposed on Iran however, for his last master manoeuvre. After from 2007 onwards as having broken the back of discreetly persuading his protégé, Hassan Rowhani, society and accruing no benefit whatsoever to the to refrain from dropping out of the race after his nation, thereby forcefully shifting stances towards own belated entry into it, Rafsanjani patiently wove an acceptance of the emerging Vienna accord. In the political web which led to Rowhani, who was spring 2016, Rafsanjani succeeded in bringing about not a natural choice for the reformist and Green a last electoral hurrah by comfortably winning the movement camp, to become an unprecedented Tehran constituency for the Assembly of Experts, sole candidate for all non-right wing elements of but withdrew from the internal contest to become its the political system. Once elected, Rowhani made chair after the extent of right-wing opposition to his use of Rafsanjani’s incessant political cover in his candidacy became clear. In a visible manifestation quest to drive through a much-criticised nuclear of the severe gap between inner-elite and societal deal. The veteran statesman would make use of his support for the statesman, the Assembly proceeded standing within the pecking order of the Islamic to choose one of Rafsanjani’s most stringent critics, Republic’s elite to drive home inconvenient truths. who had barely made into the 16-man roster of In June 2015, as the conservatives kept attacking elected candidates in Tehran, Ayatollah Ahmad the nuclear deal in the making on the grounds that Jannati, as chair.

What Lies Ahead in Post-Rafsanjani Iran

An integral part of the Islamic Republic’s factional for the continuation of their activities could be landscape, Hashemi Rafsanjani continuously noticed during his funeral, which was used as an redefined the rules of the game. His passing will opportunity, by a considerable number of reformist therefore progressively make itself felt in the supporters, for the uttering of slogans in favour of contention between the different sides within the the detained Green leaders Mousavi and Mehdi Tehran political system. Due to the shift towards Karroubi and of former President Mohammad the moderate-reformist camp of the last decade, Khatami, who is still subject to a news and photo the front which includes associates of the current ban on the press and was prevented from attending president Hassan Rowhani, remnants of the the funeral proceedings at Tehran University. It is reformist organisations which buttressed the rise important to note that, however, in recent years to power of Mohammad Khatami and his “Tehran Rafsanjani had little in the way of an executive Spring” of 1997-1999, as well as more radical Green active, role in the day-to-day progression of this movement activists and sympathisers, will be hit by arc, but rather featured as an elderly, experienced his absence. Evidence of his role as effective “cover” figure whose advice and protection this camp could

Jumada I - Jumada II 1438 - February - March 2017 11 count on, albeit in a qualified way. He cast a shadow furore, in both capitals over the overly warm and under which others could group and forward infamous meeting between Rafsanjani and the their opinions and provided external figures with then-Saudi Ambassador to Tehran in 2015 suggests. a conduit into an opaque and sometimes hostile The Islamic Republic’s political elite is therefore political environment, a point which was not lost likely to be less cohesive, having lost one of the key on foreign diplomats stationed in Tehran, as the creators of its bonds.

A Diffuse Inheritance

An immense figure in the nomenclature of the armed forces, for most of the 1980s, Rowhani shares post-revolutionary state order, Rafsanjani died the discreet, radical-averse vision of Rafsanjani in without leaving a clear heir who could readily step critical areas such as national security and foreign into his shoes. His last formal post, that of chair of policy and has similarly, with regards to factional the Expediency Council, is likely to be reassigned inclinations, been a conservative who was drawn to a personality amenable to the Supreme Leader, towards more moderate positions due to prevailing who will steer the body towards an even more circumstances. Generational considerations also pronounced lack of relevance within the internal strongly come into play, as virtually any other balances of power. While having made headway figure who was a contemporary of both Khamenei in the creation of a substratum of the elite loyal and Rafsanjani is aged over 75, some having and supportive of himself, Rafsanjani’s acolytes passed away in recent times.1 Rowhani’s slightly have yet to morph into a movement endowed with younger age, at 68, ensures that he will probably considerable and persistent societal support. From have the physical and mental ability to serve out the 1990s onwards, he cultivated a restricted set of his second term in office if, as it is most likely, politicians and diplomats, such as Gholam-Hossein he will be re-elected in May, and position himself Karbasci, former mayor of Tehran, Seyyed Hossein as the foremost moderate personality who could Mousavian, former ambassador to , compete for elevation to the Leadership should Rowhani himself and Ataollah Mohajerani, former Khamenei end his term within that period. Culture minister under Khatami, who gravitated Rafsanjani’s death will probably have the effect, at around the Executives party and remained least in the short term, of creating a tidal wave steadfastly loyal to Rafsanjani throughout the trials of emotional support for Rowhani, especially if and tribulations of the 1990s and the 2000s. They the late statesman’s family will emit, as is to be are, however, figures of another generation who expected, statements of support in favour of the largely lack the guile, standing within the elite and talents of their mentor. The closest Iran will get to 5 Senior state figures belonging to the same political generation who have passed away before Rafsanjani are, amongst others, an out and out heir is, with some approximation, the right-wing conservative Habibollah Asgharowladi, the Hassan Rowhani. Besides acting as Rafsanjani’s former chief justice Ayatollah Mousavi Ardabili, the veteran deputy, in Parliament and with regards to the statesman Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani.

Jumada I - Jumada II 1438 - February - March 2017 12 sitting president. His blood relatives will, however, will be felt in rather more pronounced ways. His have a hard task on their hands should they seek towering role in the war effort against Iraq in the to benefit, politically or otherwise, from his legacy. 1980s meant that the former president maintained As opposed to Khomeini, Rafsanjani lacked a a strong influence within the upper and mid- foundation of sorts which his family can take over echelons of bodies such as the IRGC, whose top and had no infrastructure of his own. The Iranian brass is still formed of career soldiers who forged press has reported, in the days following the their allegiance to the Islamic Republic during that seventh day mourning ceremonies, that the offices era.3 This factor allowed Rafsanjani to exert an of several close associates of Rafsanjani, including influence which will be not replicable by Rowhani that of his son Yasser, have been sealed off and the or other moderates. The former president’s ability contents probably confiscated. Perhaps conscious to bluntly intervene in foreign policy debates is also of the lack of security of the material contained different from the gradualist, meeker approach of in his much-fabled archives, Rafsanjani has stated, other figures sharing his factional allegiance, who in the preface to one of the recent volumes of lack the clout to be able to confront the Leader his memoirs, that the content of the same has on matters in which the latter has persistently been digitised and stored in several copies in CD harboured a hawkish line, such as relations with format, thereby implicitly dissuading critics from the United States, or Saudi Arabia. On both mounting raids on physical copies. It is however fronts, a clear and visible gap existed between unlikely that his three sons will be able to replicate Rafsanjani and Khamenei, one which will result in his rise to the pinnacle of the Islamic Republic, the overall discourse on such themes tilting more nor assume any high political office. Mired by both emphatically towards the Leader’s stance. Despite political and financial scandal, and subject to a a likely initial hubris period in which he will feel litany of accusations, some of which are grounded relieved by his survival of an increasingly difficult in urban legend and myth, the Rafsanjani clan has friend, Khamenei will too eventually come to feel become an example of a “bayt not kept in order”.2 the absence of a loyal critic whose prevailing desire integral part of ani Factional Landscape the spring to strengthen and maintain the political system of 2013, a weary public opinion reacted with led to the consolidation of his own power and the fervour to his belated announ. staving off of major and potentially debilitating There are realms in which Rafsanjani’s absence challenges, such as the continuation of the war against Iraq or the deepening of the confrontation 6 Amongst the key points of criticism which Khomeini levied against Montazeri at the time of the latter’s dismissal from with the West over the nuclear programme. In the successionship to the former in 1989 was the charge that these regards, Rafsanjani was a needed contrarian he had been unable to keep his bayt – his extended personal within the increasingly rarefied atmosphere of office – free from scandal and wrongdoing. In the latter years those elements of the elite with ready access to the of his career, Rafsanjani was too encumbered with a similar challenge, albeit one emerging from much closer quarters. Even his wife, Effat Marashi, would become a lightning rod 7 As an example of this support, , the head for conservative anger and recrimination against Rafsanjani of the , took part in the wake for Rafsanjani at calling as she did, on the day of the presidential vote in 2009, the Jamaran complex and reported gifted a signet ring to his for the people to spill out into the streets and protest should widow, while stating, at various times before his passing away, Ahmadinejad win the contest. his appreciation for Rafsanjani.

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Leader and who frequent his audiences.4 Another generational turnover. That mechanism was largely unique feature of Rafsanjani was his king-maker lacking in 1989, when Khomeini himself died, role, the ability to push through a figure capable of but the presence on the scene of an established picking up the incumbency of key state institutions power broker such as Rafsanjani was instrumental at critical junctures. He did this at least three in warding off a potentially protracted power times, twice to the benefit of Khamenei (the struggle and quickly coalesced the elite around presidency in 1980, the Leadership in 1989), and the selection of Khamenei. While a tentative and once, more recently in favour of Rowhani. With initial step in this process was effected with the his passing, the Iranian political elite is deprived rise to the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, of a figure capable of performing such a role, an the first head of a major state institution of the absence which could make itself particularly felt Islamic Republic bereft of any significant personal should Khamenei also pass away in the short to collaboration with Khomeini, the election of mid-term. Hassan Rowhani as his successor has blocked and The death of Rafsanjani has also driven home a effectively reversed that process, and his cabinet, broader challenge facing the entire political elite formed as it is by officials who had made a name of the Islamic Republic, that of coming to terms for themselves two decades earlier, enforcing the with the fact that the generation which came to notion of a multi-dimensional gap between state power with Khomeini and assisted him first, and elite and a society largely composed of a younger consolidated control over state affairs later, is generation with no personal recollection or entering into its twilight period without a clear memory of the foundational myths and junctures indication, or implementation, of a mechanism for of the Islamic Republic, such as the Revolution of 1978-79, the war against Iraq, and Khomeini’s 8 It has been confirmed by both sides that Rafsanjani and era. Rafsanjani’s sudden death will therefore have Khamenei would hold private meetings frequently, often on focused minds in this regard, and will give added a weekly basis, even throughout the lows of their relationship urgency to each faction to seek fresh blood capable such as 20092011-. Their adherence to this practice through thick and thin is apparently due to a wish of Khomeini, who of engaging in a political game which is likely exhorted the two, shortly before his own death, to maintain to feature new and unchartered rules as more of contact and frequent meetings until they are both alive. Khomeini’s closest associates depart the scene.

Jumada I - Jumada II 1438 - February - March 2017 Jumada I - Jumada II 1438 - February - March 2017 Jumada I - Jumada II 1438 - February - March 2017 King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies (KFCRIS)

King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies is an independent non- governmental institution founded in 1403/1983 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. As envisioned by the late King Faisal bin Abdulaziz, the Center seeks to be a platform for researchers and institutions to preserve, publish, and produce scholastic work, to enrich cultural and intellectual life in Saudi Arabia, and to facilitate collaborations across geopolitical borders. The Chairman of KFCRIS board is HRH Prince Turki Al-Faisal bin Abdulaziz, and its Secretary General is Dr. Saud bin Saleh Al-Sarhan. The Center provides in-depth analysis on contemporary political issues, Saudi studies, North African and Arab Maghreb studies, Iranian studies, Asian studies, Modernity studies, Energy studies, and Arabic language studies. The Center also organizes conferences, collaborates with prestigious research centers around the world, employs a group of distinguished researchers, and maintains contacts with a wide range of independent experts in different disciplines. The Center is home to a library containing rare manuscripts, an Islamic art museum, King Faisal Memorial Hall, and a visiting fellows program. The Center aims to expand the scope of existing literature and research so as to bring to the forefront of scholarly discussions the contributions and roles of Muslim societies in the humanities, the social sciences, literature, and arts–historically, as well as today.

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