Issue No. 952, 28 October 2011 Articles & Other Documents:

Featured Article: U.S. Releases New START Nuke Data

1. 'IAEA Report Can Stymie Iran-P5+1 Talks' 2. German Wavers over Sale of Sub to Israel: Report 3. Armenian Nuclear Specialists Move to Iran for Better Life 4. Seoul, US Cautiously Move on 6-Party Talks 5. N. Korea Remains Serious Threat: US Defence Chief 6. Seoul, Beijing Discuss NK Issues 7. Pentagon Chief Doubts N. Korea Will Give Up Nukes 8. U.S.’s Panetta and South Korea’s Kim Warn Against North Korean Aggression 9. Pakistan Tests Nuclear-Capable Hatf-7 Cruise Missile 10. Libya: Stockpiles of Chemical Weapons Found 11. U.S. Has 'Nuclear Superiority' over Russia 12. Alexander Nevsky Sub to Be Put into Service in Late 2012 13. New Subs Made of Old Spare Parts 14. Successful Test Launch for Russia’s Bulava Missile 15. Topol Ballistic Missiles May Stay in Service until 2019 16. U.S. Releases New START Nuke Data 17. Army Says Umatilla Depot's Chemical Weapons Mission Done 18. Iran Dangerous Now, Imagine It Nuclear 19. START Treaty: Never-Ending Story 20. The "Underground Great Wall:" An Alternative Explanation 21. What’s Down There? China’s Tunnels and Nuclear Capabilities 22. Visits Timely and Important 23. Surgical Strikes Against Key Facilities would Force Iran to Face Military Reality 24. KAHLILI: Iran Already Has Nuclear Weapons

Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center’s mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we’re providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats and countermeasures. It’s our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness. Established in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at http://cpc.au.af.mil/ for in-depth information and specific points of contact. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved. Issue No. 952, 28 October 2011 The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved.

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Press TV – Iran 'IAEA Report Can Stymie Iran-P5+1 Talks' Wednesday, October 26, 2011 Russia has warned the UN nuclear agency against issuing a negative report on Iran's nuclear energy program, saying such a move could undermine diplomatic efforts to resolve the West's dispute with Tehran. In a statement published on its website on Tuesday, the Russian Foreign Ministry also expressed concern about the timing of the release of the report, which is scheduled to be issued next month, IRNA reported. Moscow urged the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to handle the issue in an unbiased, delicate, and responsible way. "It would without a doubt strain the atmosphere and may hinder the start of serious negotiations… This sensitive topic requires unbiased, delicate, and responsible handling, which can hardly be possible, given the promotional hype that has begun even before the publication (of the) IAEA director general's report,” read part of the statement. Earlier in the day, the Chinese Foreign Ministry expressed hope that the IAEA would adopt an “objective and impartial” approach toward the Iranian nuclear program. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu stated that China believes dialogue and negotiations are the proper way to resolve the dispute over Iran's nuclear program. The Chinese official urged the IAEA to continue interactive cooperation with Iran and emphasized the importance of holding “diplomatic talks” to resolve the dispute. On October 22, EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton said the P5+1 group -- Britain, China, France, Russia, the United States, and Germany -- is ready “to agree on a next meeting *with Iran+ within the coming weeks at a mutually convenient venue.” Iran and the P5+1 group have held two rounds of multifaceted talks over the past 12 months, one in Geneva in December 2010 and the other in Istanbul last January. Tehran says it is ready to continue the discussion but has no intention of backing down on its nuclear rights. The UN nuclear agency has conducted numerous inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities but has never found any evidence showing that Iran's civilian nuclear program has been diverted to nuclear weapons production. And as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and a member of the IAEA, Iran maintains that it has the right to develop and acquire nuclear technology meant for peaceful purposes. http://presstv.com/detail/206654.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Space War.com German Wavers over Sale of Sub to Israel: Report By Staff Writers Jerusalem Agence France-Presse (AFP) October 26, 2011 Germany is reconsidering its sale of a sixth submarine to Israel in the wake of new tensions over Jewish settlement construction, an Israeli newspaper reported on Wednesday.

Issue No. 952, 28 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

Yediot Aharonot said Berlin was rethinking the deal because of German frustration over Israel's decision to approve new settlement building in annexed east Jerusalem, which has raised tensions between the two countries. The Israeli daily, citing unnamed "high-ranking officials," said the deal had been jeopardised by fraying relations between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Merkel was reported to have strongly criticised the Israeli premier during a telephone call last month, saying she had "absolutely no understanding" of Israel's decision to increase settlement building in east Jerusalem. Speaking to Israeli public radio on Wednesday, defence ministry director general Udi Shani declined to confirm or deny the reported problems with the submarine deal. "It's a very complicated, very sensitive file that is under discussion. There are many parameters that have to be taken into account," he said. There have been conflicting reports about whether Israel even wants to buy a sixth Dolphin-class submarine from Germany. The Israeli navy currently has three Dolphin-class submarines, two of which were bought after the 1991 Gulf War. Two others are on order from Germany and being built at the Kiel shipyard. They are due for delivery in 2012. Media reports have said the submarines can carry nuclear warheads and have an operating range of 4,500 kilometres (2,800 miles). In July 2010, the defence ministry denied that Israel was looking to purchase a sixth submarine, after media reports said Berlin had rejected an Israeli request for subsidies for the sale. http://www.spacewar.com/reports/German_wavers_over_sale_of_sub_to_Israel_report_999.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Trend News Agency – Azerbaijan Armenian Nuclear Specialists Move to Iran for Better Life 28 October 2011 T.Konyayeva, Trend Azerbaijan, Baku, Oct. 28 - The Armenian nuclear engineers are moving to Iran in search of high salaries, the Metsamor NPP's chief engineer Movses Vardanyan told in an interview with A+1 agency, Armenia Today reported. They are mostly employed at the nuclear power plant (NPP) at Bushehr, he added. "Over the recent years, about 20 people have left the Armenian NPP due to low salaries and found a job at the Bushehr NPP in Iran, where they receive high salaries," Vardanyan said. "Unfortunately, high-skilled specialists are leaving for Iran." Bushehr is the first nuclear power plant in Iran and throughout the Middle East. The plant began to be built by the German Kraftwerk Union in 1974. In 1980 the contract was terminated during the Western German government's accession to the U.S. embargo on supplying equipment to Iran. On Aug. 25, 1992, Russia and Iran signed an agreement to continue construction of the nuclear power plant. In January 1995, a contract to complete work on the first power unit was signed, and in 1998 construction management was transferred to AtomStroyExport. Bushehr NPP has been connected to Iran's electricity network on Sept. 4 and has supplied about 60 megawatt of electricity to the country's electric network since its connection to the grid.

Issue No. 952, 28 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530 http://en.trend.az/regions/iran/1950733.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Korea Times – South Korea October 26, 2011 Seoul, US Cautiously Move on 6-Party Talks By Kim Young-jin South Korean officials Wednesday remained mum on high-level talks between North Korea and the United States on how to resume nuclear disarmament negotiations but said the communist state had shown seriousness in a recent flurry of diplomacy. A Seoul official said the government was waiting for a full briefing from Washington before making any comment. But he added on condition of anonymity that in two rounds of contact between the Koreas, running in conjunction with the U.S.-North talks, Pyongyang had been “quite serious.” The cautious approach echoed that of U.S officials, who after the two-day session in Geneva earlier this week, said talks had been positive, while stamping down hope for an imminent breakthrough. Stephen Bosworth said the sides had narrowed differences on resuming six-party talks but did not elaborate on areas of progress. Seoul and Washington want the North to halt its uranium enrichment program (UEP) and allow U.N. inspectors to verify the suspension among other steps before resuming the denuclearization forum. While Pyongyang insists on returning to the table without preconditions, it has also suggested it could offer placing a moratorium on nuclear and missile tests. Efforts to restart the forum, which also includes Japan, Russia and China, have picked up pace since July, when the Koreas sat down for surprise denuclearization talks. Those helped ease tensions that had gripped the region since 2009, when the North walked away from the table and conducted a second nuclear test. Analysts said the United States is eager to get back to holding talks in a bid to stave off further provocations from Pyongyang, which waged two deadly attacks on the South last year. Seoul has pledged to respond strongly the next time, raising fears of further escalation of tension. The head of the North Korean delegation, Vice Foreign Minster Kim Kye-gwan was more bullish in his assessment of the talks, saying there was “big progress.” He also said the sides agreed to meet again, though U.S. officials did not confirm this. The State Department, however, said the sides enjoyed Korean food together for lunch, a sign of the constructive mood. Bosworth said it could be a matter of weeks and months before the North responds to the recently-held talks but kept the door wide open for future progress. "There's a long history to this relationship and we have many differences, not all of which can be overcome quickly," he told reporters. "I am confident that with continued effort on both sides, we can reach a reasonable basis of departure for formal negotiations for a return to the six-party process." Possible provision of food aid to the North as well as family reunions for Korean Americans separated from their North Korean relatives were also discussed, U.S. officials said. Washington has been noncommittal for months on whether it would send aid, apparently concerned over transparency, drawing speculation it was tying the humanitarian issue to denuclearization steps. The Seoul official said no definite plan had been made for a third inter-Korean session but said it was possible as it found the talks to be “useful.”

Issue No. 952, 28 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530 http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/10/116_97369.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Bangkok Post – Thailand N. Korea Remains Serious Threat: US Defence Chief US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta began a visit to South Korea Wednesday, pledging to keep a "nuclear umbrella" in place over Washington's close ally to deter threats from North Korea. 26 October 2011 Agence France-Presse (AFP) Panetta, on the last leg of an Asian tour which also took him to Indonesia and Japan, was to meet troops at the huge Yongsan US army base in central Seoul later in the day. US forces have been based in the South since the end of the 1950-53 war with the North, with 28,500 currently stationed in the country. The US defence chief, in an article in Wednesday's Chosun Ilbo newspaper, reaffirmed the commitment to defend the South -- which accuses the North of two border attacks last year that cost a total of 50 lives. "Working together, our militaries will continue to deter North Korean aggression, and stand prepared to defeat the North should it ever force war upon us," Panetta wrote. "It is important to send this signal because North Korea remains a serious threat. Pyongyang has demonstrated its willingness to conduct provocations that target innocent lives." The North also continued to defy the international community by bolstering it’s nuclear and missile capabilities, he said in the article, which appeared a day after US and North Korean negotiators met in Geneva to discuss a possible resumption of disarmament talks. Panetta said the US and South Korea are developing capabilities to address the North's ballistic missile threats, and strengthening operational planning. In addition, the US "will ensure a strong and effective nuclear umbrella over the ROK (South Korea) so that Pyongyang never misjudges our will and capability to respond decisively to nuclear aggression". Panetta during his three-day visit would stress US and South Korean capability to deter provocations and to defeat the North if deterrence fails, a senior defence official travelling with the secretary told reporters. He would also share views with his counterparts on the Geneva meeting. The two sides held talks Monday and Tuesday to discuss ways to revive stalled six-nation talks on the North's nuclear disarmament. Stephen Bosworth, outgoing US special envoy on North Korea, described the talks as "very positive and generally constructive" but cautioned that not all differences could be quickly overcome. The North formally quit the six-party forum in April 2009, a month before staging its second atomic weapons test. It has since repeatedly said it wants to come back without preconditions to the negotiations grouping the two Koreas, the US, China, Russia and Japan. Washington and its allies say Pyongyang must first take action to show its sincerity, such as shutting down a uranium enrichment plant that could be converted to make nuclear weapons. The official said it was important to ensure that US defence and security policy was aligned with the diplomatic process.

Issue No. 952, 28 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

"Our experience is that our North Korean friends go through cycles of diplomatic engagement and provocation. We need to be prepared for how that cycle may play itself out in the next turn." http://www.bangkokpost.com/lite/news/263291/n-korea-remains-serious-threat-us-defence-chief (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Korea Times – South Korea October 26, 2011 Seoul, Beijing Discuss NK Issues By Park Si-soo China’s Vice Premier Li Keqiang met with President Lee Myung-bak in Seoul, Wednesday, amid hopes of progress in restarting the long-stalled six-nation talks aimed at ending North Korea’s nuclear programs. His visit to Seoul came one day after he met with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang, spawning speculation that the ranking Chinese official may be a messenger between the two Koreas. “Li told President Lee that he had in-depth talks with North Korean leader Kim,” said Park Jung-ha, presidential spokesman. “The Chinese politician explained to Kim about the significance of nuclear-free Korean Peninsula to bolster regional security and peace.” The spokesman denied the speculation that there was a secret message to President Lee from the North Korean leader via the Chinese vice premier. Lee discussed a wide range of issues, including North Korea’s nuclear ambition and regional security with Li, according to the spokesman. The President called on China to play a key role in leading the reclusive North to open itself to the outside world, he added. During his stay in Pyongyang, Li was told by the North Korean leader that the communist state “hopes the six-party talks about the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula could be restarted as soon as possible,” China’s official Xinhua news agency reported early Tuesday. The “principle of simultaneous action” should be applied, it quoted Kim as saying ― a re-iteration of the North’s stance that the negotiations should begin again without preconditions. In response, Li told Kim that China would “continue to play a constructive role” to improve relations between the two Koreas and in “maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula,” Xinhua reported. The United States has said the resumption of the dialogue would come only after Pyongyang halts its nuclear activities, including its uranium enrichment program, and allow on-site inspection by an international atomic watchdog. Top nuclear envoys from the U.S. and the North met in Geneva early this week, but there was no major progress regarding the resumption. Li, who is widely believed to take over as China’s premier from the incumbent Wen Jiabao next year, also met with Korea’s Prime Minister Kim Hwang-sik. The two discussed ways to improve political and economical ties between Korea and China, according to the Prime Minister’s Office. After meeting with National Assembly Speaker Park Hee-tae and heads of four leading business associations, Li will depart for Beijing Thursday afternoon. China is the host nation of the six-party talks involving the two Koreas, the U.S., Russia and Japan. The multilateral forum has been at a standstill since April 2009 when North Korea walked away over international sanctions for its nuclear and long-range missile tests.

Issue No. 952, 28 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530 http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/10/116_97389.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Miami Herald Thursday, October 27, 2011 Pentagon Chief Doubts N. Korea Will Give Up Nukes By ROBERT BURNS, Associated Press (AP) National Security Writer SEOUL, South Korea -- U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said Thursday he is skeptical that diplomacy will push North Korea to give up its nuclear program, and he raised the prospect of the North's stance leading to "escalation and confrontation." In a question-and-answer session with reporters after meeting with South Korean government leaders, Panetta said he was concerned that North Korea is deliberately alternating between periods of modest accommodation with the West and episodes of violent aggression, perhaps with no real intention of surrendering its nuclear ambitions. Asked whether he is skeptical about a renewed effort by the Obama administration to explore a possible new round of international negotiations over the North Korean nuclear program, Panetta said, "We're not sure where those talks are headed at this point." Discussions held this week in Geneva by American and North Korean diplomats produced no apparent breakthrough. "For that reason, I guess the word 'skepticism' would be in order," he said. Separately, the State Department's top Asia policy official, Kurt Campbell, was in Seoul Thursday to brief officials on the Geneva talks. North Korea's foreign ministry issued a statement saying the talks "helped deepen each other's understanding," and said both countries agreed to further talks on whether to resume the six-party denuclearization talks involving North and South Korea, Japan, China, Russia and the United States. Panetta said China "can do more" to push North Korea to give up its nuclear program. "There are moments when we think that they are urging North Korea to engage, but frankly I think China can do more to try to get North Korea to do the right thing," he said. China is a longtime North Korean ally. "I know that sometimes they make that effort and sometimes North Korea doesn't pay attention." Panetta's visit to South Korea - his first as secretary of defense - is part of a broader Obama administration effort to shore up South Korean confidence in a military alliance that has endured for six decades. Panetta met with the South Korean defense and foreign affairs chiefs and paid a courtesy call on President Lee Myung-bak. In parallel talks, the new chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army Gen. Martin Dempsey, and top officers from the U.S. Pacific Command met with top South Korean military officers for an annual review of the U.S.-South Korean military alliance. Panetta is to attend a second round of alliance talks Friday before flying home. Panetta has called the North "reckless" and a "serious threat" to peace on the Korean peninsula, which exploded in war in 1950 and drew the U.S. and other nations into a bloody three-year conflict against the North and China. In his session with reporters Thursday, Panetta was asked what can be done to break a cycle of North Korean behavior in which it alternately makes gestures of accommodation to the West, followed by provocations. "The cycle ultimately has to be broken," he said. "There is either going to be an accommodation where they decide to make the right decisions with regards to their future and join the international family of nations ... or, if they continue these provocations, then obviously that's going to lead to the possibility of escalation and confrontation."

Issue No. 952, 28 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

Among the maneuverings that influence U.S. thinking about the security threat posed by North Korea is the process now under way in which the supreme leader, Kim Jong Il, is expected to turn over the reins of power to his son, Kim Jong Un, a newly minted four-star general believed to be in his late 20s. He would be the third-generation leader in a family dynasty that has ruled since Kim Il Sung founded the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 1948. North Koreans are expecting to learn more about Kim Jong Un next year when the nation celebrates one of its biggest historical milestones: the 100th anniversary on April 15 of the birth of Kim Il Sung. U.S. officials are unsure what timeline has been set for the leadership succession, but two senior American military officers in Seoul said Thursday it appears the process has slowed, possibly because Kim Jong Il's health problems seem to have eased. The officials spoke to a group of reporters on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the topic. U.S. and South Korean officials believe Kim Jong Il suffered a stroke in August 2008 that kept him out of the public eye for months. The officials, who are privy to the latest intelligence assessments, said North Korea's recently more accommodating approach to the U.S. is judged to be only a tactical maneuver, likely to be followed next year by North Korean demands for concessions. That would follow a decades-long pattern of North Korean behavior in which unmet concessions lead to a period of provocations, such as the 2006 nuclear test that came just months after the North cut off nuclear disarmament talks. The U.S. officials declined to say whether they believe the North can be persuaded to give up its nuclear weapons, but their analysis of the North's basic approach to the West strongly suggested they do not expect it to change course. At the same time, the North is making gains in certain aspects of its conventional military, the officials said. It has expanded its commando force - meant to infiltrate the South and conducted rear-area sabotage and assassination in the event of war - and kept up its creation of underground facilities to protect key weapons and command centers from outside bombardment. http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/10/27/v-fullstory/2474076/pentagon-chief-doubts-n-korea.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Bloomberg News.com U.S.’s Panetta and South Korea’s Kim Warn Against North Korean Aggression By Eunkyung Seo and William Sim October 28, 2011 U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and South Korean Defense Minister Kim Kwan Jin said North Korean aggression “is not to be tolerated” and agreed to deepen deterrent capabilities against Kim Jong Il’s regime. “North Korea should abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs via verifiable and irreversible measures,” the two ministers said in a statement after meeting today in Seoul. Panetta said the U.S. remains committed to strengthening “extended deterrence” for its Asian ally. Panetta has used his first trip to Asia since taking office in July to urge more regional security coordination to counter North Korea’s “serious threats” and Chinese military expansion. The U.S. resumed direct talks with North Korea on Oct. 24 in Geneva as Chinese Vice Premier Le Keqiang was meeting Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang.

Issue No. 952, 28 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

Tensions have risen on the Korean peninsula following two attacks last year that killed 50 South Koreans. While the two sides agreed in July to try to revive six-nation talks on the North’s nuclear-weapons program, there has been little progress. “Pyongyang has demonstrated its readiness to conduct provocations that cost innocent lives,” Panetta said at a press conference with Kim, according to a pool report. The U.S. and South Korea are working on a “counter- provocation plan” that will be completed “within the year,” he said. South Korean President Lee Myung Bak met with U.S. President Barack Obama earlier this month in Washington and the two said North Korea must cease attacks such as the sinking of the Cheonan warship in March 2010 that killed 46 South Korean sailors and the November shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. North Korea denied involvement in the Cheonan attack. Kim’s regime abandoned the six-nation nuclear disarmament talks involving the U.S., South Korea, Japan, China and Russia in April 2009. North and South Korea remain technically at war after their 1950-1953 conflict ended in a cease-fire. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-28/u-s-s-panetta-and-south-korea-s-kim-warn-against-north-korean- aggression.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Economic Times – India 28 October 2011 Press Trust of India (PTI) Pakistan Tests Nuclear-Capable Hatf-7 Cruise Missile ISLAMABAD: Pakistan today tested nuclear- capable Hatf-7 cruise missile having a range of 700 km that can hit targets in India, saying the launch was aimed at consolidating the country's strategic deterrence capability and strengthening national security. The test of the "multi-tube indigenously developed" missile, which has stealth capabilities, was successful, the military said in a statement. The missile with a range of 700 km can carry both nuclear and conventional warheads. "The test will consolidate Pakistan's strategic deterrence capability and further strengthen national security," the statement said. The test was aimed at validating the "design parameters of the weapon system." The military said a "special feature" of the launch was the validation of a "new multi-tube missile launch vehicle". The vehicle with three missile tubes "enhances manifold the targeting and deployment options in the conventional and nuclear modes". "With its shoot-and-scoot capability, the missile launch vehicle provides a major force multiplier effect for target employment and survivability," the statement said. The Hatf-7 or Babur is a "low flying, terrain hugging missile with high manoeuvrability, pinpoint accuracy and radar avoidance features". The missile system incorporates the "most modern cruise missile technology of Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM) and Digital Scene Matching and Area Co-relation (DSMAC)", the statement said.

Issue No. 952, 28 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

The test was witnessed by Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee Chairman Gen Khalid Shahmeem Wynne, Strategic Plans Division Director General Lt Gen (Retd) Khalid Kidwai, Strategic Force Command chief Lt Gen Tariq Nadeem Gilani and senior officers from the armed forces and strategic organisations. The test was "warmly appreciated" by President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, who congratulated scientists and engineers involved in the launch. http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics/nation/pakistan-tests-nuclear-capable-hatf-7-cruise- missile/articleshow/10519462.cms (Return to Articles and Documents List)

London Telegraph – U.K. Libya: Stockpiles of Chemical Weapons Found Chemical weapons have been found in Libya by National Transitional Council forces, a representative of the movement that ousted the late Muammar Gaddafi has said. 27 October 2011 The NTC said the chemical warheads had been secured and would be made safe by experts. "They are from the Gaddafi era and are under guard, until they can be handed over," an NTC representative said at a meeting between the council and NATO representatives in Qatar. The discovery of the munitions proves that Gaddafi had refused to give up his weapons of mass destruction despite promising Tony Blair in 2004 he would relinquish them in the 'Deal in the Desert'. Mr Blair has long claimed that he forced the dictator to give up his weapons of mass destruction programme. The disarming process was not finished because of the outbreak of war and the rebels feared Gaddafi would unleash deadly mustard gas and other chemicals on his own people. Ian Martin, head of the UN mission in Libya, told a Security Council meeting that new previously undeclared sites for storing chemical weapons had been uncovered since the fall of Gaddafi's government. Gaddafi's regime had "accumulated the largest known stockpile of anti-aircraft missiles," Mr Martin said. "Thousands were destroyed during NATO operations. But I have to report to you our increasing concerns over the looting and likely proliferation of MANPADS," or Man-Portable Air Defense Systems, Mr Martin told the 15- member Security Council. He said munitions and large numbers of mines had also been looted. Nuclear and chemical weapons materials are mainly controlled by National Transitional Council forces. But Mr Martin noted that "it has become clearer that there are additional sites with previously undeclared chemical weapons or materials that the government is about to formally declare" to international inspectors. International experts working with the NTC had identified MANPADS sites and storage areas, mainly in eastern Libya, though Martin cautioned that "hundreds" of suspected sites should still be inspected. He said mines had been laid around many cities and that there were large quantities of unexploded bombs and missiles in Gaddafi's hometown of Sirte and in Bani Walid. "In Tripoli, many stockpiles are suspected in residential areas, including in schools and hospitals, where they seem to have been moved by Kadhafi forces to conceal them from airstrikes. They mostly remain unsecured," Mr Martin said.

Issue No. 952, 28 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

The surface-to-air missiles can be used against civilian jets and other ordnance can easily be converted into car bombs and roadside explosives, according to experts. Human Rights Watch said that two unguarded sites it has inspected near Sirte contained surface-to-air missiles, tank and mortar rounds, large numbers of munitions and thousands of guided and unguided aerial weapons. The group said that while its representatives were at one site, which had already been looted, civilians and armed fighters arrived with pickup trucks to remove more weapons. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8851973/Libya-stockpiles-of-chemical- weapons-found.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency U.S. Has 'Nuclear Superiority' over Russia 25 October 2011 Data published by the U.S. Department of State on Tuesday indicates that the United States has some 300 more deployed nuclear weapons than Russia. According to New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms facts sheet, posted on the State Department’s website, the United States has 822 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, while Russia has 516. Russia is also at a disadvantage in the number of warheads on deployed carriers – 1,566 warheads against 1,790 American warheads. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which entered into force on February 5, 2011, commits the United States and the Russian Federation to reduce and limit the number of deployed and non-deployed strategic offensive arms to the agreed aggregate numbers. Beginning April 6, 2011, inspections under the New START Treaty are regularly conducted in the Russian Federation and the United States with consistent data exchange carried out every six months. To date, the U.S. has conducted twelve inspections while Russia has conducted eleven inspections. These inspections have taken place at ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber bases, storage facilities, conversion or elimination facilities, and test ranges. WASHINGTON, October 25 (RIA Novosti) http://en.rian.ru/world/20111025/168112458.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

ITAR-TASS News – Russia 25 October 2011 Alexander Nevsky Sub to Be Put into Service in Late 2012 MOSCOW, October 25 (Itar-Tass) — The fourth-generation nuclear-powered strategic missile carrying submarine Alexander Nevsky built at the Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk will start test firing Bulava intercontinental ballistic missiles no earlier than in summer 2012, a source at the Russian Governmental Military Industrial Commission told Itar-Tass on Tuesday. “Following sea trials and a series of successful solitary launches of Bulava missiles, the Alexander Nevsky will be put into service by the Russian Navy in late 2012,” he said.

Issue No. 952, 28 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

“The first serial missile carrying submarine of the Borei class started its first two-week sea trial in the White Sea the day before. The trial will test the operation of all the submarine units and mechanisms in various regimes. The Alexander Nevsky will return to Sevmash in the first ten days of November for the elimination of possible defects,” he said. “Weather permitting, the sea trial of the submarine will continue this year. If the sea covers with ice in December, the trial will resume in spring 2012 and last through the end of summer, like it happened in the case of the Yuri Dolgoruky. Hence, the Alexander Nevsky will begin test firing Bulava missiles no earlier than in summer 2012. A series of successful test launches is a must, which means the submarine may be put into service no earlier than in the end of 2012,” the source said. The Alexander Nevsky has one serious advantage over the Yuri Dolgoruky: it will not have to perform a duo Bulava test launch. “The salvo test launch was necessary for making sure of the missile system’s readiness for being put into service. By the time the Alexander Nevsky starts test firing Bulava missiles, the latter will have been put on combat duty,” he said. The Sevmash shipyard is a component of the United Shipbuilding Corporation. It is the largest shipbuilding enterprise in Russia and the only shipyard of the country, the main task of which is atomic submarines building for Navy. The enterprise, occupying the area of more than 300 hectares, includes in its structure more than 100 subdivisions. More than 25,000 people work on the basic enterprise of Severodvinsk. From 45 surface ships, 163 submarines (among them 128 have nuclear power units), have been built on Sevmash since 1939. Civil production manufacturing is focused on the oil and gas projects on the Arctic offshore zone. Sevmash specialists also take part in construction of surface fields of Russian North - manufacturing of industrial and accommodation modules, equipment for oil production, oil and gas pipeline and other objects inspection. More than 100 civil vessels of different classes and purposes have been built since 1990 (tugs, mini-bulk carriers, pontoons, barges, fish farms) for foreign customers. http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c154/255943.pdf (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Barents Observer – Norway New Subs Made of Old Spare Parts October 27, 2011 By Thomas Nilsen The Russian navy’s two newest nuclear-powered strategic submarines that are sailing the White Sea this autumn are partly constructed from near 20 year old hulls of non-finished smaller submarines. The two submarines of the Borey class are the first new strategic submarines in the Russian navy since the last Delta-IV class submarine was commissioned in 1992. But, “Yuri Dolgoruky” and “Aleksandr Nevsky” are not totally new, Rossiskaya Gazeta reports.

When the construction of “Yuri Dolgoruky” started at the Sevmash yard in Severodvinsk back in November 1996, the shipyard simply took the unfinished hull of an unfinished Akula-class attach submarine and started the welding to enlarge it. The construction work on the hull for what was supposed to be an Akula-class was started four years earlier, in 1992, according to the list of submarines posted on Wikipedia.

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The hull of the second Borey-class submarine “Aleksandr Nevsky” is also originally based on an older Akula-class submarine that was never finished. “Aleksandr Nevsky” sailed out on her maiden voyage in the White Sea last Saturday, reports Regnum. The work on the hull of what was then supposed to be the “Lynx” Akula-class submarine started at the shipyard in Severodvinsk back in 1993 and then, 11 years later in 2004, the shipyard brushed off the dust of the hull and started to refit it to what is now “Aleksandr Nevsky.” According to Rossiskaya Gazeta, the old block sections used to build the new Borey class submarines were the forward and rear end. The construction of the third submarine of the Borei-class, "Vladimir Monomakh" started in 2006 and is today some 50 percent ready, reports Itar-Tass. According to the book Korabli VMF SSSR (Naval vessels of the USSR), published in St. Petersburg in 2003, also the third Borei-class submarine, named “Vladimir Monomakh” is originally based on a Akula-class hull from 1992. It is not know if any of the other parts of the new submarines consists of spare parts from older submarines. http://www.barentsobserver.com/new-subs-made-of-old-spare-parts.4977784-58932.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Russia Today (RT) – Russia Successful Test Launch for Russia’s Bulava Missile 28 October 2011 Russia's cutting-edge intercontinental ballistic missile, Bulava, has been successfully test-launched from a submarine in the White Sea. Equipped with 10 warheads with a 9,000-kilometer range, it is even capable of withstanding nuclear attack. The Bulava is to become a fundamental part of Russia's nuclear arsenal. After a successful maiden launch in June, it was decided to put the missile into mass production. The latest launch was carried out from the nuclear-powered submarine Yury Dolgoruky in the Russian Far East on Friday. It is the 17th test launch of a Bulava missile. Seven have failed; ten have been successful, including all five of the most recent test launches. "The missile's warheads reached the firing range at the designated time, which was confirmed by objective control means," Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Col. Igor Konashenkov announced on Friday. The Bulava is Russia's newest submarine-launched three-stage solid propellant ICBM, with several separating warheads capable of altering their trajectories in-flight and hitting targets up to 9,000 km away. The nuclear-powered submarine missile cruiser Yury Dolgoruky, which is the head ship of Project 955 of the Borey class, will be accepted for service along with the new Bulava missile system. Eight similar Borey-class submarines will be built by 2020, in accordance with the state armament program. They are expected to be the main naval part of Russia's strategic nuclear forces for several decades. Each will be able to carry up to twelve ICBMs. http://rt.com/news/bulava-missile-launched-963/ (Return to Articles and Documents List)

RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency Topol Ballistic Missiles May Stay in Service until 2019

Issue No. 952, 28 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

28 October 2011 The service life of Topol mobile ballistic missile systems could be extended until 2019, Commander of Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) Lt. Gen. Sergei Karakayev said on Friday. “The road-mobile Topol missile systems may remain in service with the SMF until 2019,” Karakayev said at a meeting with SMF veterans. “The evaluation of its *Topol missile+ reliability and technical condition allows us to consider further extension of its service life.” The RS-12M Topol (SS-25 Sickle) is a single-warhead intercontinental ballistic missile, approximately the same size and shape as the U.S. Minuteman ICBM. The first Topol missiles entered service in 1985. The missile has a maximum range of 10,000 km (6,125 miles) and can carry a nuclear warhead with a yield of 550 kilotons. Although the service life of the SS-25 (originally 10 years) is being periodically extended, the missile will be progressively retired over the next decade and replaced by mobile Topol-M (SS-27 Stalin) and RS-24 Yars missile systems. As of August 2011, the SMF operated at least 171 road-mobile Topol missile systems, 50 silo-based and 18 road- mobile Topol-M systems, and nine RS-24 systems. MOSCOW, October 28 (RIA Novosti) http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20111028/168206957.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Global Security Newswire U.S. Releases New START Nuke Data Wednesday, Oct. 26, 2011 The United States as of last month officially had 1,790 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, while Russia had fielded 1,566 long-range weapons, according to details from a semiannual information swap mandated under a strategic nuclear arms control treaty between the two countries (see GSN, Aug. 5). The United States had 822 ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and nuclear bombers deployed at the time of the exchange, the State Department said in a fact sheet released last week. Russia wielded 516 such launch- ready delivery vehicles. The count of U.S. bombers and ballistic missile firing platforms totaled 1,043, including fielded and reserve systems. Russia reported holding 871 bombers and missile firing platforms. The New START pact, which entered into force on February 5, requires the sides to each reduce deployment of strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550, down from a cap of 2,200 mandated by next year under an older treaty. It also limits the number of fielded warhead delivery platforms to 700, with an additional 100 strategic systems permitted in reserve. The treaty calls for the nations to regularly share quantities, siting and schematics of armament equipment and sites (U.S. State Department release, Oct. 20). Russia in an earlier accounting had come in under the 1,550 cap the nations are required to meet within seven years. The nation is now back over that maximum level, the Federation of American Scientists said on Monday in an analysis of the released data. Moscow has deployed 29 additional warheads on its ballistic missiles, placing it 16 weapons over the threshold. "Because of the limited format of the released aggregate numbers, however, the changes are not explained or apparent. As a result, though not yet 1 year old, the New START treaty is already beginning to increase uncertainty

Issue No. 952, 28 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530 about the status of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces," Hans Kristensen, director of the organization's Nuclear Information Project, said in the analysis. The sides have carried out "a very modest combined reduction of 19 warheads and 65 delivery vehicles in seven months," Kristensen added. "Apparently [the] two nuclear superpowers are not in a hurry." In addition, the countries possess "thousands" of strategic and tactical nuclear warheads not covered by the pact, the expert noted. "To put things in perspective, the U.S. military stockpile includes nearly 5,000 warheads; the Russian stockpile probably about 8,000. In addition, thousands of retired, but still intact, warheads are in storage for a total combined U.S. and Russian inventory of perhaps 19,000 warheads," he stated. Russia's new warhead deployment occurred alongside the nation's five-system drop in the number of fielded delivery vehicles since last February, from 521 to 516, Kristensen wrote. Information released by the two governments does not make it possible to determine the fashion in which changes were occurring, he added: "As a result, transparency of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces is decreasing. "Part of the explanation is the deployment of additional RS-24 ICBMs, which carry three warheads each. But that’s a limited deployment that doesn’t account for all. Other parts of the puzzle include continued reduction of the single-warhead SS-25 ICBM force, the operational status of individual Delta 4 SSBNs [ballistic-missile submarines], and possibly retirement of one of the aging Delta 3 SSBNs." The United States, meanwhile, now has 10 fewer deployed warheads than in February, for a new total of 1,790, the expert said. The count of fielded delivery systems has dropped from 882 to 822, which he said "probably reflects the removal of nuclear-capable equipment from so-called 'phantom' bombers. These bombers are counted under the treaty even though they are not actually assigned nuclear missions. The U.S. has not disclosed the number, but another 24, or so, 'phantom' bombers probably need to be denuclearized. Stripping these aircraft of their leftover equipment reduces the number of nuclear delivery vehicles counted by the treaty, although it doesn’t actually reduce the nuclear force." The Defense Department over the decade is likely to move to cut the number of deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles from 288 to 240, according to Kristensen. The count of operational silo-based ICBMs could also drop from 450 to 400 if Washington chooses to keep its strategic bombers, he added (see GSN, Oct. 14). The newly released information demonstrates the sides "have gotten off to a slow start and excessive nuclear secrecy is reducing the international community’s ability to monitor and analyze the changes," Kristensen wrote. "Russia essentially has seven and half years to offload 16 warheads from its force to be in compliance with New START by 2018. Not an impressive arms control standard. Instead, the task for Russian planners will be how to phase out old missiles and phase in new missiles. There will be no real constraint on the Russian force." The new information also highlights the United States' significant edge over its former Cold War rival on strategic nuclear delivery systems, according to Kristensen. "Even as Russia deploys the RS-24 ICBM and Bulava SLBM in the coming years, the gradual retirement of the SS-18, SS-19, SS-25 and SS-N-18 could reduce the total number of delivery vehicles to perhaps 400 by the time the New START treaty enters into force in 2018." Meanwhile, Washington today plans to keep 700 nuclear-weapon carriers through 2018, meaning at the next decade its force could be twice as large as Russia's. "Indeed, the U.S. ICBM force alone could at that time include as many delivery vehicles as the entire Russian triad," the expert noted. "The U.S. force will retain a huge upload capability with several thousand nondeployed nuclear warheads that can double the number of warheads on deployed ballistic missiles if necessary," he wrote. "Russia’s ballistic missile force, which is already loaded to capacity, does not have such an upload capability. "This disparity creates fear of strategic instability and is fueling worst-case planning in Russia to deploy a new 'heavy' ICBM later this decade," Kristensen wrote (Federation of American Scientists release, Oct. 24).

Issue No. 952, 28 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

To date, the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of the two governments have traded nearly 1,500 notifications regarding nuclear-weapon transfers, test-firings and alterations of information, according to the State Department. The countries have completed three displays mandated under the pact: one of Russia's RS-24 ICBM and firing equipment, one of the U.S. B-1 bomber and another of the U.S. B-2 bomber. "To date, the U.S. has conducted 12 inspections (eight Type One, four Type Two); Russia has conducted 11 inspections (six Type One, five Type Two)," the State Department said. "These inspections have taken place at ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber bases; storage facilities; conversion or elimination facilities; and test ranges." Type One audits address facilities with fielded and reserve strategic systems, while Type Two checks specifically address sites with only reserve systems, according to an analysis by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. The initial effort to comply with the treaty "has been successful and is progressing smoothly," the fact sheet states. "The outstanding working relationship that developed during negotiations has carried over into implementation. "As expected, there have been differences and concerns with implementation, but both sides have continued to work cooperatively to resolve them," the statement adds. "We look forward to reporting further success and additional updates as New START implementation continues" (U.S. State Department release). http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20111026_1032.php (Return to Articles and Documents List)

News Tribune – Tacoma, WA Army Says Umatilla Depot's Chemical Weapons Mission Done By Tri-City Herald October 26, 2011 HERMISTON -- The last container that once held chemical weapon agent at the Umatilla Chemical Depot has been incinerated. The final ton container that held liquid mustard blister agent came out of the metal parts furnace at 9:17 a.m. Tuesday, ending the depot's mission to store surplus chemical weapons. The 20,000-acre depot just south of the Washington and Oregon border once stored 12 percent of the nation's stockpile of chemical weapons, including nerve and mustard agent. "Our employees are proud to complete the mission of destroying the chemical agent safely and ahead of schedule," said Steve Warren, project general manager for URS Corp., which holds the Army contract for the project. The Chemical Weapons Convention international treaty required the depot's entire inventory of chemical agent to be destroyed by April 29, 2012. Although Army officials called incineration of the last ton container the end of nearly 50 years of chemical agent storage, the incineration plant still must incinerate some of the last chemical weapon agent recently drained from that and other containers. That could be done this week. Then any remaining agent will be flushed out of lines and burned. But "for all intents and purposes, this is the end of processing," said Hal McCune, protocol manager for the Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility, on Tuesday.

Issue No. 952, 28 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

What is now the depot was created to store conventional munitions in 1,001 earth-covered "igloos" just before the United States entered World War II. In 1962, it began to be used also to store chemical weapons. The last conventional munitions were shipped off the depot in the mid-90s, and in 2004, the depot began to incinerate chemical weapons on site. It started with deadly GB and VX nerve gas, much of it in weapons such as rockets, bombs, projectiles and mines. The last of the nerve gas was destroyed in 2008 and the incineration plant was converted to destroy the remaining agent, mustard blister agent, starting in 2009. In total, 3,717 tons of chemical weapons agent were destroyed. The final ton container of mustard agent destroyed Tuesday was the last of 220,604 munitions and containers that held the agent. "Today, the employees of the (incineration plant) made their mark on history by completing agent destruction operations," said Gary Anderson, project manager, in a statement. "More than 1,000 dedicated Army and contractor employees have made Oregon safer for its citizens." Next, work will turn to cleaning up and tearing down the incineration plant, using the metal parts furnace to destroy any contaminated equipment, tools, piping and protective clothing, until it too is demolished. The Army has adopted a locally developed plan that calls for the depot to eventually be divided into areas for the Oregon National Guard, a wildlife refuge, agriculture and industrial use. The goal of the industrial use is to replace some of the jobs that will be lost during the next few years as remaining environmental cleanup and demolition is finished at the depot. http://www.thenewstribune.com/2011/10/26/1880157/army-says-umatilla-depots-chemical.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Hudson Institute – Washington, D.C. OPINION Iran Dangerous Now, Imagine It Nuclear Real Clear World October 25, 2011 By Jaime Daremblum May we now dispense with the polite fiction that a nuclear-armed Iran could somehow be "contained"? After all, if Iranian officials were willing to plot the assassination of a prominent Saudi diplomat on U.S. soil (in partnership with Mexican gangsters, no less), what does that say about the nature of their regime? What does it say about their capacity for aggression and their appetite for risk? What does it say about their willingness to contravene the most basic norms of international behavior? Lest we forget, this was hardly the first time that Tehran attempted to murder someone overseas. Thirty-one years ago, in July 1980, the Iranian government sponsored the assassination of Iranian exile Ali Akbar Tabatabaei, who was then living in Bethesda, Maryland. (Tabatabaei had worked at the Iranian embassy in Washington under the Shah. The gunman who killed him, an American convert to Islam named Dawud Salahuddin, subsequently escaped to Iran, where he has lived as a fugitive for the past three decades.) For that matter, since the Islamist takeover in 1979, high-level Iranian officials "have been linked to the assassinations of at least 162 of the regime's political opponents around the world," according to the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center. Indeed, "at least twenty officials, agents or proxies of the Islamic Republic have been tried and convicted of involvement in the orchestrated killings of Iranian dissidents and others abroad."

Issue No. 952, 28 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

Several of those killings took place at a Berlin restaurant in September 1992, when Iranian-backed gunmen slaughtered three senior members of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (Fattah Abdoli, Homayoun Ardalan, and Sadegh Sharafkandi), along with their translator (Nouri Dehkordi). This vicious crime was planned at the highest levels of the Iranian regime, with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and then-President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani each offering support. It took place exactly six months to the day after Iranian agents executed a terrorist bombing at the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, which killed 29 people. Roughly two years later, in July 1994, Tehran carried out an even deadlier bombing at the city's AMIA Jewish community center. This attack, the worst terrorist atrocity in Argentine history, killed 85. Interpol has since issued arrest warrants for several past or present Iranian officials in connection with the AMIA massacre, including the current defense minister, Gen. Ahmad Vahidi. With its failed scheme to murder the Saudi ambassador, Tehran graduated to a new level of violent audacity. "If the Justice Department's information is correct," writes Iran expert Reuel Marc Gerecht, "the conspiracy confirms a lethal fact about Iran's regime: It is becoming more dangerous, not less, as it ages." What would it mean if such a regime went nuclear? Let's assume, for the sake of argument, that a nuclear-armed Iran would never use its atomic weapons or give them to terrorists. Even under that optimistic scenario, Tehran's acquisition of nukes would make the world an infinitely more dangerous place. For one thing, it would surely spark a wave of proliferation throughout the Greater Middle East, with the likes of Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia - all Sunni-majority Muslim countries - going nuclear to counter the threat posed by Shiite Persian Iran. For another, it would gravely weaken the credibility of U.S. security guarantees. After all, Washington has repeatedly said that the Islamic Republic will not be permitted to get nukes. If Tehran demonstrated that these warnings were utterly hollow, rival governments and rogue regimes would conclude that America is a paper tiger. Once Tehran obtained nuclear weapons, it would have the ultimate trump card, the ultimate protection against outside attack. Feeling secure behind their nuclear shield, the Iranians would almost certainly increase their support for global terrorism and anti-American dictatorships. They would no longer have to fear a U.S. or Israeli military strike. Much like nuclear-armed North Korea today, Iran would be able to flout international law with virtual impunity. If America sought to curb Iranian misbehavior through economic sanctions, Tehran might well respond by flexing its muscles in the Strait of Hormuz. As political scientist Caitlin Talmadge explained in a 2008 analysis, "Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz tops the list of global energy security nightmares. Roughly 90 percent of all Persian Gulf oil leaves the region on tankers that must pass through this narrow waterway opposite the Iranian coast, and land pipelines do not provide sufficient alternative export routes. Extended closure of the strait would remove roughly a quarter of the world's oil from the market, causing a supply shock of the type not seen since the glory days of OPEC." Think about that: The world's leading state sponsor of terrorism has the ability to paralyze the global economy, and, if not stopped, it may soon have nuclear weapons. As a nuclear-armed Iran steadily expanded its international terror network, the Western Hemisphere would likely witness a significant jump in terrorist activity. Tehran has established a strategic alliance with Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez, and it has also developed warm relations with Chávez acolytes in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua while pursuing new arrangements with Argentina as an additional beachhead in Latin America Three years ago, the U.S. Treasury Department accused the Venezuelan government of "employing and providing safe harbor to Hezbollah facilitators and fundraisers." More recently, in July 2011, Peru's former military chief of staff, Gen. Francisco Contreras, told the Jerusalem Post that "Iranian organizations" are aiding and cooperating with other terrorist groups in South

Issue No. 952, 28 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

America. According to Israeli intelligence, the Islamic Republic has been getting uranium from both Venezuela and Bolivia. Remember: Tehran has engaged in this provocative behavior without nuclear weapons. Imagine how much more aggressive the Iranian dictatorship might be after crossing the nuclear Rubicon. It is an ideologically driven theocracy intent on spreading a radical Islamist revolution across the globe. As the Saudi plot demonstrates, no amount of conciliatory Western diplomacy can change the fundamental nature of a regime that is defined by anti- Western hatred and religious fanaticism. Ambassador Jaime Daremblum is a Hudson Institute Senior Fellow and directs the Center for Latin American Studies. http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=8439 (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Voice of Russia – Russia OPINION/Interview START Treaty: Never-Ending Story By Kudashkina Ekaterina October 26, 2011 Interview with Gennady Yevstafyev, a retired lieutenant-general of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service and expert in Russia-NATO relations. As far as Missile, MD – Missile Defense is concerned, we are now in a very particular stage of affairs, you know there are all kinds of crafty suggestions on the part of the Americans to involve our practical participation in some sort of limited exercises, you know, like a test of equipment of their interceptors and so on. I would, rather, make a more political statement before coming to a serious discussion. First of all, it is important to maintain the dialog on Missile Defense, but they consider that the dialog somehow delays the four-staged plan of establishing Missile Defense, four phases. Now they, by the 31st of December, they are going to be through with the first stage and this first stage includes the establishing of radar on the Turkish territory, they have already signed an agreement upon this. And secondly, they have naval elements of the Missile Defense, based on the naval ship cruisers like Monterrey. Monterrey, but this cruiser was mentioned in the news not so long ago. This Monterrey, this summer went into the Black Sea which, allegedly, joined maneuvers with the Ukrainians, but the problem, you know, it was an attempt to see how the Russian Federation would react towards introducing into the Black Sea area, the most sophisticated at the moment. The most sophisticated interception based on system EDGE and it is based on the ships of Monterrey-type. They are going to build a number of them and Monterrey would be substituted very soon, shortly by the ship also Missile Cruiser, which is called Sullivan. So this is the first stage and the second stage or phase is a number of exercises or operations, which they are planning to finish by 2015, this includes Romanian base Deveselu and the third stage is going to be introduced by the full operation of the Polish base for interceptors which is made to go into the operation by 2018. If we take on the face-value the statements made by American Missile Defense and political leaders, they claim that the present system don’t have anything dangerous for Russian Missile Force. It is, maybe, to a certain extent, true, because interceptor SM3, which is going to be introduced into the area for the interception of Iranian missiles, maybe is not so dangerous for Russian Missile Force, but Mr O’Reilly, the head of Missile Defense Agency, speaking on the 18th of this month in Chicago at the Atlantic Council Meeting devoted to Missile Defense, he stated that they continue to work about GBI. But what does GBI stand for?

Issue No. 952, 28 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

GBI means Ground Based Interceptors; these were the interceptors they were planning to introduce under George Bush, it is kept in silence and it is really dangerous thing, the hints he gave are quite clear, you can’t depend on what Americans are saying now, you know it is very difficult to predict what is going to happen in future. Today we have Obama, and he is trying to show some cooperativeness in the field of dealing with Russia on the Missile Defense issues, but come Republicans and you never know what is going to happen. We have a brand, fresh, in my judgment, example of when the Treaty on Missile Defense, which was destroyed by George Bush Administration in 2002 after years of existence. There were negotiations and there were exchanges of information and so on and finally they said they are going to leave the Treaty and they left it. In this sense Russia has to be very circumspect. This May, when there was GAID meeting at Deauville in France, by this Meeting there was the State Department and Foreign Affairs Ministry of Russia, they have agreed on a certain paper and this Deauville paper was not a sort of a paper, which was about legal binding guarantees, but this was a paper, which was trying to bring the issue on the surface and to continue discussion on it. It has been already agreed between the two Foreign Ministries but when Obama came to Deauville, he declined to sign this statement, because, allegedly, he was convinced by the Pentagon and the Intelligence Services of the United States that this is a detrimental paper for the interests of the United States. And he didn’t sign. Then, I suspect, that their idea was to press Mr. Medvedev, who was supposed to become the next president of Russia, to press him into more concessions for the American position, than it was on the surface. It was a very serious tactical mistake on the part of Americans, if they were really interested in making a deal with Russia. Now, you said, if they are really trying to make a deal with Russia, so, are they making any steps to make-up for their miscalculation. Now, when we have decided the case of president Putin they understood the mistake they made and they were trying to return to this kind of paper. So, they are. But in other words. And Ellen Tauscher, who is Under Secretary of the State for missile negotiations with Russia, how keen was the old statement to Atlantic Council on the 18th said that we are ready to give promises in writing. You understand the difference of notions. I can give you any promise in writing and then I would say time has run out and writing is not a word, the ink it was, written words. And she also said that she cannot provide any legally binding commitments. No, that is the point. And just two minutes after, despite of her speech she made a very clear statement the United States under no circumstances would give Russia a legally binding guarantees about Missile Defense, which they are building and not being re-erected against Russia and it was very clear that they are not prepared to discuss. Moreover, she was trying to, somehow, indirectly threaten Russia. She said “look, you have to join quickly, otherwise you’ll be too late”. But the point is, she repeated the two main elements. First of all they are prepared to exchange missile data with Russia, for that they suggest establishing a particular center, joint centre. Well, nothing is wrong with that, depending on conditions and the modalities we can agree about this kind of centre. But it is not new, is it? The idea was for a very long in the air and it was not really finalized even in the last ten years, but the main point is that they want to establish a second centre and now O’Reilly said openly “that would be the centre of operations”. They said that, well Russian officers could present at this centre, but who is going to take decisions on the use of the Missile Interceptors. And this is the key question and they don’t want to discuss modalities of this centre. It is quite clear that it is striking difference from Russian proposal of sector defense, in each sector there is a responsible body which would operate its coordination and cooperation with the whole structure of Missile Defense. Nobody speaks about the second element, you see, Americans indirectly say, that it is American-Euro Missile Defense, it’s an American contribution. So they contribute part of their capacity to Europe Defense, this means that they are creating national defense, in other words they would rather have two sets of Missile

Issue No. 952, 28 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

Defenses. And if we go further, then we should claim that, for example with Japan, they have a very well developed Missile Defense System on the basis of American interceptors of the EDGE system. They are going to cover the whole world with their Missile Defenses and they would involve us in building Euro Defense and we are a huge country and we need our interests to be covered by Missile Defense otherwise we are going to be open to any kind of missile challenge or threat in the Euro-Asian space. And we can’t work on this bases. So, it do supposes threat to Russia? Is it a general understanding? Some people suggest that we should involve into the discussions of Americans of the Euro-Asian space. First of all they are not going to do this, secondly I don’t see any reason why we should allow Americans to guarantee our Missile Defense in Asian part of our country, that would be a sort of, I would say, proliferation of American high humanistic approach. Factually, they are building the global system of Missile Defense in their interests in order to exclude any possible threat towards their assets and interests and some allies, not every ally, but some allies. And we are not among those people who will cower sincerely by their effort. They never abandon the idea of neutralizing of our Missile Force. But then, in their project of building such a system they will also need to negotiate with China. Well, China is a special case, you know. In 1999 I spoke to Chinese military people in the Chinese Military Headquarters. At that time they have only started to understand the whole complexity of the Missile Defense project of Americans, but they caught it immediately, the danger they caught it immediately. You know, Chinese are in a very dangerous position, because the type of Missile Defense Americans have established with Japan, at the moment, is a very efficient method of neutralizing Chinese Missile Assets, that’s why China is behaving itself very quietly, though they understand, I’m afraid the Americans misunderstand the deep distrust the Chinese have towards them, but they are in a particular position. What kind of position? At the moment they don’t have a real capacity to block the American – Japanese Missile Defense barrier. With course of time, I’m sure, the Chinese would create something worthwhile, but at the moment they are not in position to prevent the Americans from mollification as I said of their Missile Force, which is not a very big force, at the moment. It is growing, but it’s not big enough. So, are you saying that there is no solution to the problem? Of course the simplest thing is to create such kind of combination of Missile Forces, Missile Assets, which would mollify the possible dangers of future development of American Missile Defense in Europe. It will take money, it will take time, maybe it is the cheapest answer. One of the answers has already been announced. Some people on the Russian side say, that we are not going to negotiate Tactical Nuclear Armaments with Europeans and Americans. It is a good move, because this kind of Armaments, they are mostly short range and they would really devastate all the American Assets, built in Easter Europe and in Turkey. And though, I’m a person who is with particular proposals on Tactical Nuclear Armaments, I would agree to this position now, because we made a condition that we would agree on discussions on Tactical Nuclear Armaments only if we make a satisfactory deal for us on the methods of Missile Defense. So, Mr. Yevstafyev, at least at present, it really looks like a never-ending story? I would make a point, the whole discussion, which is put forward by the Americans especially the key-note speech of Tauscher, just after coming from Moscow, it has a hidden idea that they suggest Russia a role of junior partner and the whole thing would be dominated by Americans, decided by Americans. When they say they can’t trust the Missile Defense of NATO into the other hands, not members of NATO, but the same is true with us. We can’t trust our Missile Defense into the hands of NATO and especially to the Americans. Coming to a meant, I have to tell that there is every reason to believe that the next Summit Meeting of our leaders and Medvedev in Hawaii is not going to produce anything worth than a real hope for solution in this kind of problem and we have to look forward and

Issue No. 952, 28 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530 we have to search for kind of decisions which would preserve our interests, of course while maintaining dialog with them. And lastly, some people claim that by Summit Meeting in Chicago in May 2012 there could be some breakthrough or decision, by the way, Chicago Meeting in connected with the Meeting of NATO Summit, but it is going to happen after inauguration of the next Russian president, and we know who is going to be the next Russian president, in this sense I don’t give any hope for breakthrough there, especially after our important negotiators, though anonymously, but gave signs and gave some signals that the whole thing, at the moment, is dead-locked. And if Americans really want to be proud of their idea of resetting then they have to make a constructive, serious change in their present position on Missile Defense. Otherwise there is no chance to proceed and we will have to find ways of securing our National Security interests by other means. http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/10/26/59365310.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace OPINION/ Proliferation Analysis The "Underground Great Wall:" An Alternative Explanation By James M. Acton October 26, 2011

You yourself may vividly feel the terrible fear that you have of the other party but you cannot enter the other man’s counter-fear, or even understand why he should be particularly nervous.

---Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations, 1951

It is tempting to dismiss the story in Monday’s Wall Street Journal claiming that China has around 3,000 nuclear warheads as the kind of reporting that could only be considered “fair and balanced” on Fox News and just ignore it. After all, as long ago as 2004, Jeffrey Lewis tracked down the origin of media reports cited by the Journal that China has 2,350 nuclear weapons. Embarrassingly, the source is an online essay based on bogus U.S. intelligence information that was posted by a Singapore University student. Moreover, it hardly seems worth wasting storage space on the Carnegie server explaining why it is invalid to estimate the size of China’s contemporary arsenal by taking a 1960s U.S. intelligence report that predicted how many warheads China would have in 1973 and then assuming that it has built up at a constant rate since then. What does make the article worth engaging with, however, is its inability to even try to understand China’s strategic challenges and why it might go to some fairly extreme lengths to try to solve them. The purpose of the Journal article is to raise awareness of China’s nuclear modernization and the “immense strategic leverage” it would supposedly give China in a war. Now, I certainly don’t claim to know why China is modernizing its nuclear force. China’s modernization may be offensively orientated. Perhaps Beijing does wish to change the status quo in its favor by force of nuclear arms. The “facts” collected by the Journal, however, provide no evidence—for or against—these propositions. The article focuses on the vast network of underground tunnels, the “Underground Great Wall,” that China has built to protect its nuclear forces. “For decades,” writes Bret Stephens in that knowing tone adopted by the Journal’s finest, “nuclear experts have understood that the key to ‘winning’ a nuclear exchange is to have an effective second-strike capability, which in turn requires both a sizable and survivable force.” Wrong. A survivable second-strike capability is the key to not losing a nuclear exchange. It ensures that an adversary cannot disarm you and then use nuclear threats to bend you to his will. Even if China had 3,000 warheads all mounted on intercontinental ballistic missiles—which it doesn’t—it could still not disarm the United States. Apart from the inability of inaccurate Chinese missile to destroy hardened American silos, the four or more U.S. submarines (each

Issue No. 952, 28 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530 of which is armed with about 100 warheads) that are at sea at any given time ensure the invulnerability of the U.S. deterrent. By contrast, China does have reasonable grounds to fear that the United States is seeking a war-winning nuclear capability. The United States deploys something just shy of 2,000 strategic warheads with more in reserve. Its delivery systems are exquisitely accurate. It is developing conventional weapons designed to hunt down mobile missiles. And, on top of that, Washington has consistently refused requests from Beijing to explicitly state that the United States is not seeking the ability to eliminate China’s nuclear forces. Whether China’s fears are justified or not is irrelevant (although, for the record, I think they are exaggerated). The point here is that they are understandable, especially from a military planning perspective, and most likely genuine. In fact, the crowning irony is that those who argue that the United States should pursue a war-winning capability against China (some of whom regularly opine in the Journal) generally show the least recognition that this would concern China and prompt to it to take countermeasures. This brings us onto the Underground Great Wall. Given the extent of Chinese fears, the idea that Beijing might build 3,000 miles of tunnels to protect a small nuclear force should not be beyond belief. After all, it’s not exactly unprecedented for China to try to protect itself from external threats by building a gargantuan defense line, it is? Phillip Karber, a Georgetown University professor who conducted most of the research on which the Journal article is based, questions the scale of the project. He asks why China needs such a long network of tunnels if it only has the 300 or so warheads estimated by the U.S. intelligence community. To answer this question Karber should examine the United States’ own nuclear history. Back in the late 1970s, many in the United States expressed deep concerns, sometimes in the Journal, that the Soviet Union was opening up a “window of vulnerability”; at some point in the 1980s—at the moment of “maximum danger”—the Kremlin would supposedly use its awesome force of land-based ballistic missiles (which, even then, were much more accurate than Chinese weapons are today) to annihilate U.S. missiles, rendering the United States defenseless. One American response was the MX missile (later renamed the Peacekeeper, although, for some reason, the new name never caught on). The original plan was to put each new missile in one silo. However, worried about the vulnerability of silos, Congress blocked this plan in 1976. Three years later, after the U.S. military examined more than 40 options, President Jimmy Carter eventually approved an alternative: the “shell game.” The United States planned to construct 4,600 silos for the 200 missiles it was going build—yes, that’s right, 23 silos for each missile. The missiles would have regularly been shuttled back and forth between different silos so the Soviet Union would not have known where any of them were. Thus, if it had wanted to disarm the United States, Moscow would have had to target every single silo, requiring a staggering number of warheads (9,200, in fact, if it is assumed two warheads would have been assigned to each silo). 4,600 silos to protect 200 missiles… Not completely dissimilar from the Underground Great Wall, is it? In the event, the shell game was never constructed. President Ronald Reagan rejected it in favor of the traditional one-silo-per-missile model. But, had the United States—like China today—not have had to bother with the “inconvenience” of democracy then perhaps not even the Journal could have professed such amazement at Chinese tunneling. James M. Acton is a senior associate in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment and a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow. A physicist by training, Acton specializes in deterrence, disarmament, nonproliferation, and nuclear energy. His research focuses on developing realistic pathways towards a world without nuclear weapons by strengthening nonproliferation bulwarks and rethinking deterrence. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2011/10/26/underground-great-wall-alternative-explanation/682z (Return to Articles and Documents List)

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The Heritage Foundation OPINION/ the Foundry Blog What’s Down There? China’s Tunnels and Nuclear Capabilities By Dean Cheng October 26, 2011 Recent news reports have highlighted Chinese construction of a system of underground tunnels and raised serious questions about what they might imply regarding China’s nuclear capabilities. One story highlighted that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) may have some 3,000 miles of tunnels, sufficient to move systems underground across the breadth of the country. Much of this was apparently dug by the Second Artillery Force, which is responsible for China’s nuclear forces, so the assumption is that many of these tunnels are related to China’s nuclear deterrent. The most commonly enunciated fear is that China has far more nuclear weapons than it is generally credited with. Among the initial group of nuclear powers (U.S., Russia, U.K., France, and the PRC), the Chinese are generally believed to have the smallest nuclear arsenal, with only a few hundred warheads. This is consistent with a strategy of “minimum deterrence”—fielding only enough warheads to severely damage other nations. The existence of these thousands of miles of tunnels raises the possibility that, in fact, China has much more than a “minimum” deterrent. The larger points, however, are neither about the tunnels nor the number of warheads that might be hidden in them. Rather, this story should remind readers:  China is opaque. We have no good idea of the number of nuclear weapons that the PRC fields. Chinese officials have often stated that they are interested only in a minimal nuclear deterrent. But even if these statements are correct, it is still an assumption that China has developed a limited number of warheads and, just as importantly, that it is pursuing and will pursue only a minimal deterrent strategy. These assumptions, in turn, are grounded in one’s view of China more generally. The reality is that China’s nuclear forces, much less its nuclear strategy, are hidden from view.  China’s nuclear needs are different. The lack of understanding of the PRC is only partly due to Chinese obfuscation and silence. It is also rooted in the insistence of many analysts on applying Cold War superpower mental models to the PRC. Both the U.S. and the USSR needed large numbers of ICBMs, because their main opponent was on the other side of the globe. But for the PRC, deterring Russia need not entail ICBMs—only deterring the United States does. So, while China may only field a few dozen ICBMs, it is a flawed assumption that it does not also field a substantial regional nuclear force, holding at risk the range of targets from Tokyo to Moscow to Delhi.  Chinese views of what constitutes stability are radically different from our own. Many American analysts argue that nuclear states have never gone to war with each other in the belief that nuclear weapons are by their nature stabilizing. Such blithe statements are belied by the Sino–Soviet border clashes of 1969, when the Chinese precipitated a series of battles in Manchuria that soon spread along the border to Xinjiang. China was the weaker of the two, having only exploded its first atomic bomb in 1964 and its first H-bomb in 1967, which underscores that the Chinese do not necessarily see deterrence in the same way Western analysts (much less Western arms control advocates) do. None of this means that the tunnels necessarily conceal thousands or tens of thousands of warheads or missiles. Half of the tunnels were apparently dug during the Cold War, when Mao warned the nation to “dig deep holes, and store grain,” in preparation for a possible Soviet or American nuclear attack. But this should be cold comfort, for the reality is that it is not clear what those tunnels conceal.

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In this context, it is irresponsible to be arguing for “global zero” when the actual number of nuclear weapons fielded by potential opponents is simply not known. President Obama’s push for yet another nuclear arms control treaty with Russia to further lower the number of nuclear forces, as well as his advocacy of global nuclear disarmament, presumes that only Russia can rival the U.S. in nuclear forces. The President appears totally unconcerned that the Chinese might have substantial numbers of nuclear weapons (including launchers) hidden away. The fact that the United States is also the only nuclear nation with no program of nuclear force modernization raises further questions about what “providing for the common defense” means for this Administration. All of this should be food for thought for Congress and the Administration as defense budget cuts are debated. Dean Cheng is Research Fellow in Chinese Political and Security Affairs in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. http://blog.heritage.org/2011/10/26/whats-down-there-chinas-tunnels-and-nuclear-capabilities/ (Return to Articles and Documents List)

China Daily – China OPINION/Op-Ed Contributor Visits Timely and Important October 27, 2011 By Wang Sheng (China Daily) Page - 8 Chinese vice-premier's trip to the two Koreas will facilitate communication for early resumption of the Six-Party Talks Chinese Vice-Premier Li Keqiang began his official visits to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) on Oct 23. The successive visits, amid the global financial and debt crises, deepening regional cooperation in Asia and the easing of tensions on the Korean Peninsula, are of great strategic significance for China. Li's five-day visit to the neighboring peninsula reflects the great importance China attaches to developing relations with both the DPRK and ROK. Besides strengthening high-level communication and deepening mutually beneficial economic and trade cooperation with the two neighbors, easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and promoting the improvement of North-South relations and the resumption of the Six-Party Talks are also likely to be high on his agenda. Due to geographical and historical ties, the Korean Peninsula is seen as one of regions that is of the most strategic importance to China. For an emerging developing power, a peaceful, nuclear-free, prosperous and friendly Korean Peninsula is in line with China's national interests and China has always been friendly and sincere in its dealings with the DPRK and ROK. It has been said that if a neighboring country is friendly it doubles the benefits, while if the neighbor is unfriendly the damage can also double. China's diplomacy toward the Korean Peninsula is an important part of its good-neighborly policy. And Li's visits to the two Koreas again demonstrate its goodwill intentions. Friendly China-DPRK and China-ROK relations have brought tangible benefits to all sides, and whether from a historical viewpoint or from the present reality, there is no reason not to get along with one another.

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The current easing of tensions on the Korean Peninsula has been built on the improvement in North-South relations. Since this year, Pyongyang has repeatedly taken initiatives to ease bilateral relations with the ROK and the ROK is trying to develop its relationship with the DPRK on a "normal basis" and re-implement the peaceful unification policy. China has been paying close attention to these developments and Li's visits could play an important "mediation" role and help further promote reconciliation and cooperation between the two neighbors. The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the common goal of all parties concerned, as well as the basis of cooperation for all parties in the Six-Party Talks. It is not Pyongyang's ultimate goal to have nuclear weapons. So it is realistic for Pyongyang to repeatedly express willingness to return to the nuclear talks without preconditions. Its biggest concern is the problem of guaranteeing national security. The key to solving this problem lies in the improvement of DPRK-US relations. Any slight progress in this area should be encouraged, and China should conduct strategic cooperation with the United States on this issue. The DPRK and the US opened their second round of direct talks in Geneva on Monday, following similar discussions in New York in July 2011. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu said that China supports the two countries' dialogue and hopes this will help enhance mutual trust and create conditions to restart the nuclear talks and reach a proper solution. The US insists that the DPRK needs to show its sincerity by stopping its uranium enrichment program. While, Pyongyang argues that its nuclear enrichment program is for nuclear energy. Li's visit will promote Pyongyang's contacts with Seoul and Washington, narrowing their differences and disagreements. While meeting with Kim Jong-il, top leader of the DPRK, Li said China buttresses the DPRK in keeping and strengthening contact and dialogue with relevant parties and pushing forward further mitigation of tensions on the peninsula, creating conditions for reopening the Six-Party Talks at an early date. All in all, in the context of the improving overall situation on the Korean Peninsula, China's timely communication and coordination efforts and constructive suggestions will undoubtedly contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability on the peninsula and in the region, and might be a new starting point for the resumption of the Six- Party Talks. The author is an expert on the Korean Peninsula at Jilin University. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-10/27/content_13984966.htm (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Bellingham Herald – Bellingham, WA OPINION/Essay Thursday, October 27, 2011 Surgical Strikes Against Key Facilities would Force Iran to Face Military Reality By LAWRENCE J. HAAS WASHINGTON, D.C. - The Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States and bomb Saudi and Israeli embassies in Washington and elsewhere was not some bizarre move by a rogue operator within Iran's government. It was, instead, the logical next step in Iran's increasingly lethal war against the United States - a step demanding that Washington discard its all-too-predictable calls for greater international "isolation" for Tehran, and its reticence for confrontation, by responding with military action.

Issue No. 952, 28 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

Military action need not mean full-scale war, of course, but the action must be significant enough to force the radical regime in Tehran, which clearly does not fear the United States, to take notice. Targets could include Iran's terrorist training camps, its military sites, and key parts of its nuclear weapons program. Having said that, military action should be teamed with stronger efforts to tighten the economic and financial noose on Iran. Along with imposing more of its own sanctions and pushing for more European and United Nations sanctions, the United States should lead Western efforts to target in particular the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) whose Qods Force spearheaded this plot. The IRGC is a steadily growing economic, military, and political force within the Islamic Republic. Washington can sanction multinational corporations that do business with the IRGC, and it can encourage its European allies to impose travel bans on, and freeze the assets of, IRGC leaders. Nevertheless, U.S. military action against Iran is long overdue, and this brazen plot to launch terror on U.S. soil only strengthens the case for it. Iran is the world's most aggressive state sponsor of terrorism and, directly or through Hezbollah and its other terrorist minions, it has reportedly killed more Americans than any nation since Vietnam. The attacks date to the early 1980s. Iran claimed credit for Hezbollah's 1983 truck bombing of our embassy in Beirut, which killed 241 U.S. marines, and it was likely behind the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, which killed 19 Americans. In more recent years, Tehran's attacks on the Americans have grown more frequent and more brazen. In 2006, a Hezbollah-affiliated group claimed responsibility for the attempted bombing of the U.S. embassy in Caracas. A year later in Iraq, the Qods Force helped plan and execute an attack on the Provincial Joint Coordination Center in Karbala, killing five Americans and wounding three others. In recent years, as top U.S. defense officials told Congress over the summer, Tehran has been supplying insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan with training, other support, and arms, including improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that are responsible for growing numbers of U.S.casualties. U.S. officials also revealed recently that Iran is working with al Qaida The new terror plot marks neither the first time Iran has sought to launch terror in the United States - it killed a former Iranian diplomat in suburban Washington in 1980 - nor the first time that it has targeted embassies and other foreign interests around the world. As for this new plot, efforts to label it a rogue operation are not credible. The Qods Force is an elite group within the IRGC, which reports directly, and has sworn an oath of allegiance, to the nation's most powerful figure, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The notion that the Qods Force launched the plot with neither Khamenei's knowledge nor approval defies credibility. Iran has been at war with the United States ever since the 1979 Islamic Revolution catapulted a radical regime to power. It has killed Americans and aggressively sought to thwart U.S. interests in the region and beyond. It's time for the regime to pay a real price - one that will force its leaders to take notice before continued U.S. reticence spurs more Iranian brazenness.

A former communications director to Vice President Al Gore, Lawrence J. Haas is senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the American Foreign Policy Council (www.afpc.org), a non-profit organization that provides scholarly information to the nation's foreign policy experts.

McClatchy-Tribune did not subsidize the writing of this column; the opinions are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent the views of McClatchy-Tribune or its editors. http://www.bellinghamherald.com/2011/10/27/2245774/surgical-strikes-against-key-facilities.html

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Washington Times OPINION/Commentary KAHLILI: Iran Already Has Nuclear Weapons Western intelligence has known it for years By Reza Kahlili, the Washington Times Thursday, October 27, 2011 The pressure the United States and the West is bringing to bear on Iran to keep it from acquiring nuclear weapons is all for naught. Not only does the Islamic Republic already have nuclear weapons from the old Soviet Union, but it has enough enriched uranium for more. What's worse, it has a delivery system. The West for nearly a decade has worried about Iran's uranium enhancement, believing Iran is working on a nuclear bomb, though the government maintains its uranium is only for peaceful purposes. When Iran began its nuclear program in the mid-1980s, I was working as a spy for the CIA within the Revolutionary Guards. The Guards' intelligence at that time had learned of Saddam Hussein's attempt to buy a nuclear bomb for Iraq. Guard commanders concluded that they needed a nuclear bomb because if Saddam were to get his own, he would use it against Iran. At that time, the two countries were at war. Mohsen Rezaei, then-chief commander of the Guards, received permission from the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to start a covert program to obtain nuclear weapons, so the Guards contacted Pakistani generals and Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist. Commander Ali Shamkhani traveled to Pakistan, offering billions of dollars for a bomb, but ended up with a blueprint and centrifuges instead. The first centrifuge was transferred to Iran on Khomeini's personal plane. In a second but parallel attempt to amass nuclear weapons, Iran turned to the former Soviet republics. When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1990, Iran coveted thousands of tactical nuclear warheads that had been dispersed in the former republics. In the early 1990s, the CIA asked me to find an Iranian scientist who would testify that Iran had the bomb. The CIA had learned that Iranian intelligence agents were visiting nuclear installations throughout the former Soviet Union, with particular interest in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan, which had a significant portion of the Soviet arsenal and is predominately Muslim, was courted by Muslim Iran with offers of hundreds of millions of dollars for the bomb. Reports soon surfaced that three nuclear warheads were missing. This was corroborated by Russian Gen. Victor Samoilov, who handled the disarmament issues for the general staff. He admitted that the three were missing from Kazakhstan. Meanwhile, Paul Muenstermann, then vice president of the German Federal Intelligence Service, said Iran had received two of the three nuclear warheads and medium-range nuclear delivery systems from Kazakhstan. It also was reported that Iran had purchased four 152 mm nuclear shells from the former Soviet Union, which were reportedly stolen and sold by former Red Army officers. To make matters worse, several years later, Russian officials stated that when comparing documents in transferring nuclear weapons from Ukraine to Russia, there was a discrepancy of 250 nuclear weapons. Last week, Mathew Nasuti, a former U.S. Air Force captain who was at one point hired by the State Department as an adviser to one of its provincial reconstruction teams in Iraq, said that in March 2008, during a briefing on Iran at the State Department, the department's Middle East expert told the group that it was "common knowledge" that Iran had acquired tactical nuclear weapons from one or more of the former Soviet republics.

Issue No. 952, 28 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

Lt. Col. Tony Shaffer, an experienced intelligence officer and recipient of a Bronze Star, told me that his sources say Iran has two workable nuclear warheads. An editorial in Kayhan, the Iranian newspaper directly under the supervision of the Office of the Supreme Leader, last year warned that if Iran were attacked, there would be nuclear blasts in American cities. Despite knowing that Iranian leaders were seeking nuclear weapons, Western leaders chose to negotiate and appease with the hope of reaching a solution with Iran. Nearly three years into President Obama's administration, we must acknowledge that the policies of first a carrot of good will and then a stick of sanctions have neither stopped the Iranians with their nuclear program nor have they deterred their aggressive posture. The Iranian leaders today, despite four sets of United Nations sanctions, continue with their missile and nuclear enrichment program, and they have enough enriched uranium for six nuclear bombs, according to the latest International Atomic Energy Agency report. The Revolutionary Guards now have more than 1,000 ballistic missiles, many pointed at U.S. military bases in the Middle East and Europe. The Guards also have made great strides in their intercontinental missile delivery system under the guise of their space program. As I revealed earlier, nuclear weapons-capable warheads have been delivered to the Guards, and Iran's supreme leader has ordered the Guards to arm their missiles with nuclear payloads. Iran's navy also has armed its vessels with long-range surface-to-surface missiles and soon will expand its mission into the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico. "History suggests that we may already be too late to stop Iran's nuclear bomb. Why do we suppose Iran cannot accomplish in 20 years of trying - with access to vast amounts of unclassified data on nuclear-weapons design and equipped with 21st-century technology - what the U.S. accomplished in three years during the 1940s with the Manhattan Project?" asks nuclear weapons expert Peter Vincent Pry, who served in the CIA and on the EMP Commission, and is now president of EMPact America. Mr. Pry concludes that Iran only needs a single nuclear weapon to destroy the United States. A nuclear EMP (electromagnetic pulse) attack could collapse the national electric grid and other critical infrastructures that sustain the lives of 310 million Americans. Are we ready to finally realize what the goals and the ideology of the jihadists in Tehran are and take appropriate action against them? The Iranian people themselves, who oppose the dictatorial mullahs, for years have asked us to do so. Thousands of them have lost their lives to show us the true nature of this regime. We must act before it's too late. Reza Kahlili is a pseudonym for a former CIA spy who is a fellow with EMPact America and the author of "A Time to Betray," about his double life in Iran's Revolutionary Guards (Threshold Editions, Simon & Schuster, 2010). http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/oct/27/iran-already-has-nuclear-weapons/?page=all#pagebreak (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Issue No. 952, 28 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530