D. Bassett British Trade and Policy in Indonesia 1760-1772. (Met 3 Kaarten)

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D. Bassett British trade and policy in Indonesia 1760-1772. (Met 3 kaarten)

In: Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 120 (1964), no: 2, Leiden, 197-223

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• he general outlines of British policy in the Eastetin Seas during \ and after the Seven Years' War are well known. .The East India Company had difficulty in paying for its expanding exports of silk and tea from Canton and sought to limit its shipments of silver to China by using South East Asian produce as an alternative form of payment. The Company also hoped to attract Chinese junks to an entrepot outside the monopoly of the Co-hong, where the terms of exchange would be more favourable to the British. These solutions to the China remittance problem involved the establishment of a British settlement in the China Sea or the Indonesian Archipelago. The search for an eastern entrepot took many forms, but in the 1760's it was confined to Alexander Dalrymple's scheme for a settlement in the Sulu Archipelago and to the temporary British occupation of Manila in 1762-4:1 In the 1770*s, as the Company's payments' problem became more acute, the Balambangan project was supplemented by official British missions seeking permission for a settlement in Acheh, Kedah, Riau, Trengganu and Cochin China.2 British private, or "country", traders such as Francis Light and James Scott also recommended the occupation of Junk Ceylon and Penang.3 None of .these schemes was immediately. successful, and the search was renewed, with strategie overtones, after the Anglo-French war of 1778-83 and the Anglo- Dutch war of 1780-4. Probably the greatest setback to British hopes

1 V. T. Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 1763-1793, I, (London, 1952), 62-83. 2 D. G. E. Hall, A History of South East Asia, (London, 19SS), 427-8; L. A. Mills, "British Malaya, 1824-67", JMBRAS, XXXIII, (3), (1960), 18-9; A. Lamb, "British Missions to Cochin China: 1778-1822", JMBRAS, XXXIV, (3) & (4), (1961), 13-77; Harlow, op. cit., 97-102; H. P. Clodd, Malaya's first British pioneer: the life of Francis Light, (London, 1948), 12-25, 29-32, 34-42. 3 Clodd, op. cit. Dl. 120 13

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 10:19:41AM via free access 198 D. K. BASSETT. was the defeat of the Bugis of Riau and Selangor by admiral J. P. van Braam in 1784, which foiled a current British plan to settle at Riau. The unjustified British fear thait Van Braam's victory was the prelude to Dutch domination of Malacca Strait impelled the Calcutta government to accept the sultan of Kedah's offer of Penang in 1786.4 It is evident that most of the British schemes for an eastern entrepot were directed to localities on the periphery of the Dutch Malay- Indonesian empire. Acheh, Kedah, Junk Ceylon and Cochin China were independent of Dutch control in the eighteenth century and the Sulu Archipelago was claimed by Spain, not Holland. But the geo- graphical scope of the British quest for a settlement was not so limited as to justify Dr. Tarling's recent generalization that the British Com- pany "avoided openly invading the Dutch sphere of influence" until Thomas Forrest sought to open a factory at Riau in 1784.5 The attempt of Monckton to conclude a British defensive alliance with the Bugis in 1772 would have involved the establishment of a British military post at Riau. This was a far more provocative proposal than Forrest's plan to open a small trading post at Riau and mediate in the Dutch-Bugis war in 1784.6 Equally challenging from the Dutch view- point were governor Roger Carter's schemes to extend British trade and settlement from the Bencoolen presidency to Banjarmasin, Sunda Strait and east Java in 1762-7. These schemes are the subject of the present paper. The trade which Carter sought to develop with eastern Indonesia involved both the British Company and the British "country" traders. The intrusions of the latter into the Java Sea in the 1760's, while their India-based compatriots were threading Malacca Strait to Riau, do much to explain Dutch reluctance to concede the British right of free navigation in the Eastern Seas explicitly during the Anglo- Dutch peace negotiations of 1784. British free navigation had been synonymous with free or illicit trade since the Seven Years' War and the British assurances in 1784 that the spice monopoly would be respected must have seemed particularly hollow in the light of past Dutch experience. The enterprize of the British "country" trader also

4 V. Harlow and F. Madden, British Colonial Developments, 1774-1834, (Oxford, 19S3), S2-3; D. K. Bassett, "Thomas Forrest, an eighteenth century mariner", JMBRAS, XXXIV, (2), (1961), 117-8. 5 N. Tarling, Anglo-Dutch Rivalry in the Malay World, 1780-1824, (Queensland, 1962), 6, 12-3. 8 Instructions from Warren Hastings and council to Thomas Forrest, 31 May 1784, Harlow and Madden, British Colonial Developments, 12.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 10:19:41AM via free access BRITISH TRADE AND POLICY IN INDONESIA. 199 compelled the British Company to adopt a firmer attitude towards Dutch pretensions to the exclusive navigation of the Java Sea than is usually imagined.. Dr. Tarling seems to imply that prior to 1784 the British Company limited itself to the negative policy of avoiding recognition of Dutch claims in this matter.7 In fact, the British Company explicitly asserted the British right of free navigation in the Eastern Seas on several occasions in the 1760's. The Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1784 simply gave diplomatic sanction to the British Company's traditional position. The settlement of Fort Marlborough at Bencoolen had little to recommend it, although it was the most important British possession in Indonesia between 1714 and 1825. East Indiamen bound from London to Canton found difficulty in beating up from Batavia to Bencoolen to take in a cargo of pepper. The distance separating Ben- coolen from the shipping lanes of Sunda Strait also hindered the expansion of the settlement's trade in Indonesia. Bencoolen lacked a proper harbour where pepper could be shipped and the local mortality rate for Europeans was very high. The subordinate British settlements on the west Sumatran coast were widely dispersed and the Company's sloops which were used to bring their pepper and cassia to Bencoolen were costly to maintain. It was a normal condition for the presidency to produce an annual deficit.8 Bencoolen depended heavily on Batavia for its supplies of rice, timber and naval stores, but the tolerance of the Dutch government was uncertain. John Herbert was the official British resident at Batavia during the Seven Years' War, but the Dutch government apparently declined to continue this arrangement in 1763 and 1764. It was even reported in August 1764 and August 1765 that governor-general Van der Parra had forbidden dealings with the British in victuals and naval stores.9 The rumours proved incorrect, but the transactions of the Bencoolen government at Batavia in 1764-73 were usually conducted through two Batavian citizens, James Burnett and Stephen Lieve Garrison.10 These were the natural handicaps of Bencoolen. In 1760-1 the settlement had suffered an extraordinary setback when the French

T Tarling, op. cit., 6-11. 8 For a discussion of local problems see J. Bastin, Essays on Indonesian and Malayan History, (Singapore, 1961), 40-2, 143-63., Tapanuli, Natal, Moko Moko, Lais, Manna and Krui were the principal British out-stations or residencies in west Sumatra. 9 F.M.C., 31 Aug. 1764, S.F.R., (I.O.L.), vol. 72; 7 Aug. 1765, S.F.R., vol. 73. 10 James Burnett returned to Europe in October 1769.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 10:19:41AM via free access PHILIPPINES

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Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 10:19:41AM via free access BRITISH TRADE AND POLICY IN INDONESIA. 201 captured Fort Marlborough, destroyed the fortifications and dispersed the population. After the restoration of the British administration at Bencoolen in 1762, president Carter sought to revive the prosperity of the settlement by bringing back the Chinese who had been carried to Batavia by the French. A considerable number were repatriated to Bencoolen on the Diligent in June 1763 and Prince Henry in August 1764.11 Appeals were also made to the British supercargoes at Canton and the deputy-governor of British-occupied Manila to send techni- cally skilied Chinese to Bencoolen.12 But the Canton supercargoes were reluctant to risk an incident with the Chinese imperial govemment and the Manila military command could send only a few hundred Chinese artisans. The latter, who probably came to Bencoolen under duress, proved more of a liability than an asset, and in May 1765 the Bencoolen government suspended its request for Chinese immigrants until the future location of the presidency was settled.13 There were really three major aspects to British policy in Indonesia in 1762-72. At bottom there was the firm conviction that Bencoolen was an unsatisfactory site for the presidency. For twenty years after the French conquest the British directors declined to rebuild the fortifications of Bencoolen properly because they contemplated moving the settlement to a better site. Secondly, there was the necessity to make the best of the existing situation by attracting Indonesian trade, particularly the spice trade, to Bencoolen. Finally, the Bencoolen government became an instrument for the extension of British trade and influence, both official and unofficial, among the islands of eastern Indonesia. It need scarcely be added that the decade of the 1760's witnessed a similar trend in Malacca Strait, where the growing British connections with Kedah, Kuala Selangor and Riau were as detrimental to the prosperity of Dutch Malacca as British voyages to Pasir and eastern Java promised to be for the Dutch government in Java. In 1762 the British court of directors seems to have suggested that the seat of the Bencoolen presidency might be moved to Tapanuli or Semangka (Keyser's) Bay. The Bencoolen government considered Tapanuli too remote to supervise the other pepper producing settlements of the west coast, but approved of Semangka Bay as a site

11 F.M.D.C., 27 and 30 June 1763, S.F.R., vol. 71; 15 and 20 Aug. 1764, S.F.R., vol. 72. 12 Manila was captured from the Spaniards by the British in 1762. It was returned to Spain in 1764 after the treaty of peace. 13 F.M.C., 9 May 1765, S.F.R., vol. 73.

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PRINCES' ISLAND JAVA 24 MILES

, 20 MILES ,

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 10:19:41AM via free access BRITISH TRADE AND POLICY IN INDONESIA. 203 to which the local pepper trade and the përahu-borne trade of eastern Indonesia could be attracted. It was also believed that the bay would provide a safe harbour for outward and homeward bound China ships.14 The Bencoolen government was deterred from exploring Semangka Bay by the Company's injunction to avoid disputes with the Dutch and the lack of an engineer to undertake the preliminary survey. It was not until December 1764 that captain Tolley of the engineers arrived at Ben- coolen on the Earl of Elgin. By that time governor Carter and the council favoured Silebar and Pulu Bay (near Bencoolen) as potential harbours rather than Semangka Bay. They recognised, however, that the excellent anchorage at Pulu Bay was offset by unhealthy, swampy ground which would not easily bear the weight of fortifications. Silebar was healthier, but the anchorage there would be inadequate unless the local river could be diverted.15 Tolley presented a rather equivocal report of his survey in May 1765,16 but was sufficiently explicit for the council to decide that Pulu Bay was too swampy and that any place was preferable to Bencoolen. The council resolved unanimously that fixing some where in the Straits of Sunda will be the most eligible upon every Consideration, not only as it respects the Company's Interest, but likewise that of Individuals, from its being in the very Center of the pepper Countries, where great quantities are raised; from the number of inhabitants there; its secure Navigation, and fine harbours for Shipping; its immediate and ready intercourse for trade to and from most parts of India; and these without losing or relinquishing any of the Company's present Settlemts. on this Coast.17 The council gave particular consideration to Lampong Bay and Semangka Bay, but after consulting two sons of the headman of Semangee in Semangka Bay, decided that the suzerainty of the sultan of Bantam in that area was too explicit to admit a British settlement. Instead, it was resolved to explore the south-west Sumatran coast between Flat Point (Vlakke Hoeke) and the Dutch boundary stone three or four leagues to the eastward in Semangka Bay. The famous mariner, Thomas Forrest, assured the council that a good anchorage existed at that spot and the sons of the headman of Semangee confirmed that provisions would be easy to obtain there. As alternative sites for a British settlement the Bencoolen government selected Princes' Island off the coast of Java to the south-west of Sunda Strait and Belimbing Bay inside Flat Point on the south-west tip of Sumatra. 14 F.M.C., 26 Feb. 1763, S.F.R., vol. 71. 15 F.M.C., 31 Jan. 1765, S.F.R., vol. 73. 16 F.M.C., 31 May 1765, loc. cit. 17 F.M.C., 1 June 1765, loc. cit.

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Princes' Island was regarded as lying beyond the dominion of Bantam and Belimbing Bay was claimed to be a British possession already. The seriousness of the council's resolve is indicated by its decision to préparé an exploratory expedition consisting of the ships Admiral Watson and Beckenham, the snow Diligent and the sloop Grampus. A member of the Bencoolen council, two other convenanted servants, captain Tolley, 200 troops and the necessary slaves, artificers and engineers were to embark on the ships.18 The expedition never sailed, possibly because Tolley, whose wife had died on 24 May 1765, asked for and was given permission to proceed to Madras for his health on 2 July.19 In December 1765 the council advised captain Skottowe of the Royal George to examine' Semangka Bay and Belimbing Bay en route to Banjermasin to determine whether a more accurate survey was necessary.20 But there is no evidence that Skottowe was able to devote any time to this part of his instructions. It was not until February 1769 that the court of directors ordered the setting up of a select committee at Fort Marlborough to consider again the question of transferring the presidency to a better site.21 In the interim the British moves to attract the spice trade to Bencoolen and to develop British trade and settlement in eastern Indonesia had taken place. One of the most cherished branches of Dutch trade was the Moluccan spice monopoly, although Dr. Wright has shown recently that the Dutch Company had difficulty in extirpating surplus spice production and adjusting the supply to a dwindling European demand.22 Bugis përahus certainly came to Bencoolen before the British reoccupation in 1762, because Thomas Forrest sold opium to their captains during the brief interregnum after the departure of the French invaders.23 18 F.M.C., 15 June 176S, loc. cit. 19 F.M.C., 2 July 1765, loc. cit. The board admitted that Tolley's departure would probably prevent the beginning of new fortifications. 20 F.M.C., 9 Dec. 1765, S.F.R., vol. 73. The council hoped that one of the bays, even if inadequate for a. capital settlement, would at least serve as "a Place of Shelter for Ships who may meet with contrary Winds in boating [sic] up to Marlbro'". 21 CD. to F.M., 10 Feb. 1769. Separate enclosure to select committee of same date. S.F.R., vol. 32. 22 H. R. C. Wright, "The Moluccan Spice Monopoly, 1770-1824", JMBRAS, XXXI, (4), (1958), 1-16. 23 T. Forrest, A Voyage from Calcutta to the Mergui Archipelago, (London, 1792), 77-8 f.n., 85-6. Captain Vincent of the Osterley set up a makeshift British government at Bencoolen in July 1761, but the deputy-governor, Samuel Ardley, did not arrive until February 1762. Roger Carter assumed the governorship in July 1762.

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The përahus which arrived at Bencoolen from "Java, Bally [Bali] and other places to the Eastward" in August 1762 seem to have been laden mainly with salt. In order to encourage 'the trade, president Carter bought the salt for the Company and entered into a contract to buy future consignments at $40 per coyan.2i He also applied to Calcutta in September 1762 for 50 chests of opium, for which Re anticipated the eastern pêrahus would provide a growing demand.25 His recommendation that the Bencoolen government should supply gunpowder to the Mandarese and Bugis skippers to assist their defence on the homeward voyage was accepted by the council.26 Meanwhile, in their letter of February 1761, the British directors urged Carter to attract a large spice trade to Bencoolen as a means of augmenting local revenues and offsetting the contemporary deficit of the settlement. If private individuals lacked the means to develop this connection, the Company was prepared to undertake it, even if an initial loss was incurred.27 Carter saw no immediate prospect of private merchants taking the initiative in the spice trade, but he reserved the right to involve the Company in it if. the occasion required.28 In 1762, as a stimulus to Malay-Indonesian importers, thé Bencoolen government removed the duties on the produce of the archipelago, with the exception of a 15% import duty on "Eastern clouting". In 1763 250 piculs of cloves and 600 piculs of cassia lignum were imported to Bencoolen from eastern Indonesia. Carter anticipated an increase in spice supplies in 1764, but only a few stragglers arrived because of the persistent northerly winds off the west Sumatran coast and the threats the Dutch reputedly made to the Mandarese.29 In November 1764 Carter hit on the scheme of buy ing the cloves imported that year at $100 per picul on the Company's account. He also persuaded the Bencoolen council to enter a contract by which the Company would buy all the cloves which the eastern nakhodas were unable to sell to private merchants at Bencoolen during the two years from 1 Decem- ber 1764. The contracted price of $100 per picul was what the nakhodas claimed they could get in Selangor and "in going there they run less

24 F.M.D.C, 16, 21, 25 Aug., 13 Sept. 1762. S.F.R., vol. 71. 25 F.M.C., 20 Sept. 1762, loc. cit. 28 F.M.C., 22 Nov. 1762, loc. cit. 27 CD. to F.M., 4 Feb. 1761, S.F.R., vol. 31. At that time the directors were not yet certain that Fort Marlborough had fallen to the French. 28 F.M.C., 25 Oct. 1762, S.F.R., vol. 71. 29 F.M. to CD., 20 March 1765, S.F.R., vol. 13.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 10:19:41AM via free access 206 D. K. BASSETT. risque than to this place".30 The Bugis and Mandarese who bought their cloves at Pasir and other intermediate ports argued unsuccessfully that $110 was the lowest price that they could accept. The Company declined to renew Carter's clove contract when it expired in December 1766, but by that time spice smuggling to Ben- coolen had declined markedly. The Company bought about 100 piculs of cloves in 1764 and only 120 piculs reached Bencoolen in 1765. In November 1767 governor Wyatt admitted that very few cloves were brought to Bencoolen in 1766 and 1767, and those of the latter year were imported "by some people from hence who went freighters on some Bugis praws [përahus] three years ago". Only two boats, both hailing from Bencoolen, imported cassia lignum to the settlement in 1767.31 Wyatt's predecessor, Carter, ascribed the decline of the Ben- coolen spice trade to the Vigilance of the Dutch, who last Year [1765] fitted out a Fleet to attack the Island of Ceram from whence they [cloves] are brought, and were so successful as to destroy about forty Vessels that were loading there, fifteen of which belonged to the People of this Place.32 Five of the përahus which sailed from Bencoolen to Ceram in 1765 were owned or hired by Edward Coles, the Company's warehouse- keeper, and each one carried two swivel guns and four muskets. borrowed from the Company's armoury.33 In September of that year, John Herbert of the Bencoolen council was accused of selling arms to the Malays in the bazaar in "China Row", but cleared himself by explaining that the muskets referred to were for sale only to the eastero nakhodas, who needed to defend themselves against pirates or the Dutch on the eastern voyage.34 The London directors imposed a complete ban on the sale of arms to Malay-Indonesian sea captains in February 1768, lest they be used later against British or Indian Vessels voyaging to the eastward.35 The Company's decision not to renew Carter's clove contract in December 1766 was clearly influenced by the poor sale which cloves found in London. In that month the directors suspended the Company's investment in cloves after noting that a private consignment of cloves sent home on the Grosvenor would fetch only 7s.-8s. per lb. on

30 Loc. cit. Also F.M.C., 3 and 7 Nov., 1 Dec. 1764. S.F.R., vol. 72. 31 F.M.C., 7 Nov. 1767, S.F.R., vol. 75; also F.M. to CD., 4 Jan. 1768, S.F.R., vol. 14. 32 F.M. to CD., 19 April 1766, S.F.R., vol. 13. 33 F.M.C., 1 Dec. 1764, S.F.R., vol. 72. 34 F.M.C., 13 Sept. and 8 Oct. 1765, S.F.R., vol. 73. 35 CD. to F.M., 5 Feb. 1768, S.F.R., vol. 31.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 10:19:41AM via free access BRITISH TRADE AND POLICY IN INDONESIA. 207 the London market.36 The court was anxious nevertheless to foster the general prosperity of Bencoolen and made. no objection when governor Wyatt decided not to increase customs duties at the settlement beyond the 15% import duty on "Eastern clouting" which had been retained in 1762. On the contrary, the directors were prepared to remove even this impost if they could encourage "the Trade to the Eastward" by so doing.37 The reaction of Wyatt and the Bencoolen council to this suggestion is quite significant. They declined to abolish the 15% duty in November 1769 because such a step would throw "this branch of Trade" into the hands of the Chinese & other Country Merchants to the prejudice of the Company's Servants". Instead, the duty was relaxed only for "clouting" imported by European private merchants from "the Eastward Islands, Atcheen, or other Malay Ports". This was done "the better to enable them to prosecute their Schemes to the Eastward... [and] ... to indemnifye them in some measure from the heavy Expence their vessels are navigated at".38 The development of British country trade with eastern Indonesia in the 1760's will be examined later in this article. It is sufficient for the moment to note that the trade was valuable enough apparently by 1769 for Wyatt to discriminate against possible Asian competitors. The failure of the Bencoolen government's quest for spices can also be ascribed to the competition that Bencoolen had to face from the free ports of the Malay Peninsula. Reference has already been made to the fact that the Bugis and Mandarese skippers used the price of cloves in Selangor as a determinant of the Bencoolen price. When Wyatt declined to add to the 15% duty on "Eastern clouting" in November 1767, he noted the recent news that the clove smugglers had "returned to their former tract, being supplied with Bengal & Coast Goods at Cuda [Kedah] & Salangore [Selangor] in the Streights of Malacca cheaper than we can afford them here".39 After the end of the Seven Years' War there was a considerable increase in the British country trade from Madras and Calcutta to Acheh, Kedah, Kuala Selangor and Riau. The Dutch government at Malacca lacked both the authority and the resources to hinder this commercial boom. Acheh

36 CD. to F.M., 24 Dec. 1766, loc. cit. 3T F.M.C., 7 Nov. 1767, S.F.R., vol. 75; F.M. to CD., 4 Jan. 1768, S.F.R., vol. 14; CD. to F.M., 14 Dec. 1768, S.F.R., vol. 32. 38 F.M.C., 7 Nov. 1769, S.F.R., vol. 77. «• F.M.C., 7 Nov. 1767, S.F.R., vol. 75; F.M. to CD., 4 Jan. 1768, S.F.R., vol. 14.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 10:19:41AM via free access 208 D. K. BASSETT. and Kedah were free ports, while Selangor and the Riau-Johore empire, where the Dutch had treaty rights, were under the political control and commercial influence of the Bugis. It was not only piece goods which were imported to Malacca Strait from Bengal and Madras, but opium bought from the British Com- pany's agents in Calcutta. In this branch of commerce, too, Bencoolen was at a disadvantage. It will be recalled that governor Carter asked the Bengal govemment to supply the Bencoolen presidency with 50 chests of opium in September 1762 to meet the demand created by the eastern nakhodas. When the first 25 chests" reached Bencoolen in August 1763, Carter inaugurated the Opium Society of Fort Marl- borough, which guaranteed the Company a profit of $100 per chest on the invoiced price in return for a monopoly of opium sales at Bencoolen, Natal and Moko Moko.40 The beginnings of the opium trade were rather erratic. Fifty chests of opium were imported to Bencoolen by the Society in 1763 and the consignment required from Calcutta was trebled in 1764. Unfortunately, the Nancy ketch (captain William Cleghorn), which carried 70 chests of the 1764 order, was lost in a mutiny or treacherous attack near Acheh in September 1764.41 The Society had to buy 20 chests • of opium from commodore John Watson of the frigate Revenge in August of that year. The price of $450 per chest was so high that the Society could not allow the Company the guaranteed profit of $100 per chest, but the risk of disappointing the eastern nakhodas completely clinched the bargain with Watson.42 The managers of the Bencoolen Opium Society were mortified "to find every Private Trader supplied with this Commodity and their own Endeavors ineffectual" because of the failure of the Calcutta government to support the west Sumatran monopoly.43 But their troubles seemed to be over in February 1765 when they received 75 chests of opium on the Diligent and an assurance that the Bengal government had banned the free trade in opium to the British posses- sions in west Sumatra.44

40 F.M.C., 18 Aug. 1763. S.F.R., vol, 71. The court had given Carter authority to set up the Opium Society in its letter of 4 February 1761 41 For depositions concerning the loss of the Nancy see F.M.C., 20 and 23 Oct., 3 Nov. 1764, S.F.R., vol. 72. Matthew Bray, the second mate, who was suspected of complicity in the plundering of the ship, was executed at Madras in 1765. 42 F.M.C., 22 Aug. 1764, S.F.R., vol. 72. 43 F.M.C., 7 July 1764, loc. cit. 44 F.M.C., 23 Feb. 1765, S.F.R., vol. 73. The captain of the snows Syren and Diligent which brought the Society's opium from Bengal in August 1763 and

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In reality the respite was illusory, because the Bencoolen Opium Society had to compete with the country traders who frequented the Malay and Dutch ports in Malacca Strait and west Sumatra. The Bengal presidency continued to sell opium freely for export to non- British settlements. "It is well known", commented the Bencoolen council in March 1765, that tho' ye Bengal price still remains at 650 Rupees per Chest to private Merchants yet that the quantity purchased at Bengal last year was very considerable, perhaps as much as ever, & that the price has probably, indeed it may be said [to have] only been kept up at Bengal by its being engrossed by the Gentlemen of Patna & purchased from the hopes that the Merchants at Bengal entertained that by being first at Market their Sales would be equivalent thereto. So far is certain from private advices, that above 500 Chests are gone from thence to the Streights of Malacca last year & it is also pretty certain that the Dutch are fully supplyed.45 The current selling price of opium at Bencoolen, Natal and Moko Moko was $365 per chest, inclusive of the Company's profit of $100, but the Calcutta cost price of 650 rupees or $300 probably gave the Bengal merchants a sales advantagè in the Selangor, Riau and west Sumatran markets.46 The demand for opium at Bencoolen was not as great as anticipated and the Bengal government accidentally over- supplied Bencoolen presidency in 1765. The demand declined still further because the clove smugglers, disconcerted by the poor opium supplies at Bencoolen in 1764 and the strict Dutch watch in the eastern quarter and Sunda Strait in 1765, seem to have reverted to Malacca Strait.47 Three British country ships also helped to undermine the opium sales in Bencoolen by trading in that commodity at the Malay and Dutch ports of west Sumatra.48 Nor was it only the country

February 1765 was the famous mariner Thomas Forrest. Forrest's where- abouts between 1765 and 1770 were previously unknown, but it now appears that he resigned the service in- October 1765 after his return to Bengal. See F.M.C., 8 March 1766, S.F.R., vol. 74; also D, K .Bassett, "Thomas Forrest", JMBRAS, XXXIV, (2), 109. 48 F.M.C., 23 March 1765, S.F.R., vol. 73. 48 The cost price of opium in Calcutta must have been rising sharply, because Forrfest bought opium in Calcutta at 250 Arcot rupees per chest in 1762 and sold it for 550 rupees per chest at Analabu, south of Acheh. Forrest, Voyage from Calcutta to the Mergui Archipelago, 45-6. The Arcot rupee tended to fluctuate in value, but it was usually worth 2s. 4d. 47 F.M.C., 12 Nov. 1765, S.F.R., vol. 73. 48 Loc. cit. The ships were the Bombay galley (captain Read), Jenny snow (captain Sam Price) and Betsy galley (captain David Symmonds). The Jenny and Betsy were from Madras. Other British country ships on the west coast in 1765 were the Elisabeth (Jacob Johnston) from Madras, the Success (Peters) and Adventure (McBride) from Bombay. The Elisabeth and Betsy went on to Batavia.

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traders who nullified the monopoly of the Opium Society. Captain R. E. Tyrrell of the Company's snow Syren put into Analabu and Padang en route from Bengal to Bencoolen early-in 1766. In the subsequent enquiry as to why he did not choose to call instead at the British settlements of Naital and Moko Moko, Tyrrell explained that he wished to utilise the off-shore winds and needed to victual at Padang. But the mates of the Syren revealed that Tyrrell had sold 30 chests of opium and several bales of piece goods at Padang. He would have sold them at Analabu had he not been forestalled by captain Crawford of the Bengal country ship LapwingA9 The poor prospects of the Bencoolen Opium Society as originally constituted led to several unauthorised kmovations. By May 1765, much to the indignation of the Company's junior merchants, who were excluded, the Opium Society became synonymous with the members of the Fort Marlborough council. The "General Concern" or co-partnership of council members which was formed in that month had its antecedents in the partnership of governor Roger Carter, Joseph Darvall and John Herbert. This enterprizing trio purchased the Success snow in March 1765 and tried to develop direct trade with eastern Indonesia. The blessing of the Company could be anticipated because the directors had suggested in November 1763 that the pepper investment for Canton could be increased by resuming the Company's trade with Banjarmasin.50 Carter argued that the ship which the directors planned to send to Banjarmasin would not be ready to leave Bencoolen until June 1765. Neither was Banjarmasin an important opium entrepot, but the surplus opium held by the Bencoolen Opium Society had to be sold before it deteriorated. Finally, the opium must be sold in the eastern islands before the importers from Selangor and Batavia reached there and spoiled the market. As a result of these arguments, the council allowed Carter, Darvall and Herbert to purchase 40 chests of opium from the Opium Society and ship them on the Success to "try what can be done towards opening a Trade to the Eastern Islands". The usual cost price at Bencoolen was $365 per chest, but the owners of the Success were allowed a rebate of $50 per chest, subject to the approval of the directors. The Success also carried 14 of the Company's soldiers, some military stores and a covenanted servant tp collect information during the voyage.51 -

49 F.M.C., 25 March 1766, S.F.R., vol. 74. 50 CD. to F.M., 16 Nov. 1763, S.F.R., vol. 31. 51 F.M.C., 23 March 1765, S.F.R., vol. 73.

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The Success (captain David Rannie) sailed for eastern Indonesia on 2 April 1765. The details of her voyage cannot be given here. Suffice it to say that she lost her passage to Pasir in Borneo and Edward Coles, the supercargo, sold the opium at Riau. The Success then sailed to Bengal, where Coles bought opium from Messrs. Vansittart and Plowman for the partnership and, rather dishonestly, added a large quantity of opium on his own account. The market for opium at Riau in 1766 was not particularly good — a fac t which Coles attributed to the import of competing opium from the Fortune, which was anchored at Kuala Selangor, and which Carter attributed to the dishonestly of Coles in selling his opium in competition with his employers. In an attempt to find a better market, Coles sailed to Palembang and Pasir, but the Bugis to whom he had sold opium at Riau were at Pasir before him, and Carter, Darvall and Herbert seem to have made a loss on the voyage.52 The Success returned to Ben- coolen in July 1766 and five days later her owners offered 80 tons of tin and some birds' nests to the council for shipment to Canton on the Hawke East Icidiaman.53 Coles, who had a large stock of tin himself, deliberately undersold his employers and incurred a reputation for dishonesty which was still with him when he sailed on the British expedition to Balambangan in January 1773.54 By the time the Success returned to Bencoolen, it had become the property of the "General Concern" of council members which had been formed in May 1765. The "Concern" was justified subsequently on the ground that the capital amalgamation involved enabled the pro- moters to engage in more than "the little Pedling Trade of Piece Goods". It was argued that through the "Concern" the Bencoolen Opium Society would be able to compete more effectively against the opium importers from India. The grievances of the junior merchants, while real enough, would be more than offset by the general prosperity which would accrue to Bencoolen from the opening of new branches of trade. The "Concern" hoped ultimately "to engage in such a Number of Shipping as might enable them to carry on a large Trade to the Eastern Islandfs] and to the Streights of Mallacca, Bay of Siam

52 Carter-Coles correspondence, July 1766 in F.M.C., 19 Oct. 1772, S.F.R., vol. 79. «« F.M.D.C, 14 and 19 July 1766, S.F.R., vol. 74. 64 F.M.C., 19 Oct. 1772, S.F.R., vol. 79. The Fort Marlborough board agreed to transfer Coles to the Balambangan establishment so that he might not become a member of the Bencoolen council.

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& ca.".55 By February 1766 the council partnership employed three snows of 200 tons apiece and hoped "soon to say the West Coast is not without Ships of their [sic] own".56 The junior merchants were admitted "to the opium monopoly at the insistence of the directors in February 1766,57 but the date when the council members ceased to manage their maritime trade as a partnership is uncertain. The "General Concern" may have dissolved when Carter resigned the governorship to Wyatt in January 1767 or when he left for Madras in the following August. In the interim, the Success made two voyages "to the Eastward" in öctober 1766 and June 1767. The Tartar brig, another of Carter's' ships, made an abortive attempt to reach the Sulu Archipelago via Java in March-May 1767, of which more will be said later. Finally, the Betsy, which may have been the other ship of the "Concern", seems to have visited Batavia and other ports to the eastward in April-June 1767.58 On several occasions the covenanted servants of the Company were employed^ as supercargoes' on these ventures. James Stevenson, who was a factor on the Bencoolen establishment, went on the Tartar to Bengal in September 1766. Giles Holloway, the Fort Marlborough sub-treasurer, sailed as supercargo on the Success in October 1766. The directors were critical of this practice for some years to come, but there is no doubt that it persisted. Meanwhile, the Bencoolen government endeavoured to resumé the Compaiiy's trade with Banjarmasin, as the directors had recommended in November 1763. On the rather garbled information of one, Nakhoda Tangee, the Bencoolen council decided that the existence of a Dutch factory ait Banjarmasin did not signify a Dutch monopoly of local pepper exports.59 When Tangee returned to Banjarmasin in December 1764, Carter senf letters by him to the old sultan, "Tomjeed Allah", and the young sultan who was said actually to manage the govern-

66 F.M.C., 28 Feb. 1766, S.F.R., vol. 74. 56 Loc. cit. 57 Ibid. 58 Certain other British ships visited Batavia in 1767, but we have no evidence that they sailed further east. They included the Elisabeth (Wilmot), Berkshire (Holland) and Leopard (Panton) from Bengal, the Four Friends (Cathcart) from Madras and the Prospero (Cunningham). A trade of this volume would explain why governor-general Van der Parra tried to restrict the export of rice and sugar from Batavia by foreign ships at the end of 1767. See M. L. van Deventer, De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch Geeag over Java, VIII, (The Hague, 1883), 96-7. B» F.M.C., 22 Sept. 1764, S.F.R., vol. 72; F.M. to CD., 20 March 1765, S.F.R., vol. 13.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 10:19:41AM via free access BRITISH TRADE AND POLICY IN INDONESIA. 213 ment.60 Carter also signed a contract to receive Banjarmasin pepper at Bencoolen at $10 per picul and sought permission from London to-sell military stores to the Banjarese.61 Unfortunately, Tangee did not return to Bencoolen in 1765 and the council lacked detailed information on Banjarmasin when they sent the Royal George and Diligent there in January 1766.62 By this time the Banjarmasin venture had grown into a more ambitious scheme. As early as May 1765, the Bencoolen council agreed that if the ship sent to Banjarmasin failed to get a cargo, in her return hither she [should] touch at as many of the Eastern Islands not in possession of the Dutch as may be 'found Convenient, as well to purchase a Loading of Rice which will be wanted here, as with a View to procure intelligence of the Spice and other Trade; and to fix upon a place where a Settlement might be made if hereafter it should be concluded practicable and proper; or otherwise [to] enter into such Contracts with the Natives as may give the Company a preference to trade with them exclusive of all other Nations.63 The council's instructions of 9 December 1765 to Nairne, Skottowe and Chalmers, the supercargoes of the Royal George, listed the regiems worthy of inspection as "Passeer [Pasir], Sembowa [Sumbawa], Bally [Bali] & other Ports to the Eastward", and urged them tb waste no time in making for them if the Banjarese proved indifferent to British overtures. A current rumour that the Dutch were withdrawing their factory from Banjarmasin encouraged the Bencoolen council to anti- cipate an enthusiastic reception from the Banjarese, but they deemed an export of 6,000 piculs of pepper per annum to be the minimum which would justify the expense of a settlement. Nor were they prepared to exceed the price of $6 per picul which the British had paid for Banjarmasin pepper in 1745. The council also preferred Pulo Laut off south east Borneo to Banjarmasin as the site of the British settlement, because it was healthier and better situated to attract the trade of south and east Borneo, the Spice Islands and Java. Finally, the supercargoes were advised during the outward voyage to investigate trade openings in Bangka, where there was "a very considerable Settle- ment of Chinese on the East Coast...., wherein a Abundance of Tin is procured & is sold to the Dutch at Pallimboang [Palembang]".6^ 60 Presumably, the old sultan was Tamjidoellah, who died in 1767, and the young sultan was Nata, Akamoeddin Saidoellah, who had taken the title in October 1762. See J. C. Noorlander, Bandjarmasin en de Compagnie in de tweede helft der 18de Eeuw, (Leiden, 193S), 43-7, 189. 61 F.M.C., 1 Dec. 1764, S.F.R., vol. 72. Tangeé assured Carter that only fire- arms would sell in Banjarmasin. 82 F.M. tó CD., 19 April 1766, S.F.R., vol. 13. 83 F.M.C., 9 May 1765, S.F.R., vol. 73. 64 F.M.C., 9 Dec. 176S, loc. cit. Dl. 120 14

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These schemes were certain to give offence and alarm to the Dutch government at Batavia. In May 1765, W. H. van Ossenberch, the retiring direotor of the north east coast of Java, had urged upon his successor, Johannes Vos, the desirability of a Dutch military post at Blambangan in south east Java, lest "onze magtige antagonisten, ik meene de Engelsen" should gain a foothold there.65 One of the rulers of Bali, Gusti Agung of Mangoei, claimed suzerainty over the eastern hook of Java and Ossenberch wished to eliminate Balinese influence there. Gusti Agung had already carried off the brothers Pangeran Pati and Pangeran Willis from Blambangan to Bali. In Banjarmasin, the Dutch resident, Willem Adriaan Palm, was finally achieving some success in maintaining the Dutch pepper contract of 1747 despite Chinese competition and the arbitrary inclinations of sultan Akamoeddin Saidoellah. The total pepper export of Banjarmasin barely reached the 6,000 piculs required by the Bencoolen council,66 and a successful British venture there would require the complete elimination of the Dutch and Chinese. The report of the supercargoes of the Royal George in July 1766 makes no mention of a British inspection of Bangka and probably nothing was done. When the Royal George reached Banjarmasin, the sultan sought Palm's advice and declined to make a commercial agreement with the British Company.67 Only 22 of the 70 chests of opium on the Royal George were sold at other ports, because ships from Bengal were at Pasir for the first time and Dutch influence was strong in Sumbawa.68 The supercargoes considered sailing to Mempa-

65 Van Deventer, Java, VIII, 24-5. 88 Noorlander, Bandjarmasin, 50, Bijlage 7. 67 Op. cit., 51. Report of Nairne, Skottowe and Chalmers, 15 July 1766, S.F.R., vol. 14. 68 Report of Nairne etc, loc cit. One of the ships at Pasir was of course Carter's Success with Edward Coles aboard. Another ship, which Noorlander describes as being pirated, probably by the Banjarese (op cit., 51), was undoubtedly the London (captain Alves). I ara indebted to Mr. Ifor B. Powell of University College, Cardiff, for forwarding details in litt., 5 Aug. 1962, which suggested that the London was the victim. This is confirmed by the Carter-Coles correspondence of July 1766, in which Coles explains his failure to find a good market for Carter's opium at Pasir. by "the unfortunate accident, which happen'd to the London". The implication would seem to be that the London was carrying opium, which the murderers of Alves placed on the market at Pasir. F.M.C., 19 Oct. 1772, S.F.R., vol. 79. Another Bengal ship (captain Mackintosh) was at Pasir in 1766 or 1767, and left behind Nicholas Wray, who made his way subsequently to Lagufree in Celebes. In 1768 Wray warned Philip Carteret, the famous circumnavigator of the world, of a reputed Dutch plot against him in Celebes. See H.M.S. (I.O.L.), vol. 146, ff. 147-9.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 10:19:41AM via free access BRITISH TRADE AND POLICY IN INDONESIA. 215 wah, Trengganu and other ports on the China Sea to dispose of their opium, but the urgency of conveying an offer of a settlement in Blambangan to the Bencooleri government induced them to return direct to Bencoolen from Bali Strait. They presented their report to Carter and the council on 15 July 1766.69 When the Royal George called at Buleleng in Bali, the sultan of Karangasem approached the supercargoes to invite British support for his pending invasion of Blambangan. The latter temporised by sug- gesting that the invasion be postponed until December, but hinted that the peaceful benefits to be derived from a British settlement would surpass those of a war in Blambangan. On sailing to Pangpang Bay, the supercargoes were greeted by a Chinese, Kay Ban, who described a conversation he claimed to have had with Gusti Agung at Mangoei, in which the latter had indicated his wish to see the British Company open a settlement in Blambangan. At first the supercargoes suspected a plot by the Dutch at Grisek to discover their,plans, but quickly accepted Kay Ban's assurances that Gusti Agung, having secured Pangeran Pati and Pangeran Willis, hoped to forestall an attack on Blambangan by Karangasem by interesting the British in the country. It is impossible to teil whether Gusti Agung genuinely approached the British supercargoes, because for the sake of secrecy the supercargoes did not try to discuss the matter directly with Gusti Agung or his shahbandar in Pangpang. British information was derived entirely from Kay Ban and another Chinese. When the British ships left Pangpang for Bencoolen, it was Kay Ban who was sent to Mangoei to obtain confirmation of Gusti Agung's offer to the Company. Kay Ban was given some cloth for sale and a përahu to enable him to come to Bencoolen with his report. A few days earlier, emissaries from Karangasem and Lombok had visited the British supercargoes at Pangpang to seek British friendship. The expressions of British esteem with which they had to be content were not wholly false, because the supercargoes had an eye to "the Choice of Places in the Streights of Lomboc to settle in" if the Pangpang Bay project proved abortive. Pangpang Bay was described by the British supercargoes as a well sheltered anchorage where small ships could be launched. There was enough teak and other timber to meet local needs and supply Fort Marlborough. Blambangan was believed to extend 70-80 miles inland from Pangpang Bay and foodstuffs were plentiful in peaceful times.

68 Report of Nairne, Skottowe and Chalmers, 15 July 1766, S.F.R., vol. 14.

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The presence of a British settlement would stimulate the local Chinese to resumé the arrack and sugar manufacture they had allowed to lapse and other Chinese immigrants would come to help them. The junks which brought the immigrants would stimulate local trade and provide Chinese goods at better terms than at Canton. The Company- cpuld expect to benefit from the sale of iron, steel, copper, saltpetre and opium, the export of sappan wood, and the duties on arrack and sugar manufacture. Finally, a British settlement at Pangpang Bay. would allow the Company to break the Dutch spice monopoly and foil the Dutch precaution "in so carefully excluding us from the Streights of Sunda". A long term possibility was the exploration of New Holland or Australia. The supercargoes anticipated that the Dutch would seek "to prevent our breaking in on what they may reckon their Limits, having been so long in the undisturbed Possession of the Trade to the Eastward of the Streights of Malacca & Sunda". But they argued that the Dutch would seek to foil British efforts by politica! intrigue in adjacent countries rather than by direct intervention in Bali or Blam- bangan, where they had never had a settlement.70 The Dutch reaction.was actually much more forthright. Govemor- general P. A. van der Parra soon learned of marked British activity off Blambangan and interpreted it correctly as an attempt to settle there.71 A Malay emissary sent by Johannes Vos to Blambangan and Bali brought back a report that two British ships and thirteen barks were expectedat Pangpang. It was also said that the local Chinese planned to hand over Pangpang Bay to a band of Mandarese. Strangely enough, Gusti Agung assüred the Malay that the military preparations at Mangoei were dictated by his fear of a combined attack by the British and Karangasem.72 Van der Parra instructed Vos to move a section of Dutch troops to Blambangan to assert Dutch sovereignty and sent large military and naval reinforcements to eastern Java, Madura and "Bali Strait. In March 1767 a major Dutch expedition invaded Blambangan, with immediate success. The war soon spread to the states of Lamadjang, Malang and Antang and the Dutch had to take Blambangan a second time in May 1768. Pangeran Willis, who had returned to Blambangan to fight the Dutch,73 was captured and banished to Banda. Balinese hegemony in the south east hook was

70 Loc. cit. 71 Van Deventer, Java, VIII, 56-7. 72 Op cit., iv. "Relaas van Bappa Mida, Samarang 21 December 1766". 73 Opl cit., xii f.h; 1, 73.'

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 10:19:41AM via free access BRITISH TRADE AND POLICY IN INDONESIA. 217 eliminated. Despite the Dutch naval blockade of the Blambangan coast during the war, several Englishmen were fóund at Pangpang when it feil in May 1768. According to Dutch sources, the British were already negotiating with Daing Tjallak, a Chinese (?), about the planting of sugar cane and. the building of a sugar mill there.74 If this was the case, the men involved were British country traders, not the Company's agents, as will appear below. The directors of the British Company considered the Pangpang Bay project in February 1768, but deferred a decision. The erased sentence in the court's rough despatch ran: "We have no design at present to accept the Offer of a Settlement at Pampang".75 Thè refusal was made explicit a year later after the directors had heard that the Dutch Company had hoisted its flag at Pangpang.76 The vague expression of friendly inclinations towards Karangasem, to which the directors confined themselves in February 1768, was not followed up. The disinclination of the British directors to undertake political commitments in Bali and Blambangan did not imply their acquiescence in Dutch monopolistic pretentions in the Java Sea. One of the few British ships which visited the north Java coast during thé Dutch campaign of 176777 was the Tartar brig, which called at Boriang. The Tartar, one of Carter's ships, was commanded by Burrington Netherton and left Calcutta in December 1766 bound for Sulu and other eastern ports with a cargo of opium and piece goods. After leaving Bencoolen, the ship put into Bönang on 28 May 1767 to get provisions. While bartering ashore, Ransom, the chief mate, and his boat's crew were arrested by the Dutch resident of Rembang, who appeared with a body of cavalry. Netherton went to Rembang personally to demand their release, but was asked to await a decision by Vos, the director in Semarang. According to Netherton, the resident of Rembang claimed that he had explicit orders from Batavia to use force "to stop all English Vessels bound to the Eastward". When Netherton sailed to Lombok ihstead to buy provisions, he was warned that the Dutch ban on dealings with the British extended there and even involved the killing of any Englishman who resisted arrest. Desperately short of

74 Op. cit., xiv, f.n. 2. Another Chinese who was implicated was "The-Poanks", a fugitive from Batavia. Op cit., 74. 75 CD. to F.M., 5 Feb. 1768, S.F.R., vol. 31. 76 CD. to F.M. select committee, 10 Feb. 1769, S.F.R., vol. 32. 77 Van der Parra noted a marked decline in the number of British ships in the area that year. Van Deventer, Java, VIII, 75.

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rice, water and men, Netherton took the Tartar back to Bencoolen, where he lodged a complaint against the Batavia govemment.78 The Bencoolen government had standing instructions to avoid giving just cause for offence to its Dutch neighbours, but there was no question of accepting Dutch pretensions to limit the British right of free navigation. "Be very particular therein", wrote the British directors in January 1765, "if at any Time you shall meet with any Interruption from them under their Pretensions to an exclusive Navigation in the Eastern Seas, [so] that we may assert and support our undoubted Privilege of a free Passage in and through them".79 On hearing Netherton's complaint, governor Wyatt and the council protested formally to Van der Parra, demanding satisfaction for the loss of the Tartar's voyage and the immediate release of Ransom and 'his men. The Bencoolen government deplored the "unjustifiable Practices of the Dutch" in seeking to confine the navigation of the Eastern Seas to themselves. Wyatt also referred the incident to the directors to take appropriate action.80 Van der Parra's reply of 30 December 1768 was not received at Bencoolen until May 1769. Supported by a wealth of depositions from Rembang, Van der Parra rejected the Bencoolen government's "ill grounded representations" and maintained that the Dutch Company had done nothing contrary to justice, humanity or existing Anglo- Dutch treaties. He suggested that Netherton was engaged in contra- band trade and that his real destination was Macassar not Sulu. Netherton's precipitate departure from Bonang without Ransom and the boat and his failure to return, "maugre his pretences to the contrary", were interpreted as evidence of his guilt.81 Van der Parra rejected as ludicrous Netherton's charge that the Batavia government had given orders for the killing of British interlopers in east Java and Lombok and attributed Netherton's loss of his voyage to the change in the monsoon. Passing to general principles, Van der Parra deriied the British freedom "to come to places wherever you please" as a violation of the right of a sovereign to restrict admission to his terri- toriës. He concluded by advising the Bencoolen government not to issue marine passports irresponsibly and thus encourage British country

78 F.M.C., 6 June 1767, S.F.R., vol. 75. n CD. to F.M., 25 Jan. 1765, S.F.R., vol. 31. 80 F.M.C., 6 June 1767, S.F.R., vol. 75; CD. to F.M., 4 Jan. 1768, S.F.R., vol. 14. 81 Netherton died at Bencoolen on 21 July 1767.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 10:19:41AM via free access BRITISH TRADE AND POLICY IN INDONESIA. 219 traders "in places where they have no right to Trade".82 Van der Par- ra's letter confirmed the suspicions of the Bencoolen government that the Dutch planned to stop British trade to eastern Indonesia and the British directors were again pressed to seek satisfaction in Europe.83 The outcome of the Tartar affair in Europe is unknown to the present writer, but it is clear that Netherton's fate did not deter British country ships from sailing the Java Sea. Allowing for possible omissions, twelve British country ships visited Bencoolen in 1769, of which five went on to Batavia and another two, the Assistance (Evans) and Fortune (Wilmot), certainly made voyages "to the Eastward". Six ships passed through Bencoolen to Batavia in 1770 and another ship, the Experiment (Richardson), was in eastern Indonesia between January and September. In 1772 thirteen British country ships came to Bencoolen, of which five sailed to Batavia. The corresponding figures in 1773 were fifteen and twelve. The voyages "to the Eastward" seem to have been the particular concern of Richard Wyatt & Company of Bencoolen, which owned the Assistance and Experiment in 1769-70 and also owned ithe Fortune and Union by 1772-3. The Experiment was commanded on her eastern voyage in 1770 by William Richardson, who had been captain of Carter's Succëss, and the cargo she later carried to Bengal included $8,500 of wax and $28,200 of black Borneo pepper.8* John Herbert, who was a member of another Bencoolen partnership until September 1771, owned the Jenny (Hobson) and Bencoolen Merchant (Orrock). He left for Madras in December 1771, only to reappear in the following October as chief of the projected British settlement at Balambangan in the Sulu Archipelago. The contemporary prosperity of the Bencoolen merchant community is evident from the large loans which Wyatt & Company made to the Company in 1772-3 and the sum of $151,000 which various citizens placed in the Company's cash in return for bills on London in January 1771. In addition it is clear that there was a marked expansion in British India-based country trade to Bencoolen and Batavia after 1768. It is possible, but not certain, that some of the ships in this latter category

82 Van der Parra to Wyatt and council, 30 Dec. 1768 in F.M.C., 31 May 1769, S.F.R., vol. 77. 83 F.M.C., 31 May 1769, loc. cit.; also F.M.C., 7 Nov. 1769, loc. cit. 84 Manifest of private trade exported from Fort Marlborough, 1770, S.F.R., vol. 14. The Experiment may have been the ship which the Dutch resident of Banjarmasin, Palm, mentioned as "een flinke lading peper gekregen hebben" at nearby Tabanio in 1770. Noorlander, Bandjarmasin, 54.

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sailed from Batavia to eastern Indonesia before returning to Bencoolen and India. There is of course one element in the situation for which no allow- ance has been made. This is the Madras and Calcutta country merchant-skippers who preferred to reach eastern Indonesia via Malacca Strait and Riau rather than via Bencoolen. The presence of Bengal ships at Pasir in 1766 certainly suggests that this connection existed. After 1766 there are several possibilities. The first is that the limited, spasmodic trade with Pasir and Banjarmasin which character- ised the Bencoolen partnerships in 1767-70 was also typical of the country traders in India. The second is that the Bengal country trader utilised the advantages he possessed in purchasing opium and piece goods to expand the connection with Pasir via Riau. And finally the India-based British country trader may have relegated the task of maintaining the link between Riau and Pasir to the Bugis, who were capable competitors with local connections in both places.85 Which of these surmises is correct it is impossible to say without examining the Madras, Bengal and Borneo Factory Records, which are not available to the present writer. The presence of a British settlement at Balam- bangan in 1773-5 may have iritroduced a new element ihto the situation. The year 1773 is also a .useful point at which to close our exami- nation of official British policy in Indonesia. By that time, as we have seen, the East India Company had long since abandoned its plans to form a settlement at Banjarmasin, Bali or Pangpang Bay. In February 1769 the directors had instructed Wyatt to set up a select committee of the Fort Marlborough council to consider again the problem of removing the presidency from Bencoolen. The directors hoped to set up a fort on the east coast of Sutnatra in any suitable area where the Dutch could not claim effective occupation.86 In its reply in January 1770, the select committee confined itself to opposing an east Sumatran settlement, because the whole coast from Jambi southwards was Dutch- controlled and effective supervision of the west coast plantations was impossible from the other side of the island.87 It was not until March

85 Thomas Forrest, who visited Pasir en route to Balambangan on the Britannia early in 1773, described it as consisting of 300 wooden houses, móstly inhabited by Bugis merchants. The Bugis overthrew the local Malay sultan at that time and compelled him to move elsewhere. Edward Coles was to have been the Company's resident at Pasir, but this incident caused Herbert to close the factory. Forrest, Voyage from Calcutta to the Mergui Archipelago, 83-5. 86 CD. to F.M. select committee, 10 Feb. 1769, S.F.R., vol. 32. 87 F.M. select committee to CD., 12 Jan. 1770, S.F.R., vol. 14.

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1771 that a botanist, Charles Miller, and an engineer, Carl Gustavus Whalfelt, began a survey of the south Sumatran coast which ultimately extended from Belimbing Bay to Bencoolen.88 The result of this com- rnendable effont was the discovery that only small' ships drawing less than three fathoms could shelter in Belimbing Bay,89 and that there was a rather better anchorage for ships beating up the coast at Bandar Bay near Kawur.90 Clearly, wherever the Fort Marlborough presidency moved, it would not be to the south. The 1770's mark the diversion of the Company's interest from the provocative projects in the Java Sea and Sunda Strait to the peripheral areas of Malacca Strait and the South China Sea. In December 1769 Joseph Darvall, the resident of Natal, drew the attention of the directors Laurence Sulivan and Joseph Hurlock to the predominant position which a group of Madras merchants had secured in Acheh. Darvall suggested that the Company should supplant the Madras merchants and develop Acheh into an entrepot for the trade of China, India and the eastern archipelago. He argued that the British Company might exploit its patronage of the sultan of Acheh to gain "fuil possession of nearly one half the Island [of Sumatra], without a single Dutch Settlement intervening, & besides be masters of the Navagaition [sic] of great part of the Straits of Malacca".91 In March 1770 Robert Cowan Kellett sent Sulivan a similar report on Acheh from Madras.92 The London directors pressed for further information on the commercial prospects in Acheh and the role of the Madras Association there. In order to obtain it, the Bencoolen government sent Giles Holloway to Acheh in September 1771 „and >the Madras government sent Charles Desvoeux in February 1772. By the time Desvoeux set out, the letters of Francis Light to Warren Hastings extolling the prosperity of Kedah induced the Madras government to send the Hon. Edward Monckton as an additional ambassador to Kedah.93 Finally, in September 1771, after a preliminary survey of the Sulu Archipelago by captain Trotter,

88 In the process, Whalfeldt walked overland from Belimbing to Bencoolen. . «• F.M.C., 4 July 1772, S.F.R., vol. 79. 90 F.M.C., 11 July 1772, loc. cit. 91 J. Darvall to L. Sulivan, Natal, 4 Dec. 1769, S.F.R., vol. 30. 92 R. C. Kellett to L. Sulivan, Madras, 8 March 1770, loc. cit. 93 F. Light to W. Hastings, 17 Jan. 1772, B.M. Add. MS. 29,133, ff. 8-12. The reports of Monckton and Desvoeux can be found in S.F.R., vol. 15; Also see Clodd, Malaya's first British pioneer, 12-23.

Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 10:19:41AM via free access 222 D. K. BASSETT. the directors sent the Britannia to Balambangan and appointed John Herbert to govern the new settlement.94 Every one of these enterprizes failed. Holloway and Desvoeux were rebuffed in Acheh in 1771-2 and Monckton failed to obtain permission for a British settlement in Kedah, Riau and Trengganu. Balambangan, which was occupied in 1773, never became the great entrepot of the China Sea envisaged by Dalrymple and the settlement was already a commercial failure when it was destroyed in a Suluk raid in February 1775.95 But abortive as these ventures were, they set the pattern of future British policy in the Eastern Seas. The missions of Holloway and Desvoeux were the precursors of the equally unsuccessful Botham and Kinloch missions to Acheh in 1782 and 1784. Monckton's embassy to Riau, Kedah and Trengganu was followed a decade or so later by the schemes of Francis Light and James Scott for a British settlement in Junk Ceylon and Penang and by Thomas Forrest's abortive attempt to open a British commercial post at Riau.96 Even the disastrous Balambangan enterprize had its counterpart on the other side of the South China Sea when Chapman was sent to secure a settlement in Cochin China in 1778-9.97 But the efforts of the Bencoolen government in the 1760's to promote an exchange of opium and spices, to extend the Company's activities to Banjarmasin, Pasir, Bali and Sumbawa, and to establish a British settlement in Sunda Strait or south east Java seem to have had no sequel. In the Anglo-Dutch war of 1780-4 the British Company captured Padang and planned to overthrow Dutch rule in Celebes,98 but these were the products of unusual circumstances. It was left to Raffles to endeavour to subvert Dutch influence in Indonesia in time of peace.

D. K. BASSETT

94 Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, I, 89-92. Dalrymple had actually settled sepoys at Balambangan in 1764-5, after the evacuation of Manila, but they were withdrawn. 95 Harlow, op. cit., 93-7. 88 Hall, History of South East Asia, 428-9; Clodd, Malaya's first British pioneer, 29-32, 34-5; Bassett, "Thomas Forrest", JMBRAS, XXXIV, (2), 115-9. 9T Harlow, op. cit., 97-102; A. Lamb, "British Missions to Cochin China: 1778-1822", JMBRAS, XXXIV, (3) and (4), 13-77. 98 Harlow, op. cit., 105-6, 135-43; Bassett, "Thomas Forrest", JMBRAS, XXXIV. (2), 113-4.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Add. MS. Additional Manuscript. B.M. British Museum, London. CD. Court of directors of the East India Company. F.M. Fort Marlborough. F.M.C. Fort Marlborough Consultations. F.M.D.C. Fort Marlborough Diary and Consultations. H.M.S. Home Miscellaneous Series; India Office Library. I.O.L. India Office Library, Commonwealth Relations Office, London. JMBRAS. Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society. S.F.R. Sumatra Factory Records, India Office Library.

GLOSSARY

Coyan. A measure of weight = 40 piculs or 5,333.3 English lbs.

Curr'ency. The dollar referred to throughout is the Spanish dollar or real of eight valued at 5 English shillings by the British Company. The Sicca or Arcot rupee was worth about 2s. 4d.

Nakhoda. An Asian sea captain.

Përahu. Often given as praw, prow, prau, prahu. A small Indonesian or Malay sailing ship.

P.icul. A measure of weight, usually equivalent to 133.3 English lbs., but varying in particular instances.

Shahbandar. The royal official in an Asian port who was responsible for the supervision of foreign traders.

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