00: SOME BRITISH SOLDIERS IN AMERICA SOME BRITISH SOLDIERS IN AMERICA BY CAPTAIN W. H. WILKIN THE SHERWOOD FORESTERS ffoo LONDON HUGH REES, LTD. 5, REGENT STREET, S.W. 1914 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ,206 PREFACE THE average Englishman knows very little of the war which raged from 1775 till 1783. If he thinks of it at all, he merely remembers Horace " Walpole's remark about the war in which England saved a rock and lost a continent." Even soldiers as a rule know hardly anything of the doings of their own regiments in North America during the Revolutionary War. In 1862 Lord Wolseley (then a Colonel) entered Boston Harbour on his way to Montreal to take up a staff appointment in Canada. When an American gentleman pointed out Bunker's Hill, " Colonel Wolseley remarked, Ah ! that was a dreadful disaster for us" in his ; and autobiography he confesses the shame he felt when the American " I sir Bunker's Hill was replied, beg your pardon, ; a victory for the English." A little consideration will show that the British Army in North America would have no reason to shun comparison with its successors in South Africa, and the gallant deeds of our Boer fellow-subjects in South Africa were certainly not surpassed by those of the Americans. In 1775 the population of the United Kingdom was about 14,000,000, and the white population of vi PREFACE the revolted colonies was between 2,000,000, and 3,000,000. The Royal Army in America (includ- ing Canada) never exceeded 50,000 men, yet it took the colonies more than seven years to secure their independence, and then they were only successful with the help of France. In 1899 the population of the United Kingdom was about 40,000,000, while the Boer population of the two republics did not exceed 400,000. England had to maintain an army of 250,000 men in South Africa, and even then the war lasted more than two and a half years. During the century which inter- vened between the two wars, steam and electricity had done to annihilate distance much ; improved means of communication had assisted co-operation between forces and tinned foods widely separated ; rendered the task of maintaining an army in the field far less difficult. In both wars the enemy were far better supplied with information than the British troops. It is true that the invention of smokeless of value to the Boers but on powder proved great ; the other hand the wooded nature of the country in which most of the fighting took place enabled the American colonists to conceal their numbers and dispositions. In one respect the British Army was worse off in America than it was in South Africa. The colonists in America were men of our own race, and thus the war was almost a civil war. Many officers, among them Sir William Howe, were very unwilling to serve against the Americans. General Amherst, the conqueror of Canada, actually declined the command of the army, and other PREFACE vii officers remained on half-pay till the outbreak of war against France enabled them to serve their country against a foreign foe. One cannot read about the American War of Independence without being struck by its similarity in many ways to the recent war in South Africa. Americans are apt to resent the comparison, and to point out that they were successful whereas the Boers were not. They frequently ignore the fact that when they gained their independence, England was engaged in war against France, Spain, and Holland the three strongest naval powers in at that time while and Europe ; Russia, Sweden, Denmark formed the Armed Neutrality ready to join the Coalition should a favourable opportunity arise. Under similar circumstances no one would claim that we could have proved successful in South Africa. Moreover it is well to remember that the surrender of Yorktown, which practically decided the result of the war, was due to the French fleet obtaining the command of the sea for a time, and that 7,000 excellent French soldiers formed part of the attacking army, so that it is not without just cause that "Yorcktown" figures in the Gallery of Victories at Versailles. It is a matter of common knowledge that the advice of Sir William Butler, the Commander-in- Chief in South Africa before the war, was disregarded. In like manner Gage, the Commander-in-Chief in America, wrote as follows on October 30, 1774 : " If force is to be used at length, it must be a con- siderable one; for to begin with small numbers viii PREFACE will only encourage resistance and not terrify." A little later he asked for 20,000 men, but his request was disregarded by the Ministry. Lord Wolseley stated in the House of Lords that the advice which he gave at the time of the crisis in 1899 was ignored. In 1775 there was no Commander-in-Chief, but the Adjutant- General, General Harvey, wrote on June 30 to Howe : " Unless a settled plan of operations be agreed upon for next spring, our army will be destroyed by damned driblets." The military authorities at home fully realized the gravity of the position, for on the same date General Harvey wrote : " Taking America as it at present stands, it is impossible to conquer it with our British Army. To attempt to conquer it internally by our force is as wild an idea as ever controverted common sense." It is weU to remark that when these words were written England was not at war with any European power. British officers who had served in North America did not underestimate the difficulties before them in the light-hearted manner of the politicians at home. In both wars sound military plans were on various occasions subordinated to political con- siderations, with very serious results. In South Africa the Boers wasted their strength before Mafeking and Kimberley, and the outbreak of the war found a small British force dangerously exposed at Dundee. In America the British operations, particularly in the south, were largely PREFACE ix based on expected support from loyalists. The two greatest disasters which befell the Americans Fort were both largely due to political causes. Washington was only held out of deference to effect Congress, who had passed resolutions to that ; and when Lincoln was considering the advisability of evacuating Charleston, the inhabitants insisted on the place being defended. The eighteenth century is often regarded as a dull period, but the middle of that century marks a very interesting development in the history of the British Army. It was during the Seven Years' War that Stringer Lawrence and Clive following the example set by the French first showed what British officers could do with native troops. At the same time British and Colonial troops were fighting side by side against the French in America. In the American War of Independence, British officers first showed their aptitude for commanding colonial irregulars, and in Tarleton's Legion and Simcoe's Rangers we see the predecessors of the Imperial Light Horse and other famous corps in South Africa. It was inevitable from the nature of the fighting that in each war there should be a certain number of cases where the white flag was abused, and where irregulars, after offering to surrender, fired on the British but it is lamentable troops ; truly that during the South African War, as in the eighteenth century, there existed Members of Parliament who were not ashamed to cheer when the news of British reverses was announced in the House of Commons. x PREFACE The first three chapters deal with Howe, Carle- ton, and Clinton the three Commanders-in-Chief. The fourth chapter deals with Rawdon, who gained the victory of Hobkirk's Hill at the age of twenty- six, and he is followed by the three brilliant partisan leaders, Simcoe, Tarleton, and Ferguson. Medows and Harris must be dealt with together. In later years they both distinguished themselves in India. In America Medows commanded a battalion of Grenadiers, and then gained the brilliant of the French victory La Vigie against ; while the letters of Harris are most interesting. The first eight chapters all deal with men who made their mark, and who, with the exception of all rose to rank but the letters Ferguson, high ; of Lieutenant Hale are interesting just because he was not a man of note, and they describe the war from the point of view of a British subaltern. For permission to reproduce the letters of Lieutenant Hale I am indebted to his descendant Miss Hale, and to the Editor of the Regimental Annual of the Sherwood Foresters. I am especially indebted to Tarleton's History, Simcoe's Journal, the Journal of Major Andre, the Historical Documents published by the Literary and Historical Society of Quebec, and Lushington's "Life of Lord Harris." Among modern histories of the war in America I owe a special debt of gratitude to Fortescue's "His- tory of the British Army," and to Major-General Greene's "Revolutionary War of the United States." The latter work contains a wonderful series of maps. CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. HOWE 1 II. CARLETON - 25 III. CLINTON - 46 IV. RAWDON - 74 V. SlMCOE - 90 VI. TARLETON - - 118 VII. FERGUSON - - 150 VIII. MEDOWS AND HARRIS - 172 IX. HALE - 214 xi LIST OF SOME WORKS CONSULTED MAJOR ANDRE : Journal (privately printed by Bibliophile Society of Boston) . Dictionary of National Biography. J. FERGUSON : Two Scottish Soldiers. J. FISKE : The American Revolution. HON. J.