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P A U L A B I M W · • E D I

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AN INTRODUCTION TO 'S THOUGHT, WITH MAJOR NEW UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL Reader

Edited by P a u l R a b i n o w

Pantheon Books, New York Compilation, editorial matter, and Introduction Copyright © 1984 by English translations of the Preface (original version) to , Volume II; Politics and Ethics: A n Interview; Polemics, Politics, and Problemizations: An Interview with ; and What is Enlighten ment? copyright © 1984 by Random House, Inc.

All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. Published in the United States by Pantheon Books, a division of Random House, Inc., New York, and simultaneously in Can ada by Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto.

What Is Enlightenment? based on an unpublished French manuscript by Michel Foucault. Copyright © as an unpublished work, 1984, by Michel Foucault and Paul Rabinow.

Politics and Ethics: An Interview, based on an unpublished French manuscript by Michel Foucault. Copyright © as an unpublished work, 1984, by Michel Foucault.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Foucault, Michel. The Foucault reader.

1. Philosophy-Addresses, essays, lectures. 1. Rabinow, Paul. II. Title. B2430.F721 1984 194 83-19510 ISBN 0-394-52904-9 ISBN 0-394-71 340-0 (pbk.)

Manufactured in the United States of America

First Edition

Text design by Marsha Cohen Acknowledgments

Grateful acknowledgment is made to the following for permis sion to reprint previously published material:

Cornell University Press: Michel Foucault, "W hat Is an Author?" translated from the French by Josue v . Harari, in Textual Strategies: Perspec tives in Post-Structuralist Criticism, edited by Josue V. Har ari, pp. 141-160. Copyright © 1979 by Cornell University. An earlier version, in French, was published in the Bulle tin de la Societe Franfaise de Philosophie. Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, , History," in Lan guage, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Inter views by Michel Foucault, translated from the French by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon, and edited by Donald F. Bouchard. Copyright © 1977 by Cornell Uni versity. Used by permission of the publisher, Cornell University Press.

Random House, Inc.: Michel Foucault, : An Archaeology of the Hu man Sciences, translated from the French by Alan Sheri dan-Smith. Copyright © 1970 by Random House, Inc. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduc tion, translated by Robert Hurley. Copyright © 1978 by Random House, Inc. Michel Foucault, Power/: Selected Interviews and Writings, 1972-1977, edited by Colin Gordon. Copyright ©1972, 1975, 1976, 1977 by Michel Foucault. Michel Foucault, , translated by Rich ard Howard. Copyright © 1965 by Random House, Inc.

v vi . Acknowledgments

Michel Foucault, : The Birth of the Prison, translated by . Copyright © 1977 by Alan Sheridan. Reprinted by permission of Pantheon Books, a division of Random House, Inc.

Rizzoli Communications, Inc. : Michel Foucault interview, "Space, Knowledge, and Power," from Skyline (March 1982), published by Rizzoli Communications, Inc. Re printed by permission.

The University of Chicago Press: Michel Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress," from Michel Foucault: Beyond and Hermeneu tics, 2nd ed., by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow. Copyright © 1982, 1983 by the University of Chicago. All rights reserved . Reprinted by permission of the Univer sity of Chicago Press. Nietzsche, G e n ea log y , H i s t o r y

1. G en e al og y is gr ay, meticulous, a n d patiently documentary . It operates on a field of entangled a n d confused parchments, on d o cu m e nt s that h a v e been scratched over and recopied m a n y times. On this basis, it is obvious that Paul Reel w a s w r o ng to follow the English t end ency in describing the history of morality in ter ms of a linear development - in reduci ng its entire history a nd genesi s to an exclusive concern for utility. He ass u m ed that w o r d s h a d kept their meani ng , that desires still pointed in a single direction, and that retai ned their logic; and he ig nored the fact that the w or l d of speech and desires has k n o w n invasions, struggles, plundering, disguises, ploys. From t hes e elem ent s, how e v er , g e ne al og y retrieves an indispensable re straint: it m u st record the singularity of events outside of a n y m on ot o nou s finality; it m u st seek t he m in the most unpromising places, in w h a t we tend to feel is w i t hou t h i s t o r y - in sentiments, love, conscience, instincts; it m u s t be sensitive to their recur rence, not in order to trace the gradu al curve of their evolution, but to isolate the different scenes w h e r e they e ng a g ed in dif ferent roles. Finally, genealogy m u s t define even those in stances w h e n t hey are absent, the m o m e n t w h e n t h e y r e m ai n ed u n r e a l i z e d (Plato, at Syracuse, did not become M o h a m m e d ) . Genealogy, consequently, requires patience and a k now l e d g e of details, a n d it depends on a vast accumulation of source

This essay first appeared in Hommage a Jean Hyppolite (paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971), pp. 145-72 . Along with "Reponse au cercle d' epistemologie," which became the introductory chapter of The Archaeology of Knowledge, this essay represents Foucault's attempt to explain his relationship to those sources which are fundamental to his development. Its importance, in terms of understanding Foucault' s objectives, cannot be exaggerated. It is reproduced here by permission of Presses Universitaires de France .

76 Nietzsche, Genealogy, History . 77

material. Its "cyclopean monuments" 2 are constructed f r o m "discreet a n d �p arently insignificant and according to a rigorous m et ho '; t hey cannot be the product of "l ar g e a n d well-meaning rrors." 3 In short, g eneal og y d e m a n d s relentless erudition. G eneal og y does not oppose itself to history as t h e lofty and profound g az e of the philosopher m i g h t com par e to the molelike perspective of the scholar; on the cOJ:ltrary, it rejects the metahistorical d epl o y m e n t of ideal significations a n d indef inite teleologies. It opposes itself to the search for "or i g i ns ."

2. In Nietzsche, we find two uses of the w or d Ursprung. T he first is unstressed, a n d it is found alternately w i t h other t er m s such as Entstehung, Herkunft, Abkunft, Geburt. In The Genealogy of Morals, for ex a m pl e , En tsteh u n g or Ursprung ser v e s e q u ally well to denote the origin of d u t y or g u i l t y conscience;4 a n d in the discussion cif logic a nd k n o w l e d g e in The Gay Science, their origin is indiscriminately referred to as Ursprung, Entstehung, or Herkunft.5 The other use of the word is stressed. On occasion, Nietzsche places the term in opposition to another: in the first p a r a g r a p h of , All Too Human the miraculous origin (Wunderursprung) sought by metaphysics is set against the anal yses of historical philosophy, w h i c h poses questions uber Herkunft und Anfang . Ursprung is also u s e d in an ironic and deceptive m anner . In w h a t , for instance, do we find the original basis (Ursprung) of morality, a foundation sou ght after since Plato? "In detestable, narrow -mi nd ed conclusions. Pudend 6 Or in a related context, w h e r e shou l d we seek th rigin of religion (Ursprung), which Schopenhauer located i a particular metaphysical sen timent of the hereafter? It belongs, ver y simply, to an invent io n (Erfindung) , a sleight-of-hand, an artifice (Kunststilck) , a secret formula, in the rituals of black magic, in the w o r k of t h e Schwarzkunstler.7 One of the m o st significant texts w i t h respect to the u s e of all these terms a n d to the variations in the u se of Urspru ng is the preface to the Genealogy. At the begi nni ng of the text, it s objective is defined as an examination of the origin of m o r a l

preconceptions a n d the t er m used is Herkunft . Then, Nietzsche proceeds by retracing his personal involvement w i t h this q u e s - 78 . and Method tion: he recalls the period w h e n he "calligraphied" philosophy, w h e n he questioned if God m u st be held responsible for the origin of evil. He now finds this question am u si ng and properly characterizes it as a search for Urspru ng (he will shortly use the sam e term to su mm ari ze Paul Ree's activity) .8 Further on, he ev okes the anal yses that are characteristically Nietzschean an d that begi n wi t h Human, All Too Human. Here, he speaks of Herku nfthypothesen . This use of the w or d Herku nft cannot be arbitrary, since it serves to designate a num ber of texts, begin ning w i t h Human, All Too Human, w hich deal wi t h the origin of morality, asceticism, justice, and punishment. A nd yet the word u s e d in all these works had bee n Ursprung .9 It w o u l d seem that at this point in the Genealogy Nietzsche w i s h e d to validate an opposition bet w een Herkunft a n d Ursprung that did not exist t en ye ar s earlier. But immediately following the use of the two terms in a specific sense, Nietzsche reverts, in the final par agr aphs of the preface, to a u sag e that is neutral and equivalent.lO W h y does Nietzsche challenge the pursuit of the origin (Ur sprung), at least on those occasions w h e n he is trul y a geneal ogist? First, because it is an attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, a n d their carefully protected identities; because this search as su m es the existence of immobile forms that precede the external world of accident a n d succession. This search is directed to "that w hi ch w as alr eady t here," the i m ag e of a primordial trut h fully ad equ at e to its nature, a nd it necessitates the remov al of ev er y m a s k to ultimately disclose an original . H ow ev er , if the genealogist refuses to ext end hi s faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, he finds that there is "som et hi ng altogether different" behind things: not a timeless a n d essential secret, but the secret that they h ave no essence or that their essence w a s fabricated in a piecemeal fash ion from alien forms. Examining the history of reason, he lear ns that it w a s born in an altogether "reasonable" f a s h i o n - f r o m chance; 11 devotion to truth a nd the precision of scientific met h ods arose from the passion of scholars, their reciprocal hatr ed , their fanatical a n d u n e n d i n g discussions, a n d their spirit of com p e t i t i o n - t h e personal conflicts that sl ow l y forged the w e a p o n s of reason. 1 2 Further, genealogical analysi s show s that the con cept of liberty is an "invention of the ruling classes" 13 and not Nietzsche, Genealogy, History . 79

fundamental to m an 's nature or at the root of his attachment to being a n d truth. W h a t is found at the historical beg i nni ng of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dis sension of other things. It is disparity.14 History also teaches h ow to l au g h at the solemnities of the origin. The lofty origin is no more than "a metaphysical exten sion w hi ch arises from the belief that things are most precious a n d essential at the m o m e n t of birth." 15 We t e n d to t hi nk that this is the m om e nt of their greatest perfection, w h e n t he y em erged dazzling from the h a n d s of a creator or in the s h a d o w l e s s light of a first m orning . The origin a l w a y s precedes t he Fall. It com es before the body, before the w o r l d a n d time; it is a ssociated with the gods, and its story is a l w a y s s u n g as a t heog on y . But his torical beg i nni ng s are lowly: not in the sense of m od est or dis creet like the steps of a dove, but derisive a n d ironic, capable of u n d o i n g ev er y infatuation. " W e w i s h ed to a w a k e n the feeling

( of m a n ' s sovereignty by s h ow i ng his divine birth: this pat h is n o w forbidden, since a m o n k e y stands at the ent r anc e ." 16 M a n originated w i t h a grimace over his future development ; a n d Zar athustra himself is p l ag u e d by a m o n k e y w h o j u m p s along be hind him, pulling on his coattails. The final postulate of the origin is linked to t he first t w o in bei ng the site of truth . From the v ant ag e point of an absolute distance, free from the restraints of positive k n o w l e d g e , the origin m a k e s possible a field of k now l ed g e w hose function is to recover it, but a l w a y s in a false recognition' d u e to the excesses of its o w n speech. The origin lies at place of inevitable loss, a the point w h e r e the truth of things corresponded to a truthful , the site of a fleeting articulation that discourse h a s obscured a n d finally lost. It is a new cruelty of history that compels a reversal of this relationship and the abandonment of "adolescent" quests: behind the al w a ys recent, avaricious, and m e a su r ed truth, it posits the ancient proliferation of errors. It is now impossible to believe that "in the r e nd i ng of the veil, truth rem ai ns truthful; we have lived long e n o u g h not to be taken in." 17 Truth is undoubtedly the sort of error that cannot be refuted be cau s e it w a s h a r d e n e d into an unalterable form in the long baking process of history.18 Moreover, t he very ques tion of truth, the right it appropriates to refute error and oppose 80 . Truth and Method itself to appearance, the m a n n e r in w hi ch it developed (initially m ad e available to the wise, then w i t h d r a w n by m e n of piety to an unattainable w or l d w h er e it w a s given the double role of consolation a n d imperative, finally rejected as a useless notion, superfluous a n d contradicted on all s i d e s ) - d o e s this not form a history, the history of an error we call truth? Truth, a n d its original reign, has h ad a history wit hi n history from w hi c h we are barely em er g i ng "i n the time of the shortest s h a d o w , " w h e n light no longer seems to fl ow from the depths of the sky or to arise from the first m o m e n t s of the day.19 A g ene al og y of v alues, morality, asceticism, and k n o w l e d g e will nev er confuse itself w i t h a quest for their "or igins," will never neglect as inaccessible the vicissitudes of history. On the contrary, it will cultivate the details a n d accidents that accom p a n y e v e r y begi nni ng ; it will be scrupulously attentive to their pett y malice; it will aw ai t their emergence, once u n m a s k e d , as the face of the other. Wherev er it is m ad e to go, it will not be r e t i c e n t - in "excavating the d e pt h s ," in allowing time for these el em ents to escape fr om a labyri nth w h e r e no truth h a d ever d et ai ned them . The genealogist needs history to dispel the chi meras of the origin, s o m e w h a t in the m anner of the pious phi losopher w h o needs a doctor to exorcise the s h ad o w of his soul. He m u s t be able to recognize the events of history, its jolts, its surprises, its u n s t e a d y victories a n d unpalatable d e f e a t s - t h e basis of all beginnings, at avisms, and heredities. Similarly, he m u st be able to di ag nose the illnesses of the body, its conditions of w e a k n e s s a nd strength, its br e ak d o w ns and resistances, to be in a position to j u d g e philosophical discourse. History is the concrete bod y of a development, w i t h its moments of intensity, its l apses, its extended periods of feverish agitation, its fainting spells; a nd only a metaphysician w ou l d seek its soul in the dis tant ideality of the origin.

3. Entstehu ng a nd Herku nft are more exact than Ursprung in recording the true objective of geneal ogy; and, w hil e t hey are ordinarily translated as "origin," we must attempt to reestablish their proper use. Herkunft is the equival ent of stock or descent; it is the ancient affiliation to a group, sustained by the bonds of blood, tradition, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History . 81

or social class. The analysis of Herkunft often involves a consid eration of race or social type. 20 But th� traits it attem pts to identify are not the exclusive generic characteristics of an indi vidual, a sentiment, or an , w hich per mit us to qualify t h e m as "Greek" or "English"; rather, it seeks the subtle, s i n gu l ar , and subindividual m ar k s that m i g ht possibly intersect in t h e m to form a net w or k that is difficult to unravel. Far from being a category of resemblance, this origin allows the sorting out of different traits: the Germans im agined that they h a d finally ac counted for their complexity by sa yi ng t hey possessed a d ou bl e soul; they w e r e fooled by a simple computation, or rather, t h e y w e r e simply t r yi ng to m ast er the racial disorder f r o m w h i c h t h e y h a d formed themselves.21 W h e r e the soul pret end s unification or the self fabricates a coherent identity, the genealogist sets o u t to s t u d y the b e g i n n i n g - n u m b e r l e s s beginnings, w h o s e faint traces a n d hints of color are readil y seen by a historical e y e . T h e analysis of descent permits the dissociation of the self, its rec ( ognition and displacement as an e m p t y synthesis, in liberating a profusion of lost events. An examination of descent also permits the discov ery, un d er the u ni q u e aspect of a trait or a concept, of t he m y r i a d ev e nt s thr ough w h i c h - t h a n k s to w hi ch, against w h i c h - t h e y w e r e formed. Geneal og y does not pr et end to go back in tim e to re store an unbr ok en continuity that operates b e y o n d the disper sion of forgotten things; its d u t y is not to demonstrate that t h e past actively exists in the present, that it continues secretly to anim ate t h e present, h avi n g i m posed a predetermined for m on all its vicissitudes. Geneal ogy does not resemble t h e e v o l u t i o n of a species a nd does not m a p the destiny of a people. On t h e contrary, to follow the complex course of descent is to m a i n t a i n passing ev ent s in their proper dispersion; it is to identify t h e accidents, the m i nu t e d e v i a t i o n s - or conversely, t he c o m p l e t e r e v e r s a l s - t h e errors, the false appraisals, and t he f ault y cal culations that g av e birth to those thi ngs that continue to exist a n d h a v e valu e for us; it is to discover that truth or bei ng does not lie at the root of w hat we k n o w a n d w hat we are, bu t t he exteriority of accidents. 22 This is undoubtedly w h y ev er y origin of morality from the m om ent it stops being p i o u s --a n d Herkunft can never be- h a s value as a critique.23 82 . Truth and Method

Deriving fr om such a source is a d ang er ou s legacy. In nu mer ous inst ances, Nietzsche associates the terms Herkunft a n d Erbschaft . Nevertheless, we should not be deceived into thinking that this her it ag e is an acquisition, a possession that g r ow s and solidifies; rather , it is an unstable assem blage of faults, fissures, and heterogeneous layer s that thr eat en the fragile inheritor from within or from u nd er n eat h : "injustice or instability in the mi nds of certain m e n , their disorder and lack of decorum, are the final consequences of their ancestors' numberless logical inaccuracies, hast y conclusions, and superficiality." 24 T he search for descent is not the erecting of foundations: on the contrary, it disturbs w h a t w a s previ ou sly considered immobile; it fragments w h a t w a s thought unified; it show s the heterogeneity of w h a t w a s im agi ned c onsistent w i t h itself. W h at convictions and, far more decisively, w h a t k n ow l ed g e can resist it? If a genealogical anal ysis of a scholar w e r e m a d e - of one w h o collects facts a n d care fully accounts for t h e m - his Herku nft w ou l d quickly d ivulge the official pa per s of the scribe a nd the pl eadi ng s of the l a w y e r their fat her 25-in their appar ent ly disinterested attention, in the " p u r e " devotion to objectivity. Finally, descent attaches itself to the body. 26 It inscribes itself in the ner v ou s system, in temperament, in the digestive appar atu s ; it a p p ea r s in faulty respiration, in improper diets, in the debilitated and prostrate bodies of those w hose ancestors committed errors. Fathers have only to mistake effects for causes, believe in the reality of an "afterlife, " or maintain the value of eternal truths, a n d the bodies of their children will suffer. C ow ardice a n d hypocr isy, for their part, are the simple offshoots of error: not in a Socratic sense, not that evil is the result of a mistake, not becau se of a turning a w a y from an original truth, but becau se the b o d y maintains, in life as in death, thr ough its strength or w e a k n e s s , the sanction of ever y truth a n d error, as it sustains, in an inverse m anner , the o r i g i n - d e s c e n t . W h y did m e n invent the contemplative life? W h y give a supr eme value to this form of existence? W h y maintain the absolute truth of those fictions which sustain it? "During barbarous ages . . . if the strength of an indi vidu al declined, if he felt himself tired or sick, mel anchol y or satiated and, as a consequence, wit hou t desire or appetite for a short time, he became relatively a better Nietzsche, Genealogy, History • 83 man, that is, less dang er ou s . His pessimistic i d eas only take form as w o r d s or reflections. In this frame of m i n d , he eit her became a thinker an d prophet or used his imagination to feed his superstitions." 27 The b o d y - a n d everything that touches it: diet, climate, and, s o i l - i s the d om ai n of the Herkunft. The b o d y manifests t he stigmata of past experience and also g i v es rise to desires, failings, a n d errors. These elements m a y j oin in a b o d y w h e r e they achieve a s u d d e n expression, b u t as o ften, their encounter is a n engagement in w h i c h t h e y efface each other, w h e r e the b o d y becomes t he pretext of their insurmountable conflict. The b o d y is the inscribed surface of events (traced by lan g u a g e and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated self (adopting t h e illusion of a substantial unity), a n d a v ol u m e in perpetual disintegration. Genealogy, as an analysis of descent, is thus situated w i t hi n the articulation of the b o d y a n d history. Its task is to expose a b o d y totally imprinted by history and t he process of history's destruction of the body.

4. Entstehung designates emergence, the m om ent of arising. It stands as the principle a nd the si ngular l a w of an appariti on . As it is w r o n g to search for descent in an uninterrupted conti nuity, we sh ou l d avoid thinking of emergence as the final term of a historical development; the ey e w a s not a l w a y s i nt e nd ed for contemplation, a nd pu n i s hm e nt has h ad other pu r p os e s t ha n setting an example. These developments m a y a p p e a r as a cul mination, but they are mer el y the current episodes in a series of subjugations: the eye initially respond ed to the requirements of hu nt i ng a n d warfare; an d p u n i s h m e n t has been subjected, throughout its history, to a variety of n e e d s - r e v e n g e , excl u ding an aggressor, compensating a victim, creating fear. In placi ng present needs at the origin, the metaphysician w o u l d convince us of an obscure purpose that seeks its realization at the m o m e n t ' it arises. Genealogy, however, seeks to reestablish the v ar i ou s systems of subjection: not t he anticipatory p o w e r of m e a ni ng , bu t the haz ar d ou s pl ay of dominations . Emergence is a l w a y s pr od u ced through a particular st ag e of forces. The anal ysi s of the Entstehung m u s t d eli neat e this interaction, the struggle these forces w ag e against each other or 84 . Tru th andMethod

against adverse circumstances, and the attempt to avoid d eg en eration a n d regain strength by dividing these forces ag ai nst themselves. It is in this sense that the emergence of a species (animal or h u m a n ) and its solidification are secured "in an ex tended battle ag ai nst conditions which are essentially a n d con stantly unfavorable." In fact, "the species must realize itself as a species, as s o m e t h i n g --haracterized by the durability, uni formity, and simplicity of its f o r m - w h i c h can prevail in the per pet u al struggle against outsiders or the uprising of those it oppr esses from w i t hi n." On the other hand, individual differ ences em er g e at another stage of the relationship of forces, w h e n the species has become victorious and w h e n it is no longer threatened from outside. In this condition, w e find a struggle "of egoisms turned against each other, each bursting forth in a splintering of forces and a general striving for the sun and for the light." 28 There are also times w hen force contends against itself, a n d not only in the intoxication of an abundance, w h i c h allows it to divide itself, but at the m om ent w h e n it w eak ens. Force reacts against its g r ow ing lassitude and gains strength; it imposes limits, inflicts torments and mortifications; it masks these actions as a higher morality and, in exchange, regains its strength. In this m anner , the ascetic ideal w as born, "in the instinct of a decadent life which . . . struggles for its ow n ex

istence ." 29 This also describes the m ov em ent in w hi ch the Ref ormation arose, precisely w her e the church was least corrupt;30 G er m an Catholicism, in the sixteenth century, retained e n o u g h strength to t u r n against itself, to mortify its o w n bod y and his tory, and to spiritualize itself into a pure religion of conscience. Emergence is thus t he entry of forces; it is their eruption, the leap from the w i n g s to center stage, each in its you t hful strength. W h a t Nietzsche calls the Entstehungsherd 31 of the con cept of g ood ness is not specifically the energy of the strong or the reaction of the w e a k , but precisely this scene w h e r e t hey ar e d i s p l ay e d superimposed or face-to-face. It is t\othing but the space that divides them , the void thr ough w hi c h t he y excha ng e their threatening gestures a nd speeches. As descent qualifies the strength or w e a k n e s s of an instinct and its inscription on a body , em er g e nce designates a place of confrontation, but not as a closed field offering t he spectacle of a struggle a m o n g equals. Nietzsche, Genealogy, History . 85

Rather, as N ietzsche demonstrates in his analysis of good a n d evil, it is a "no n -p la ce," a p u r e distance, w h i c h indicates that the adversaries do not belo ng to a c o m m o n space. C o nse quently, no o ne is responsible for an emergence; no one can glo r y in it, since it a l w a ys occurs in the interstice .

In a sense, only a single drama is ever staged in this " n o n p la ce ," the endlessly repeated pl ay of dominations. The d o m ination of certain m e n o ver others leads to the differentiation of values;32 class domination generates the idea of liberty;33 a n d the forceful appropriation of things necessary to surviva l a nd the imposition of a duration not intrinsic to t hem a ccount for the origin of logic. 34 This relationship of domination is no more a "relationship" than the place w h e r e it occurs is a place; a nd , precisely for this reason, it is fixed, t hr ough o u t its h istory , in rituals, in meticulous procedures that impose r ights and obli gations . It establishes marks of its p o w er and eng r av es m em ories on things and even within bodies. It makes itself accountable for debts and gives rise to the uni verse of rules, w h i ch is by no m e a n s desig ned to temper violence, but rather to satisfy it. F ol l o wing traditional beliefs, it w ou ld be false to think that total w a r exhausts itself in its ow n contradictions and ends by re no u n cin g v io lence and submitting to civil l a w s . O n the co nt rar y , the law is a calculated a n d relentless pleasure, d elight in the p r o mised blood, w hi ch permits the perpetual instigation of new dominations and the staging of meticulously repeated scenes of violence . The desire for peace, the serenity of compromise, a nd the tacit acceptance of the law, far f r o m representing a major mo r al co nver sion or a utilitarian calculation that gave rise to the la w, are b ut its result and, in point of fact, its perversion: " guilt, conscience, a n d dut y had their threshold of emergence in the right to secure obligations; and their inception, like that of a ny majo r event on earth, was saturated in b l o o d ." 35 H u m a n i t y does not grad ua lly progress fr om combat to combat until it ar rives at univ er sa l reciprocity, w h e r e the rule of l a w finally re places warfare; h u m a n i t y installs each of its violences in a syst em of rules a n d t hus proceeds f r o m d o mina t io n to d o mination . The nature of these rules allow s violence to be inflicted on v io lence a nd the resurgence of new forces that are sufficiently strong to d o minate those in p o w er . R ules are e m p t y in them- 86 • Truth and Meth o d selves, violent and unfinalized; they are impersonal and can be bent to any purpose. The successes of history belong to those who are capable of seizing these rules, to replace those who had used them, to di,Sguise themselves so as to pervert them, invert their meaning, and redirect them against those who had initially imposed them; controlling this complex mechanism, they will make it function so as to overcome the rulers through their own rules. The isolation of different points of emergence does not con form to the successive configurations of an identical meaning; rather, they result from substitutions, displacements, disguised conquests, and systematic reversals. If interpretation were the slow exposure of the meaning hidden in an origin, then only metaphysics could interpret the development of humanity. But if interpretation is the violent or surreptitious appropriation of a system of rules, which in itself has no essential meaning, in order to impose a direction, to bend it to a new will, to force its participation in a different game, and to subject it to secondary rules, then the development of humanity is a series of interpre tations. The role of genealogy is to record its history: the history of morals, ideals, and metaphysical concepts, the history of the concept of liberty or of the ascetic life; as they stand for the emergence of different interpretations, they must be made to appear as events on the stage of historical process.

5. How can we define the relationship between genealogy, seen as the examination of Herkunft and Ents tehung, and history in the traditional sense? We could, of course, examine Nietzsche's celebrated apostrophes against history, but we will put these aside for the moment and consider those instances when he conceives of genealogy as wirklicheHistorie, or its more frequent characterization as historical "spirit" or "sense ." 36 In fact, Nietzsche's criticism, beginning with the second of the Un timely Meditations, always questioned the form of history that rein troduces (and always assumes) a suprahistorical perspective: a history whose function is to compose the finally reduced diver sity of time into a totality fully closed upon itself; a history that always encourages subjective recognitions and attributes a form of reconciliation to all the displacements of the past; a history Nietzsche, Genealogy, History . 87

whose perspective on all that precedes it implies the end of time, a completed development. The historian's history finds its sup port outside of time and pretends to base its judgments on an apocalyptic objectivity. This is only possible, however, because of its belief in eternal truth, the immortality of the soul, and the nature of consciousness as always identical to itself. Once the historical sense is mastered by a suprahistorical perspective, metaphysics can bend it to its own purpose, and, by aligning it to the demands of objective science, it can impose its own "Egyp tianism." On the other hand, the historical sense can evade metaphysics and become a privileged instrument of genealogy if it refuses the certainty of absolutes. Given this, it corresponds to the acuity of a glance that distinguishes, separates, and dis perses; that is capable of liberating divergence and marginal elements-the kind of dissociating view that is capable of de compos!ng itself, capable of shattering the unity of man' s being through which it was thought that he could extend his sover- , eignty to the events of his past. Historical meaning becomes a dimension of wirkliche Historie to the extent that it places within a process of development everything considered immortal in man. We believe that feel ings are immutable, but every sentiment, particularly the noblest and most disinterested, has a history. We believe in the dull constancy ofinstinctual life and imagine that it continues to exert its force indiscriminately in the present as it did in the past. But a knowledge of history easily disintegrates this unity, depicts its wavering course, locates its moments of strength and weak ness, and defines its oscillating reign. It easily seizes the slow elaboration of instincts and those movements where, in turn ing upon themselves, they relentlessly set about their self destruction.37 We believe, in any event, that the body obeys the exclusive laws of physiology and that it escapes the influence of history, but this too is false . The body is molded by a great many distinct regimes; it is broken down by the rhythms of work, rest, and holidays; it is poisoned by food or values, through eating habits or moral laws; it constructs resistances . 38 "Effec tive" history differs from traditional history in being without constants. Nothing in ma n -n o t even his b o d y - is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understand- 88 . Truth and Method ing other men. The traditional devices for constructing a com prehensi v e view of history and for retracing the past as a patient a n d continuous development m u s t be systematically disman tled. Necessarily, we m u st dismiss those tendencies that en courage the consoling pl ay of recognitions. Knowledge, e v e n u n d e r the banner of history, does not d epend on "rediscovery," a n d it emphatically excludes the "rediscovery of ourselves." History becomes "effective" to the degre e that it introduces dis continuity into our v er y b e i n g - as it divides our emotions, d r am atizes our instincts, multiplies our b od y and sets it against itself. "Effective" history depri ves the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature, and it will not permit itself to be transported by a voiceless obstinacy t ow ar d a millennial ending . It will up root its traditional foundations a n d relentlessly disrupt its pre t end ed continuity. This is because k n ow l ed g e is not m a d e for understanding ; it is m a d e for cutting. From these observations, we c a n grasp the particular traits of historical meaning as Nietzsche understood it- t h e sense which opposes wirkliche Historie to traditional history. The former tr ansposes the relationship ordinarily established bet ween t he eruption of an ev ent and necessary continuity. An entire his torical tradition (theological or rationalistic) aims at dissolving the singular ev ent into an ideal c o n t i n u i t y - as a teleological m o v e m e n t or a natur al process. "Effective" history, how ev er , deals w i t h events in terms of their most u ni q u e characteristics, their most acute manifestations. An event, consequently, is not a decision, a treaty, a reign, or a battle, but the reversal of a relationship of forces, the usurpation of pow er , the appropria tion of a vocabulary tu r ned against those w h o h ad once u s e d it, a feeble domination that poisons itself as it g r ow s lax, the ent r y of a m a s k e d "other ." The forces operating in history are not controlled by destiny or regulative mechanisms, but r espond to h a ph a z a r d conflicts. 39 They do not manifest the successive forms of a primordial intention and their attraction is not that of a conclusion, for they a l w a y s app ear t hr ough the singular ran d o m n e s s of events . The inv erse of the Christian world, s p u n entir ely by a divine spider, and different from the w or l d of the Greeks, divided b et w e e n the r eal m of will a nd the great cosmic folly, the world of effective history knows only one k i ng d om , Nietzsche, Genealogy, History . 89 without providence or final cause, where there is only lithe iron hand of necessity shaking the dice-box of chance ." 4() Cha nce is not simply the drawing of lots, but raising the stakes in every attempt to master chance through the will to power, and giving rise to the risk of an even greater chance.41 The world we know is not this ultimately simple configuration where ev ent s are re duced to accentuate their essential traits, their fin a l m eaning, or t h eir initial and final v a lue . O n the contrary, it is a profusion o fentangled events. If it appears as a "marvelous motley, pro f o u n d and totally meaningful, " this is because it b ega n and continues its secret existence t hr o ugh a " h o s t of er r o r s a n d phan tasms . " 42 We want historians to confirm o ur belief that the present rests u p o n p r o fo und intentions a nd i m m ut a b le necessi ties. But the t rue historical sense confirms our existence a m o n g countless lost events, w i t h o u t a l a n d ma r k or a p o int of reference . Effective history can also invert the relationship that tradi tional history, in its dependence on metaphysics, establishes b e t w e e n proximity a n d distance . T h e latter is g i v e n to a con templation of distances a n d heights : the noblest periods, the highest forms, the mo st abstract ideas, the p ur est individualities . It accomplishes this by getting as near as possible, placing itself at the foot of its m o u nt a in peaks, at t he risk of a d o p ting the famous perspective of frogs. Effective history, on the other hand, shortens its vision to those things nearest to it- t h e body, the ne r v o u s system, nutrition, digestion, and energies; it unearths the periods of decadence, and if it chances up o n lofty epochs, it is w it h t h e s u s p i c i o n - n o t vindictive b u t j o y o u s - of finding a barbarous and shameful confusion. It has no fear of looking d o w n , so lo ng as it is und er sto od that it looks from above a n d descends to seize the va rio us perspectives, to disclose disper sions and differences, to leave things undisturbed in their own dimension and intensity. It reverses the surreptitious practice of historians, their pretension to examine things furthest from themselves, the groveling manner in which they appr o a c h this promising distance (like the metaphysicians w h o proclaim the existence of an afterlife, situated at a distance from this w o r ld , as a p romise of their reward) . Effective history studies what is closest, b ut in an abrup t dispossession, so as to seize it at a distance (an approach similar to that of a doctor who looks closely, 90 . Truth and Method w h o p l u ng e s to m ak e a diagnosis and to state its ). Historical sense has more in com mon wit h m edicin e than phi losophy ; a n d it should not surprise us that Nietzsche occasion a l y employs the phrase "historically and physiologically," 43 since a m o n g the philosopher's idiosyncracies is a complete denial of the body. This includes, as well, "the absence of historical sense, a hatr ed for the idea of development, Egyptianism," the obsti nate "pl aci ng of conclusions at the beginning," of " m ak i ng last things first." 44 History has a more important task t han to be a h a n d m a i d e n to philosophy, to recount the ne ce ss ar y birth of truth a n d v alues ; it should become a differential k n ow l ed g e of energi es a n d failings, heights a n d degenerations, poisons a n d antidotes. Its task is to become a curative science. 45 The final trait of effective history is its affirmation of knowl e d g e as perspective. Historians take u nu s u al pains to erase the el em ents in their w or k w hi ch reveal their g r ou nd ing in a par ticular time and place, their preferences in a controversy - t h e unavoidable obstacles of their passion. Nietzsche's version of historical sense is explicit in its perspective an d acknowledges its syst em of injustice . Its is slanted, bei ng a delib erate appraisal, affirmation, or negation; it reaches the lingering and poisonous traces in order to prescribe the best antidote. It is not g i v en to a discreet effacement before the objects it observes a n d does not su bmit itself to their processes; nor does it seek laws, since it gives equal w ei g ht to its o w n sight and to its objects. T hr oug h this historical sense, k now l ed g e is allowed to create its o w n g ene al og y in the act of cognition; a n d wirkliche Historie c om p o se s a g eneal og y of history as the vertical projection of its position.

6. In this context, Nietzsche links historical sense to the his torian's history. T h e y share a beg i nni ng that is similarly i m pu r e a nd confused, share the sam e sign in w h i c h the sy m pt o m s of sickness can be recognized as w ell as the seed of an exquisite flower. 46 T h e y arose simultaneously to follow their separate w a y s , bu t our task is to trace their common g e n e al o g y. The d escent (Herku nft) of the historian is unequivocal: he is of h u m b l e birth. A characteristic of history is to be without choice: it encourages thorough understanding and excludes Nietzsche, Genealogy, H i s t o r y . 91 qualitative j u d g m e n t s - a sensitivity to all things w i t h o u t d is tinction, a comprehensive v i e w excluding differences . N o t h i n g m u st escape it and, more importantly, nothing m u s t be ex cluded. Historians argue that this p roves their tact a nd discre tion. A ft er all, w h a t right ha v e they to impose their tastes a n d preferences w h e n t hey seek to deter mine w h a t actually o ccur r ed in the past? Their mistake is to exhibit a total lack of taste, the k i n d of crudeness that becomes smug in the p resence of t he loftiest elements a n d finds satisfaction in r ed ucing t he m to size . T he historian is insensitive to t he most disgusting things; or rather, he especially enjoys those things that should be r ep ug na nt to him . H i s appa rent serenity follows from his concerted avoidance of the exceptional a nd his reduction of all things to the lowest c o m m o n denominator. N o t h i n g is a llowed to sta nd a b o v e him; a nd und e r lyin g his desire for total k n o w l ed g e is his search for the secrets that belittle everything: " ba se cur io sit y ." W h a t is the source of history? It comes from the plebs. To w h o m is it addressed? To the plebs. A n d its discourse st r o ngly resembles the demagogue's refrain: "No one is greater t ha n y o u a n d a n y o n e w h o presumes to get the better of y o u - y o u w h o are g o o d - is ev il . " The historian, w h o functions as his d o ub le, can be heard to echo: " N o past is greater t ha n y o u r present, and, through my meticulous erudition, I will rid y o u of y o u r infatuations a n d transform the gr a nd eur of history into petti ness, evil, a nd misfo r t une ." T he historian's ances try goes b a ck to Socrates. This demagoguery, of course, must be ma sked. It m u s t hide its singular malice un d e r the cloak of universals . As t he d ema go gue is obliged to i n v o k e truth, law s of essences, a n d eternal necessity, the historian m u st invo ke objectivity, the ac cura cy of facts, a nd the pe rm a ne n c e of the past. T h e d e m a g o g u e denies the body to secure the sovereignty of a timeless idea, a n d the historian effaces his p ro per individuality so that ot her s may enter the stage a n d reclaim t heir o w n speech. He is d i v i d e d against himself: forced to silence his preferences a n d o v e r c o me his distaste, to b lur his o w n perspective a n d replace it w i t h the fiction of a universal geometry, to mimic death in order to enter the ki ngd o m of the dead, to a d o p t a faceless a n o n ym it y . In this w o r l d w h e r e he has conquered his ind iv idual w ill, he b eco mes 92 . Truth and Method a g u i d e to the inevitable l aw of a superior will. H av i ng curbed the d e m a n d s of his indi vi dual will in his knowl edge, he will disclose the form of an eternal will in his object of stud y . The objectivity of historians inverts the relationships of will a n d k n o w l e d g e and it is, in the sa m e stroke, a necessary belief in providence, in final causes a n d t e l e o l o g y - t h e beliefs that place the historian in the family of ascetics. "I can't stand these lustful e u n u c h s of history, all the seductions of an ascetic ideal; 1 can't stand these blanched tombs producing life or those tired an d indifferent beings w h o dress up in the part of wi sd om and ad opt an objective point of v i e w . " 47 The Entstehung of history is found in nineteenth-century Europe: the l a n d of interminglings and bastardy, the period of the "man-of-mi xtu r e ." We have become barbarians with respect to those rare m om e nt s of hi g h civilization: cities in ruin a n d enigmatic m onu m ent s are spread out before us; we stop before g api ng walls; we ask w h a t gods inhabited these e m p t y temples. Great epochs lacked this curiosity, lacked our excessive defer ence; they ignored their predecessors: the classical period ig nored Shakespeare . The decadence of Europe present s an i m m e n s e spectacle (while stro nger periods refrained from such exhibitions), a n d the nature of this scene is to represent a theater; lacking m o n u m e n t s of our o w n making, which properly belong to us, we live a m o n g cr o w d ed scenes. But there is more. Eu r opeans no longer k n o w themselves; they ignore their m ixed ancestries a nd seek a proper role. They lack individuality . We can begi n to u n d e r s t a n d the spontaneous historical bent of the nineteent h century: the anemia of its forces and those mixtures that effaced all its i nd i v i dual traits pr oduced the sam e results as the mortifications of asceticism; its inability to create, its absence of artistic wor k s , a n d its need to r el y on past achievements forced it to adopt the base curiosity of plebs. If this fully repr esent s the geneal og y of history, how could it become, in its o w n right, a genealogical analysis? W h y did it not continue as a form of dem og ogi c or religious k n o w l e d g e ? H o w could it cha ng e roles on the sam e stage? Only by bei ng seized, d om i nat ed , a n d t u r ned against its birth. A n d it is this m o v e m e n t w h i c h pr operl y describes the specific natur e of the Entstehung: it is not the unavoidable conclusion of a long prep- Nietzsche, Genealogy, History • 93 aration, but a scene w here forces are risked in the chance of confrontations, w h e r e they emerge triumphant, w h e r e t h e y can also be confiscated . The locus of emergence for metaphysics was surely A t h e n i a n demogoguery, the v ul ga r spite of So crates and his belief in immortality, a n d Plato co uld h a v e seized this Socratic p h i l o s o p hy to t u r n it against itself. Undoubtedly, he w a s often t emp t ed to do so, b ut his defeat lies in its consecration. The problem w a s similar in the nineteenth century: to a v o i d doing for the p o pula r asceticism of historians w h a t Plato d i d for Socrates. This historical trait should not be f o un d ed on a p h i losophy of history, but dismantled, beginning w i t h the things it produced; it is necessary to master history so as to t ur n it to genealogical uses, that is, strictly anti-Platonic purposes. O n l y t hen w il l the historical sense free itself f r o m the d e m a n d s of a suprahistorical history.

7. The historical sense gives rise to three uses that oppo se a n d correspond to the three Platonic modalities of history. T h e first is parodic, directed against reality, a n d opposes t h e t heme of history as reminiscence or recognition; the second is dissociative, directed against identity, and o pposes history given as conti nuity or representative of a tradition; the third is sacrificial, di rected against truth, a nd opposes history as know led ge . T h e y i m p ly a use of history that severs its connection to m e m o r y , its metaphysical a n d anthropological m o d e l , a n d c o n s t r u c t s a countermemory - a transformation of history into a totally dif ferent form of time . First, the parodic and farcical use. The historian offers this confused a n d a n o n y m o u s Eur o pea n, w h o no lo nge r k n o w s h i m self or w h a t na me he should adopt, the possibility of alternative identities, more individualized and substantial than his own. But the ma n w it h historical sense will see that this substitution is simp ly a disguise . Historiaris supplied the R ev o lu t io n w i t h R o m a n prototypes, w i t h knight' s a rmor, a n d the Wa g ner ia n era w a s g iv e n the sw o r d of a G e r m a n h e r o - p h e m eral props that po int to our o w n unreality. No one k ep t t h e m fr o m v ener ating these religions, from going to B a y r e u t h to com memorate a new afterlife; they w e r e free, as well, to be trans formed into street v endor s of e m p t y identities. The new historian, 94 . Truth and Method the genealogist, will know w h a t to mak e of this m as q u e r ad e. He w i l l not be too serious to enj oy it; on t he contrary, he will push the m asq u er ad e to its limit and prepare the great carnival of time w h e r e m as k s are constantly reappearing . No longer the identification of our faint individuality w i t h the solid identities of the past, but our "unrealization" through the excessive choice of identities -Frederi ck of Hohenstaufen, Caesar, Jesus, Dionysus, and possi bl y Zarathustra. Taking up these m ask s, revitalizing the buffooner y of history, we adopt an identity whose unrealit y su r passes that of God, w h o started the charade. "Perhaps, we can discov er a realm w h e r e originality is again possible as par odists of history a nd buffoons of God." 48 In this, we recognize the par odic double of w hat the second of the Untimely Meditations called "monumental history" : a history giv en to reestablishing the hi g h points of historical development a n d their maintenance in a per pet u al presence, g i v en to the recovery of works, actions, a n d creations t h r ou g h the m o n og r a m of their personal essence. But in 1874, Nietzsche accused this history, one totally devoted to veneration, of barri ng access to the actual intensities a n d creations of life . The par od y of his last texts serves to em p hasi z e that "monumental history" is itself a par ody . Genealogy is his tory in the form of a concerted carnival. The second use of history is the systematic dissociation of identity. This is neces sar y because this rather w eak identity, w hich we at tem pt to support a n d to unify u nd e r a mask, is in itself only a parody : it is plural; countless spirits dispute its possession; numer ous syst ems intersect a n d compete. The study of history m a k e s one " h a p p y , u nlike the metaphysicians, to pos sess in oneself not an immortal soul but m a n y mortal ones." 49 A nd in each of these souls, history will not discover a forgotten identity, eager to be reborn, but a complex system of distinct and multiple elem ent s, unable to be master ed by the pow er s of synt hesis : "it is a sign of superior culture to maintai n, in a fully conscious w a y , certain phases of its evolution w h i c h lesser m e n pass t hr oug h w i t ho u t thought. The initial result is that we ca n u nd e r s t a nd those w h o resemble us as completely det er mi ned sy st em s and as representative of diverse cultures, that is to say, as necessar y a n d capable of modification. A n d in return, we are able to separate the phases of our ow n evolution and consider Nietzsche, Genealogy, History . 95

them individually ." 50 The p ur po se of history, g u id e d by ge nealogy, is not to discover the roots of our identity, b ut to c o m m i t itself to its dissipation . It does not seek to define o u r u n i q u e threshold of emergence, the h o m e la n d to w h i c h metaphysicians promise a return; it seeks to m a k e visible all of t hose d isco nt inu ities that cross us . 1 / Antiquarian histor y," according to the Un timely Meditations, pursues opposite goals. It seeks the continuities of soil, language, a n d urban life in w h i c h o ur p resent is r ooted, and, ''by cultivating in a delicate ma n ne r that w h i c h existed for all time, it tries to co nserve for posterity the co nd itions u n d e r w h i c h we w e r e b o r n ." 51 This type of history w a s objected to in the Meditations because it tended to block creativity in support of the laws of fidelity. S o m e w h a t l a t e r - a n d a lr ea d y in Human, All Too H u m a n - N i e t z s c h e reconsiders the task of the a ntiqua r ian, but w i t h an altogether different emphasis. If g e n e a lo g y in its o w n right gives rise to questions concerning our native land, native language, or the la w s that go v er n us, its int entio n is to reveal the heterogeneous systems w hich, ma sked by the self, inhibit the formation of a n y fo r m of identity. The t hird use of histor y is the sacrifice of the subject of kno w led ge . In appearance, or rather, according to the m a s k it bears, historical consciousness is neutral, d evo id of passions, a nd committed solely to truth . B u t if it examines itself a n d if, more generally, it interrogates the various forms of scientific consciousness in its history, it finds that all these fo r ms and transformations are aspects of the w ill to kn o w led ge : instinct, passion, the inquisitor' s d evotion, cruel subtlety, and malice . It discovers the violence of a position that sides against those w h o are h a p p y in their ignorance, against the effective illusions by w h i c h h um a n it y protects itself, a position that encour ages the dangers of :r:esearch a nd delights in disturbing discoveries. 52 The historical analysis of this rancorous will to knowledge53 reveals that all kno w led ge rests u p o n injustice (that there is no right, not even in the act of kn o w in g , to truth or a f o un d a t io n for truth) a nd that the instinct for kno w led ge is malicious (so met hing mu r derous, op po sed to the happiness of ma nkind ). E v e n in the greatly ex panded form it assumes today, the w ill to k n o w l e d g e does not achieve a universal truth; man is not g i v en an exact a nd serene ma stery of nature . On the contrary, it ceaselessly 96 . Truth and Method multiplies the risks, creates d ang er s in ev er y area; it breaks d o w n illusory defenses; it dissolves the unity of the subject; it releases those el em ent s of itself that are dev ot ed to its subversion a n d destruction. Know l ed g e does not sl ow l y detach itself from its empirical roots, the initial needs' from w h i c h it arose, to become pu r e speculation subject only to the d em and s of reason; its de v e l o p m e n t is not tied to the constitution and affirmation of a free subject; rather, it creates a progressive enslavement to its instinctive violence. W h er e religions once d e m a n d e d the sac rifice of bodies, k n o w l ed g e now calls for experimentation on ourselves, 54 calls us to the sacrifice of the subject of k n ow ledg e . "The desire for k n o w l e d g e has been transformed a m o n g us into a passi on w h i c h fears no sacrifice, w h i c h fears nothing but its o w n extinction. It m a y be that m an k i nd will eventually perish from this passion for k no w l ed g e . If not t hr ou g h passion, t he n t h r ou g h w e a k n e s s . We m u st be pr epar ed to state our choice: do we w i s h h u m a n i t y to end in fire and light or to end on t he s a n d s ? " 55 We should now replace the two great problems of ni net eent h -centur y philosophy, pass ed on by Fichte a nd H egel (the reciprocal basis of truth a n d liberty a nd the possibility of absolute knowledge), w i th the t hem e that "to perish t hr oug h absolute k n o w l e d g e m a y w ell form a part of the basis of being." 56 This does not m ea n , in terms of a critical procedure, that the will to truth is limited by the intrinsic finitude of cognition, b u t that it loses all sense of limitations a n d all claim to truth in its unavoidable sacrifice of the subject of. k nowl edge . "It m a y be that there r em ai ns one prodigious idea whi ch m i g h t be m a d e to prevail over ev er y other aspiration, w hic h m ig ht overcom e the most victorious: the idea of hu m a ni t y sacrificing itself. It see m s indisputable that if this n e w constellation a p p ea r ed on the ho rizon, onl y the desire for truth, w i t h its enor m ous prerogatives, could direct a n d sustain such a sacrifice. For to k no w l ed g e, no sacrifice is too great. Of course, this probl em has n e v e r be e n p o s e d . " 57 The U n t i m e l y Medita tions discussed the critical use of history: its just treatment of the past, its decisive cutting of the roots, its rejection of traditional attitudes of reverence, its liberation of m a n by presenting him w it h other origins than those in w h i c h he prefers to see himself. Nietzsche, however, reproached crit- Nietzsche, Genealogy, History . 97 ical history for det achi ng us from ever y real sour ce a n d for sac rificing the v e r y m o v e m e n t of life to the exclusive concer n for truth. S o m e w h a t as w e hav e seen, Nietzsche reconsiders this line of thought he had at first refused, bu t directs it to altogether different ends. It is no longer a question of j u d g i n g the past in the n a m e of a truth that only w e can possess in t h e present, but of risking the destruction of the subject w h o seek s k now l ed g e in the endless d epl oym ent of the will to knowledge. In a sense, g eneal og y returns to the three modalities of history that Nietzsche recognized in 1874. It returns to t h e m in spite of the objections that Nietzsche raised in t h e n a m e of t h e affirmative a n d creative p o w e r s of life. But t h e y are m et am or phosed: the veneration of m onu m ent s becomes parody; the re spect for ancient continuities becomes systematic dissociation; the critique of the injustices of the past by a truth held by m e n in the present becomes t he destruction of the m a n w h o m ai nt ai ns k now l ed g e by the injustice pr oper to the will to k n o w l e d g e . Notes 1Ed. : See F. W. Nietzsche's Preface to On the Genealogy ofMorals (1887), in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 1968), sec. 4, 7.

2F. W. Nietzsche, The Gay Science (1882)', trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974), no. 7.

3 F. W. Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human (1878; New York: Gordon Press, 1974), no. 3.

4 Nietzsche, Genealogy, II, sec. 6, 8.

5 Nietzsche, Gay Science, nos. 110, I l l , 300.

6 F. W. Nietzsche, The Dawn of Day (1881; New York: Gordon Press, 1974), no. 102. (Ed. : Pudenda origo is "shameful origin .")

7 Nietzsche, Gay Science, nos . 151, 353; also Dawn, no. 62; Genealogy, I, sec. 14; F. W . Nietzsche, "The Four Great Errors," in Twilight of the Idols (1 888) in The Portable Nietzsche, ed . and trans . Walter Ka ufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1954), sec . 7. (Ed. : Schwarzkiinstler is a black magician.)

B Paul Ree's text was entitled Ursprung der Moralischen Empfindu ngen . 98 . Truth and Method

9 In Human, All Too Human, aphorism 92 was entitled Ursprung der Gerechtigkeit. 10 In the main body of the Genealogy, Urspru ng and Herkunpt are used interchangeably in numerous instances (I, sec. 2; II, sec. 8, 11, 12, 16, 17). 11Nietzsche, Dawn, no. 123. 12Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, no . 34.

13 F. W . Nietzsche, The Wanderer and His Shadow (1880), in Complete Works (New York: Gordon Press, 1974), no. 9. 14 Ed. : A wide range of key terms, found in Foucault's The Archaeology of Knowledge, are related to this theme of "disparity": the concepts of series, discontinuity, division, and difference. If the same is found in the realm and movement of the dialectics, the disparate presents itself as an "event" in the world of chance.

15 Nietzsche, Wanderer, no. 3.

16 Nietzsche, Dawn, no. 49 .

17 F. W. Nietzsche, Nietzsche contra Wagner (1888), in Portable Nietzsche.

18 Nietzsche, Gay Science, nos . 110,265 .

19 Nietzsche, " H ow the True World Finally Became a Fable, " Twilight of Idols.

20 For example, on race, see Nietzsche's Gay Science, no . 135; Beyond Good and Evil (1 886), in Basic Writings, nos. 200, 242, 244; Genealogy, I, sec. 5; on social type see Gay Science, nos. 348-9; Beyond Good and Evil, no. 260 .

21 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, no. 244.

22 Nietzsche, Genealogy, III, sec . 17. The abkunft of feelings of depression.

23 Nietzsche, " 'Reason' in Philosophy, " Twilight of Idols.

24 Nietzsche, Dawn, no. 247.

25 Nietzsche, Gay Science, nos . 348-9.

26 Ibid.

27 Nietzsche, Dawn, no. 42.

28 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, no. 262. Nietzsche, Genealogy, History . 99

29 Nietzsche, Genealogy, III, no. 13.

30 Nietzsche, Gay Science, no. 148. It is also to an anemia of the will that one must attribute the Entstehung of Buddhism and Christianity.

31 Nietzsche, Genealogy, I, sec. 2.

32 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evi l , no . 260; s e e also Genealogy, II, sec. 12.

33 Nietzsche, Wanderer, no. 9.

34 Nietzsche, Gay Science, no. 111.

35 Nietzsche, Genealogy, II, no. 6.

36 Nietzsche, Genealogy, Preface, sec. 7, and I, sec. 2; Beyond Good and Evil, no. 224.

37 Nietzsche, Gay Science, no. 7.

38 Ibid.

39 Nietzsche, Genealogy, II, se c . 12.

40 Nietzsche, Dawn, no. 130.

41 Nietzsche, Genealogy, II, sec. 12.

42 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, no. 16.

43 Nietzsche, Twilight of Idols, no. 44.

.. Nietzsche, " 'Reason' in Philosophy," Twiligh t of Idols, nos. 1, 4.

45 Nietzsche, Wanderer, no . 1 88. (Ed.: This conception underlies the task of Foucault' s Madness and Civilization and even though it is not found as a conscious formulation until The Archaeology of Knowledge.)

46 Nietzsche, Gay Science, n o . 337. 47

Nietzsche, Genealogy, III, sec . 26.

48 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evi l , no. 223.

49 Nietzsche, Wanderer ( O p i n i o n s a n d Mixed Statements), no. 17.

50 Nietzsche, Hu man, All Too Human, no. 274.

51 F. W. Nietzsche, Un timely Meditations (1873-4), in Complete Works, II, no. 3. 100 . Truth and Method

52 Cf. Nietzsche's Dawn, nos. 429, 432; Gay Science, no. 333; Beyond Good and Evil, nos. 229-30.

53 Ed. : The French phrase vouloir-savoir means both the will to knowl edge and knowledge as revenge.

54 Nietzsche, Dawn, no. SOl .

55 Ibid.

56 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, no. 39 .

57 Nietzsche, Dawn, no. 45.