Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program Year 3 Final Report

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Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program Year 3 Final Report RESEARCH REPORT APRIL 2013 Evaluation of the Los Angeles Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program Year 3 Final Report Terence Dunworth, Ph.D. Dave Hayeslip, Ph.D. Samantha Lowry KiDeuk Kim Cybele Kotonias Laura Pacifici URBAN INSTITUTE Justice Policy Center 0 research for safer communities Copyright © April 2013. The Urban Institute and Harder+Company Community Research. All rights reserved. Except for short quotes, no part of this report may be reproduced or used in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval systems, without written permission from the Urban Institute. The Urban Institute is a nonprofit, nonpartisan policy research and educational organization that examines the social, economic, and governance problems facing the nation. The views expressed are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Urban Institute, its trustees, or its funders. Table of Contents CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1 I.1 OVERVIEW OF THE GRYD PROGRAM ......................................................................................................... 1 I.2 GRYD’S COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY ......................................................................................................... 3 I.3 DATA AND METHODS IN Y3 EVALUATION ................................................................................................... 7 I.4 ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT ................................................................................................................ 7 CHAPTER II MEASURING GANG VIOLENCE IN LOS ANGELES .................................................................... 10 II.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................... 10 II.2 ORGANIZATION OF THE CHAPTERS ....................................................................................................... 10 II.3 DATA SOURCES ..................................................................................................................................... 11 II.4 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH ............................................................................................................... 14 CHAPTER III GANG VIOLENCE BEFORE AND AFTER GRYD ......................................................................... 19 III.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 19 III.2 ANNUAL TRENDS IN VIOLENT GANG CRIME IN LOS ANGELES ..................................................................... 19 III.3 MONTHLY TRENDS IN VIOLENT GANG CRIME ........................................................................................... 24 III.4 ACTUAL AND PROJECTED VIOLENT GANG CRIME ...................................................................................... 26 III.4.1 Projections for the City of Los Angeles .................................................................................. 26 III.4.2 Projections for Los Angeles County ........................................................................................ 27 III.4.3 City‐County Comparisons of Actual/Predicted Violence ...................................................... 28 III.5 DID ANALYSIS OF VIOLENT GANG CRIME ................................................................................................ 29 III.5.1 Difference‐in‐Differences Results ........................................................................................... 30 III.6 CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................................................................... 32 CHAPTER IV THE SUMMER NIGHT LIGHTS PROGRAM .............................................................................. 34 IV.1 OVERVIEW OF THE SUMMER NIGHT LIGHTS PROGRAM ............................................................................. 34 IV.2 SNL SURVEY RESULTS .......................................................................................................................... 35 IV.2.1 Survey Sample Demographics ................................................................................................. 38 IV.2.2 Community Assessment ......................................................................................................... 39 IV.2.3 The SNL Experience ................................................................................................................. 45 IV.2.4 Communication and 2011 SNL Effectiveness ......................................................................... 49 IV.3 CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................................... 51 CHAPTER V PREVENTION ........................................................................................................................... 52 V.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................... 52 V.2 PRIMARY PREVENTION .......................................................................................................................... 53 V.2.1 The Gun Buy‐Back Program ..................................................................................................... 53 V.2.2 Community Education Campaign ............................................................................................ 54 V.3 SECONDARY PREVENTION ...................................................................................................................... 56 V.3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 56 V.3.2 The Referral Process ................................................................................................................ 57 V.4 THE RETESTING PROCESS ....................................................................................................................... 62 V.4.1 Overview .................................................................................................................................. 62 V.4.2 Comparison of Enrolled Youth to Not‐Eligible Youth ............................................................. 65 V.5 ASSESSING GRYD IMPACTS ON ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR ....................................................................... 76 V.5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 76 V.5.2 A Hypothetical Illustration of Regression Discontinuity ......................................................... 76 V.5.3 Comparison of Eligible and Not‐Eligible Youth ....................................................................... 80 V.5.4 Findings .................................................................................................................................... 81 V.5.5 Robustness Checks ................................................................................................................... 88 V.6 CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................................................................... 89 CHAPTER VI INTERVENTION ....................................................................................................................... 90 VI.1 FAMILY CASE MANAGEMENT ................................................................................................................ 90 VI.2 LOS ANGELES VIOLENCE INTERVENTION TRAINING ACADEMY .................................................................... 91 VI.2.1 Background and Course Certification ..................................................................................... 91 VI.2.2 Stakeholder Perceptions ......................................................................................................... 92 VI.3 CRISIS RESPONSE ................................................................................................................................ 96 VI.3.1 Crisis Incident Notification ..................................................................................................... 97 VI.3.2 Characteristics of Crisis Incidents ........................................................................................... 98 VI.3.3 Actions Taken .......................................................................................................................... 99 VI.4 TRIANGLE GROUP MEMBER SURVEYS .................................................................................................. 103 VI.4.1 On Scene Roles and Collaboration ........................................................................................ 103 VI.4.2 Short Term Incident Outcomes ............................................................................................ 106 VI.4.3 Longer Term Incident Outcomes .......................................................................................... 108 VI.4.4 Summary ............................................................................................................................... 110 VI.5 LAPD PERSONNEL VIEWS OF GRYD ...................................................................................................
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