Cambridge House, Knowl View and Rochdale

CAMBRIDGE HOUSE, KNOWL VIEW AND ROCHDALE

OPENING STATEMENT BY COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY Check against delivery PREFACE

1) Chair and Panel members, the investigation into Cambridge House, Knowl View School and Rochdale (Rochdale for short) is but one part of the statutory Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse set up by the then Home Secretary in February 2015, offering an unprecedented opportunity to examine the extent to which institutions and organisations in England and Wales have taken seriously their responsibility to protect children. 2) The Rochdale investigation focuses on Cambridge House Boys’ Hostel and Knowl View School - two institutions that provided residential accommodation for boys in Rochdale. Neither institution exists any longer. Cambridge House was a hostel which took in lone, working young men and boys, the like of which will almost certainly never exist again. KVS was a residential school for boys with emotional and behavioural difficulties. 3) Some of the young men and boys who resided at both have since passed away. The laws, regulations and guidelines that applied to the institutions in which they lived have much changed in the years since they closed. The people involved in running them or who made decisions about them are mostly retired; some too have died. 4) Some of those accused of abuse, like Cyril Smith, are themselves long dead or in prison. There have been inquiries and investigations about child sexual abuse in Rochdale in the years following, and there was even a specific (albeit unfinished) review established by Rochdale Council which began to examine some of the same issues that fall for consideration in this investigation. 5) Society and culture may have changed, but many people whose lives were forever blighted by the abuse they suffered have understandably been unable to move on and they continue to seek justice. INTRODUCTION 1. So what then is the purpose of embarking upon this investigation within this inquiry? 2. First of all, these events did not happen so long ago as to consign them to history. You will hear evidence from core participants who lived in Cambridge House in the 1960s. This investigation and the willingness of the inquiry to consider their experiences is extremely important to them particularly because they have never been afforded an opportunity to give evidence in a public setting about those experiences. Cyril Smith, whose activities at Cambridge House are one focus of attention, remained a Member of Parliament until 1992; and there is evidence of his involvement in KVS until its closure. The examination of KVS considers events which were ongoing until 1994 (which is when it stopped admitting pupils). Some individuals who were affected by sexual abuse, whilst they were pupils at KVS, particularly in the late 1980s or early 1990s are now men in middle age to whom this inquiry is equally important.

3. The decision to embark upon this investigation was in part in response to the public concern that some politicians, including Cyril Smith, were involved in child sexual abuse, and able to abuse with impunity because they were protected by the establishment. It is only really because of Cyril Smith that the wider issue of child sexual abuse in Rochdale from the 1960s to 1990s garnered attention. 4. What the investigation was struck by, however, was the broader picture that emerged by shining a light on Cyril Smith. In other words, it illuminated the day to day experiences of children that would have gone unexamined. It is this experience that in many ways tells us more about responses to child sexual abuse than focusing on the politician whose conduct drew the inquiry's attention to Rochdale in the first instance. 5. An issue in this investigation is whether there a connection between the power wielded by Cyril Smith locally (and the risk he may have posed or did pose to children) and the wider picture about abuse which emerges from the evidence. It allows the panel to consider whether deference to individuals in a position of authority, not so very long ago, may have put children at risk of child sexual abuse. The wider issue is whether authorities in Rochdale were generally too accepting; too slow to interrogate information that ought to have given rise to acute concern; and too willing to accept the status quo? Those are obvious points to consider as the evidence unfolds. 6. Rochdale not only affords the Panel a rare opportunity to consider how local public authorities responded to a politician who may have posed a risk of sexual abuse to children, but also to consider other issues emerging from this investigation which remain relevant and will contribute to the Panel’s ability to put contemporary problems of child sexual abuse in context. 7. I emphasise that this is not an investigation into Cyril Smith. It is an investigation into allegations of the sexual abuse and exploitation of children residing at or attending Cambridge House Boys’ Hostel, KVS, and other institutions, where their placement was arranged or provided by Rochdale Borough Council. The wider issues raised by this investigation include:

(i) Our attitudes to vulnerable children whose behaviours are regarded as challenging or as somehow inviting or bringin on themselves sexual abuse (in this case, young boys who frequented public. places around Rochdale and who were abused by paying adults); (ii) The particular risks from which vulnerable children may be from sexual abuse. (iii) The tendency to make children responsible for their sexual abuse instead of the adults around them. (iv) A tendency to let difficult issues drift rather than to confront them. (v) A tendency towards optimism that circumstances are improving without interrogating whether information or evidence bears that out. (vi) The failure to look at the whole picture, whether it be the whole picture of the child or the whole picture which a group of children presents. 9. The purpose of this opening statement is to introduce some of the materials that the investigation will ultimately ask the Panel to consider. We want to set the scene so

that when witnesses come to give evidence, it is understood why they are being asked certain questions or why they are being asked to deal with certain criticisms. 10. The need to go straight to the core issues really matters in this investigation. There is a wealth of documentary material; witnesses have often given very many accounts of their involvement in the events in statements and interviews; many have been asked to address documentary evidence already. The purpose of calling these witnesses is to ask them to address the most contentious points relevant to them. There will not be the opportunity to introduce every piece of documentary evidence which the Panel will, in due course, be invited to base their conclusions and recommendations upon. Indeed, witnesses may not even be asked about some of the documentary material to which I shall be referring in this statement but will in due course be posted on the website (subject to sensitivity). B rian then gives an explanation that documents will be referred to but will be placed on the website in due course]. One of the purposes of this opening statement is to draw attention to some of that material and to demonstrate where it fits in the chronology. We will endeavour to ensure that, during the course of the hearing, core participants’ attention is drawn to any other evidence upon which reliance may be placed. 11. The first part of this hearing will focus upon Cambridge House and the allegations which were made against Cyril Smith by boys who lived there; how those allegations unfolded and how they were to resurface in later years. 12. Cyril Smith was also involved in the setting up of KVS. He was a governor at the school for two distinct periods but, beyond that, his involvement with the school is less clear. There is evidence of allegations that relate to his also sexually abusing boys who attended KVS. 13. In September 1990 an intruder, who was well-known to Knowl View, known to have sexually assaulted boys from the school and had in 1984 pleaded guilty to indecent assault with a child, spent two nights in the school. It is known for certain that on the second night he sexually assaulted one boy. There may have sexual activity with other children. The coming to light of this incident proved to be the catalyst for enquiries into other serious issues related to child sexual abuse within KVS. The hearing will look at the information which had accumulated over the years that demonstrated knowledge on the part of Rochdale authorities that children (including pupils from KVS) were being exploited for money and that sexually abusive activities by pupils on other pupils were ongoing. 14. One thing you may find striking is that there is evidence of such problems affecting KVS from the 1970s onwards. Is that because residential institutions which care for vulnerable children will always be susceptible to these sorts of problems (is it in their very nature?) or was it because there was a particular culture in KVS that persisted over the years which led to a risk of sexual abuse? We hope that some witnesses with wider experience in education, social care and health will be able to assist in your consideration of this point. CAMBRIDGE HOUSE HOSTEL 15. I am going to begin with Cambridge House Hostel. 16. A committee was formed in 1960 by, amongst others, Bill Harding, a probation officer and Cyril Smith (then an Alderman), who became its secretary to set up a private hostel situated at Cambridge House. According to Mr Harding, it was intended to accommodate young men aged between 15 years and 21 years. Each boy paid a

contribution according to his income. . Smith was one of three persons on the committee who took an active part in running it. Its main function was to provide accommodation for young boys with no home or who were in the care of the local authority. In 1962 the committee opened the hostel, called Cambridge House, at 12 Castlemere Street, Rochdale. 17. Although it was anticipated that it would provide accommodation for children who were in care, this accommodation was intended to accommodate ‘working boys’. It is important to note that at that time children were able to work from the age of fifteen years. 18. In the 1969 - 1970 investigation into Cyril Smith by Lancashire Police, the investigating officer concluded that Cyril Smith was the “prime motivator” of the scheme to found Cambridge House. Contemporaneous records from the time bear this out. He appears to have been a point of contact when a local authority was trying to find a place for a child at Cambridge House and the decision maker as to whether a child was given a place. In that way, he was not only gatekeeper but also privy to highly sensitive information about the children concerned. 19. Rochdale Borough Council has confirmed that children in its care were sent to live in Cambridge House and that the council provided funds to Cambridge House for this purpose. Social services records suggest that these children were no less vulnerable than other children who were cared for by the local authority. 20. The social care records of some children demonstrate both this and Cyril Smith’s role in admitting them to Cambridge House. 21. Cyril Smith’s role extended well beyond deciding who would be admitted to Cambridge House. Edith Saille (the warden in 1962), said in a statement that Cyril Smith was the most active member of the committee and that he dealt with discipline in the home. According to her husband (also a warden), Smith took these disciplinary duties upon himself. Mr Saille was aware, from boys at the hostel, that Smith made them remove their trousers and spanked them on their bare buttocks. 22. Valuable evidence about Cambridge House has been provided by Mr Lyndon Price who was the Senior Rochdale Children’s officer from March 1965. 23. Mr Price made a statement in the course of the police investigation into Cyril Smith which, as I have said, took place between 1969 and 1970. For ease I am going to refer to this as the “Lancashire investigation”. The Panel will be taken to Mr Price’s witness statements in more detail during the hearing. For present purposes Mr Price’s evidence explains how information that Cyril Smith’s interest in disciplining boys may have had a more sinister aspect to it first came to light. 24. In 1965, a Mr Gavin (a Rochdale child care officer) informed Mr Price that a boy (RO-A49) (who was in the care of Rochdale) told him that Smith had asked him to remove his trousers and then spanked him on his bare buttocks. This report caused Mr Price to interview the boy concerned. According to Mr Price, after serious consideration, he contacted Patrick Ross, the then Chief Constable of (Rochdale) Borough Police to report the information as told to him. Mr Price did not suggest by this that he was making a criminal complaint but rather that he was simply providing information to Mr Ross that may have been of interest to him. 25. Mr Price also explained in 1970 that Cyril Smith took an active part in running Cambridge House due to staff problems and that this included disciplinary matters.

When he made this statement, Mr Price said that he found the report of the boy being spanked by Smith a difficult matter to deal with because Smith was a member of the town council which employed Mr Price. Later in 2014, Mr Price was to resile from certain aspects of that statement, but if he was intimidated by Smith’s position and power he was not the first, nor was he going to be the last to be. 26. In the statement he gave to police in 2014, Mr Price said that Mr Ross had told him “it had been decided” that no further action would be taken in respect of Cyril Smith. Mr Price states that children in the care of Rochdale were removed from Cambridge House shortly after and that Cambridge House Hostel closed down in December 1965. It seems that in 1965 Cambridge House had staffing difficulties and that the Children’s Committee of Rochdale Council was not willing to take over its running. 27. It is to be noted that Mr Gavin actually lived in the hostel from September 1965 which is how he came to speak to RO-A49 and was therefore able to pass on the information to Mr Price. 28. There is in fact no evidence of a police investigation in 1965. Greater Manchester Police was unable to find any record of it. 29. Enquiries were made of senior officers of the former Borough Force during the course of the Lancashire investigation as to whether there had been any investigation in 1965, but no one seemed to have any knowledge of the then Chief Constable carrying one out. Importantly the Chief Superintendent at Rochdale noted that whilst he was confident that Mr Price’s statement might be true, it was quite feasible that Mr Ross would have kept the complaint about Cyril Smith to himself because of Smith’s status. 30. I will return to this document later. Superintendent Leach’s final report of 11/3/70 which went to the DPP in 1970 suggests that Mr Ross who had been asked about it said that he had no recollection of “being so informed” I will come back to this later. 31. What is clear is that by 1966, Smith had acquired yet more power. He had been a Labour Party councillor and a prominent one from 1952. In 1966, he was elected the Mayor of Rochdale (for Labour) and, according to Superintendent Leach’s report he was also awarded an MBE for “services to youth”. Cyril Smith’s autobiography ‘Big Cyril’ (pg 101) evidences the extent to which he was embedded in activities in Rochdale related to children at this point. He resigned from the Labour Party whilst he was Mayor and recounts how when Labour regained control of Rochdale Corporation in 1972 he was sacked from the Youth Committee of the Council (of which he had been the Chair for twenty one years); the Youth Employment Committee (which he had chaired for twenty years); the Committee of the Rochdale Youth Orchestra (which he had formed); the Committee of the Youth Theatre Workshop (which he had helped found); and he was sacked from the Board of Governors of 23 schools (which according to Smith he had visited assiduously). It appears that he was still on the Education Committee albeit that he was removed as its Chair. 32. The remarkable and full extent of his membership of Committees can also be seen in a 14 page list setting out Smith’s official appointments in Rochdale between 1960 and 1973 THE LANCASHIRE INVESTIGATION

33. On New Year’s Eve 1969, the Chief Superintendent at Rochdale sent the Chief Constable of Lancashire Police a memorandum. He attached a report of the same date by Sergeant Brierley into an investigation which had been commenced into Alderman Cyril Smith. 34. The report was submitted by the Chief Superintendent as an interim measure principally because of the high standing in which Alderman Smith was held in political and social work circles. Apart from that, the Chief Superintendent was certain that Smith had the ear of the Editor of the Rochdale Observer which he knew as he wryly commented “to his cost on a previous occasion...” This is an early indication of the hold which Cyril Smith was considered to have over local press. 35. You will be referred to a statement later in this hearing from the former chief reporter of the Rochdale Observer which touches upon his view as to whether Cyril Smith was given special treatment by the paper 36. The Chief Superintendent suggested that Sergeant Brierley be permitted to pursue his investigation and interview the eight youths who Sergeant Brierley had referred to in his report but had yet to be spoken to. 37. A number of observations can be made about this memorandum: (i) Smith’s relations with the police appeared tense already; (ii) the security of the investigation was not designed to protect Smith but rather the integrity of the investigation; and (iii) the Chief Superintendent wanted to see the investigation progress. 38. Sergeant Brierley’s report describes how the allegations against Smith came to be made. 39. The Lancashire investigation did progress and it will be considered in some detail. There were eight complainants, six of whom had resided at Cambridge House who were to make allegations against Smith. They all gave accounts to similar effect: that Smith had purported to carry out a medical examination of them and touched them intimately or had spanked them on their bare buttocks. 40. It has been the subject of recent speculation that the Lancashire Investigation was interfered with or in some way impeded by dint of Cyril Smith’s position. For example, there were suggestions in the book “Smile for the Camera” by Simon Danczcuk and in a 2013 Channel 4 “Dispatches” programme that special branch officers or MI5 officers had taken evidence gathered by Lancashire Police. The implication is that this was to frustrate the investigation. It is thus important to trace the progress of the Lancashire investigation so as to ascertain whether any part of it was withheld or prevented from reaching the Director of Public Prosecutions. A witness from Lancashire Police will give evidence as to the internal investigations which it has made into the original 1969 - 1970 investigation for this purpose. 41. In his report dated 11/3/70 to the Chief Constable of Lancashire, Superintendent Jeffrey Leach stated that the investigation commenced by Sergeant Brierley had passed to him on 16/2/70 . 42. Before Superintendent Leach took over the investigation, Cyril Smith had asked to speak to the previous investigating officer (Superintendent Watson) and did so on 24/1/70 whilst the investigation was ongoing. It is clear that Smith was well aware of the investigation against him and what it concerned. 43. Smith set out why he had called for the meeting. He was warned about interfering with witnesses. He told the police about what he had done for the boys who were 6

complaining. He said he would “defend it to the hilt” but he was not suggesting they had conspired together, but were “telling the truth as they see it”. Smith’s interest in speaking to the officer became clear; he had to inform the Liberal Party in a matter of weeks if he intended to contest the Rochdale seat in the General Election. 44. Superintendent Leach’s report to which I will return makes clear that Smith was selected as the Liberal candidate on 2/3/70. It would appear that he decided to take a chance, no decision on charge yet having been made. 45. On 27/2/70 the allegations were formally put to Smith in an interview under caution. He had prior notice of the questions that he would be asked in written form. He declined to answer them relying instead upon a prepared written statement 46. In that prepared statement he said that he was acting ‘in loco parentis’ (although he did not explain what he meant by this) and generally denied that he had committed any indecent act. He produced, in apparent support of his account, a form signed by a resident (not the parent) stating that he had agreed that the Committee could exercise parental rights over them including matters of medical and general discipline (re RO-A50) THE POLICE FILE 47. The witness from Lancashire Police will deal with the evidence that was gathered in 1969 - 1970. For the purposes of this introduction, it is important to highlight aspects of Detective Superintendent Leach’s report which was prepared upon the conclusion of the investigation and sent to the DPP. The report conveys a clear sense of how celebrated Smith was in Rochdale at that time: “the best known public citizen” of Rochdale. 48. Returning to the concern that the Lancashire investigation into Cyril Smith had in some way been impeded, it is important to note that Superintendent Leach was unsparing in his view that the allegations were truthful. He recorded the fact that he had interviewed the complainants and was satisfied that there had been no collusion. He noted that, independently, the claims should ‘stand up’ and collectively support each other. 49. Superintendent Leach concluded that it was impossible to excuse Smith’s conduct and that over a period of time he had “sheltered beneath a veneer of respectability” and had used his unique position to indulge in a sordid series of indecent episodes with young boys towards whom he had a special responsibility. 50. The police file was passed to the Director of Public Prosecutions (at that time Sir Norman Skelhorn) under cover of a letter dated 13/3/70. It sought advice as to whether proceedings should be instigated. Receipt was acknowledged by letter dated 16/3/70. Besides the evidence of the complainants, it included the evidence from other Cambridge House committee members which generally confirmed Smith’s involvement in the disciplining of Cambridge House residents and confirmed that he had no mandate to carry out medical examinations. 51. The DPP’s response was swift. By letter dated 19/3/70, he communicated his view, in cursory terms, that there was no reasonable prospect of Cyril Smith being convicted of indecent assault. 52. A witness from the Crown Prosecution Service will be called to give further evidence about that decision and the basis upon which it was made. The Panel may wish to consider whether the decision not to prosecute Smith in 1970 appears reasonable as 7

judged against the requirements that then applied, in order to prove allegations of indecent assault. These requirements will be considered further during this hearing. Or for your consideration, was this decision han example of one member of the establishment protecting another for no other reason than that he occupied a position of power 53. In light of the decision, at the direction of the Assistant Chief Constable Smith was on 25/3/70 told in person of the decision that he would not be prosecuted 54. This was to have significant legal consequences later when the evidence against Smith was revisited. 55. Cyril Smith was, in due course, selected to be the Liberal candidate in the 1970 election standing against Jack McCann. Jack McCann held the seat for Labour with 1 41.57% of the vote. Smith took 30.40% of the vote. There has been some speculation that Jack McCann undertook to speak to the DPP (or the Home Secretary) on Cyril Smith’s behalf during the investigation into Smith. 56. Eileen Kershaw had been married to John ‘Jack’ Kershaw who was an old school friend of Smith’s. She gave Channel 4’s 2013 ‘Dispatches’ programme “Cyril Smith The Paedophile MP How He Got Away With It” an account about a time that Smith had come to their home complaining that he had been reported to the police “for something sexual”. She recalled him telling them that he had been into the police station and had challenged them (a reference to the meeting he had sought with the police in January 1970). Mrs Kershaw told ‘Dispatches’, “That was him ... full of bravado and bluster” but Smith was worried. According to Mrs Kershaw he persisted in coming round to their home over several months. In the end, Mr Kershaw suggested he get Jack McCann involved. And so Kershaw brought McCann to their house where they met with Smith. Eventually, McCann said he was to going to see the DPP to tell him either to get on and prosecute, as it had gone on long enough, or to drop it. A couple of weeks later Smith phoned in tears of relief that the case had indeed been dropped. Mrs Kershaw told ‘Dispatches’ Jack McCann’s intervention had got Cyril Smith “off the hook”. In a statement she made on 5/3/15 she said she regretted saying that because McCann had been a man of integrity and what he actually had done was to expedite the matter and resolve the situation to bring it to a conclusion but she did not think his intervention had influenced DPP’s decision. She said McCann had brought about the decision but he had not influenced it. 57. There is a reference in a police report from 1998 (to which I shall return) to information that Jack McCann had enlisted the help of the Home Secretary (Roy Jenkins) “in an effort to prevent Smith’s prosecution”. 58. The investigation has seen no direct evidence to support any suggestion that Jack McCann did intercede on Smith’s behalf to expedite or to affect the decision. In his autobiography Smith recounts that Jack McCann had been a friend but that they fell out in the course of the 1970 campaign when Smith attacked Jack McCann’s voting record. Smith may have been sacked from numerous positions locally in Rochdale in 1972 but he was elected as the Liberal Candidate in a by-election on 26 October 1972 (following Jack McCann’s death). In 1975 Jeremy Thorpe made him Chief Whip of the Liberal Party. He was to remain the Member of Parliament for Rochdale until 1992.

1 see h ttp://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/ge70/i17.htm 8

THE ROCHDALE ALTERNATIVE PRESS ARTICLES 59. The allegations against Cyril Smith were not forgotten but were to resurface 9 years after the Lancashire investigation in an article entitled “Strange Case” by the Rochdale Alternative Press or (“RAP” as it was known and which is how I shall refer to it). The editors of RAP were John Walker and David Bartlett. Mr Bartlett will give evidence in the course of the hearing. 60. The publication of the allegations in the May 1979 edition of RAP was a matter of days before the General Election of 3/5/79. The article was not being published as an act of political sabotage but rather because Smith was seeking re-election based on a personal basis as “SMITH THE MAN” and he had been critical of his leader, Jeremy Thorpe, who, at that time, was subject to a criminal investigation and prosecution with what Mr Bartlett calls “homosexual overtones”. In other words Smith was seeking re-election purely on the basis of his character and personality as opposed to his representation of the Liberal Party. Also, RAP considered he was guilty of hypocrisy in relation to the Thorpe affair. So RAP considered it legitimate that the electorate of Rochdale should be able to take into account the allegations in casting its vote. 61. RAP therefore set out the allegations which had been investigated in 1969 to 1970 and supported them by obtaining several affidavits from men setting out their experiences at the hands of Smith. According to David Bartlett, RAP had traced and identified 6 men who had been resident at Cambridge House and they had agreed to make affidavits to a solicitor. He recalled 4 of the names of the men who had provided them. The Inquiry has seen 4 affidavits bearing the ciphers RO-A50, RO-A48, RO-A4 and RO-A1. 62. RAP also approached the DPP’s office in an attempt to clarify whether the DPP had actually considered the evidence gathered in the 1969/70 investigation. RAP had good reason to believe that the DPP had determined that there was insufficient evidence upon which to prosecute Smith. The DPP’s office provided a statement that it had failed to find a file relating to Cyril Smith. A second approach brought the official statement that “The DPP cannot trace such a case being referred to us, but cannot confirm or deny receiving it.” The article also sets out a curious account of RAP having been contacted by phone by someone purporting to be the former DPP, Sir Norman Skelhorn, who said he could not remember any such case. They never confirmed it had been the former DPP. RAP followed up the May article in June confirming they had written to the Chief Constable asking him to confirm the file had been sent to the DPP. His response was published: it was a refusal to enter into correspondence about it which did not help allay suspicions of a cover-up. 63. The inquiry made a request to MI5, the Security Service, to see if it had any information that was relevant to this investigation. The Security Service conducted the searches requested and Counsel and Solicitor to the inquiry inspected their product. They identified material that was relevant and asked the Security Service to produce it to the Inquiry so it could be disclosed in the investigation. The Security Service did so and a number of documents were disclosed to core participants last week. Redactions have been applied by the Inquiry to these documents in accordance with the Inquiry's redaction protocol. The documents show that the Security Service's legal adviser was informed of the false representations to the press from the DPP’s office. Based upon their review of the information they hold, the Security Service considers they took active steps to ensure that those involved in

investigating allegations of child sexual abuse against Smith were made aware of all information of relevance to their enquiries. However, given their function was to defend the realm, at that time, and investigation was outside their remit, they simply filed the information related to the false representations that had been made to the press.

64. You will hear evidence from Mr Bartlett about the publication of the article and RAP’s attempts to bring the allegations to the attention of a wider audience. 65. What is clear is that if RAP had hoped that by publication they would expose Smith and cause the Rochdale public to think about their loyalty to him, those hopes were in vain. Smith was re-elected in greater numbers than before. Far from diminishing him, the allegations appeared to have had no effect whatsoever. 66. The importance of the RAP article lies not just in its attempt to force a closer scrutiny of Cyril Smith by his electorate, it ensured that the allegations were in the open (if they were not already) in local politics and government in Rochdale. It might be thought that in both these environments, there would be individuals more ready to ask questions of Smith than his voters. You may wish to consider whether that was the case. 67. Nor were the allegations in RAP picked up by the national newspapers. Only Private Eye proved willing to repeat them. This is despite the fact that Cyril Smith did not take any form of action against RAP. The Inquiry has contacted all the major national newspapers to ask if they have any institutional memory or archive documents that would indicate why they did not publish any story about Cyril Smith in the wake of the RAP article. Unfortunately, none has been able to provide a substantive response. HONOURS 68. The stark fact is that neither Cyril Smith’s standing in public life nor his career progression was impeded by his being accused of child sexual abuse. On the contrary, his ascent was marked by his being awarded a Knighthood in 1988. The Inquiry has come into possession of material from the Cabinet Office revealing the consideration that was given to the award to him of a Knighthood. In fact the Mail on Sunday had obtained the material under a Freedom of Information request in March 2015 about which the Daily Mail was to publish an article on 7/3/15. 69. The Lancashire investigation and the RAP allegations were to feature in the House of Lords’ Political Honours Scrutiny Committee (“PHSC”) consideration of Smith and to have been drawn to then Prime Minister (Margaret Thatcher’s) attention; despite that he was knighted. 70. A memorandum to Sir Robin Butler dated 11/5/88 records that the Committee wished to see a copy of the Lancashire Police report to the DPP. A manuscript note on this memorandum suggests that Sir Robin wrote to the DPP (“Mr” at that time; later Sir Allan Green) regarding this. The note suggests that Sir Allan Green did not have the full file but that he had Sir Norman Skelhorn’s letter and had discussed it with Sir Robin Butler.

71. A draft letter from Sir Robin states that this was an “exceptional step” which was intended to protect the Queen and the Prime Minister whilst also being fair to Cyril Smith. Further communication with the DPP certainly took place. 72. A draft letter from Lord Shackleton to the Prime Minister on behalf of the PHSC expressly referred to the investigation, to the RAP article and to the Private Eye article. Regardless of the fact it is a draft, it provides some insight into the Committee’s thinking; that “one may regret this kind of press reporting” [para 4] but that it (the scandal) could be revived if the award were given.

73. The draft also notes the fact of a break-in at the offices of The Sun newspaper revealing that the editor had a copy of the DPP’s report from 1970. This supports the proposition that national newspapers were aware of the allegations but had elected not to repeat them. 74. It is not clear if this letter was sent to the Prime Minister. However another letter was sent on 11/5/88 from the Secretary to the PHSC to an “N. Wicks” (believed to be Nigel Wicks the Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister) enclosing the RAP article and the Private Eye article. This letter stated that the Committee had signed the certificate and were content for the Prime Minister to take the final decision as to whether the honour should be conferred. 75. A letter to the Prime Minister of the same date (11/5/88) (from Lord Grimond of the Committee) indicated that the Prime Minister was aware that the Committee had “some” hesitation about the award, but the Committee now had the “honour” to report that neither his history nor character rendered Cyril Smith unsuitable to be honoured. 76. I mention this Knighthood here for two reasons. First, because it demonstrates that the Lancashire investigation and the RAP article had been considered at the very highest level of politics and seemingly did not prompt more than consideration of the DPP’s decision not to prosecute. 77. Second, because it is important to bear in mind the extent to which Cyril Smith continued to involve himself in serious issues related to the welfare of children. A Knighthood would only have reinforced Smith’s veneer of respectability and power. By way of example, records from a case in 1991 show that he played a pivotal role the removal of a child from his family home. The child in question had behaved sexually towards his eight year old sister. Rochdale Social Services were attempting to manage this situation but it is quite clear that it was the involvement of Smith in his capacity as the local MP that was decisive. 78. You will hear evidence from some of the Rochdale officers who had dealings with Smith and his associate Harry Wild (to whom I will return). It is clear that they could both be forceful, domineering and bullying. BREAK

LATER POLICE INVESTIGATIONS

79. The 1969 investigation came to be revived in March 1998 when RO-A1 approached South Wales Police to report that Smith had abused him.

80. At this point in time there was an ongoing Greater Manchester Police investigation into the sexual abuse of children at residential care homes across the Greater Manchester area. The investigation was known as Operation Cleopatra. Its first senior investigating officer was Detective Superintendent Stelfox. In 1998, Superintendent Roberts took over and became SIO. Witness statements from both these officers will be read later in the proceedings. A witness from Greater Manchester Police will be called to give evidence about Operation Cleopatra in general and how it dealt with some of the issues which are relevant to this investigation such as ‘child on child’ abuse within KVS.

81. By a memo dated 20/3/98 Chief Superintendent Keegan (Head of CID) directed that Cyril Smith be investigated as part of Operation Cleopatra.

82. On 21/5/98, Superintendent Stelfox submitted the original 1970 file (with an additional witness statement) to the CPS for advice. A witness on behalf of the CPS will explain the rationale underlying a decision not to prosecute in 1998 including the fact Smith had been told in 1970 he would not be prosecuted.

83. Detective Sergeant Hill, to whom the Lancashire file was then passed, made enquiries and reported on 2/12/98. The report was handwritten.

84. Sergeant Hill had been provided with the statement dated 19/1/70 which had been given by RO-A1 to the original Lancashire investigation. He interviewed RO-A1 (in October 1998); RO-A1 suggested that Sergeant Hill speak to Mr Bartlett which he did on 12/11/98. Mr Bartlett gave Sergeant Hill the copies of notes which he had made of his conversations with police officers during his investigations for the purposes of the RAP article. These were Tom Rankin (acting Chief Constable in 1968), DCI Wheater (of the original Lancashire investigation) and retired Superintendent Anderson.

85. Sergeant Hill’s concluded view was that, on balance, there should be further investigation now “to draw a line under the whole matter”. His personal view was that a further investigation would be merited.

86. In his statement of 19/12/14 Hill says in the result he was instructed to make further enquiries by Superintendent Roberts. He interviewed two other complainants (RO-A4 and RO-A68). In the result, he produced a further handwritten report on 18/3/99 to Superintendent Roberts who had instructed him to omit in it any recommendations. It was headed ‘Allegations re Cyril Smith’. Despite Mr Roberts’ instruction Hill included his recommendations in 11 lines in his handwritten report. The report went off for typing, and came back to him dated 29/3/99. But when it came back to him, it came back without his recommendations. He says he kept his 18/3/99 handwritten version.

87. Sergeant Hill was removed from Operation Cleopatra and has posited that this may have been as a result of pressure from above to stop anyone looking “too closely” at Cyril Smith. The witness on behalf of Greater Manchester Police will give evidence as to the extent of further investigations into Cyril Smith under the auspices of Operation Cleopatra in order to address this concern.

88. The CPS considered the position again in 1999. Again evidence will be given as regards the decision made in 1999 not to prosecute Cyril Smith and the review of the decision-making in 2012.

KNOWL VIEW SCHOOL 89. From 1963, discussions took place between 4 local authorities (Lancashire, Bolton, Rochdale and Oldham) regarding the proposed establishment of a residential special school for “maladjusted” boys for which all four authorities would be jointly responsible (meeting of Medical, Welfare & Nursery Schools Subcommittee 13/3/63). 90. In April 1968 Cyril Smith was appointed the Chairman of the “Special Sub Committee Re Residential School for Maladjusted Boys”. This subcommittee was charged with making the practical arrangements for the setting up of this school. Just as he had been to the fore in bringing Cambridge House into existence so too was Cyril Smith at the centre of the establishment of KVS. 91. A recommendation that Mr Turner be appointed its first head teacher was made in April 1968. On 15/7/68 it was resolved by the schools subcommittee of the council that the school would be called Knowl View School. 92. The school, in its early stages, remained under the auspices of the four local authorities (Lancashire, Bolton, Rochdale and Oldham) responsible for founding it (meeting of finance and general purposes subcommittee 9/10/68). 93. KVS first admitted pupils on 8/1/69. On 15/1/70, powers related to the running of the school were transferred from the joint subcommittee of the Education Committee to the Board of Governors. Cyril Smith was appointed a member of this Board in 1970. 94. RO-A7 who so far as he could recall attended in February 1969 recalled the ironic names of the dormitories at KVS being names for heaven: Nirvana, Valhalla, Bliss and then Lilliput for those under 10. If that is an accurate recollection, then the names later changed to Nordern and Egerton (the senior dormitories), and Bamford and Ashworth (the junior dormitories). 95. The early years of KVS were not auspicious and perhaps augured what was to come. One of its first members of teaching staff David Higgins was later convicted of sexually abusing pupils from KVS. Higgins was appointed to KVS in 1969. He resigned from KVS on 31/12/71 for reasons which are unknown. He was convicted in 1976 and 1983 in respect of the sexual abuse of children not related to KVS. In 2002, having pleaded guilty to 11 charges in respect of 2 KVS pupils as part of Operation Cleopatra he was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment. 96. Father Michael Seed (RO-A29) was a pupil at KVS between the years 1970 and 1974. In his book “Nobody’s Child” he described how Higgins would wash boys in the showers and encourage some to masturbate. Importantly, for the purposes of this investigation, he also described how older boys were being exploited for money in Rochdale’s public toilets. 97. Father Michael (RO-A29) spoke to the Garnham review (set up by RBC) and was regarded by Neil Garnham QC (as he then was) as having been very helpful in illuminating what it was like to be a pupil at this time. Father Michael (RO-A29) confirmed the accuracy of the information contained in his book. 98. A guide to the school, prepared for the purposes of recruiting a new headteacher in 1976, provides some insight into how the school operated at this time. It is described as having accommodation for 50 boys, aged 7 years to 16 years. This document also explains the accommodation available within the school for staff (this comprised three

houses, two married staff flats, five single staff flats and a caretaker’s house); there was substantial provision for staff to be able to live on site. 99. Whilst this prospectus mentioned that the school could accommodate this wide age range there is a lack of clarity as whether the school was admitting children across this age spectrum. 100. An admissions policy from September 1977 demonstrates that children did not automatically go home at weekends but that each child should go home at least once a half term. This policy also highlighted the risk that residential schooling could isolate the child from his family.

101. It is clear that Mr Hopwood (who had succeeded Mr Turner as headmaster) writing in 1977 sought to distinguish KVS from a residential care home on the basis that it was neither equipped nor staffed to provide for children in need of residential care. 102. This is a critical point. We will ask witnesses whether or not this was a delineation which existed in reality given that the school did care for children who were in the care of the local authority and who stayed in residential care homes when not at school or who had been sent to the school as an alternative to care. Moreover, even if children were not in care, many appear to have had complex needs that plainly required special support. Did the school formally develop so that it could take children who required specialist care or was this something which simply happened over time? 103. The risks presented by having children of this width of ages, particularly in the context of a residential school, catering for children with complex needs, is another obvious issue to consider. 104. Records from the 1970s suggest that the school operated, at least in part, along therapeutic lines. A psychiatrist, Dr Simpson, saw boys from the school on a weekly basis. The referral records (which document the head teacher’s reasons for referring certain children) demonstrate that these reasons were wide ranging (and of their time). Reasons for referral included delinquency; effeminacy; family breakdown; to gauge the academic ability of a boy, as well as behaviours indicative of serious psychiatric conditions. 105. Some insight into the vulnerabilities of children can be gleaned from these referrals. 106. Records from Dr Simpson from the 1970s also demonstrate that pupils were involved in sexual activities which were a cause for concern. For instance, in 1977 one 15 year old pupil (RO-A137) was described as having contracted pubic lice through homosexual contacts. 107. This boy is referred to in a report prepared in December 1976 by Mr Hopwood, the headmaster. He noted that 5 named boys had been found out of bed and that there was evidence of “sexual malpractice” amongst them. 108. The report concluded that this behaviour had occurred on previous occasions. Even at this early stage in the life of KVS Mr Hopwood was to observe “It has become clear that this sort of behaviour has become a sub-cultural tradition”.

109. A further record from 1977 regarding RO-A140 indicates that the activity might be linked to exploitation by adults for money. 110. The risks this boy (RO-A140, aged 15 in 1977) was at became real. 111. Further evidence about what the school was like at this time emerges from Operation Jaguar. This was the recent investigation by GMP into allegations of sexual abuse at KVS. You will hear more about this investigation from a witness from Greater Manchester Police. In the course of this investigation men made allegations of being sexually abused by fellow pupils. 112. One social worker told police in 2014 of one KVS pupil (RO-A75) who attended KVS in the late 1970s/early 1980s but had absconded and when he was picked up divulged to the social worker that he was being paid for sexual favours.

113. Another matter of note dating from this period, on 27/12/80, a female teacher (who had taken a pupil away for a night RO-F103) was given a final warning on the basis that she had formed a “personal and private friendship” with one of the pupils which she had not notified to the senior house parent. RODERICK HILTON (PT 1) 114. It is at this point in the chronology that Roderick Hilton first appears. In 1984 the headmaster of Knowl View (still Terence Hopwood), wrote a report (dated 8/2/84) concerning events involving Hilton and 4 pupils (RO-B47, RO-B328, RO-B329 and RO-B330) on the weekend of 27-29/1/84. 115. In it, Hilton is described in the report as a “slow witted eighteen-year-old youth...whom they knew had homosexual tendencies”. The suggestion is made that two pupils intended to trick Hilton or in the words of the report “rip off” Hilton: “They promised Hilton money in return for sexual favours but claim that they had no intention of keeping their part of the bargain”. This wording makes little sense and indeed it appears from the rest of the report that it was the other way round - that they promised ‘favours’ for cash. 116. This view of Hilton as potential victim of cunning children will be seen later in the evidence. 117. Ominously, the Hopwood report goes on to record that “they” (the pupils) tricked another child into performing an act of gross indecency, and how other boys came to know that “easy money was available” and one boy (RO-B330) was taken by another (RO-A88) to meet Hilton “for the purpose of obtainable money” with the result that an act of gross indecency occurred between Hilton and the boy (RO-B330). Mr Hopwood added that “At least one other grossly indecent act took place during the weekend”. 118. The two children assaulted by Hilton were reported by Mr Hopwood to have been taken to the GP who “declared them free of infection”. It is understood from other records that the children were registered at a GP local to Knowl view as opposed to their home GP. 119. The police informed Mr Hopwood they were proceeding with one specimen charge (re RO-B329) as well as 2 similar offences to be considered (re RO-B330).

The police anticipated a small fine, probation and minimum publicity given juveniles were involved. 120. There was also the suggestion that the boys could have been charged with offences such as blackmail and procuring; also Hilton’s mother had complained that Hilton was threatened by one of the boys. Mr Hopwood’s enquiries also discovered that one night one boy (RO-B47) had masturbated and ejaculated over a sleeping boy. 121. A local press report from around 22/2/84 records the fact Hilton (then aged 19) had admitted one offence of indecent assault and asked for a similar offence to be considered. Sentence was adjourned to 19/3/84 for reports according to the article. A further press article of 21/3/84 demonstrates that the police were correct to anticipate that Hilton would receive a relatively light punishment; he was sentenced to a term of 2 years’ probation with a condition to undergo medical treatment. Interestingly, the article records how the case was opened by the prosecutor who referred to the boys as entrepreneurs who, following the incidents,demanded more money from Hilton in the form of blackmail”. All this corresponds to his criminal record which refers to a sentence on 19/3/84. 122. Thus children from Knowl View were induced to bring 2 other children to Hilton and that Hilton indecently assaulted them. There is scant information as to what wider reaction this prompted. 123. This was in 1984. Six years later in 1990 Hilton (who had most certainly not gone away) was to indecently assault at least one other pupil having gained entry and stayed the night at the school. The Hilton incident in 1990 was to bring matters to a head about serious issues of child sexual abuse which had been going on for a considerable period beforehand. It is important in this opening to trace those incidents. 124. First, though, some observations about the school at this point in time. Between 1980 and 1985, pupil numbers were consistently at around 40. From 1986 there was a dramatic reduction with numbers falling to an all-time low of 19 in 1989. 125. In 1988, KVS the arrangement with the 3 other councils was cancelled so that KVS became the sole responsibility of Rochdale Council. From 1988 onwards there was also considerable instability in the management of the school. Mr Hopwood was absent through illness in 1988 and retired in 1989. Ian Ashton became the Acting Head in January 1989. Brett Andrews was appointed deputy and then he became acting head in September 1989. In October 1990, Michael Poulton (the head of another school) was seconded to KVS. This was an immediate response to the incident with Hilton in September 1990. His secondment for one term commenced in December 1990. Stephen Bradshaw was appointed head with effect from April 1991. 126. What of the children who were attending the school? According to Diana Cavanagh (Director of Education in Rochdale), writing in October 1994, children who were attending KVS: “….have been unable to cope with mainstream and (often) their family circumstances. Many have a poor self-image, have been abused and are on the Child Protection Register, have not found it possible to make good relationships with other children. Some are extremely withdrawn, avoiding contact or relationships with others and running away if pressurised. Some are aggressive and violent towards their family, other pupils and staff, both posing a

physical risk to others and disrupting other pupils’ education. Some manipulate or bully other children and constantly use inappropriate language or inappropriate sexual behaviour…” 127. You will hear more about the vulnerabilities of some of these children as the evidence unfolds. I shall also have to return to Hilton.

CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION - SMITH STREET TOILETS 128. Father Michael Seed’s (RO-A29’s) account of his time at KVS included his observations of fellow pupils who were being exploited for money by paying men in Rochdale. It is an irony in this investigation that Smith Street toilets, a centre for this exploitation was in fact overlooked by municipal offices. The Rochdale Child Protection Manager (Ms Janet Bowyer (now Mrs Weeks)) gave a statement to police in which she described how her offices had a view of the toilets and how boys would regularly sit on the wall and follow men inside. It was obvious to her that sexual activity was going on. 129. On 17/2/89, there was a meeting of representatives from police, social services and education to discuss a group of children aged between 10 and 14 years who gathered at “Tasty Bite”, a food outlet, each day when they should have been at school. Twelve children were identified, 5 of whom were in the care of Rochdale. Two others were at serious risk of coming into care. It suffices to state that a number of these children came to be identified as being exploited by paying men (includes Boy 1, Boy 2 and Boy 3). 130. One such child (Boy 1) was observed in February 1989 (aged 11) to have had a network of friends involved in criminal activities as well as sexual activity that was of concern. It was decided that he ought to be in a residential school. 131. On 3/4/89 Boy 1 started at KVS. By 22/8/89, he was remanded in care. Six days later an entry of 28/8/89 (now aged 12) in his case record shows concern that Boy 1 was involved in “rent boy’” activity. 132. A file note of 6/4/89 in the social service record of Boy 2 (then aged 11) by his social worker recorded that there was reliable information from a PC Dunning that he had been involved in “inappropriate sexual activities” at Smith Street toilets. 133. The situation was plainly serious. A file note of the following day, 7/4/89, by the child’s social worker records that he met with PC Dunning who provided information about Boy 2 approaching a man in Smith Street toilets, asking for 50p and asking if he wanted to play with him. He had apparently also gone over to the bus station and approached the same man, asking the same question, assuring him it was alright as he had got £5 the week before and could get £5-10 any time he wanted. 134. It appears from an entry of 25/4/89 in the records that Boy2 was admitted to KVS precisely because of concerns around his involvement in Smith Street toilets. He was admitted on 11/5/89. 135. A meeting was arranged with the acting head teacher of KVS (Mr Ashton) to discuss the admission of Boy 2 and a member of his family Boy 3 (who was 4 years older than Boy 2) to KVS on this basis. 136. Boy 2’s mother provided information that he had been seen around town with a man with a walking stick.

137. On 5/5/89 the social worker spoke to staff at KVS about Boy 2’s rent boy activities around the bus station. I am bringing this to your attention to make clear that it was then being clearly communicated to staff at KVS that at least one of its pupils was involved in this exploitation. 138. A case record entry of 11/5/89 by Boy 2’s social worker demonstrates his concern at the boy’s self-abusive behaviour and that it might be linked to his activities in Smith Street. 139. Boy 2was at this time living in KVS during the week and at Poplar House, a children’s home, at the weekends. 140. This exploitation was not limited to the Rochdale area. A social care record of 8/9/89 describes an account by Boy 3 (a member of Boy 2’s family) of going to Salford with, among others, Boy 1, to watch pornography, while Boy 2 went into a bedroom with a man and got £5. There was another incident where Boy 2 went into a shed with a man (which Boy 3 watched) and masturbated him. 141. As regards Boy 2, on 14/8/89 he discussed with his social worker and Dave Carter (from Elmfield Children’s Home) a man that he was involved with at the bus station. This man was his thirties and Boy 2 got money from him for doing “naughty things”. He had gone to a hut with him and there was information that other boys were involved. During the discussion, Mr Carter and the boy’s social worker quite poignantly emphasised that Boy 2 was not to blame for what had occurred and that it was the adults concerned who were wrong to involve him in these activities. On 24/8/89 Boy 2 and his social worker met with a police officer, when he confirmed to the police officer that he had been involved in sexual activities at the toilets. 142. One document makes reference to allegations that several other boys were alleged to be involved in “rent boy” activity and “cottaging” at public toilets spanning the years 1990-1992. Lunch 143. A record of 9/3/90 puts this in context - it is a KVS record of report made by PC Bottomley. It records PC Bottomley reporting that due to complaints from members of the public regarding a group of boys importuning at the town centre toilets the police carried it a raid on 8/9/90 and discovered Boy 2 (who had absconded from KVS) and Boy 1 (who had been set home as the school was closed for repairs). Worse still there was a group of some 14 boys all absconders from various children's homes organised by an older boy aged 13 (RO-A38) into a ring for extracting money for sexual favours. Unsurprisingly, men from all over the northwest had been attracted to the toilets, some as far away as Blackpool. The record notes both boys were at risk and required monitoring. 144. A KVS record of 21/5/90 describes the situation in graphic terms: having absconded from school, collected Boy 1 and gone into Rochdale, Boy 2, RO-A13 and RO-A12 stole some items from shops, following which they went to Smith Street toilets where RO-A12, Boy 2 and Boy 1 masturbated one man and A12 another. Boy 1and Boy 2 confessed all on their return to KVS, saying they did it for money. 145. As a stark reminder of the risks, the head of care at KVS reported to Social Services on 15/6/90 that he thought Boy 1 had contracted hepatitis through his “rent boy” activities.

146. It might be thought surprising that a few months later in October 1990, as regards Boy 1, Rochdale Adolescent Services considered that little information could be gleaned about what was going on in Rochdale bus station, even though the matter of sexual assault/abuse had become a matter of police concern. 147. It was reported in March 1991 that in July 1990, DC Goggins had been aware that Boy 2 was “offering services” at Smith Street toilets and going off in cars with men. This had been discussed with staff at KVS who were very concerned but felt there was little they could do as it was not a “lock up school”. 148. At around the same time, July 1990, Boy 2’s social worker struck a more positive note in his record of a meeting with Mr Paul Davies of KVS. He recorded of the child’s attitude towards his exploitation: “He does not want to be involved in it again and is angry at the men who were involved….” It was thought that he had support and relations in KVS so as to help him address the trauma he may have suffered. 149. In September 1990, Boy 2’s social worker wrote to the police to ask that he attend an alternative centre to perform his “Attendance Centre Order” in Salford on the basis of his past sexual involvement with men from the Salford area. 150. On 15/11/90, Mr Andrews (the then Acting Head) wrote to the Director of Social Services convinced that Boy 2 was in grave moral danger. The only way the school could guarantee his safety was to remove his shoes and outdoor clothing. This demonstrates not only that the headmaster was alive to the risks that Boy 2 presented but that this was also being conveyed to the Director of Social Services. 151. A report on child Boy 2 prepared by KVS staff to Brian Williams (assistant education officer) dated 27/11/90 noted that he absconded regularly from KVS and his care home. When he went missing his whereabouts were largely unknown; he had been picked up in Smith Street toilets and when he returned voluntarily he always had money and rarely seemed affected by weather conditions. This note put forward the view that Boy 2 should not return to KVS. It was said that all the boys on his house-unit knew of his activities and that Boy 2 had a draining and demoralizing effect on all of them that term. 152. As regards Boy 2, on 6/2/91 his social worker spoke to DC Goggins in an attempt to clarify details of Boy 2’s involvement in sexual activity at the toilets as there was confusion between KVS and the social worker about this. According to the note it was clear that Boy 2 was approaching men and getting 50p for masturbating them. He felt there had been incidents in March 1989 and a number between January and May 1990. 153. Pausing there, the short point is that it is clear that representatives of GMP, Social Services and KVS were all aware of information about KVS children being exploited for money in or around the town centre and beyond. 154. I will return to the issue of exploitation, but I am going to ask you now to consider the issue of ‘peer on peer’ abuse at KVS. The evidence we have considered thus far demonstrates that a number of KVS pupils were involved in what can only be regarded as serious sexual abuse at the hands of paying men outside school. But what evidence is there about circumstances inside the school? 155. Even as late as 25/10/91, a case record entry of that date documented information from Moss Side CID about Boy 1 and his brother’s involvement in “rent boy” activities.

‘PEER ON PEER’ ABUSE 156. Sexual activity between children at KVS, how to view it and how to deal with it appears to have been an enduring theme. As noted before, in 1976, Mr Hopwood considered that sexual activity between boys was already an ingrained sub-culture. Records in the years thereafter suggest that it persisted. When Mr Bradshaw was appointed Head after the events of 1990, he observed in a report dated 9/3/92 that there had been a number of incidents dating back as far as 1981 of a sexual nature, logged and mentioned, but rarely resolved, with seeming indifference to it. 157. We do not have all the records but graphic examples demonstrate sexual activity of varying seriousness such as an entry in a logbook of 11/12/87 of boys masturbating and wiping semen over other boys. 158. Another example which might have prompted concern was a record of 9/3/90 of children overheard discussing one child who masturbated and wanted another child to watch. 159. There are indications that all was not well early in 1989. As is recorded in a letter from Mr Ashton (then acting headmaster) to the Chief Education Officer on 18/4/89, one pupil had reported 2 incidents: oral intercourse and attempted anal intercourse on him by another pupil that almost certainly amounted to attempted anal rape (an attempt which was repeated)).

160. This appears to have prompted investigations by Mr Ashton who was not convinced there was not some exaggeration on account of the unpopularity of the child identified as the abuser. This child was interviewed in an apparent attempt to get him to admit what he had done. Both children were even interviewed together (involving the victim giving his account in front of the boy he said had tried to anally penetrate him) . The notes record that Mr Digan (the house parent who interviewed the boys) was of the view that a serious sexual assault had taken place. 161. Mr Ashton’s view was that it was best not to overreact and to view the incidents within the context of emotionally disturbed boys experimenting whilst having problems in making relationships. You may think that telling. It was an acceptable risk to retain the alleged abuser in the school. 162. There is no reference to any form of consensual relationship existing between the boys in that letter; to the contrary, only to the complainant’s fear of his fellow pupil. 163. Accounts from RO-A11 from December 1990 point not just to the complexities of what he reported, but that violence might be playing a part in him engaging in oral sex. 164. This sort of activity was not just reported but observed by staff (in this case the caretaker who had also been given a care role. Other children made reports about what they observed. 165. A different record from January 1991 again points to how a disclosure by one of the boys (RO-A11) of sexual involvement with an adult was dealt with and how his retraction of that allegation early the following month was left unquestioned. 166. It was said of RO-A11 on 31/1/91 by his houseparent, Duncan Eaton, in a report (RO-A11 it should be noted was a child who had been involved in the Hilton incident in the previous September to which I shall come) “... believes he has psychiatric 20

difficulties. It is my belief he has no more emotional and social problems than any other child in this school …”. You may think it important to note that RO-A11 had been an inpatient at a psychiatric hospital for some time before coming to KVS. 167. The notes of the meeting of 31/1/91 gives some flavour as to how his account that he was approached by a man outside school was treated. His request for an AIDS test was regarded as a shock tactic. There seemed to be concern that this might affect insurance rather than why he might be requesting a test. 168. The fact that there was information that this boy was involved in sexual activity with other children, had been party to the Hilton incident, had given an account of sexual activity with an adult and wanted an AIDS test appears to have been treated with a degree of cynicism rather than prompting much by way of genuine concern. 169. On 14/1/91, two members of staff visited the home of one child in order to discuss a communication from his mother about sexually activity between the boy and other boys at KVS. You might think it says something about the weight placed upon the investigation of such allegations that one of the staff sent to investigate was the school caretaker, albeit he also had a care role. In fact, as you will discover, the caretaker was regarded as part of the senior management team. 170. There is a handwritten note dated 15/1/91 which records in short but graphic terms allegations made by RO-A12 (then 14) against his fellow pupils. “They made me suck them off and they told me to let them bum me. If I didn’t let them do it, they would batter me up.

171. There is also a report from an Education Welfare Officer Ms Marsh (dated 21/1/91) about RO-A12 - “school will investigate and counsell (sic) the sexual abuse boys…”. A record was compiled (date stamped 1995) which sets out further sources of information about this pupil, among others, including a reference to him admitting in 1992 “rent boy activity”. 172. What is missing among all of the evidence are any clear, recorded accounts from the children concerned as to their experiences. There appears on the face of it to have been no or no real consideration of how frightening it might have been for any boys susceptible to bullying to have lived in that environment. It is clear from the records that there was a significant amount of violence in the school on the part of pupils and staff. There appears to have been no consideration of the risks that violent children or children with a sexual interest in others might have posed to other children with whom they lived and from whom there was no easy way escape. RODERICK HILTON (PT 2) 173. On 11/9/90, Mr Hutchinson, the acting deputy headteacher, recorded in the communication book that Hilton was in the area and that staff should be vigilant. Hilton (who was now 25) gained entry into the school that night and is recorded as having slept under a child’s bed. On the next day, 12/9/90, he gained entry to the school again and indecently assaulted at least one child. 174. In the aftermath of Hilton’s entry into KVS, at a meeting held at KVS on 24/9/90 (attended by Mr Andrews, Mr Hutchinson, Ms Simpson and Mr Williams) Mr Williams (the assistant education officer) ordered a full report. The notes of the meeting reveal discussion, among other things, on the question whether RO-A14’s parents should be told and when, about which there were differing views. Duncan Eaton (care 21

officer) expressed concern that if they were told “the lad would clam up” while Marilyn Simpson (advisor) advised they should be told before the police interviewed the boy. 175. A record of the chronology of the events of Tuesday 11 and Wednesday 12/9/90 and the immediate aftermath reveal that the child who was indecently assaulted by Hilton was excluded from school the following day (apparently because of a serious assault on another pupil). A handwritten record of 11/10/90 documented the fact that on 17/9/90 Paul Davies had seen Hilton outside the school grounds and overheard him saying that he had been into Norden unit, as a result of which Mr Davies interviewed the boys from that unit apart from RO-14 and one other boy. The interviews with the boys disclosed that RO-14 and another boy had felt sorry for Hilton as he had nowhere to go and so, on the first night, they let him, and Hilton had slept the night under RO-14’s bed. Boys spent the first night running around - a “night of pranks” as was noted. On the second night while Hilton was in RO-A14’s bedroom, other boys were unaware anything was happening. 176. A record of 14/9/90 suggests the school was aware 3 days earlier that Hilton had spent the night under RO-A14’s bed. The words at the end of this note read, “Rod has given RO-A16 £1 and we believe the Rod will want his pound of flesh rather than a £1 coin.

177. It was noted in an entry of 18/9/90 in the same running record that Hilton was a Schedule 1 sex offender and that it was “not unreasonable” that he be kept away from premises where children were. 178. The victim, RO-A14, was not asked about happened until he returned to school on 21/9/90, when he was confronted by his houseparent, Duncan Eaton, about what had happened, and admitted it. This was the same day that the school informed the Education Service about what had occurred. 179. Other notes which appear to have been taken at the time throw further light on the events. According to Paul Davies on 13/9/90 Hilton was on the grounds, police had been called and Hilton had run off. Hilton had then been seen on the roof and the police had been called. According to Mr Davies, at least, there had been no way of preventing the incident with Hilton. On Thursday 13/9/90 Hilton was still outside the school and hung around shouting and being abusive until 3am. 180. That nothing could be done was a view shared by the acting headmaster, Brett Andrews. 181. Martin Digan (houseparent) appears to have spoken to Hilton since the incident and he had confirmed what had happened. Mr Digan was aware of the incident around 7 years previously concerning Hilton and pupils. Mr Digan did think that the incident could have been avoided if staff sleeping in arrangements had been better i.e. with staff on duty sleeping between units. 182. Duncan Eaton (houseparent) considered that the school had sailed close to the wind by staff sleeping in their own houses. We take this to mean sleeping in their own houses when they should have been sleeping in school. 183. Mr Eaton was to say in a statement he made on 24/6/15 that the headmaster had invited Hilton in for refreshments.

184. It is not clear from the interviews conducted with staff after the incident which staff (if any) were officially on duty or present that night as regards the senior boys unit. In a statement he made in May 1992 Mr Eaton told how boys would want to know who was on duty to establish if a weaker member was on duty and so give them more freedom. Mr Andrews was sleeping in his house and the boys waited until they knew he was asleep. Staff were disgusted by this because there were no alarms at the time. There was no laid down procedure for sleeping in at that time. It appears staff were permitted not to sleep on the premises whilst on ‘sleeping in’ duty. Mr Hutchinson when interviewed in 1992 said there was no one sleeping between the 2 senior units. Martin Digan said in interview that it was normal practice once the boys were asleep for the staff member to go to bed; normally they would not get up in the night. 185. Hilton appeared before the Magistrates’ Court on 7/12/90 and pleaded guilty to indecently assaulting RO-A14. The case was adjourned to 4/1/91 for social enquiry reports and sentence. His criminal record suggests that sentence in fact took place on 22/2/91 when he was sentenced to a probation order for 2 years with a condition of residence. 186. RO-A14 is not a core participant in this investigation. It is a sad postscript to these events that he died only a few years later in 1996 within hours of his 20th birthday. It was reported in the press that this was through a drug overdose. The Coroner looking into the circumstances of his death stated that witnesses had suggested that there was “tensions” because of court proceedings against the Council arising from his experiences while at KVS. 187. Returning to the immediate aftermath of the Hilton incident, RO-A14 provided an account to the NSPCC on 21/9/90. This is very short and begs many questions. The document records Mr Eaton saying that he had discussed the matter with the police who had said that for as long as the children were inviting Hilton in then he was not breaking in, in which case there was no action they could take. It appears that the NSPCC thought the matter ought to be dealt with by specialist police officers, or failing that, CID, for them to decide on the most suitable response. 188. There was a meeting between some senior staff and representatives of the Education Service on 24/9/90 (attended by Mr Hutchinson, Mr Eaton, Ms Simpson and Mr Williams). Mr Eaton did not want to see RO-A14 punished for what had happened but helped. He pointed to fears the boy had about informing his parents about what had happened to him due to the possibility of revenge. 189. A document (believed to have been prepared by Marilyn Simpson on the issues emerging from staff interviews which took place shortly after the Education Service was informed of the incident with Hilton) set out some very preliminary observations. Ms Simpson noted the gulf that existed between care staff and teaching staff and the absence after this incident of staff meeting as a whole to discuss the incident. 190. Diana Cavanagh had been made the Acting Chief Education Officer for Rochdale in September 1990 (upon the retirement of Alan Naylor). She was appointed Director of Education in early 1991. She is a critical witness in this investigation as she, rather than the Director of Social Services, was charged with both leading the investigation into KVS and putting the school on a more stable footing. 191. She wrote her own brief report “Serious Incident at Knowl View School” on 24/10/90. She stated that incidents of the type that occurred on 11 and 12/9/90 were

not unknown in residential schools but that should not lead to the incident being trivialised or treated with complacency. There is no indication in that report that she was aware of any wider background to these incidents. 192. This report was written up the purposes of the Board of Governors of KVS who comvened a special meeting with Ms Cavanagh on 25/10/90. They decided to meet again on 7/11/90 in order to formulate their response. The Board duly met on 7 November 1990 with Superintendent Marshall in attendance. The view of Superintendent Marshall was that Hilton had been arrested some months ago (possibly a reference to the September 1990 incident); Hilton’s father had expressed concern that his son was being sold alcohol; Superintendent Marshall had spoken to Hilton who seemed to know what was going on and was not under age and therefore the police had no grounds for intervention. Hilton had appeared in court on 17/10/90 and had been remanded. Superintendent Marshall reiterated that the police could only take action if Hilton was obviously mentally disturbed or was committing a breach of the peace. 193. In the meantime, Hilton’s plea of guilty appears to have changed little. On the day following his plea, 8/12/90, boys reported that he was at the shops drinking and that he had a gun.

194. In a remarkably polite letter to him of 21/12/90, Mr Andrews (then acting head) asked Hilton to stay away from the school. Rather audaciously, Hilton telephoned Mr Andrews on 9/1/91 to take issue with it. 195. Consideration had been given to seeking an injunction. In a memorandum to the Director of Education dated 10/4/91, which was in the name of David Shipp (the Borough Solicitor and deputy Town Clerk) it was noted that the police were aware of Hilton and would take action if he caused further problems, adding that, on that basis, it did not seem that an injunction would particularly add anything. (In fact, Anne Taylor, who had been in the town solicitor's’ office, composed the memorandum and signed it in Shipp’s name because she had the authority to do so; but she says she would have discussed it with Mr Shipp or Mr Lawley (his eventual successor). 196. On 14/5/91, Stephen Bradshaw (the recently appointed headmaster) reported to Mr Williams (assistant education officer) that a prowler had attempted to gain access to the school the previous night. He noted that the police had been alerted but took a long time to respond. In a further letter to the police, Mr Bradshaw pointed to the sensitivity of this, given that a child had previously been sexually abused at the school by an intruder. 197. One of the most astonishing aspects of the Hilton incident is that, even after his convictions in 1984 and 1990, he continued to frequent the school with little impediment. A handwritten note headed “Steve Bradshaw” and dated 7/12/92 suggests that it was very much business as usual - there had been “4 incidents last night” “RH approaching children - saying coming in tonight” “little response from police” “moved tent nearer to school” “now on council land” “knocking on doors”. Hilton had been living in a tent outside the school. 198. On 8/12/92, Adele Bebb (assistant Director of Education) wrote to Chief Superintendent Cantrell reporting that Hilton had been released from prison and was camping on land at the rear of KVS. (Hilton’s criminal record suggests he was sent to prison for 2½ years on 20/8/91 having pleaded guilty to offences of gross indecency

with a child, indecent assault on a male young person (2), using, threatening, abusive, insulting words or behaviour with intent, possessing an offensive weapon.) Adele Bebb’s letter stated in no uncertain terms that the acting Borough Solicitor had applied for an injunction to prevent him from remaining there, but was also asking for additional police advice and assistance. 199. On 17/12/92, a boy (RO-A13) was excluded from school until 11/1/93 because the boy was encouraging “a known sex offender” on to the school premises placing other children in danger. Hilton’s criminal record reveals he was arrested on the same date for behaviour likely to cause a breach of the peace, putting beyond doubt that he was the “known sex offender”. 200. On 11/1/93, the day the excluded boy was to return to the school, Mr Bradshaw sent a memorandum to Ms Cavanagh about his understanding that an injunction would be applied for in respect of Hilton, given that he had been waiting on the drive for children, for which he had been arrested for breaching the peace, and he was camping on land at the back of KVS. 201. There was no injunction. On 21/1/93, Diana Cavanagh wrote to Mr Bradshaw to remind him that it had been discussed with him before Christmas that no injunction would be pursued in light of the fact that Hilton had been rehoused away from the school and was no longer posing any threat.

202. On 1/2/93, Mr Bradshaw again wrote to Ms Cavanagh informing her that Hilton still visited the area and had often been seen outside the school; that he would always be attracted to it and it was unacceptable to wait until he becomes a threat. He advised they become proactive rather than just hope the problem will go away. was seen outside the school. A handwritten annotation on the letter reveals there had been a meeting with Chief Superintendent Cantrell and the Borough Solicitor on 4/3/93, the outcome of which was “same as before - no legal redress because he was not posing a threat”. 203. On 7/5/93, Mr Bradshaw again wrote to to Adele Bebb (assistant Director of Education) indicating Hilton was again homeless, living in a tent in Bamford and being attracted to KVS children, and expressing his unease that he was in the neighbourhood and they had to wait for something to happen before taking action. Mr Lawley (the then acting Borough Solicitor) and police were, he said, aware. 204. On 12/5/93, Adele Bebb sent a memorandum to Mr Lawley saying, “this is a disaster waiting to happen”. An annotation on a memorandum from Mr Lawley of 20/5/93 to Adele Bebb noted Hilton was still camping ½ m away from the school. 205. You may think that it says a great deal about how seriously or not Rochdale Council and the local police took child sexual abuse when 3 years after he had found his way into the school and indecently assaulted a pupil, Hilton was still on the school’s doorstep posing a real and present danger to its young vulnerable residents.

SHEPHERD REPORT 206. I am going to return now to the sequence of events that followed the Hilton incident. As is apparent there was a series of interviews conducted with staff by members of the Department of Education immediately afterwards. It does not appear that these interviews went beyond the events of the two nights Hilton was in the 25

school, and there appears to have been an ongoing lack of clarity about the Hilton incident and wider issues related to sexual abuse. 207. It would appear that the school referred a number of boys to Dr Alison Fraser (a psychiatrist at the Child and Adolescent Unit of Birch Hill Hospital) and that in November 1990 she was in discussions with the headteacher as to how the boys referred could best be helped. Dr Fraser and Christine Scarborough (also of the unit) will give evidence in the hearing as to their involvement with the school. 208. These referrals appear to have prompted a meeting of 4/3/91 which was to prove pivotal. As the investigation understands the sequence of events, Rochdale Social Services arranged this meeting at the instigation of Dr Fraser who was alarmed at information provided to her by the boys who had been referred. Dr Fraser and Christine Scarborough both attended this meeting as did Brian Williams (assistant education officer), staff members from KVS (including Martin Digan and Duncan Eaton) and a representative from the child protection unit (Janet Bowyer (Weeks)). The meeting focused on 3 areas: the incident regarding Boy 2 (Smith Street toilets), the incident regarding Nordern Unit (Hilton), and the incident regarding RO-A11 (Hilton incident occurring in his first week of school, his “confused sexuality” and relationship with a man outside school and boys in school).

209. A handwritten note from the meeting provides further insight into concerns that were raised with references to “negligence” and “HIV”. There was also reference to “poppers” from a Bury sex shop which we will see another reference to later. 210. Another important meeting was held 4 days later on 8/3/91. Diana Cavanagh (Director of Education) ands other department staff were present at this meeting, as was Mike Poulton (interim headteacher), Police Sergeant Sterndale, Richard Flammer (educational psychologist), Cliff Bentley (advisor) and (Janet Bowyer (Weeks)) of the child protection unit. 211. It is an important document. In it, we find the assertion “Level of sexual abuse way above that which you would find in male boarding school”. 212. What appears to be a separate document sets out the history of incidents and meetings taking place from 4/3/91 onwards until 14/4/91. 213. A further source of information at this time was the Rochdale Aids Unit. By 1988 Rochdale Health Authority had set up a small team of workers involved in health promotion work around AIDS and HIV and the counselling of those who had either condition. A report “AIDS The challenge to Local Authorities” was submitted to the Health & Community Care Subcommittee on AIDS/HIV with the intention that the subcommittee would comment on the need for a corporate response. The report noted that there was a local incidence of HIV, that drug users in Rochdale constituted a risk of transmission and that many drug users in South Manchester were known to be HIV positive. 214. The investigation understands Phil Shepherd to have been one of this team. On 15/3/91, he and a colleague attended KVS. It appears they had been asked to provide training to 8 social care workers at the school. There was little by way of training; rather the staff seized the opportunity to tell Mr Shepherd about the sexual abuse of KVS pupils. Mr Shepherd in turn wrote a report dated 20/3/91. He recorded that most people would be horrified by what he had been told.

215. Mr Shepherd will give evidence in this hearing. 216. Mr Shepherd sent the report to Diana Cavanagh. She replied on 5/4/91 telling him that the Department of Education in conjunction with the police and the Governing Body had carried out an initial investigation into the events of September 1990 when Hilton had gone into the school. 217. She informed Mr Shepherd that information about other activities had not emerged until the spring term and in March a meeting had been held between the Department of Education, Social Services and police. She assured him that concerted professional action was being taken and asked that, “given the sensitivity of the situation and the fact that appropriate action was being discussed and implemented”, he not circulate his report any further or take any independent action. 218. You may have to ask whether this was an attempt to suppress this information which had not emerged in such a clear way before, or whether it was legitimate concern to ensure that matters were in hand and should proceed unimpeded or frustrated by unwelcome outside scrutiny or publicity. 219. In the note of the meetings held between 8/3/91 and 14/4/91 we find this from a meeting held after 9/4/91 but before 15/4/91 attended by Mr Bentley, Ms Simpson, Mr Flammer, Mr Kazi, Mr Williams, Mr Bradshaw, Mr Eaton and Ms Bowyer (Weeks): “I also pointed out that members of staff had again be (sic) telling ‘their story’ to outsiders which was in my view not necessary and could lead to an investigation by media which would prove to be in no-one’s interest. Stephen Bradshaw confirmed that staff would be told not to discuss the situation further outside the school”. It is not clear who authored that note. 220. At that same meeting there had been discussion about ‘Protocol interviews’ and the need to identify one or two ‘victims’ to initiate the process. Mr Bradshaw, to whom this was delegated, identified 3 boys for interview: RO-A14, RO-A11 and RO-A15, although they were not considered to be victims. KVS was to prepare relevant information for the Department of Social Services. 221. Mr Shepherd’s reply to Ms Cavanagh on 11/4/91 was that what was of greatest concern to him was that staff were still approaching other professionals to get something done. 222. The Shepherd report was seen by councillor Pamela Hawton, Chair of the Rochdale Health Authority. On 4/4/91, she wrote to the Director of Education (Ms Cavanagh) referring to a letter she had sent to the Acting Director of Social Services (Ian Davey) suggesting to him that an independent investigation should be carried out under the auspices of the Social Services Department. 223. It is at this point that you may wish to consider the role that Social Services had assumed in dealing with the situation. 224. On 24/4/91, the Acting Director of Social Services (Ian Davey) sent a memorandum to Diana Cavanagh stating that it had been agreed that the school would identify children for child protection interviews. It was agreed that all agencies involved with KVS had a responsibility for all the children to identify the child protection issues. 225. On 7/5/91, Chris Spankie, a Principal Social Worker, wrote to Janet Bowyer (Weeks) about interviewing boys about sexual abuse. The suggestion in this letter was that the boys (RO-A11 and RO-A17) would not be interviewed until there was 27

further information as to whether they had in fact been abused. In other words, unless there was firmer information that the boys had been sexually abused, they would not be asked if they had been abused. 226. Months had passed since the September incident. A memorandum of 20/5/91 from Diana Cavanagh to Mr Kazi and Mr Williams referred to Mr Shipp’s concern as to the lack of progress which had been made. It is also noted that the Social Services Department was questioning the need for an investigation which required its involvement. 227. Pausing there, it was against this background that Stephen Bradshaw took over the headship of KVS. On 17/4/91, upon his arrival, he reported to Ms Cavanagh finding the school living areas to be “cold, inhospitable and institutionalised, but with a little change and imagination could have a tremendous effect on the children’s behaviour and avoid a recurrence of serious incidents” at KVS. 228. Mr Bradshaw will be an important witness in this investigation. He took over when the school was in a state of acute crisis. You will hear evidence from him as to the pressures that he was under to stabilise the school, address the risks children were at and to take on larger numbers of children at one and the same time. 229. On 10/5/91 Mr Bradshaw wrote to Freema Taylor of the Child Protection Unit of his increasing alarm at the length of time that it was taking to initiate child protection procedures at KVS pointing out that there were children at risk in the school. 230. On 17/5/91, Mr Bradshaw wrote to her again setting out what he had been able to establish as a matter of fact - “who is doing what to whom”. This appears to have been the first systematic attempt to put all the information together divided into facts and allegations based on hearsay. It is also important because it refers to other records which were in existence at that time. The ‘fact’ sheet that refers to Boy 2 refers to him being in possession of a popper (amyl nitrate) said by the boy to have been bought at a sex shop in Bury. 231. A memorandum of 28/5/91 initialled “FT/AMS” (presumably Freema Taylor) set out what appears to be a checklist of the information contained in the Shepherd Report. It suggests that “cottaging” was not taking place Monday to Friday whilst in KVS care but rather thought to be occurring only at weekends and holidays. 232. On 30/5/91 Ian Davey (who was still the acting director of social services) wrote to Diana Cavanagh following a meeting with the Chief Executive and Town Clerk (respectively Messrs Pierce and Shipp) which had taken place on 17/5/91, and following a meeting of 29/5/91 with Freema Taylor (area manager) and Annie Dodd (senior social worker). This makes clear his view that the ‘peer on peer’ allegations which had emerged since March 1991 did not fall within the child abuse guidelines and procedures definition of child sexual abuse between children. This memorandum and the decision it records is significant in this investigation. In the case of 2 of the 3 boys who had been identified for interview (RO-A14 and RO-A11), it was concluded that there was no longer a need to interview them as the concerns “did not fit the sexual abuse between children definition in the Child Abuse Guidelines and Procedures”. 233. This raises a number of issues which it is hoped that Mr Davey will be able to address in his evidence: for instance, upon what basis was this decision based? Was it based upon incomplete information? Did Social Services not want to play a leading role in the investigation, given the level of its involvement with a number of the

children concerned already? Was Social Services not better placed to lead an holistic investigation into what had happened and might still be ongoing? 234. Ms Taylor gave evidence to the Garnham Review on 30/6/14. Unfortunately, she has since died. Some of her responses to Garnham provide an indication as to the possible thinking at the time might have been. She was asked about the ‘peer on peer’ allegations and whether they fell within or without the child abuse guidelines definition of sexual abuse between children. Her response was it would have been a grey area because boys were living in close proximity, some of whom must have been sexually abused by family and strangers and would therefore think of sex in terms of currency. But she did not know how you assess whether it is abusive without conducting interviews. As to the activities in Smith Street toilets, in her view, that would fall within the definition but people would argue with her that that activity was a function of the damage to them and should be seen in that light. As regards the Hilton incident, if boys had let him in and consented to activity, she would have regarded that as abusive but that was a “hard one”. 235. In her statement of 19/9/14, by reference to the Davey memorandum of 30/5/91, she said if the activity was deemed to be ‘child on child abuse’, then it would have fallen within the remit if child protection procedures and be dealt with by Social Services. If it was deemed to be consensual or experimental it would have fallen within KVS’s remit and be dealt with by the Education Department. All that leaves the obvious point: how would anyone know which it was without taking a proper account from the children who could say? 236. The early months of 1991 were tumultuous for Rochdale Social Services. On 7/3/91 Mr Justice Brown gave judgment in Rochdale MBC v A (“the Middleton ritual abuse case”). This was a case in which Rochdale Social Services had removed 20 children from 6 families. Interim care and control was granted to Rochdale and access to their families suspended. Social workers thought that some children had been subjected to organised ritual abuse. Rochdale applied for the permanent removal of all the children from their families. The cases went before the High Court and its judgment was damning. On 11/3/91, the Social Services Committee noted the resignation of the Director of Social Services. It was then Ian Davey was made the Acting Director. 237. On 18/9/91 the Minister for Health requested that the Social Services Inspectorate conduct an immediate inspection of Rochdale Social Services. This request was made as a result of the publicity surrounding the Middleton case. The report noted, amongst other points, that in September 1990, Rochdale Social Services was still working to guidelines which predated the ‘Working Together’ guidelines for arrangements for inter-agency cooperation for the protection of children from child abuse.

MELLOR REPORT 238. Returning to the decision by Social Services that the particular activities at KVS did not fall within the ambit of child protection, it is at this stage in the chronology that Valerie Mellor a Consultant Psychologist at Booth Hall Hospital becomes significant. There will be evidence about her involvement in KVS and about what she uncovered. This part of the opening statement will simply sketch out her involvement as it fits into the overall chronology.

239. On 4/6/91, Diana Cavanagh introduced Ms Mellor to a meeting of the key individuals involved in KVS. This included Mr Bradshaw, Mr Shipp and Ms Simpson. The record of the meeting makes clear that Ms Mellor’s role was to provide advice as to how best to proceed with an enquiry into the activities of boys at the school. It appears that at that point no interviews had taken place with any of the children said to have been involved. She was asked to provide an impartial response to the questions: is KVS providing education appropriate to the needs of the pupils; are staff were able to deal with the problems identified; and what should be provided. 240. There was a further meeting of the same individuals on 25/6/91 by which point Mrs Mellor had been able to make some enquiries. 241. According to Ms Mellor, Detective Inspector Henderson of Greater Manchester Police had told her that there were no ongoing concerns about activities at the town centre toilets. 242. Ms Mellor said she had come to the tentative conclusion that it would not be right nor necessary to interview boys at the school. Part of the basis for this was that there was no indication that inappropriate sexual behaviour was taking place in the school. 243. It might be thought surprising that activity in the local toilets or indeed at the school had simply stopped. It does not appear to have done. As the evidence demonstrates, there was information about children still being exploited in 1991 which appears to have continued. 244. Between them, Ms Mellor and Mr Bradshaw did appear to be getting closer to the truth about some aspects of what had occurred. In a meeting of 12/9/91, Hilton was observed to have been “not external” but “... very much a part of school life” and furthermore that there had been a feeling of “agency sympathy” for Hilton rather than the school. 245. A number of children who had been involved in these activities were not from Rochdale but had been placed there by other local authorities. A letter of 24/9/91 from Manchester Council set out its views in forthright terms about Rochdale’s failure to communicate the position as regards one of its children (RO-A15) involved in sexual activity with another boy. 246. Mr Bradshaw, in Autumn 1991, recorded that the school had been rock bottom when he started and that the Mellor inquiry made the “Pindown Experience” look like a day at the seaside. Nonetheless he recorded that he was sick of writing memos that were totally ignored. 247. The unknown author of another document considered that there were points of comparison between the Pindown Report and events at KVS. 248. Concerns were mounting at the length of time that Ms Mellor was taking in producing her report. It was not in fact ready until February 1992, and is dated 18/2/92. 249. The investigation will consider why certain parts of a different version of the report had certain passages or parts removed before it was more widely circulated to Councillors and officers of the Council, as well as police and staff at KVS. 250. The Mellor report did not assuage the misgivings of all. In a letter of 16/3/92, councillor Hawton informed Ms Cavanagh that she still had very considerable anxiety that the situation was ever able to reach the point which it did.

251. It appears that staff were also concerned that the Mellor report left ”unresolved matters”. By 5/5/92, this appears to have prompted a further investigation which was intended to clarify any residual areas of concern about the level of care and management by care and teaching staff leading up to September 1990. This would be the third investigation into the events at KVS. 252. It appears that Mr Pierce, the Chief Executive of Rochdale Council, continued to be updated as to progress. On 1/5/92 he asked Diana Cavanagh for a statement of what action had been taken as regards KVS so that he could be in a position to advise the Leader on these matters as soon as possible. 253. This is a further aspect of this investigation. Who amongst senior officers and politicians in the Council did know about the events at KVS? 254. In a memorandum in response, on 8/5/92, Diana Cavanagh updated him as to progress post-the Mellor Report. HODGE/DOBIE REPORT 255. Staff were interviewed by Dr Selwyn Hodge and Liz Dobie in 1992. Dr Hodge will give evidence during the course of this hearing. In June 1992, Dr Hodge and Ms Dobie produced their report: “Report for the Director of Education by Selwyn Hodge, Chief Advisor and Elizabeth Dobie, Education Officer (Special Education)”. According to the report, it was intended to be “a final scrutiny of past sequences and a termination of speculation”. 256. In general terms their report suggested that relationships between teaching staff and care staff operated on wholly schismatic lines. Staff dysfunction extended beyond their professional duty. The report makes clear the view of Dr Hodge and Ms Dobie that sexual relationships between staff bore upon the moral tone of the school and had a relationship to the events of September 1990. CAVANAGH REPORT 257. Diana Cavanagh also produced a report: “Report of the Director of Education on Staff Behaviour on the Period September 1989 to October 1990”. This report drew from all of the reports and the responses which had been received from outside agencies up to that point. 258. There is a further narrative of events which is undated but post-dates Ms Mellor’s February 1992 report. No author’s name is given but it seems likely to have been written by Mr Bradshaw. It notes that incidents dated back to 1981 or to Mr Taylor’s time (then headmaster) and that “the circumstances surrounding the school were not one isolated incident, it was a culture and the ‘Hilton’ incident was symptomatic of that culture”. 259. It is appears from the evidence that staff relationships continued to be tense and dysfunctional. A letter to Liz Dobie on 23/10/92 signed by some members of staff referred to their working alongside colleagues in whom they had no confidence. This is understood to have been related to the so-called “sex in a tent incident” in July 1992 which was much featured in the local press. Two members of staff on a camping trip with pupils in France had got drunk and had sex with each other in the vicinity of pupils (albeit they were said to be asleep). 260. It is perhaps not surprising that children were still being exploited in Smith Street toilets well into 1992. There was information in August 1992 that Boy 2 and Boy 1

were “offering their bodies for sale / offering to masturbate any man who might fancy it” and might be charged with gross indecency. 261. One of the recommendations which Valerie Mellor made in her report was that there be a further investigation into the school in January 1993. She attended a meeting of the school governors at KVS on 20/1/93 at which her remit was discussed. She was to spend a week at the school to evaluate the mental health of pupils, whether the school’s approach as regards pupils was healthy, the needs of pupils, staffing levels and whether pupils were happy. 262. Pausing there, it is of note that, at this point, Cyril Smith was once again on the scene, taking an interest in KVS. On 2/1/93 Smith wrote to Diana Cavanagh expressing the deep concerns of Harry Wild, “my good friend” as he himself called him, “...and Vice-Chair of Governors at KVS”. Smith said it was Wild’s view that the school be closed and the land sold. But what Smith was suggesting was an enquiry, warning if the LEA did not, the danger was others might, such as the national press. A letter from Ms Cavanagh to Smith of 27/1/93 thanked him for his time in meeting her on 20/1/93.

263. Smith was to be co-opted as a Governor in July 1994 until the school’s closure. 264. Ms Mellor did return to the school, but it was many months later. In a letter of 12/5/93, Ms Cavanagh said she was keen to close the chapter on KVS. It is equally clear from the letter that Ms Mellor had been unwell. The visit was eventually confirmed for 23 and 24/6/93. 265. The tone of Ms Mellor’s review was extremely upbeat. The typed notes of 12/7/93 include: the whole school was happier, more relaxed and more welcoming. 266. This visit sufficed to give KVS a clean bill of health in such terms. However old problems persisted: on 12/5/93 Hilton was described by Adele Bebb to Bill Lawley as a “disaster waiting to happen”; a log of 9/6/94 records that the police had investigated a male at whose flat three pupils from KVS had spent the night. He was noted not to be a Schedule 1 offender, but “child protection” had had dealings with him for enticing young boys into his flat; record of 6/7/94 stated that an alarm had gone off and a child RO-A46 (found in the dining area having tried the staff room) reported that a man had walked past his bed; on 19 July 1994, a staff member disturbed a man inside the foyer of the school at 9.30 at night; on 10/10/94, an adult male was spotted at the front door at midnight. 267. KVS stopped admitting pupils in 1994 and finally closed its doors in 1996.

HARRY WILD 268. There is one more individual who needs to be mentioned at this point. Operation European was an investigation into Harry Wild, a long-time associate of Cyril Smith. He was mentioned in the Lancashire investigation. He was another prolific committee member and was also on the Board of Governors of KVS. He was elected as the Chair of the Board of Governors in September 1994. 269. Operation European was prompted by Wild’s application to the police for support for his “Rochdale and District Youth Fitness Foundation”. This prompted a “discrete” investigation into whether Wild was a fit and proper person to be involved with young 32

people in 1999. The report describes the outcome of these discrete inquiries as “disturbing”. There had already been an investigation into Wild in 1997 on suspicion that he was grooming young prisoners at HMP Buckley Hall in Rochdale. Wild had given rise to serious concerns on the part of prison staff as regards his relations with certain prisoners. These will be considered further in this hearing with a witness from GMP. 270. What matters for present purposes is that there is evidence that Wild was able to have access that might be thought inappropriate to boys in KVS. ● Helen Woodward, a residential care worker at KVS from April 1994, recalled an occasion when she found a man she believed to be Wild in a single bedroom with a pupil. ● Donagh McKillop, deputy house manager at KVS from April 1991 to December 1994, says that when Wild visited the school he felt uncomfortable in his presence. ● Stephen Bradshaw told the Garnham review on 27/6/14 that he had real concerns about him based on gut reaction. ● Martin Digan says that on 6/9/94 (sic) when he was on sleepover duty he found a boy screaming during the night. Two other boys saw the man and from their description Digan knew it was Wild. He says the police were called. This is the same incident that was logged in fact for 6/7/94. ● Michael Tuck, a support worker at KVS from 1993/94, appears to give a description of a similar incident but believes he identified the figure as Cyril Smith (as he got into a Mercedes car which he recognised as Smith’s). He told Martin Digan about it and left it with him. ● In 2016, Stephen Bradshaw said he did not recall such an incident and believed he was never informed about it, particularly as there was a night log which he read every morning. This would have been a major incident involving Socials Services and possibly police. He is confident there was no sexual assault and very much doubts it occurred. He did not recall ever seeing Smith at the school and says no Governor had keys to the premises or had unauthorised access. 271. The evidence as regards Cyril Smith’s visits to the school is varied and will be considered further during the hearing. 272. Despite its closure over 2 decades ago, KVS has continued to resurface, provoking concerns that investigations into what happened were deliberately concealed. It has been suggested that the local politicians were a party to this and to suppressing allegations about Cyril Smith (regardless of their political allegiances). There has been rumour and speculation about some form of deal between local political parties not to make allegations about Cyril Smith. We will call some of those politicians in the final week of this hearing so that they can be asked more about that. 273. From everything you are to hear and read in the course of this investigation, you might consider that the children residing at KVS were not only extremely vulnerable, but also were not so much schooled, rather contained. You might also consider whether, through years of habit and history, those in authority of the school had

simply irredeemably lost control, with its resident children the victims and collateral damage. PROCEDURE 274. Each of the counsel for the core participants will now have an opportunity to make a short statement lasting no longer than 15 minutes. That will be followed by the evidence which we be structured in a sensible, and we hope logical way, and sequentially, so far as that is possible, taking into account witness’ availability. 275. For everyone’s understanding, may I explain how live witnesses who have not waived anonymity will appear in person. Live witnesses who are anonymous will have special measures in place to protect their identities. Before anonymous witnesses testify, the hearing room will need to be cleared of press and members of the public, who will be able to listen to audio of the witness in a separate room. I shall invite the Chair and the Panel to rise while these arrangements are being made, and, in the case of two anonymous witnesses who are to give their evidence by video-link, while the video-link is being set up for those witnesses. 276. In the case of witnesses whose evidence is to be read, they will not be called in the hearing room but their account/s will be read into the record.