When Peace Fails but Terrorism Succeeds
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WHEN PEACE FAILS BUT TERRORISM SUCCEEDS DO FAILING PEACE AGREEMENTS ENCOURAGE TERRORISM? Pierre Thompson Master's Thesis Spring 2018 Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University Supervisor: Chiara Ruffa CONTENTS ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................... 3 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .......................................................................................................... 4 TABLES AND FIGURES ......................................................................................................... 5 ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................................... 6 I. WHEN PEACE FAILS ............................................................................................ 8 II. THEORY ................................................................................................................ 11 A. Definitions .............................................................................................................. 11 B. Identifying a Research Gap in Two Fields ............................................................. 12 C. Proposing a Theory of Failing Peace, Radicalization and Terrorism .................... 15 D. Presenting the Hypothesis ...................................................................................... 21 III. RESEARCH DESIGN ........................................................................................... 21 A. Motivating the Cross-Case Study ........................................................................... 21 B. Motivating the Within-Case Study ......................................................................... 28 C. Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Research ................................................ 31 IV. CROSS-CASE STUDY: 34 COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENTS ....... 34 A. Data Description ..................................................................................................... 34 B. Regression Analysis ............................................................................................... 36 V. WITHIN-CASE STUDY: THE MINDANAO PEACE PROCESS ...................... 38 A. History of the Case ................................................................................................. 38 B. Analysis of Peace Process Turning Points: 1996 – 2004 ....................................... 40 C. Analysis of Peace Process Turning Points: 2014 – 2016 ....................................... 49 VI. LIMITATIONS ...................................................................................................... 58 A. Potential Flaws of the Cross-Case Study ............................................................... 58 B. Potential Flaws of the Within-Case Study ............................................................. 60 VII. CONCLUSION: CAN TERRORISM SUCCEED? ............................................... 63 WORKS CITED ....................................................................................................................... 65 APPENDIX .............................................................................................................................. 72 2 ABSTRACT The quality of peace at the end of civil war has emerged as an important concept for understanding persistent security threats. This study seeks to bridge two well established fields by asking: Does the failure to implement a peace agreement encourage terrorism? I argue that the psychological effect of a failing peace agreement shapes the individual’s propensity to terrorism by enhancing the appeal of a frame which favors “radical” action to advance the group’s struggle for recognition. Terrorism can be simultaneously an emotionally driven response at the individual level, and a rational choice at the group level. This paper employs mixed methods. A cross-case study measures the spatial/temporal variation in peace settlement implementation and the intensity of terrorism between/within 34 post-accord settings. A within- case study leverages temporal variation to illustrate how four violent non-state actors responded to perceptions of salient loss at various points in the Mindanao peace process. While each organization used terrorism strategically, the strategies were not always linked to peace settlement implementation. This study advances understanding of the event-driven relationship between implementation failure and terrorism, the process by which “radical” frames convert an individual’s emotional reaction into political violence, and the dynamic integration of quantitative and qualitative research. KEYWORDS peace agreement, implementation, terrorism, radicalization, quality peace, framing process, political violence 3 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Mother Teresa once said, “If you want to bring happiness to the whole world, go home and love your family.” I owe a large debt of gratitude to my “family” around the world: In the United States, to my mom and grandparents, for their unconditional support; to Rotary International, Rotary District 7620, and the Rotary Club of Washington, DC, for their bold commitment to promoting peace; to my friends and mentors in Pax Christi, for their modeling peacebuilding as a vocation; and to my brothers and sisters at Shrine of the Sacred Heart, for their many good wishes and prayers over the years. In the Philippines, to Dr. Jasmin Nario-Galace, for her encouragement to learn about the Mindanao peace process from those who have worked on it; to Archbishop Antonio Ledesma, SJ, and Milet Mendoza, for their example of building bridges in Mindanao with the spirit of ecumenism; to Jack Pamine, for his stories of dialogue with rebel groups; to Joey Lopez, for his lucid history of the Philippines; to my brothers at the Congregation of Jesus and Mary, and sisters at the Religious of the Good Shepherd, for their ministry of hospitality and helping me understand the universal call to holiness; and to Gwen Borcena, Genie Lorenzo, and Fr. Bill Kreutz, SJ, for their wonderful Ignatian companionship. In Sweden, to my brothers and sisters at St. Lars, for their blessed fellowship, which brought me such joy when I was going through a difficult time; to the Newman Institute, for permitting my use of the library and common spaces at unconventional hours; and to Sten and Käthe Ström, for their intellectual, spiritual and physical nourishment. Reinhold Niebuhr petitioned God for “the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, courage to change the things I can, and wisdom to know the difference.” Chiara Ruffa, my advisor, was helpful in providing these things too! 4 TABLES AND FIGURES Tables Table 1: Core Framing Tasks Accomplished by the ‘Radical’ and ‘Master’ Frames Table 2: Covariates and Their Expected Relationship with Terrorism Table 3: Four Actors and Intervals Delimited by Four Turning Points Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in the Cross-Case Study Table 5: Correlation Coefficients Matrix Table 6: Regress Terrorism Index on Covariates (country-specific fixed-effects model, ‘within’ estimator) Table 7: Regress Terrorism Index on Covariates (time-invariant fixed-effects model, ‘between’ estimator) Table 8: Annualized Incident, Death, Injury, and Hostage-taking Rates in the Philippines Table A-1: Comprehensive Peace Agreements Recorded in the Peace Accords Matrix Table A-2: Top 10 Terrorism Incidents in the Philippines: 2 September 1996 – 31 March 2001 Table A-3: Top 10 Terrorism Incidents in the Philippines: 31 March 2001 – 10 May 2004 Table A-4: Top 10 Terrorism Incidents in the Philippines: 27 March 2014 – 25 January 2015 Table A-5: Top 10 Terrorism Incidents in the Philippines: 25 January 2015 – 9 May 2016 Figures Figure 1: ‘Gains and Losses’: Framing Effects Induced by Trigger Events at the Societal Level Figure 2: ‘Radicalization’: Frustration and Framing Effects at the Individual Level Figure 3: ‘Shock Therapy’: Effect of Terrorism on the Majority Group’s Valuation of ‘Cheap Peace’ and ‘Costly Peace’ Figure 4: Comprehensive Peace Agreements in the Cross-Case Study Figure 5: Kernel Density of the Terrorism Index Figure 6: Kernel Density of the Proportion of Failing Provisions Figure 7: Annualized Terrorism Incident and Death Rate in the Philippines: Before and After 31/3/2001 Figure 8: Annualized Terrorism Incident and Death Rate in the Philippines: Before and After 25/1/2015 Figure A-1: Proportion of Failing Provisions and Terrorism Index in 34 Cases 5 ABBREVIATIONS AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines AQ al-Qaeda ARMM Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao ASG Abu Sayyaf Group BBL Bangsamoro Basic Law BIAF Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (armed wing of MILF) BIFF Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters BTC Bangsamoro Transition Commission CAB Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro (2014) CISAC Center for International Security and Cooperation CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement CPP Communist Party of the Philippines FTO “Foreign Terrorist Organization” (designation by US State Department) GRP Government of the Republic of the Philippines GTD Global Terrorism Database IEP Institute for Economics and Peace ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant JI Jemaah Islamiyah MFA Mindanao Final Agreement (1996) MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front MNLF Moro National Liberation Front NPA New People’s Army (armed wing of CPP) OPAPP Office of the Presidential Adviser to the Peace Process PAM Peace Accords Matrix START Study of Terrorism and Responses to