DO FOREIGN POLICY REVIEWS MAKE A DIFFERENCE? John J. Noble In Canada’s first foreign policy review in 1970, Foreign Policy for Canadians, Pierre Trudeau turned his back on the Pearsonian concept of Canada’s role in the world, and suggested foreign policy was “merely an extension of domestic policy and Canada’s national interests.” The next major review was the Mulroney government’s 1985 Green Paper, Competitiveness and Security. In 1995, in Canada and the World, the Chrétien government suggested the projection of Canadian values, along with prosperity and security, as keystones of foreign policy. What will the Martin government propose as a vision of Canada in the world in its International Policy Review, finally due out this month? John Noble considers the question and suggests: more of the same. La première révision de notre politique étrangère remonte à 1970, quand Pierre Elliott Trudeau a troqué le concept pearsonien d’un véritable rôle à jouer pour le Canada contre une vision faisant de la politique étrangère le « simple prolongement de notre politique intérieure et de nos intérêts nationaux ». Il faudra attendre 1985 et le Livre vert Compétitivité et sécurité du gouvernement Mulroney pour assister à une deuxième révision majeure. Puis, en 1995, le gouvernement Chrétien publiait Le Canada et le monde, document faisant des valeurs canadiennes la clé de notre politique étrangère, aux côtés de la prospérité et de la sécurité. Quelle vision le gouvernement Martin proposera-t-il dans sa propre révision attendue ce mois-ci ? Sans doute rien de très neuf par rapport à son prédécesseur, pronostique John Noble. ester B. Pearson is often cited as the “model” for Pearson was also the consummate multilateral diplo- Canadian foreign policy, including the two very dif- mat, but here again he showed his pragmatism when he L ferent conceptions espoused by Lloyd Axworthy and confessed in his memoirs: “I felt that support for the UN Andrew Cohen. Pearson was above all a pragmatist who was at times less of a call to action than a prayerful and worked endlessly to maintain good relations with the undemanding expression of our idealism and our hopes, a United States and the United Kingdom. kind of satisfying ritual like the automatic repetition of the In his memoirs Pearson notes that “Canada’s great- Lord’s Prayer.” est interest is international peace and security...This Conservative critic Howard Green charged that Pearson interest is prejudiced when there is division within the was the “chore boy of the Americans” for his role in solving Commonwealth or between London, Washington and the Suez crisis and this no doubt resonated with a portion of Paris...Canada must do what she could to promote unity the Canadian public during the 1957 general election when between the United States and Britain.” He also said it Diefenbaker upset the Liberals. John Diefenbaker’s efforts to was “a first principle of Canadian foreign policy to coop- restore relations with the British came to naught as did his erate closely with the two countries with whom every attempts to shift 15 percent of trade away from the US impulse of sentiment, history, self-interest, trade and towards Britain. He didn’t withdraw Canadian troops from geography counsels such co-operation.” When they dis- United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in Egypt after his agreed “we are in trouble.” Pearson also admitted in his election and his position on South Africa’s expulsion from memoirs “there will be times when, in the interests of the Commonwealth remained until the apartheid regime the unity which is so necessary, we may have to abandon crumbled in the 1990s. His policies with respect to Cuba our own views in favour of those held by the United and selling wheat to China also became stalwarts for all States.” future governments. POLICY OPTIONS 41 FEBRUARY 2005 John J. Noble Diefenbaker’s minority govern- pamphlets in 1970, entitled Foreign time Trudeau agreed to test cruise mis- ment imploded over his inability to Policy for Canadians. It identified the siles over Canadian territory notwith- take a decision to arm the Bomarc mis- following priorities: fostering econom- standing the fact that a majority of siles, which he had bought as a substi- ic growth; safeguarding sovereignty Canadian public opinion was opposed. tute for the cancelled Avro Arrow and independence; working for peace In his memoirs, Trudeau’s second to fighter/interceptor (CF-105), with and security; promoting social justice; last foreign minister, Mark McGuigan, nuclear weapons. Diefenbaker resent- enhancing the quality of life and notes that in the 1980-82 period ed the clear intrusion of the US gov- assuring a harmonious natural envi- “Canadian difficulties with the United ernment into the 1963 federal ronment. None of the pamphlets States had seldom been so widespread and deep-seated. Those Pearson was also the consummate multilateral diplomat, but problems were compounded by the lack of rapport here again he showed his pragmatism when he confessed in between Trudeau and his memoirs: “I felt that support for the UN was at times less Ronald Reagan, which of a call to action than a prayerful and undemanding threatened to end in a expression of our idealism and our hopes, a kind of satisfying rather ugly fashion, but which we were eventually ritual like the automatic repetition of the Lord’s Prayer.” able to manage — just bare- ly — with the prime minis- election, which he fought and lost directly addressed relations with the ter’s eating of some humble pie.” using very anti-American rhetoric. United States. Trudeau set up quarterly meetings However that anti-American rhetoric That omission was corrected in between the Canadian and American kept Pearson from winning a clear the fall of 1972 when Mitchell Sharp foreign ministers in October 1982 after majority in 1963. issued a paper on options for relations he appointed Allan MacEachen to When Pearson became prime min- with the United States which noted replace Mark McGuigan as his foreign ister he tried to repair the relationships that “the challenge of living distinct minister in an attempt to resolve some damaged by Diefenbaker with both the from, but in harmony with, the irritants on both sides. This practice British and the Americans. Pearson, world’s most dynamic and powerful was continued throughout the time even with a minority government, nation, the United States, was one of that George Shultz was secretary of made early visits to London to meet the two inescapable realities, both cru- state, but it fell into disuse after Jim Harold Wilson and to Hyannisport to cial to Canadian policy needs.” The Baker succeeded him in 1989. meet President Kennedy (none of the other issue was national unity. The John Turner wanted better rela- angst, indecision and delay associated paper looked at three options for rela- tions with the United States and he with where and when Paul Martin Jr. tions with the US: 1) the status quo; 2) instructed his foreign minister Jean should meet with President Bush). deeper economic integration; and 3) Chrétien to pass this message to Pearson agreed to pass messages diversification away from the US George Shultz at their one and only between the Americans and North toward other economic markets. meeting in Jakarta in early July 1984. Vietnamese, he agreed to Lyndon Trudeau chose the third option Turner also decided not to proceed Johnson’s request for Canadian troops and tried to establish better relation- with a Canadian initiative in the in Cyprus and secured the Auto Pact ships and more trade with the Committee on Disarmament in with the United States which con- European Economic Community and Geneva to ban anti-satellite weapons tributed greatly to the economic well Japan. When Trudeau left office after a personal intervention from being of central Canada. Canada’s trade with the United States George Shultz. had increased to three quarters of all ierre Trudeau turned his back on Canadian exports. The third option rian Mulroney made clear in his P Pearson’s concept of Canada’s role had failed because Canadian business, B 1984 election campaign that he, in the world and early in his mandate which does the trading, wasn’t inter- too, wanted a new and better relation- he rejected the foreign policy review ested, nor were the Europeans or ship with the United States and that he conducted by foreign affairs officials as Japanese business communities. intended to give the Americans the being too consistent with the past. He It was ironic that Trudeau who had benefit of the doubt on certain issues. put his own stamp on foreign policy initially scoffed at the Pearsonian Mulroney defended the United States by proclaiming that it was merely an “helpful fixer” role for Canada ended in some instances and in others chal- extension of domestic policy and his time in office in pursuit of his peace lenged the US to take account of the Canada’s national interests. Trudeau’s initiative designed to lower tensions views of others. He took issue with the foreign policy review was issued in six between East and West. At the same Americans over South Africa and parts 42 OPTIONS POLITIQUES FÉVRIER 2005 Do foreign policy reviews make a difference? of their Central American policy. and had taken concrete steps to rein- States. A suggestion to resurrect this prac- Mulroney was unfailing in his pursuit vigorate the relationship by addressing tice has recently been made by Thomas of Canadian interests with respect to a several other American concerns. Axworthy and makes eminent sense. free trade agreement, acid rain, and The Mulroney foreign policy review The Chrétien government’s foreign Arctic sovereignty.