DO FOREIGN POLICY REVIEWS MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

John J. Noble

In Canada’s first foreign policy review in 1970, Foreign Policy for Canadians, Pierre Trudeau turned his back on the Pearsonian concept of Canada’s role in the world, and suggested foreign policy was “merely an extension of domestic policy and Canada’s national interests.” The next major review was the Mulroney government’s 1985 Green Paper, Competitiveness and Security. In 1995, in Canada and the World, the Chrétien government suggested the projection of Canadian values, along with prosperity and security, as keystones of foreign policy. What will the Martin government propose as a vision of Canada in the world in its International Policy Review, finally due out this month? John Noble considers the question and suggests: more of the same.

La première révision de notre politique étrangère remonte à 1970, quand Pierre Elliott Trudeau a troqué le concept pearsonien d’un véritable rôle à jouer pour le Canada contre une vision faisant de la politique étrangère le « simple prolongement de notre politique intérieure et de nos intérêts nationaux ». Il faudra attendre 1985 et le Livre vert Compétitivité et sécurité du gouvernement Mulroney pour assister à une deuxième révision majeure. Puis, en 1995, le gouvernement Chrétien publiait Le Canada et le monde, document faisant des valeurs canadiennes la clé de notre politique étrangère, aux côtés de la prospérité et de la sécurité. Quelle vision le gouvernement Martin proposera-t-il dans sa propre révision attendue ce mois-ci ? Sans doute rien de très neuf par rapport à son prédécesseur, pronostique John Noble.

ester B. Pearson is often cited as the “model” for Pearson was also the consummate multilateral diplo- Canadian foreign policy, including the two very dif- mat, but here again he showed his pragmatism when he L ferent conceptions espoused by Lloyd Axworthy and confessed in his memoirs: “I felt that support for the UN Andrew Cohen. Pearson was above all a pragmatist who was at times less of a call to action than a prayerful and worked endlessly to maintain good relations with the undemanding expression of our idealism and our hopes, a United States and the United Kingdom. kind of satisfying ritual like the automatic repetition of the In his memoirs Pearson notes that “Canada’s great- Lord’s Prayer.” est interest is international peace and security...This Conservative critic Howard Green charged that Pearson interest is prejudiced when there is division within the was the “chore boy of the Americans” for his role in solving Commonwealth or between London, Washington and the Suez crisis and this no doubt resonated with a portion of Paris...Canada must do what she could to promote unity the Canadian public during the 1957 general election when between the United States and Britain.” He also said it Diefenbaker upset the Liberals. John Diefenbaker’s efforts to was “a first principle of Canadian foreign policy to coop- restore relations with the British came to naught as did his erate closely with the two countries with whom every attempts to shift 15 percent of trade away from the US impulse of sentiment, history, self-interest, trade and towards Britain. He didn’t withdraw Canadian troops from geography counsels such co-operation.” When they dis- United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in Egypt after his agreed “we are in trouble.” Pearson also admitted in his election and his position on South Africa’s expulsion from memoirs “there will be times when, in the interests of the Commonwealth remained until the apartheid regime the unity which is so necessary, we may have to abandon crumbled in the 1990s. His policies with respect to Cuba our own views in favour of those held by the United and selling wheat to China also became stalwarts for all States.” future governments.

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Diefenbaker’s minority govern- pamphlets in 1970, entitled Foreign time Trudeau agreed to test cruise mis- ment imploded over his inability to Policy for Canadians. It identified the siles over Canadian territory notwith- take a decision to arm the Bomarc mis- following priorities: fostering econom- standing the fact that a majority of siles, which he had bought as a substi- ic growth; safeguarding sovereignty Canadian public opinion was opposed. tute for the cancelled Avro Arrow and independence; working for peace In his memoirs, Trudeau’s second to fighter/interceptor (CF-105), with and security; promoting social justice; last foreign minister, Mark McGuigan, nuclear weapons. Diefenbaker resent- enhancing the quality of life and notes that in the 1980-82 period ed the clear intrusion of the US gov- assuring a harmonious natural envi- “Canadian difficulties with the United ernment into the 1963 federal ronment. None of the pamphlets States had seldom been so widespread and deep-seated. Those Pearson was also the consummate multilateral diplomat, but problems were compounded by the lack of rapport here again he showed his pragmatism when he confessed in between Trudeau and his memoirs: “I felt that support for the UN was at times less Ronald Reagan, which of a call to action than a prayerful and undemanding threatened to end in a expression of our idealism and our hopes, a kind of satisfying rather ugly fashion, but which we were eventually ritual like the automatic repetition of the Lord’s Prayer.” able to manage — just bare- ly — with the prime minis- election, which he fought and lost directly addressed relations with the ter’s eating of some humble pie.” using very anti-American rhetoric. United States. Trudeau set up quarterly meetings However that anti-American rhetoric That omission was corrected in between the Canadian and American kept Pearson from winning a clear the fall of 1972 when Mitchell Sharp foreign ministers in October 1982 after majority in 1963. issued a paper on options for relations he appointed Allan MacEachen to When Pearson became prime min- with the United States which noted replace Mark McGuigan as his foreign ister he tried to repair the relationships that “the challenge of living distinct minister in an attempt to resolve some damaged by Diefenbaker with both the from, but in harmony with, the irritants on both sides. This practice British and the Americans. Pearson, world’s most dynamic and powerful was continued throughout the time even with a minority government, nation, the United States, was one of that George Shultz was secretary of made early visits to London to meet the two inescapable realities, both cru- state, but it fell into disuse after Jim Harold Wilson and to Hyannisport to cial to Canadian policy needs.” The Baker succeeded him in 1989. meet President Kennedy (none of the other issue was national unity. The John Turner wanted better rela- angst, indecision and delay associated paper looked at three options for rela- tions with the United States and he with where and when Paul Martin Jr. tions with the US: 1) the status quo; 2) instructed his foreign minister Jean should meet with President Bush). deeper economic integration; and 3) Chrétien to pass this message to Pearson agreed to pass messages diversification away from the US George Shultz at their one and only between the Americans and North toward other economic markets. meeting in Jakarta in early July 1984. Vietnamese, he agreed to Lyndon Trudeau chose the third option Turner also decided not to proceed Johnson’s request for Canadian troops and tried to establish better relation- with a Canadian initiative in the in Cyprus and secured the Auto Pact ships and more trade with the Committee on Disarmament in with the United States which con- European Economic Community and Geneva to ban anti-satellite weapons tributed greatly to the economic well Japan. When Trudeau left office after a personal intervention from being of central Canada. Canada’s trade with the United States George Shultz. had increased to three quarters of all ierre Trudeau turned his back on Canadian exports. The third option rian Mulroney made clear in his P Pearson’s concept of Canada’s role had failed because Canadian business, B 1984 election campaign that he, in the world and early in his mandate which does the trading, wasn’t inter- too, wanted a new and better relation- he rejected the foreign policy review ested, nor were the Europeans or ship with the United States and that he conducted by foreign affairs officials as Japanese business communities. intended to give the Americans the being too consistent with the past. He It was ironic that Trudeau who had benefit of the doubt on certain issues. put his own stamp on foreign policy initially scoffed at the Pearsonian Mulroney defended the United States by proclaiming that it was merely an “helpful fixer” role for Canada ended in some instances and in others chal- extension of domestic policy and his time in office in pursuit of his peace lenged the US to take account of the Canada’s national interests. Trudeau’s initiative designed to lower tensions views of others. He took issue with the foreign policy review was issued in six between East and West. At the same Americans over South Africa and parts

42 OPTIONS POLITIQUES FÉVRIER 2005 Do foreign policy reviews make a difference? of their Central American policy. and had taken concrete steps to rein- States. A suggestion to resurrect this prac- Mulroney was unfailing in his pursuit vigorate the relationship by addressing tice has recently been made by Thomas of Canadian interests with respect to a several other American concerns. Axworthy and makes eminent sense. free trade agreement, acid rain, and The Mulroney foreign policy review The Chrétien government’s foreign Arctic sovereignty. On the latter issue conducted by Joe Clark in 1985 and policy review issued in 1995 was entitled he obtained a totally unscripted com- issued as a Green Paper entitled Canada in the World. It identified three mitment from President Reagan: “let’s Competitiveness and Security: Directions for key objectives (the so-called three pillars) put the sovereignty issue aside, we Canada’s International Relations. It identi- of Canadian foreign policy: the promo- won’t do anything up there without fied six basic objectives strikingly similar tion of prosperity and employment; the your permission.” This proved to be to Trudeau’s Foreign Policy for Canadians: protection of our security, within a stable the basis of an agreement that has unity; sovereignty and independence; global framework; and the projection of done just that for the past eighteen peace and security; justice and democra- Canadian values (human rights, democ- years. Mulroney said “no” to one of cy; economic prosperity and the integri- racy, rule of law and the environment) Reagan’s pet projects, the Strategic ty of our natural resources. and culture. While the packaging may Defense Initiative, without any signifi- Mulroney also implemented a rec- have been different, the underlying cant impact on the relationship ommendation from DFAIT that there objectives were consistent with those because he had already established should be annual summits between him- identified in the Trudeau and Mulroney good personal relations with Reagan self and the president of the United foreign policy reviews.

The Gazette, Montreal Canada in the world: Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson and External Affairs Minister Paul Martin Sr., at the opening of the United Nations General Assembly in September 1963. “Pearson was above all a pragmatist,” writes John Noble, “who worked endlessly to maintain good relations with the United States and United Kingdom.” The Pearsonian legacy was somewhat repudiated in Pierre Trudeau's 1970 foreign policy review.

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hrétien failed to establish the National Security Strategy of the United mentary secretary for Canada-US rela- C same relationship with George W. States, by bringing together in one tions could be asked to participate at Bush as he had with Clinton and document how the various strands of its meetings. appeared so engrossed in the policies available to the government in The prime minister’s early promis- internecine warfare within his own its relations with other countries will es for a new and better relationship party that he was incapable of disci- be knit together. The Martin govern- with the United States sounded plining those knee-jerk anti-Americans, ment did produce a national security encouraging but then it took over four who supported him against a more pro- strategy in April 2004, which is really months for a real meeting between American Paul Martin. the Canadian version of the US home- him and President Bush in April 2004. In January 2003 the then foreign land security strategy. The November 30, 2004 visit to minister Bill Graham launched a “dia- One of the earliest announce- Ottawa by President Bush resulted in logue with Canadians” to try to find out exactly Trudeau’s foreign policy review was issued in six pamphlets in what Canadians wanted their foreign policy to be. 1970, entitled Foreign Policy for Canadians. It identified the Six months later, just following priorities: fostering economic growth; safeguarding after the Iraq War formal- sovereignty and independence; working for peace and security; ly ended, Graham promoting social justice; enhancing the quality of life and announced the results of his dialogue. The key assuring a harmonious natural environment. None of the issues identified were: 1) pamphlets directly addressed relations with the United States. strengthening a multilat- eral system based on the rule of law; 2) ments from the new prime minister, the issuing of a “Joint Statement by reforming international institutions; who had directly supervised the drastic Canada and the United States on com- 3) close relations with U.S. should be a decline in foreign policy, defence and mon security, common prosperity: A fundamental foreign policy priority; 4) aid expenditures throughout most of new partnership in North America.” security at home depends on the sta- the 1990s, was his commitment on his The statement sets an agenda for bility, order and prosperity of the glob- frist day in office to strengthening Canada-US co-operation not only in al community and with the human Canada’s influence in the world. Four key bilateral areas, but also commits rights and democratic development of specific measures were announced: the two countries to work together people around the world. Graham sug- First, the minister of foreign affairs was internationally on a wide range of gested that the three pillars of the asked to lead in the development of an issues “in support of our common val- Canadian foreign policy announced integrated and coherent international ues.” This statement was virtually by the Chrétien government in 1995 policy framework for diplomacy, ignored by the Canadian media in remained virtually intact with minor defence, development, and trade; sec- much the same way that the Quebec embellishments. ond, the creation of a new cabinet Summit declaration of March 17, 1985 An international policy review to committee on global affairs, chaired by between President Reagan and PM enunciate the Martin government’s the PM, which would take an integrat- Mulroney had been two decades earli- policies with respect to diplomacy, ed approach to foreign affairs, defence, er. The Quebec declaration was the defence, development and trade was international development, trade and first step on the road to a bilateral free announced on December 12, 2003, the other international issues; third, the trade agreement. Whether this latest very day of the government’s swear- creation of a new cabinet committee statement of partnership will develop ing-in and reiterated in the February on Canada-US relations, chaired by the into the North American Security and 2004 and October 2004 Speeches from prime minister, to ensure an integrat- Prosperity Initiative (NASPI) espoused the Throne. The document was prom- ed, government-wide approach to for the past two years by the Canadian ised for the autumn of 2004, but has Canada-US relations and to be sup- Council of Chief Executives remains yet to surface. Such a coordinated exer- ported by a Canada-US secretariat in an open question. cise would be difficult in the best of the Privy Council Office; and fourth, The PM has also promised more times at both the bureaucratic and the appointment of a parliamentary money for defence spending and an political levels, which perhaps secretary to the PM for Canada-US increase in the size of the Canadian explains why none of Martin’s prede- relations. The mandate of the cabinet Forces to enable them to carry out more cessors ever attempted to do so, and committee on Canada-US relations operations abroad. At the same time all why it has not yet seen the light of noted that at the discretion of the department shave been instructed to day. Such a document should produce chair (the PM), Canada’s ambassador carry out a five percent reduction exer- the Canadian equivalent of the to the United States and the parlia- cise under the guise of “program

44 OPTIONS POLITIQUES FÉVRIER 2005 Do foreign policy reviews make a difference? review.” There has been no suggestion those that existed during the Cold there may be times when “we may that the departments involved in the War and they may require responses have to abandon our own views in International Policy Review are exempt- which have nothing to do with the favour of those held by the United ed from this expenditure cut. traditional role played by the States.” The November 30, 2004, joint Canadian military. But Canadians still statement committing Canada and n the issue of Canadian values, want armed forces that are capable of the United States to co-operate inter- O Prime Minister Martin initially intervening in international peace- nationally of a wide range of issues is reminded us that many of these are in keeping and peacemaking operations to be welcomed and provides an fact universal values treasured by approved by either the UN or NATO. opportunity that should be seized to Canadians (liberty, democracy, indi- The October 2004 Speech from the promote co-operation. vidual opportunity, fairness). By the Throne’s proclamation that it is no The changing nature of the compo- time of last October’s Speech from the longer possible to separate domestic sition of Canada’s multicultural society Throne those universal values had and international policies is a reitera- has had an on-going impact on aspects again become transformed into tion of what Trudeau said in Foreign of Canadian foreign policy. In the 1990s Canadian values and the PM was sug- Policy for Canadians 34 years ago. the large ethnic communities with roots gesting that the world needed “more in Eastern Europe (including the wife of of Canada.” He has also called for mul- foreign policy which is grounded Prime Minister Mulroney) were instru- tilateral institutions that work and A in promoting Canada’s security mental in forcing the active involve- suggested that no one nation ment of both the Mulroney and can manage the consequences Mulroney defended the United Chrétien governments in the of global interdependence on States in some instances and in search for peace in the Balkans. its own. others challenged the US to take The Haitian community in It should be clear from the Montreal is important enough above that while changing account of the views of others. He in several ridings to ensure that world circumstances have took issue with the Americans over Canada can no longer ignore resulted in various changes to South Africa and parts of their this poorest country in our Canadian foreign policy over Central American policy. Mulroney Caribbean neighbourhood. The the years, there have been list could go on and on. Almost some fundamental Canadian was unfailing in his pursuit of every ethnic background is now foreign policy objectives Canadian interests with respect to a represented in Canada and it which have not changed: pro- free trade agreement, acid rain, and has become almost inconceiv- viding for the security of Arctic sovereignty. On the latter issue able to imagine an event hap- Canadians and the rest of the pening anywhere in the world world; providing for Canada’s he obtained a totally unscripted which does not resonate some- economic security; and the commitment from President Reagan: where in Canada at both the promotion of universal values “let’s put the sovereignty issue aside, public and political level. of social justice which most we won’t do anything up there This reality has been over- Canadians embrace. Various looked by proponents of governments have responded without your permission.” “niche” diplomacy, which in various ways in their attempts to and economic growth cannot but requires a degree of homogeneity achieve these objectives, but the basic focus on our relations with the which has never existed in Canadian objectives are still there. That is hard- United States. But Canadians don’t society. The same reality impacts on ly surprising. It also means that the want their foreign policy to focus the government’s ability to be more proposition that the fundamentals of exclusively on relations with the selective in concentrating our aid pro- the three-pillar policy enunciated in United States and it is folly to suggest gram to a small group of countries. It 1994-95 are outdated today is balder- otherwise. One of the greatest chal- also impacts on which crisis we regard dash. The Martin government has lenges facing Canadian foreign policy as salient to Canada. chosen to take the second pillar (the is how to re-engage the United States Another of Prime Minister Martin’s promotion of trade and investment) in the multilateral system which it first acts on December 12, 2003 was to away from foreign policy and make it was so instrumental in creating at the introduce changes to the organization a fifth pillar of its economic strategy, end of the Second World War. of his government, breaking up the but it still relates to interaction with Without the United States’ active par- Department of Foreign Affairs and the world outside Canada. ticipation the UN system will fade International Trade into two separate The real threats to Canadian and wither. This may be an opportune departments and setting up a secretariat security today are different from time to recall Pearson’s view that in the Privy Council Office to run

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Canada-US relations and to backstop a bring forth the document until he is cer- and certainly was not a holdover from new cabinet committee on Canada-US tain that it fully reflects how he wants to the “horse and buggy age” as suggest- relations, chaired by the prime minister. proceed to achieve the objectives he has ed by a senior mandarin in the new This left the new departments of already set out since November 2003. Department of International Trade. Foreign Affairs and International Trade One of the more puzzling mes- Some see it as a deliberate ploy by the with little or no responsibility for policy sages sent out by the breakup of DFAIT PCO to denigrate the whole concept of development with respect to our most is that foreign policy and trade policy a professional foreign service. important ally and overwhelming trad- are somehow no longer directly While the rhetoric of the Martin ing partner, the United States. Foreign linked. “Jobs, jobs, jobs” was a key ele- government’s International Policy Review policy is henceforth to be conducted on ment of the Mulroney and Chrétien may try to be innovative, Canada’s fun- a “whole of government approach” foreign policies. Martin appears to damental foreign policy objectives have ostensibly due to the ever increasing dif- have decided that somehow our eco- and will remain more or less constant. ficulty in distinguishing between nomic interests in promoting foreign The means to try to achieve those objec- domestic and foreign policy. But promo- trade and two-way investment are bet- tives may well be different. What is tion of trade and investment is no ter served by a stand-alone department important is that the means be real and longer part of this government’s foreign separate from foreign policy. This cre- not just hortatory wishful thinking that policy, but rather its economic policy. ates uncertainties which go far beyond the world needs more Canada. Any policy document like the the inevitable turf wars between International Policy Review which is sup- bureaucrats involved in the divorce. John J. Noble, a career foreign service offi- posed to deal with the operations of at Will Canadian heads of mission still be cer and former ambasssador to Greece, is least four departments and which involved in the promotion of trade a fellow at the Weatherhead Center for affects many others as well is unlikely to and investment or will that be left International Affairs at Harvard see the light of day before it receives the increasingly to trade commissioners? University and director of research and stamp of approval from the Privy The Canadian model of an integrated communications and the Centre for Trade Council Office and the PMO. It would department of foreign affairs and Policy and Law at Carleton University appear that the PM is not anxious to international trade was working well and the University of Ottawa.

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