A Reformed Senate As a Check on Prime Ministerial Power
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A Reformed Senate as a Check on Prime Ministerial Power by Evan Sotiropoulos One problem of Canadian parliamentary democracy is the concentration of power in the hands of the Prime Minister and the ascendancy of the Prime Ministers Office over Parliament. This article looks at some of the reasons for the weakness of the House of Commons vis à vis the Prime Minister. It then looks at the Senate and the place a reformed Senate may have in acting as a counterweight to a system that has been transformed from executive centred to prime ministerial dominated. n a representative democracy, individuals are elected democracy, but should these traditions serve to restrict Ito “represent” the views of the citizenry and, in debate and circumvent the duty of an elected theory, meet in a common place to actually debate representative to question certain conclusions and even public policy. Although the practice of politics is partake in the decision making process? commonly divorced from the theory, the current rift A matter of consternation among MPs is the fact that between the two should concern all Canadians. It should “the rules on what constitutes a government defeat are be noted that as national elections become increasingly vague and hence flexible … [since] an important matter leader-centric, most candidates at the local level pin their remains subject to dispute”3. political aspirations on the performance of their party Liberal Party regimes – including the three under with the hope of punching their ticket to Parliament. Chrétien – would regularly muzzle backbenchers by de- Therefore, when those green seats are distributed in claring various non-money bills matters of confidence. Ottawa, the occupants are expected – following former The crack of the party whip was exemplified during the Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s theory – to ‘sing from emotional debate to limit compensation to Hepatitis C the same hymn book.’ The British practice shows “a victims. With the politics of the issue on their side, the Re- secular decline in party line voting … over the past two form Party moved a motion obliging the government to decades,” with even the Conservative majority pay damages to all sufferers; in an extraordinary move, government of the 1980s experiencing legislative defeat Chrétien declared the motion to be one of confidence de- on several occasions1. In contrast, the presence of strong spite the wording of the motion that omitted expressing party discipline in Canada has many negative non-confidence in the government4. Furthermore, as his consequences including reducing the responsiveness time in office came to an end, the Prime Minister indi- from elected officials2. Since dissension is discouraged cated the omnibus package to amend the Canada Elections and individuals looking to advance their political career Act would be considered a matter of confidence – an- usually form a cohesive team, the centre can exert its other extreme use of the party whip. Despite attempts to considerable influence over backbench members. institutionalize a three-line whip modeled on the British Customarily, cabinet solidarity and party discipline are example, Paul Martin ordered many in his caucus to integral parts of a Westminster-style parliamentary support the party line on moral issues such as the vote on same-sex marriage. His short tenure as PM did little to transform a system reliant on access to the political cen- Evan Sotiropoulos recently took an M.A. in political science from the tre or "Who do you know in the PMO?" University of Toronto. This is a revised version of a paper presented to In a parliamentary system, maintaining the confidence the 2007 Trent-Carleton Graduate Student Conference in Peterborough. The author thanks Lawrence LeDuc and Michael Stein of the House is a fundamental requirement of the gov- for comments on earlier versions of this article. Any errors or erning party. Given that MPs typically vote as their party omissions that remain are the author's sole responsibility. 28 CANADIAN PARLIAMENTARY REVIEW/SPRING 2008 dictates, this cornerstone of Canadian democracy is con- new members were simply unable to keep the stantly reinforced. For the government, steadfast sup- government accountable”. The complex organization of port by its MPs allows for an executive to rule with little government and the many subtleties of life in the House, threat. For the opposition, a disciplined caucus allows for necessitate the need for long serving members able to a unified and consistent alternative to be presented to the competently hold the government to account. Canada’s public. The question is this: can party disciplined be re- 39th Parliament is packed with neophyte politicians: cur- laxed while still allowing a prime minister to effectively rently, more than one in five members has served less govern and simultaneously respecting the notion of re- than two years, while approximately half of all MPs have sponsible government? The British practice “shows that served around three years. party discipline can be weakened … without deviating in In Britain, since most members who enter Parliament any serious way from the principles of responsible par- never sit in cabinet, MPs there – instead of setting their liamentary government.”5 With minimal clout, govern- sights on the ministry – become effective committee ment backbenchers resort to simply influencing the members and vigorous constituency representatives. decision making process since their only real threat – vot- The political reality on the other side of the Atlantic al- ing against the government – is silenced by excessive lows elected officials to hone their watchdog skills over party discipline; this in turn reduces their ability to keep many years. The inexperienced Canadian Member of a watchful eye on the executive. Frustrated with their in- Parliament, unable to remove the shackles of party disci- ability to affect policy, many members of Parliament sim- pline, must deal with another obstacle in keeping the ply treat the House of Commons as a short stopover in a government to account – the multifarious engagements long career. of the federal government. The Temporary Member Too Much to Catch The high turnover among MPs prevents the develop- In the middle of the twentieth century, the federal min- ment of institutional memory – a natural prerequisite to istry consisted of about twenty individuals; in recent properly oversee and, where necessary, curb the actions times, Messers Mulroney, Chrétien and Martin have led of government. Many argue that “amateurism – the pre- ministries double that size. The growth in the number of ponderance of short, interstitial careers – has, among cabinet posts has meant a corresponding increase in the other things, robbed the House of Commons of a cadre of federal bureaucracy. Furthermore, excluding public debt dedicated and experienced MPs capable of challenging charges, program expenses for the federal government the power of cabinet6” Today, most people do not elect totalled more than $175 billion in the 2005-2006 fiscal specialists but instead, send generalists to Ottawa with- year. The broadening of government responsibilities has out the proper skill set and experience to fulfill the duties meant the ordinary MP is mismatched in curbing the in- of a parliamentarian. This claim is further substantiated fluence of a pervasive PMO. Although “there was a time by the perceived role MPs have over government deci- when the Commons did make effective use of the esti- sion making: in a survey produced by Public Policy Fo- mates process to review government plans in detail and - rum, October 2000, over 500 senior government officials to establish guidelines to hold the government account able” 10 this is no longer the case. ranked Members of the House of Commons second to last in their ability to influence policy. 7 Norman Ward Given that “elections are rarely won or lost on ques- 11 argued decades ago that “most members of Parliament, tions of management” the political context in Canada does not cultivate an environment where assessing the far from being legislators who enact laws with the com- Estimates is a top priority for elected officials. Since the petence born of experience, are mere transients.8” opposition is constantly looking for embarrassing mis- The critical election of 1993 and the corresponding calculations (e.g. the gun registry fiasco) or administra- composition of the thirty-fifth Parliament serve to high- tive errors (e.g. the sensationalized HRDC grants and light the problem of the temporary member. After the contributions “boondoggle”) there is limited political collapse of the federal Progressive Conservative (PC) upside in properly reviewing tedious spending esti- Party, Jean Chrétien and his Cabinet had almost all the mates. meaningful experience in the House. The executive – in- The inexperience of most MPs coupled with numerous cluding parliamentarian heavyweights like Herb Gray other commitments associated with public life, suggests and Lloyd Axworthy – averaged eight years of federal the House of Commons will continually be unable to service or two full terms, whereas opposition members check the concentration of power in Canadian politics. 9 had barely over a year experience under their belts . Sim- While the media, courts and Officers of Parliament like ply put, “the net result of this gap in experience was that the Auditor General play a part in checking the execu- SPRING 2008/CANADIAN PARLIAMENTARY REVIEW 29