Canadian Military History
Volume 20 Issue 1 Article 2
2011
Destroying Hitler’s Berghof: The Bomber Command Raid of 25 April 1945
Oliver Haller
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh
Part of the Military History Commons
Recommended Citation Haller, Oliver "Destroying Hitler’s Berghof: The Bomber Command Raid of 25 April 1945." Canadian Military History 20, 1 (2011)
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Haller: Destroying Hitler’s Berghof Destroying Hitler’s Berghof The Bomber Command Raid of 25 April 1945
Oliver Haller
Introduction A large force of Avro Lancaster Abstract: This paper examines the heavy bombers and DeHavilland dolf Hitler celebrated his final Royal Air Force raid on Adolf Hitler’s Mosquito light bombers left England Berghof on the Obersalzberg in to attack Hitler’s mountain retreat in Abirthday in a concrete crypt April 1945. Arthur Harris, the head at the end of April 1945. The reach of Bomber Command, wanted to Obersalzberg near Berchtesgaden. of enemy firepower had forced emphasize air power’s decisive His Berghof represented one of the him underground to escape an role in the defeat of Nazism. most evocative symbols of Nazism approaching firestorm that had been However, Winston Churchill and and of the international community’s Bernard Montgomery, among fuelled by years of hatred, suffering others, questioned the usefulness failure to grasp opportunities to stop and death. Soviet artillery was well of destroying Berchtesgaden so Hitler prior to German rearmament. within range of the city and the shells late in the war. Unlike traditional Journalists revelled in the payback of over 40,000 guns began further explanations that focus on post- – even if belated – of the Berghof’s reducing a heavily bombed city to Dresden guilt, this article destruction. Unfortunately for contends that British politicians ashes. Some of those who remained at grew increasingly concerned with Bomber Command’s image, even the dictator’s side already referred to the economic state of postwar though headlines such as “Hitler’s the bunker beside the chancellery as Germany and the potential costs Chalet Wrecked” triumphantly the “mortuary” or as a “show house of the upcoming occupation. The celebrated a kind of victory, the RAF’s of living corpses.”1 On 25 April 1945, continuation of area bombing at this efforts that day have subsequently late stage of the war reinforced the Soviet armour and infantry pushed fears and consequences of “overkill.” been portrayed by historians in an through the few remaining German Harris’s disconnect with postwar anticlimactic manner if at all.4 defensive lines and encircled Berlin. civil-military concerns negatively It was simply “intolerable” to Other historic events on that influenced the postwar image of Bomber Command, Max Hastings day underscored the totality of Nazi Bomber Command. writes in a couple of sentences defeat. An American lieutenant from devoted to the raid, to “sit out the the 69th Infantry Division met with a world,” Harry S. Truman remarked, last weeks of the war in idleness.”5 small group of Soviet soldiers near the “than continued cooperation of the Considering the British devotion to German town of Torgau on the banks nations which had to muster the force “rubble bouncing” at the end of the of the Elbe in northwestern Saxony. necessary to defeat the conspiracy war, the decision to bomb Hitler’s Hitler’s rapidly shrinking empire of the Axis powers to dominate the retreat must certainly have been had been cut in two. Journalists world.”3 A new world was already motivated by more than boredom. understood the implications and taking shape as the curtain fell on At the time, journalists offered three rushed proclamations of “victory” Nazism. A few days later, Hitler’s basic reasons. First, the bombing was into print.2 On the same day that gasoline-soaked corpse burned in a simply “business as usual” in that the Soviet and American troops shook ditch. operation continued the systematic hands at Torgau, the delegates of 50 A fourth major event on 25 destruction of industrial, military countries met in San Francisco to form April has largely gone unnoticed and government facilities. Journalists the United Nations. “Nothing is more by historians and is consequently reported that this raid had the special essential to the future peace of the rarely acknowledged today. and laudable objective of decapitating
Published© Canadian by Scholars Military Commons History @, Laurier,Volume 2011 20, Number 1, Winter 2011, pp.5-20. 5 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 2
the Nazi state by physically removing of industrial cities could no longer industry to the House of Commons.9 Hitler. A third explanation added influence the war’s outcome. He Most politicians, including Roosevelt that Bomber Command wanted requested an end to the strategic air and Stalin, understood that the to prevent the construction of an war on 1 April. At “this advanced destruction of industrial assets “Alpine Redoubt” for a last stand by stage of the war,” he admitted in a later needed for reconstruction or at least German forces with the defensive note to Winston Churchill, “no great as part of a reparations settlement advantages of mountainous terrain. or immediate additional advantage made no economic or humanitarian Journalists as well as a large number can be expected from the attack of sense at all. of Allied military officers were the remaining industrial centres Churchill grew increasingly gripped by nearly “hysterical fears of Germany.”7 Portal nevertheless hostile to a bombing strategy that of a never-ending partisan war on listed a number of cases where the called his postwar policy into German soil.”6 bombers might still be used. These question. After the destruction of In revisiting the events of the exceptions included strikes against Dresden in mid-February, he sent raid, the present article evaluates “communications systems” and a minute (later revised to remove these three explanations and suggests preventing the formation of centres the word “terror”) to the Chiefs of
a fourth: by striking directly at of resistance and in particular a Staff urging a review of the bombing PL 144277 Joint Imagery Centre (CFJIC) Canadian Forces the hated Nazi leader, Bomber “redoubt in Southern Germany.” The offensive: Command was endeavouring to continued determination to use bombs change its image as a blunt weapon to encourage German surrender, one It seems to me that the moment has of terror. It is clear that Air Chief of the primary goals established at the come when the question of bombing Marshal Arthur Harris, commander- Casablanca Conference of 1943, did of German cities simply for the sake in-chief of Bomber Command, feared not signify a stop to the destruction of increasing the terror, though under that politicians such as Winston of urban infrastructure or the killing other pretexts, should be reviewed. Churchill had misinterpreted the of civilians. Otherwise we shall come into control destruction of cities such as Dresden Government officials reacted to of an utterly ruined land. We shall or Pforzheim as excessive force the inevitability of victory and the not, for instance be able to get bordering on barbarism. Churchill’s continuation of Anglo-American housing materials out of Germany attempt at distancing himself from bombing efforts in a different for our own needs because some the bombing campaign is a familiar manner and from a far different temporary provision would have to theme in analyses of this period. It is perspective. Ever since the expulsion be made for the Germans themselves. the intention here to point out that of German military forces from The destruction of Dresden remains the destruction of Hitler’s Berghof, Normandy at the end of August a serious query against the conduct as described by press accounts based 1944, various political agencies had of the Allied bombing. I am of the on information provided by the expended considerable energy on opinion that military objectives military, tried to remind everyone establishing a framework for the must henceforward be more strictly that the defeat of Nazism had been postwar reconstruction of Europe studied in our own interests rather the overriding aim of the war over that included the administration of than that of the enemy.10 Germany. Unfortunately for Harris, a conquered Germany. Churchill a single raid could not possibly agreed with the general Foreign Office Bomber Command reacted in a change hardening opinions that view that Europe would benefit from myopic manner characteristic of his lack of political acumen had a balanced policy that recognized an institution blinded by undue cultivated. Decades of acrimonious the “importance of the contribution concentration on operational goals at debate concerning the effectiveness which German industry could make the expense of larger perspectives. “I and morality of strategic bombing to the rehabilitation of Europe and do not personally regard the whole followed. to world prosperity.”8 At Yalta in of the remaining cities of Germany,” February 1945, Churchill battled Harris responded, “as worth the against the more punitive demands bones of one British grenadier.”11 Strategic Bombing in 1945 of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph German cities did, however, matter Stalin in order to safeguard German in the kind of stable postwar world he Combined Bomber Offensive industry and thereby reduce the costs Anglo-American politicians wanted Twas effectively over at the start of of occupation on British taxpayers. to create. It is therefore surprising April 1945. The chief of the air staff, At the end of the month, Churchill that some historians share Bomber Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, summarized these discussions and Command’s perspective and understood that the area bombing openly declared his stance on German attribute Churchill’s shift to legacy https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss1/26 2 Haller: Destroying Hitler’s Berghof Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre (CFJIC) PL 144277 Joint Imagery Centre (CFJIC) Canadian Forces
The Combined Bomber Offensive was effectively over at the beginning of April, but RAF Bomber Command continued to strike targets in Germany. Here, a Bomber Command Avro Lancaster conducts a daylight raid on Germany in 1945.
issues to shock or even felicitous the actual or imminent overrunning bombing directive in mid-April pandering to increasingly hostile of the enemy’s few remaining centres repeated the demand that the heavy public opinion.12 Churchill’s focus of industrial production weighed on bombers support the ground forces during the month of February their minds. The American strategists in the final thrusts into Germany. To expressed a real fear that the bombers understood that the strategic bombing ensure compliance with this decision, were tearing to pieces infrastructure campaign was over. General Carl A. Eisenhower reminded the Strategic needed for the postwar recovery. Spaatz, commander of US Strategic Targets Committee that their tasks More politically astute than Air Forces in Europe, called for were restricted to target selection and Harris, Portal had decided to an end to operations and ordered not setting overall policy.16 Harris find middle ground by restricting his heavy bombers to work more maintained defiance. what was left of strategic bombing closely with the tactical air forces to In fairness, Harris had consistently doctrine to what Robert A. Pape assist the men on the ground. Harris pushed a unique bombing agenda calls a “punishment strategy… disagreed. Even though he lamented that had no use for moral facades. harming enemy civilians in order that his Lancasters and Halifaxes He had accepted the brutal nature of to lower their morale and motivate “had practically no more targets modern warfare and often showed them to force their governments to left,” he curiously refused to accept a sophisticated understanding of end the war.”13 Targeting industry victory and instead wracked his brain industrialized economies. The air made little sense. On 6 April, Portal in order to come up with methods marshal’s support of area bombing repeated Churchill’s warning that of avoiding tactical missions.15 deviated considerably from the the further destruction of German Supreme Commander General American adoption of precision cities would only complicate the Dwight D. Eisenhower, having seen bombing. Based on the work of the future occupation.14 This point was the destruction in Germany with his Air Corps Tactical School during understood by most of the officers own eyes, tried to force Harris into the 1930s, American bombing who assembled at the SHAEF compliance by transferring the full strategy called for the disruption headquarters in Reims at the start of weight of Allied air power against of an enemy’s industrial system by the month to discuss target selection. what remained of the Wehrmacht targeting and destroying the flow of The physical seizure of German and the enemy’s communications essential commodities such as ball- territory by Allied ground forces and system. His last formal strategic bearings or fuel. Once this aim was
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011 7 3 Canadian Military History, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 2
Left top: This photo, taken by a US 9th Air Force P-51 scout pilot, shows a group of American B-24s attacking the German city of Nordhausen on 11 April 1945. Left below: An aerial view of the bomb damaged city of Nordhausen taken on 12 May 1945.
achieved, it was argued, the output of a stretched wartime economy would plummet. Harris dismissed the central hypothesis of American industrial suppression that formed the heart of daylight bombing against Germany after 1942. Large modern industrial economies retained significant flexibility based on immense dormant dual-use capacities that could be mobilized when needed. Bomber Command learned early in the war
US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) 342-FH-3A21419-57323AC Administration and Records US National Archives that only the aggregate destruction of major German cities within a particular industrial region such as Hamburg could suppress output in any meaningful sense. The American attempt at halting ball-bearing production at Schweinfurt in 1943, for example, failed to acknowledge the ability to draw on stocks, develop alternatives or even buy replacements from neutral states or brutally exploit the occupied territories. Even though many treatments of British strategy after the war have criticized Harris for failing to accept American doctrine and thereby concentrate almost exclusively on synthetic fuel and transportation targets, a strategy that ultimately paralyzed the German economic and military system, NARA 342-FH-3A22119-57297AC this criticism is based largely on a misunderstanding.17 The aggregate reduction of German cities eroded the overall output of a wide range of dual-use commodities needed for every aspect of the economy including synthetic fuel. The wide dispersal of thousands of small, medium and large firms throughout cities such as Berlin meant that only area bombing acknowledged the actual dimensions and nature of modern industrial economies. https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss1/28 4 Haller: Destroying Hitler’s Berghof
In many ways, especially when it after Harris switched to operations inflicting prohibitive casualties in is considered that the Germans on the command justified as necessary the hundreds of thousands.23 In the ground did not often perceive for tactical support of the ground April, Harris ignored Churchill’s of clear differences between area forces. Aircrew released their request to stand down and instead and precision bombing,18 the air bombs over Leipzig on 10 April, pushed strongly for the destruction of marshal’s strategy was neither wrong Nuremberg and Bayreuth on 11 Potsdam (along with Berchtesgaden) nor misguided. The image of Bomber April and Potsdam on 15 April. at the Air Commanders Conference Command suffered in part because The Dresden-Leipzig-Halle and on 12 April. Field Marshal Bernard of the organization’s effectiveness Halle-Nuremberg rail lines, Harris Montgomery, the Deputy Supreme against an industrial infrastructure claimed, were critically important for Commander, expressed doubts that could not easily be separated into the movement of men and material. that the marshalling yards and military and civilian components.19 The choice of Potsdam, however, barracks of either city constituted Bomber Command’s target shows that these selections permitted important targets of any real value selection during April demonstrated the continuation of orthodox area at that point in the war. In any a spirit of business as usual. bombing strategy under the cloak of case, the field marshal also feared Operations during the initial week tactical requirements. The Potsdam that the bombing of targets along of that month flattened cities such raid was more indicative of Harris’ the Soviet line of advance might as Nordhausen. Harris officially stubborn faith in air power as a now carry serious political and proclaimed the need to dislocate decisive weapon owing to his military repercussions. Pressing the enemy political apparatus by wartime obsession with the levelling tactical concerns, Harris convinced destroying administrative buildings of the Berlin region as a way to knock a reluctant Portal to authorize the and to weaken military effectiveness Germany out of the war – the so- operation. The destruction of Potsdam by torching barracks. Due to called elusive “knockout blow.”21 that followed, notable for the loss of poor bombing accuracy despite The Potsdam raid, the last of over the baroque “Garnisonkirche” and significantly improved capabilities, 300 attacks against the capital and not the interdiction of German traffic, most of the buildings targeted surrounding area during the war, resulted in the suspension of these survived unscathed and a majority attempted to vindicate his strategic kinds of operations a day later.24 From of the bombs fell on residential outlook that the “wiping out” of Churchill’s perspective, the bombing areas instead.20 Sadly, concentration German cities was “an end in itself.”22 of Potsdam demonstrated yet another camp inmates working at the Dora Harris had sponsored a number act of unwarranted destruction. He underground facilities producing V-2s of large operations that aimed at asked: “What was the point of going were also killed. While a legitimate levelling Berlin and its suburbs, and blowing down Potsdam.”25 military target, the bombing of Germany’s largest urban area, and Instead of recognizing that these Nordhausen, which was occupied shortly thereafter, indicated a strong disregard for political concerns by Bomber Command. Politicians could hardly understand any need to further dislocate a disintegrating enemy. In any case, the kinds of buildings targeted were needed by the future occupation authorities in order to house military personnel. Since strategic operations were NARA 342-FH-3A22287-121809AC suspended that week for precisely this reason, it was also apparent that Harris unknowingly worked against future Allied interests. Although for different reasons, other cities fared equally poorly
Potsdam as it appeared after the war. Photograph taken in August 1945.
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011 9 5 Canadian Military History, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 2
kinds of raids might work against the southern Germany on 16 April and could throw 1,609 bombers against image of Bomber Command, Harris Leipzig was captured three days Germany – including 353 Halifaxes, turned his attention to Berchtesgaden later. Resistance in the Ruhr pocket 1,087 Lancasters and 203 Mosquitos. and the Berghof. dissolved and the commanding Almost one-quarter of this strength officer, Field Marshal Walter Model, would participate in the Berghof perhaps thinking of his complicity operation.27 German air opposition The Decision to Bomb in atrocities on the eastern front or had also virtually collapsed. German the Obersalzberg in terms of accepted behaviour for piston-engine aircraft ceased a man of his rank, shot himself in operations against the western Allies id-April witnessed the effective the head on 21 April. Area bombing after a last desperate effort on 7 April. Mcollapse of German resistance. operations against cities that would Prodded forward by the “strains of Soviet forces breached the Oder almost certainly be captured within martial music over the radio,” 120 River and surrounded Berlin by 25 days therefore hardly made any sense German aircraft intercepted American April. The Anglo-American advance at all. If operations had aimed instead bomber formations and “attempted a into Germany helps illustrate a clear at fulfilling the SHAEF demand to mass suicide ramming operation problem concerning the area bombing stop the retreating Germans by the at immense expense.” Thereafter, of Nordhausen, Leipzig or Potsdam. tactical application of air power, what remained of the Luftwaffe was On 7 March, the Western power’s excessive damage could have been ordered to face the Soviet advance armies had crossed the Rhine in force. mitigated.26 and only 200 jet fighters were left to Twenty-one German divisions were In any case, the bombers operated fend off over 9,000 Anglo-American bypassed and encircled in the Ruhr. under conditions vastly different to heavy bombers alone.28 By 11 April, infantry and armour those of 1943 or even 1944. In the war’s These thousands of bombers were had penetrated as far as Magdeburg final months, the daily availability of unleashed against communications only 60 miles from Berlin. American bomber aircraft reached the highest under near perfect conditions with soldiers reached Nuremberg deep in levels of the war. Bomber Command experienced aircrews that now had
An aerial view of Hitler’s retreat, four miles east of the railyards in the town of Berchtesgaden. This photo was taken in February 1945 before the area was bombed. 1: The Wachenfels or Berghof, Hitler’s housing complex; 2: SS Barracks; 3: the Platterhof hotel; 4: Martin Bormann’s house.
2 NARA 342-FH-3A19415A-56347AC
4
3
1
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss1/210 6 Haller: Destroying Hitler’s Berghof
the technological capacities of hitting mountains. An initially unwilling Redoubt,” the RAF Italian campaign with exceptional accuracy. US Eighth Hitler had ordered the creation of narrative records, “retaining, at any Air Force flew 3,946 sorties against an alpine fortress in mid-March rate for a time, the food-producing transportation targets over the 10- 1945. The Berghof had access to a and industrial area of Northern day period starting on 16 April. communications centre equal to those Italy.” The redoubt would have a Bomber Command contributed with bordering Berlin Zossen. Hitler’s perimeter of approximately 400 miles 622 sorties. Of course, the list of even frequent visits to the Berghof had with Berchtesgaden acting as the these tactical targets shrank by the demanded extensive development “nerve centre.” The advantages of hour. The contracting Reich squeezed to enable communication between Allied air superiority, it was pointed what remained of rail movement the dictator and his armies. German out, would have been lost in the into an increasingly small area. labourers worked for several mountains and Allied attempts to Much of this traffic was focused on weeks to expand the fortifications take control of the Alps would have Munich and Salzburg. The number around Hitler’s resort and stockpile carried the risk of significant losses.33 of locomotives operating in the armaments, ammunition and food. On 21 March, the German region doubled under increasingly The inner core of the Nazi party Chief of the Air Staff General oppressive conditions. The trains expected Hitler to leave the capital Koller transferred elements of his simply had nowhere else to go prior to Soviet encirclement.30 Hitler, staff to both Berchtesgaden and after American bombers struck the however, never seriously entertained Thumersbach near Zell am See in marshalling yards of Regensburg, the redoubt concept. The dictator Austria. Ritter von Greim, Hermann Dresden, Munich and Salzburg. had decided to stand or fall in Berlin. Göring and approximately 90 officers Railway lines were cut, rolling stock Party Secretary Martin Bormann later surrendered to the Americans was damaged and bridges were summed up Hitler’s viewpoint at Thumersbach.34 This transfer of brought down or made impassable. with the observation that any south Luftwaffe staff to Berchtesgaden, Mustering all of the skills developed German military defence could not seemed to RAF analysts to foreshadow during the war, including feint attacks survive the capitulation of Berlin the establishment of a redoubt. and window and mandrel screens, for long. The factories of the capital Considering that the German military Bomber Command contributed with were responsible for a significant had nowhere else to go and that additional strikes against the cities percentage of overall armament Berchtesgaden’s infrastructure of Pilsen, Schwandorf, Cham and production. Hitler decided to remain already made the area the natural Komothau. The southern German in the German capital to fortify the replacement headquarters for Zossen, infrastructure could no longer cope willpower of the few men and boys RAF concerns regarding a redoubt with the weight of traffic and enemy left to fight his last battle.31 On 22 took on skewed – almost wishful ordnance. A 14,000-car jam near April, he announced that he would – thinking. They even disregarded Munich developed that was not stay in Berlin.32 radio broadcasts that announced cleared until June 1945.29 In any case, the Allied fear of an Hitler’s firm determination to hold It could be argued that the 25 Alpine redoubt was partly built on Berlin against the Soviet advance.35 April raid against Berchtesgaden was the hard fighting experienced in the Even though the American ostensibly part of the same tactical mountains and hills of Italy and the OSS had initially helped raise the operations. However, since the fact that the enemy’s forces from all spectre of an Alpine Redoubt, the city represented the end of the rail fronts seemed to be headed towards Americans opposed the bombing line, with traffic travelling through the Alps. A document from the of Berchtesgaden and did not share Salzburg instead, this hypothesis Luftwaffe operations staff dated 27 the views expressed by Harris.36 lacks credibility. The matter of April 1945 later appeared to confirm The bunker systems on the the “Alpine Redoubt” represents these fears. The report advocated Obersalzberg were cut deeply into another and more complicated the creation of a “final bulwark of the mountainside. Similar raids on issue. A number of authorities fanatical resistance.” The Luftwaffe Monte Cassino in Italy and especially such as the American Office of High Command or OKL called for Caen in Normandy had furthermore Strategic Services were convinced the area to be sealed off, the transfer already demonstrated the limitations by Nazi propaganda that fed their of the maximum possible quantities of air power. The destruction of analysts’ own assumptions that the of military supplies, the creation of Caen on 7 July 1944 reduced the city German high command intended industrial plant to supply the soldiers, to more easily defensible rubble; to concentrate what remained of and even the creation of airfields. Max Hastings points out that “this their armies in the Alps in order “They were in a position to withdraw action came to be regarded as one to wage a desperate defence in the straight into the southern face of the of the most futile air attacks of the
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011 11 7 Canadian Military History, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 2
war.”37 Bomber Command failed to offer evidence concerning how the destruction of Hitler’s house or even the railway station would hinder the erection of a defensive perimeter. In terms of the journalistic
accounts issued after the raid, it PL 144281 CFJIC is painfully obvious that none of Bomber Command’s stated aims have the slightest credibility. Regarding the tactical neutralization of enemy communications, Berchtesgaden represented the end of a minor railway line and perhaps one of the most insignificant rail targets left in the Reich. In terms of any effort at decapitating the Nazi state, all available evidence indicated that Hitler remained in Berlin on the other side of Germany. It is furthermore unclear how Harris thought even the largest bombs could cut into the mountain in order to either kill top Nazi or military officials or even destroy valuable infrastructure. The RAF’s final mission clearly must have been formulated with something else in mind.
A strike photo taken during the Royal Air Force attack on the island of Wangerooge on 25 April 1945. Two aircraft, a Halifax above and a Lancaster underneath, cross the The Obersalzberg Raid target area with bomb doors open, while explosions obscure the ground below.
omber Command engaged in Btwo major operations on 25 April The Obersalzberg raid was two miles east of Berchtesgaden, 1945. In addition to bombing Hitler’s different. The Lancasters struck the target area contained Hitler’s alpine retreat, the heavy bombers two primary targets that had no residence as well as those of other were sent on a tactical mission in defensive purpose or capability. Nazi officials, a hospital, a garage support of the ground forces. The The first British target was the and barracks for the SS guards. The target was the island of Wangerooge Kehlsteinhaus. Referred to by the Berghof itself measured roughly 837 near Bremen. The British had learned Allies as the “Eagle’s Nest,” it was a by 380 metres.39 at Antwerp that coastal artillery chalet-style pavilion on a 1800-metre Aircraft unable to bomb Hitler’s could interfere with shipping and peak with a spectacular view built alpine retreat were ordered to keep port facilities closed. British for Hitler to entertain dignitaries release their bombs over a number troops had just reached Bremen and and guests. The small building of secondary targets including the required the large port installations to represented a real test of British bridges in Salzburg. In accordance take pressure off of Antwerp. A total capabilities. Oboe, the British aerial with SHAEF orders, that major of 308 Halifaxes, 158 Lancasters and blind bombing targeting system, city represented the focal point 16 Mosquitos exploited clear weather, had an error radius of roughly 100 of a series of tactically-oriented flat terrain and the proximity of metres. Hitting something this small bombing raids. The Americans also the targets to the shoreline, which depended on a bit of luck. The second bombed communications targets in simplified aiming, to saturate the target was considerably larger. The Traunstein, Reichenhall, Salzburg, coastal artillery emplacements with Wachenfels or Berghof, Hitler’s Hallein, and Freilasing – all within explosives. Six aircraft were lost but housing complex, sat on the rim of close proximity to the Obersalzberg. the raid was hailed a success.38 the village of Obersalzberg. Located These strikes resulted in over 300 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss1/212 8 Haller: Destroying Hitler’s Berghof
civilian deaths and caused significant the 200 operational fighters available diary records that the bombing was damage to rail stations, hospitals to the Luftwaffe. Fighters were not “accurate and effective” and that only and infrastructure such as gasworks. scrambled, and the small number two Lancasters were lost.42 Bomber Command therefore seemed of German jet fighters on patrol It is necessary to examine this dry once again destined to participate on failed to intercept the bombers. comment more closely. First of all, the fringes of an American operation Flying at roughly 320 kilometres per most of the squadrons involved in the that made far more military sense.40 hour, the mass of aircraft headed two operations flew their last sorties. Bomber Command sent 359 towards Paris, flying over friendly All combat deaths during the final Lancasters from 22 squadrons to add territory, and then turned towards days of a conflict somehow appear Hitler to the long list of “bombed Germany. The bombers reached the the most tragic. The first Lancaster out” Germans – those who lost their target between 0900 and 1000 hours. was manned by aircrew from the homes and were forced into shelters. Because of the shrinking size of the Australian No.460 Squadron. The The aircrews were composed of an Reich, the time spent over enemy squadron itself was believed to have international group of 2,529 men territory in range of flak batteries was dropped the greatest tonnage of from England, Australia, Rhodesia, brief. The weather conditions over bombs of any in Bomber Command, Canada and Poland. The operational the target appeared equally positive. or roughly 24,000 tons, during the experience of these men ranged Only minimal amounts of snow and war. It had also suffered some of the from old hands to those flying their mist on the ground obscured the highest loss rates; 169 Wellingtons first mission. Another 16 Mosquitos Obersalzberg. The Obersalzberg and Lancasters failed to return home. accompanied the “heavies” to assist anti-aircraft artillery defences were This particular aircraft, on its first the raid by guiding the Lancasters onto relatively light considering the mission, was seriously damaged by the target using Oboe. Furthermore, political importance of the area. flak . Engine power was cut. In the a significant number of fighters were Bomber Command recorded only attempt to leave the aircraft, one of the also ordered to protect the bomber minor but accurate anti-aircraft men’s parachutes opened inside the streams from the now slight danger fire. A large number of bombs were aircraft. The pilot remained at his post of interdiction by German fighters. therefore dropped onto the two and executed a “dead-stick” landing Aircraft from 13 squadrons of RAF targets under good conditions. About to save the trapped man’s life. The Fighter Command and 98 Mustangs 1,232 tons of ordnance fell on the plane crash-landed near Traunstein of the US Eighth Air Force flew as Obersalzberg. This load included about 50 kilometres northwest of escorts.41 the last six-ton “Tallboys” of the Berchtesgaden. Fortunate not to The bomber crews could expect war dropped by 16 Lancasters of 617 suffer any casualties, the airmen near-ideal conditions when they took Squadron. The bombers then turned were captured and moved to various off from 19 different bases in England towards Belgium and returned prisoner of war camps. The speed of on the morning of 25 April. The escort largely unmolested to England the Allied advance meant that they fighters themselves out-numbered by 1200 to 1400 hours. The war were soon liberated. Several men were freed within four days.43 The other Lancaster’s story The Kehlsteinhaus, also known as Hitler’s “Eagle’s Nest,” sits atop an 1800 metre peak was less fortunate. Several aircraft in the Obersaltzberg. It was a prime target in the 25 April raid but emerged unscathed. were moderately damaged by the German guns and yet continued back to England. Another aircraft was diverted to Paris as a precaution. But German flak destroyed a bomber from No.619 Squadron. The crew was relatively experienced by the standards of the day. They had participated in a number of operations beginning in December 1944. These included raids against NARA 342-FH-3A20295-164760AC such cities as Heilbronn and Politz in Germany. They also participated in the disastrous 5 January 1945 raid against the French coastal city of Royan that killed between 500 and
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011 13 9 Canadian Military History, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 2
These two photos were taken during the RAF raid on Berchtesgaden on 25 April 1945. In the photo on the left, taken early in the raid, a large cloud of smoke caused by the attack is visible in the bottom right corner; Hitler’s Berghof is indicated by a black arrow. The second photo, taken later in the raid shows evidence of the damage caused by the raid including a number of bombs strikes directly on Hitler’s Berghof (see the wings of the house to the left and right of the white arrow.) Canadian War Museum 19810210-019 & -020 Museum 19810210-019 Canadian War
800 French civilians. Shot down by aircraft. Flight Lieutenant John Huge bomb craters circled the target. the German antiaircraft defences, the Sampson, who flew a Mosquito IX Hitler’s residence, considering the plane hit the earth near Hallein about of No.105 Squadron, stated that weight of bombs, fared relatively 10 kilometres north of Berchtesgaden. none of the Oboe marking aircraft well. Photo reconnaissance on 26 Four airmen died. Three survived succeeded on 25 April. Subsequent April showed that the Berghof was and were taken prisoner. Like their analysis established that the “not so seriously damaged” and compatriots, they were soon freed mountains blocked the release signal only three hits were recorded. The and returned to England in May at the critical moment even though attack was more effective against the 1945.44 the British aircraft flew at close to army barracks and the surrounding 12,000 metres altitude. Furthermore, buildings. The initial report noted that photographs taken by the Lancaster “there is very heavy damage to huts in The Raid’s Results crews indicate that intense smoke the camp for Czech workers and in the quickly obscured the targets. The settlement for evacuated children.” hat did the Obersalzberg raid marking of Hitler’s “Eagle’s Nest” German assessments corroborate Wachieve? A lone German Arado and residence proved difficult.45 the first British impressions. The 234 jet reconnaissance bomber was The initial reports pointed out German damage report added that
intercepted by P-51s and destroyed. that the Lancasters had generally Bormann and Göring’s houses were NARA 342-FH-3A20796-57466AC The pilot successfully bailed out and missed their targets. The “Eagle’s destroyed, that the SS barracks survived. The pathfinders, however, Nest” escaped completely unscathed. were heavily damaged, but that the faced an obstacle more daunting Not even the “Tallboys” managed to Berghof and Platterhof Hotel were than fighter harassment. Nature itself compensate for the bombing accuracy only damaged.46 stood in the way of the specialist needed to hit such a small building.
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss1/214 10 Haller: Destroying Hitler’s Berghof
Subsequent British reports made heavy damage when one medium the amended damage reports do not greater claims. “The Lancasters block was destroyed, another was really alter the overall impression obtained three direct hits on the wrecked by a direct hit, and a third that little of substance was achieved. chalet,” an Air Ministry Bulletin had half of its top story blown off. The “Eagle’s Nest” escaped damage dated 27 April announced, and The residence of Spahn, head of altogether. The Berghof was later added that “both wings have been SS administration, was partially destroyed by SS guards – who set severely damaged.”47 An intelligence destroyed, and administration light to the residence and vacated summary went even further: headquarters and air raid control the area. It should also be noted center was smoking furiously at time that less spectacular results such it can be seen that the Wachenfels, the of photography. The main control as the destruction of a “settlement Fuhrer’s personal residence, suffered center for guarding Obersalzberg for evacuated children” vanished three direct hits. Part of the main was also hit.48 from the summary. Nor were any building was destroyed, and both casualties mentioned. wings were very seriously damaged. The latter report’s emphasis German civilian and military All important buildings as well as on the SS barracks, not part of the losses on the ground were light. numerous unidentified buildings primary target set, deflected attention The bunkers of Berchtesgaden in the target area were affected. The from the fact that the mission’s two and the Obersalzberg, as already SS barracks suffered particularly main targets still stood. In any case, noted, had been strengthened as
An American P-47 Thunderbolt passes low over Hitler’s Berghof shortly after the end of the war when it became a popular sight- seeing destination (dozens of US soldiers are visible among the ruins). It was one of the main targets of the 25 April raid, but it was not seriously damaged. Most of the damage seen below was caused by SS troops who torched the house before they left. Note the large bomb crater behind the house caused by the impact of a 12,000 pound Tallboy bomb. NARA 342-FH-3A20796-57466AC
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011 15 11 Canadian Military History, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 2
part of the general reaction to the growing intensity of the Combined Bomber Offensive in 1943. Martin Bormann had personally directed the construction of air raid shelters and had tunnel systems cut deep into the mountain side. These tunnels linked Hitler’s bunker with the military headquarters and the local anti- aircraft defences and communications. NARA 342-FH-3A20797-57509AC These systems represented some of the most modern of the Nazi state. The party functionaries had palatial accommodations that were well-serviced by electrical power, heating and ventilation systems. They were even hardened against chemical weapons and the tunnel openings were protected by a series of machine gun nests manned by the SS. These bunkers and tunnel systems successfully protected the inhabitants of the Obersalzberg and Berchtesgaden in April 1945. Even though the damage to some of the village surface dwellings was extensive, the bunkers and tunnels – and the complex’s defensive capabilities – were largely intact. Only 31 people were killed. The bombing did convince those officials who had congregated in the Obersalzberg region to move deeper into the Austrian Tyrol. Hermann Göring, stripped of all his titles and offices by Hitler, emerged from his bunker a few days later, left the vicinity and then surrendered to the Americans on a country road. When the US 3rd Infantry Division entered into the Berchtesgaden NARA 342-FH-3A20803-B58600AC area, they found neither defiant German soldiers nor Nazi officials. A timed bomb exploded in one of the municipal offices and wounded several American soldiers, but the “Alpine Redoubt” had been a myth.49 The Allied press reports that followed the raid revealed another dimension to the bombing operation. Nowhere was the political nature of These two photo show Hitler’s Berghof after the war. Most of the damage was caused by the SS Guards after the war, but at the bottom of the top photo is the crater from one the Obersalzberg operation more of the Tallboy bombs dropped on 25 April. In the bottom photo, the collapsed portion of apparent than in the headlines. “RAF the wing of the building in the foreground was also caused by a bomb strike on 25 April. https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss1/216 12 Haller: Destroying Hitler’s Berghof
Lancasters blew to pieces Hitler’s shortages and that industry could still dropping almost 2.5 million tons of Chalet at Berchtesgaden today manufacture sufficient arms to resist bombs on tautly-stretched industrial with a direct hit by a 12,000-pound the Allies until spring 1946.53 Air systems and war-weary urban earthquake bomb,” journalists all power, seen from this perspective, populations would not seriously over the western world celebrated, shortened the war by several years. weaken them. Germany and Japan “and rained the mammoth bombs Richard Overy points out: had no special immunity…The final down on his ‘Eagle’s Nest’ fortress victory of the bombers in 1944 was, atop Kehlstein Mountain five miles There has always seemed something Speer concluded, ‘the greatest lost from the chalet.”50 Additional articles fundamentally implausible about the battle on the German side ...’. For with titles such as “Berchtesgaden contention of bombing’s critics that all the arguments over the morality Flattened” celebrated the destruction of a major Nazi symbol. Journalists Below: This photo, taken looking south, shows the ruins of the SS Barracks, heavily emphasized the special historical role damaged in the 25 April raid, on the right, and the Platterhof Hotel garage on the left. of the Berghof and the importance Bottom: The Platterhof hotel was also significantly damaged in the air raid. After the of its ruin. At a time when the war, the US Army occupied the site and after substantial repairs, the Platterhof was Soviets engaged in fierce street reopened as the Hotel General Walker. fighting and closed in on Hitler in the German capital, the bombing of the Obersalzberg symbolized the western powers partnership with the Soviet in the final destruction of Nazism and its leader. Berchtesgaden, the articles stated, was an alternate Nazi capital and “the last spot over which the swastika will fly.”51 Such blatant use of hyperbole could not disguise the fact that Hitler
had rejected the idea of a final stand NARA 342-FH-3A20802-A58600AC in the Alps. As a symbol of Allied victory, any euphoria caused by the supposed destruction of Hitler’s house was therefore extremely short- lived. The raid faded from public memory. General Eisenhower later even attributed the entire bombing operation to the US Eight Air Force.52 Harris himself failed to mention the raid in his memoirs. For obvious reasons, he was far more interested in pointing out comments by the Nazi Armaments Minister Albert Speer concerning the effectiveness of aerial bombing in reducing industrial output. Speer argued that the spectacular advances of Allied ground forces in 1944 would not have prevented the armaments industry
from supplying German forces for NARA 342-FH-3A20801-58600AC over a year. A Speer memorandum composed in September 1944 speculated that the shrinking land mass of the Reich would not soon lead to serious raw materials
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011 17 13 Canadian Military History, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 2
or operational effectiveness of the German soldiers.57 These arguments in the arsenal against Nazism. He bombing campaigns, the air offensive demonstrate the decisive impact of promoted the open presentation was one of the decisive elements in both strategic and tactical bombing of his strategy that encouraged the Allied victory. operating in a murky world between “deliberate” devastation of civilian the strategic and operational levels of targets.61 Worse still, instead of Even historians who downplay war. The destruction of bridges, for standing down in April, Harris Bomber Command’s contribution, example, hurt both industry and the continued along a path that threatened such as Robert Pape, point out ability to move men and material to to frustrate the future administration that the bombers choked German the front. This duality lay at the heart of a defeated Germany. Bomber communications and the flow of of strategic bombing doctrine and it is Command exhibited a degree of commodities such as oil. “From manifestly wrong to focus exclusively “civil-military disconnect” that World War I until the 1980s,” Pape on tactical input. Such tendencies, was bound to undermine positive concludes, “[bombers] were most it can be argued, reflexively call perceptions of its contribution. effective in support of ground power, Speer’s conclusion that the targeting Those who toured Germany serving as the ‘hammer’ to ground of industrial targets “caused the after the war, such as the economist power’s ‘anvil,’ with the anvil usually breakdown of the German armaments Kenneth Galbraith, wrote that doing most of the work.”54 It should industry” into question.58 German cities were a “sickening be pointed out that Pape and others sight.”62 A British officer called fall victim to a statistical chimera. them “Pompeiis petrified by the Even though basic logic would Conclusion volcano of modern war.”63 American recognize that the sheer scale of correspondent William Shirer, on the bombing offensive destroyed he suppression of German visiting Nuremberg at the end of the any German ability to hold the line Tindustrial output cost Bomber war, wrote in his diary: indefinitely,55 it is misplaced to Command 44.4 percent of their airmen count the number of tanks or guns – the highest of any Allied service.59 It is gone! The lovely medieval town actually destroyed on the battlefield The bombing of the Obersalzberg behind the moat is utterly destroyed. and measure this total against those could have represented the crowning It is a vast heap of rubble, beyond weapons systems neutralized by achievement of Harris’ difficult and description, and beyond hope of strategic airpower alone. The basic expensive war against Nazism. His rebuilding. As the prosaic U.S. army targets of strategic bombing such as policies had shortened the war by puts it, Nuremberg is ‘91 percent manufactured output and especially several years. Why, then, was Bomber dead.’ The old town, I should say, morale are difficult to define and Command robbed of a campaign the old Nuremberg of Duerer and therefore even harder to judge.56 medal and Harris denied a peerage Hans Sachs and the Meistersingers The literature creates a strong after 1945? Why was the destruction is 99 percent ‘dead.’64 case that the collapse of German of Hitler’s mountain retreat ignored? communications stands as the This article demonstrates that The bombing campaign was strongest argument for bombing Harris’s dismissal of concerns about now interpreted as a complicating effectiveness. The interference with postwar recovery set strategic bombing factor in the goal of global prosperity. rail traffic during late 1944 and at odds with pragmatic politicians British economic experts claimed early 1945 played the greatest role like Churchill. Bomber Command’s in November 1945 that Bomber of any of the services in quickening attack on urban infrastructure, as Command had returned the German the speed of German collapse. The pointed out, represented a rational economy “back to the beginnings of historiography is clear that the response to the realities of modern industrialisation” and that recovery interdiction of communications armaments production. On the would be difficult and expensive.65 restricted the flow of coal and that other hand, the American policy of While the German “Pompeiis” this in turn led to systemic shortfalls “precision bombing” was premised were potent symbols of strategic air in output at essential fixed nitrogen on an assumption that military power, they also became linked to installations after they had used and civilian sectors were clearly postwar hardship and the long road up their stockpiled coal. As these divisible and “create[d] the illusion to recovery. From the perspective of reserves were depleted, and the Allies of good bombing against bad.”60 politicians such as Churchill, the final closed the ring around Germany, Unlike the Americans, Harris failed bombing raids of the war appeared serious fuel and explosives shortages to understand that the moral high counterproductive in terms of the hampered the efforts of frontline ground represented a strong weapon coming occupation of Germany and
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss1/218 14 Haller: Destroying Hitler’s Berghof
the overwhelmingly more important with Hitler’s Last Foray,” Central European when?,” Journal of Strategic Studies 18, History 41 (2008), pp.71-92 (p.76). no.1, 1995, pp.145-74.. task of domestic reconstruction. 7. Charles Portal, “Area Bombing: Note 18. Joerg Friedrich, Der Brand. Deutschland im Harris failed to realize that each by Chief of the Air Staff“ in David L. Bombenkrieg 1940-1945 (Berlin: Ullstein, additional raid added to mounting Bashow, No Prouder Place: Canadians and 2002), p.176. the Bomber Command Experience 1939- 19. Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, worries about the challenges of 1945 (Vanwell Publishing Limited: St. The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany German reconstruction and the Catharines, Ontario, 2005) pp.427-429. 1939-1945, Volume II: Endeavour, Part 4 attacks were increasingly viewed 8. Alec Cairncross, The Price of War: British (London: HMSO, 1961), pp.214 and 261. Policy on German Reparations, 1941-1949 20. “The Liberation of North West Europe, in a negative light. Since Churchill (New York: Blackwell, 1986) pp.49- Volume V: From the Rhine to the Baltic 1 had expressed real worries that were 52 and Llewellyn Woodward, British October 1944 - 8 May 1945, Air Historical reflected in military decision-making Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Branch/II/117/6 (E),” p.253, CHOM Series: History of the Second World War Library. at the highest levels, the success (London: H.M.S.O., 1976), vol. 5, p.216. 21. Peter William Grey, “The Strategic of the strategic bombing carried 9. Winston S. Churchill, “27 February 1945,” Leadership and Direction of the Royal significant negative repercussions in Robert Rhodes James, ed.öö, Winston S. Air Force Strategic Air Offensive against Churchill: His Complete Speeches 1897-1963, Germany from Inception to 1945“ expressed in the postwar political vol. 7: 1943-1949 (London: Chelsea House (University of Birmingham, 2009), p.247. unwillingness to openly reward the Publishers), p.7111. 22. “It is surely obvious that children, invalids decisive contribution of strategic 10. Winston S. Churchill, General Ismay and old people who are economically for COS Committee, 28 March 1945, in unproductive but must nevertheless air power. Viewed in this way, Bashow, No Prouder Place, p.410. consume food and other necessaries are the bombing of Hitler’s mountain 11. Henry Probert, Bomber Harris: His Life and a handicap to the German war effort and Times (Stoddard: Toronto, 2001), p.322. it would therefore be sheer waste of effort worked against Bomber Command 12 Ibid., pp.321-322 and Bashow, No Prouder to attack them...The German economic and vanished from the historical Place, p.410. system, which I am instructed by my narrative. 13. Strategic bombing strikes “fixed military, directive to destroy, includes workers, industrial or civilian targets in and near houses, and public utilities, and it is political or economic centers…[to] pursue therefore meaningless to claim that the either a punishment strategy by harming wiping out of German cities is “not an Notes enemy civilians in order to lower their end in itself...“ quoted in Grey, “Strategic morale and motivate them to force their Leadership and Direction,“ p.278. governments to end the war, or a denial 23. See the description of Operation 1. Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 1936-1945: Nemesis strategy, by damaging the opponent’s Thunderclap in Frederick Taylor, Dresden: (London: Penguin Books, 2000) p.805. war economy to the point that sufficient Tuesday 13 February 1945 (Bloomsbury: 2. “Army Tie Marked by Moscow Guns,“ production cannot be maintained to London, 2005). New York Times, 28 April 1945, p.3. continue the war successfully”. Robert 24. DSC/TS 100/9 Pt. 5 Encl. 33A Para. 12 3. Harry S. Truman, “President Truman‘s A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and in “Liberation of North West Europe, Address to the Opening Session of United Coercion in War (Cornell University Press: Volume V,” p.253. Nations Conference on International New York, 1996), p.46. 25. Bashow, No Prouder Place, p.429. Organization at San Francisco,“ 25 April 14. Letter Portal to Arnold, 6 April 1945 26. “The Liberation of North West Europe, 1945, US Department of State, Department (AHB/ID4/23 (B)) and P.M‘s Directive, Volume V,” p.254. of State Bulletins, vol. XIII (Washington: in Air Historical Branch 1 Air Ministry, 27. Webster and Frankland, Strategic Air USGPO, 1945) pp.596-607. “The Second World War 1939-1945 Royal Offensive, vol. IV, appendix 39: Average 4. “Hitler’s Chalet Wrecked,” The Times, 26 Air Force Narrative The Italian Campaign Daily availability in Bomber Command of April 1945. 1943-1945 Volume II: Operations June aircraft and aircraft with crews at selected 5. Even the most important examinations 1944 – May 1945 – Air 10710, Book dates 1930-1945, p.428. of the Combined Bomber Offensive leave 940-544,” , p.324, College Hall Library 28. Air Ministry (ACAS), “The Rise and Fall out the raid in its entirety or mention Cranwell [Hearafter CHOM library]. of the German Air Force (1933 to 1945),” it briefly. Alan J. Levine, The Strategic 15. The routine weekly conference at SHAEF, Air Ministry Pamphlet No. 248 (1947), Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945 (Westport, HQ then at Reims DSC/TS.100/9, Pt. V, 2006, pp.388-391, CHOM Library. CT: Praeger Publishers, 1992); Max Encl.26a. (AHB/IIS/112/1/100/9 (E) in 29. “The Liberation of North West Europe, Hastings, Bomber Command (London: Pan ibid.” pp.324 and 325. Volume V,” pp.254-255. Books, 1999), p.344; Richard J. Overy, 16. No.4 16 April 1945 (AHB/ID4/377), in 30. Hugh Trevor-Roper, The Goebbels Diaries - The Air War, 1939-1945 (New York: ibid., p.324. The Last Days (London: Pan Books, 1979), Stein and Day, 1980); John Terraine, A 17. It can, however, be argued that “the pp.213-214. Time for Courage: The Royal Air Force evidence suggests that the American 31. David Irving, Hitler’s War (London: Focal in the European War, 1939-1945 (New bombs ruined the oil industry and British Point Publications, 2001), pp.827-828. York: Macmillan Publishing Company, and American bombs flattened it and kept 32. Kershaw, Hitler, 1936-1945, p.810. 1985); Robin Neillands, The Bomber War: it flattened.“ Still, the debate concerning 33. Appendix 44: OKL/Luftwaffe Operations The Allied Air Offensive Against Nazi area and precision bombing continues. Staff, The National Redoubt, 27 April Germany (New York: Overlook Press, Williamson Murray, Strategy for Defeat: 1945, Air Historical Branch 1 Air Ministry, 2001) and Charles Webster and Noble The Luftwaffe, 1933-1945 (Maxwell Air “The Italian Campaign 1943-1945 Volume Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Force Base, Ala Air University Press, II,” pp.10-11. For confirmation of the Against Germany 1939-1945, vol. IV: 1983), p.276; Richard G. Davis, Bombing Redoubt plan, the narrative cites the OKL Annexes and Appendices, History of the the European Axis Powers : A Historical document and “German Strategy Brit. Second World War United Kingdom Digest of the Combined Bomber Offensive, Hist. Section C.M. ‘Blue Book’ Histories,” Military Series (London: HMSO, 1961). 1939-1945 (Maxwell Air Force Base, (AHB IIJ11/58/29) and Appreciation 6. Christina von Hodenberg, “Of German Alabama Air University Press, 2006), on the National Redoubt G-2 HQ Frauleins, Nazi Werewolves, and Iraqi p.571; W. Hays Parks, “‘Precision’ and 15th Army Gp., 18 Apl. 1945. (AHB/ Insurgents: The American Fascination ‘area’ bombing: Who did which, and IIJ11/58/29). Operation Instruction No. 3
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011 19 15 Canadian Military History, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 2
HQ 15th Army Gp., 12 Feb. 1945. (AHB/ 48. Extract, Air Intelligence Summary No. 78, (European War) (Washington: USGPO, IIJ11/58/24 (A), App.0-3).] in ibid., For Week Ending 6 May 1945, Naval and 30 September 1945), p.37; Alfred C. pp.255-256. Military, Obersalzberg Institute. Mierzejewski, The Collapse of the German 34. “Rise and Fall of the German Air Force,” 49. Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the War Economy, 1944–1945: Allied Air Power p.399. Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946, Army and the German National Railway (Chapel 35. “Despite Hamburg radio broadcasts Historical Series (Washington: Center of Hill: University of North Carolina Press, boasting that HItler was in Berlin Military History, United States Army, 1988), p.184 and Alfred C. Mierzejewski, commanding the defence of the toppling 1975). The Most Valuable Asset of the Third Reich: A capital, it was believed generally at 50. “Berchtesgaden House is Hit by Six- History of the German Railway System, 1920- Allied supreme headquarters that the Ton Bomb,“ London, 25 April 1945, 1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North fuehrer actually has long since fled to his Obersalzberg Institute. Carolina Press, 1999), vol. 2, pp.158-61. southern redoubt and probably now is at 51. “Berchtesgaden Flattened,” The Globe and 58. Interrogation of Albert Speer, former Berchtesgaden,“ “Hitler Fled Berlin Long Mail, 26 April 1945, pp.1-2. Reich Minister of Armaments and War Ago, Allies Say,“ Ottawa Citizen, 24 April 52. This oversight was probably related Production (18th July 1945), Webster and 1945, p.1. to the considerable American effort in Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive Against 36. Untitled Document, taken from the Fred the region on the same day. Dwight D. Germany , vol. IV, pp.378-395. Mueller-Romminger Collection, The Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (John 59. Middlebrook and Everitt, Bomber Obersalzberg Institut e.V., Berchtesgaden. Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, Command War Diaries, pp.700-701. [Hereafter Obersalzberg Institute] 1997), p.296. 60. Overy, Why the Allies Won , p.295. 37. Max Hastings, Overlord: D-Day and the 53. Interrogation of Albert Speer, former 61. Grey, “Strategic Leadership and Battle for Normandy 1944 (Pan Books, Reich Minister of Armaments and War Direction,“ p.278. London, 1999) pp.262-265. Production. 6th Session – 15:00-17:00 62. John K. Galbraith, A Life in Our Times 38. Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everitt, hours, 30th May 1945, Webster and (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981), p.200. eds., The Bomber Command War Diaries: Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive Against 63. Douglas Botting, From the Ruins of the An Operational Reference Book 1939-1945 Germany 1939-1945, vol. IV, pp.371-378. Reich: Germany 1945-1949 (Meridian: New (New York: Viking, 1985), pp.700-701. 54. Robert A. Pape, “The True Worth of Air York, 1985), p.34. 39. Target Information Sheet: Berchtesgaden, Power,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (March/ 64. Ibid., p.124. 5 October 1944, Obersalzberg Institute April 2004). 65. Hans Möller, Zur Vorgeschichte der deutschen 40. Ibid., and Schadenmeldung zu den 55. M. Kirby and R. Capey, “The Area Mark. Die 402 Währungsreformpläne 1945- Einfluegen am 25.4.1945, Obersalzberg Bombing of Germany in World War II: An 1948, Eine Dokumentation unter Mitwirkung Institute. Operational Research Perspective,“ The von Wolfram Kunze herausgegeben und 41. Middlebrook and Everitt, Bomber Journal of the Operational Research Society eingeleitet von Hans Möller (Basel: Kyklos- Command War Diaries, pp.700-701. 48, no. 7 (July 1997), p.674. Verlag, 1961), p.117. 42. “The Liberation of North West Europe, 56. Modern American air power doctrine Volume V”; Bomber Command War Diaries, offers the strong argument that “Victory pp.700-701. in war is not measured by casualties 43. For more information on the squadrons, inflicted, battles won or lost, or territory see ibid., pp.771-772 and 777-778 and occupied, but by whether or not political
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss1/220 16