2.1 Iraq Port Assessment

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2.1 Iraq Port Assessment Updated in Dec. 2017 by Capt. Wolf Lampe, Consultant seconded by BLG LOGISTICS, Bremen/Germany Iraq Port Assessment Iraq’s main port is Umm Qasr North Port. Additionally Umm Qasr South Port and – to a lesser degree - Al Maqal Port at Basra offer professional port services. Minor ports are present along the Shatt al Arab. These river ports were not assessed in recent years. The satellite image shows the river delta of Shatt al Arab. Dredging the Shatt al Arab estuary is inhibited by political reasons since 30 years – the border between Iraq and Iran is situated at mid-river – vessel’s max. draught is limited to 5 m. The access to Umm Qasr is maintained at a depth allowing max. vessel’s draught of 11 m. Pilots are stationed off the coast. Tidal range is 3,0 to 3,4m. Approaches to Basrah and Umm Qasr Page 1 4.4 Iraq Port and Waterways Company Contact List NOTE: The following comparison was provided by the private NAWAH Port Management (NPM) The comparison highlights the lead time differences between the Port of Basra and other alternative ports and borders of entries into Iraq. Al Maqal Port, BASRA (Iraq) UMM Qasr Port (Iraq) Page 2 Seaborne from UAE to Port: 3 days Sailing from UAE to Port: 2- 3 days Customs Clearance: minimum 3 days (note: depending on the commodity and the necessity of sampling and analysing food items 3-5 days average seemed more likely in 2017) Customs Clearance: minimum 3days Ground Transit to Basra: 1 day Ground Transit to Basra: Total Transit Time: 5-6 days 1 day Total Distance to Basra City Center: 0 km Total Transit Time: 6-11 days Total Distance to Basra City Center: 60 km AL SHUWAIK Port (Kuwait) MERSIN Port (Turkey) Sailing from UAE to Port: 2 days Sailing from UAE to Port: 12 days Customs Clearance: 4-6 days Customs clearance: 8-12 days · (2-3 days at AI Shuwaikh Port; (5-7 days at Mersin, Turkey; 2-3 days at Safwan Gate) Ground Transit to Basra: 1 day Total Transit Time: 7-9 days * 3-5 days at Zakho, Iraq) Ground Transit to Basra: 5-6 days Total Distance to Basra City Center: 168 km (2 days to Zakho border; Port OF AQABA (Jordan) 1 day transit to lrbil; Sailing from UAE to Port: 1 1 days 2-3 days to Basra) Customs Clearance: 4 days Ground Transit to Basra: 6-8 day Total Transit Time: 21-23 days * Total Transit Time: 25-30 days * Total Distance to Basra City Center: 1,442 km Total Distance to Basra City Center: 1,940 km * Total transit time may be longer due to unexpected border closures between countries Key port information can also be found at: http://www.maritime-database.com www.marinetraffic.com http://ports.com http://www.worldportsource.com/ http://directories.lloydslist.com/ Page 3.

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