Politics&Diplomacy

Federalism and Nationalism in Polish Eastern Policy

Timothy Snyder

As the European Union admits more and more states of the Timothy Snyder is Assistant Professor of former communist bloc, the eastern border of the Euro- History at Yale Univer- pean Union will overlap with a number of other very sity. His most recent book is The Reconstruction important divides: between more and less prosperous states, of Nations: Poland, , between western and eastern Christianity, between states , , 1569- with historically friendly ties with the United States and 1999. those without. Integration into the European Union will become far more than a metaphor, as its borders will func- tion like those of a sovereign state. Wh e r e will the European Union find its eastern policy, its Os t p o l i t i k ? During the Cold War, West Germany was the main so u r ce of eastern policy, for good reason. A divided Germany then marked the border of eastern and western Europe. Tod a y , Germany has been reunified, and soon the European Union will enlarge to include Germany’s eastern neighbors, most importantly Poland and Lithuania. The cold war lasted for two ge n e r ations; the new divide between eastern and western Europe promises to last at least as long. Poland and Lithuania will soon become, and long remain, the eastern marches of the European Union. Their ideas and initiatives are likely to guide whatever eastern policy the European Union devises. What exactly their inclinations will be, however, is far from clear. The eastern question persisted throughout modern Pol -

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ish and Lithuanian political history, The Union of Lublin. In the 1560s, from the founding moment of the Pol - the first important question about the ish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in st r u c t u r e of the Polish state arrived along 1569 to its collapse, from the re c re- with the golden age of Polish civilization ation of Poland and Lithuania in 1918 and statehood: How should Poland deal to the Second World War, and through with its eastern neighbors? Luckily, the the Cold War to modern-day Euro- middle nobility of the Grand Duchy of pean integration. Eastern policy has Lithuania, who sought to secure for been an uneasy mixture of two distinct themselves the rights already enjoyed by concepts: the creation of common their Polish peers, answered the question institutions with neighbors, which I for them by supporting union. That shall call federalism, and the incorpo- union was established at Lublin in 1569; ration of territory, which I shall call it was the final achievement of Polish King nationalism. In general, nationalism Zygmunt II, who was the last member of

The tension between nationalism and fe d e r alism was overcome perfectly only once, in a grand strategy formulated in the 1970s.

proved to be simpler but more risky, the Jagiellon dynasty. Upon his death, while federalist solutions were more Polish and Lithuanian nobles asserted complicated yet also more dura b l e . their right to elect his successor at the The tension between nationalism and Gr eat Confederation of in 1573. fe d e r alism was overcome perfectly only Although the words federalism and once, in a grand strategy formulated in nationalism were not used at the time, the 1970s that radically rei n t e r p re t e d the Lublin Union rep r esents the first nationalist and federalist legacies. This important attempt at deciding between st r ategy was based on the idea that Pol i s h whether to create common institutions i n t e rests demanded the creation of with eastern neighbors or incorporat e Lithuanian, Belarusian, and Ukrai n i a n them into Poland. The Lublin Union is nation-states. However, the success of quite properly rem e m b e r ed as an exam- that eastern strategy has made it red u n - ple of the first tendency, for the Gran d dant since its application after 1989 Duchy of Lithuania retained its own (along with other reforms) helped assure ad m i n i s t r ation, treasury, code of law, Poland’s (and Lithuania’s) accession to and army. However, the Lublin Union the European Union. also involved incorporation. The Pol i s h Once this integration is complete, king demanded, and received, the the entire eastern question will be southern provinces of the Grand Duchy posed anew, with different, and per- of Lithuania, known as Bratslav, Kyiv, haps higher, stakes. As this historical and . While Lithuania pre- realignment approaches, a review of served and developed its native institu- traditional Polish eastern problems and tions, Ukraine was wrenched from solutions is very much in order. Lithuania and added to Poland. It

[1 1 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs S N Y D E R Politics&Diplomacy became part of the Polish Kingdom, Cossacks. When the Cossacks were with no special rights. needed, higher numbers were allowed Th e re f o r e, there was a differen t i a t i o n and pay was sent. In this way, the incor- in policy between Lithuania and Ukrai n e po r ation of Ukraine by Poland sharp- from the very beginning. Instead of being ened the incipient conflict between two a separate political entity, as Lithuania native Ukrainian groups: the richest was and is, Ukraine became an undefined local boyars, who used Polish prac t i c e s addendum, more a space than a country. to become wealthy landowners, and the Even so, the connection to Po l a n d Cossacks, who grew in size thanks to revived and rejuvenated Ukrainian civi- peasant suffering but were never inte- lization. The formation of a political gr ated into the political system. This union with Poland led to great sociocul- tension escalated into a full-scale tu r al intermixing. Confronted with new Uk r ainian civil war in 1648 after the Polish religious thought and the achieve- provocation of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi. ments of Latin and Polish scholarship, After Khmel’nyts’kyi allied with Mus- the Ukranian Orthodox clergy launched a covy in 1654, his Cossacks helped Mus- brilliant Renaissance and Reformation, covy to make war on the Pol i s h - L i t h u a n - ch a r acterized by cosmopolitan education ian Commonwealth. The results were and religious tolerat i o n . 1 disastrous: nearly a third of the Com- However, every step Ukraine took monwealth’s inhabitants died in the war to w a r ds the Polish model of European and associated calamities; official rel i - civilization deepened the gaps between gious toleration was undermined by a Uk r ainian magnates and the rest of soci- new suspicion of non-Catholics; and the ety. Roman Catholicism and the Pol i s h Commonwealth itself began a fatal eco- language unified the Ukrainian and Pol - nomic and political decline. This first ish noblemen, but distanced Ukrai n i a n attempt at federalism had failed miser- noblemen from their own peasantry. ably. The internal Ukrainian tensions Meanwhile, Ukrainian peasants were ge n e r ated by the political union were too enserfed and impoverished as Polish and gr eat to sustain. From the experience of Jewish agents were brought in by the early modern Poland-Lithuania, it seems gr ain trade to organize the cultivation of that federations are inherently harder to Uk r aine’s fertile black earth. manage than policies of incorporat i o n . The Cossacks, Ukraine’s special caste This is all the more true in times of war, of free warriors, posed a special dilem- when the various parties concerned are ma. Although they helped Polish and mo r e likely to be absorbed by prospects Lithuanian knights defeat Sweden, of immediate gain and loss, and less Muscovy, and the Ottomans, the Pol - inclined to negotiate complicated com- ish-Lithuanian nobility took an promises. The complexity of federal ungenerous view of the Cossacks. solutions places them at an inherent dis- Although many Cossack officers were advantage to nationalist ones. themselves nobles, the rank and file we r e mainly of peasant origins. Since P ilsudski and Dmowski . Jo z e f noble landowners wished to keep the Pilsudski and Roman Dmowski, the two peasants on the land, they tried to lim- most important Polish politicians of the it the numbers of legal or “reg i s t e re d ” early twentieth century, articulated

Winter/Spring 2003 [1 1 3] F E D E R ALISM AND NAT I O NALISM IN POLISH EASTERN POLICY mutually exclusive ideas of Poland. Pil - tion collapsed, and was simply sudski was a federalist from the east, a in c o r p o r ated into Pol a n d . socialist of noble origin who imagined In attempting to build his federat i o n , Poland reborn in a federation with Pilsudski was unable to overcome his lack Lithuania. His Poland would be bound of local allies. Popular support would together by ancient traditions, the com- have helped, but the peasants and Jews of mon sense of the Polish-speaking elite of tr aditional Lithuania saw no special rea - whatever ethnic origin, and the generos- son why they should be governed from ity and effectiveness of a modern state. Warsaw. With time he might have made a Dmowski, a stonecutter’s son from cen- better case, but time is precisely what war tr al Poland, had an entirely differen t denied him. Most of all, he lacked the vision. He imagined a new Poland crea t - support of at home, many of whom ed from a modern Polish society. This recognized that every eastern enlarge- society was built from the Pol i s h - s p e a k - ment moved Poland to the political left, ing peasantry, and was meant to match disturbing the delicate balance between Germans and surpass Jews. Traditions and right and left. The assassination of elites were important only insofar as they Poland’s federalist President, Gabriel helped the masses to understand their Narutowicz, by a right-winger punctuat- common nationhood. The east was to be ed the end of the federal ideas, and Pil - in c o r p o r ated so long as its population sudski ret i r ed from politics—for a time. could be absorbed into Polish culture. 2 Yet Pilsudski had made a major change Polish eastern policy began anew in to the nationalist canon. Ukraine, prev i - 1919 when Pilsudski marched his armies ously marginal, became central. After east to claim the ancient territories of securing control of the West Ukrai n i a n Lithuania. From Pilsudski’s perspective, Republic provinces of L’viv and Galicia, the Polish-Bolshevik War that followed was Pilsudski allied himself in 1920 with the fought to create a new Pol i s h - L i t h u a n i a n Kyiv state of Symon Pet l i u r a. Poles and fe d e r ation. In the end, however, his pur- U k rainians fought the Bolsheviks as poses were thwarted not by the Bolsheviks, allies until the Treaty of Riga, but this whom he defeated, but by the Pol i s h alliance was short-lived. With the Trea t y nationalists who negotiated the peace. Pil - of Riga, Poland agreed to rec o g n i z e sudski was commander in chief of the Soviet Ukraine and promptly interned army, but Dmowski’s National Democrat s its former Ukrainian allies. Pil s u d s k i ’ s dominated the national assembly and the hope to create a Ukrainian buffer state peace delegation. They handed back east- went unfulfilled; there was little he could ern lands under Polish control to the Bol- do besides apologize to his Ukrai n i a n sheviks, including all of what Pil s u d s k i co m r ades in arms. Nevertheless, the imagined as the Belarusian canton of the pr ecedent for a military alliance with fe d e r ation. Meanwhile, Lithuanian lead- Uk r aine had been set. ers made clear that they had no interest in In 1926, when Pilsudski returned to a federation. Pilsudski still controlled Vil - power by military coup, he rem e m b e re d nius and its surroundings, which were to his Ukrainian allies, and sent his friend be the Central Lithuanian canton of the and fellow federalist Henryk Józewski to fe d e r ation. Yet without Belarus and eth- govern the province of Volhynia, which nic Lithuania, the whole idea of a federa- was by far the most Ukrainian region in

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Poland. Józewski, a veteran of the 1920 tions in Poland’s east. Soviet deportation campaign who was a native of Kyiv and of old eastern Polish elites from 1939- sp o k e Ukrainian, had grand plans for 1941 and Nazi racial policies from 1941- the revival of Ukraine within Poland. He 1944 both undermined any remnants of returned Ukrainian education to the fe d e r alist traditions. After the Ukrai n - classroom, brought the Ukrainian lan- ia n - P olish civil war began in 1943, the guage to the liturgy of the Orthodox idea of federal relations between Ukrai n e Ch u r ch, and ensured that loyal Ukrai n - and Poland seemed absurd. Stalin rec o g - ian politicians were elected to parlia- nized the primacy of ethnic nationalism ment. Recalling his experiences in the when he chose to separate Poles from Polish-Bolshevik War, Józewski Uk r ainians in 1944; meanwhile Pol i s h promised independence in communists used the achievement of the future while working for their loyal- ethnic homogeneity in Poland to gain ty within Pol a n d . 3 popular support. It seemed federal i s m Li k e Pilsudski’s Lithuanian federa- had disappeared from view, perhaps for- tion, Józewski’s Volhynian experiment ever. Communist Poland, in any event, was doomed by a silent alliance of two had no eastern policy as such, and the nationalisms. Ukrainian nationalists eas- history of Polish power in the east ily penetrated the non-governmental became taboo. London Poles agreed with organizations Józewski sponsored, and Stalin that the idea of a federa t i o n exploited the relative freedom of Vol h y - between Poland and its eastern neighbors nia. They were not satisfied by Józewski’s was dead; they believed that Vilnius and limited reforms, and promised peasants L’viv were Polish cities that should be mo r e freedom and more land. Once res t o r ed to Pol a n d . 4 again, attempts at federalism were easily As early as 1947, a lonely voice pro- undermined by these issues. If Vol h y n i a posed something totally different. Jerzy was to enjoy land reform, why import Giedroyc, born in , was a federal i s t thousands of Polish officers as colonists? and an admirer of Pilsudski. Between the If Ukrainian was to be taught in schools, wars he understood national questions in why not create entirely Ukra i n i a n terms of the survival of the Polish state, schools? Meanwhile, Polish nationalists rather than the position of the Pol i s h we r e hostile to the Volhynian experi- nation. Even during World War II, he ment from the very beginning. After maintained contacts with Ukrainian col- Pilsudski’s death, Józewski lost control leagues, and planned a forum for post- over policy in Volhynia, and his experi- war discussion.5 Since Pilsudski had died ment came to an end in 1938. in 1935 and Józewski was imprisoned in communist Poland (for his prewar poli- 1973: Giedroyc and Mieroszews- cies, among other things), Giedroyc was ki. Today, Volhynia is best rem e m b e re d left as the leading voice of the old feder- by Poles as the site of horrific ethnic alist position. In 1947, his monthly Ku l - cleansing by the Ukrainians. The Vol - tu r a endorsed the notion that Pol a n d ’ s hynian cleansing, which incited bloody new eastern borders were acceptable, and Polish responses, was only one of many that L’viv and Vilnius could be left with similarly terrible events brought on by Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Lithuania. At the brutality of Nazi and Soviet occupa- the time, this view was scandalous and

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largely ignored, and Giedroyc left it to tries between Poland and Russia. Like his friend to explain nationalism, it accepted that the only the strategic logic. meaningful form of political existence In 1973, Mieroszewski began outlining was the independent nation-state. Its an eastern policy for a future, indepen- goal was neither a federation in which dent Poland. In Mieroszewski’s view, Poland would be the stronger partner, Russian and Polish nationalism would be nor an incorporation of eastern bor- the primary dangers to such a state. derlands, leaving the rest to Russia. Its Imperialists in both Warsaw and goal was to create a band of durable would be tempted by the lands between nation-states between Poland and Rus- them—Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukrai n e — sia, whose main function from the Pol-

The European Union, like the Lublin Union, is rather an elite project, and its weaknesses reside in its lack of popular support.

and would likely make a deal at their ish point of view was to resolve by their expense. Mieroszewski thought that such very existence all eastern questions and a deal would poison Polish domestic pol- therefore prevent the Polish state from itics, and ultimately doom the Pol i s h overreaching and falling into territori- state. To prevent this chain of events, he al traps set by Moscow. argued that a future Polish state should Although the Ku l t u r a eastern program recognize its eastern frontier with was greeted at first with silence and skep - Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine. Set- ticism, Mieroszewski’s path-bre a k i n g ting aside historic grievances, Pol i s h 1973 article was widely disseminated over statesmen should accept that an aggres - the next twenty years, became accepted by sive eastern policy was not in the inter- the Polish counter-elite created by the ests of Poland. Mieroszewski argued that So l i d arity movement, and was imple- the Polish opposition should announce mented after the 1989 revolutions. In in advance that it accepted these bor- the early years of Polish independence, ders. Moreover, the Polish opposition the eastern program worked poorly should help and encourage Lithuanian, when applied to states that did not Belarusian, and Ukrainian indepen- resemble nation-states (Russia and dence movements. This meant accept- Belarus) and well with those that did ing that Ukrainian, Belarusian, and (Lithuania and Ukraine). This eastern Lithuanian national history and senti- pr o g r am allowed Poland to overco m e ments were equal to those among the the challenges of a restive and rev a n c h i s t Polish—a revolutionary concept.6 Polish minority around Vilnius and of a In intellectual terms, this grand strat - historically-minded Lithuanian gov- egy was entirely new. It was neither feder- ernment. In retrospect, it mattere d alist nor nationalist, though it drew from most in relations with Ukrai n e . both traditions. Like federalism, it Just as had prescribed, informal accepted the political reality of the coun- relations between the Polish and Ukrai n -

[1 1 6 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs S N Y D E R Politics&Diplomacy ian oppositions became formal rel a t i o n s original Ku l t u r a pr o g r am was fulfilled, between an independent Poland and Skubiszewski proposed a policy of still-Soviet Ukraine. Independent European standards, in which Pol a n d Poland and Soviet Ukraine had res o l v e d and its neighbors would agree to certain all their outstanding national and bor- European norms of minority rights in der questions in quasi-formal agree - the common hope of European inte- ments well before the end of the Soviet gr ation. Later Polish governments used Union. The ra p p r o c h e m e n t between War s a w the country’s relatively advanced posi- and Kyiv achieved before December tion in the European queue to channel 1991 was a major reason why the Soviet European leverage against eastern Un i o n ’s disintegration was peaceful. By neighbors interested in integra t i o n . removing the Polish question from When Poland accedes to the European Uk r ainian politics before it was even Union in about two years, these types of raised, For eign Minister Krzysztof Sku- st r ategies will no longer be possible, and biszewski and Polish diplomats fostered those who plan Polish eastern policy will c o o p e ration between west and east find themselves in an unprec e d e n t e d Uk r ainians, and between communist position. What can we predict about a reformers and opposition intellectuals. Europe in which Poland and Lithuania The Po l i s h - U k rainian re c o n c i l i a t i o n pool sovereignty with western neighbors moved from legal recognition to politi- in 2004? Do traditions of federal i s m cal cooperation to historical rec o n c i l i a - and nationalism offer any guidance? tion over the course of the 1990s.7 On the surface, it might appear that Giedroyc and Mieroszewski created a joining the European Union implies a synthesis of federalism and nationalism continuation of federalism. Yet the that fit the international politics of the European Union, like the Lublin postwar and post-Cold War world. The Union, is in fact ambiguous on this intellectual achievement of 1973 had sc o r e. To put the matter bluntly, the become a complete political success by European Union, like the Lublin 1994: the Soviet Union had been Union, will embrace Poland and Lithua- removed from the map, and Poland had ni a but in the main exclude the East ar r anged its relations with all of its new Slavs. The European Union, like the eastern neighbors. The central place of Lublin Union, is rather an elite pro- Uk r aine was guaranteed by the newly- ject, and its weaknesses reside in its lack formed Pol i s h - U k r anian axis, which may of popular support. In many policy very well be considered the great success essentials, moreover, the Polish choice of Skubiszewski’s eastern policy. The new for Europe is more nationalist than policy, a blend of nationalism and feder- federalist. To join the EU, in at least alism, had finally resolved the eastern one important sense, is like integrating question, at least for the time being. with a nation-state. 8 The eastern policy of the 1990s, while European Union: National or its goal was the preservation of Pol i s h Federalist ? From the mid-1990s, statehood, at least re q u i red serious Skubiszewski and his successors were engagement with neighbors to the east. gr eatly helped by the prospect of Euro- In particular, Poland in the 1990s fos- pean Union enlargement. After the te r ed human contact with its neighbors,

Winter/Spring 2003 [1 1 7] F E D E R ALISM AND NAT I O NALISM IN POLISH EASTERN POLICY signing a visa-free agreement with Oder. The scale of this change, to come Uk r aine despite EU opposition. When perhaps in 2004, is comparable to that Poland joins the EU, it also joins its bor- of 1918, 1945, or 1989. What should the der agreements. Poland’s eastern borde r response be? The intellectual legacies of becomes the eastern border of the EU, nationalism and federalism remain avail- and Poland’s eastern neighbors become able for the interpretation, as they have the eastern neighbors of the EU. Russ- since 1569. The traditions of the Lublin ian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian citizens Union remain salient in a new world of will find themselves confronted with the European Union. They await a new gen- ha r d external border of the EU, now er ation of interpreters, diplomats, and de m a r cated along the Bug rather than the citizens who relish a challenge.

N OT E S 1 A notable recent publication is Nataliia Press, 2002), 154-216. Ia ko v e n k o, Paraleln’yi Svit (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2002). 5 with Kryzsztof Pomian, Au t o b i - 2 Very perceptive was Ksawery Pruszynski, Ni e z a d - ografia na cztery rece (W arsaw: Czytelnik, 1996). owoleni i entuzjasci ( Warsaw: Panstwowy Instytut 6 Consult Juliusz Mieroszewski, “Polska ‘Ostpoli- Wydawniczy, 1990 [1939]), 637-644. tik’,” and “Rosyjski ‘Kompleks Polski’ i ULB,” Ma t e r i - 3 Consult Wlodzimierz Medrzecki, Woj e w o d z t w o aly do refleksji i zadumy (P aris: Instytut Literac k i , wo l y n s k i e , (Wroclaw: Ossolineum, 1988); Jan Kesik, 1976), 110-122, 175-186. Zaufany komendanta (W roclaw: Wydawnictwo Uniwersyte- 7 For an extended treatment of post-1989 eastern tu Wroclawskiego, 1995). policy, see Snyder, Reconstruction of Nations, 232- 4 The causes, course and consequences of ethnic 27 6 . cleansing are treated in Timothy Snyder, The Recon - 8 Peter Andreas and Timothy Snyder, eds., The struction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Wall Around the West (Lanham: Rowman and Little- Belarus, 1569-1999 (New Haven: Yale University field, 2001).

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