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Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control

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Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control Chapter 1 Executive Summary Contents Page Introduction . 3 Principal Findings . 3 Comparison of Potential ASAT and Arms Control Regimes . 13 1. Existing Constraints. 13 2. Comprehensive ASAT and Space-Based Weapon Ban . 14 3. ASAT Weapon Test Ban and Space-Based Weapon Deployment Ban 15 4. One Each/No New Types . 17 5. “Rules of the Road” for Space . 17 6. Space Sanctuary . 18 7. Space-Based BMD . 19 Treaties of Limited Duration. 20 Tables Table No. Page l-1. Effect of Regimes on ASAT Development and Arms Control ., .. ....,13 l-2. Sensor Technology for Compliance Monitoring . .16 Chapter 1 Executive Summary INTRODUCTION For over two decades the United States and clear whether such survivability measures will the Soviet Union have used satellites for mil- be adequate to guard against the highly de- itary purposes. As a result of recent techno- veloped ASAT threats of the future. Another logical advances, military satellites will soon possible contributor to satellite survivability be able to play a more significant role in ter- is mutually agreed arms control. A judicious restrial conflicts. These space assets will be combination of certain arms control measures able to supply more types of information, more and unilateral satellite survivability measures rapidly, to more diverse locations. Some will might provide more security to U.S. military carry out target acquisition, tracking, and kill satellites than either type of measure alone. assessment functions, thus operating more At the same time, however, arms control directly than before as components of weap- measures which constrained the threat to U.S. ons systems. satellites would also constrain the ability of This growing military utility also makes sat- the United States to weaken Soviet military ellites attractive targets for opposing military capabilities by attacking their satellites in forces. Both the Soviet Union and the United time of war. In addition, limits on ASATS States have been developing anti-satellite would severely limit the kinds of ballistic mis- (ASAT) weapons. These weapons could weaken sile defense weapons that might be deployed the opponent’s military capabilities by depriv- in the future. (The subject of ballistic missile ing his forces of the services of some satellites. defense is dealt within a companion OTA re- The existing Soviet anti-satellite weapons— port, Balistic Missile Defense Technologies.) and future, potentially more effective ASATS This report explains the dilemmas facing –pose a growing defense problem for the U.S. policymakers and assesses the pros and United States. cons of some options for dealing with the chal- A variety of unilateral measures, passive lenge of anti-satellite weapons, particularly in and active, may improve the survivability of the light of projected future weapons tech- U.S. military satellites. At present, it is un- nology. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS Current Soviet military satellites pose though not “weapons” themselves, support only a limited threat to U.S. military ca- and enhance the effectiveness of terrestrial So- pabilities, but future space systems will viet forces that would engage in direct com- pose a greater threat. bat. For example, if navigation satellites im- prove munition delivery accuracies, then fewer The Soviet Union currently uses satellites munitions are required to accomplish a given to perform a wide variety of tasks including missile launch detection, communications, objective. The growing military utility of sat- navigation, meteorological surveillance, pho- ellites has rekindled U.S. interest in ASAT tographic and radar reconnaissance, and col- weapons. lection of electromagnetic intelligence (e.g., Some Soviet satellites already supply lim- radar emissions). Many of these satellites, al- ited targeting information to other terrestrial 3 4 assets. The Administration has expressed its These options include nondestructive as well concern about: as destructive measures; those presented be- low are not mutually exclusive. present and projected Soviet space sys- tems which, while not weapons themselves, ● Possible nondestructive responses to So- are designed to support directly the viet MILSATs: U. S. S.R. ’S terrestrial forces in the event of –Force Augmentation: U.S. combat or a conflict. These include ocean reconnais- support forces could be increased to sance satellites which use radar and elec- counter the increase in effectiveness tronic intelligence in efforts to provide tar- geting data to Soviet weapon platforms which Soviet forces could derive from which can quickly attack U.S. and allied sur- use of military satellites. Force augmen- face fleets. ’ tation is often, but not always, more costly than other means of mitigating At present Soviet radar (RORSAT) and elec- the threat posed by Soviet military sat- tronic intelligence (EORSAT) ocean reconnais- ellites. sance satellites pose only a limited threat to –Passive Countermeasures: By using U.S. and allied surface fleets. RORSATS and passive measures to conceal or disguise EORSATS are typically deployed at altitudes their identity and nature, U.S. forces and inclinations which offer limited observa- could reduce the utility of Soviet recon- tion range. Although the observation “swath” naissance satellites. For example, as- of these satellites will eventually cover most sets now detectable by radar might be of the Earth, if only one or two of these satel- redesigned to reflect radar signals only lites are operational-as has been customary weakly in order to evade detection by in peacetime-then a ship would be exposed radar satellites, or radio silence might to observation only intermittently and might be practiced, or covert signaling tech- successfully evade the satellite. The Soviet niques used to prevent detection by sat- Union could increase the number of deployed ellites that collect signals intelligence. RORSATS and EORSATS, thereby making –Electronic Countermeasures and Electro- evasion more difficult. Other countermeasures optical Countermeasures: Electronic coun- exist which could further reduce the threat termeasures such as “jamming” (i.e., posed by these satellites, but such measures overloading enemy receivers with might not be available to merchant resupply strong signals) and “spoofing” (i.e., vessels operating during a protracted non- sending deceptive signals) could be used nuclear conflict. to interfere with satellite functions. In the future, sophisticated communication, Electro-optical countermeasures such navigation, and surveillance satellites are as “dazzling” (temporary “blinding”) or likely to play a greater role in all levels of ter- spoofing optical sensors are also avail- restrial conflict. This will increase the incen- able. However, these countermeasures tive for both the United States and the Soviet —especially spoofing—require detailed Union to develop and deploy ASAT weapons. knowledge of the satellite systems (e.g., operational frequencies, receiver sensi- tivity, etc.) against which they are Possible responses to the threat posed directed. by Soviet military satellites are numer- ● Possible Destructive Responses to Soviet ous and diverse. MILSATs: A variety of options are available to miti- –Inadvertent But Inherent ASAT Capa- gate the threat to U.S. and allied security bilities: The inherent ASAT capabilities posed by Soviet military satellites (MILSATS). of nuclear weapons such as ICBMS and SLBMS could be used to destroy low- ‘President Ronald Reagan, Report to the Congress: U.S. Po]- altitude Soviet satellites; with some icy on ASAT Arms Control, Mar. 31, 1984. modifications, these weapons might 5 also be used to attack satellites at Although national utility for space system higher altitudes. Some types of non- support is difficult to assess precisely and nuclear interceptors (e.g., that demon- meaningless to compare between nations, it strated in the U.S. Army’s 1984 Hom- is apparent that the United States is more de- ing Overlay Experiment (HOE)) which pendent on MILSATS to perform important might eventually be developed and de- military functions than is the Soviet Union. ployed for BMD purposes, would have The United States has global security commit- some inherent ASAT capability. Fi- ments and force deployments, while the Soviet nally, any highly maneuverable space- Union has few forces committed or deployed craft capable of noncooperative rendez- outside the borders and littoral waters of mem- vous—e.g., the U.S. Space Shuttle—has bers of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and some ASAT potential. Cuba. The United States has corresponding —Planned ASAT Weapons: When oper- requirements for global and oceanic command ational, the current USAF MV ASAT and control communications (C3) capabilities weapon will be able to destroy Soviet and relies largely on space systems to provide military satellites in low-Earth orbit. these requirements. The Soviet Union, on the –Advanced ASAT Weapons: Space- or other hand, can rely on landline communica- ground-based directed-energy weapons tions systems and over-the horizon radio links or advanced kinetic-energy weapons for many of its C’ needs. Satellite communi- could be developed that would be able cations links are used by the Soviet Union but to destroy Soviet satellites beyond the are not as essential as those of the United range of existing or planned U.S. ASAT States. In addition, the Soviet Union has weapons. greater capability to reconstitute satellites which are lost in action; hence even to the ex- The United States is now more depen- tent
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