TITLE. "Anglo-Afghan Relations, 1798 - 1878, with particular reference to British Policy in Central Asia and on the North-West frontier of India. " Theis submitted for the degree _ of Doctor of;,,,Philosophy in the University of Durham. January 1950. Munawtivar Khan, B. A. ACENOWLEDGEMENT. I wish to place on record my sincere appreciation of the guidance, the constructive criticism, and the very helpful suggestiors that Professor W. L. Burn has given me in carrying out this research. Without this and the continual encouragement that he gave me I feel that the completion of this work would have remained but a wishful dream. Thanks are also due to the Commonwealth Relations Office and the .Public Records office, for the use I have made of their material. Extensive use has been made of the Indian Section of the King's College library, Newcastle upon Tyne. MUNAYMAR KHAN. INDEX OF CHAPTERS. Chapter 1. Introduction. pp. 1-5. to 2. British Relations with Persia and Afghanistan 1798-1838. pp. 6-48. It 3. Anglo-Russian Relations 1815-1836. pp. 49-64. it 4. The Liquidation of Lord Auckland's Policy. pp. 65-91. it 5. Anglo-Afghan Relations 1853-1863. pp. 92-120. _ " 6. The Foreign Policy of Lord Lawrence. pp. 121-153. It 7. Lord Mayo and the Broadening of Policy. pp. 154-177. It B. Foreign Office Negotiations 1869-1874. pp. 178-192. 9. Sheer Ali: The Kaufmann Correspondence and the Simla Conference. pp. 193-214. It 10. The Conaxvative Government and Lord Northbrook 1874-1876. pp. 215-232. it 11. Lord Lytton's Viceroyalty: (1) To the Peshawar Conference. pp. 233-257. if 12. Lord Lytton's Viceroyalty: (2) The Genesis of the Second Afghan War. pp. 258-274. if 13. Conclusion. pp. 275-278. Appendix 1. Opinions on Rawlinson's Memorandum. pp. 279-301. 2. Sheer Ali's viers on Admission of British Agents 1869. pp. 302-303. 3. Russo-Persian Relations 1869-1875. pp. 304-314. 4. Russian Declarations in respect of Afghanistan 1869-1876. pp. 315-316. 5. Draft Treaty for the Peshawar Conference. pp. 317-322. (l). ., CH A'P TERI INTR0DUCT10N One ofI-the difficulties in the'way of historical study is the practice of attaching "labels" to men" and policies. We read öf the "forward" policy on the North- West frontier of India and, by contrast, of the-policy which is variously"described as the "non-intervention" or the "backward"-policy or, in' Wyllie's phrase, the policy*of "masterly inactivity". 'We read of the Punjab School and the Sind School. Sometimes it is almost made to appear, for journalistic convenience, ` as though there be could only two possible policies for the British and Indian governments to pursue in respect of the North-West frontier and Central Asia; that these policies retained their identity in all circumstances; and that a man who had to follow elected one - who had, so to speaks picked was his side - certain to follow it for the rest of his life. The history of British rule in India affords' evidence enough of the influence which one man or a small group of men could exert. The decision to crush Tipu Sultan, for example, was very much the personal decision of Wellesley. (2) But it was a decision which he took after considering facts which he believed or knew to exist. Political- policies are seldom, if ever, advanced for the sake of advancing them. Men embark on policies because they believe in them; not, as they might tell a story or make a joke, to provide amusement or pass the time. The facts on which they base their policies may be wrongly under- stood and variously interpreted; the deductions from them may differ widely. These considerations are relevant to an assessment of the wisdom of a particular policy; but it is quite another thing to suggest, as is sometimes done, - that the non-intervention and the forward policies were the creation, the patent or the whim of certain individuals; of Lord Lawrence and Lord Lytton, for example. It is equally idle to be dogmatic about schools of opinion. John Jacob's plan for the British occupation of Quetta is often regarded as the first sign the of re-emergence of the forward policy after the disasters of the first Afghan War; and since this plan was also substantially that of Frere and Green, both Sind men, it is regarded as the peculiar mark of the "Sind School" and therefore as antipathetic to the "Punjab School". And yet, as we shall see, it was also held by two very notable members of the "Punjab School", Edwardes and H. B. Lumsden. Another danger in dealing with the subject of this (3) thesis is to imagine that the problem of British relations with Afghanistan and Central Asia was sui generis, involving considerations which were utterly peculiar to it. Yet no Governor-General of India had an infinite choice of alternatives. The alternatives which came to be known as the forward policy and the non-intervention policy in respect of the North-West frontier existed, for example, in respect of Mysore in 1798-99. Indeed, they are among the most elementary of political choices. In an area so fluid as India in the eighteenth century a particular Power was bound either to go'forward or to halt. Each course-had its own dangers. This condition of fluidity existed-in respect of Afghanistan and Central Asia it had after ceased to exist in respect of India. dangers The anticipated from Russian intervention in and through Persia and Afghanistan were roughly paralleled by the dangers (to which Wellesley was so sensitive) of French intervention in and through Mysore. Those who later pointed to the difficulties which the Russians would have in encountered Afghanistan might have supported their case by a letter which Arthur Wellesley wrote to John Malcolm on 20th June 1803: "The more I see of the Mahrattas, the more convinced I am that they could never have any alliance with the French, The French, on their arrival, would want equipments, which would cost money, or money (4) them; s. in to procure and there is not Mahratta the whole country, from the Peshwa down to the lowest horseman, who has a shilling or who would not require assistance from them". The danger of thinking that policy in respect of Afghanistan differed from policy_ in respect of every other . country was very, strongly put by Henry Lawrence in his Defence of Macnaghten (1843). Lawrence was concerned to point out that what had happened at Kabul was not some- thing which could not happen anywhere else: it could easily, happen, for. instance, in Delhi. "I wish, moreover, point out that the mode of operation so pertinaciously"to styled "the Afghan system", and currently linked with the name of the late envoy, as if, with all iteerrors, it had originated with him, is essentially our Indian system; that it existed with all its defects when air William Macnaghten was in his cradle, and flourishes in'our own provinces now that he is in his grave". 1 It is worth while observing, also, that the temptation to intervention or annexation is the greater if the supreme authority in the "victim" state is precarious or challenged. It-, Was the failure of the Peshwa to maintain his authority, especially after the death of Nana Farnavis in 1800, which led to the Treaty of Bassein (1802) and British intervention. It was the disintegration of the authority of Ranjit Singh which precipitated the first Sikh War after his death in 1. J. L. Morison: Lawrence of Lucknow, p. 335 (1934). 0 (5) 1839. The roles of puppet king and nationalist pretender, of Shah Shuja and Dost Moharmaad, were only too easy to fill. It will be obvious from what follows that the policy of the Indian government was bound to be affected, however indirectly, by what happened in countries as far removed as Poland and Armenia. It is important to remember, also, how much Indian policy was affected by British party politics; by the result of general elections in which India was not in the least degree an issue. If Peel's government of 1834-35 had lasted longer Lord Heytesbury and not Lord Auckland would have gone out to India as Governor-General. Both the first and the second Afghan Wars ultimately became important issues in British politics, and the policies followed, in the one case by a Whig and in the other by a " Conservative government, were none the better for that. -, There only remains one more point to make in this introductory chapter. The wisdom of a policy depends upon what could be known or reasonably anticipated at the time when the policy was formed or executed. The mere fact that Auckland was in error in 1838 does not necessarily mean that Lytton was in error in 1878. The growth of the Russian empire in Central Asia, the development of railway communi- cation in India - these and many other factors make it necessary to judge every policy on its merits as they existed at the time. c6 i 0HAPTER2 BRITISH RELATIONS WITH PERSIA AND AFGHANISTAN, 1798 - 1838 When in 1809 Theophilius Metcalfe arrived. in Calcutta it was to find his brother Charles (afterwards Lord) Metcalfe "negotiating with a semi-fabulous chieftain on the edges of Central Asia". The phrase is that of the most recent biographer of Lord Metcalf el and it is not clear whether or not it was ever used by Theophilius Metcalfe. But it has the merit, since Charles Metcalfe's mission was to Ranjit Singh, of taking the Punjab-out of its later geographical context as part of British India and putting it in its true contemporary place as part of the Central Asian structure.