Demessie Fantaye Regional Approaches to Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa
Demessie Fantaye Regional Approaches to Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa About the author
Demessie Fantaye is an independent consultant and researcher, previously employed at the Department of Political Science and International relations, College of Social Sciences, Addis Ababa University. His research interests include the mechanisms of indigenous conflict resolution in pastoralist communities in Ethiopia, the nexus of security, development and conflict in Ethiopia in particular and the Horn of Africa region in general, and maritime security issues in the Horn of Africa region. Demessie Fantaye has published several book reviews, articles and reports focusing on the developmental policies of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and on maritime security issues.
Imprint:
Published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Addis Ababa Office P.O. Box 8786, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Tel.: +251-11-123-32 45/46, Fax: +251-11-123 38 55 Email: [email protected] Website: www.fes-ethiopia.org ©Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2014
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4 Regional Approaches to Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa
Contents
1. Objectives and Methodology of the Study...... 7
2. Introduction...... 7
3. Conceptualizing Maritime Security...... 10
4. Sources and Manifestations of Maritime Insecurity in the Region...... 12 4.1 Sources ...... 12 4.1.1 State Failure in Somalia...... 12 4.1.2 Weak Maritime Governance and Maritime Security Apparatus in the Region...... 13 4.2 Manifestations ...... 14 4.2.1 Piracy...... 14 4.2.2 Chemical and Toxic Waste Dumping...... 15 4.2.3 Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing...... 16 4.2.4 Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons...... 17 4.2.5 Illegal Migration and Human Trafficking...... 18 4.2.6 Maritime Delimitation and Competition over Maritime Resources...... 18 4.2.7 Landlocked States...... 19
5. International Response to Maritime Insecurity in the Region...... 20 5.1 International Law...... 20 5.2 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions and Related UN Initiatives...... 21 5.3 Other Multilateral and Bilateral Initiatives to combat Piracy...... 23 5.3.1 Multilateral Initiatives...... 23 5.3.2 Naval-Military Initiatives...... 24 5.3.3 Non-State Actors...... 25
6. Regional Approaches to Maritime Insecurity in the Region...... 26 6.1 Regional Initiatives...... 28
5 6.1.1 Djibouti Code of Conduct...... 28 6.1.2 IGAD Somalia Inland Strategy and Action Plan to Prevent and Counter Piracy...... 28 6.1.3 Regional Strategy against Piracy and for Maritime Security in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean...... 29 6.1.4 Kampala Process...... 29 6.2 National Level Initiatives and Programmes...... 29 6.2.1 Accession to Relevant International Conventions...... 29 6.2.2 Incorporation of Provisions Criminalizing Piracy into Legislation and the Legal Code...... 30 6.2.3 Military and Naval Actions against Piracy...... 30
7. Complementarities between Regional Efforts and the International Community’s Initiatives in the Sphere of Maritime Security...... 31
8. Problems and Differences between Regional Efforts and International Community Initiatives in the Sphere of Maritime Security...... 32
9. Conclusion ...... 34
10. Recommendations and Entry Points...... 35
11. Sources...... 37
6 Regional Approaches to Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa
1. Objectives and Methodolo- structural view of maritime insecurity in the Horn of Africa. This has led to a situation in gy of the Study which immense resources and efforts have been directed to the fight against piracy, This study, commissioned by the Friedrich- while other sources of maritime insecurity Ebert-Stiftung (FES), seeks to unravel the have been sidelined. The initiatives against dynamics and impact of maritime security maritime piracy have been characterized in the Horn of Africa region. It also has the by duplication of effort and competition objective of assessing the strengths and between different agencies and entities. weaknesses, synergies and contradictions While it is undeniable that the efforts of existing initiatives and programmes against piracy have achieved impressive related to maritime security in the region. results, regional initiatives have received Ultimately, the study aims to identify the negligible support. components of a distinctly African and specifically regional approach to maritime States in the region and the primary regional security issues. organization have sought repeatedly to articulate a distinct agenda and set of Methodologically, the study is based on interests in the sphere of maritime security a review and analysis of the literature. but they have also had to adapt to the Furthermore, the author carried out a series circumstances. More specifically, the of interviews with officials of the Inter- governments in the region have cooperated Governmental Authority on Development, with international initiatives and in the IGAD Security Sector Programme (IGAD, process garnered resources and benefits IGAD-ISSP) and the Ethiopian Shipping Lines derived from the global focus on piracy off (ESL). The author also relied on field notes the coast of Somalia. and data gathered from research visits to Somalia (Puntland) to study Somali piracy in 2009 and 2010. 2. Introduction The study argues that efforts to improve maritime security in the Horn of Africa region have assumed a pattern in terms In this study the region will be defined in of which the concerns and perspectives terms first elucidated comprehensively by of the developed world have tended to Buzan (1983, 1991). He assumed that the overshadow the agenda of the states in use of the term “region” “means that a the region. This dichotomy is revealed, distinct and significant subsystem of security for instance, in the interpretation of the relations exists among a set of states whose sources of maritime insecurity, the focus fate is that they have been locked into of initiatives and the informal division of geographical proximity with each other” tasks concerning maritime security that has (Buzan, 1991:188, quoted in Berouk 2009: emerged in the region. While as far as the 2). Accordingly, the assumption is that the international community is concerned the states of a region are intertwined in terms primary concern is maritime piracy, actors of existing and emerging patterns of conflict in the region have a more complex and and cooperation (ibid.).
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Conventionally, the term “the Horn of Ethiopia and Uganda are landlocked Africa” (or simply “the Horn”) refers to the (Figure 1). north eastern part of Africa bounded by the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean and which The Horn of Africa is characterized by in the west extends to the western borders internecine intrastate and interstate of the Sudan. Usually it is understood that conflict. These conflicts have their roots the states of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia in the interlinked and mutually reinforcing and Djibouti comprise the region known dynamics of the history and pattern of as the Horn, although currently it includes state formation, the nature of the political the states of Kenya and the Sudan. Some systems, social structure and economic observers use the term “the greater Horn” underdevelopment prevalent in the region. and include Uganda and the region of the Conflicts have been endemic in the region. Great Lakes under this rubric. These conflicts, however, have generally been confined to dry land, with the maritime For the purposes of this paper, the Horn domain (the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and of Africa is understood to include Sudan, the Western Indian Ocean), remaining Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, South almost unaffected. Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia. These countries share a wide range of similarities, in terms of culture, languages, religions, social structures and economic patterns.
The Horn of Africa abuts one of the most important maritime routes in the world. Shipping lanes through the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean are critical to world trade and also as an important transit route for oil shipments.
The maritime domain is also central to the states of the region in socio-economic terms. The bulk of the import and export needs of the states in the region are serviced through the ports on the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden (GOA) and Western Indian Ocean. The maritime domain is also a source of exports and nutrition for the population of the coastal states of the region.
Somalia (with a coastline of 3,025 km), Eritrea (2234 km), Sudan (853 km), Kenya (536 km) and Djibouti (314 km) are the coastal states of the region.1 South Sudan,
1 See: http://world.bymap.org/Coastlines.html
8 Regional Approaches to Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa
Figure 1: Map of the Horn of Africa
The major exception to the abovementioned Yemen, while Ethiopia lent practical aid trend was the brief Eritrean–Yemen conflict to Eritrea (Lefebvre 1998: 376–380). This over the Hanish Islands in December 1995, conflict also exemplified the importance of which was resolved by arbitration. This economic issues and resource needs as key conflict exposed the potential tensions drivers in this short-lived war (ibid.: 372– and rifts in the region, with major Arab 376). Lefebvre points out that Eritrea and states voicing diplomatic support for Yemen had been granting mineral and oil
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exploration rights to Western corporations traffic in territorial and contiguous waters and had also signed tourism development and preventing threats to the landmass agreements focusing on the islands and of the state from the maritime domain in waters of the Red Sea prior to the outbreak times of war and peace. Therefore, the of outright conflict (ibid.). traditional conception of maritime security is linked inextricably to the projection of Since the late 1990s, however, maritime naval-military power over the sea. Over insecurity has emerged as a critical and time, the protection of maritime traffic attention-grabbing issue in the region. from pirates also became bound up with the Major efforts and resources have been concept of maritime security and has been expended and policy initiatives launched subsumed into international law. Maritime on maritime security in the Horn of Africa. security has more recently come to include While conventionally the most glaring the exclusivity and protection of economic manifestation of maritime insecurity in the investments in so-called exclusive economic region is assumed to be piracy, which affects zones (EEZ). the waters of the Somali coast, the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean, other In the second half of the twentieth century, threats and issues – such as chemical and the concept of maritime security has evolved toxic waste dumping, illegal, unreported constantly. These shifts have coincided and unregulated fishing that depletes fishing with decolonization and the desire of a resources, the illegal trade in small arms large number of Asian and African states and light weapons and illegal migration and to assert control over their coastal waters human trafficking that occur in the waters and economic zones. Newly emerging off the Somali coast and the Gulf of Aden – threats such as “terrorism on the high also deserve to be mentioned. seas” (as exemplified by the Achille Lauro incident), the prospect of exploiting mineral and oil resources on the sea bed, fears of the contamination of the oceans by oil 3. Conceptualizing Maritime tankers and the dumping of chemical waste Security have also affected the notion of maritime security. The United Nations Convention The concept of maritime security, while on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS III) took commonly understood to be self-evident, on board many of these shifts, such as the requires elucidation because the meaning recognition of exclusive economic zones of the term has shifted over time and, extending from the limit of the territorial needless to say, is also context-specific. sea up to a maximum of 200 nautical miles (nm) from the coastal base line. Customarily, maritime security is understood in the narrow sense of ensuring the safety In the contemporary period, more expansive of maritime traffic from threats. More conceptions of maritime security are the specifically, at the national level, the concept norm, transcending the narrow, traditional, of maritime security is predicated on the state-centric view, with its sole emphasis on centrality of the protection of maritime military-naval threats, to include economic,
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environmental and livelihood concerns which are measured and understood viewed in a global framework. primarily in terms of the challenge they pose to Africa’s economic prospects. An apt example of the expansive contemp - orary definitions of maritime security is In this regard, conceptualizations of the definition put forward by Onuoha maritime security that are framed in relation (2009: 32). He writes that “maritime to the West and to the idea that the end of security incorporates unhindered oceanic the Cold War meant an end to ideological trade, safe navigation, the safeguarding of and/or systematic challenges to the system coastal communities and their livelihoods, of global capitalism and liberal democracy, protecting the food chain and preserving also deserve mention. The views of Professor the oceanic contribution to the health of the Geoffrey Till are important in this context. planet”. He further conceptualizes maritime Till argues that the West has entered a “post- security as incorporating two dimensions, modern” and “post-Mahanian” (reference the intrinsic and extrinsic (ibid.: 33). The to US naval strategist and historian Alfred intrinsic dimension for Onuoha incorporates Thayer Mahan) era of sea power, in which the biological and environmental safety of previous notions of naval power and the oceans, their ecological processes and threats emerging from other states are no life forms, while the extrinsic dimension longer relevant (Till 2007, cited in Holmes incorporates the “foreign objects existing 2010: 164). Till postulates that in future in or making use of the maritime domain”, naval power and maritime security will be such as people, vessels, infrastructure and geared primarily to ensuring good order at human utilization of water sources. sea and that maritime traffic and usage are not endangered by threats such as piracy A related definition that is more African- and terrorism (ibid.). However, the recently centred is the definition developed by the increasing tensions in the Pacific and the Brenthurst Foundation in collaboration South China Sea due to the competing claims with the African Union Commission and of Asian states over maritime delimitation the African Centre for Strategic Studies and the naval arms race between these (Brenthurst Foundation, African Union countries seem to postulate a future which Commission and the African Centre for may not tally with Till’s vision. Strategic Studies, 2010). This is a holistic and comprehensive definition of maritime This paper is based on an expansive security in that it encompasses the criticality definition of maritime security that is of the economic and commercial utilization context-specific and also incorporates the of waters (seas, oceans, lakes, rivers and economic, environmental and livelihood so on), their environmental safety, their aspects of the maritime domain, in line with importance as a source of nutrition and the conceptualizations of maritime security livelihood and also their safety or protection developed by Ononuha (2009) and the from illegal or criminal activities (ibid.: Brenthurst Foundation (2010), as outlined 10–12). This paper also conceptualizes the above. It also relies on an anthropocentric threats to Africa’s maritime security in terms notion of the causes and manifestations of of two categories: security and non-security, maritime security.
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4. Sources and Manifestations 4.1 Sources of Maritime Insecurity in the 4.1.1 State Failure in Somalia Horn of Africa The main causal dynamic that gives rise to maritime insecurity in the region is As mentioned in the Introduction, the issue state failure in Somalia. This has led to a of maritime insecurity in the Horn of Africa situation in which individuals and groups has been acquiring greater prominence and operating from bases on the Somali coast has increasingly sidelined other issues and attack international shipping and are able to concerns. Conventionally, the most glaring capture and hold vessels, cargos and crews manifestation of maritime insecurity in the hostage in relative impunity. State failure – region is piracy. in other words, the absence of a working criminal justice system and the inability to But the existence of other forms of exert control over the maritime domain maritime insecurity in the region should – has allowed other forms of maritime not be discounted. These threats – such as insecurity (such as illegal, unreported and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, unregulated fishing, chemical and waste dumping of chemical and toxic waste in the dumping, trafficking in small arms and light waters off the Somali coast, illegal migration weapons and illegal migration and human and human trafficking over Somali waters trafficking) to proliferate in the waters off and the Gulf of Aden and the illegal trade or the Somali coast. trafficking in small arms and light weapons – are equally critical and may even pose The Transitional Federal Government greater, long-term dangers to the states in in Somalia, although internationally the region. recognized, is still too weak to effectively project its power and authority across large Several qualifications are important in stretches of Somalia, although it is being this context. The first point that must be assisted by the AMISOM (African Union borne in mind is that the manifestations Mission to Somalia), Kenyan and Ethiopian of maritime insecurity reflect or are the troops and has recently achieved successes outcome of deeper, underlying structural against the Harakat-Al Shabaab-Mujahideen dynamics. A second qualification is the (HASM) Islamist insurgency. Somalia also need to understand that the manifestations has weak regional authorities, such as and sources of maritime insecurity in the the entities of Puntland and Somaliland. region are mutually related and reinforcing. According to most sources, the Somaliland Finally, it should be understood that making coastline does not host pirate activity but a strict delineation between the causes and the Puntland coast is a major centre and manifestations of maritime insecurity is jumping-off point for pirate activity. problematic. To summarize, the absence of a functioning state apparatus across large parts of Somalia, the absence of a security apparatus and a working criminal justice system, coupled
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with Somalia’s long coastline, have been disputes between maritime states in the conducive to the emergence and continued region. existence of piracy. The closest equivalent to an institution that Moreover, the potential high returns from monitors and studies marine ecological piracy and the extreme unlikelihood of conditions in the waters of the region proceeds from piracy being targeted by is the Regional Organization for the law enforcement and banking supervision, Conservation of the Red Sea and the Gulf either in Somalia or the region, create of Aden (PERSGA). PERSGA is a regional further inducements to engage in piracy. intergovernmental organisation based on the Jeddah Convention and the later Cairo To conclude, as Homan and Kamerling Declaration of September 1995. PERSGA’s (2010: 68–71) so fittingly put it, at present, central objective is to conserve the marine Somalia presents a set of conditions that and coastal environments of the Red Sea, make it an ideal incubating ground for the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Suez and the piracy. However, conditions in Somalia also Gulf of Aqaba. Three of the states of the create a conducive environment for other region – Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia – are threats to maritime security. members of PERSGA, while the remaining four members are Egypt, Jordan, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Yemen. 4.1.2 Weak Maritime Governance and Maritime Security Apparatus in the Region PERSGA holds regular meetings and also conducts training and capacity building Another factor that has, directly or indirectly, for marine conservation personnel and allowed piracy and other forms of maritime scientists of member states. Member insecurity to flourish, has its roots in the states have also signed several protocols weak maritime governance and maritime on conserving marine biological diversity security apparatus of the coastal states of and marine pollution. However, PERSGA the region. has yet to carry out a comprehensive study of marine ecological conditions in regional The states in the region and the IGAD have waters. Another possible weakness of not developed the necessary maritime PERSGA may be the range of its membership governance system and regulatory and therefore its mandate. Moreover, framework to police and govern interactions Eritrea and Kenya are not members. in their maritime domains. The absence of a maritime regulatory The coastal states also lack a body to assess framework and system in the region may the extent and range of maritime resources be due to a shortage of capacities and (biological and mineral) available in their resources (human and material). maritime domain. This means that the exploitation and utilisation of maritime The coastal states of the region have a resources is also occurring in a context negligible ability to project power and exert ungoverned by any rules or normative control over their maritime domains. The principles, which creates the potential for weak and small coastguards and navies of
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the coastal states constrain their ability to literature – that allow them to range further prevent or stop illegal activities in their own in search of likely targets. An apt instance in territorial waters, contiguous zones and this context is the attack on the Greek ship EEZs. Navios Appolon in December 2009, which was captured by pirates 200 nautical miles These states also lack the ability to utilize (nm) east of the Seychelles, approximately their ports efficiently (in terms of efficiency 700 nm from Somalia. As Figure 2 shows, and capacity) and to exploit their maritime the range at which Somali pirates operate resources (fishing, hydrocarbons and has been increasing. mineral wealth).
The cumulative effect of these processes has led to the emergence of a maritime vacuum, which in turn has allowed the proliferation of illegal activities.
4.2 Manifestations
4.2.1 Piracy Piracy off the coast of Somalia, in this context, refers to individuals and groups operating from havens along the long Somali coastline that target shipping (mainly foreign) in the waters off the Somali coast, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean. Somali pirates attack ships and vessels in these waters and hold crews, cargos and vessels hostage until the payment of a ransom. The first reported attacks occurred in the 1990s and over the years the number of attacks and ships targeted has increased. The size of the ransoms being demanded has also increased.
Over the years, Somali pirates have demonstrated an ability to adapt to and counter the measures taken to defend against their attacks. One example of this adaptability is the growing range and scope of pirate attacks, using larger ships – often referred to as “mother ships” in the Figure 2: Expansion of Pirate Operations
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The economic and commercial conseque- piracy, as well as the international response nces of Somali piracy are immense and (see Abdullahi Rashid 2009; David Anderson have a global impact through the implicit et Al. 2009; Bibi Van Ginkel and Frans-Paul and explicit threat posed to shipping that van der Putten 2010; Mohamed Samantar transits through the Gulf of Aden and the and David Leonard 2010). There is an Suez Canal. emerging debate and a range of perspectives on the phenomenon of piracy in the region. There is a growing literature on the causal While an exhaustive summary of the dynamics, political and socio-economic literature is beyond the scope of this study, it consequences and ramifications of Somali should be pointed out that there is a central divide in the literature between those who emphasise the economic and sociological aspects and roots of Somali piracy and those who view piracy primarily from a securitized, law and order perspective.
4.2.2 Chemical and Toxic Waste Dumping The PERSGA website states that the central threats to the marine environment and re- sources of its member states (which include the Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia) include “habitat destruction; non-sustainable use of living marine resources; navigation risks and risks from petroleum production and trans- port; urban and industrial hotspots; and rapid expansion of coastal tourism” (PERS- GA). Chemical and toxic waste dumping is viewed as a less likely threat (ibid.).
An earlier study released by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, which discusses marine pollution problems in Africa, including Eritrea and Kenya, saw the sources of marine pollution in a more nuanced manner (Njenga 1995/1996: 6–7, 20–24). In the case of Eritrea the study argued that the coastal and territorial waters of Eritrea and marine biology were in pristine condition due to their under-exploited status and that the most important potential danger lay in pollution from oil spills (ibid.: 7). However, the report
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described Kenya’s coastal and territorial no marine-biological analyses of the waters waters and marine biological resources as off the Somali coast have been carried out, already threatened by pollution from inland which could prove these accusations valid. sources, such as sewage from ports and towns on the coast and industrial waste Ultimately, the expansion of Somali piracy (ibid.: 22–24). It is striking that neither study has led to shipping avoiding the Somali views oil spills and chemical and waste coast and opting for much more distant dumping as major environmental concerns routes, which can be assumed to have led to in the region. However, in the absence of a a concomitant drop if not the disappearance comprehensive bio-chemical assessment of of waste dumping in the waters off the the maritime domain, it would be difficult to Somali coast. draw definitive conclusions about the scale and extent of marine pollution in the region. 4.2.3 Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Nevertheless, the waters off the Somali Fishing coast have long been described as a While illegal, unreported and unregulated dumping ground for chemical and toxic fishing is regarded as a severe problem waste. Ever since the collapse of the Somali with immense implications for the human state, there have been persistent reports security of coastal states in Africa, there have of the dumping of industrial and other been few studies and little reliable data that wastes in Somali territory and waters. The allow one to draw conclusions regarding the first reports emerged in the 1990s and scope of such fishing in the maritime domain allegations persisted into the early years of of the Horn of Africa. Illegal, unreported the new century (Green Peace Italy 1992; and unregulated fishing is widely assumed UNEP 2005; Bashir Mohammed Hussein to deplete fishing stocks and may imperil 2010). These reports suggest that inland the ecological balance, even leading to the waste dumping in Somalia occurs with extinction of certain species. The livelihoods the connivance of local actors (warlords of coastal communities depending on and political figures who either received fishing may also be threatened by illegal, financial payoffs or arms and ammunition unreported and unregulated fishing. consignments in payment). One recent study on such fishing in the Waste dumping is also alleged to have Southern Africa Development Community occurred in the waters off the Somali coast, (SADC) region estimates that the global reportedly with adverse consequences for value of the trade in fish and fishery the health and livelihoods of coastal fishing products derived from illegal, unreported communities. Some suggest that this is one and unregulated fishing may amount to of the factors that pushes individuals and US$ 4–14 billion annually and that US$ 1 groups in coastal communities to engage in billion of this trade may derive from such piracy (IGAD 2009, 2011; Bashir Mohammed fishing in African waters (DFID 2008: 6). A Hussein 2010). related study underlines the multifaceted challenges posed by illegal, unreported and However, it should also be pointed out that unregulated fishing and the necessity for a these reports are often anecdotal and that
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comprehensive approach to the problem which led to loss of life. Pirate groupings (HSTF 2006: 18–39). in Somalia have cited illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in Somali waters Both studies postulate a direct correlation and the need to discourage it as one of the between the capacity of the maritime motivations for their attacks and hijackings security apparatus of coastal states and the on international shipping. scope of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in coastal waters and EEZs. However, similar to waste dumping, all indications are that illegal, unreported and As pointed out earlier, studies to assess the unregulated fishing has been curtailed scope and extent of illegal, unreported and largely due to the indirect effects of pirate unregulated fishing in the maritime domain activity in the waters off the Somali coast. of the Horn of Africa states have not been conducted. Anecdotal evidence and media reports suggest that such fishing may be 4.2.4 Trafficking in Small Arms and Light pervasive in waters off the Somali coast. Weapons It should be pointed out that, objectively, The Gulf of Aden and the waters off the the situation in Somalia, coupled with the Somali coast also function as a transport weak maritime security and enforcement lane for different types of small arms and capabilities of the coastal states in the light weapons for warring groups in Somalia, region, creates a conducive environment for but also satisfy demand in parts of Ethiopia, illegal fishing. Djibouti and northern Kenya, which further exacerbates different types of conflicts at The earliest reports of illegal, unreported the level of the grassroots and other conflicts and unregulated fishing in Somali waters in these states. These weapons are shipped date from the aftermath of the collapse of from Yemen and transported in small boats the Somali state. The main alleged culprits and dhows to areas along the Somali coast. are fishing boats and vessels from certain Precise figures regarding the quantity and EU member states and Asia (Dershowitz and monetary value of the trafficked small arms Paul 2012). and light weapons are lacking, but weapon ownership is widespread in Somalia. For When it was rife, illegal, unreported and instance one European Commission study unregulated fishing supposedly led to cited by Lionel Cliffe (2005: 8) estimates that the depletion of certain fish stocks and 64 per cent of adult Somalis possess one or endangered the livelihoods of coastal more weapons. communities in Somalia. Reports from the Puntland region indicate instances in which The trafficking in small arms and light vessels engaged in illegal, unreported and weapons generates profits and also plays unregulated fishing damaged the fishing a role in exacerbating existing conflicts. equipment and boats of local communities However, a cause and effect relationship (IGAD 2009, 2011). There have also been between the illegal trade in small arms and unverified reports of violent confrontations light weapons and conflict is questionable between ships involved in illegal, unreported (Ibid: 10). and unregulated fishing and local fishermen,
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4.2.5 Illegal Migration and Human Traf- As can be seen from Table 1, several states ficking in the region have maritime jurisdictional claims that subsume EEZs and continental The sea lanes in the Gulf of Aden and shelves. The governments of Kenya and adjacent high seas are also an important Somalia have formally submitted competing corridor for illegal migration and human claims for instance regarding delimitation of trafficking. Migrants from Somalia and parts the continental shelf (see “Law of the Sea”, of south-eastern Ethiopia are transported Bulletin No. 70, UN, 2009: 52). from jumping-off points along the Somali coast to the Yemeni and Saudi Arabian The importance of the maritime domain to coastlines. It is another form of transnational the coastal states cannot be underestimated. criminal activity in the maritime domain, The overwhelming bulk of their export and but has received negligible attention. import trade is through their ports and across the seas. The coastal areas and the Illegal migration and human trafficking give seas are also potentially – and in the case rise to extensive violations of the basic of Kenya already – an important source of human rights of the people who are being revenue and economic activity generated trafficked and in turn may generate social from tourism. The economic importance of tensions in the receiving countries. the maritime domain of the coastal states also includes fisheries and the potential oil 4.2.6 Maritime Delimitation and Competi- and mineral resources to be explored and tion over Maritime Resources exploited from the seabed. Maritime delimitation issues and competi- The fishing industry of many of the coastal tion over maritime resources are a poten- states in the region is backward and reliant tial source of tension between the coastal almost exclusively on artisanal fishing states of the region. While at present these (Teweldemedhin 2008; Hassan and Tako: tensions are dormant due to the relevant 1998).2 Exporting the catch to generate countries’ weak maritime force projection foreign exchange and the processing of capabilities and their inability to exploit fishery products are almost non-existent maritime resources, in future, with increas- or at a rudimentary stage of development ing maritime force capabilities and due to (ibid.). conflicting claims over the delimitation of EEZs, these tensions may well lead to conflicts. 2 See: http://fao.org/fishery/countrysector/FI_DJ/en
Table 1: Claims of Maritime Jurisdiction of IGAD coastal states States Territorial sea Contiguous zone Exclusive economic zone Continental shelf Sudan 12 nm 18 nm – 200 nm Eritrea 12 nm 24 nm * Djibouti 12 nm 24 nm 200 nm Somalia 200 nm – – Kenya 12 nomination – 200 nm Note: * Precise limits of Eritrea’s EEZ are based on the phase 2 arbitration award of Yemen-Eritrea Arbitral Tribunal (for details see Michael Reisman 2000). Source: Data compiled from “Law of the Sea”, Bulletin No. 63, 2007, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, New York: United Nations.
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Kenya is the exception to this rule: the pressure. Landlocked states can also be fishing sector there is more developed affected by internal political problems in and generates export revenue, under the coastal states, which was the case during management of the Ministry of Fisheries the violence after the 2007 elections in Development. Kenya (which affected Uganda).
Currently, excluding Eritrea, fishing stocks Access to the sea can be negotiated between and rights have not yet emerged as a source landlocked and coastal states, but such of tension between coastal states in the access is never absolute or totally secure. region, which may be taken as another International law, for example, recognizes indicator of the predominantly artisanal and the “right of access” of landlocked states backward fishing sector of the region. but this right is to be based on a bilateral agreement between a landlocked and a In the past, several coastal states have coastal state and is always subordinate to the granted offshore oil exploration rights to doctrine of sovereignty, which means that it companies and the prospects of potential is not absolute and also cannot be imposed oil and mineral deposits may raise maritime on a coastal state. For example, Appendix tensions between coastal states. To date, 3 of the United Nations Convention of the Eritrea and Kenya have granted offshore oil Seas, Article 125, sub article 1, states that exploration rights to foreign corporations. landlocked states “have the right of access At this point, none of the coastal states of to and from the sea”, but the following sub the region are exploiting or deriving revenue articles, particularly sub article 3, state that from the exploitation of off-shore mineral transit/coastal states “have the right ... to and oil resources. ensure that the rights and facilities provided for in this Part for land-locked states shall in no way infringe their legitimate interests”. 4.2.7 Landlocked States Thus Article 125, sub article 3 of Appendix 3 of the UNCLOS (1982) subordinates the right Three of the member states of the Inter- of access to the sea of landlocked states to Governmental Authority on Development the decisions and interests of the coastal/ (IGAD) – South Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda transit state. – are landlocked and thus depend on their neighbouring coastal states for access to the But there are encouraging indications with sea and for their import and export needs. regard to cooperation between landlocked and coastal states. The recent joint project Landlocked states depend on coastal states between Ethiopia, Kenya and South Sudan for access to the outside world and therefore to build an oil pipeline, road and railway need to maintain good relations. Tensions linking South Sudan and Ethiopia with Lamu could lead to the coastal state denying the port in Kenya (Lamu-Southern Sudan-Ethi- landlocked state access or right of transit, opia Transport [LAPSSET] Corridor project, which occurred during the 1998–2000 exemplifies this trend of cooperation be- Ethiopian–Eritrean war. The coastal state tween the two types of state in the region. can also use its control over the landlocked state’s access to the sea to apply political
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5. International Response to also be seen as another determinant of the Maritime Insecurity in the Re- international reaction. gion Another aspect that needs to be mentioned here and has a bearing on the international Since 2008, there has been an increasing reaction to Somali piracy centres on the international focus and emphasis on incidence of pirate attacks in the waters of maritime security issues in the Horn of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Africa. The international community has Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The increasing expended resources and launched a host of range of the Somali pirates is also important. initiatives on maritime issues in the region. Beginning in the late 1990s, the frequency of successful and unsuccessful attacks However, the efforts and initiatives of the perpetrated by Somali pirates has been international community have concentrated on the rise (Potgieter 2012: 6–8). Somali on one manifestation of maritime insecurity pirates have also been ranging farther to the exclusion of others, namely Somali out onto the high seas in search of viable piracy. targets, sometimes as far as 1,000 nm from the Somali coast. Certain features of Somali piracy have de- termined the scope and nature of the inter- To understand the international communi- national reaction to it. Somali piracy targets ty’s response to Somali piracy, it is best to shipping in some of the most important conceptualize it on several levels. Objective- shipping lanes in the world. Somali pirates ly, the international community’s response also attack and hijack ships in internation- should be framed in relation to the Conven- al waters, which simplifies one of the key tion and provisions of international law, the jurisdictional hurdles to the prosecution of initiatives and programmes of the United those accused of piracy. Coupled with the Nations and its agencies and the bilateral fact of state failure in Somalia, which means and multilateral initiatives of states and that there is no functioning government ca- non-state actors. pable of exercising control and jurisdiction, the incentives and ease of entry for -inter national actors are higher. The econom- 5.1 International Law ic and commercial costs of Somali piracy are also immense: ransom payments have The key international legal instrument reached several million US dollars, euros dealing with piracy is the United Nations and pounds. The economic and commercial Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) costs of Somali piracy also include the high- and the Geneva Convention of 1958. er insurance costs for cargo and crew that shipping operators incur when transiting Both Conventions recognize piracy as a these waters. Higher costs are also incurred crime of universal jurisdiction, which means by shipping companies and operators who that the forces of any state can take action take longer, more circuitous routes to avoid against, prosecute and imprison pirates. pirate attacks. Ultimately, the media- cov However, this universal jurisdiction is limited erage and high profile of Somali piracy can to the high seas or international waters and
20 Regional Approaches to Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa
only allows “hot pursuit” of pirates with the of combating piracy: the Convention for the consent of the coastal state. Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988, revised Article 107 of UNCLOS and Article 15 of the in 2005 (also known as the SUA Convention), 1958 Geneva Convention define piracy as: the Convention on the Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic 1965, the (a) any illegal acts of violence or Hostage Taking Convention and, finally, detention, or any act of depredation, the UN Convention against Transnational committed for private ends by the Organized Crime and its protocols. crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another 5.2 United Nations Security Council ship or aircraft, or against persons (UNSC) Resolutions and Related UN or property on board such ship or Initiatives aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons Since 2008, with the escalation of pirate at- or property in a place outside the tacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden area, jurisdiction of any State; and the consequent threat to shipping lanes (b) any act of voluntary participation in and traffic, the United Nations has passed the operation of a ship or of an aircraft several resolutions on piracy in these wa- with knowledge of facts making it a ters. In effect, the successive UN resolutions pirate ship or aircraft; have created a framework that allows states (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally and multilateral actors to undertake a host facilitating an act described in of measures against piracy. subparagraph (a) or (b). It is important to underline that the tenor However, critics allege that UNCLOS is not and substantive content of the UNSC comprehensive and has gaps. The UNCLOS resolutions since 2008 have been consistent Convention supposedly has a narrow in certain respects. While the resolutions definition of piracy. More specifically, in have increasingly raised the issue of the present context, its greatest weakness capacity building and state reconstruction is supposed to be that it does not cover so- in Somalia, centred on the Transitional called »preparatory acts« and does not apply Federal Government and the regional to territorial waters. The provisions within authorities, these objectives are viewed the Convention also constrain international in an instrumental manner, as merely a or multilateral efforts to fight piracy. means to an end, namely combating Somali piracy. Although these UNSC resolutions Therefore, to facilitate the fight against have drawn attention to the problems of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the UN and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing some governments take the view that and waste dumping in Somali waters, other Conventions would better serve the UNSC resolutions have not granted the purpose. The consensus is that the international naval forces operating in the following Conventions, due to their breadth area a mandate to target vessels engaged in and scope, would better serve the objective these activities in Somali waters. Successive
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UNSC resolutions have not shifted from a resolutions is the plethora of UN agencies securitized, law and order punitive approach and bodies addressing the issue of Somali to Somali piracy. Finally, an important piracy, such as the UNDP, UNODC, the IMO point that emerges from a perusal of these and UNPOS.
Table 2: UNSC Resolutions on Piracy off the Somali Coast UNSC Resolution Date Intent
Resolution 1816 2 June 2008 Authorizes naval operations in Somali territorial waters for a period of 6 months by foreign naval forces based on prior consent from the Transitional Federal Government Resolution 1838 7 October 2008 Calls on member states to utilize naval and aerial assets to combat piracy with its source in Somalia Resolution 1846 2 December 2008 Authorizes naval operations in Somali territorial waters for a period of 12 months by foreign naval forces based on prior consent from the Transitional Federal Government Resolution 1851 16 December 2008 Authorizes land-based operations against pirates operating from Somali territory; calls on countries to facilitate “ship rider arrangements” Resolution 1897 30 November 2009 Calls on member states to extend support to building up the capacity of the Transitional Federal Government and region- al authorities to combat piracy Resolution 1918 27 April 2010 Calls on member states and states in the region to criminal- ize piracy and urges implementation of the Djibouti Code of Conduct Resolution 1950 23 November 2010 Renewed attention to and emphasis on capacity building in Somalia and the importance of a comprehensive approach to tackle Somali piracy. It urges member states to strictly enforce arms embargos. Calls on member states to renew naval and aerial efforts against piracy. It underlines the co- ordination role of the CGPCS. Mentions the importance of targeting financial proceeds and the organizers and finan- ciers of acts of piracy Resolution 1976 11 April 2011 Raises issues of capacity building in Somalia in terms of the CJS and requests the secretary general to render a report on the problems of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and waste dumping in Somali waters. Identifies UNPOS as UN focal point for counter-piracy efforts Resolution 2015 24 October 2011 Emphasizes establishment and strengthening of anti-piracy legislation and provisions criminalizing piracy in Somalia and the general region Resolution 2020 22 November 2011 Emphasizes the importance of extending the inclusion of provisions criminalizing piracy in legislation and legal codes of countries in the region
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The United Nations Political Office for 5.3 Other Multilateral and Bilateral Somalia or UNPOS was identified as the Initiatives to combat Piracy focal point for UN anti-piracy efforts in UN Security Council Resolution 1976 (2011). 5.3.1 Multilateral Initiatives UNPOS, through its programmes, plays Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of a central role in the capacity building of Somalia (CGPCS) the security apparatus of the Transitional Federal Government and in facilitating The CGPCS was established on the basis of political stabilization in Somalia. UNSC Resolution 1851 (2008). The CGPCS is an international mechanism which acts as The United Nations Office on Drugs and a contact to facilitate efforts in the struggle Organized Crime (UNODC) and the United against piracy. The CGPCS is composed Nations Development Programme (UNDP) of representatives of states, regional are extensively involved in capacity build- organizations and observer members. The ing and training with regard to the criminal CGPCS has several objectives, among which justice system in Somalia. These UN agen- support for operational and informational cies are involved in prison construction and needs, acting as a coordination centre, expansion, training programmes for judges strengthening judicial frameworks and and legal professionals and working on the increasing safety capabilities of commercial inclusion of provisions criminalizing piracy ships and their operators are the most in the legal codes of the Transitional Federal important. To achieve these objectives, the Government and various regional author- CGPCS acts through four working groups ities in Somalia. The UN Joint Programme which meet frequently. The CGPCS also has on Local Governance and Decentralized Ser- a trust fund at its disposal through which it vice Delivery and the Somalia Reconstruc- disburses funds to states for legal reforms tion and Development Programme focus on and strengthens their criminal justice decentralized service delivery in relation to systems. the Transitional Federal Government and regional authorities in Somalia (Homan and Kamerling 2010: 97). The International Criminal Police Orga- nization (Interpol) The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is also closely involved in creating a Interpol is also involved in the efforts framework for regional and multilateral against piracy; it established a Maritime efforts against piracy. The IMO has organized Piracy Task Force in January 2010. The a series of sub-regional meetings to Task Force focuses on improving evidence facilitate regional efforts in the fight against collection, facilitating information exchange piracy and armed robbery against ships in and increasing the capacities of police the region. The IMO has also assisted in investigation units and personnel deployed the formulation of security procedures and against pirates (Interpol 2012). Interpol has codes to be followed by ships and ports in developed a global database on maritime the region to counter piracy. piracy that includes details of pirates, financiers and leaders of pirate networks, including their financial assets. Interpol is
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actively involved in training and upgrading NATO: Operations Allied Provider, Allied police capacities in the region. Protector and Ocean Shield
5.3.2 Naval-Military Initiatives The North Atlantic Treaty Organization deployed Standing NATO Maritime Group EU (Operation Atalanta) 1 (SNMG1) to protect humanitarian aid shipments from pirate activities in 2008. The EU (European Union) launched the EU Later, operations Allied Protector and Ocean Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atalanta Shield were launched consecutively with a (EU NAVFOR – Atalanta) in December 2008. more specific anti-piracy focus. NATO naval Since then its mandate – “to deter, prevent operations in the region also comprise crew, and intervene in order to bring an end to acts air elements and ships, from different NATO of piracy and armed robbery” – has been states. renewed several times. Several EU member states take part in EU NAVFOR operations, which have foiled many pirate attacks and led Combined Maritime Task Forces (CMF): to the capture of many pirates. The EU also Combined Task Force 150 and 151 took the lead in establishing and maintaining the Internationally Recommended Transit The United States Navy deployed Combined Corridor (IRTC), in which maritime traffic is Task Force 151 (CTF-151) to counter piracy safe from pirate attacks. EU NAVFOR is the in the GOA and Western Indian Ocean, largest single group among the naval units succeeding CTF 150. While CTF 151 is under and forces operating in the region. the operational command of the United States Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) headquartered in Bahrain, it is EU CAP Nestor also a multinational operation comprising personnel and vessels from several states EU CAP Nestor is a training and capacity- (NATO member states and naval forces from building programme – with its headquarters governments closely tied to the United in Djibouti – launched by the EU to States). improve the counter-piracy and maritime governance capabilities of states in the region. While initially the programme Other Naval Forces in the Region was supposed to work with five states in the region (Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, the Countries such as Russia, the People’s Seychelles and Tanzania), only Djibouti and Republic of China and India have also the Seychelles have availed themselves of deployed elements of their navy in the Gulf the opportunities provided by it (Bueger of Aden and Western Indian Ocean, with 2013). the mandate to combat piracy.
Japan, South Korea and Malaysia have also deployed single vessels in the waters of the region, while states such as Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have occasionally
24 Regional Approaches to Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa
deployed vessels as part of the earlier political issues. While the US government mentioned multilateral initiatives. and its representatives envisage a role for these firms in the fight against piracy, the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction attitudes of the UN and several European (SHADE) states is markedly different. The legal issues range from provisions in the laws of Overall coordination and information sharing particular states regarding the presence regarding the naval-military efforts to of VPDs registered under their flags to the combat Somali piracy is conducted through problem of potential impunity in relation the meetings of the Shared Awareness to the violence perpetrated by VPDs. Legal and Deconfliction group, based in Bahrain. difficulties may also arise in case ofthe These meetings bring together officers capture of pirates by VPDs in terms of the from the multilateral naval initiatives and legality of the arrests and the evidence that countries with naval forces operating in the may be submitted. region, the UN, Interpol and representatives of shipping interests (Bueger 2013: 85). Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
5.3.3 Non-State Actors In Somalia, several NGOs are involved in Private Security Firms programmes and activities to rehabilitate former pirates and reintegrate them into Private security firms constitute another society. There are also NGOs that have important set of actors participating in the participated in consciousness-raising and struggle against Somali piracy. Such firms awareness campaigns against piracy and the offer a range of services to protect shipping toleration of pirate activities. from pirate attacks, ranging from armed escort ships to armed so-called “vessel To cite one example, Norwegian Church protection detachments” (VPDs). Aid (NCA) in Puntland carried out a training and vocational programme that targets Private security firms are also hired by vulnerable young people and former pirates shipping interests to negotiate the release to give them training in skills in demand in of hijacked crews, ships and cargo and urban areas (IGAD 2011: 32). Hundreds of to handle ransom payments with Somali young people have benefited. pirates. These firms have also carved out a role for themselves in training and The activities of these NGOs diverge from the equipping police and military personnel of securitized approach characteristic of other the different regional authorities in Somalia, multilateral agencies and organisations ostensibly for combating piracy, although confronting piracy off the coast of Somalia. there are indications that they have not been particularly successful in this role.
The role of private security firms in the fight against piracy brings up a host of legal and
25 Regional Approaches to Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa
6. Regional Approaches to Later in October 2009, an AU ministerial conference held in Durban endorsed both Maritime Insecurity in the Re- the African Maritime Transport Charter and gion the Plan of Action, which had been updated since 1994. The conference is also important Discussion of the regional response to issues because it issued the Durban Resolution of maritime insecurity needs to be framed on Maritime Safety, Maritime Security and in relation to continental debates and the Protection of the Marine Environment. The frameworks and declarations of the African Durban Resolution primarily addressed Union (AU). maritime transport, marine economic resources and their utilization. The Durban One of the earliest and most important resolution also raised concerns about documents related to maritime issues and piracy and the protection of the marine Africa is the African Maritime Transport environment as central to Africa. Charter and Plan of Action, formulated in 1994 and later updated. The Fourteenth African Union Summit of Heads of State, held in 2010, endorsed all The African Maritime Transport Charter three documents mentioned here. covers a broad range of issues and has an economic focus. It raises the importance The AU also commissioned a study on a of promoting the growth and development draft African maritime security strategy of Africa’s merchant fleets, promoting the in collaboration with the Brenthurst efficiency and capabilities of Africa’s ports Foundation and the African Centre for and encouraging states to devote resources Strategic Studies. The document, mentioned to their maritime sectors. The Charter also earlier – “Maritime Development in Africa: underlines the importance of harmonizing An Independent Specialists Framework” laws and regulations regarding the maritime (2010) – develops a comprehensive vision sector of Africa. The Charter also raised for an African maritime security strategy. issues with a more securitized aspect, such At the same time, it envisages that bilateral as piracy. However, it does mention issues and multilateral arrangements with non- such as illegal, unreported and unregulated African partners are key to ensuring Africa’s fishing in African waters. maritime security needs (ibid.: 8).
The Charter was a milestone, envisaging The AU has also formulated a Common actions at the continental, regional and African Defence and Security Policy, state level to achieve its objectives (Baker although it pays little attention to maritime 2011: 44). It called for the formation of new security (AU 2004). institutions and mechanisms or called on existing institutions to take on the task of Finally, in January 2014, at the Twenty- achieving the objectives set out. Second Summit of Heads of State and Government, the AU adopted the 2050 The plan of action was also detailed in Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 defining its objectives and the actions AIM Strategy). This strategy is based on a necessary to achieve them. holistic and comprehensive approach to
26 Regional Approaches to Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa
maritime security that encompasses the member states from benefiting from their economic, human security, environmental maritime resources. and securitized dimensions. This strategy envisages actions and initiatives across a As regards the structural dynamics and wide spectrum and also outlines a variety manifestations of maritime insecurity in the of implementation mechanisms. It also Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Western specifies a wide range of objectives. Indian Ocean, it is clear that the states in the region have been unable to cope with the The recent adoption of an Africa-centred variety of problems that have emerged. and holistic vision of maritime security for the continent is an undeniable achievement. The traditional threats to the security of However, past experiences suggest that it these states have previously tended to remains to be seen whether this strategy emerge from the land and not the seas will ever be implemented. For example, the (unless one includes colonialism). Economic declarations, resolutions, charters and plans underdevelopment and lack of resources of actions produced by the Organization of and capacities have constrained states in the African Unity (OAU) and later by the AU, region from articulating a comprehensive while ambitious and full of good intentions, position on maritime issues and from have never been implemented. While it projecting any degree of control over cannot be denied that, at the continental their maritime domains. The cumulative level, a consciousness of the holistic and effect of all these factors is a prevalent intertwined nature of maritime security underestimation of the importance of the exists, this knowledge and consciousness maritime domain and its implications for has not been translated into actual actions the economic prospects and security needs and programmes. of the region in general and the coastal states in particular. Several factors may explain this state of affairs, but lack of resources and capacities The states in the region and the region as an seems to be the most obvious reason for entity have not developed a comprehensive the AU’s failure to develop a comprehensive maritime security strategy. An objective maritime regulatory framework. The AU appraisal reveals that the approach to the lacks the wherewithal and manpower to complex issue of maritime security is ad hoc translate commitments into action. At the and reactive. level of the member states, the lack of the requisite technical capacity coupled with Despite the abovementioned realities and weak maritime force projection capabilities weaknesses, the states in the region and seem to be the most important factors IGAD have attempted to tackle the issue preventing coastal states from asserting of piracy, launching policy initiatives and a more assertive maritime presence programmes. Ultimately, they are in the and exerting control over their maritime process of defining a distinct and regional domains. Weak port management and perspective in response to the challenges inefficiency in utilising port facilities, coupled posed by maritime insecurity. with small merchant and fishing fleets and inability to exploit maritime resources stop
27 Regional Approaches to Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa
The following discussion will outline the incorporating provisions criminalizing piracy, initiatives and programmes that have implementing ship rider arrangements and been formulated and the actions being concluding memorandums of understanding taken on maritime insecurity in the region. (MOUs) with multilateral actors and The discussion will first touch on regional states that allow for the prosecution and initiatives and then discuss initiatives and imprisonment of Somali pirates in Kenya actions at the state level. (Baker 2011: 47).
6.1.2 IGAD Somalia Inland Strategy and 6.1 Regional Initiatives Action Plan to Prevent and Counter Piracy The states in the region and regional IGAD has addressed the issue of Somali organizations have formulated a host of piracy and the wider complex of maritime initiatives in response to Somali and other security in the region repeatedly, in various piracy. While ostensibly these are regional statements and communiqués. The IGAD initiatives, the role of external actors, such Peace and Security Strategy (IPSS), while as the donor community, should not be including a maritime component, does not underestimated. address the maritime focus in adequate detail (Interview CTA). However, the IPSS does represent the beginnings of a comprehensive 6.1.1 Djibouti Code of Conduct approach to maritime security in that it The Djibouti Code of Conduct arose from a raises marine environmental issues, marine conference sponsored by the International resources and the needs of landlocked Maritime Organization in Djibouti in January states, if in abbreviated form (interview 2009. The conference saw extensive CTA). Specifically, the IPSS identifies four participation from across the region and strategic priority areas and maritime also included Western states, as well security issues fall under priority area as Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The central three, which subsumes emerging common focus was to encourage the states in the peace and security threats, including region, especially coastal states, to include piracy (Kasaija Phillip Apuuli 2011: 364). provisions in their legislation and legal Priority area four includes “trans-boundary codes criminalizing piracy and also to accept water resources management, energy »ship rider« arrangements (IGAD 2009: 20– resources management and environmental 12). It also envisaged the establishment of management”, which can also be viewed national focal points for piracy and armed as overlapping issues in terms of maritime robbery against ships and the sharing of security (ibid.: 365). information on reported incidents. Piracy information exchange centres were also The ISSP also possesses a maritime security to be established with external assistance component, although it is in its early stages in Dar es Salaam, Mombasa, Sana’a and a and has yet to register tangible progress. maritime training centre in Djibouti. Five states in the region signed the Djibouti In 2009, the IGAD Capacity Building Code of Conduct. However, only Kenya has Programme against Terrorism (IGAD-ICPAT) adhered to the provisions of the code by also initiated a study on Somali piracy, the
28 Regional Approaches to Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa
Report on the Impact of Piracy on the IGAD from the EU, the United States and various Region. international organizations. The meeting developed a comprehensive and broad In 2011, the IGAD Security Sector strategy and also a Regional Plan of Action. Programme (IGAD-ISSP) prepared an IGAD Somalia Inland Strategy and Action Plan The EAS-IOC strategy seeks to promote to Prevent and Counter Piracy. This is a a three-pronged approach to maritime detailed and comprehensive approach to security: incorporating IGAD’s Somalia the scourge of Somali piracy. The emphasis Inland Strategy and Action Plan to Prevent is on actions and initiatives with an onshore and Counter Piracy, encouraging states in focus. It envisages a wide range of measures the region to accelerate the prosecution based on a programmatic and gradual of pirates in their court systems and approach. One of the advantages of the emphasizing the importance of the IGAD strategy and action plan is that it international community in strengthening departs from the conventional securitized regional maritime capabilities. and punitive approach to Somali piracy and takes into account the broader political, social and economic dynamics that led to 6.1.4 Kampala Process the emergence of Somali piracy. Above all, the strategy and action plan are premised The Kampala Process is another regional on the assumption that the root cause of mechanism focusing on maritime security. Somali piracy and the exacerbation of the The Process is a coordinating mechanism other manifestations of maritime insecurity that links the TFG, different regional in the region is the collapse of the Somali authorities in Somalia, UN agencies and state and therefore argues for an emphasis representatives of Western states. The on state reconstruction in Somalia. activities and meetings of the Kampala Process have focused on efforts to combat However, IGAD’s lack of resources and piracy in the waters off the Somali coast. capacities, coupled with the reluctance of Its mandate also includes following up the donor community to commit resources Somalia’s claims related to its EEZ and to such a broad undertaking, has meant that addressing issues concerning its territorial the strategy and action plan have not been waters. implemented.
6.2 National Level Initiatives and Pro- 6.1.3 Regional Strategy against Piracy grammes and for Maritime Security in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean 6.2.1 Accession to Relevant International Conventions In October 2010, a group of ministers from East Africa, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean In terms of accession to the relevant (EAS-IOC) states met to address maritime international conventions on maritime security issues, specifically Somali piracy. security progress is uneven across the The meeting also included representatives region. Such accession is critical because
29 Regional Approaches to Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa
it facilitates the criminalization of forms of Since 2009 the Kenyan government has activity that lead to maritime insecurity. signed MOUs with the EU and the United States to accept captured pirates, prosecute In the region, Eritrea – a coastal state – is them and then imprison them if they are not a signatory of the UNCLOS Convention. found guilty (Obuah 2012: 49). In return, Somalia, Djibouti and Ethiopia have signed Kenya has received assistance and funds. but not ratified the Convention and related In fact, Kenya holds the largest number of agreements. Kenya and Uganda are the imprisoned Somali pirates outside Somalia. only countries that have signed and ratified all. With regard to the SUA Convention of 1988, Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya and Uganda 6.2.3 Military and Naval Actions against are signatories, while Eritrea, Somalia and Piracy Ethiopia are not. In terms of military and naval actions against Somali piracy, the regional authorities in Somalia, especially the authorities of 6.2.2 Incorporation of Provisions Criminal- Puntland, have launched several onshore izing Piracy into Legislation and the Legal attacks against Somali pirates, capturing Code some of them and, in some cases, freeing As already pointed out, the UN and Western hijacked crews, cargos and vessels (IGAD states have been encouraging states in 2009: 27–31, IGAD 2011). the region to criminalize piracy and thus facilitate the prosecution and imprisonment As already pointed out, the international of captured pirates. The UN and the West community is providing extensive assistance have offered incentives in the form of to the SFG and regional authorities in capacity building of the criminal justice Somalia to upgrade their military, naval system, development funds and assistance and law enforcement capabilities, primarily to expand the maritime capabilities of against pirates and, in the case of the SFG, coastal states. also against the HASM insurgents. These projects are ongoing. The states in the Western states are reluctant to prosecute region, such as Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somali pirates based on the fear that they Uganda, have also been involved in efforts might apply for asylum once they complete to strengthen the military capabilities of their prison terms. This has led Western the SFG and regional authorities through governments to seek to “subcontract” their training programmes. legal responsibilities to third states. The navies and coastguards of Kenya and The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) Djibouti have also received international and its successor, the current Somalia Federal assistance to strengthen their maritime Government (SFG), as well as regional capabilities. However, this assistance seems authorities in Puntland and Somaliland and to be awarded not with the idea that in the government of Kenya have made the the future these forces will play a more greatest progress in this regard. The other expansive role in the fight against Somali states in the region have lagged behind in piracy, but more as a reward for supporting terms of criminalizing piracy.
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the international community’s naval and Within this framework an informal division other efforts. of tasks between international actors and regional states has emerged. The UN, the United States and the EU define the parameters of actions and initiatives to 7. Complementarities between combat piracy. These powers conduct and, in a manner of speaking, “monopolise” naval- Regional Efforts and the Itern- military actions on the high seas and in the ational Community’s Initia- territorial waters of Somalia. On the other tives in the Sphere of Maritime hand, the states in the region are expected to reform their legal systems so that they can Security prosecute and imprison captured pirates handed over by international naval forces. The international community’s (United States, EU and other major powers) actions However, despite the imbalances and and initiatives concerning maritime security problems posed by the lopsided nature of are framed in terms of a perception that the “cooperation” between the states in the views piracy off the coast of Somalia as region and the international community, it is the primary manifestation or source of undeniable that efforts against Somali piracy maritime insecurity in the region. Other are bearing fruit. Hundreds of individuals manifestations of maritime insecurity are accused of piracy have been tried in Somalia disregarded. and also in courts in Kenya, the Seychelles and Yemen, and those found guilty have Secondly, the international community’s been imprisoned. Today hundreds of Somali envisaged resolution of the problems posed pirates are either awaiting trial or completing by piracy foregrounds military-naval options, their prison terms. The deterrent effect of but also sees it as a legal and criminal such a policy cannot be underestimated. problem. Therefore the policies, initiatives and efforts of the international community Many attacks have been foiled and, in in relation to maritime security in the region, some cases, hijacked ships with their crews have been developed to ensure that actions and cargos have been freed. Due to the by other states (including in the region) protection afforded by international naval support these initiatives, either directly or forces in the region, maritime traffic is indirectly. safer. More specifically the IRTC initiative is another indicator of the success of the Due to the imbalances and inequalities current approach. of the international system and also the resource constraints and lack of capacity As recent reports indicate, since their characteristic of the states in the region, the heyday in the period 2008–2010, Somali agenda and premises of the international pirate attacks have shown a sharp decline community regarding maritime security (see, for instance, Stratfor November 2012, have defined what policies and actions are also http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/747-six- feasible. month-drop-in-world-piracy-imb-report and http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/811-imb-
31 Regional Approaches to Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa
reports-drop-insomali-piracy-but-warns- 8. Problems and Differences against-complacency). As Table 3 shows, the frequency of Somali pirate attacks between Regional Efforts and and successful hijackings has fallen: it International Community Ini- seems that the presence and actions of tiatives in the Sphere of Mar- the international naval forces have had an appreciable effect in increasing the costs itime Security and reducing the incentives for piracy. It seems clear that the international commu- nity, acting both bi- and multilaterally, is ful- Table 3: Frequency of Somali pirate attacks ly committed to the effort against piracy. It 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 is also clear, however, that the multiplicity of programmes and activities being deployed Total 163 174 176 35 9 against piracy creates problems in terms of number coordination and duplication of efforts. For of instance the UNDP, UNODC and UNPOS are attacks all, to varying degrees, engaged in capacity Attacks 114 65 28 15 9 building of the security sector in Somalia. foiled UNODC and UNDP-ROLS are also engaged in strengthening the criminal justice sys- Ships 46 47 25 5 0 tem. Various EU member states and states hijacked in the region are also involved. The EU CAP Nestor programme also focuses on capac- Sources: Adapted from “Source: EU NAVFOR Video Material: TV-Newsroom of the Council of the ity building and in many respects overlaps European Union”, 20 December 2012 and PAWW with ongoing activities and initiatives of oth- (Piracy Analysis and Warning Weekly), http://www. er multilateral and bilateral actors (Bueger oni.navy.mil/Intelligence_Community/piracy,htm 2013). While the security sector and the criminal justice system in Somalia certainly deserve attention, duplication of efforts and the consequent waste of resources is a valid The assistance rendered by the international concern. community is also strengthening the criminal justice systems of the region. International The multiple initiatives formulated by assistance is also incrementally improving different multilateral actors are so similar the maritime force projection capabilities of that the question arises of whether many the coastal states. of these initiatives could be combined. The situation seems to reflect competition Finally, international assistance in stabilizing between multilateral actors to carve out a the situation in Somalia and assisting the role for themselves. Somali Federal Government is also of critical importance. The current state of the struggle against piracy also reveals important divergences between the region and the larger international community in relation to
32 Regional Approaches to Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa
maritime security issues in the region, more geared to a quick fix and immediate Somali piracy in particular. results. For the international community, multilateral naval action is necessitated The perspective of the states in the region by state failure in Somalia and the weak and also IGAD is that the root cause of maritime capabilities of the states in the Somali piracy is the collapse of the Somali region. This dictates the division of tasks state and that a long-term solution to it that has emerged between regional states and the other manifestations of maritime and the international community. The insecurity in the region depends on the Western perspective on Somali piracy also stabilization of Somalia and the resurrection tends to discount the contribution of illegal, of the Somali state (interview CAM). For unreported and unregulated fishing and these states and IGAD, initiatives and waste dumping to piracy. actions should thus have an onshore focus. They also take the view – as gleaned from The states in the region and some in Soma- policy statements and documents – that lia also view the presence of international efforts should be comprehensive and go naval forces in regional waters with trep- beyond a securitized, punitive approach to idation and suspicion. The fact that - inter the problem (interview CAM). national naval forces are not mandated to take actions against vessels engaging in ille- The broader international community has gal, unreported and unregulated fishing and also been lukewarm in terms of its support waste dumping is also viewed as unfair. A for proposed regional initiatives, seemingly related perception sees the costs associat- regarding them as too ambitious and ed with the international naval presence as expensive.3 expensive (for the international communi- ty) and assumes that these resources could On the other hand, the views of the have been better allocated to strengthen the international community are at odds with capabilities of the TFG and the maritime ca- the current realities on the ground and are pabilities of the coastal states in the region, which would make it possible to achieve the same objectives at a cheaper price. There 3 One example of this is the author’s experience as are also concerns that the waters abutting a consultant for the IGAD-ISSP during the validation the region could become an arena of naval workshop (22–23 February 2011), when the “IGAD Somalia Inland Strategy to Prevent and Counter and geopolitical rivalries between the major Piracy 2010–2015” was presented to an audience powers (see Holmes 2010). comprising representatives of member states, donor governments, regional and multilateral actors, such Pragmatism and the possibility of as the EU, NATO and various UN agencies. During the immediate practical benefits dictates deliberations, representatives of several UN agencies raised doubts about the capabilities of IGAD and behavioural patterns in the region (states member states to implement the strategy and action and IGAD) in relation to maritime security. plan. They also pointed out that the UN agencies Regional governments, while cognisant of they represented were involved in the same spheres the divide between themselves and the that the strategy and action plan were targeting and broader international community regarding suggested that IGAD should direct its resources and efforts in other areas. Some representatives of donor maritime security issues, have chosen to governments expressed similar misgivings. focus on practical benefits to be derived
33 Regional Approaches to Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa
from collaboration with the agenda of the were lopsided and that the counterparties developed world. These benefits range had not provided the promised funds and from financial support, capacity building of support for the Kenyan criminal justice sys- the criminal justice system and maritime tem. force projection capabilities (training and equipment for coastguard units and Another critical gap in the maritime security personnel) and the establishment of training efforts is the negligible contribution and facilities. On several occasions states in role of coastal communities and civil society. the region have collaborated with broader This is partly explained by the nature of the international initiatives dictated by these political regimes in the Horn of Africa – incentives.4 authoritarian, illiberal or semi-democracies, lack of transparency and accountability – The different forms of cooperation between and the tendency for maritime issues to be the states in the region and the international regarded as “high politics”. The situation is community are not free of tensions. For in- not uniform, however. The SFG and regional stance, as already mentioned, Kenya has co- authorities in Puntland have consulted and operated with the international community involved communities and their leaders – by introducing legal provisions criminalizing religious figures, clan and sub-clan elders – piracy and also concluded several MOUs in campaigns to raise community awareness with the United States and the EU. These of pirates and piracy. These efforts have MOUs made it possible to try Somali pirates played a critical role in shifting narratives captured by international naval forces in and public opinion across Somalia, so much international waters committing attacks or so that the hitherto dominant narrative of preparatory to committing attacks against piracy as a reaction to illegal, unreported third country ships in Kenyan courts and to and unregulated fishing and waste dumping imprison them in Kenyan prisons. However, has lost considerable support. NGOs in since October 2010 Kenya has terminated Puntland have also done substantial work these MOUs (Obuah 2012: 54). There were in changing perceptions and rehabilitating concerns in Kenya that these agreements former pirates. Representatives of international naval forces operating off the Somali coast have also held consultations with leaders of coastal communities in 4 Several instances might corroborate this impres- Puntland. Nevertheless, the fact remains sion. For instance during the meeting (26–29 January that maritime issues receive little attention 2009) that led to the signing of the Djibouti Code of Conduct, the key concern of the representatives of from the general public in the region and the states of the region and other African states was this must be addressed. the establishment of training facilities and offices in their respective countries, to the exclusion of other critical issues. The delegates, in terms of both their composition and their participation in the proceed- 9. Conclusion ings, seemed to be inadequately prepared for and aware of the multifaceted legal and other implica- The primary objective of this study is tions of the proposed code of conduct. The author to examine the dynamics and scope of was present at the conference as a consultant for the IGAD-ICPAT. maritime security in the region. The Horn
34 Regional Approaches to Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa
of Africa region is characterized by inter- tensions, the struggle against piracy is and intra-state conflicts rooted in state making progress. However, this could be formation in the region, relations between imperilled if the contradictions and tensions state and society, underdevelopment and are not resolved. a host of other factors. Maritime insecurity has not traditionally been an issue here, but The experiences of the region so far are also that is changing. important in terms of the lessons learned and provide a useful template for successes and The sources and manifestations of maritime failures in the sphere of maritime security. insecurity in the region are complex and More specifically, the experiences and intertwined; maritime issues may also competing narratives also provide critical become a source of rising tensions between insights into the issues and realities facing states. the developing world and governments in terms of collaboration and cooperation At present, it is piracy that has drawn the with the developed world on issues of attention and resources of the international maritime security. It could be argued that community and the region. While it is other regions in Africa and indeed the rest indeed a serious threat, we have argued that of the developing world could derive useful exclusive emphasis on piracy off the coast lessons from the experiences of the Horn of of Somalia obscures the deeper dynamics Africa. of the problems afflicting the Horn of Africa and also the broader aspects of maritime insecurity in the region. 10. Recommendations and The paper argues that the regional states and Entry Points the main regional organization, IGAD, have yet to formulate a comprehensive regional From the above overview, a number of maritime security strategy. At the same time, general recommendations and entry points the region is in the process of formulating its can be put forward with a view to facilitating own position on maritime security. This has the emergence of a distinct regional been accelerated by the international focus approach to maritime security in the Horn and attention on piracy off the Somali coast. of Africa and, in the process, expanding However, the international community’s – the complementarities and synergies especially the Western states’ – exclusive between this emerging regional approach focus on piracy and the securitized punitive and the broader international (bilateral approach adopted towards it conflict and multilateral) reaction to certain with the emerging regional consensus on manifestations of maritime insecurity in the regional maritime security issues. region.
While synergies and complementarities It is clear that in the Horn of Africa region exist in the current efforts against piracy, maritime security is inextricably linked to the contradictions and tensions are also mainland dynamics and processes. There- critical and deserve attention. It is clear fore, in the long run, democratization, good that, despite these contradictions and governance, economic growth, socio-eco-
35 Regional Approaches to Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa
nomic transformation and improvements in nature of the maritime insecurity challenges the lives of the peoples in the Horn will play in the region. This would necessarily be a a central role in ensuring a safer and more long-term process. In this context, further secure maritime domain. The history of in- research and dialogue on maritime security ter- and intra-state conflict in the region has issues in the region are critical and should also had spillover effects on the maritime be supported. domain. The following should be viewed as entry IGAD and its member states should therefore points in the effort to develop a regional play a more proactive role in creating and maritime security approach: facilitating democracy, good governance and economic growth in the Horn of Africa. More • The need to develop a more efficient and specifically, they should strive to transcend effective mechanism for coordination previous patterns of conflict. Urgent efforts between the multiple and overlapping should also be made to reintegrate Eritrea initiatives to combat Somali piracy. (as a key coastal state in the region) into This would help to keep costs down IGAD and the broader international system and enable more efficient and effective and to end its isolation. deployment of resources.
The absence of a functioning state apparatus • Oversight, coordination and enforcement in Somalia and the continuous civil war have of initiatives and programmes related had a marked impact on maritime security to maritime insecurity in the region in the region. Therefore, the stabilisation of should be based on subsidiarity. Local Somalia and the strengthening of the SFG institutions and actors should take on a should provide the framework and starting more proactive role. point in all efforts to improve the maritime security situation. This comprehensive • The creation and strengthening of a approach to the crisis in Somalia and its maritime governance and security links to maritime security in the region is system in the region. The starting point exemplified by the IGAD Somalia Inland in this process is the IGAD-ISSP and its Strategy and Action Plan to Prevent and maritime security component. The latter Counter Piracy. In this context, it is clear should receive resources and support that the IGAD Strategy and Action Plan from the international community and deserves greater international support and could play a key role. assistance. • Assessment of marine resources The region and the broader international (fisheries, minerals, oil and tourism) community should strive to develop a and constant environmental assessment consensus that would facilitate a shift of the maritime domain require urgent from the current exclusive focus on attention. piracy and a securitized, law and order punitive approach to a broader and more • At present, to prevent the duplication of comprehensive approach that takes into efforts and waste of resources, PERSGA account the multifaceted and complex should be viewed as the ideal institution
36 Regional Approaches to Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa
in the region to undertake such activities. • States and governments in the region Coastal states such as Eritrea and Kenya should revise their legislation and should join PERSGA. PERSGA should incorporate into their legal codes also receive support and resources provisions that criminalize some of the that would allow it to map the region’s key manifestations of maritime insecurity marine resources and also periodically in the region, such as piracy, trafficking conduct environmental assessments. in small arms and light weapons, illegal migration and human trafficking. In • Political stabilisation and reconstruction this context, provisions that criminalize of the Somali state should be prioritised. laundering of the proceeds of such criminal activities and tighter banking • International efforts to support capacity regulations can play a very important building and strengthen the SFG and role in combating maritime insecurity. regional authorities in Somalia should be intensified.
• International naval forces operating 11. Sources off the Somali coast should receive an expanded mandate that would also Articles and Books allow them to target ships and boats Anderson, David et al. (2009): “Somalia and allegedly engaged in illegal, unreported the Pirates”, ESF Working Paper, No. 33, De- and unregulated fishing and chemical cember. and toxic waste dumping. Apuuli, Kasaija Phillip (2011): “IGAD’s Peace • Awareness raising and changing public and Security Strategy: A Panacea for Long- opinion in Somalia regarding some of Term Stability in the Horn of Africa Region?”, the key manifestations of maritime in Roba Sharamo and Berouk Mesfin (eds), insecurity, such as piracy, trafficking in Regional Security in the post-Col War Horn small arms and light weapons and illegal of Africa, Institute of Security Studies: Pre- migration should be an urgent priority. toria, South Africa. NGOs can play a key role here. Baker, Michael I. (2011): “Toward an African • Coastal states in the region should Maritime Economy: Empowering the Afri- receive support and resources to can Union to Revolutionize the African Mar- strengthen their maritime force itime Sector”, Naval War College Review, projection capabilities. Bearing in mind Vol. 64, No. 2 (Spring). the nature and scope of the main forms of maritime insecurity in the region, Berouk, Mesfin (2009): “The Horn of Afri- coastguard units deserve immediate ca security complex”, in Roba Sharamo and attention and support. Berouk Mesfin (eds), Regional Security in the post-Col War Horn of Africa, Institute of • States in the region should sign and Security Studies: Pretoria, South Africa. ratify the key international conventions relating to the maritime domain.
37 Regional Approaches to Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa
Brenthurst Foundation, African Union Com- Fisheries in Somalia”, 15 ARF, Maritime and mission, and the African Centre for Strategic Fishery Institute, Mogadishu: Somalia. Studies (2010): “Maritime Development in Africa: An Independent Specialists’ Frame- Hussein, Bashir Mohamed (2010): “The work”, Brenthurst Discussion Paper, March. Evidence of Toxic and Radioactive Waste Dumping in Somalia and its Impact on the Bueger, Christian (2013): “In search of a Enjoyment of Human Rights: A Case Study”, mission? The EU’s regional training mis- Paper presented at the United Nations Hu- sion for EUCAP Nestor”, Online at: http:// man Rights Council, Panel Discussion on piracy-studies.org/2013/in-search of-a-mis- Toxic Wastes, June 2010. sion-the eus-regional-training-mission-eu- cap-nestor/. IGAD (2009): Report on the Impact of Piracy on the IGAD Region, March, Addis Ababa. Cliffe, Lionel (2005): “Armed Violence and poverty in Somalia”, A Case Study for the IGAD (2011): Somalia Inland Strategy and Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative, Cen- Action Plan to Prevent and Counter Piracy, tre for International Cooperation and Secu- Addis Ababa. rity, Department of Peace Studies, Universi- ty of Bradford. Lefebvre, Jeffrey A. (1998): “Red Sea Secu- rity and the Geopolitical-Economy of the Dershowitz, Suzanne and Paul, James (2012): Hanish Islands Dispute”, Middle East Jour- “Fishermen, Pirates and naval Squadrons: nal, Vol. 52, No. 3. The Security Council and the Battle over So- malia’s Coastal Seas”, Global Policy Forum, Njenga, Frank X. (1995-96): “Marine Pollu- February. tion Problems in Some Countries of Africa and Strategies for Inter-Country Coopera- Holmes, James R (2010): “The Interplay tion in Alleviating These Problems”. Addis between Counterpiracy and Indian Ocean Ababa: United Nations Economic Commis- Geopolitics”, in Bibi van Ginkel and Frans sion for Africa, ECA/NRD/MAR/95-96. Paul van der Putten (eds), The International Response to Somali Piracy: Challenges and Obuah, Emmanuel (2012): “Outsourcing Opportunities, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: the prosecution of Somali pirates to Kenya: Netherlands. A failure of international law or a response to the domestic politics of states?”, African Homan, Kees and Susanne Kamerling (2010): Security Review, Vol. 31, No. 3 (September). “Operational Challenges to Counterpiracy Operations off the Coast of Somalia”, in Bibi Onuoha, Freedom C. (2009): “Enhancing Van Ginkel and Frans Paul van der Putten Regional Maritime Cooperation in Africa”, (eds), The International Response to Somali African Security Review, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Sep- Piracy: Challenges and Opportunities, Mar- tember). tinus Nijhoff Publishers: Netherlands. Potgieter, Thean (2012): “Maritime security Hassan, Musse Gabobe and Tako, Mahamud in the Indian Ocean: strategic setting and Hassan (1998): “Current Status of Marine
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features”, Paper 236, Institute of Security Greenpeace Italy. Online at: www.beppe- Studies, August. grillo.it/200508/debiti_it_salot.html.
Rashid, Abdullahi (2009): “Puntland Count- High Seas Task Force (HSTF). 2006. “Closing er-Piracy Survey”, Draft Assessment Report, the Net: Stopping Illegal Fishing on the High Norwegian Church Aid, June/July. Seas”. Online at: http://illegal-fishing.info/ uploads/HSTFFINALweb.pdf Reisman, Michael W. (2000): “Eritrea-Ye- men Arbitration (Award, Phase II: Maritime IMB. “IMB reports drop in Somali piracy, Delimitation)”, American Journal of Interna- but warns against complacency”. Online tional Law, Vol. 94, No. 4 (October). at: http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/811-imb- reports-drop-in-somali-piracy-but-warns- Teweldemedhin, M.Y. (2008): “The Fish In- against-complacency. 22 October 2012. dustry in Eritrea: From Comparative to Com- petitive Advantage”, African Journal of Agri- IMB. “Six month drop in world piracy, IMB cultural Research, Vol. 3, No. 5 (May). report shows”. Online at: http://www. icc-ccs.org/news/747-six-month-drop-in- Samantar, Mohamed and David Leonard world-piracy-imb-report-shows. Monday, (2010): “Puntland and the Quandary of So- 16 July 2012. mali Piracy”, Draft Paper, August. INTERPOL. 2011. “INTERPOL European UN (2007): “Law of the Sea”, Bulletin No. 63, Commission-funded project to assist East Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the African police fight maritime piracy”. Online Seas, Office of Legal Affairs, New York: Unit- at: http://www.interpol.int?News-and-me- ed Nations. dia/News-media-releases/2011/PRO13. 5 February 2011. UN (2009): “Law of the Sea”, Bulletin No. 70, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the INTERPOL. 2012. “INTERPOL and NATO co- Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, New York: United operation set to boost global efforts against Nations, p.52. maritime piracy”. Online at: http://www. interpol.int/News-and-media/News-me- dia-releases/2012/N20121006, 6 October Web Sources 2012.
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39 Regional Approaches to Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa
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Interviews
Interviewee BM Interviewee CAM Interviewee CTA
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FES Peace and Security Series No. 16
About the FES Peace and Security Series The lack of security is one of the key impediments their national, regional and continental responses. to development and democracy in Africa. The The FES Africa Peace and Security Series aims to existence of protracted violent conflicts as well contribute to this dialogue by making relevant as a lack of accountability of the security sector in analysis widely accessible. many countries is challenging cooperation in the field of security policy. The emerging African Peace The series is being published by the FES Africa and Security Architecture provides the institutional Security Policy Network, namely: framework to promote peace and security. • FES Addis Ababa (FES Regional Security Policy Project Eastern Africa, African Union As a political foundation committed to the values Cooperation) of social democracy, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung • FES Maputo (FES Regional Security Policy (FES) aims at strengthening the interface between Project Southern Africa) democracy and security policy. FES therefore • FES Abuja (FES Regional Security Policy Project facilitates political dialogue on security threats and West Africa)
About this study
This study argues that efforts to improve maritime piracy while other sources of maritime insecurity security in the Horn of Africa region have have been sidelined. The efforts and initiatives assumed a certain pattern whereby the concerns against piracy have been characterized by a and perspective of the developed world have duplication of efforts and competition between tended to overshadow the agenda of the states different agencies and entities. While the efforts in the region. This dichotomy between the above against piracy have achieved impressive results, mentioned actors reveals itself for instance in the this has been achieved in a context where regional interpretation of sources of maritime insecurity, interests and initiatives have been sidelined. the focus of initiatives and the informal “division of tasks” in the sphere of maritime security that States in the region and the primary regional has emerged in the region. organization, the IGAD, have repeatedly tried to articulate a distinct agenda and set of The study argues that for the international interests in the sphere of maritime security but community the primary concern and threat is practically speaking they have also had to adapt piracy. On the other hand, states and non-state to the circumstances. This study shows that the actors in the region have a more complex and governments in the region have cooperated with structural view of the nature of maritime insecurity international initiatives and in the process garner in the Horn of Africa. The study shows that this resources and benefits derived from the global has led to a situation where immense resources focus on piracy off the coast of Somalia. and efforts have been directed to the fight against