David R. Griffin, "Relativism, Divine Causation, and Biblical Theology."
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From Owen Thomas, ed. God’s Activity in the World: The Contemporary Problem. AAR Studies in Religion 31. Chico, CA: Scholar Press, 1983. 8. RELATIVISM, DIVINE CAUSATION, AND BIBLICAL THEOLOGY David R. Griffin The most influential way among Christian theologians of un- derstanding the relation between divine and nondivine causation has been that based upon the schema of primary and secondary causa- tion. I believe that this schema (besides being unintelligible, and resulting in an insuperable problem of evil for philosophical theology) 1 has unfortunate implications for understanding the re- lation between the work of the biblical scholar, on the one hand, and Christian faith and systematic theology, on the other. In particular, this primary-secondary schema of causation leads to a relativism which renders arbitrary both Christian faith and the practice of devoting special attention to the texts of the biblical tradition. Furthermore, the difficulties inherent in this schema have been instrumental, I believe, in leading many theologians to omit the category of divine causation altogether. In the first part of this paper I will discuss the relativistic implications of the schema of primary and secondary causation. In the second part I will discuss an alternative understanding of the relation of divine and nondivine causation suggested by the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. In the third part I will suggest some implications of this process view for conceiving the task of "biblical theology." I The Schema of Primary and Secondary Causation According to the schema of primary and secondary causation, divine and nondivine causation are on two different "levels." God is not in any sense "one cause among others"; rather, his causation is on a totally different level from that of all the worldly causes. While these worldly causes may be called "natural," they include all the distinctively human, and therefore "histor- ical," influences as well as those of nonhuman nature. All of these worldly or natural causes are termed "secondary" causes, while God is considered the "primary" cause of every event. God's From Encounter 36 (1975): 342-60. Reprinted with permission. 117 118 God's Activity in the World causation is termed "primary" not only out of deference, but also because the “secondary“ causes are instrumentalities of the divine will. In terms of this distinction, it is obvious that a "miracle" could not be simply defined as an "act of God," since God is the (primary) cause of every event. Rather, a miracle differs from non-miraculous events only in that, while God normally uses secon- dary causes to execute his will, in performing a miracle he brings the event about directly, without using any mediating instruments. This notion of two different levels implies that there are different perspectives from which to regard any non-miraculous event. On the one hand, one can regard it in relation to God. When so considered, it must be regarded as totally determined by God. The divine causation is the sufficient cause for its existence and total actuality, down to the most minute detail. Accordingly, reference to the divine causation constitutes a sufficient expla- nation for the event in question. Reference to conditioning non- divine causes is not necessary, since these "causes" were them- selves totally caused by God, and hence exercise no autonomous (from God) causation, but are mere instruments of his purpose. On the other hand, one can regard the non-miraculous event in relation to its nondivine antecedent causes. Regarded from this perspective, no reference to God's causation is needed. A suffi- cient explanation for the event can in principle be found within the realm of "secondary" causation. There are various ways that one can understand nondivine sufficient causation. If one is a radical determinist, the antecedent secondary causes will be re- garded as constituting the sufficient cause for any event. If one is a dualist, the antecedent events will be regarded as constituting sufficient causes for certain types of events (e.g., nonliving ones for a vitalist, or nonhuman ones for a Cartesian dualist), while the sufficient cause for other events (e.g., living, or hu- man) may be regarded as consisting of the antecedent causes plus the self-determination of the event in question. The nondualistic nondeterminist may regard every event as requiring reference both to antecedents and to self-causation for its sufficient explana- tion. But in any case, a sufficient explanation for any non- miraculous event can in principle be found without any reference to divine causation. This understanding of the relation of divine to nondivine causation has been widely accepted by "liberals" and "conservatives" alike. Within the context of the primary-secondary schema, Griffin: Relativism, Divine Causation 119 liberals and conservatives differ only in regard to whether miracles (as defined above) ever occur. Conservatives affirm the occurrence of one or more such events, while liberals deny that they ever 2 occur. At least they deny that there can ever be a sufficiently good reason for affirming that an event has happened without any "natural" (secondary) causes. It is most important to see that this is where the issue lies as long as the schema of primary and secondary causation is pre- supposed. The issue is not between "naturalistic" and "super- naturalistic" explanations, since both groups affirm supernatural causation. Nor is it between those who, while believing that all events have naturalcauses, do and do not think that some or all events require reference to God in order to have a "sufficient" explanation. For, both groups hold that an ultimate explanation for any event requires reference to its primary cause, God. And, most importantly, both groups agree that God is not “one cause among others," to be introduced as a supplementary factor within the context of a discussion of natural causes. The term "divine causation" can never refer to one cause among others; it is either used to refer to the primary sufficient cause, which is on a dif- ferent level from the natural causes, or it is not used at all. Accordingly, the only real item for debate is whether God, who usually employs secondary causes which provide sufficient explana- tions on their own level, always uses these. This schema in its "liberal" form has understandably been widely accepted, more or less self-consciously, by Christian bib- lical scholars. For it allowed them to retain as private citizens faith in divine providence, and yet as public historians to accept without qualification the almost universally accepted convention that historians qua historians do not refer to divine influence as an explanatory category. That is, while they could of course re- port that, for example, Jones believed he was called by God to perform a certain deed, the historian can never affirm that "Jones performed this deed (partly) because he was actually influenced by God to do so." Since the idea of "divine causation" belongs to a different level of discourse from that of “natural (including historical) causation,* this means that "faith" and "history" are separate (but equal) perspectives, never to be merged into a higher synthe- sis of "faithful history." The liberal Christian who is a historian need not and should not suppose that he is privy to an additional causal factor (divine influence) unknown to his secular colleagues. 120 God's Activity in the World For, even though he believes in divine providence, he knows this belief is irrelevant to the task of the historian, since God always provides causes which are sufficient in terms of the level of ex- planation at which historians operate. Hence, he can be as fully secular as his non-believing colleagues. For, unlike the conser- vative Christian historian, he can be fully secular even in regard to the central events of the biblical records. However, while this view has its advantages, it also has un- fortunate consequences, both for Christian faith in general and the role of the biblical scholar in particular. These consequences can be seen by first looking at this view's implications for the use of the terms "special act of God" and "revelation." A. "Specialal Acts of God" and "Revelation." On the basis of some views of the relation between divine and nondivine causation, there would be a meaningful distinction between a "special act of God" and a "revelation." For example, if one accepts some form of popu- lar supernaturalism according to which the world's processes normally go along independently of God's action (except for perhaps some sort of undifferentiated sustaining action), with God only occasionally interrupting those processes by some special action, these occasional interruptive actions could meaningfully be called "special acts of God," whether or not any human beings recognized them as such. In fact, they could have occurred long before any humans appeared on the scene, e.g., the first creation of life could be considered such an act of God. A conservative version of the primary-secondary schema will have essentially the same im- port. God is equally the cause of all non-miraculous or ordinary events, i.e., those with sufficient natural causes, so they are all acts of God, while those events which cannot be explained in natural categories, and must be referred immediately to the divine causation, are extraordinary acts of God. Hence, both the popular supernaturalist and the conservative primary-secondary schematist can refer to certain events in them- selves as "special (or extraordinary) acts of God." As such these past events can be clearly distinguished from divine "revelations," since for an event to become a revelation it must be received as such by someone. By definition, a revelation must be a revelation to someone, whereas an act of God is what it is independently of any person's recognition of it.